The British Combat Aviation Brigade

It has been in the works for quite some time, and will be a building site for several years still, but the UK is finally standing up its own Combat Aviation Brigade to bring some order in the convoluted and overlapping command arrangements of its helicopter forces.

I’ve known about this plan for many months, but couldn’t really talk about it before some sort of official announcement was released. This finally happened yesterday, even if, primarily because of the pandemic, it was an extremely low-key news.

I’ve been and I remain extremely critical of much of what the Army is doing and saying about its future, but for all it’s worth I can certainly say I am a big supporter of this one move. It is arguably long, long overdue and the brigading of the units involved in fielding aviation groups in support of british land forces has long featured in my recommendations for the future structures of the Army. 

The Wings of what once was 24 Air Mobile Brigade have been chosen as the TRF for the new 1 star command, 1^st Aviation Brigade (1st Avn Bde). Fun fact: in my proposals for the future, as far back as 2013, I had seen this coming. It has to be admitted, however, that it was a relatively easy guess: the other likely candidate was the Striking Eagle badge that used to be 16 Air Assault Brigade’s symbol until the return of Pegasus In 2018 and which has stuck around since as badge of the Attack Helicopter Force.

Back to serious matters, 1^st Aviation Brigade is the main component of a wider restructuring of Army aviation (known as Project COLINDALE) which has been very, very slowly progressing ever since 2015.

Primary drivers for change are the need to generate efficiencies; the need to build a C2 construct capable to brigade aviation elements in support of a Divisional deployment, rather than penny-packet groups only suited to brigade or sub-brigade deployments; and the ongoing review of the infrastructure footprint of the Army Air Corps.

Notoriously, all three Services have had to craft a plan to divest a lot of bases, barracks and land in an effort to achieve savings and enable the modernization of the remaining infrastructure. Army Aviation is supposed to do its bit in this project, but decisions on the future footprint remain elusive. Essentially, the biggest dilemma is whether to close down Middle Wallop or Wattisham, since Yeovilton is going nowhere and there isn’t a real alternative to keeping Aldergrove for operations in Northern Ireland.

Operations in Arctic conditions have been intense between 2019 and 2020, with the debut of british Apaches in Norway and their first arctic use of Hellfire missiles. This is part of the as yet unpublished "UK Defence in the High North" strategy in which the UK committs to a much increased role on the Norway flank of NATO for the next decade. 

From what can be observed from the outside, the closure of Wattisham with the migration soutwards of the Apache squadrons is the desired outcome, but clearly the complexity and cost of the move are very much preventing the sealing of a definitive plan. It is clear that the time for such a move is now, if not yesterday, since the transition between the current AH1 standard and the new Block III standard is soon to begin on the flightline, with the first remanufactured helicopters arriving this year. The Army would like to co-locate all Apache training phases, currently split between Conversion To Type carried out by 673 AAC at Middle Wallop and Conversion To Role  done by 653 AAC, Wattisham, with the ultimate objective of also merging the 2 squadrons into a single one (653 AAC).

3 and 4 Regiments will remain otherwise relatively unchanged, each with its two frontline squadrons and with an uplift to manpower in the ground element to sustain an higher operational tempo for high intensity operations.

In terms of Command and Control, aviation groups have so far deployed under the control of HQs pieced together from disparate Joint Helicopter Command resources, assigned to the commander of one of the constituent forces. The Commander of the Attack Helicopter Force has been the core for one such “makeshift” Aviation Task Force (ATF-1); Commando Helicopter Force provides another (ATF-2) and Support Helicopter Force (RAF Chinook and Puma 2 squadrons) provide the basis for a third.

The use of Force Commanders and augmentees from JHC is no longer judged sufficient as it lacks the command capacity and battle staff power needed to plan, refine and execute multiple tasks at the necessary speed, concurrency and endurance.

The formation of a permanent 1-star command with associated staff also offers the benefit of providing a “plug-in point” that better enables integration with international forces and, primarily, with the US Army’s own Combat Aviation Brigades. Most countries the UK will be working with, have long had a 1-star Aviation HQ directing employment of Aviation Battlegroups, and others, like France, have in recent times gone in the same direction.

1^st Aviation Brigade, based in Middle Wallop, will be born out of the progressive merging of the current Attack Helicopter Force (AHF) command element (the overarching command sitting above 3 and 4 Regiments AAC) with the Aviation Reconnaissance Force (ARF, essentially the overarching command element overseeing 1 and 5 Regiments AAC) and later of the Watchkeeper Force (WKF) as well.

Instead of having separate AHF and ARF forces, the Avn Bde will instead be a deputy commader in chief for the ATTACK and one for the FIND functions.

In preparation for the more ambitious role of Aviation in future Divisional operations, several large scale operations have seen whole AAC Apache squadrons flying long range strikes across the UK and even deep into France. The teaming of Wildcat and Apache, including the use of the first to laser-mark targets in favor of the Hellfire missiles of the latter, has also been tested and validated 

Watchkeeper will continue to be operated by 47 Regiment Royal Artillery, which continues to work on equipping and training 4 equipment batteries. The change of command won’t be particularly dramatic since 47 RA has been under Joint Helicopter Command control already since 31 august 2016, when it resubordinated from 1^st ISR Brigade as part of efforts to overcome the problems that have tormented this UAV capability in its work up to full service readiness.

Under the 31 (HQ) Bty, 10 (Assaye) Bty and 43 (Lloyd’s Company) Bty were the first subunits to become operational with Watchkeeper, and have since been joined by 74 (The battleaxe Company) Bty and finally by 57 (Bhurtpore) Bty, which resubordinated from 32 RA during 2019.

From 2019, Watchkeeper is finally cleared to fly from Boscombe Down. Intense operations are ongoing also from Akrotiri, Cyprus.

1 Regiment AAC has had to abandon all ambitions of eventually re-activating 669 AAC and 672 AAC squadrons on AW-159 WILDCAT, as had once been planned. These ex Lynx units have now disbanded, leaving the Regiment composed of 661 and 659 Squadrons, plus 652 as training unit delivering both Conversion to Type and to Role. The regiment will have the ability to force generate as an Aviation Battlegroup for deployment.

4 Regiment AAC has under command 656 and 664 Squadrons on Apaches. The first is the specialist in Apache shipboard operations and the primary supplier of Attack Helicopter support to 3 Commando Brigade. 664 is primarily aligned to 16 Air Assault Brigade. The regiment will increasingly contributed to the max output required by Division scale operations, however. It should eventually take responsibility also for the combined CTT and CTR training unit, 653 Sqn.

3 Regiment AAC has the Apache squadrons 662 and 663. Both Attack Helicopter regiments will have the ability to force generate as Aviation Battlegroups for deployment.

5 Regiment AAC will oversee internal security operations (essentially, Northern Ireland and Special Forces support) and will also oversee aviation support to training overseas (7 Flight in Brunei and 29 Flight in BATUS). The regiment is otherwise made up by 2 squadrons; 665 AAC operates Gazelle helicopters from Aldergrove, while 651 AAC operates fixed wing ISLANDER and DEFENDER aircraft from the same base. Since 1 April 2019, however, 651 Sqn has been transferred to the RAF and once the new arrangements eventually reach Full Operational Capability, 651 will be removed from the Army’s order of battle. 665 AAC is instead intended to re-equip with a new helicopter replacing Gazelle. The expectation is that a small number of H-145 helicopters will be acquired for the role. Some could also replace the Gazelles of 29 Flight in BATUS, Canada.

