Tuesday, January 19, 2016

Bits and pieces - UPDATE

The release of a first factsheet about the SDSR 2015 and some other documents and announcements begin to provide some of the details that the original document did not provide. This article is meant to provide a quick summary of what we now know.


UPDATE begins 

F-35 and weapons 

Some new information is now available about plans for putting british weapons on the F-35B. This graphic, released by US officials back in early 2015, should be confirmed:



The Block IV programme and the full list of the weapons that will effectively be integrated is still taking shape. The Pentagon and the JPO are taking time to evaluate the options and hopefully come up with a programme which is realistic and can be delivered on time and on budget. The problem is that the list of the wishes is pretty long, and steadily growing. Not everything is going to make it onto the final list.

The RAF confirms that integrating Meteor and SPEAR Capability 3 is the main priority for Block IV. Regarding SPEAR Cap 3, after a moment in which the "US option" of SDB 2 was seen as putting at risk the survival of the current programme, the RAF now confirms that they remain committed to the MBDA 100B design, which is expected to reach Main Gate in 2018.

Regarding Meteor, internal carriage requires clipped wings, especially to carry multiple rounds. These will be adopted: studies done by MBDA have long confirmed that no problems are to be expected.
After trying to secure italian participation in the Meteor integration process, the UK seems now to put much hope in Japan: a bi-national programme, known as Joint New Air to Air Missile (JNAAM) is taking shape, entering its second phase this year.
The programme is about mating the Meteor with an advanced AESA radar seeker made in Japan. There can be little if any doubt that the clipped wings will also be part of this "new" design.
Timeframes for the JNAAM have not been detailed, but the Meteor that goes into the F-35 might actually well be the JNAAM itself. Japan is purchasing the F-35A, so their interest is easily explained.

In practice, it looks like JNAAM will be the actual AMRAAM C-5 replacement for the RAF: the C-5 can now be expected to stay in service well into the 2020s, arming the retained Typhoon Tranche 1 (which cannot receive Meteor without expensive upgrades and retrofits) and, initially, the F-35B.
The AMRAAM C-5 support contract has been recently extended out to 2020, and a further 5 years or more of extension are extremely likely.

Meteor and SPEAR Cap 3 remain the UK's primary requirement for Block IV


ASRAAM New Build, also known as Block 6, should not present problems. Basically, it is the same ASRAAM as is already being integrated, with only minor changes, mainly obsolescence removal in some components. Similarly, SPEAR Cap 1 - Penetrator should not present serious challenges, as it is merely a replacement of the current warhead with the recently ordered bunker-buster one, with the same external shape. These two "integrations" should be little more than an update, easy to get through, as the F-35B is already receiving full integration of the current Paveway IV (2 internal, 4 external) and ASRAAM (2 external) in Block 3F.

The SPEAR "Seeker" is almost certainly a SPEAR Capability 1 development, which means a seeker for Paveway IV enabling better moving-target capability. Raytheon UK is indeed offering such a seeker option for PWIV, and the RAF is evidently interested, but no contract has yet been signed for this development and it looks like it will be the first one to get written off the list of requirements if the JPO asks the UK to remove something.
Other possible PWIV developments proposed include wing-kits for gliding over stand-off distances and a diminished power warhead offering lower risk of collateral damage. All these and more could come one day as SPEAR Cap 1 developments.

Finally, Storm Shadow. The RAF has now formalized its intention not to integrate Storm Shadow on the F-35, instead aiming to integrate its successor, which should come out in the 2030 - 35 timeframe, from SPEAR Capability 5, also known as the UK-France "Future Cruise and Anti-Ship Weapon" programme.

The decision does not come entirely as a surprise. Storm Shadow has been a bit on the losing side as of late: substantial stock reductions have happened after the SDSR 2010 (reportedly over 200 million in value, so a reduction possibly equating to 200+ missiles) and, in France, a dramatic decision has been taken to go down to just 100 rounds in storage.
Moreover, Storm Shadow is aging. France will begin this year a programme to update and life-extend the Scalp missiles remaining in stock, and the UK should participate, although there is no official confirmation from the british side.
The Storm Shadow life-extension is believed to make up SPEAR Cap 4.
Even with the life extension, Storm Shadow should leave service around 2030, and since integration on the F-35 could only realistically take place after 2026, as part of Block V, it is obvious that it would represent a waste of money.
The decision to aim directly to Cap 5 makes sense, but the wait will be a long one. Every effort should be made to try and shorten the wait as much as possible.

Brimstone never gets mentioned. Unfortunately, internal integration of Brimstone is very likely to be a problem due to the weapon being rail-launched rather than dropped. The development of Brimstone 2, with a whole new propulsion rocket, would have been the perfect moment for introducing a "drop launch" mode, but it does not seem to have happened. There is no talk of external integration either, for now.
However, SPEAR 3 is more of a mini-cruise than a CAS weapon, so that integrating Brimstone (or an eventual 3rd generation variant of it, coming out from SPEAR Capability 2) is probably going to be required at some point to provide a more adequate spread of capabilities.

The Common Weapon Launcher, if funded into service, will enable carriage of 2 Paveway IV or 3 Brimstone or 3 SPEAR 3 on four of the six external pylon of the F-35.


If the Common Weapon Launcher development progresses, this triple rack (being developed for Typhoon by adapting the existing triple Brimstone rack) could then become an attractive (and obvious) option for external integration on F-35 as well, potentially doubling the number of Paveway IV that can be carried externally and allowing carriage of SPEAR 3 and/or Brimstone rounds when complete stealth is not a requirement. All this, however, is left for a rather distant future, not before Block V (so after 2025/26).

In the meanwhile, BK-4 is now flying and will soon be in british hands for good. The production contracts for LRIP 9 and 10 should come soon, while some long lead orders have begun for Lot 11 as well.

It is confirmed that Marham will have an Integrated Training Center.

Finally, Squadron Ldr Jonathan Smith RAF will be the 1st international pilot to complete the entire F-35B training at MCAS Beaufor, following the move of the training squadron from Eglin. 



V-22 Osprey for the UK? 

There is not any remaining doubt about a very real british interest in the V-22 Osprey. From a number of news and declarations, it seems pretty clear that both the Royal Navy and the Special Forces Director are pushing for an Osprey purchase.

Officers from the JHC confirmed the interest days ago, but said that it is "unlikely" that the purchase might happen. The british interest for retrofitting helicopters (believed to be the Chinook, ideally, but with Merlin HC3 as alternative; SEE BELOW in this article) for air to air refueling (a new capability) is apparently a consequence of the impossibility of ordering Ospreys.

The Royal Navy interest is due to the Carrier On-board Delivery mission and, potentially, for the future ability of the V-22 to act as a tanker for AAR of helicopters and jets. Special Forces are interested because of its reach and speed, and AAR capability: the Osprey does not require a "slow" tanker, but could use the existing Voyager probes. So it costs more to procure, but does not require equipping C-130s as tankers.

V-22 demonstrating AAR capability from drogue adapter on KC-135 boom

Photo by Mike Yeo


There is interest in France and in Italy as well, and even Spain has thought about it, but all countries seem to be in a "we'd like to, but we can't" situation. The possibility of a cooperative acquisition programme is fascinating but unlikely to solve the money and manpower problems.

