tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4429092391991629252024-03-19T08:27:19.907+01:00UK Armed Forces CommentaryNews, rumours, analysis and assorted ramblings on the strategies, the missions, the procurement of kit and the future of the Armed Forces.Gabrielehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/01623558391676151582noreply@blogger.comBlogger411125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-442909239199162925.post-77325011534568503022022-09-11T17:35:00.002+02:002022-09-12T17:24:55.313+02:00Does Ukraine salvage STRIKE? <p> </p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">The quick exploitation of the gap that the
Ukrainians have punched in a lightly-held section of the Kharkiv front and in
general the successful use of wheeled AFVs has caused some legit discussion
about whether the Ukrainian experience supports the British Army’s STRIKE
concept. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">This is a discussion to be had, although I’m
not sure we have all of the necessary information yet, and might not have it
for quite some time still. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">What i think must be said, already now, is
that we should be very careful in mixing “rapid movement of wheeled AFVs” with “STRIKE”,
because we were told in no uncertain terms that the two things were quite
different and well separated. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">I think no one has any real doubt about the
viability and usefulness of wheeled mechanized formations, and their ability to
move quickly along roads. Wheeled Mechanized Brigades have existed in multiple
countries for decades, and in general in the history of warfare infantry has
followed tanks in wheeled trucks (or in half-tracks) for most of the time
mechanization has been a thing. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">Remember that tracked AFVs to carry infantry into battle appeared only
late in World War II, and essentially went into operation only in the British and Canadian armies
with the KANGAROOs, after all. Later, t</span>he Soviet union has had a multitude of Motor
Rifle Brigades combining MBTs and wheeled BTRs of various marks. The British Army used to have significant wheeled armoured components, and in the Cold War it has SAXON to work as a literal battle taxi to bring troops forwards to reinforce BAOR. </p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">In short: tanks (as in, actual MBTs) + Wheels is not new, is not
revolutionary and is, ultimately, not STRIKE. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">If you think Ukraine in any way vindicates
British Army STRIKE brigade you have first to prove Ukraine formations actually
bear any resemblance to STRIKE. Because if what we are talking about is
actually a mechanized phalanx <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>exploiting
a breakthrough, that is not new, and is not STRIKE. How many examples could we
list, from the fall of France in 1940 to the breakout from Normandy and
beyond...? </span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB"><br /></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjHULhUL8Jzi5Kks0glDxrTgoGiZT4lWOWz_3ga9MWvlNbJSemzphZ4qWFR1XP2ARe6jtz7PU7Dm-14lOpsmbr7EbAee0mB_t4K1VtQOUZPsyOa2c01w1Py8jLyjtjn09KVL6gXZpe0FQ4fbdc79g8u7ijgCIpYulXlKWJjAVzp3rlrG55fWfqtwQzz/s1536/ukraine-50-days-1536x864.jpg" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="864" data-original-width="1536" height="225" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjHULhUL8Jzi5Kks0glDxrTgoGiZT4lWOWz_3ga9MWvlNbJSemzphZ4qWFR1XP2ARe6jtz7PU7Dm-14lOpsmbr7EbAee0mB_t4K1VtQOUZPsyOa2c01w1Py8jLyjtjn09KVL6gXZpe0FQ4fbdc79g8u7ijgCIpYulXlKWJjAVzp3rlrG55fWfqtwQzz/w400-h225/ukraine-50-days-1536x864.jpg" width="400" /></a></div><br /><p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">The British Army did not say it was
building a mechanized brigade and it did not copy any of the medium, all-wheeled brigade that have proliferated in various Armies all around the world. The British Army said it
had come up with a new concept, a new way of fighting that exploited dispersion
to “penetrate an Anti-Access, Area Denial (A2AD) “bubble” and begin its
disintegration”. This is how Chief General Staff Sir Nick Carter sold the
concept from the onset, and how it was experimented and engineered, as
explained years later by Brigadier James Martin, commander of 1<sup>st</sup>
Armoured Infantry Brigade/STRIKE experimentation group between November 2018
and july 2020. </span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">If i had to find a direct counterpart to the STRIKE brigade, i would probably point to the original CENTAURO-centric brigades imagined by the Italian army in the late Cold War. CENTAURO, having anti-tank capability, was supposed to "race" along roads to meet an enemy penetration, and more specifically an amphibious assault by the Soviet Mediterranean Squadron on Italy's long and exposed coast. It had to contain the russians, successfully grappling with an heavier force for long enough for heavier allied formations to also arrive. </span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">STRIKE was described as a quick reaction tool that would self-deploy "from Catterick to Tallin" to contain a russian assault, so there is some similarity. But in practice, that's also as far as that similarity goes, because STRIKE then diverges in both concepts and execution. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-GB"><o:p> </o:p></span></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-GB">STRIKE
as a concept <o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">Being the commander of the very brigade
that was due to become the first STRIKE formation, Brigadier James Martin ought
to be the voice we should be listening to when trying to understand what sets
STRIKE apart from a conventional mechanized brigade. </span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><br /></p>
<iframe allow="accelerometer; autoplay; clipboard-write; encrypted-media; gyroscope; picture-in-picture" allowfullscreen="" frameborder="0" height="310" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/3q7gp6QInOE" title="Session Five: Fighting in denied and dangerous environments" width="550"></iframe>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB"><i>Brigadier James Martin speaks from minute 28.45</i></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB"><i><br /></i></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB"><i><br /></i></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">Speaking at the RUSI Land Warfare
Conference 2019, the brigadier was clear on Dispersion being the core of the
whole project, and specifically said: </span></p>
<p align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span lang="EN-GB">“fighting dispersed provides opportunity for decisive
action that could otherwise be pretty difficult to come by. It allows for
levels of infiltration, penetration and unpredictability that can decisively
threaten a peer opponent Command & Control, his echelon forces and of course
its logistic elements”.<o:p></o:p></span></i></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">There cannot be any doubt that what he
summarizes as “dislocation at scale” is targeted at <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">peer</b> enemies and is supposed to allow the STRIKE sub-units to
infiltrate the enemy front and threaten command posts, echelon and logistics in
its rear. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">In my rather less charitable way to describe
it: the British Army expected STRIKE to go directly to Exploitation without having
to achieve a Breakthrough. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">He further specifies that experimentation
has looked at <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">brigade </b>frontage of 82
to 100 km width, up to 100 km in depth </span></p>
<p align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span lang="EN-GB">“beyond the traditional FEBA (forward edge of the
battle area), if that concept still has relevance”<o:p></o:p></span></i></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">He then reaffirmed the bit about
operational marches of 2.000 kms (the infamous “Catterick to Tallin” line that
Carter had used all the way back in 2015) and tactical advances / investments
along up to 12 different routes, with sub-unit dispersion “well beyond the
confines of the kilometre grid square” </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">In other words, experimentation up to 2019
had supposedly proven the feasibility, and indeed the effectiveness of the idea
as it was first conceived in 2015. How fortunate! </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">In more recent times there has been a sort
of revisionism about STRIKE, led by a 2020 <a href="https://uklandpower.com/2020/05/06/british-army-strike-an-inside-view/comment-page-1/" target="_blank">article from “STRIKE prophet” on uklandpower.com</a>, written pretty literally to respond to my criticisms.
According to this new current, STRIKE is a perfectly sensible “screening and
exploitation force”, built on past operations and proven, clear concepts. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">I find it instructive that Brigadier James
Martin talks about covering and exploiting only once in his address about
STRIKE. He does so when addressing lethality, and saying that STRIKE only needs
to be “competitive with, not necessarily superior” to an enemy heavier force. He
goes on to add that in experimentation this was achieved by “consistently privileging
anti-armour capabilities across the brigade in the forms of <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">organic</b>, <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">mounted and dismounted</b> <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">ATGW in
every Platoon and Troop as well as some CSS elements</b>”. This, he went on
saying, enabled the STRIKE brigade to “survive, operate and win as both a
covering and exploitation force”. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">Ukraine does indeed prove how much damage
can be caused by having ample availability of mounted and dismounted ATGW
capabilities, but then again I don’t think there ever was <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>a doubt about this particular point. <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span></b><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">I don’t have any doubt about the viability
of what is still, in the end, a mechanized brigade to provide a screening /
covering and an exploitation function, but if this was the point, there would
be no need to call it “STRIKE” and pretend it was a new and revolutionary
thing. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">The British Army intended STRIKE to do
things differently and achieve some extraordinary effects, as Brigadier Martin
so aptly explained. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">If mechanized brigades do well in Ukraine,
that has next to zero relevance to STRIKE. I don’t think there ever was a doubt
on the usefulness of mechanized brigades and indeed on the mobility of wheeled
AFVs. But since it was called STRIKE because it was going to be something
different, something more, it can only be considered validated if we observe
something on the battlefield that rhymes with what makes STRIKE unique. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">The breakthrough in Kharkiv does not look
like a single brigade exploiting by dispersion on a 100 x 100 km battle area,
sorry. It just does not. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">STRIKE bde didn't have MBTs but AJAX. Is
any of Ukraine's mech battlegroups deliberately trying to fight without MBTs but using IFVs in medium armour fashion? </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">STRIKE bde was supposed to have a 100 Km
front. Is it happening in Ukraine? </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">STRIKE talked of exploitation without
breakthrough, purely by dispersion/infiltration. Any evidence of anything similar proving feasible on the ground?</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">If none of STRIKE’s defining
characteristics are to be observed, we cannot possibly see a validation of them in
the ongoing operations. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-GB">STRIKE
as executed <o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">I repeatedly made the point that a concept
is ultimately only as good as its execution, so we have to also consider what
the STRIKE brigade actually looked like and the context in which they appeared.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">STRIKE prophet and others go on to claim
that STRIKE is supposedly platform-agnostic, but the reality is that the Army