658 Squadron, which operates in support of the SAS with Dauphin helicopters, will sit under the regiment but clearly its actual line of command is somewhere else.

The Brigade also commands 6 Regiment AAC with its 4 squadrons of reservists (675. 677, 678 and 679) who backfill ground support roles positions and provide war establishment uplift to the manpower of regular squadrons.

The training regiments (2, 7 and 9) of the Army Air Corps will not be included in the brigade. With WILDCAT training delivered directly by 1 Regiment AAC via 652 Sqn and with the same approach eventually planned for adoption by 3 and 4 Regiments with 653 AAC taking over all phases of APACHE training, it is expected that 7 Regiment AAC will fold its remaining functions into 5 Regiment AAC (training for the successor to Gazelle and oversight of overseas flights) and then disband. There are no firm official dates yet for this to happen; the main obstacle being the enduring inability to agree on whether to vacate Wattisham.

2 Regiment will carry on delivering the early phases of AAC personnel training in 668 and 676 Squadrons.

9 Regiment has been recently stood up at RAF Shawbury as part of the Defence Helicopter Flying School and has taken under command 670 AAC and 60 RAF Squadrons. It works alongside 2 Maritime Air Wing which delivers training through 660 AAC and 705 NAS squadrons. This arrangement will carry on.  

The aviation brigade will deploy under 3(UK) Division for major divisional operations and will deploy scalable C2 elements and associated Aviation Battlegroups or Units of Action for smaller scale contingencies. The Brigade will be resourced to operate with “at least” 4 Avg BGs and will be able to take under command non-british formations.

In particular, it is assumed than in any “max effort” scenario requiring 3(UK) Division to be fielded, 1^st Aviation Brigade would have to deploy the vast majority of all frontline helicopter fleets, as it is expected than the Littoral Manoeuvre helicopter force (the Commando Helicopter Force with the MERLINs of 845 and 846 NAS plus the WILDCATs of 847 NAS, reinforced by 656 AAC with APACHEs and some CHINOOKs for heavy lift) would be required to operate as the same time as the main ground-based force.

Air mobility up to Company level is also assumed as requirement for Rear Area security: during a Divisional deployment, a Light Brigade formed out of units from 1^st (UK) Division would deploy with Rear Area security roles.

It is assumed that 2 Squadrons of CHINOOKs, for up to 26 helicopters in total, would be deployed for such a large scale operation. If massed together for a primary operation, these helicopters could easily airlift a whole air assault battalion in one wave. If realized, this ambition would mean deploying more Chinooks than are found normally in American CABs.

24 Apache would also be the target, same number as are found in an attack battalion within an American CAB.

The main weakness of british aviation is naturally Medium Lift. Wildcat has extremely limited lift capability, while the small number of Puma HC2s is expected to be, for the most part, busy with Special Forces requests. The Americans, conversely, employ large numbers of Black Hawks, including several permanently tasked with CASEVAC / MEDEVAC role. French, Italians, Germans and others count on large numbers of NH-90 for the medium lift, but, with the sole exception of Germany, are in turn much weaker in terms of heavy lift.

Apart from the new and enhanced capabilities of command and execution of multiple concurrent operations, the Brigade will benefit from a substantial restructuring of 7 Battalion REME, which also includes 132 Squadron, Royal Logistic Corps, combining Equipment Support and repair with logistic sustainment of the deployed force.

Regimental REME workshops within 1, 3 and 4 Regiments will be restructured and strengthened with their own Equipment Support platoons and vehicle platoon for sustaining increased tempo of operations in the field.

The 3 british Chinooks deployed in Mali give much needed Heavy Lift support to the french forces in the region. In their first year of deployment they flew for 1192 hours, lifting 7,052 soldiers and 475 tonnes of freight 

On top of those organic resources, 7 REME will provide a 2^nd line of Aviation Close Support in the field, with two Aviation Companies (71 and 72) and a Field Company specializing in Recovery (70 Fd Coy). 73 Aviation Coy relocated to Yeovilton in the last few years and will merge with 1 AAC regiment’s workshop elements to provide organic support.

1^st Aviation Brigade is very much inspired by the US Army’s own CABs, but, for the moment at least, will continue to suffer of some of the typically british over-convoluted and overlapping layers of command and inter-service arrangements. 

Somewhat counter-intuitively, for example, the brigade does not seem destined to include 244 Signal Squadron, the designate aviation support comms units, which remains more loosely at JHC level, despite the unquestioned need for Communication and Information Support. I fully expect experience in the field to eventually lead to the resubordination of said squadron into the brigade, regardless of what the assumptions are right now.

More significantly, while 1^st Avn Bde will have very significant organic FIND and ATTACK capabilities thanks to WILDCAT, WATCHKEEPER and APACHE, it won’t have direct day to day control over Manoeuvre helicopters as the CHINOOK and PUMA Squadrons are part of the RAF.

Connection with these crucial elements will be maintained through the higher level of command (Joint Helicopter Command), and deployed support helicopters will fall under 1^st Avn Bde control during operations. Even then, it is acknowledged that “support helicopter squadrons have less organic life support than attack and recce formations and are not expected to manoeuvre in the same way”.

Similarly, the brigade won’t have direct control of the Tactical Supply Wing and Joint Helicopter Support Squadron.

This once again brings into focus the unhelpful awkwardness of having the troop carrying helicopters, quite frankly, sitting under the “wrong” Service. I don’t intend to denigrate the RAF’s commitment to the Support Helicopter Force, much as I will be inexorably accused of doing exactly that. I believe I’m simply stating a fact of life.

I will also immediately acknowledge that it is, at the moment and in the foreseeable future at the very least, almost unthinkable to prospect a transfer of CHINOOK and PUMA in Army hands. The effects on manpower could admittedly be disastrous if a well established RAF “family” was broken up, dramatically changing the career prospects of those who serve into it. Moreover, the Army is the Service that is most severely struggling with recruitment and retention, as well as grappling with decades of accumulated obsolescence across its structures and vehicle fleets, leading to a budget which is already broken as it is. As a consequence, I am NOT recommending a transfer at this time, although I will forever remark that it should be an objective for the future, perhaps to be incrementally implemented alongside the purchase of new build CHINOOKs to replace the oldest airframes in the coming years (assuming that the ongoing CHINOOK Capability Sustainment Programme does survive the new Integrated Review, of course). 

Transferring capabilities is difficult, but not impossible: the already mentioned case of 651 AAC is an example, and the transfer of MERLIN HC3 to the Navy is another.

What I am unashamedly urging is the immediate consideration of alternative joint solutions to bring the Support Helicopter Force into the Aviation Brigade and to restructure CHINOOK and PUMA 2 ground support / life support elements to deliver a more homogeneous capability for manoeuvre and flexible basing. As of now, APACHE and WILDCAT units are aiming for an increased ability to deploy forward and switch between Forward Operating Bases and multiple FARPs to operate in bitterly contested scenarios, while CHINOOK and PUMA 2 remain more decisively tied to availability of a better established Main Operating Base.

In addition, I believe that any honest appraisal of the resources available would conclude that creating a coherent Aviation Sustainment Battalion by combining Tactical Supply Wing, JHSS and 132 RLC Sqn is the sound thing to do. 7 REME could then focus entirely on Equipment Support.