The british special forces do have helicopter requirements in the next few years, which include replacing the Lynx AH9A when it goes out of service in 2018. Currently employed by 657 Sqn AAC, the Lynx might end up perhaps extended to 2022, but a replacement is a real need.
The Special Forces Director seems to like the idea of going from Lynx to Osprey, but probably will have to settle for far less ambitious solutions. In 2011 it was almost forced to accept the Wildcat "Light Assault Helicopter" variant, in numer of 8. It did not progress back then, but it might return.
There is even the risk that nothing comes, which would be worse still.

In any case it goes without saying that, if the Osprey was purchased, it certainly would not go to the Army Air Corps: the RAF would most certainly want to take it, and only the Fleet Air Arm might have a chance to obtain it instead, due to its usefulness for the carriers.




CBRN 

The MOD and HMG continue to be silent on the incoming U-turn which will see the Army taking back the whole CBRN mission after it was moved entirely to the RAF Regiment back in the previous SDSR (after years of "jointery" in the Joint CBRN regiment).
The latest Factsheet provides no additional details.

In the meanwhile, however, FALCON Sqn (Royal Tank Regiment) is continuing to work up towards operational capability with the re-activated Fuchs recce vehicles. This year will include training exercises in Jordan that will put the sqn to the test.

One Troop of Fuchs on exercise. The army is back in the CBRN business. The truth is that they should have never been pushed out of it. The transfer to the sole RAF Regiment was a monumental cock-up and lots of hard won knowledge was, reportedly, literally cancelled from the hard drives. It took the tragedy of Syria to bring back some common sense (and Fuchs).

FALCON on exercise. DROPS carrying the Decontamination equipment are in sight.

The unit is a Very High Readiness formation available to the Field Army Command. It comes with two Troops (13 and 14) alternating into the "Vanguard" role.
Each troop has 4 Fuchs vehicles in two sections; plus 2 Coyote MEP vehicles carrying C2 and Logistic Sustainment kit. Each Troop also has a Decontamination capability provided by 2 Multi Purpose Decontamination Systems, currently carried on the old DROPS trucks, due for replacement with EPLS in 2017.
A 9th Fuchs is held by the Sqn HQ and works in a Confirmation role. 2 more Fuchs are possibly being used for tests and evaluation purposes, while a simulator for training has been activated.
A number of Panther and Husky vehicles are also part of the squadron's fleet of some 30 vehicles.

The old IBDS has now been replaced by a more capable, wider-area system


The Integrated Biological Detection System has been replaced by the new Biological Surveillance Collector System. Probably two such systems have been procured, and according to the contract notice for support services, each system comprises an advanced, containerized laboratory and a number of fixed, unattended sensors which can be deployed around a wide area. The sensors are, at least for now, not networked, which means that CBRN specialists must regularly visit the sensors to collect their findings. Networking is expected to be added later on. Initially, the BSCS will be taken up by 20 Wing CBRN.
The area protected is reportedly much larger than what could be covered by IBDS, but the system obviously remains a static solution, good for protecting major HQs or key rear line areas.

It is worth reminding thet the Ajax armored vehicle comes with CBRN sensors providing mobile early warning from the very frontline.

Light Role Teams, possibly 8 of them, are the most recognizable expression of the RAF Regiment CBRN capability. It is now apparently planned to move everything back into the Army field. 

Re-absorbing the capabilities provided by 20 Wing (CBRN), RAF Regiment (composed of 26 and 27 Field Squadrons) will take time, investment and manpower. FALCON Sqn is too small to do everything on its own, and hundreds of soldiers will be needed. The consequence of the return of CBRN into the Army might imply a change of role for one Cavalry regiment, probably one of the Light Cav formations.


UPDATE ends



MCM Force 

The SDSR Joint Force 2025 graphic shows 12 MCM vessels, down from 15 today. The Factsheet confirms that 3 of the oldest Sandown class vessels will leave service by 2025.
This is not unexpected as it is felt that the Hunt ships are more useful and, more importantly, more suited to be refitted to serve as motherships for the unmanned vehicles of the offboard MHC and Sweep capability in development.

The Hunt class vessels are being re-engineered and re-engined, with 5 vessels refitted by the end of this year. The remaining 3 will now however take longer to retrofit, and the programme will not be over before late 2019.
It is not clear at this stage whether the delay is connected to MHC work: the Royal Navy has been planning for a few years now to convert at least one Hunt into a mothership, needed for further MHC sperimentation.
The conversion of up to 4 Hunt vessels is part of the (UK only) Unmanned Combined Sweep capability programme, and so the first few vessels of the class might soon have their stern modified with an unmanned vehicles "hangar", a cargo space for the larger unmanned surface vehicles and an A frame for their launch and recovery.

We might learn more about the "unmanned future" late this year, when the Royal Navy will hold the "Unmanned Warrior" exercise / demonstration as part of Joint Warrior 16-2.



OPVs

The factsheet again confirms that two more OPVs will soon be ordered, bringing the total of River Batch 2 vessels on order to 5.
The fleet will grow to "up to six", which is a way to say that the future of HMS Clyde, the Falklands patrol vessel, is still uncertain. It might be kept into the far future, giving a fleet of 6 OPVs, or be replaced by one of the new vessels, giving a fleet of 5.
The River Batch 1 ships will be withdrawn from service, and might find customers abroad: Bangladesh is reportedly interested. 

The factsheet reaffirms that the role of the OPVs will be expanded to cover standing tasks abroad:

We will use these ships to support our destroyers and frigates in delivering routine tasks and to enhance our contribution to maritime security and fisheries protection.

An earlier post-SDSR statement by the First Sea Lord had already made it clear, while also adding that the Royal Navy will try to use reservists on board the OPVs whenever possible, which makes sense.

In the meanwhile, as a last confirmation that the Royal Navy has finally seen the light on OPVs, the North Atlantic standing tasks is, for the second time, being covered by a River: HMS Mersey has deployed days ago, following the success of her sister HMS Severn, which proved the feasibility of giving the Caribbean role to the OPVs.



MARS Solid Support Ships

They are expected to enter service around the middle of the 2020s, roughly in line with the out of service dates for the current Fort ships, which are spread 2022 to 2025.
No other detail released.



Amphibious role for the carriers

The factsheet reaffirms the objective of being able to land a 1800-strong Royal Marines battlegroup, even after HMS Ocean will have been withdrawn. Both carriers will receive mods to enable greater capacity to carry and deploy amphibious forces. The SDSR had mentioned the sole HMS Prince of Wales but, as could be guessed, she is likely going to just be the first to get the mods.

The scope of the upgrades is not detailed, but adding accommodations and preparing spaces for carrying ammunition and stores for the embarked marines is highly likely. Studies have also been completed on how to arrange helicopter spots on deck, dividing it in 10 operational areas. It is not clear if HMS Queen Elizabeth (which hasn't had her deck coated and painted yet) will be able to get the 10 spot deck right at build. Might have to be added during a later refit. Hopefully, Prince of Wales will get it from the start.


Fast Jets

Unavoidably, Tornado GR4 gets another life extension, with the third squadron extended again, out to 2018. The OSD remains 2019.
No further detail is provided about when the two new Typhoon squadrons will form. It is highly likely that they will depend on the rundown of Tornado.

FCAS, the joint project with France for developing a UCAV, continues. A national technology programme will complement the joint studies with national developments.