considered the replacement of MASTIFF (used in some of the experimentation, by
the way) as absolutely indispensable. The procurement of the Mechanized
Infantry Vehicle (for which BOXER was eventually selected, as we know) was
moved forwards from 2029 to 2023, and the STRIKE brigade IOC depended literally
on BOXER becoming available. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">As we know, each STRIKE brigade was going
to have 2 Regiments of AJAX (removed from the armoured infantry brigades) and 2
infantry battalions mounted in BOXER APC. One of those AJAX regiments was going
to be a “Medium Armour” formation tasked with providing tank-like support to
the infantry, despite armament and protection being unchanged. </span></p><p class="MsoNormal"></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjPGcYdTkPCx-KCOPPJKpF2vFdoUp4RJTh9K_Ys17f3nKc4XIwZC9oq8PuFAT9uS4FywxyP83LiVeOVkThm2EVGQg4vKKoy-JNWMGsZUW89lzpOqde_dCUjCX43IgMEZG1CQciK3YPZWjukpSgpL3622bVblVa0YtObIcXwFUSbpLjm_9ciDG_ZE7tE/s684/2nd%20Strike.JPG" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="495" data-original-width="684" height="290" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjPGcYdTkPCx-KCOPPJKpF2vFdoUp4RJTh9K_Ys17f3nKc4XIwZC9oq8PuFAT9uS4FywxyP83LiVeOVkThm2EVGQg4vKKoy-JNWMGsZUW89lzpOqde_dCUjCX43IgMEZG1CQciK3YPZWjukpSgpL3622bVblVa0YtObIcXwFUSbpLjm_9ciDG_ZE7tE/w400-h290/2nd%20Strike.JPG" width="400" /></a></div><br /><table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgQ6-mm_SONvgUidSn3esBJNqQ8-M9IVUe4_WKa_buUL1EKwyNXFgiZ8JOu4mRRmHbbYAr8F9B5gaWk_IHJdIEMbIdnDy1rdTZNjUl-3vCrZPje3qjrx0vo1x573EEd2BwTOWNqLfVOTt1GS4j_4pNBGqcizlkPbnojQrrMK5HfAc9ZCI0ShoX8vY78/s674/Strike%20Brigades.JPG" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="515" data-original-width="674" height="306" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgQ6-mm_SONvgUidSn3esBJNqQ8-M9IVUe4_WKa_buUL1EKwyNXFgiZ8JOu4mRRmHbbYAr8F9B5gaWk_IHJdIEMbIdnDy1rdTZNjUl-3vCrZPje3qjrx0vo1x573EEd2BwTOWNqLfVOTt1GS4j_4pNBGqcizlkPbnojQrrMK5HfAc9ZCI0ShoX8vY78/w400-h306/Strike%20Brigades.JPG" width="400" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><i>Future Soldier put an end to STRIKE brigades plans and with WARRIOR going out of service, BOXER is no longer heading to Catterick at all. WARRIOR's demise leaves plenty of empty garages around Bulford and Tidworth.</i> </td></tr></tbody></table><br /><span lang="EN-GB"><br /></span><p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">All my doubts about STRIKE brigades stand,
starting from the AJAX – BOXER mix, which would have had inexorable
consequences for the ability of STRIKE brigades to conduct those long
operational marches. </span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">It is telling that the British Army has converted 77
Oshkosh tanker tractors into “Medium Equipment Transporters” with trailers
rated for 44 tons payloads. These would have been indispensable to carry AJAX
(and at the same time not sufficient) during a STRIKE brigade operational
march. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">This is particularly ineffective because
between AJAX and BOXER it is the former that has the sensors and the firepower
that are meant to enable STRIKE to fight and be competitive with enemy heavy /
heavier forces. It is AJAX that has the sensors to acquire targets and direct
joint Fires. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">In a workable STRIKE brigade, AJAX should
have been wheeled and able to ride on into battle in the very vanguard. To return to my earlier comparison with the italian example from the 80s, AJAX was supposed to be STRIKE's very own CENTAURO. But while CENTAURO has MBT-like firepower with a 105 mm (and now 120 mm in CENTAURO 2) and is wheeled, AJAX has the firepower of a IFV and is tracked. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">AJAX was hammered into STRIKE for lack of alternatives, not because it was ever thought for anything resembling STRIKE's CONOPS. And allow to say me one thing: if you have to deal with METs,
you might just as well deal with HETs (a bit bigger and with one extra axle,
yes, but otherwise entirely comparable) and carry actual MBTs. Which,
unsurprisingly, is what mechanized formations that include both tracks and
wheels tend to do, all around the world, whether it’s a soviet / Russian Motor
Rifle Brigade or a german armoured brigade or a French heavy brigade. </p><p class="MsoNormal">Either you don't have tracks at all, to fully capitalize on the long range mobility of wheels, or those tracks tend to belong to MBTs. STRIKE's mix was very unique, and very sub-optimal. </p><p class="MsoNormal"><br /></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjH2FD48rfv7jTbHYT-2LXZRNZcdleR6SXiWrlPeqeilskzqswHJB40b4r9-VNJWdmJeG502fW5jHO75nRos-E6OM6ZSYL5ChxiSdskUESqSIh3pYlet3yi-vyiyF4Vr7IfqQQAqvldE0J_ZWP2SdIPOZHP9ecEWW1W8UziBoEAmE3u-XGfq19Kw1zB/s3579/FcIrr_kWAAUT_G8.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="1988" data-original-width="3579" height="223" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjH2FD48rfv7jTbHYT-2LXZRNZcdleR6SXiWrlPeqeilskzqswHJB40b4r9-VNJWdmJeG502fW5jHO75nRos-E6OM6ZSYL5ChxiSdskUESqSIh3pYlet3yi-vyiyF4Vr7IfqQQAqvldE0J_ZWP2SdIPOZHP9ecEWW1W8UziBoEAmE3u-XGfq19Kw1zB/w400-h223/FcIrr_kWAAUT_G8.jpg" width="400" /></a></div><br /><table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjFZieIu6eyiw6hgM-JE74CSjDdQzVv8oavnjKYFsYz1a2QBFoUaL1atKRquyaHtnOHLwuuyWzKSCDyT8tisH-7xJO7CI1H6NUbtBkBDf-AnZeweZfFnt3c-xxtYG4pi2TRMNJTFcXbeUWR9IzvYkoAzTfW_iHVtqDOJe96Ry9cc8sZmj8M-13XzAFk/s3467/FcIrsAXXoAIbzP2.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="1968" data-original-width="3467" height="228" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjFZieIu6eyiw6hgM-JE74CSjDdQzVv8oavnjKYFsYz1a2QBFoUaL1atKRquyaHtnOHLwuuyWzKSCDyT8tisH-7xJO7CI1H6NUbtBkBDf-AnZeweZfFnt3c-xxtYG4pi2TRMNJTFcXbeUWR9IzvYkoAzTfW_iHVtqDOJe96Ry9cc8sZmj8M-13XzAFk/w400-h228/FcIrsAXXoAIbzP2.jpg" width="400" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><i>The operational debut of MET during IRON SURGE, the flash reinforcement of the battlegroup in Estonia following Russia's invasion of Ukraine. You can appreciate how little practical difference there is, at the end of the day, between HETs and METs. Investment in more HETs and METs, but to quickly carry MBTs and WARRIORs respectively, would have made more of a difference for the British Army's ability to quickly move towards battle than adding a wheeled APC does. </i></td></tr></tbody></table><br /><p class="MsoNormal"><br /></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">It was also extremely dubious whether
Brigadier Martin’s point about availability of mounted and dismounted ATGW at
all level was ever going to be realized. The Overwatch variant of AJAX (more
accurately, technically a sub-variant of the ARES) was cancelled years ago now, and while
Battle Group Organic Anti-Armour is now its own program, hopefully to result in
ground-launched BRIMSTONEs, it is not yet anywhere near being in service. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">A recent US authorization for the Foreign
Military Sales of 513 lightweight JAVELIN Command and Launch Units also
includes an unspecified number of electronic assemblies to enable the fitting
of a single JAVELIN tube on the RS4/PROTECTOR remote weapon station used on
ARES and BOXER, but apart from this there is no real evidence of any big
investment in new mounted ATGW capabilities. </span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB"><br /></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgTPXWKkvj4k-7q01mkoeqV6IZ4wLo9-vPRhrV3JoQAOHtdh2mTKw6tAIgu7d5xnRMJV4RxTNsWtevQmJl0Pk5Au0MRSGS7-ktibHGjjUm58QlnXUGR4BFBf-zKDbaI9uY8wTYjhrWs_IZeqG6g8gaonQ3Lc8PWlVF5xM1gL4yz2A5Hn2n5bxN6UjGN/s703/BOXER%20variants%20and%20sub-variants.png" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="703" data-original-width="659" height="400" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgTPXWKkvj4k-7q01mkoeqV6IZ4wLo9-vPRhrV3JoQAOHtdh2mTKw6tAIgu7d5xnRMJV4RxTNsWtevQmJl0Pk5Au0MRSGS7-ktibHGjjUm58QlnXUGR4BFBf-zKDbaI9uY8wTYjhrWs_IZeqG6g8gaonQ3Lc8PWlVF5xM1gL4yz2A5Hn2n5bxN6UjGN/w375-h400/BOXER%20variants%20and%20sub-variants.png" width="375" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><i>Variants and sub-variants breakdown of the BOXER Batch 1 order. It is assumed the "Recce/Fire Support Vehicle" was eventually going to get JAVELIN integrated on the RS4 RWS, but there is no definitive confirmation available in the open. Readers and Twitter followers will know that i think the British Army is wasting way too much money on BOXERs for ambulance and command posts roles, while mounting a ridiculously small number of infantry battalions in the new vehicle and missing firepower and key variants such as a recovery vehicle. I'd rather use cheaper vehicle bases in Support roles and reserve BOXER for the fighting roles at the front. This is, by the way, what happens in Germany, where FUCHS is used, or Italy where ORSO and LINCE cover all of the ambulance requirements and the vast majority of mobile command post needs. </i></td></tr></tbody></table><br /><span lang="EN-GB"><br /></span></p><p class="MsoNormal">There is a very bitter irony in the fact
that Brigadier Martin’s power point slide when he talked about lethality showed
a german PUMA IFV firing a SPIKE anti-tank missile. AJAX does not possess that
capability, obviously, so...</p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB"><br /></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"></p><table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhWnqmBeK4Q3VnMoIMzRrKaTDtb4yf3h9FjLr_30xXkfQMEZrv3nlpOXRQTqIgixrXVhgupGjEnefy_73RGJJFXc-ImTVQh-sOlbS9jfIjCnavkooDWYL6MorUSCzONcoCAQhSQN7XYg5X-Lec-SXslrdGwF5dUXUm8zREfYpav1-_cDMLIE-kBmadL/s2048/MIV%20representatives%20in%20Norway%20april%202022%20for%20brief%20on%20PROTECTOR%20RS6%20and%20RT20%2040%2060.jpg" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="1364" data-original-width="2048" height="266" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhWnqmBeK4Q3VnMoIMzRrKaTDtb4yf3h9FjLr_30xXkfQMEZrv3nlpOXRQTqIgixrXVhgupGjEnefy_73RGJJFXc-ImTVQh-sOlbS9jfIjCnavkooDWYL6MorUSCzONcoCAQhSQN7XYg5X-Lec-SXslrdGwF5dUXUm8zREfYpav1-_cDMLIE-kBmadL/w400-h266/MIV%20representatives%20in%20Norway%20april%202022%20for%20brief%20on%20PROTECTOR%20RS6%20and%20RT20%2040%2060.jpg" width="400" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">MIV programme personnel from the British Army at a Kongsberg event in Norway last April, getting a demonstration of the RS6 RWS, a step up from the RS4, which can employ the M230LF 30x113 mm cannon and JAVELIN </td></tr></tbody></table><br /><p></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiADMEBOEBfZTt25hyl_6uVNhY4jWAS8Rqm9miE1eFw-24-829TD_bsFjMWWZHzYAS2C_JhcbVBhLG3cUGIEqoo2pNggJrthrPsU6_1_yNLzIcMGXhWCzU1Ic48TXjGDJ-wfkUEEFGZM3hDwGZTHuhm_1g2N18x2kQ2TQc72uOmam7N1JqhTbNoyudd/s2048/RS6%20demo.jpg" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="1536" data-original-width="2048" height="300" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiADMEBOEBfZTt25hyl_6uVNhY4jWAS8Rqm9miE1eFw-24-829TD_bsFjMWWZHzYAS2C_JhcbVBhLG3cUGIEqoo2pNggJrthrPsU6_1_yNLzIcMGXhWCzU1Ic48TXjGDJ-wfkUEEFGZM3hDwGZTHuhm_1g2N18x2kQ2TQc72uOmam7N1JqhTbNoyudd/w400-h300/RS6%20demo.jpg" width="400" /></a></div><br /><span lang="EN-GB"><br /></span><p></p><p class="MsoNormal">In other words: even the one bit of the
concept that was pretty unquestionably wise still does not have, to this day, a
clear path to becoming an operational reality. It has been widely suggested that, now that BOXER is de facto replacing WARRIOR, a firepower boost will have to come, somehow, but there's still, even to this day, no evidence of a firm plan being in place. </p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">And beyond the viability of this bizarre
brigade construct in itself, we should <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">never</b>
fail to consider the impact that the sudden STRIKE brigade obsession had on the
wider Army. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Army
2020 (the 2011 plan centered on 3 armoured infantry brigades) was a plan mainly
concerned with sustaining enough brigades to maintain a “1 in 5” cycle for
enduring deployments (6 months deployed, 24 to rest, regenerate, train), and
inevitably so since operation HERRICK was still Defence’s main effort. Even so,
Army 2020 very much had “contingency” (state on state warfare, that is) in
mind. Its heavy core of 3 capable armoured brigades was meant to preserve the
Army’s warfighting know how. Army 2020 planning guidelines did include a
Divisional "best effort", with 3 brigades, 2 of which armoured and 1
of which would be made up by elements of 16 Air Assault brigade and 3 Cdo
brigade. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">In other words, Army 2020 was meant to
protect the Army’s ability to field a force pretty much equivalent to that
generated for Operation TELIC in 2003, but from a smaller overall army.