Finally, proper planning should go into an integrated plan for adjusting / expanding the warfighting establishment as required, with Reserve support coming both from 6 AAC Regiment and from Royal Auxiliary Air Force formations. 1^st Aviation Brigade will indeed include 6 AAC Regiment in its structure exactly for that purpose, and RauxAF elements connected to the Support Helicopter Force will, in a way or another, end up involved in any case.

Better to properly develop the arrangements in peacetime than scramble later when deployment time comes.

Army 2020 Refine: a proposal

This post summarizes, in broad points, my proposal for the reworked structure of the British Army as the forces try to turn Joint Force 2025 into a reality.
So far, very little, if anything, is known about "Army 202 Refine", the internal British Army effort to try and make sense of the SDSR's "Strike Brigades" and other changes that were announced before being properly thought out.
My proposal attempts to close some capability gaps and bring a better balance to the force structure, correcting several weaknesses of Army 2020.

The main assumptions behind this proposal are:

- Regular Manpower capped at 82.000
- No real additional resources

As such, it can only be a case of shifting resources from an area to the other to achieve a better end result. Army 2020 is poor of supports and deployable brigades, with over half of its (understrength) infantry thrown messily into that big bag that is the current "Adaptable Force".

Rationalize HQs

Army 2020 has a recognized shortage of Signal specialists, which have been sacrificed in 2010 to avoid cutting other infantry battalions. The shortage is making it complex to support brigade and division HQs, and the Multi Role Signal regiments rotation is already in crisis. Last year, after a brief experience of regiments rotating in and out of role, the army made a U-turn and 3^rd Signal Regiment resumed its “Divisional” title, returning full time to division support.

Army 2020 and the other internal studies carried out by the Army have reaffirmed again and again the importance of having a 2-star HQ level to handle the “strategic” picture and allow the brigade(s) to focus on the tactical side. But for all the good intentions expressed, the British Army is nonetheless down to a single deployable division HQ (3^rd UK Div) while 1^st UK Div would first require augmentation and the generation of a supporting signal regiment from the little resources available.

On the other hand, the Army is working to generate a new “Standing Joint Task Force HQ”, and maintains support for the ARRC and two small “Early Entry HQs”.

As for brigade-level communications and ICS support, the Army has a single sqn in support of the Air Assault Task force generated from 16 Air Assault brigade and 4 Multi-Role signal regiments to cover for the three Reaction Force brigades and everything drawn from the Adaptable Force.

The shortage is real: the whole Adaptable Force, with its 7 “brigades” does not include a single assigned Royal Signal formation. Not one.

With the Army moving to a 4 reaction brigades structure (2 armoured and 2 “strike”), the Multi-Role Signal regiments will probably stop pretending to rotate in and out of role and will end up aligning permanently each to a particular brigade.

It is fundamental to rationalize the HQs and the (insufficient) resources that support them. The largest deficit is in Royal Signal regiments. Entire formations are needed yet inexistent, and there are obvious difficulties in trying to re-generate such specialized, training-intensive formations, even if Light Role infantry battalions were cut and manpower allocations shifted. It would still be complex, expensive and slow to recruit, train and organize the very many communication specialists needed.

So, how do we improve the current situation?

By cutting the ARRC. Or, at least, by removing the signal resources assigned to it.

Sometimes, when talking about defence, the infamous “vanity project” accusation comes up. I despise that kind of argument, but if there is one area where it is applicable, it is in the area of big, hulking NATO Corps level commands. Europe is crammed full of 3 Star land HQs, as everyone wants to get the chance to be the leader in a large NATO operation. The UK has the ARRC, France has its own 3 star HQ, Italy has another, Spain has one, Germany and Netherlands maintain another, one is in Greece, one in Poland, one in Turkey. And there is the Eurocorps too, which is not a NATO formation but is linked by an agreement that allows its employment.

There is a shortage of deployable Divisions to populate army Corps, but HQ-wise, we are well covered.

It is my opinion that the UK and NATO would both be better served by a more rationally structured and equipped British Army, better able to support enduring operations.

Re-roling and re-assigning the resources of 30 and 22 Signal Regiment would greatly ease the Royal Signal crisis, and reduce the amount of extra formations to be rebuilt. It would still be necessary to raise a number of squadrons to complete the force structure:

-          The two Early Entry HQs would become aligned with the HQs of 16 Air Assault and 3 Commando brigades. Being the early entry formations, they are best placed to be the first Joint Forces command deployed in a theatre of operation. This will also restore both formations to “true” brigade status, from their current resourcing more adequate to just generating and supporting a battlegroup.

-          The two Deployable Division HQs would become the frameworks of two Joint Task Forces HQs. They will have a “traditional” manoeuvre division HQ element and a more capable Joint Force main HQ element within the same organization, and will each have a Divisional Signal Regiment as enabler.

-          244 Sqn, 30 Signal Regiment is currently the only formation tasked with providing communication support to aviation elements. A second Av Sp Sqn would be required, and would have to be formed, in order to assign one formation to each Combat Aviation Brigade.

-          216 Signal Sqn should be expanded to a Multi Role Signal Regiment. This would require taking command of 250 Gurkha Signal Sqn (currently part of 30 Signal Regiment, but already tasked with support to the Air Assault Task Force) and of at least part of 258 Sqn (also from 30 Regiment), which is tasked with supporting and enabling the Early Entry HQs. 3 Commando brigade’s signal element will get a similar reinforcement.

-          30 Signal Regiment will need, effectively, 3 new squadrons to replace the existing ones, which will keep their specialization and will move towards the relevant supported HQs. 30 Signal Regiment will become a Multi Role Signal Regiment of the brigade type.

The end result should be:

-          6 Brigade-level Multi Role Signal Regiments (2, 21, 22, 30, 16 and another formed with 216 Parachute Signal Sqn as base). Two regiments in heavy armour role, two in mechanized role and 2 Light / Air Assault.

-          2 Divisional Signal Regiments (1, 3)

-          2 Aviation Support Squadrons

These resources are meant to enable the re-organization of the Field Army upon two identical Divisions, on the same general model followed by the French Armee de Terre, with each formation including one Light / Air Mobile formation (parachute role to stay focused within 16 Air Assault Bde only); one Medium (or Strike, if you prefer) bde and one Heavy bde. The Division will have its own Logistic Brigade, an Artillery Group and an attached “Combat Aviation Brigade.

The two divisions will alternate yearly into readiness.

HQ UK Support Command would control the remaining elements of the Army, with “London District” replaced by a Brigade-level HQ, the Guards Brigade.

Combined Arms Regiments

Resources available: 227 Challenger 2; 245 Warrior CSP in IFV configuration; FV432 Bulldog then ABSV

Army 2020 has 3 Type 56 tank regiments, each with 3 large squadrons of 18 tanks plus 2 for the RHQ. Exercises have shown that this arrangement (and in general the number of tanks available) is not sufficient to provide MBT support to all battlegroups generated from the brigade.

The Warrior CSP programme will retrofit 245 vehicles with the new turret and 40mm gun. This number appears insufficient to equip 6 armoured infantry battalions, especially considering a healthy number of vehicles is assigned to BATUS.