Pilots training 

No details provided, but the number of training aircraft to be procured to replace Tucano, G.115 and Beechcraft 200 will go upwards a bit from the abysmally low expected totals published by the NAO a while back, as the new shape of the RAF will require more crews.
Announcements for both the Fixed and Rotary Wing training fleet programmes are to be expected this year.



A new force generation cycle

It is now confirmed that the Army will have to adopt a different readiness cycle, on 2 rather than 3 years, as the requirement for 2025 is to have one armoured and one strike brigade at readiness at any one time.
The factsheet provides no indication about if and how the Army will continue to be able to sustain for enduring operations a brigade in the field. The focus of all documents remains on the "Maximum Effort", that is elevated from 30.000 in the SDSR 2010 to 50.000, of which 30.000 made up by the Army division with 3 brigades.
Despite what was earlier said in the House of Lords (the division would have two armoured and one strike brigade), it seems far more believable to assume that such division would have one armoured and one strike brigade, with the third composed by PARA and/or Royal Marines. Even so, it remains a formidable force, and one which would take quite some time to be generated. The expected "notice to move" required is not detailed.

Greater Ambition. By 2025 we will be able to deploy a force of around 50,000 drawn from:

• A Maritime Task Group of between 10-25 ships and 4,000 to 10,000 personnel.

• An Army Division of three brigades and supporting functions of between 30,000 to 40,000 personnel.

• An Expeditionary Air Group of between 4-9 combat aircraft squadrons, 6-20 surveillance platforms and 5-15 transport aircraft and 4,000 to 10,000 personnel.

• Joint Forces, including enablers and headquarters, of around 2,000 to 6,000 personnel.

A force of 2 to 5 Light Role Infantry battalions will be reconfigured (and made smaller to free manpower, presumably to enable the formation of the strike brigades) into units with an establishment of 450 to 500 men, tasked with defence engagement and training abroad.
The most optimistic reports have suggested that these battalions will be a "Tier 2" Special Forces capability resembling the US Green Berets, but there is every reason to be skeptical: where would the army find the money and the wide range of precious specialists in all trades which are required to form US-style "A teams"?
The effective capability range is likely to be much more modest.



Armoured Cavalry

Joint Force 2025 will require the Ajax family of vehicles to equip four rather than three brigades. Ajax will continue to provide armoured cavalry, primarily tasked with reconnaissance, to the armoured brigades, while also serving the Strike Brigades, where it will also deliver a "Medium Armour" capability.

Medium Armour used to be a capability area of FRES, and was about creating a light / medium tank with a 120mm gun. Unfortunately, Medium Armour in its original shape has been cancelled to save money and is extremely unlikely to come back.

Logic suggests that Ajax could be asked to equip 4 regiments rather than 3, requiring a bit of a change in terms of regimental allocations and structures since the number of vehicles purchased is, again, unlikely to grow.



Challenger 2 Life Extension Programme 

There will not be a smoothbore gun retrofit nor a powerpack change, but the army hopes to expand the range of ammunition natures available (no details, however). On the mobility side, it appears that new Hydrogas suspensions and a re-manufacturing of the existing engine to improve reliability and performances are on the cards. More power and better suspensions are very much welcome, considering that when fitted with the full range of add-on armor, RWS and jammers the Challenger 2 weights an astonishing 75 tons.

Another major change is the replacement of the thermal sight, which might also be re-located over the turret, away from the current not too happy placement on top of the gun mantle.



The Army is calling for 227 tanks with room for growth (or shrinkage) as Oman might want to buy in and the SDSR 2015 might imply an increase (extremely unlikely) or a further decrease (unfortunately pretty likely with the loss of the third armoured brigade).

For reasons hard to guess but extremely frustrating and groan-inducing, the Army is looking at yet another 2-year concept phase before reaching Main Gate in 2019. So slow, in fact, that the Army is considering an interim solution for the Thermal imaging sensor, to enter service in 2018. Hard to even comment.



Heavier tanks, stronger bridges

Project Tyro, the upgrade to the BR90 bridging equipment, remains an army priority. By 2022, the project hopes to deliver a replacement truck for the current Unipower while reinforcing or replacing the bridge elements to deliver a Military Load Class (Tracked) of 100, at a minimum, to restore full freedom of movement even for the most heavily loaded Challenger 2 tanks.

As last published, the requirement is for 25 to 33 sets of Close Support Bridging CSB (the bridge sets which are carried and launched by the Titan bridgelayer). 33 is the current number, but a reduction to 25 as one armoured brigade vanishes would not surprise anyone.

Each Close Support Bridging  set is composed of:

- 1 Titan bridgelayer  (not touched by Project Tyro)
- 2 bridge sets spanning 13.5 meters (No 12 tank bridge) - requirement for new system is 12 to 15 meters
- 1 bridge set spanning 26 meters (No 10 tank bridge) - requirement for new system 24 to 28 meters
- Unipower 8x8 BR90 TBT trucks for transport of the resupply bridge sets
- Trestles and combination briding equipment to enable spanning a 66 meters gap - requirement min 60 m

The requirement extends to General Support Bridging GSB, with 12 to 16 sets planned. A set is composed of:

- 1 BR90 ABLE launch truck
- 2 BR90 TBT trucks carrying bridge elements
- bridging elements to build a single-span 32 meters
- elements to build a 44 meters span bridge with Long Span equipment -
- elements to build a 62 meters two-span bridge using fixed or floating piers 


The ABLE vehicle in the middle horizontally launches the GSB bridge. The trucks on either side carry the bridge elements.


The GSB upgrade requirement is for a solution offering 28 to 36 meters in single span, scalable to a minimum of 60 meters while retaining a minimum MLC 100 (T). 





Greater accuracy for the artillery 

This year, Indirect Fire Precision Attack will try again to put something in service. The IFPA programme is a saga of Royal Artillery attempts to modernize which have almost always been frustrated by cancellation or endless delaying.
Now it is planned that AS90 will trial a precision artillery system by Orbital TK. This is believed to be their Precision Guidance Kit, a course-correction fuze with GPS which dramatically reduces the CEP for normal, existing artillery shells.

Procurement of a guided shell (with available options including Excalibur, SPG, Vulcano) was also planned, and hopefully will return to the fore.

The Royal Artillery could also definitely make good use of the Alternative Warhead for GMLRS. This round replaces the now withdrawn bomblets-carrier rocket, restoring Wide Area Attack capability with 0% of residual Unexploded Ordnance scattering. Entering production for the US Army, this round (partly) restores that "Grid Square Removal" capability that was once the pride of the MLRS but that has been lost to make it "only" a long range "sniper" with point attack capability by GPS guided unitary warhead.  

It would be sweet to one day learn the fate of the Fire Shadow loitering munition, too...



Apache CSP 

Main Gate, with the decision to be made between wholly new build or re-manufacturing of existing helicopters is "months not years away", according to JHC officials.
I'm not exactly reassured: Main Gate was planned specifically for March 2016, and the "months not years" is a downgrade. Will the decision still come in march, or will it slip to the right?



Helicopter Air to Air Refueling

One of the most surprising developments coming out from the SDSR is the (possible) procurement of an AAR capability for british helicopters. Funded by the Special Forces money, it would be the main part of the SDSR promise to give SF transport aircraft and helicopters the ability to deploy "farther, faster". 