Accordingly, it was acknowledged that a Divisional deployment would only be
possible with adequate warning and preparations, because supports were
insufficient.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">When in 2015 Army was given direction to
accelerate regeneration of a warfighting, deployable Division because focus by
then was squarely back on being able to provide NATO with a sizeable land
component, a rational mind would have sought to improve the readiness of the
existing armoured brigades while rebuilding as many of the missing supports as
possible. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">It was, without a doubt, doable. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">But the Army instead decided that the
overwhelming priority to be funded was procurement of BOXER, not just to
replace MASTIFF in the single mechanized infantry battalion that had been part
of each Armd Inf Bde of Army 2020, but to build a whole new kind of fighting
formation. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">Under 2015’s “Army 2020 Refine”, the
Division would have again been composed of 2 armoured brigades, with the 3<sup>rd</sup>
one being a STRIKE brigade, leaving 16AA, 3Cdo and a light brigade from 1<sup>st</sup>
Division for Rear Area security on top. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">In practice, a force much heavier than had
been generated for the invasion of Iraq in 2003, coming out of a smaller army.
An army that didn’t really enjoy any growth from Army 2020 plans. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">Army 2020 Refine and STRIKE were the ultimate
"do more with less" madness, calling for a super demanding force
generation cycle and the ability to deploy 100% of the armoured brigades in the
ORBAT. And it was supposed to solve the difficulties that Army 2020 had in
deploying 2 armd bdes from 3. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">It was, in other words, a fairy tale that Land
HQ at Andover told itself. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">By 2019 it was painfully evident that the
Defence budget was again running hot and that the Army was in particularly dire
straits ahead of the incoming Integrated Review, but in December BOXER was
ordered, reconfirming it as Andover’s number 1 priority. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">From that point onwards, the Army’s ability
to fund upgrades to CHALLENGER 2 and WARRIOR, and in general its chances of
hanging on to its current sizes and programs were, to put it mildly, tied to
the chances of rolling nothing but sixes at every throw of the dice. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">Thankfully, the Army rolled several sixes.
Boris Johnson’s government put many billion pounds of investment into Defence
and Land HQ got most of the increase and the largest allocation over the 10
years. Those were 2 sixes rolled. Getting the CHALLENGER 3 programme funded was
another. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">WARRIOR ended up not rolling its six, and
in general the Army’s mess at that point was so big that the money was never
going to be enough for everything. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">The STRIKE brigades as once imagined have
disappeared, and the Army is getting smaller, with Future Soldier leaving it
dramatically short of actually deployable and meaningful brigades. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">In all of this, w</span><span lang="EN" style="mso-ansi-language: EN;">hat Ukraine probably proves once again is that
replacing MASTIFF with MIV was never what was urgent. Fires, air defence, MBTs
themselves and even the IFVs are decisive. Shape of the wheeled APC is
secondary. Ukrainian mechanized infantry is making do with an unlikely dog’s
breakfast of platforms, including, funnily enough, MASTIFF itself. <o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">In the end,
F</span><span lang="EN-GB">uture Soldier itself admits that the picking of
priorities was disastrous. It finally puts the money into CR2 upgrades,
artillery and air defence (hoping that plans continue to progress).</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">Warrior did end up being the sacrificial
lamb and BOXER is now de facto THE vehicle the British Army’s future depends upon,
but that was unavoidable after the December 2019 contract and the building of
two assembly lines in the UK.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">The only ray of true hope at the moment is
(apart from the promises of a further defence budget boost) the coming of a
Chief General Staff who has pretty clearly said that there is much to fix, and
that he is prepared to change Future Soldier structures to (hopefully) deliver
real combined arms formations and not pure lip service. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">I’ve seen hints that the so called
Operation MOBILISE might result in a first refinement of Army plans to be
announced by the end of the year. I’m wishing it the best of luck, and I’m
hoping rationality has returned to Andover, because it’s badly needed. </span></p>Gabrielehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/01623558391676151582noreply@blogger.com40tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-442909239199162925.post-1581601428054847432022-05-08T18:04:00.001+02:002022-05-08T18:18:42.376+02:00Everyone is recce, everyone is strike: an organisation for a small but tough British Army<p> </p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="EN-GB">As I’ve made hopefully clear on Twitter in several different
occasions, I am convinced the Integrated Review was very good. The Defence
Command Paper had a lot of good things about it too, although it is clear that
some things would need more funding to truly get moving according to stated
ambitions. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="EN-GB">Future Soldier is the one document that is not just disappointing
but flat out concerning. It is to be hoped that a “Refine” will come swiftly,
because the plan feels like it was <a href="http://ukarmedforcescommentary.blogspot.com/2022/02/an-internal-struggle.html">written by "2 guys" wanting
fundamentally different things</a>. Brigade Combat Teams and combined arms
integration at lower levels on one side; preservation of increasingly
artificial barriers and tribalism between Corps and Regiments and specialties
on the other. The end result is an awkward compromise that fails to deliver “conventional”,
solid brigades and equally fails in progressing new ways of operating. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="EN-GB">The Army is “lucky” in that the events in Ukraine represent a
perfect chance to save face and justify the changes without admitting that the
problems were all there from the get go.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="EN-GB"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="EN-GB">Future Soldier fails to articulate a new concept for how to
structure, field and employ force in the field. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The Army’s “Conceptual Force 2035”,
which up to at least 2017 was looked at very seriously, imagined an army completely
reconfigured to deliver 3 smaller but capable divisions made of lighter,
faster, more deployable, largely independent battlegroups, with dispersion
being the norm. Conceptual Force 2035 specified that the disaggregated fighting
requires Combined Arms capabilities to be organic at lower level, to ensure the
dispersed Battlegroups do not have to wait for a superior echelon to make
supports available. This includes having more organic Indirect Fire capability
and employing it alongside greater ATGW capability to offset the capability
currently delivered by MBTs through “lighter” vehicles.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="EN-GB"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="EN-GB">Apparently, Conceptual Force 2035 has since lost traction, and that
actually saddens me, because at this point the army is in such miserable shape
that it was arguably the one model it could follow to try and regain some
effectiveness. On the other hand, 2035 was always way too close in time for
many of the things imagined to actually happen. Robotic and Autonomous Systems,
for example, are nowhere near as mature as needed for the full vision to take
shape, and without pervasive use of ground combat uncrewed vehicles it’s easy
to imagine that the main difficulties experienced in the simulations will have
been infantry shortages and resupply problems.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="EN-GB"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="EN-GB">Whatever vision takes shape next is anyway unlikely to stray too far
away from Conceptual Force 2035 ideas, because rebuilding a large “conventional”
force would require manpower and money that simply isn’t going to be there.