Each tank and armoured infantry regiment should enjoy a recce element with 8 Ajax vehicles, but this will become hard to accomplish now than a fourth cavalry regiment is required for the 2^nd Strike Brigade.

One solution to these issues is the Combined Arms Regiment, already adopted years ago by the US Army and, in several variations, by Israel, Italy and others.

The existing 3 tank and 6 armoured infantry regiments / battalions would be integrated to generate six new units, named “regiments” and formally composed of two “battalions” (for capbadges preservation, mostly):

-          1 “battalion” with 2 tank companies, each with 14 Challenger 2. Ideally, 2 more tanks would be required for the HQ

-          1 “battalion” on 2 armoured infantry companies, each with 14 Warrior CSP

-          1 regimental HQ Coy

-          1 regimental Support Coy with mortars and ATGW

-          1 regimental Reconnaissance Coy with 3 recce troops (8 Ajax plus as many Ares APCs and/or Warrior CSP carrying dismounts) plus Sniper platoon and Pioneers (the snipers commonly end up working in close collaboration with the recce platoon anyway)

This extremely powerful formation is, in practice, a formed, stable battlegroup. Each of the two armoured brigades would have 3 of these, which could alternate regularly in the role of Lead Armoured Battlegroup at high readiness. Supplemented by one squadron from the brigade’s Cavalry regiment; one artillery element from the brigade’s Fires regiment and one logistic and support group, it would make for a very capable early entry heavy force.

Having three in each brigade could allow an 18 months readiness period, in which each battlegroup is at high readiness for 6 months.

This should enable a somewhat reduced pressure on personnel, which could otherwise end up facing a demanding schedule in the passage from a 3-brigades to a 2-brigades rotation model.

Supports

The centralization of supports that took place in the last few years will be, in good measure, reversed. Signal Regiments first of all: it has already become evident (arguably, it always was, if you ask me) that the “rotation” does not really work. My suggestion for the future army assumes that signal regiments will be closely related to a brigade or division HQ.

1 Signal Brigade would be disbanded as a consequence of the end of the ARRC mission as detailed earlier.

Artillery regiments will also return to a formal alignment with the respective brigades. 1^st Artillery Brigade will be replaced by two smaller Artillery Group HQs attached each to a Division. This group will have much the same functions as the resurrected Div Arty commands in US Army divisions, ensuring both coherence in training, force structure and methods and a greater connection with the division’s commander and the maneuver forces.

The Div Arty group will also regularly control the assigned Air Defence Regiment generated from Joint Ground Based Air Defence, with 12 and 16 Regiments alternating in readiness and coming with a mix of Stormer HVM and FLAADS Land Ceptor batteries.

3 AS90 batteries will re-role on L118 as one Heavy brigade converts into a mechanized / Strike formation.

A 4^th Precision Fires battery on GMLRS and Exactor should however be formed, so that each Heavy and Strike brigade have one.

Reserve Artillery regiments on L118 will be disbanded and the batteries assigned directly to the currently small and rather under-strength Adaptable and Air Assault artillery regiments on L118. These regiments currently have only 12 guns each (in two batteries of 6 in the case of 7 RHA, possibly in 3 batteries of 4 elsewhere, a final decision might not have been made yet).

They should be ideally uplifted each to 3 batteries of six guns, but it might only be possible to achieve a 3x4 structure due mainly to manpower problems. The two Light / Air Assault regiments should receive two reserve gun batteries each.

4 Royal Artillery Regiment is currently classed as “Adaptable Regiment – Large”, as it has 6 batteries, having an extra Tac Gp Bty in force. It is the obvious candidate to become the Fires element of the second Strike Brigade, converting its “extra” bty to GMLRS.

Some manpower will become available thanks to the downgrade of one of the regiments currently on AS90. It should be enough to make the extra GMLRS Bty possible.

7 RHA should also see V Parachute Battery brought out of Suspended Animation to return to a 3 gun batteries structure.

Close Support Engineer regiments will also be aligned to the brigades. The current two adaptable regiments only have two regular squadrons, plus 1 or two reserve squadrons. The Parachute and Commando regiments also have only 2 regular squadrons each, plus 1 reserve. An uplift would be required, but the manpower margin from “downgrading” one regiment from Heavy Armour to Mechanized will probably only suffice to fix one of the two Adaptable regiments, to cover the second Strike brigade. Additional manpower can only be obtained at the expense of infantry posts, if the total is to stay at just 82.000.

The uplift would be needed as currently 21 and 32 RE have each only two regular squadrons and one reserve sqn. 23 PARA and 24 Commando are in the same situation, and all would benefit from an extra regular sqn.

The logistic element requires a rethink. Army 2020 leaves the Army with the Reaction Brigades well supported each by a Close Support, a Theatre support and a Reserve transport regiments, while the support available to the Adaptable Brigades is made up by two bare-bones “Force Support” regiments.

A re-organization is needed, to create a modern “Brigade Support Regiment”, in Heavy, Medium and Light variants, thought to cover the needs of a maneuver brigade in the field, with the Theatre level of support held back at divisional level, within the Logistic Brigade.

It is important that the Brigade HQ is not detached from the logistic element of maneuver: the brigade commander must be very much involved in the logistical aspect, always. He cannot and should not attempt to maneuver without having a clear understanding and grip over logistics in his area.

At the same time, the commander must be relieved of theatre-wide considerations, which must be handled at a superior level.

Close Support Logistic is a brigade task, Theatre Support should be a Division task, handled through the Logistic Brigade.

Close Support Logistics must also include the maintenance of vehicles and equipment, so that the brigade’s REME battalion is also an important part of the restructuring. Closely related is also the medical aspect: the experience of brigade logistic support in other countries (but also, to stay within the UK, in 3 Commando Brigade) shows that Medical, Equipment Support, Fuel and general stores are so closely related to be pretty commonly reunited inside the very same regiment (It happens in 3 Commando but also in US BCTs and in Italian army brigades, to make a few examples).

Each Brigade should have its own “Support Group” comprising a capable Brigade Logistic Regiment, a REME Equipment Support battalion and the Medical Regiment.

Theatre-level support, movement of supplies, transport of heavy vehicles, reception staging and onwards movement (RSOM) and field hospitals are instead better left at the Divisional Level, via Logistic Brigade.

The relevant elements will be generated from Force Troops Command to compose the Vanguard Enabling Group.

The Brigade Logistic Regiments would be built from the existing Close Support Regiments (1, 3, 4 RLC) and from the Adaptable Force Logistic Regiments (6, 7 RLC). The latter will need expansion, as currently they are composed only of one supply sqn and a Fuel Sqn plus HQ.

13 Air Assault Regiment RLC would be restructured to accommodate a wider brigade role compared to its current structure, optimized for support to the sole Air Assault Task Force.

The three Theatre Support Regiments would redistribute part of their manpower and capability and would become two, held at Logistic Brigade level.

Currently the Army has a single Tank Transporter Sqn. It might make sense to recreate a second sqn, so each Division has its own. This will also depend on the future face of this capability, as the current PFI arrangement ends in 2024 and there is no info yet on what will be done next.

REME resources would also need to be redistributed and re-arranged. Each brigade should have a capable Equipment Support Battalion, which would be obviously larger in equipment-intensive Heavy Brigades and smaller in the Light Brigades. The current 3 armoured close support REME formations (3, 4 and 6) can cover the two Heavy Brigades and one Strike Brigade (one regiment will become a bit smaller as it is “downgraded” to mechanized). 1 and 2 REME battalions currently are 2-companies formations assigned  to the Adaptable Force. Each would need uplift, with one being assigned to the second Strike Brigade and one to the Light Brigade.