The idea is not new: the director special forces tried to obtain such a capability already years ago, but only obtained a few Chinook HC2A, which only have the fuselage predisposition for an AAR probe. Fitted for but not with, in other words. Impossibility to procure the probe at the time brought forth the purchase of the 8 HC3 Chinook, with their "fat tanks" for extended range.

Now it is time to try again, with the wish being to procure and retrofit a number of probes on some of the Chinooks.
The only other helicopter in british hands with a latent AAR capability is the Merlin HC3, which was trialed years ago in british skies with the assistance of an italian C-130J tanker.
Italy has now procured the HH-101 CAESAR CSAR variant of the Merlin, with AAR probes available, and has 6 C-130J tankers.

JHC officials confirmed only this week that the AAR for helicopters is a real aspiration. The rumor has been around from before the SDSR publication, however.
Details, as always, are non existent. The JHC only provided vague indications, saying we are still in an early phase and even saying that the UK might not acquire tanker kits for its own C-130J, depending on allies showing up to refuel its helicopters.
There seems to be an incredible confusion in the UK about whether AAR is a key capability or not: on one side, a shiny fleet of 14 Voyager tankers with lots of give-away fuel, on the other side several strategic platforms unable to plug in to receive.
Now, the possibily of adding a bunch of helicoper receivers without procuring the tanker capability.
Tell me that it is not dumb, if you can.




Procuring two or more tanker kits for short-fuselage C-130Js really should be a no brainer.


With 14 C-130J meant to be retained in the long term, there should be no particular problem. Initially, however, the MOD has signaled to LM that only the long-fuselage C-130J-30 will be retained.
The existing tanker version of the C-130J is based on the short fuselage variant, however. It is highly questionable whether trying to create a long-fuselage tanker is feasible / worth the risks. The simplest solution would be to keep some short fuselages as part of the 14.
This might already be the case: according to Defense News, the recently signed contract for extending the support arrangements for the C-130J include provvisions for the future fleet of 14, including two aircraft earmarked for helicopter refueling.

 
Fat tanks and AAR probe make the "SF" Chinook, the MH-47, unique looking. Will the UK be given access to the probe? Apparently simple, the probe is something the US has been reluctant to export in the past.


Retrofitting the HC3 (HC5 post JULIUS upgrade) with AAR probes would make them similar to the US special forces Chinook variant, and would give them extremely long legs, making them a strategic resource.
As well as Special Operations, such helicopters could cover CSAR duties, providing the UK with a capability which has been absent for an eternity.
It is understood that the Army / Special Forces Director are looking for an Internally Transportable vehicle able to be carried, fully armed and ready, within a Chinook.


The Flyer Gen III internally transportable vehicle is used by US forces and is now being procured by Italian special forces as well. It is one of several available options.

The combination of AAR and internally carried vehicle would represent an extremely capable combination. Although it is licit to wonder if putting the Boom on at least some of the Voyagers wouldn't have had a greater strategic effect, especially with P-8 Poseidon on the way, with a confirmed future overland surveillance role as well (de-facto replacing Sentinel R1 after 2022).

The C-130J will be upgraded with Block 8.1 software and hardware, enabling the addition of enhanced communications and self-defence equipment to finally properly replace the lost C-130K in Special Forces configuration, allowing the long delayed Project Hermes to progress.
9 aircraft have already been retrofitted with external fuel tanks, expanding range.



Merlin HM2: some more, please 

The Royal Navy has not abandoned the fight to try and squeeze the last 8 Merlin HM1 into the budget for an HM2 upgrade and a continuation of service. The SDSR did not approve the request, but the Navy intends to try again and logic suggests that the best chance will come with the Main Gate for CROWSNEST. Expanding the fleet from 30 to 38 helicopters would be incredibly beneficial as it would allow for a "separate", permanent AEW fleet without biting too deeply into the availability of "normal" HM2 for ASW and Maritime Security roles.



From Zephyr to a replacement for Desert Hawk 

The SDSR factsheet again does not mention Zephyr directly, but there is little doubt that it will be the platform for the "high altitude communications relay" also described as "high altitude long endurance surveillance and relay RPAS".
Zephyr 8, to be test flown this year, is expected to stay aloft for 3 months, flying as high as 70.000 feet and has british origins and has seen constant MOD involvment.
The problem of Zephyr is that using solar power brings not just advantages but also issues: the payload margin is tiny, with only 5 kilograms available to work with. The main challenge so will probably be developing a communications relay package and a surveillance sensors package (or, with further miniaturizaiton and miniaturization, a combined payload) small enough to fit while still delivering the effects needed.
Longer term, Airbus (now owner of Zephyr) plans further developments, bringing the payload to 20 and then to 40 kg.

An operational Zephyr system could include up to 4 UAVs controlled by a single Ground Control Station. Flying several at once over the same area is made easier by the fact that no one else flies so high, so there are no deconfliction issues. Using multiple UAVs allow for very long range signal relay and means that payload problems can be somewhat avoided by having one UAV carrying surveillance sensors and another the communications relay.
There is a lot of potential. News that the MOD would purchase 3 Zephyr 8 came out before the SDSR was published. For some reason, the MOD immediately tried to silence the reports, forcing even Airbus to backtrack on its announcement.
A Zephyr purchase, though, seems all but certain at this point.

 
Within a few months we should have a better idea of what features Protector will come with, with Main Gate expected early this year. It should be based on the "certifiable" Predator B by GA-ASI and hopefully will finally employ british weapons, instead of requiring GBU-12 and Hellfire purchases.


Desert Hawk III has received an upgrade giving it digital communications and has seen its operational life extended 6 years, out to 2021. Further upgrades are being evaluated but are not under contract: LM offers a "3.1" upgrade package that extends endurance from a maximum of 90 to 150 minutes; fully waterproofs the drone and replaces the current interchangeable sensors with an integrated electro-optic, infrared and laser illuminator payload, so that all functions are available at the same time.


This upgrade might be a cheap solution for making the DH III the mini-UAV of choice well into the 2020s, but the Army and the Royal Marines are already investigating a replacement. Plextek is working to develop a miniaturized solution for Sense and Avoid and also a mini radar sensor that could fit within a mini-UAV fit to replace DH.
Sense and Avoid would make it much safer to employ low-flying UAVs in areas where helicopter movements are also present: the British Army has had near miss events which have caused some worry.

The Royal Navy is pushing hard to get two new UAV programmes started this year, but all depends on securing funding. The two programmes are the Flexible Deployable UAS and the Joint Mini UAS.
FDUAS is intended to be the "post Scan Eagle": the Royal Navy has extended the contract for the provision of contractor owned, contractor operated Scan Eagle systems out to the middle of 2017, with the hope of immediately moving on to a new, navy owned service. Described as a "Sea Eagle plus", the system could use a more recent variant of Sea Eagle, or the larger Integrator selected by the US Navy and USMC, or perhaps something else entirely.
It would still be a small UAV compatible with existing ships.

The JMUAS is a requirement primarily expressed by the Royal Marines, which aren't happy with how Desert Hawk performs at sea, in amphibious scenarios. JMUAS, being Joint, probably hopes to be an Army-Navy programme aiming at finding a common replacement for Desert Hawk III.