While I am not expecting new IFVs to come into service anytime soon, the Fires
"ingredients" that would be indispensable for CF35-like combat groups
are in the plan, and there are promising signals that the number of BOXERs will
continue to grow. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="EN-GB">Ultimately, the <a href="https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/922969/20200930_-_Introducing_the_Integrated_Operating_Concept.pdf"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Integrated Operating Concept 2025</span></a></span><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"> has set out the following list of
attributes for the future force:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><o:p> </o:p></span> </p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Have
smaller and faster capabilities to avoid detection<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Trade
reduced physical protection for increased mobility<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Rely more
heavily on low-observable and stealth technologies<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Depend
increasingly on electronic warfare and passive deception measures to gain and
maintain information advantage<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Include a
mix of crewed, uncrewed and autonomous platforms<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Be
integrated into ever more sophisticated networks of systems through a combat
cloud that makes best use of data<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Have an
open systems architecture that enables the rapid incorporation of new
capability<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Be markedly
less dependent on fossil fuels<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Employ
non-line-of-sight fires to exploit the advantages we gain from information
advantage<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Emphasize
the non-lethal disabling of enemy capabilities, thereby increasing the range of
political and strategic options<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="EN-GB">Unless these attributes are quite drastically revised, the new
concepts will necessarily have a lot in common with CF2035. I think the army
need to accept this, because “mass” will never be there. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="EN-GB">What we see in Ukraine is that not even the Russians are achieving
the kind of mass needed to create a “traditional” continuous front. The British
Army, with far less troops and material, won’t be able to create a front
either, unless it’s ridiculously narrow. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="EN-GB">Dispersion these days is unavoidable, not only to reduce vulnerability
against enemy Fires, but also simply to cover ground. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="EN-GB"><o:p> </o:p></span></p><table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEipgYXKedHdGlCe22UPQprpEVJ-T5dh4EpCjV2gi1W60Tf8R4h0P8pmgRxg7_GIZU19Kdv-Yp0BKomvlNJyybm-2I4oR9Bt_I6ue_SaFBaGJMLpK07j3idyYAtEdX8H8kVml00Mz6MiHkz_oJPorScfqcMAeBNED6KiH-5I1P50bsfLZD5I-P98QHry/s951/CF2035.JPG" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="892" data-original-width="951" height="375" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEipgYXKedHdGlCe22UPQprpEVJ-T5dh4EpCjV2gi1W60Tf8R4h0P8pmgRxg7_GIZU19Kdv-Yp0BKomvlNJyybm-2I4oR9Bt_I6ue_SaFBaGJMLpK07j3idyYAtEdX8H8kVml00Mz6MiHkz_oJPorScfqcMAeBNED6KiH-5I1P50bsfLZD5I-P98QHry/w400-h375/CF2035.JPG" width="400" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"></td></tr></tbody></table><span lang="EN-GB"><br /></span><p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="EN-GB">STRIKE was way too optimistic in imagining huge tactical advantages
to be secured by a force which was going to have no particular mobility
advantage on comparable formations and certainly no firepower advantage
whatsoever. It imagined an enemy paralyzed by dispersed STRIKE elements
advancing on multiple directions simultaneously, completely failing to
appreciate that dispersed elements can very easily and quickly become isolated
and very difficult to resupply. For years, STRIKE literally assumed that there
would be no need for it to conduct bridging operations in the direct fire zone,
which was one of the wildest, most absurd assumptions ever. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="EN-GB"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="EN-GB">Ultimately, too much about STRIKE was just not credible, but dispersion
is something we will have to deal with, by necessity if not by choice. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="EN-GB">The challenge is defining a workable British Army organization that
maximizes the survivability, lethality and usefulness of its small force.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="EN-GB">Some starting assumptions: </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="EN-GB"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoListParagraph" style="margin-bottom: 0cm; mso-add-space: auto; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; text-indent: -18pt;"><!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri;"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">-<span style="font: 7pt "Times New Roman";">
</span></span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB">Long range Fires are arguably
the only way to “close the gaps” between dispersed force elements and ensure
that small deployed contingents have disproportionate effect. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="EN-GB"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoListParagraph" style="margin-bottom: 0cm; mso-add-space: auto; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; text-indent: -18pt;"><!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri;"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">-<span style="font: 7pt "Times New Roman";">
</span></span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB">The ability of Fires to truly “close
the gaps” depends on their responsiveness and on the ability to provide
targeting from a multitude of sources all across the manoeuvre force. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="EN-GB"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpFirst" style="margin-bottom: 0cm; mso-add-space: auto; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; text-indent: -18pt;"><!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri;"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">-<span style="font: 7pt "Times New Roman";">
</span></span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB">For the foreseeable future at
least, the tank remains a fundamental <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>capability. Its survivability, combined with
the high number of “stored kills” can hardly be replaced by volleys of
missiles. It is reasonable to assume that in the future tanks might shed weight
as piling up passive protection simply becomes counter-productive and we might
see Robotic / Autonomous vehicles taking up more of the MBT role, but until
technology matures we have to make good use of what is available and works. </span></p>
<p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle"><span lang="EN-GB"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="margin-bottom: 0cm; mso-add-space: auto; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; text-indent: -18pt;"><!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri;"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">-<span style="font: 7pt "Times New Roman";">
</span></span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB">Air defence must be much more
widely distributed, otherwise all sorts of threats will have an easy time
targeting troops in the field. </span></p>
<p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle"><span lang="EN-GB"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="margin-bottom: 0cm; mso-add-space: auto; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; text-indent: -18pt;"><!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri;"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">-<span style="font: 7pt "Times New Roman";">
</span></span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB">Recce by stealth is
increasingly unlikely to be feasible. Land manoeuvre can be observed by a
multitude of drones, space, air and ground based sensors, and the widespread
availability of all sorts of communication systems make it pretty much
impossible to imagine small armoured vehicles sneaking unobserved on the enemy.
</span></p>
<p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpLast"><span lang="EN-GB"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="EN-GB">That recce by stealth is no longer feasible is something the British
Army, just like other armies worldwide, has de facto accepted quite some time
ago. Recently, the Royal Dragoon Guards have provided some welcome clarity on
how the Cavalry regiments are attempting to confront the combination of the
AJAX disaster, the CRV(T) imminent retirement and further manpower reductions. The
latter has the inexorable consequence of leading from a 4 Sabre Squadrons
structure down to 3. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="EN-GB"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">SCIMITAR is going to be replaced by
WARRIOR, which has already seen some use with the cavalry since at least 2018
as an AJAX surrogate. But of course, since there are nowhere near enough
working WARRIORs, they are concentrated in just ONE Sabre squadron, albeit
enlarged to 5 Troops. Interestingly, WARRIOR cavalry will, in field, mix with
CHALLENGER, with the RDG forging a close relationship with the Queen’s Royal
Hussars. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">This is the only logical consequence of
accepting recce by stealth is (mostly) dead, and follows examples from other
parts of the world. Notably, the US Army has re-introduced a company of M1
tanks into its cavalry squadrons, and also grouped the Styker MGS and ATGW into
the reconnaissance squadron of the Stryker BCTs, until it decided to remove the
MGS from service. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">In Italy, to give another example,
CENTAURO/CENTAURO 2 support FRECCIA in the Cavalry regiments doing
reconnaissance for the brigades. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">In truth, there’s no need to wander the
world at all: the UK’s original FRES SV plan notoriously included a true medium
armour variant with 120 mm smoothbore cannon, which would have accompanied the
SCOUT. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">There really is nothing new in all of this:
it is just another sad and self-destructive circle that the British Army has
walked. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">It really is sobering that, after 30 years
and billions of expenditure, the Army’s future is a team of CHALLENGER and
WARRIOR. When one looks back at WARRIOR demonstrators for the recce cavalry
role, and at high-tech experiments such as VERDI, and thinks about all that
followed, it’s impossible not to get emotional. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="EN-GB"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="EN-GB">The Guided Weapons/Javelin Troop is enlarged into Sabre Sqn mounted
in "variety of armoured vehicles", which presumably means anything
from JACKAL to Mastiff to have some mobility. The Squadron will de facto fight
dismounted and in close liaison with the infantry (in the case of the RDG,
specifically alongside 5 RIFLES), employing JAVELIN, NLAW and LASM / ASM. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="EN-GB">There has been no increased allocation of JAVELIN. Of course, one
bitterly adds. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="EN-GB"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="EN-GB">The final Sabre Squadron groups the Sniper troop, Surveillance Tp,
Assault (pioneer) Tp and C2 Tp. This seems to build upon work Household Cavalry’s
B Squadron has been doing for the last several years, ahead of what was
supposed to be the first conversion in the Army from CRV(T) to AJAX, and the
assumption of their role within STRIKE. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="EN-GB">Adding snipers is, apparently, a major revolution that took a long
time. In 2020 B Sqn HCR formed an Anti-Tank Troop and had worked for a while to
“try” and form a Mortar Troop as well. Sadly, this seems to have been way too
ambitious a revolution, and there is no sign of mortars in the new cavalry
structure. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="EN-GB"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="EN-GB">In general, the new Cavalry organisation is all about forming
combined arms groups in the field, but without adopting it in the barracks. And
once again I ask: why? Why can’t the British Army make that final step and try
to give itself a structure which is more in line to how it actually expects to
fight? </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="EN-GB">The main reason not to do it, the logistic complication of having
regiments home-based far from each other, is gone, with the heavy forces all
centered upon Bulford, Tidworth and Warminster. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="EN-GB"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="EN-GB">Structures <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">must</b> change
because the current ones are simply not fit for purpose and they unnecessarily
complicate future planning, training and operations by maintaining artificial
separations in roles and capabilities. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-GB">An
organisation for dispersed, heavy hitting forces</span></b></p><p class="MsoNormal">The
<a href="http://www.douglasmacgregor.com/rsggeneralpublic.pdf">Reconnaissance Strike Group</a> imagined and championed by retired US Army Colonel Douglas
Macgregor remains, in my opinion, the most promising force structure to face