16 Air Assault Brigade currently only has 8 Field Coy REME, under command of the RLC Regiment. This needs to be uplifted to a light role REME battalion by adding two extra coys and one HQ.

Finally, each Division should have its “Theatre-level” Force Support battalion. Currently, only one exists (5 REME). Another should be raised, with both becoming Hybrid formations with 2 regular and 2 reserve companies.

This substantial restructuring would be eased somewhat by the fact that at least 6 regimental Light Aid Detachments would become available for reassignment as the Tank regiments are incorporated into the Combined Arms Regiments and at least 3 Light Role infantry battalions are disbanded. The RLC restructuring could also possibly free up some resources.

Combat Aviation Brigades

Despite the efforts of Joint Helicopter Command, the integration between aviation and land forces is still cause of concerns, as evidenced in the Operation Herrick lessons learned report. To try and improve the alignment of precious helicopter resources with the readiness cycle of the land forces, my proposal is to form two deployable Combat Aviation Brigades. Their structure would make force structure of readiness mechanism that, in large part, already exist. Under Army 2020, for example, the two Attack Helicopter regiments alternate yearly into readiness, and align one squadron with the Air Assault Task Force and one with the Amphibious Task Force.

The Attack regiments are also tasked with generating a deployable Aviation HQ element, and another is generated by the RAF’s Support Helicopter Force.

The Aviation HQ, in my proposal, would be enhanced and removed from the regiments, to be concentrated at brigade level with the formation of the two CABs.

Each CAB would have:

-          One HQ, structured to support 2 deployable elements alternating into readiness

-          One Signal Sqn (the existing 244 and another)

-          One Reconnaissance, Command Support and Light Utility regiment with two WILDCAT Sqns

-          One Attack Regiment with two APACHE Sqns

-          One Support Regiment with one CHINOOK and one PUMA Sqns

-          One Aviation Support Battalion, composed of elements from the current Joint Helicopter Support Squadron (LZ management, underslung loads); logistic element from 132 RLC Sqn, Fuel element from the Tactical Supply Wing and Aviation Support Coy REME.

-          One RAF Regiment Field Sqn for force protection and for MERT defence

-          One Watchkeeper battery, in close contact with the ISR brigade

Joint Helicopter Command would maintain direct control of the Joint Special Forces Support Wing (including one CHINOOK Sqn) as well as of the training units, including 673 Sqn (APACHE OCU), 653 Sqn (APACHE Conversion to Role), 652 (WILDCAT OCU) and 28 Sqn (Puma and Chinook OCU). The two deployable brigades would be aligned each to an Army Division. The elements needed for the CABs are mostly already existent, although adjustements would be required.

Mechanized and Light brigades

Each mechanized brigade should have one Cavalry regiment on Ajax and three infantry battalions mounted on MIV vehicles. These infantry elements should be large and capable, and be built to the numbers of the Army 2020 Heavy Protected Mobility Battalions. This means being established for 709 men and women, and currently there are only 3 such battalions planned: 3 more will need to re-role and expand in order to form two brigades.

Obviously, the required manpower will have to come out of other battalions. The fourth and additional Armoured Cavalry regiment will also require a shift of resources within the cavalry. The formation of the Combined Arms Regiments in the Armoured Brigades should help in freeing up some personnel both in the Cavalry, Infantry and REME domains, but wider restructuring will be required.

Two Light Cavalry regiments would be assigned to the Light / Air Assault brigades. The third would give its Colours to the resurrected CBRN Regiment, and part of its manpower would shift towards 3 Commando Brigade to help form a Cavalry element within 30 Commando IX.

The Light Brigades would be structured on 4 regular infantry battalions each. 16 Air Assault Brigade would keep the 2 PARA battalions (and with them, the Parachute entry role and capability) and add two Light Protected Mobility battalions. 51 Brigade would have two Light Role / Air Mobile battalions and two Light Protected Mobility Battalions.

The Light role and Light Protected Mobility battalions should receive a manpower uplift to at least restore the lost rifle platoons that were sacrificed within Army 2020 planning.

16 Air Assault needs extra REME resources: it has been given 8 Field Company, removed from 7 Battalion REME, but needs to receive further resources to form a Lightweight Equipment Support Battalion commensurate to the task of supporting the enlarged brigade’s capability.

In order to make possible the restructuring of the Army, manpower margins have to be created, and the only way to do so while preserving wider capability is to cut a number of Light Role infantry battalions. At least 3 battalions would be removed from the ORBAT, resulting in over 1600 posts “recovered” and available for other uses. Of these, 450 would go to beef up three battalions for the second Strike Brigade, and another 600 to reinforce the Light Protected and Light Role battalions in the two Light brigades. The Royal Signals expansion would absorb much of what’s left, and any remaining margin would be useful in Royal Engineers, REME or Artillery figures.  

28 battalions are enough to sustain the proposed force structure and continue with all other commitments (1 Special Forces Support Group, 2 Public Duty battalions, 2 battalions in Cyprus, 1 in Brunei), with a margin of 2 Light Role battalions (at Army 2020 establishment) for Defence Engagement and other tasks.

So I believe that, overall, this proposed structure delivers the best balance of capability and makes the best possible use of available manpower, vehicles and equipment. It closes some of the worst gaps that Army 2020 created, and does so at an overall acceptable cost for the infantry.

The Army's deficits - UPDATE

Are 82.000 men too few? Yes, especially if you waste them.

There is little doubt that 82.000 regulars are a small manpower base for a major army like the british one. The limit has been met by accepting constraints almost anywhere, and some other limitations have only been narrowly avoided (example: the 60mm handheld mortars remain, but at one point they were due to be shelved in all but PARA and Commando battalions). However, 82.000 is not a shabby number. If used well, it can still sustain a good combat force. The problem is that the british army is not using its 82.000 regulars in a way that makes sense, due to political interference. Namely, due to the 2010 order from HMG to cut a maximum of five infantry battalions, to avoid a loss of capbadges. I bang on this problem quite often, but it is indispensable to do so, because this single order is continuing to cause absurd distortions in the force structure.

The biggest and most amazing issue is that, due to the conflicting requirements caused by the 2010 orders, 7 out of 11 army brigades are currently undeployable. They are a container of precious resources (3 cavalry regiments, 2 artillery regiments, 2 logistic, 2 REME, 2 artillery, 2 medical and over half of the infantry battalions) piled up messily and destined to be thrown together yearly to form a “brigade package” which, in an enduring operation abroad, would have to cover the 4^th and 5^th deployment in the 5-deployments cycle.

There is a lot of value in the Adaptable Force. Yet, all of it is of dubious actual employability. The infantry battalions are scrawny: they have been kept around, but all rifle companies are short of one platoon. Every area has been cut back to the bare minimum of men needed.

The Light Cavalry regiments have no direct firepower greater than that offered by HMG and GMG.

The Artillery regiments have a mere 12 L118 Light Guns each, and the supporting elements (command, REME, etcetera) have been cut to the bare bone.

The Logistic Regiments are down to 2 squadrons plus HQ Sqn.

And there is not a single Royal Signal regiment in the whole Adaptable Force.