Later on, the Royal Navy continues to plan for procurement of a tactical, large, multi-role Rotary Wing UAS. The early experiments with the AgustaWestland SW-4 Solo have been convincing, but an operational system is years away, for the Royal Navy. Some interesting studies and projects are already ongoing, either for industrial initiative or with MOD funding: these include a miniaturized FLASH dipping sonar and a small pod capable to deploy mini sonobuoys, the latter potentially targeted also at the manned Wildcat helicopter.

Meanwhile, the Royal Navy is continuing to experiment with small, inexpensive 3D-printed drones. After the first successful tests from the OPV HMS Mersey, a number of the same mini-drones have been embarked on HMS Protector for her current deployment down south.  



Ballistic Missile Defence

A BMD radar will be procured, but it is not clear yet if it will be fixed or mobile, nor where it will be based. It will be a british contribution to the NATO BMD plans.

Importantly, BMD activities on the Type 45 destroyers will continue. So far, these have included developing suitable radar and software mods to enable tracking of ballistic targets. Simultaneous AAW and BMD is planned and might have already been tested.
Studies have also been funded to shape a plan for eventual adoption of MK41 launchers and SM-3 interceptor missiles.
No kinetic interception is going to be acquired for now, but at least a path is being opened.



Deployable HQ 

A new 2* deployable standing Joint Force headquarters to command and control the Joint Expeditionary Force is promised. Probably, it is actually a modernization of the Joint Rapid Reaction Force HQ element.

Saturday, January 9, 2016

Of Signals and Headquarters


As we wait to finally discover something about the fabled Joint Force 2025 and its actual impact on the army's capabilities, plans and structure, it is time to bring once more communications and headquarters into the spotlight, as this area is a particularly critical one, and there's a recognized shortage of resources, which is due to become even more evident with the coming of the "Strike Brigades".

The graphic below, which i've created, depicts (as accurately as possible) the current structure of the Royal Signals in all its main components. It also contains some indications about sub-unit composition and role in this Army 2020-driven structure.

A few changes from the last major public update have become evident: for example, two Reserve squadrons were authorized to change their name, as requested back in 2012. 69th Sqn, 32th Regiment, became 40th (North Irish Horse) Squadron; while 47 Sqn, 71st Regiment became 31st (Middlesex Yeomanry).

Far more important, there seems to be a change or role for a couple of regiments: 2nd Signal Regiment was expected to become a Multi Role Signal Regiment of the "Divisional" type, providing support to 3 UK Division. However, 2nd Signal Regiment has actually become a "Brigade" MRSR, with the task of supporting 12th Armoured Infantry Brigade.
It was once planned that 12th Brigade would be supported by 16th Signal Regiment instead: the fact that 16th Regiment has moved back to the UK only in the last year might have caused a rethink, using 2nd Regiment to provide the brigade with the capability earlier.

Unfortunately, there is no solid information at this stage about what comes next for 16th Signal Regiment: will it become the second "Divisional" regiment once planned (adding to 3rd Signal Regiment) or will it become a fourth brigade-type formation?

Full Size at the link

The configuration of the Signal regiments is closely related to the work that the British Army has been doing (and is continuing to do) on formation headquarters. As part of Army 2020, a series of experiments have been carried out under the auspices of Project URQUHART and Project HORROCKS: the objective is the evolution of 1 and 2 star HQs and the determination of the associated Information & Communication Solutions (CIS).

Notoriously, the combination of increased network requirements and cuts to manpower and resources have forced an extensive restructuring of the Royal Signals, which has seen all Divisions and Brigades (with the exception of 16th Air Assault and 3rd Commando) lose their signal elements, which have been centralized within the Multi Role Signal Regiments.

At the end of the day, though, operational realities mean that the brigades still have a signal element attached: not a squadron, but a whole regiment. Although all MRSR sit under 7 Signal Group, 11th Signal Brigade, they have clear roles and clear associations to specific formations.
The problem is that there are only 5 MRSRs, enough for the 3 armoured infantry brigades and the two division HQs (two MRSR were planned to be of the "divisional" type, both associated primarily to 3rd UK Division).
As said earlier, the plan has changed somewhat and it is hard to say if there will effectively be a second "divisional" regiment. With the Reaction Force moving to 4 brigades under Joint Force 2025, sheer necessity might suggest making do with a single "divisional" regiment in exchange for an additional "brigade" regiment.

The "Brigade" regiments have one squadron tasked primarily with FALCON and associated Wide-Area network systems. They create the area-wide communications network in favor of the brigade and of its battlegroups.
One squadron provides Close Support communications to the brigade's components: primarily, to the Vanguard Enabling Group, which includes the Combat Support and Combat Service Support elements.
Finally, one squadron continues to be tasked with much the same task as the old brigade squadrons: providing the tactical HQ for the brigade. For this task, the squadron is equipped with Bulldog armored vehicles and Panther.
The establishment is around 530, including 8 reserve and 4 civil servants posts. 

The "Division" regiment is shaped by the "evolved" 2 Star HQ concept which came out of Project HORROCKS. The regiment has one squadron tasked primarily with providing the Main HQ installation. This is a very large and pretty hard to move complex: it takes 17 ISO containers or more to carry all the equipment associated, which includes 50 DRASH shelters, in various sizes, recently procured by the British Army to replace the old tents.
It will be erected a great distance away from the firing line, for obvious reasons: technology is expected to compensate for the distance.

Full Size at the link

It remains a very vast and vulnerable complex, which in any high-end warfare scenario will need to be properly protected at least against air attack. And it is unsettling to think how good a target such HQ makes for a ballistic missile (Scud or Iskander), against which the British Army can't field anything. Even with CAMM / Land Ceptor on the way as replacement for Rapier, the ground-based anti-air capability remains limited, and Anti-Ballistic capability is pretty much non existent. 

A smaller HQ, meant to move more frequently to stay closer to the frontline, is also provided.
Finally, a squadron is tasked with providing an armoured, fully mobile tactical HQ. The HQ itself is formed up by 8 Bulldog 436 vehicles and tents, and is supported by a number of Radio Re-Broadcast points on Bulldog and Panther vehicles. The squadron is established for 12 Bulldog. 
This HQ is highly mobile and far easier to conceal, but a limitation comes from technology: the HQ needs to stop in order to communicate fully. Only Voice channels are available on the move.
The US Army has been investing heavily in improving communications and achieving command capability on the move, but it is not clear if the british army will attempt to obtain similar capabilities anytime soon. Beginning the replacement of BOWMAN (project LE TAcCIS / Morpheus) in the next few years is on the cards, but it will be a very long and gradual process, and an On-The-Move capability might or might not be included in the early phases. 

The "Divisional" regiment also needs to deliver Close Support CIS to the units associated to the division, and in particular to the Logistic Brigade and its components. The Logistic Brigades used to have their very own Signal Troop, but this is no longer the case and, anyway, a Troop would probably not suffice anyway.

There is an obvious shortage of resources: 5 brigades are needed to support a single enduring deployment; 4 brigades are planned for 3rd UK Division in Joint Force 2025; the renewed focus on the 2 star HQ even in brigade-sized operations calls for a better ability to maintain a Divisional HQ in the field.
When all these factors are considered, the shortage can be quantified in whole regiments. It is not clear if Joint Force 2025 will have any real chance to do something about this shortage.