the current challenges of land warfare.</p><p class="MsoNormal"><br /></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjTAqCSK5960TULbxnQAgusVCXfrNC3hNZ-N1EtW_hC1uowAVmJmAw-mzx9q8sex5HgcQb-124s1Jh0QHBGLFNDbGVhzzj9PFImEkEGb3XBNvJi2rrmOEgMtWpxXhWD1HTgoDh4SWQFmtVY86-WOzISDqFTWW-STzMxVruWPkrMBJ3r4lx5iOnpzaLx/s1102/RSG_1.JPG" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="822" data-original-width="1102" height="299" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjTAqCSK5960TULbxnQAgusVCXfrNC3hNZ-N1EtW_hC1uowAVmJmAw-mzx9q8sex5HgcQb-124s1Jh0QHBGLFNDbGVhzzj9PFImEkEGb3XBNvJi2rrmOEgMtWpxXhWD1HTgoDh4SWQFmtVY86-WOzISDqFTWW-STzMxVruWPkrMBJ3r4lx5iOnpzaLx/w400-h299/RSG_1.JPG" width="400" /></a></div><br /><p class="MsoNormal"><br /></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">It is,
obviously, presented at “American scale”, so with numbers that the British Army
could never match, but <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>conceptually it
is a valid framework that is centered on manoevre forces capable of dispersed,
mobile, operations <span style="mso-bidi-font-style: italic;">across a wide area
in presence of capable enemy forces. It is meant to survive and fight in the
modern battle space where ISR and EW are pervasive and Fires are a constant
threat. <o:p></o:p></span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-style: italic;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpFirst" style="mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; text-indent: -18pt;"><!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri; mso-bidi-font-style: italic; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri;"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">-<span style="font: 7pt "Times New Roman";">
</span></span></span><!--[endif]--><i><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">This new battle space demands self-contained independent battle groups;
formations that operate on land the way the Navy’s ships operate at sea: within
the range of their organic ISR and STRIKE capabilities. <o:p></o:p></span></i></p>
<p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle"><i><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><o:p> </o:p></span></i></p>
<p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; text-indent: -18pt;"><!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri; mso-bidi-font-style: italic; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri;"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">-<span style="font: 7pt "Times New Roman";">
</span></span></span><!--[endif]--><i><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">RSG suppresses or destroys enemy air defense and missile assets-RSG is
effective when immediate responsiveness is required, in complex terrain or in
poor visibility.</span></i><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-style: italic;"> <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpLast"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-style: italic;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-style: italic;">There is no separation between Manoeuvre and Reconnaissance forces in
the RSG. The entire force is about recce and manoeuvre. It uses 4 battalion
battlegroups to jointly Find, Target and Manoeuvre, and has a Fires battalion
at its core. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-style: italic;">As the expectation is to operate dispersed, the RSG is deliberately
conceptualized as a sort of mobile fortress in which the battalions surround
and protect the Fires element, feeding it targets to destroy. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-style: italic;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjCa8iE866jBaXJnrC5vnecZuBipRf4bjIF0M-TLBmUkAjDSP6sbuBreeNQ2Z2Ktat38HrGpGAnVfErRWimOzS6I01MlK_dfAPNypj0lAIKK-NBbzSirzohhxRJMDMFx6uExYD5P2az3ao46R3pMuVXZhhVHJ5dT5TnNPrGkDouxR4OQOyejZLWnjTb/s1111/RSG_2.JPG" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="827" data-original-width="1111" height="297" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjCa8iE866jBaXJnrC5vnecZuBipRf4bjIF0M-TLBmUkAjDSP6sbuBreeNQ2Z2Ktat38HrGpGAnVfErRWimOzS6I01MlK_dfAPNypj0lAIKK-NBbzSirzohhxRJMDMFx6uExYD5P2az3ao46R3pMuVXZhhVHJ5dT5TnNPrGkDouxR4OQOyejZLWnjTb/w400-h297/RSG_2.JPG" width="400" /></a></div><br /><p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-style: italic;">The Integrated Operating Concept 2025 guidance, the Conceptual Force
2035 assumptions and the equipment programmes underway are all very attuned to
an RSG-inspired force structure for the main combat formations. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-style: italic;">The new USMC Littoral Regiment has its own lesson to give, in how it
produces a self-contained manoeuvre formation with its own “Anti-Air Battalion”
(which is actually a more multi-role unit than the name suggests, delivering
also air control and Forward Arming and Refueling Points for the supporting
aviation element) and Sustainment Battalion. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-style: italic;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p><table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgMMD9T4Q-rHDYQTl8LPOii_LIiUyYLeN6rAcRZdwtlwZxGTVZjQeqUidTtwhBjRgiEbRpQda23AFsx1d-qLLypWzz_9RmkQnLGLrlNcGFHGWD3f83T7e7SFKTnQCC8c3tmp_QcdOp-oCFhp_2n2fb38vLGEpfFnJ-GHabjHdXiYJj_5hvRaCA7cO9K/s1098/RSG_4.JPG" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="831" data-original-width="1098" height="303" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgMMD9T4Q-rHDYQTl8LPOii_LIiUyYLeN6rAcRZdwtlwZxGTVZjQeqUidTtwhBjRgiEbRpQda23AFsx1d-qLLypWzz_9RmkQnLGLrlNcGFHGWD3f83T7e7SFKTnQCC8c3tmp_QcdOp-oCFhp_2n2fb38vLGEpfFnJ-GHabjHdXiYJj_5hvRaCA7cO9K/w400-h303/RSG_4.JPG" width="400" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><i>The RSG as imagined for american use is a huge formation which contains a number of armoured vehicles an UK formation wouldn't possibly match, just like the US Armored Cavalry Regiment of the 1990s was comparable to an entire british Division, but the concepts are what matter</i></td></tr></tbody></table><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-style: italic;"><br /></span><p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-style: italic;">Imagine the British Brigade Combat Team as a formation of 4 Combined
Arms Regiments arranged around a Fires formation. Each Regiment would have a
Manoeuvre Battalion with Infantry mounted in BOXERs and, in the “Heavy”
variant, cavalry squadrons with CHALLENGER 3. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-style: italic;">One of the roles of the Manoeuvre battalion would be to Find targets
and direct Fires. The current Tactical Group Batteries of the Royal Artillery,
and indeed Surveillance and Target Acquisition sensors, including SERPENS
counter-battery radars and the new portable battlefield surveillance radar,
would be pushed directly into these units. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-style: italic;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-style: italic;">AJAX is really a thorn. Obviously, if it survives and enters service it
will have to be used, both alongside Challenger in mixed Recce-Strike Squadrons
within the manoeuvre battalion (heavy) and without tank in (medium)
configuration. But in truth, if I could have one wish granted, it would be to
make AJAX vanish and get back the money to fund the upgrade of more CHALLENGERs
and the procurement of more and better armed BOXERs. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-style: italic;">A possible template for the Cavalry squadron could come from the old US
Armored Cavalry Regiment, in which troops combined Scout platoons on BRADLEY
with tank Troops with M1. Each Troop had 8+1 ABRAMS and 12+1 BRADLEY, and this
could be a possible mix to practice with WARRIOR and then with AJAX if it
really comes. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-style: italic;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-style: italic;">Alongside the Manoeuvre formation there would a Combat Support
Battalion delivering Pioneer and engineer capabilities as well as organic
Fires. The kind of reach imagined by Conceptual Force 2035 could easily be
achieved by adopting 120 mm mortars carried in BOXERs, and BRIMSTONE-based <a href="https://defence.nridigital.com/global_defence_technology_may21/dstl_british_army_anti-armour_requirements">MountedClose Combat Overwatch (MCCO)</a>. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-style: italic;">There would also need to be a SHORAD troop, initially equipped of
course with STARSTREAK/LMM, on STORMER self-propelled launchers wherever
possible. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-style: italic;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-style: italic;">There would then be a Sustainment Battalion combining REME and Logistic
elements. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-style: italic;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-style: italic;">The Fires Battalion at the center of the Brigade would ideally revert
to the mixed format of Artillery regiments in Army 2020, so with a GMLRS
Battery in addition to the AS90 (and then Mobile Fires Platforms) batteries.
This would give the BCT the ability to strike out to at least 150 km with GMLRS
ER. The Precision Strike Missile would ideally be held at Division level in
another GMLRS regiment, able to strike out to well over 500 km, with strategic
relevance that will increase in the coming years as spiral development of the
missile delivers a seeker for striking mobile targets, from Air Defence units
to warships at sea, to ranges of 700 km and beyond. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-style: italic;">To hopefully reduce costs, the Division’s GMLRS regiment would use a
truck base, with the M270 launchers given to the Brigades. In the US, work has
started on a Palletized Field Artillery System which is a 2-pod GMLRS launcher
that can be used stand-alone or carried on a EPLS-type truck, or even on the
deck of a ship. Germany hopes to soon add a truck-based, GMLRS compatible,
2-pod launcher, so there are options for the UK to procure more rocket
launchers, with wheeled mobility and beyond, without going anywhere near HIMARS
that comes with a single pod due to C-130 volume and weight constraint
considerations. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-style: italic;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p><table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEi-drSAFXlXpuYsx-Zve8VPJSN85nxfB82bmznpV-IKZlRs_EaaAk1TxNKQ4eofrfi0_VJooqkf-tUSMOQ1brpIqLw1leR2TCH-m1Dydy5dZg1RxfpmtM6ttD8HZEYbw68umMIUb9S89LJes8-ZLkoWdKap5O7PO2o_elsI6WQ4K5SpkG-K06sFz6vO/s1102/RSG_3.JPG" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="822" data-original-width="1102" height="299" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEi-drSAFXlXpuYsx-Zve8VPJSN85nxfB82bmznpV-IKZlRs_EaaAk1TxNKQ4eofrfi0_VJooqkf-tUSMOQ1brpIqLw1leR2TCH-m1Dydy5dZg1RxfpmtM6ttD8HZEYbw68umMIUb9S89LJes8-ZLkoWdKap5O7PO2o_elsI6WQ4K5SpkG-K06sFz6vO/w400-h299/RSG_3.JPG" width="400" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><i>The proposed "early entry" vanguard element of a RSG is arguably not that far away, Robotic and Autonomous Systems aside, from what the Conceptual Force 2035's Future Combat Team aspired to be.</i></td></tr></tbody></table><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-style: italic;"><br /></span><p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-style: italic;">At brigade level would also sit an Air Defence battery with SKY SABRE,
with CAMM ER missiles planned to be available from 2026. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-style: italic;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-style: italic;">A Division of 4 BCTs in this “Heavy” configuration would be a good
start. Hopefully a second Division could then follow, in a “medium”
configuration without the CR3s. <o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-style: italic;"><br /></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-style: italic;">At Division level, remaining Light forces, either air mobile or mounted in vehicles (if you expect to operate dispersed and over a wide area, moving on foot just won't give you the tempo you need) would be chiefly tasked with ensuring supplies to get to the BCTs across theatre. Ensuring the safety of the supply flow is going to be an absolutely key task, and Ukraine only goes to prove this. </span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-style: italic;">The "operational reserve" that Future Soldier is supposed to create should have this as its primary mission: each Division should have a Reserve brigade which, while undoubtedly light for lack of enough vehicles and heavy gear, will have to possess credible protected mobility to literally plug holes in the flexible, shapeless front and ensure supplies get through. </span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-style: italic;"><br /></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-style: italic;">The Vanguard Light Brigade in Army 2020 Refine, and arguably the whole of what remained of 1st Division, had a rear area security role in a major operation, in which they would operate to secure the rear of 3rd Division. This requirement is also recognized by the new WAYPOINT 2028 organisation of the US Army, most evidently in the presence of the Force Protection brigade in the Penetration Division. </span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-style: italic;">The British Army will have to ensure this key role is adequately covered. Expanding the fighting role of the Royal Military Police, in a way similar to what the US Army does with its own MPs is possibly part of the answer. The Reserve should be part of the Answer, too. </span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-style: italic;"><br /></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-style: italic;">Forget about even trying to procure a new tracked IFV, focusing instead
on BOXER coming with the appropriate variants and firepower, so for example the
already mentioned 120 mm mortar. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-style: italic;">In early May, Rheinmetall published a periodical accounting report
outlining potential deals that must legally be communicated, and it notably
includes a 3<sup>rd</sup> Lot BOXER order for the UK, numbering c 400 vehicles.