The Signal deficit

Amazingly, the 7 brigades of the Adaptable Force have access to zero dedicate Signal support. There is not a single Signal regiment tasked with supporting the Adaptable Force. Under Army 2020, Signal resources have been “centralized” under 1^st and 11^th Signal Bdes. In particular, the 11^th Brigade groups the signal regiments destined to ensuring brigades and divisions can communicate. 5 “Multi Role Signal Regiments” have been formed and put in Group 7. The reserve Signal Regiments form Group 2.

Group 2 is tasked with the provision of UK ICS support. The regiments are not deployable, but they are paired with the regular ones and provide reinforcement to them.

That leaves 5 regular regiments which are tasked with providing communications for brigades, divisions and all supporting elements (logistic brigades, field hospitals, theatre entry units from 104 Log Bde). Between 2011 and 2015, the plan has been for the 5 regiments to be restructured to the same shape and capability, to enable seamless transition from one position to another in the Readiness Cycle and in the Army’s ORBAT.

The FORM (Formation Readiness cycle) was thus intended to be spread over 5 years, with each regiment spending three years aligned with one of the Reaction Force armoured infantry brigades (a complete cycle Other Tasks Year, Training Year, Readiness Year) before moving on to spend one year aligned with the Reaction Force Division HQ (providing the Forward and Main HQ and support for attached units) and finally conclude the FORM with a “Committed Year” delivering ICS support to… whoever needs it across the army, including troops in Afghanistan for Op TORAL to forces busy in the Middle East under Op SHADER and all sorts of other small deployments (training tasks and defence engagement tasks abroad).

If an enduring operation popped up and had to be supported, the “Committed Year” probably would entail deploying in support of the Adaptable Brigade going in the field, even though this would inexorably break Harmony Guidelines.

Let that sink in: half of the army (and the majority of its brigades) has no assured, dedicate communications support.

The whole wisdom and feasibility of the “centralization” of resources is called into question. It just can’t really work, no matter how many buzzwords are thrown at the plan to make it look like “innovation”. What the Multi Role Signal Regiment concept does is providing uniformity in structures and capabilities across the regiments and deliver Signal units that can actually meet the needs of a brigade / division HQ in the field. But did the restructuring of signal resources also require the removal from the supported brigades and division?

The current multi role signal regiment has:

-          one armoured squadron, mounted on Bulldog, delivering the manoeuvre HQ for the Division or Armoured Infantry Brigade. Effectively, these are the Brigade Signal Sqns of the pre-2011 era, removed from the brigades and incorporated into Signal regiments.

-          one squadron delivering communications support to Vanguard Enabling elements from 104 Log Sup Bde and Force Troops Command

-          one squadron delivering FALCON Trunk service and SATCOM to enable operations of the deployed force and of its supporting elements

In the Division support role, one squadron is needed to deliver the Main HQ, a huge field deployable command structure comprising 50 or more DRASH tents, 2 FALCON elements, a REACHER Satcom access point and hundreds of other elements.

The complexity of the Division Support role and the changes it requires to training, equipment and structure have ended up making the originally envisaged FORM mechanism almost unworkable. The result…? Months after shelving “Division Signal Regiment” from its title, 3 Signal Regiment is now once more called 3 (UK) Division Signal Regiment, and while remaining under OPCON of 11^th Signal Brigade, it is now permanently aligned to the divisional task, giving a “4 + 1” FORM.

Three regiments (21, 1 and 16) have already taken up the intended Multi Role Signal Regiment structure. 2 Signal Regiment, on the other hand, has stopped its restructuring to provide much needed Signal support to all deployed packages during 2016: this includes a multitude of short term training tasks and other duties in Africa and elsewhere; support to BATUK training etcetera. To make things more complex still, HMG keeps piling up commitments on the shoulders of the Army, having committed 4 Brigade HQ for High Readiness in the 3^rd and 4^th quarters of this year as framework HQ of the European Union Battlegroup, while also promising some personnel to the Spanish-led NATO Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (Land) 16.

So, an area already stretched thin is stretched thinner still, with 2 Signal Regiment tasked to send men all over the place, literally.

Hilarity will ensue when the Army tries to make sense of Joint Force 2025, with its 4 regular, reaction brigades (up from 3). That will probably entail the definitive abandonment of the Army 2020 “centralization” and FORM rotation. With 3rd Signal Regiment already committed to the Divisional role, there are just 4 regiments for 4 brigades of two types (armoured, tracked – mechanized, wheeled). It seems fair to assume that the Signal Regiments will align permanently each to a single brigade, and that will end the “innovation” of Army 2020.

Cuts are not innovation.

Elsewhere, centralization is just as virtual: Artillery, REME, Medical, Logistic units, all obviously need to reflect the characteristics of the brigade they are meant to support, so that huge differences exist between the regiments committed to supporting the Reaction Force and those left for the Adaptable Force.

Again, does it even make any real sense to keep these units formally separated from the manoeuvre brigades? As I’ve said many times already, I think no, it does not make actual sense. No one else is doing it and the US Army, the only one which had done something remotely similar by giving its Brigade Combat Teams only token engineer elements, grouping the rest into brigades, is going back to fix the mess.

Moreover, the problem of the Enduring Operation remains: math is a cruel mistress, and the British Army continues to be at least 1 Signal Regiment short of the minimum requirement for 5 brigades to alternate in the field.  

The Firepower deficit

The british army ranks among the lightest in the world when it comes to generating firepower. It does not employ 120mm mortars in its battalions; it does not have vehicle-borne ATGWs; it fields Cavalry Regiments which have in the Grenade Machine Gun their most powerful direct fire solution, etcetera, etcetera.

There is also a lot of curiosity ahead of the selection of a solution for the Mechanized Infantry Vehicle (MIV) requirement. Will it still be a simple APC, with no firepower option greater than an RWS with a .50 or GMG if we are lucky…?

The british army has been deeply impressed by the French operations in Mali and has found in those the ultimate argument in favor of the “medium weight force”, based on the 8x8, which it has been pursuing for decades (without any success so far). British soldiers have been training on the VBCI in France, getting to know it, its merits and the tactics connected with the vehicle.

However, it must be noted that VBCI did well in Mali because it is an IFV, with a turret and a 25mm gun. The gun bit cannot be ignored. The french army has found itself in difficulty in Mali when faced by columns of pick-ups armed with 14.5mm Russian machine guns and the ubiquitous 23mm ZSU cannons and other heavy weaponry. Those weapons outgun and outrange the .50 HMG, and represent a serious threat. In Afghanistan the problem was not quite as keenly felt due to how the Taliban fight and act, but in Mali the French army ended up pulling out the old 20mm AA guns to fit them on the back of trucks to outgun or at least match the firepower and reach of the 14.5 and 23mm on the enemy pick ups. We are not even talking about the firepower of a Russian mechanized formation, but of ISIS-level cheap crap, which can already be enough to create serious risks and difficulties.  

The "Strike Brigade", if the MIV ends up being an APC with a RWS, will be outgunned by pretty much anyone on earth, and all direct firepower requirements will fall on a handful of Ajax from the brigade’s cavalry regiment, being used not just for recce but as "medium armour" element as well.
It is worth reminding that FRES SV originally included a specific "medium armour" variant. That was a serious item, armed with the 120mm gun.
But now Medium Armour is merely another double-hatting of the recce variant.