The roles of 22nd and 30th Signal Regiments have also been cleared somewhat: 22nd is meant to support the ARRC, while 30th is more focused on providing support to british high readiness units, including the Vanguard aviation element (support and attack helicopters - 244 Sqn is the last aviation support signal unit, down from the whole 21 Regiment before the SDSR 2010). 250 Sqn is tasked with delivering support also the 16 Air Assault brigade HQ and has an air assault troop for the task.

Communications are a key component of the army's capability, and Joint Force 2025, if it is to deliver real improvements, will have to find new ways to match requirements and means. Project HORROCKS continues, and according to earlier documents it will work out to 2018 to refine the new HQ concepts.
The advent of Joint Force 2025, replacing Army 2020, will obviously have an impact, and it is still hard to guess how far reaching it will be.
HORROCKS was expected to be followed by CALVERT, with the target of designing headquarters for the longer term, towards 2030. The replacement of BOWMAN will be a key component of this process. Replacing (finally) Bulldog is also going to be a key passage, and here both the Ajax family and the ABSV family will be involved.
There seems to be little doubt, in any case, that network requirements will continue to grow, and while technology can help, manpower requirements for the Corps of Royal Signals will continue to stay high.

Tuesday, December 22, 2015

British Army 2025: a proposed concept and structure



Since the British Army plans for Joint Force 2025 still are nowhere to be seen, there is space for suggestions. I decided to write my own.



Combined Arms Regiments

How to transform the 3 armoured infantry brigades of Army 2020 into two armoured infantry brigades for future force 2025, not losing MBTs, keeping 3 main maneuver units (plus Cavalry for recce and screening) and at the same time addressing the insufficiency of the 245 Warrior CSP in Infantry and Infantry Command variants?

If I was the one making the decisions, my first pick would be the Combined Arms Regiment, on the model of those adopted years ago by the US Army.
The current three tank regiments and 6 (on paper) armoured infantry battalions would be mixed to become 6 Combined Arms Regiments. Each CAR would have 2 tank squadrons with 14 MBTs, and 2 armoured infantry companies, plus a Recce and Screening element and a Support Weapons Company.
With 1 further MBT (and a Warrior) in the RHQ, the regiment would line 29 MBTs and a similar number of Warrior IFVs.
The reconnaissance and screening element would be provided by a strong squadron with Ajax and Ares / Warrior / ABSV apc carrying dismounts.
The Support Weapons Company would deliver long range guided weapons capability (Javelin); snipers; assault pioneers and mortars. In particular, it is highly desirable to invest in 120 mm mortars for both ABSV mortar carriers (for the tracked, heavy brigades) and MIV mortar carriers (for use in the Strike Brigades). 
Combining the Tank Regiments and the existing armoured infantry battalions means making do with what is already available / on order. Indeed, the passage from 9 regiments / battalions to 6 units allows savings which are easily quantified: 3 less REME LADs, 3 less recce platoons on Ajax, a reduced requirement for ABSV vehicles and a reduction in the number of armoured infantry companies (from 18 to 12).
A cut by any other name, but one which looks more and more unavoidable: 245 updated Warriors just aren’t enough for more.

Advantages include a more appropriate ratio of MBTs to IFVs (the insufficient number of tanks in the current Armoured Infantry Brigade structure has been evidenced in training) and the CAR is, in its daily shape, much closer to a realistic Battlegroup composition. Instead of being pieced together on deployment, the CAR is always in typical battlegroup shape.
The number of tanks, overall, would stay exactly the same: Army 2020 has 3 tank regiments with 58 tanks each, for a total of 174. 6 CARs with 29 tanks each give exactly the same total, compatible with the 227 tanks in holding post 2010 cuts. The new brigade would be able to pair each infantry company with a tank squadron. This is not possible in the Armoured Infantry Brigades as currently planned (58 tanks, of which the majority sits in three squadrons of 18 each). 

The CAR could be given a stronger reconnaissance and screening element by receiving more than 8 Ajax, and/or complementing them with a greater dismounted element carried in Ares or ABSV. 

The mortars are essential: moving up to the 120 mm opens up whole new lethality, range and precision opportunities: guided 120 mm mortar rounds are becoming available. Having mortars in direct support to tanks gives an excellent counter to enemy ATGW teams. Adding mortars into armoured regiments is something that elsewhere already happens, from the US to Israel, but the british army would not be able to afford adding a mortar element into the tank regiments unless they become one with the armoured infantry battalions. 
The CAR concept allows the six existing mortar platoons to offer a (virtually) greater cover. The cover is evidently not actually greater, but just better placed to respond to the various needs. 

With a powerful screening and recce element; a powerful fire support element, tanks and armoured infantry, the CAR is a battlegroup in itself. It has everything it needs to hit the ground running if needs be. This is unlike the current Army 2020 Lead Armoured Battlegroup, which has to be built up by taking one tank squadron plus HQ (18  + 2 MBTs) from the brigade’s tank regiment; two armoured infantry companies from one of the brigade’s battalions and a company on Mastiff from the brigades’ Heavy Protected Mobility Infantry battalion, as well as all relevant sub-units from artillery, medical, logistic and engineer regiments and battalions. 

Capbadges chapter: moving from 9 to 6 units has obvious capbadges implications. But a CAR arrangement gives options to keep all capbadges alive, with a bit of imagination. The tank and infantry elements could keep their “battalion” status within the CAR, and thus preserve their respective capbadges and identities while being joined at the hip into the new combined units. Six CARs would actually allow the resurrection of lost cavalry capbadges, as 3 tank regiments would become 6 “small battalions”… Not to mention that the CARs themselves could take up some historic title of their own, if there was the will to make it happen.
The rich history of the british army is added value, but it cannot shape the force structure. It must be considered, absolutely, but not drive the strategy. Only capability should drive the planning, with the capbadges preservation coming last on the list of priorities.


Balance of change from Army 2020 to a Joint Force 2025 CAR

MBTs: same (174 tanks in the regular regiments)
Warrior IFVs: same (245), but equipping 12 instead of 18 rifle companies
Ajax: slightly less or same. There will be 3 less Recce platoons to form, freeing up 24 Ajax. However, they could just be assigned to the platoons remaining, to expand them from 8 to 12 vehicles each. Otherwise, they would go to the second Strike Brigade to ease the formation of its recce Cavalry regiment.  
ABSV: less. Same number of mortar carriers and other variants, but reduced requirement in some other areas, due to the reduction from 9 separate units to 6. 
A reduction also comes from other units within the armoured brigades: going down to two armoured brigades mean just 2, rather than 3 armoured medical regiments, so less ABSV ambulances are required. Same goes for Close Support REME units.  
REME: 3 less LADs required due to the drop from 9 to 6 main armoured units, freeing up resources to transfer to the Strike Brigades, the second of which will need the uplift as it changes from a mostly Light Role adaptable infantry brigade into a mechanized formation. More vehicles and kit means needing more REME (and more RLC logistic support too: another uplift needed there). 



Strike Brigades

One Strike Brigade will be obtained downgrading one of the three Armoured Infantry Brigades planned by Army 2020, while another will be obtained by upgrading one of the seven adaptable brigades.