If this does indeed happen, it would push the UK purchase above the 1,000
threshold (523 in the 1<sup>st</sup> Lot ordered in late 2019; 2<sup>nd</sup> Lot
of 100 added in April), and there’s a lot of good things that can be done with
a thousand high end vehicles if you are laser-focused on maximizing combat
capability. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-style: italic;"><br /></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjXnHzZrZTjrztXhxdlVoOrw2HAkp-72sLSVQHXhe3qldW1ek7aYj4Jz7jkY4_uCnylUzqFtT-3noZbdxm4PvFE2PTu2lgsNRLefOKnDFO5vpWJvwRgTW9YVFVvOafs413S5bhXH53LUtknmujOpkmp4ijAelzFul-DBGb0B3-Zz1vq9AA1s7HT-gTU/s1701/FSFdlwDXwAAeRrf.jpg" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="1003" data-original-width="1701" height="236" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjXnHzZrZTjrztXhxdlVoOrw2HAkp-72sLSVQHXhe3qldW1ek7aYj4Jz7jkY4_uCnylUzqFtT-3noZbdxm4PvFE2PTu2lgsNRLefOKnDFO5vpWJvwRgTW9YVFVvOafs413S5bhXH53LUtknmujOpkmp4ijAelzFul-DBGb0B3-Zz1vq9AA1s7HT-gTU/w400-h236/FSFdlwDXwAAeRrf.jpg" width="400" /></a></div><p class="MsoNormal"><br /></p>My recommendation is always the same: Ambulance and Command Post and
other supporting roles mostly do not need, or do not <i>really</i> benefit from
being on a precious BOXER base. That is exactly what Multi Role Vehicle
Protected should exist for. That’s how France, using Griffon alongside VBCI,
and Italy using ORSO alongside FRECCIA, are maximizing the combat output of
their 8x8 fleets.<p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-style: italic;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p><table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEicC5VCL250juLMoVKB3WmQc5BLRhAPXYvYQBgax-7glXWW5E9CLKjRb9qtzaErMayp1F0CJ4H6K0LPw71QqEodANvTeWI8SSmF1Zt2PBLigGT9AayM7wIcwU_c-Vtpe2-zjwEXLlpc4XarhXwiVmMeGZ9nz3d9Xu5mo1QiHjY86XhmDjYLSsokirTO/s800/Patria-1.webp" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="375" data-original-width="800" height="188" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEicC5VCL250juLMoVKB3WmQc5BLRhAPXYvYQBgax-7glXWW5E9CLKjRb9qtzaErMayp1F0CJ4H6K0LPw71QqEodANvTeWI8SSmF1Zt2PBLigGT9AayM7wIcwU_c-Vtpe2-zjwEXLlpc4XarhXwiVmMeGZ9nz3d9Xu5mo1QiHjY86XhmDjYLSsokirTO/w400-h188/Patria-1.webp" width="400" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><i>The Patria 6x6 is being adopted by Finland, Latvia, Estonia and Sweden as Common Armoured Vehicle System. It is an example of a good, cheap candidate to be the perfect supporting vehicle to BOXER in a multitude of roles. </i></td></tr></tbody></table><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-style: italic;"><br /></span><p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-style: italic;">Ideally, I repeat, I would also forget about AJAX, if there really is
the chance to claw back the money, and the Treasury is willing to let the MOD
invest in advance. There is no overstating how helpful it would be to get more
than 5 billion pounds to invest on programmes that are actually in step with
the Army’s conditions. <o:p></o:p></span></p>Gabrielehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/01623558391676151582noreply@blogger.com57tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-442909239199162925.post-29161295899527915022022-02-25T00:01:00.005+01:002022-02-25T11:45:09.550+01:00An internal struggle? <p> </p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">In the last while I’ve been hard at work on
a long article, destined to the leading Italian defence-themed publication,
which tries to explain the intricacies of Future Soldier to a non UK audience. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">It’s not an easy job, especially with how
intricate some uselessly convoluted layers of command are, and because of the
whole story of how Army 2020 and Army 2020 Refine came before. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">Trying to explain this last decade plus of
British Army turmoil has reinforced in me the belief that the British Army is
fundamentally at war with itself. I can’t prove this conclusively from the
outside, but the observation of these years has led me to believe that there
are at least two factions (probably more) pulling the Army in different
directions. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">Purely for making my task easier, I will
refer to the factions as “Traditionalists” and “Innovators”. I’m not exactly in
a position to say which faction might be closer to the Truth, so neither term
should be read as necessarily positive or negative. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">What matters is that, from the outside, it
is pretty much impossible for me to look at what happened to the British Army
in these years without thinking that a radically different line of thought has
gained the upper hand sometime between end 2014 and 2015. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">The STRIKE Brigades, which I will
immediately say i continue to think did not make real sense in the form
imagined and described, were a major departure from the thinking that had
generated Army 2020. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">Army 2020 Refine turned the Army’s
priorities on its head: in Army 2020 the Mechanized Infantry Vehicle was only
supposed to arrive around 2029, to replace MASTIFF. It would have equipped a
single infantry battalion within each armoured infantry brigade, serving much
the same purpose of the german JAGERS. Germany uses its BOXERs, at least for
now, precisely in that way: one JAGER battalion riding in BOXER APCs, serving
as reinforcement for 2 battalions of PANZERGRENADIERS in PUMA IFVs. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">Traditional. Well understood. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">Behind the scenes, the “Innovators” came up
with Conceptual Force 2035. I don’t know exactly when the study started, nor
what its current status is: the British Army isn’t a transparent organisation.
But the last time I heard officers explain the concept (in 2017), it called for
the Army to be completely reorganized into Future Combat Teams described as “small,
light and fast”, permanently combined arms in nature, built to the Rule of 4
(with Assault, Covering, Echelon and Reserve forces), flatter in hierarchy,
with more distributed Command & Control and more Indirect and Precision
Fires rather than “tanks”. </span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB"><br /></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"></p><table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEjVs2M87Qj1SMxq8PWmg38OBweKKEj1G2xYs4qYWVIXIq6UpKbgFu0SZ-Te5NYNx9y8m_R5kQZx5UlgxSbCq0AyMYBm3ylrWkKTFzfRLfPAfo7thVsthHu2_ciiC4e4P0eIzsgQJvtk7YEvMP2XsCYsek42D9FiIZ7ITGD6FVKCwcgGd83kKn9arx31=s951" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="892" data-original-width="951" height="375" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEjVs2M87Qj1SMxq8PWmg38OBweKKEj1G2xYs4qYWVIXIq6UpKbgFu0SZ-Te5NYNx9y8m_R5kQZx5UlgxSbCq0AyMYBm3ylrWkKTFzfRLfPAfo7thVsthHu2_ciiC4e4P0eIzsgQJvtk7YEvMP2XsCYsek42D9FiIZ7ITGD6FVKCwcgGd83kKn9arx31=w400-h375" width="400" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">Conceptual Force 2035 summarized by the British Army Review</td></tr></tbody></table><br /><span lang="EN-GB"><br /></span><p></p><p class="MsoNormal">In greater detail, the Future Combat Team
was ultimately described as a formation of around 500 people in total, but at least as
capable as a more traditional, 1250-strong armoured battlegroup. It would have,
indicatively, a single, 4-platoons infantry company, with an armoured Sqn in
support, plus assault pioneers and integral Combat Service and Combat Service
Support.</p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">In order to perform in a comparable way to
the larger, “traditional” BG, the Future Combat Team would add “around 90”
robotic and autonomous vehicles (surface and air) to its “around” 50 vehicles. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">The Future Combat Team would get its
survivability more through dispersion and rapidity of action and movement than
from physical armour. In order to push the enemy at a greater tempo and more in
deep, the FCT would use robotic vehicles to “push reconnaissance to the point
of destruction”. Greater Anti-Tank Guided Weapons coverage and greater
availability of organic Fires were meant to ensure firepower without having to
lug heavy and logistically-intensive MBTs around. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">Future Combat Teams as imagined would be
able to move “2000 km from a Surface Port of Debarkation (SPOD)” in order to
get into battle and would be self-sustainable for at least 5-7 days of
operations (transit included). </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">The Future Combat Team would have organic
sensors and Fires to be able to “sense and engage” at ranges of at least 15
kilometers, and “understand” out to 30 km. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">The Future Combat Teams would manoeuvre
largely independently of each other, but would still be grouped into Brigade
Combat Teams. The Brigade layer of command would have the purpose of ensuring
Cyber and Electro Magnetic Effects (CEMA), ISTAR, Information Manoeuvre and
“medium” artillery to support its FCTs with. Brigade Combat Teams would, on
their part, also be independent in their operations, indeed fielding enough CS
and CSS to operate for extended periods with little to no support from the
parent Division, or to provide mutual support to other BCTs. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">The Division’s role would mostly be to
provide longer-range Fires and support (CEMA, ISTAR, IM etcetera). </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">Conceptual Force 2035 and the apparition of
the STRIKE brigades were clearly connected. STRIKE was a first step moved in
the direction imagined by the “Innovators”, although one that came with
enormous risks attached and which, in my opinion, chose its priorities in the
wrong order and with the wrong timing. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">STRIKE’s overwhelming priority was
indisputably the purchase of a 8x8 MIV, at pretty much any cost to the rest of
the Army. It completely turned the original Army 2020 on its head by bringing
MIV forwards to 2023, leaping ahead of the modernisation of Armoured Cavalry
(2025), MBTs (2025) and Armoured Infantry (2026). This not only put the fate of
heavy armour in obvious jeopardy, but complicated an already complex budget
situation and meant that the key improvements to the Artillery and other key
enablers were left to live only on paper. Money simply wasn’t there to proceed
with those projects which, with pretty much no exception, all date back to many
years before Future Soldier. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">That brings us to today, and to an army
which is once again shrinking. The Armour has indeed suffered, as was to be
expected: CHALLENGER 3 lives on, but WARRIOR has been sacrificed. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">According to the NAO’s assessment of the
post-Review Equipment Plan, however, a budget of 2.5 billion pounds will be
made available in the next few years to uplift the BOXER purchase to at least
around 750 vehicles. This means two things: the Army will actually be spending
more money than it would have cost to update WARRIOR; and it will receive pretty
much 1 BOXER for every lost WARRIOR (245 turreted vehicles were expected). </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">That tells to me that the loss of WARRIOR
is more of a choice than a cut. The choice of an Army that made BOXER its
number 1 priority all the way back in 2015 and which on rejoining the OCCAR BOXER
team reserved for itself options for a total of 1.500 vehicles. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">Maybe I’m getting into conspiracy theorist
territory, but I think the faction of the “innovators” very much wanted things
to go as they have. The sensation is that they firmly believe BOXER is the
perfect vehicle for the Future Combat Team concept, and they are doing
everything they can to secure its advent. If 2025 really comes with money to
try and define an FV432 replacement with, expect more BOXERs to be ordered! </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">Future Soldier’s other winner is the
Artillery, which sees money finally going its way. I honestly think not a
single one of the artillery programs on the way are genuinely “new”. Almost all
of them are only the latest evolution and name-change of projects that were
already on the list back in 2010, if not earlier, under the unfortunate
Indirect Fire Precision Attack mega-programme. The new Precision Strike
Missile, for example, is literally the replacement of ATACMS, which the Royal
Artillery has wanted for all this time and pursued, without success, with the