Ahead of the MIV (and ABSV, hopefully) decision, the British Army should reconsider its firepower capabilities. Everyone and their dog are rethinking the merry and unarmed 8x8 APCs. Poland is putting remote 30mm gun turrets complete with SPIKE missiles on its Rosomak in the APC version. Even Germany is thinking about putting Puma turrets on Boxer. The US Army is rethinking the Stryker and working to put an unmanned turret with a 30mm gun on it. And even before that, Stryker battalions were supposed to include a number of Mobile Gun System vehicles with the 105mm gun, now possibly to be replaced by the new Mobile Protected Firepower once they fund and select a vehicle for the requirement.

Are they the mad ones? Don't think so. Of course, money is always a problem. Turrets and guns have a cost. But if the Strike Brigade is to be useful and, at least to a degree, able to deploy alone and get the job done exploiting its strategic and tactical mobility, the MIV must have firepower.

At least one vehicle in each MIV section should carry an unmanned turret with a serious gun, ideally the same 40mm employed by Warrior and Ajax, if you ask me.

Indeed, in my mind the Light Cavalry regiments need some guns with more punch and reach than HMG and GMG, too. And quickly, because the French experience proves how easy it would be to put a current Light Cavalry formation in trouble.

Workable solutions to this problem exist, and have been put forwards in France and in the US, where the M230 30mm chain gun used on the Apache has been adapted to vehicle RWS weighting as little as 450 kg (including 250 rounds), which have been tested on Humvees and M-ATV vehicles and even on the little, Chinook-internally transportable Flyer. While putting the CTA 40mm gun on Jackal does not seem to be doable, a number of vehicles in each regiment could be armed relatively easily with the land variant of the 30mm gun used by the Apache attack helicopter. This would also have the merit of not introducing a new cannon and a new stock of ammunition to manage: commonality with the Army Air Corps would ease things somewhat. Lethality out to 2 km would be vastly improved. 

The M230 on the Flyer lightweight vehicle. This could be a low-pain solution to the firepower deficit in the Light Cavalry.

Both the MIV and the ABSV mortar carrier variants should come fitted with 120mm mortars. The 81 mm mortar makes sense for Light formations, but armoured and mechanized battalions, which aren’t as tormented by weight issues, should really adequate their firepower to what is by now the international standard. 

The US Army has awakened to the weakness of Light Role infantry brigades and early-entry parachute forces which lack mechanization and direct fire punch. The Mobile Protected Firepower, for which BAE is offering a renewed and improved M8 light tank, aims to provide Infantry BCTs and Air Assault / Parachute BCTs with an air-droppable, light, protected, well armed fire support platform. It could also end up replacing the rather unsuccesful Stryker Mobile Gun System in Stryker brigades. In the meanwhile, the US Army is funding unmanned turrets with 30mm guns for its Stryker troop carriers. The UK should take notice of both developments.

The Army “hopes” to have an ABSV variant in the ATGW role, possibly reinstating vehicle-borne long range anti-tank missile capability in the British forces after many years of gap. The MIV should come with an ATGW variant as well, arguably with even greater urgency since the Strike Brigades will not include tanks to relay upon.

The EW deficit

Another important programme for the future is Landseeker, the tentative of Land command to procure new EW systems. Ever since Soothsayer was cancelled, the army has been able to make progress in this field only with the purchase of Light systems, procured as UOR for use in Afghanistan.

But one of the lessons of the war in Ukraine is that EW really is game-changing, and Russian formations make ample use of it. The british army needs to acquire more capable systems not to be shut out of this particular fight.

Lessons from Op Herrick

The Army has released part of the document produced to summarize the lessons of operations in Afghanistan. They are many, but several are related to aviation support and manoeuvre. The ability to move troops by air, using helicopters, is a recognized key strategic ability, yet the army fears that, with the end of operations in Afghanistan, the helicopters will tend to be available only for the PARAs. Maybe this concern has something to do with how 16 Air Assault Brigade has been split from the Apache helicopter regiments and pulled out of Joint Helicopter Command. Specific aviation needs which have long been neglected are also mentioned, including medical evacuation via MERT teams, which are not normally available, and helicopter transport for the commanders.

The crucial importance of aviation to the whole army and the need for enduring close integration make me think, not for the first time, that the one Force Support Brigade that Army 2020 should have given us was the Combat Aviation Brigade.

This belief is further reinforced by the observations contained in the Herrick campaign review about the different tour length for aviation personnel and the problems in ensuring that ground forces and air forces deployments remain connected properly. More must be done to re-align tour lengths for future operations, but the document laconically says that JHC has no intention to do so, at least “at the time of writing”. The wild difference in tour lengths should absolutely be mitigated, although tour duration will never be written in stone due to considerations of output and performance of the crews.

It seems to me that having JHC in Andover is not enough to ensure proper Air-Land integration, and I continue to believe that the combat aviation brigade construct should be a priority for Joint Force 2025.

The Op Herrick campaign study also says that the Warrior 514 is not fit for the purpose of carrying and enabling a Fire Support Team. It should be carefully considered whether it is possible and cost-effective to proceed with the 514 upgrade the Royal Artillery has been pursuing, so far without success, for years, or if it wouldn’t be easier to just purchase some more Ajax in the Joint Fires variant. Ajax comes with more space, more power and a more modern electronic architecture that should ease the integration of all systems needed. Moreover, using only the relevant Ajax variant would remove the need for developing and procuring the role-specific 514 upgrade.

Another area in which I feel vindicated is Air Drop. The Op Herrick document contains the recommendation to procure precision and guided airdrop capability for stores.

The British Army also needs to recuperate the ability to airdrop Light Gun and vehicles: currently, this is not possible since the Medium Stressed Platform is not compatible with the C-130J’s cargo floor and a temporary integration, although pursued for a while, seems not to have been funded.

If, Then, Else

There are basic truths that do not change, no matter how many buzzwords SDSR documents use. There are things in the military which just are what they are, and can’t be “radically innovated”. Operational capability is not achieved by an understrength Light Role infantry battalion, but by a coherent construct composed of a recce element, a manoeuvre element and the key fire and logistic supports, plus adequate communications. A messy pile of resources will not deliver adaptable combat power just because you stick the “adaptable” adjective to it on paper.

The Army needs to be given real freedom of manoeuvre in reorganizing its structures. And the army must face the problem with rationality and honesty.

If the Division is important, then resourcing it must be a priority and having only one deployable HQ is probably not enough. It imposes a really short duration to operations.

If air manoeuvre is key, your force structure must reflect your doctrine.

If you know that to make a brigade you need a Cavalry/recce element, at least 3 manoeuvre formations, ideally a direct fire support unit, artillery, logistic, communications, medic and equipment support, build a structure that reflects it.

My “SDSR” for the British Army is as follows:

Disband 4 Light Role infantry battalions to free manpower for other needs (should make available at least around 2200 all ranks all trades).

Form two additional brigade Signal Regiments and one additional Aviation Support Signal Sqn (use 1300 all ranks, all trades).

Beef up 16 Air Assault brigade with Light Cavalry regiment; swap 2nd Gurkha Rifles for 2 Light Protected Mobility battalions. Build up 8 Field Coy REME into a battalion; reinforce other supporting formations with a third sub-unit each.

Form a second airmobile brigade with two Light Role (instead of PARA) and two Light Protected Mobility battalions.