The current 3 Heavy Protected Mobility Infantry battalions (one in each armoured infantry brigade) can be expected to move across to the Strike Brigades. At least a fourth regiment is needed, however, assuming that the Strike Brigades will have at least 2 “heavy” mechanized formations each (with Mastiff at first, and then with the new 8x8 MIV).
Since a mechanized infantry battalion is close to 200 men larger than a Light Role battalion, the reduction in armoured infantry caused by the CARs will be re-absorbed quite quickly to cover all the areas where growth is required.

Ideally, the Strike Brigades should have 3 infantry battalions on MIV, but it takes quite some optimism to imagine the british army with enough funds to purchase the hundreds of 8x8s needed for such structure.
An alternative could be a structure with 2 heavy battalions and a light battalion, mounted on Foxhound. There are 6 such light battalions planned under Army 2020, with, crucially, 400 Foxhound already on order.

Soldiers from 4 RIFLES get to know the french VBCI. A rifle coy from 4 RIFLES has spent months working with the Armee de Terre and specifically with VBCI. Clearly, an experiment ahead of the start of MIV 

Army 2020 includes 3 heavy cavalry regiments on Ajax, which means that the two armoured brigades and the first of the strike brigades are covered. A fourth regiment on Ajax is however needed for the second strike brigade. An Ajax regiment is well over one hundred men larger than a Light Cavalry regiment on Jackal, but the CAR reform will have freed up manpower to adjust the various areas without an increase in the total number of regulars. Planned numbers of Ajax-family vehicles should suffice to form 4 regiments, but it might be necessary to make each regiment a bit smaller, and adjust the ratio of variants (Ajax, Ares). 

General Dynamics UK is already working on a proposal for the MIV requirement
What the Strike Brigades lack is a direct fire support platform bringing heavy, tank-like firepower to the party. The Ajax only has a 40 mm gun, and the MIV might end up having nothing more than a .50 or GMG on RWS. A direct fire variant of the MIV would be a real blessing, but, again, money is the obvious issue.



Infantry Brigades

The six remaining infantry brigades should continue to include two “deployable” brigades, working to a two year force generation cycle, with supports for one deployment, so that future enduring operations will be sustainable.
Under Army 2020, three out of seven adaptable brigades are the main deployable framework upon which a three-year force generation cycle is built, forming each year a package including up to 5 infantry battalions (2 mounted on Foxhound, 3 Light Role plus paired reserve battalions) and a Light Cavalry regiment (plus paired reserve).
Two sets of supports (artillery regiment, engineer regiment, medical regiment, REME, logistic regiment) are also available, so that the Adaptable force, when needs be, can support two six-months deployments out of the 5 needed, in circle, for an enduring operation if the “1 in 5” principle is to be respected.

In Joint Force 2025, the number of “deployable” infantry brigades could shrink to two. And since one set of supports will have to be upgraded to cover the second Strike Brigade, only one would remain.
The infantry brigades would be tasked with a single deployment within a cycle of 5, instead of two.



The transition of supports

Plenty of questions remain on how support units will be reconfigured. For example, artillery: while it is reasonable to expect no changes for the artillery regiments associated to the two remaining Armoured Infantry Brigades (3 batteries with AS90, 1 Precision Fires battery with GMLRS and EXACTOR), the composition of the artillery regiment for the Strike Brigades is anyone’s guess.
The AS90 appears too heavy and large to fit within the “deployability” that the Strike Brigade is supposed to offer. On the other hand, its firepower, protection and mobility would fit a mechanized formation better than the L118 Light Gun.
The loss of one armoured brigade could result in further reductions to the number of AS90 batteries, even though one of the (several) lessons of the war in Ukraine is the enduring key importance of artillery… and the fact that pretty much everyone in NATO is really at a disadvantage against the kind of indirect firepower available to Russian-style formations. Losing AS90s is really not something that should happen, yet it is a quite likely outcome.
If the army decides to put AS90 in the Strike Brigades, their total number (89 post 2010 cuts) means that adding a net three batteries is going to be next to impossible.
The Strike Brigades could perhaps receive only two AS90 batteries (+1 bty from Army 2020 planning), with the balance made up by L118.

Towards 2030 (the OSD for both AS90 and L118), a new plan for artillery might be necessary, and again France could provide an useful indication: their CAESAR truck-mounted howitzer would be a perfect fit for the Strike Brigades. The Armee de Terre is also now planning to procure the CAESAR NG, on an armored 8x8 platform, as replacement for their remaining tracked heavy howitzers.
The UK could, and probably should, follow the same direction when the time comes: while the tracked howitzer brings several advantages (more armor, more mobility, 360° coverage due to the turret), it costs more, it is harder to deploy and, ultimately, misses out on part of its advantages due to its resupply chain.
The AS90 has the mobility of a MBT and good protection, but in the end depends entirely on wheeled trucks carrying the ammunition. Trucks which are less mobile and more vulnerable to counter-battery fire.
Arguably, the advantages of the tracked self-propelled howitzer are only enjoyed fully if, like in the british army, a vehicle with the same protection and mobility features is used to carry ammunition during shoot and scoot fire missions.
In absence of money for those, it might be best to just go for the different advantages offered by a lighter, cheaper, wheeled howitzer.
Crucially, the CAESAR comes with the longer barrel (and thus the greater range) that AS90 sadly didn’t get when the BRAVEHEART upgrade programme collapsed.

The L118’s replacement could be the 120mm towed mortar. Even easier to deploy, even smaller and lighter, it offers almost as much range, same lethality and a greater variety of ammunition, already including precision guided shells.
A French-style combination of CAESAR and mortar batteries could give even 16 Air Assault and 3 Commando a good level of capability, offering both the power and reach of the 155 and the strategic and tactical mobility of the 120mm mortar.
But this is in future prospective.

The GMLRS is a key capability, for its long range, its precision, its effects. Its weight and mass is not far from the “defining form factor” for the Strike Brigade, which has its sweet spot at around 30+ tons. Weight and mass which must be compatible with A400M Atlas transport (even though air insertion alone will never be a realistic option for deploying a brigade, and arguably not even a battlegroup, with the number of cargo aircraft the UK can reasonably expect to have available).
The GMLRS comfortably fits within that sweet spot, and because of what it brings to the fight, it is to be recommended that a Precision Fires battery is included in the Strike Brigade’s artillery element.
This means adding a fourth GMLRS battery (up from 3 in Army 2020), but it should be doable: the army should have some 36 launchers at B1 standard. 
One issue is that the GMLRS is now a pin-point precision weapon only, having lost the ability to annihillate dispersed forces in a wide area with the withdrawal of the rockets loaded with submunitions. The US Army is beginning to put in service the Alternative Warhead rockets, which replace the submunitions with an enhanced fragmentation payload with zero risks of residual Unexploded Ordnance on the ground and restored wide-area attack capability. The Royal Artillery should buy a stock of these rockets as soon as possible.

Engineer regiments will change, as well. The loss of one armoured brigade means that less Titan and Trojan will be required; even assuming that the remaining two regiments will increase their holding to compensate.
The Terrier, at around 30 tons, will be the key capability of the Strike Brigade’s own engineer regiments.
Bridgelaying will probably fall on the shoulders of the ABLE systems and of the few REBS, which should have been brought into core after the end of Op Herrick.

Medical regiments for the Armoured Infantry Brigades are currently equipped with the medical variants of FV432 tracked vehicles, which might be replaced by suitable variants of the ABSV when the programme finally progresses.
The Medical regiments for the Strike Brigades could use an ambulance variant of MIV, eventually, although less expensive options, such as the ambulance variant of the Multi Role Vehicle – Protected, might be adopted instead.