Convert the third Light Cavalry regiment in the CBRN Regiment as the mission is taken back from the RAF Regiment.

1st UK Division to be restored as a deployable HQ; 1st Signal Regiment to resume its Divisional role

Two Armoured Infantry brigades each with one cavalry regiment with Ajax and 3 Combined Arms Regiments each. The 6 CARs are to be formed by merging the current 3 tank regiments and 6 armoured infantry battalions. Each CAR to have 2 squadrons of Challenger 2 tanks, 2 companies of infantry on Warrior and one Manoeuvre Support Coy with mortars, ATGW, Recce troop, Snipers and Pioneers.

2 Medium Brigades each with one cavalry regiment with Ajax and 3 infantry battalions on MIV.

Align each support regiment permanently to one brigade. Each brigade to have one Signal regiment, 1 artillery regiment, 1 REME, 1 Medical, 1 Brigade Logistic Regiment.

The regiments currently assigned to 16 Air Assault and to the Adaptable Force will need an uplift and the formation of the missing sub-units. This will quickly use up all the remaining manpower recouped with reductions elsewhere.

Create a 4th regular Precision Fires artillery battery with GMLRS and Exactor. Each armoured and medium brigade to have its own.

Cut 3 AS90 batteries, re-role to L118 and assigned to Medium Brigade. An autocannon like CAESAR would be perfect to equip the Medium Brigades, but money won’t be available before 2030 at the very least (current OSD for both AS90 and L118).

Purchase a number of lightweight 30mm guns to fit on Jackals to give greater firepower to the Light Cavalry. At least a share of the MIVs should come armed with the CTA 40mm gun in an unmanned turret.

Create two Combat Aviation Brigades, one for each Division. Each brigade to have:  

1 Reconnaissance, Light Utility & Command Support regiment with WILDCAT (2 Sqns) and Watchkeeper (1 large battery). Ensure close liaison with Division HQ for command support utility role, as from Op Herrick lesson learned.

1 Assault Regiment, with one Chinook (HC4 and HC6) and one Puma HC2 squadrons.

1 Attack Regiment with two Apache squadrons.

1 Aviation Support Signal Sqn (244 Sig Sqn, existing, and a second one to be formed) 

1 Aviation Logistic Group (REME Av Coy, RLC Supply Sqn, Tactical Refueling Sqn, Joint Ground and LZ Support Element. The REME Coys exist within 7 REME; the RLC element is currently 132 Sqn, might need reinforcement as it is restructured in two twin sub-units; same for the Tactical Refueling Wing and the Joint Helicopter Support Squadron)

1 Force Protection and MEDEVAC Sqn (RAF Regiment Field Squadron, with attached permanent MERT organization supported by one Chinook and one Puma flights from the Assault Regiment)

 

24 Air Mobile brigade. Back as a Combat Aviation Brigade? If it depended on my judgement, yes.

Going back to 2 deployable Division HQs will be given sense by redistributing the deployable brigades under the two, following the example of the French army under their Au Contact plan: each Division should control one armoured, one medium and one air mobile / light brigade.

The readiness cycle will last two years, one of reset and training and one at readiness. Each year, one Division, with its brigades, will be responsible for preparing and fielding the force needed for any crisis arising.

16 Air Assault will continue to have the two PARA battalions and will alternate them in the Airborne Task Force role. I gave thought to putting one PARA battalion in each brigade, but figured it would probably complicate things rather than ease them.

This restructuring cuts back on infantry to re-invest in enablers, first of all on the Royal Signal, but also to rebuild sub-units in currently understrength logistic, artillery and engineer regiments in order to better exploit the still considerable resources available and deliver a greater number of deployable brigades and, hopefully, a greater integration with aviation resources.

Cutting four infantry battalions will still leave 27, of which 20 in the Deployable Brigades. That leaves 7 to cover Cyprus (2 battalions), Public Duties (2 battalions), Special Forces Support Group (1), Brunei (2 battalions, one in the UK and one in Brunei, alternating regularly). Every two years, the battalions in Cyprus and in Public Duties role will swap place with the Light Protected Mobility battalions in the Light Brigades. The two Gurkha battalions will continue to alternate to cover Brunei. It is a tight fit, but all roles are covered and the resources that remain are better exploited.

Both Divisions will have their own Logistic Brigade. Rather than directly incorporating every logistic regiment, though, the brigade will contain the “Theatre” elements, which stand between the UK and the brigade area of responsibility. The logistic brigades should cover that level, ensuring the flow of supplies from the UK to the area of operations and forward to the Brigade area of responsibility. The Manoeuvre Brigade should instead have its own Close Support Logistic element, configured to deliver all the way to the line of fire.

A number of Force Troops brigades would consequently be removed: 1^st Artillery Brigade will be replaced by smaller Artillery Integration Cells at the Divisional Level. 11^th Signal Brigade would be removed from the ORBAT, with the reserve regiments and 10 and 15 support regiments assigned to Groups within 1^st Signal Brigade.

8^th Engineer Brigade would stay, but the Close Support group would be removed as the combat engineer regiments are handed back to the manoeuvre brigades, leaving Force Support Group (Land), Force Support Group (Air) and Force Support Group (EOD). 

EDIT: I've just learned that 25 (Close Support) Group, with the 3 heavy engineer regiments destined to the Armoured Infantry Brigades, has resubordinated to 3rd UK Division. The two hybrid regiments (21 and 32) which would support the Adaptable Force have been assigned to 12 (Force Support) Group within 8 Engineer Brigade. Not quite the return to the manoeuvre brigade yet, but a step in that direction.
EDIT ENDS 

The formation of the Combat Aviation Brigades will still leave 1 Chinook squadron, which will be devoted to Special Forces role and CSAR. Ideally, it will have the long-range HC3 (which are being upgraded to HC5 and fitted with Digital Flight Controls like those found on the new HC6s) and, if they really will be funded, the AAR probes to further expand their reach.

Formally outside of the Combat Aviation Brigades will also remain 657 AAC (also special forces support), 658 AAC (Dauphin for urban SF ops), all grouped in the Joint SF Air Wing.

The training squadrons will also remain outside, at least in terms of Force Generation Cycle.    

Flexibility and task-grouping will continue to be encouraged and pursued, but with a different approach. Task-grouping must become an easier proposition and something that is carried out orderly within the brigade. Flexibility is best achieved by using standardized structures for sub-units and by reducing the amount of re-roling and mixing up of parts within infantry battalions. Currently, in any one year the personnel within a typical british infantry battalion can be moved around infinite times; mortar platoons can go without touching a mortar for months and re-ORBATing is way too frequent. This may give soldiers knowledge of a wider variety of roles, but the confusion it brings cannot be actually helpful. Jacks of all trades and masters of none, that’s the likely outcome.

It is time to bring standardization and order in basic structures. Build battalions which can be employed, and brigades that can readily pick pieces from their constituting units to form battlegroups, following practices recognized by everyone within the army.

It won’t solve all problems, but it’ll do wonders to improve the effective combat power of those precious, few 82.000 regulars. And it'll make supporting future enduring operations a realistic proposition. At the moment, it does not seem to be realistic at all, because too many pieces are not available, sacrificed to keep capbadges thrivin and to shield politicians from the backlash that comes from losing an historic regiment. 

Time to put CAPABILITY first.