Beyond the adjustments (less track and heavy armor; more wheels and medium weights), the real key question in this hundredth restructuring of the army must be a very basic one: does it make sense to centralize support units away from the maneuver brigades? I’ve written more than once to say that no, it doesn’t, and that remains my belief.
Now more than before. Since the regiments are inexorably taking on a structure that reflects the brigade they have to support, the benefits of centralization are quickly made irrelevant. It would be far better if the key supports were part of the relative brigade (at least for the armoured and strike brigades).

A reorganization of logistics also appears necessary. With the army having won, at least in the talk, a renewed commitment to the Division as operational, deployable level, the task should now be to reorganize the divisional logistic brigade.
The maneuver brigade should include the logistic elements it needs at the tactical level, to support its own operations, whether as a full formation or broken into dispersed battlegroups. The logistic brigade should have a theatre-wide responsibility, and be the point of contact between the maneuver brigades and the main port (air and sea) of debarkation of stores, equipment and materials, with these being, of course, primarily the responsibility of 104 Log Bde with its theatre-opening capabilities.



Between US and France

It appears clear that the British Army is trying to position itself, structure-wise, somewhere between the US and France. Concepts coming from either country clearly run into the british army’s own planning. And in my proposal, due to the CARs, the resemblance with the A-BCTs of the US Army would be even greater.

I think many will have noticed the resemblance between Joint Force 2025 and the “Au Contact” plan of the French armee de terre. The 2 heavy, 2 medium, 2 light plus airmobile brigade structure is the same, with the British Army adding a number of further infantry brigades of, honestly, dubious usefulness, but that are needed as containers for infantry battalions busy on a variety of roles in the UK and abroad.

The French Au Contact plan, which also puts renewed focus on the Division, has gone for a very rational spread of capability: each Division commands 1 armoured, 1 medium and 1 infantry brigade. In the French case, the “infantry” brigades are particularly capable and specialized, since one is the Mountain brigade and one the PARA brigade.
The armee de terre then has an “airmobile” brigade which is, really, an aviation brigade, since it does not include ground maneuver units other than the logistic battalion. It contains the helicopter squadrons, but the infantry would come from other brigades.
The French “airmobile” brigade actually resembles more the “new” Joint Helicopter Command than it does 16 Air Assault Brigade.

I call JHC “new” because, as part of the restructuring, 16 Air Assault brigade has been pulled out of JHC and assigned to Field Army Command. In the process, 16 Air Assault Brigade has lost direct control of the helicopter regiments, that remain in JHC alongside the 7 Aviation Support Battalion REME (including 132 Aviation Supply Sqn RLC).
16 Air Assault now has all the ground units (including 8 Field Company (PARA) REME, which has left 7 REME and joined 13 Air Assault Support Regiment RLC instead) while the JHC has all the major aviation units.
Major aviation units that, by August 2016, will include 47 Regiment Royal Artillery, with its 3 Watchkeeper batteries: it has been decided that, despite its ISTAR role, a UAV of that size and complexity should not be under direct command of the ISTAR brigade, but rather under the aviation experts of JHC.  
All Desert Hawk III mini-UAS instead are to be grouped in 32 Regiment RA, within the ISTAR brigade.

Unlike the Armee de Terre, the British Army seems determined not to split the brigades evenly across the two Divisions. All armoured and strike brigades will be under 3(UK) Division, while 1(UK) Division will have the six infantry brigades.
This is probably in no small part due to geography and infrastructure: the heavier and more complex brigades largely gravitate around Salisbury Plain for both basing and training. Sitting under the same Div HQ probably makes sense because of that. However, if the Division is to be so important in the future of the british army, careful thought should go into how to ensure that 1(UK) Div HQ can deploy, command and, through its logistic brigade, support whatever brigade the UK is fielding in a determinate moment.





Recommendations:

-          Re-arrange heavy armour formations according to the Combined Arms Regiment structure

-          Use the manpower savings obtained via CAR to uplift the units needed for the second strike brigade. The first comes from downgrading one of the armoured brigades of Army 2020. 

-          Bring CS and CSS units back into the maneuver brigades, and structure their sub-units to support both full-brigade operations and the agile, quick deployment of battlegroups formed from within a specific CAR 

-          The battlegroup mechanism should no longer be matter of making a complete dog’s breakfast by pulling pieces from everywhere across the brigade, and even beyond. As much as possible, the dogma should be: structure like you fight. Battle-grouping must be thought into the very structure of the brigade, on the lines of what happens within 16 Air Assault and 3 Commando due to their specific readiness requirements. A basic battlegroup from the armoured brigade should consist of a CAR, an artillery battery, an engineer squadron, a recce squadron, plus all other elements up to a CAMM battery for air defence where required. 

-          If the Division is key, plan accordingly, and uplift the capability of 1(UK) Div HQ. 

-          A triple, two-year force generation cycle based on the alternation into readiness of 2 armoured, 2 strike, 2 infantry brigades. This will make possible to deploy a Division of three brigades, as from SDSR ambitions. Simultaneous deployment of both armoured brigades, as has been indicated in the House of Lords, promises to be quite challenging, and will require, at a very minimum, the maintenance of high vehicle availability. It seems a “third world war” desperation scenario, or something, otherwise, that the Army would only be able to do if given ample notice to move (more than 1 year, surely). 

-          ABSV remains a fundamental part of the future of the army. It must be progressed at all costs. 

-          120 mm mortars should be introduced in the armoured and mechanized regiments and battalions. 

-          Once, the MOD was looking at 8x8 in pure APC configuration, with nothing but a .50 or GMG as main armament. This severely limits the usefulness of the 8x8 in a conflict against a near peer adversary and even, as the French found out in Mali, represents a serious weakness against enemies with ample access to 23 mm guns and 14.5mm machine guns mounted on pick-ups. The French vehicles armed with .50 have found themselves repeatedly outmatched by the firepower and reach of the enemy, so much so that they have brought old 20mm guns out of storage and put them on trucks used as convoy escorts. The French VBCI has the 25mm gun, and that is a key part of why it did so well in Mali (although the one-person turret, did not prove entirely convincing). It is very important that at least a share of the MIVs get fitted with an unmanned turret with the CTA 40mm cannon, to ensure that each company has adequate firepower.
The US Army is putting remotely operated, basket-less Kongsberg Protector MCRWS on its Strykers to arm them with 30mm guns, and this hopefully will provide further “inspiration” to the british army as well. 

-          Another lesson readily learnt by the Armee de Terre in Africa is the need for an escort squadron within the Logistic regiments. The British Army is well aware of this necessity as well, but probably unable to release manpower from elsewhere to fix the problem. If some of the small light role infantry battalions that will remain after the restructuring were looking for a role, this might just be it…   

          The third Light Cavalry regiment should be assigned to 16 Air Assault Brigade to become a IX unit including squadrons mounted on Jackal, the Pathfinders and the framework for integrating EW teams and Air Defence troops, on the lines of what 30 Commando IX does for 3 Commando brigade. Ideally, a small number of CVR(T) vehicles should be retained for this particular regiment, to give a small, highly mobile, highly deployable armor element which could prove invaluable in some situations.