Large Long Range Rocket programme.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">All that Future Soldier does is direct
money their way. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">And if you think about it, the upgrades to
GMLRS, the Land Precision Strike requirement for a tactical missile reaching
out to 60 – 80 km and, at a lower level, the <a href="https://defence.nridigital.com/global_defence_technology_may21/dstl_british_army_anti-armour_requirements" target="_blank">Battlegroup Organic Anti-Armour</a>
project are key ingredients for the Future Combat Team vision. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">Speaking of the latter programme alone: the
priority is the Mounted Close Combat Overwatch, a new capability that wants to
threaten enemy armour at ranges of 10 and more kilometres and which includes
concepts for container-based vertical launchers holding as many as 50 BRIMSTONE
missiles. In an Army that has so far resisted, with ludicrous reasoning and
incredible stubbornness, even the idea of putting a couple of ATGWs on the
turret of IFVs or of AJAX! </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">Mounted Close Combat Overwatch is perfectly
attuned with the Future Combat Team idea, just as BOXER is arguably well in
tune with the kind of mobility and sustainability the new formations should
have. </span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB"><br /></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEjALbgStVGT_a19eyTxUjxCz9ww3nIokdoOmMU7ZHzqsD9wC7ex4_CUccWIZ0uMok3AfZCEOQtWUv9bKD5gy7EXa8CMocw8qA1YOEM1TsiSvqzqbM3v2_u_CO96Qa56UAfegCWkPx_oANB2BNdUTgHFwTgpJoqd_snTSuouZCAcrrz4UjGrXM8W9gs8=s900" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="460" data-original-width="900" height="205" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEjALbgStVGT_a19eyTxUjxCz9ww3nIokdoOmMU7ZHzqsD9wC7ex4_CUccWIZ0uMok3AfZCEOQtWUv9bKD5gy7EXa8CMocw8qA1YOEM1TsiSvqzqbM3v2_u_CO96Qa56UAfegCWkPx_oANB2BNdUTgHFwTgpJoqd_snTSuouZCAcrrz4UjGrXM8W9gs8=w400-h205" width="400" /></a></div><br /><span lang="EN-GB"><br /></span><p></p><p class="MsoNormal">I don’t know if it is just my hope
speaking, but if you look at Future Soldier through the lens of Conceptual
Force 2035, you can actually see a thread of coherence in many choices,
including the adoption of the Brigade Combat Team moniker and the narrative
about greater all-arms integration at lower levels of command.</p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">Looking through this particular lens, I’m
tempted to say that Future Soldier is the result of a compromise between the
faction of Tradition and the faction of Innovation: the equipment programme is
in many ways shaped by the Innovators, but the structures, despite the
appearance of the BCT title, remain very, very conservative. CHALLENGER 3
itself starts to look like a stopgap, a temporary and partial solution to the
firepower requirement that in the long term, for the “Innovators” at least,
probably includes no MBT at all. Or at least not an MBT in the shapes and
weight classes we see today. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">And AJAX... well, AJAX exists. Only because
it was ordered before the “Innovators” could prevent it, if I have to guess,
and because nobody has yet worked up the courage to cancel it because there is
no certainty money would be available to replace it. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">There is grandeur in this view of Future
Soldier, to borrow a phrase from Charles Darwin. There is the comfort of
thinking that the plan has not been written out of pure despair on the back of
a paper napkin during a lunch in the mess at Andover. If one focuses purely on
the structure of the “BCTs” and on the “Deep Recce Strike BCT”, that is the
scene one is left imagining. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">Looking at the equipment choices with
Conceptual Force 2035 at hand, there seems instead to be an underlying logic,
hidden under thick layers of compromise. </span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB"><br /></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEg2mrJqCNO12_xmjvOY65m5WEB7EC-FQJoVa4Jfnv86vniRUUoDJRFBPmeyb2tntHGWQJmdUm-p5FYP86UkQZ9nlFarRc95U4Qi_BVM9P-3Ytf4goSpGj-Ft98uk98MJqRfJrUHTYGn4i4Nd3FVw4-PtbbHahrVtMaluNJ4WomO3IQF97JUkpGvOoyf=s941" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="627" data-original-width="941" height="266" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEg2mrJqCNO12_xmjvOY65m5WEB7EC-FQJoVa4Jfnv86vniRUUoDJRFBPmeyb2tntHGWQJmdUm-p5FYP86UkQZ9nlFarRc95U4Qi_BVM9P-3Ytf4goSpGj-Ft98uk98MJqRfJrUHTYGn4i4Nd3FVw4-PtbbHahrVtMaluNJ4WomO3IQF97JUkpGvOoyf=w400-h266" width="400" /></a></div><br /><span lang="EN-GB"><br /></span><p></p><p class="MsoNormal">I
don’t know if the Future Combat Team is the right solution to build a British
Army that is relevant for the future despite its small sizes. I think the idea
is bold and has many merits, and is, at least in theory, well suited for the
UK. I don’t believe the lack of mass can ever truly be compensated, but it
makes sense for a small army to be more “insurgent”, slippery and able to
strike at long range. Even the most powerful countries in the world currently
have little to no answer to long range missile strikes, so focusing on Fires is
a way for a small army to inflict disproportionate pain to an adversary.</p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">I think the “Innovators”, assuming they
really exist in the way I imagine, have a good point. Not necessarily Truth,
but a good proposal. Just yesterday, on Wavell Room, <a href="https://wavellroom.com/2022/02/23/rise-of-the-rocket-launcher/?utm_content=bufferfbf2b&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter.com&utm_campaign=buffer">an
interesting article</a> was posted which certainly belongs in the “Innovator”
field and that rhymes with Conceptual Force 2035 in many ways. It is part of
the reason why I’ve decided to write this short piece.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">Just as I’ve been and remain among the most
ferocious and outspoken critics of the STRIKE brigades for the way the whole
story was handled, I will say that I’m a supporter, in principle, of Conceptual
Force 2035. And I’ve been for years, as my old articles prove. This might
appear contradictory, but I don’t think it is. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">If done right, focusing not just on the
right capabilities but on the right distribution of them into permanent
combined arms formations, CF2035 approaches could definitely ensure the British
Army packs a heavy punch despite its diminutive frame. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">The problem is that the Army has spent the
decade stuck in a dangerous no man’s land between a “traditional” force and the
“innovative” one. It is mutilating itself through its inability to take a
definitive decision and stick to it. The violence with which the ship was
turned in 2015 has ultimately resulted in the army becoming even smaller, and
still Future Soldier fails to conclusively pick one side, with the result that
it fields neither a decent, traditional heavy division nor an innovative,
integrated, permanently combined-arms collection of agile “super-BGs”. If the
Army doesn’t get out of the no man’s land quickly, it will end up grinding
itself to pieces, Review after Review. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">Imagine, if you will, an Army that had the
maturity to pick one direction, and stick with it. The Armee de Terre did, and
its SCORPION programme is the result. Is it a perfect system for all wars? No,
but they are nonetheless in a situation orders of magnitude better than the
British Army’s. And they haven’t burned billions with zero return. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">Imagine, if you will, an Army that had
selected its path before ordering AJAX, and had worked with coherence ever
since...<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Whatever the decision taken, it
would be in far better shape today. </span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB"><br /></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB"><br /></span></p>Gabrielehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/01623558391676151582noreply@blogger.com14tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-442909239199162925.post-30425397366666638392021-12-19T22:40:00.002+01:002021-12-19T23:05:42.093+01:00A Future Soldier alternative<p> </p><p class="MsoNormal"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-GB">Some
observations on Future Soldier. And AJAX. <o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">There can be no discussion of an
alternative to Future Soldier without first spending a few words on AJAX, and
how the plan as published has faced some issues, or ignored them.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">Even after the recent oral statement and the publication of the report into the
vibration and noise disaster, we still do not know if AJAX will ever be
able to get into service. Proposals for a number of fixes have been formulated
but will now have to be trialed, evaluated and costed, and who knows what the
result will be, and how long it will take. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">Future Soldier (for now) assumes AJAX will
eventually deliver, but there are very good reasons to fear it won’t. It is
also increasingly out of place in an Army that has lost its IFVs and does not
have a budget that would enable the launch of a second major acquisition
programme to replace it. The British Army seems to have well and truly crashed
into its “French moment”, and I don’t know if there will ever again be a
tracked IFV in service. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">At this point, my personal opinion is that AJAX <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">should</b> <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">not</b> survive. The money yet not sunk on AJAX would be redirected
primarily towards more BOXERs (because that is the only thing that can be
purchased quickly, and expanding the order is cheaper than trying to launch a
separate procurement for something else) and towards a modest expansion of the
CHALLENGER 3 project. However, given the current situation and the fact that
the Army is clearly afraid that, if it lets go of this deal for 589 AFVS, it
will not be able to get them replaced, it is indispensable to consider the scenario
in which AJAX does survive. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">We can only guess, at this stage, how the
Army thinks it will fight in the future. The Future Soldier plan deliberately
avoids venturing into the shape of the “warfighting division” on deployment,
unlike Army 2020 Refine, the previous plan. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">Under Army 2020 Refine, 3<sup>rd</sup>
Division was going to have 2 armoured infantry brigades and 2 STRIKE brigades,
but the planning assumption was that, on deployment, only one of the STRIKE
formations would go. The equipment allocations went hand in hand with that
assumption, because <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">at no point</b> of
the STRIKE odyssey there was a funded, well-timed plan to get to both brigades
being fully resourced. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">Now 3<sup>rd</sup> Division is down to 2
armoured infantry “Brigade Combat Teams” and a “Deep Recce & Strike Brigade
Combat Team” which will see the current 1<sup>st</sup> Armoured Infantry
Brigade merge with 1<sup>st</sup> Artillery Brigade in Summer 2022. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">I’m <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">guessing</b>
that the whole package is expected to deploy in the field, but the document
does not exactly gives us confirmations or any detail about the timeframes and
other accompanying conditions and assumptions. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">Assuming the whole package is now expected
to deploy, the principal changes are the greater number of BOXER battalions and
AJAX regiments that would deploy. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">Future Soldier lists 5 BOXER-mounted
infantry battalions, up from 4 in the Army 2020 Refine plan (2 per each STRIKE
brigade). If the whole package is to be deployable, this is an increase from 2
to 5 “deployable” BOXER units. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">Of course, it does not compensate the fact
that, under Army 2020 Refine, there were going to be 4 WARRIOR-mounted
battalions in addition to the ones on BOXER. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">The number of AJAX regiments is the same
(4, with the fourth to be obtained by having King’s Royal Hussars regiment
losing MBTs to convert to AJAX instead), but their distribution has changed:
instead of being assigned in pairs to each STRIKE brigade (so with the
assumption that only 2 out of 4 would simultaneously deploy) they are now
assigned as follows: </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">1x in each Armoured Infantry BCT</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">2x in the Deep Recce Strike BCT</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">If the whole package is going to be
deployable, the assumption is that AJAX units will be held at higher readiness
to deploy and will have an even more important role to play. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">We can also speculate on the Why. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">In a STRIKE brigade, one AJAX regiment
would be in “Armoured Cavalry” configuration, and would have reconnaissance and
screening as its main role. The other, controversially, was going to be known
as “Medium Armour” and would have had the exact same AJAX vehicles, organized
differently, more akin to a Tank regiment, with the mission of supplying the
very lightly armed BOXERs with intimate fire support. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">In practice, once in the field the STRIKE
brigade was going to possibly parcel out “Cavalry” squadrons to cover the
reconnaissance needs, while organizing the rest of its resources in combined
arms battlegroups that, by default, would have included: </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">1x Medium Armour Squadron (14 AJAX in 4
Sabre Troops and 2 more in the HQ, plus a section of 4 ARES carrying JAVELIN
teams) </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">2x Mechanized Infantry Companies on BOXER
(12 Infantry Carrier Vehicles in 3 Rifle Platoons, 1 Ambulance, 3 more for the
OC, 2IC and CSM respectively) </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB"><o:p> </o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB"></span></p><table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEg7I7LjkllQsYCiA2EaXkLFOys_LH6qfgoqbpPLN4zKE36HVEg7SukyQY_xJ_zEt3VtpeI_oJxNQIKbBfFC5UN-KLT-4_p52N_fp5oSwfdhZayBuTjgKIo3nIXX3r0xLBpx4MtR9TcyPWlR0DjIxXYaD1RqIe47ScUPZ3IUEGJbDbo2K510LlknQnZK=s1600" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="900" data-original-width="1600" height="180" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEg7I7LjkllQsYCiA2EaXkLFOys_LH6qfgoqbpPLN4zKE36HVEg7SukyQY_xJ_zEt3VtpeI_oJxNQIKbBfFC5UN-KLT-4_p52N_fp5oSwfdhZayBuTjgKIo3nIXX3r0xLBpx4MtR9TcyPWlR0DjIxXYaD1RqIe47ScUPZ3IUEGJbDbo2K510LlknQnZK=s320" width="320" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">Internal Wargaming of the STRIKE brigade. A battlegroup with the standard Medium Armour Sqn is visible nearest to the camera. </td></tr></tbody></table><span lang="EN-GB"><br /></span><p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">BOXER, being lightly armed and, unlike
WARRIOR, unable to drive the infantry onto the target and deliver supporting
fire on the spot, was (and is) expected to dismount the infantry a “safe”
distance away from the target. The dismounts would have gotten their intimate
fire support not by their APCs, but by AJAX. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">In the Armoured Infantry Brigade, of
course, the WARRIOR covers both bases (at the cost of carrying 2 dismounts
less) and works alongside the CHALLENGER tanks. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">That was the previous plan. What happens
now? </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">Despite much talk of attempts to improve
the armament of at least some of the BOXERs, they remain wheeled APCs which the
Army continues to see as unsuited for driving <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">onto</b> the target. The Army has been very clear and consistent in
saying that BOXER is not and won’t be a WARRIOR replacement, because it does
not have that kind of capability. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">Unfortunately, however, the BOXER is
physically replacing WARRIOR anyway. It will take its place into the infantry
battalions that would have had WARRIOR, and will take over the garages and
bases in Salisbury plain. It will sit within the Armoured Infantry Brigades,
since the STRIKE brigades are no more. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">It will replace WARRIOR... while being in
no way adequate to replace WARRIOR. Wonders of British Army planning! </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">This situation means that the firepower gap
that AJAX was meant to fill in the STRIKE battlegroups not only is unchanged
and undiminished, it is literally 100% worse since WARRIOR will be withdrawn
from service. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">Future Soldier no longer lists any of the
AJAX regiments as “Medium Armour”, but i suspect this is just a cosmetic
change. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">As we have seen, when STRIKE was a thing
and the 2 Armoured Brigades had no Cavalry of their own at all, they were
supposed to be supported for their reconnaissance and screening needs by elements
coming from the single STRIKE brigade, aka from 2 AJAX regiments. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB"><o:p> </o:p></span></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEhNqChOfkoNDnV6rPmsGp6Iepzb-xjym-pekNcVXP1R5N11EQvngMvpw7wWaPm4znxub0mERSwSxbWN_AXQRzpnlvIz_T81YynyjXK53hJ4dMBZshoJGyFgkH341rSgjPofXYbM_5EbP8MWeW9uowWGsvn35ZJo6_z0Qtj01AyJRLwxr3LPoSzgfq0n=s648" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="641" data-original-width="648" height="317" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEhNqChOfkoNDnV6rPmsGp6Iepzb-xjym-pekNcVXP1R5N11EQvngMvpw7wWaPm4znxub0mERSwSxbWN_AXQRzpnlvIz_T81YynyjXK53hJ4dMBZshoJGyFgkH341rSgjPofXYbM_5EbP8MWeW9uowWGsvn35ZJo6_z0Qtj01AyJRLwxr3LPoSzgfq0n=s320" width="320" /></a></div><br /><p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">Under the new plan, the 2 armoured BCTs
each have an AJAX regiment, and 2 more sit into the Deep Recce Strike BCT. This
means 4 AJAX regiments potentially in the field at once. All of them, if we
look at the names on paper, to cover Cavalry tasks. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">Do we believe to that? Until yesterday, 2
AJAX regts were supposed to be enough to deliver recce, screening and fire
support organic to the STRIKE Battlegroups proper, with the Armoured Brigades
having no cavalry on their own, and now the Cavalry requirement is virtually
doubled...? </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">I don’t think so. It seems clear to me
that, while the Army is (rightly so) too embarrassed to call AJAX “medium
armour” anymore, the requirement for it to support the infantry is more acute
than ever before. With WARRIOR gone, <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">there
is nothing else</b> that can deliver the supporting fire of a high-elevation,
quick firing gun to suppress infantry, light armour and enemy ATGW teams.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">Logic suggest that the Deep Recce &
Strike BCT with its 2 AJAX regiment will do the cavalry job... and the AJAX
regiments in the Armoured BCTs will, regardless of names and titles, end up
playing that “medium armour” role. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">I’ll be controversial about it and say
that, by accident and inability to set sensible priorities, the British Army is
on the path to (poorly and remotely) emulate the Russian “TERMINATOR” vehicle
concept by having AJAX, a non-tank, non-IFV, provide intimate support to tanks
and infantry. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">If AJAX is to stay, I can only hope there
is a decent technical solution to its vibration and noise problems. What is not
going away is fact that AJAX and BOXER are 2 unfinished projects thrown
together in despair to create something that is workable, but way too expensive
and awkward for what it does. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">I honestly don't think there are
alternatives for a wheeled, under-armed APC and a
vehicle-with-firepower-of-upgraded-Warrior-but-unable-to-carry-dismounts. All
you can do is have APC sitting back, disgorging dismounts some distance away
while AJAX “plays Warrior” accompanying them.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">I’ll also have to try and guess how the
Army now expects to kit out 5 infantry battalions with BOXER without new
vehicles being purchased. In this case i must assume they have done what i’ve long
been saying would be unavoidable, and changed the mix of variants in the order.
</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">For example, I think the 60 engineer
section vehicles<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>could probably have
been switched to Infantry carriers: remember that Future Soldier downgrades the
previous plan from 4 brigades to 2, effectively, and there is already an
engineer variant of AJAX, the ARGUS, on order. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">Until recently, we can assume ARGUS would
have equipped the Armoured Infantry Brigade’s engineer regiments, while the
BOXERs would have gone to the engineer regiments of the STRIKE brigades. Now,
there are only the former left to equip. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">The order for 61 ambulances could also have
been cut back sharply, as well as the (absolutely out of balance) 123 between
Command Posts and Command Post – Utility vehicles. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB"><o:p> </o:p></span></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEiSLdDQcUxXAF0xWfbwCynz3_4tviqHT_UQOEc91YWAXGSgzWhIvtzVeC0QaHLK0nm-4ih1obeJYCvnitBSkxHIsJgUD9xGyva8FKtOSyNFnAVge-3iT6pYUWk2c9O9elzInP-KNI3EcBDUtF1IzKJK-eJeipr74HUce-jaBHymG8S6olKEARi4tGJe=s703" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="703" data-original-width="659" height="320" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEiSLdDQcUxXAF0xWfbwCynz3_4tviqHT_UQOEc91YWAXGSgzWhIvtzVeC0QaHLK0nm-4ih1obeJYCvnitBSkxHIsJgUD9xGyva8FKtOSyNFnAVge-3iT6pYUWk2c9O9elzInP-KNI3EcBDUtF1IzKJK-eJeipr74HUce-jaBHymG8S6olKEARi4tGJe=s320" width="300" /></a></div><br /><p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">Finally, a comment on another case of
British Army contradictory decisions: it appears likely that the Mobile Fires
Platform project, for the replacement of the AS90 with a new 155/52 gun, has
seen its requirement slashed significantly. Possibly by half, despite the
Army’s narrative being a greater focus on the Deep battle and long range Fires.
</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">The requirement previously fluctuated
between 98 and 116 guns, but with one firm assumption: 4 regiments would get
the new gun. 2 regiments for the armoured infantry brigades (19 RA and 1 RHA)
and 2 for the STRIKE brigades (3 RHA and 4 RA). </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">But under future soldier, 3 RHA is
converting to GMLRS, and its place in support of 4 “Light BCT” is taken by 103
Royal Artillery Regiment (Reserve). Very big doubts hang over the deployability
of 4<sup>th</sup> Light BCT as its Combat Support and Combat Service Support are all dependent on Reservists showing up when needed. Moreover, it is now going
to be an extremely light brigade, and this makes it very difficult to imagine
103 RA being outfitted with MFP. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">4 RA will support 7<sup>th</sup> Light
Mechanised BCT and <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">might</b> still get
MFP, eventually. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">Instinctively, i say that the MFP requirement has just stealthily been cut by 25 to 50%. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB"><o:p> </o:p></span> </p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-GB">An
alternative Future Soldier <o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">In my alternative proposal, Infantry
battalions take (kind of) even more of a hit, in favour of building up the
range of supports needed to ensure there are more Combined Arms Formations that
can be formed and put into the field. The Army Special Operations Brigade and
the Ranger regiment remain, but the parallel Security Force Assistance Brigade
is removed in favour of manpower going to other roles. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">The main design drivers of my alternative
proposal are: </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpFirst" style="mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; text-indent: -18pt;"><!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri;"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">-<span style="font: 7pt "Times New Roman";">
</span></span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB">North and South focus. The UK’s
national strategy has, now more than ever, a two-pronged (3 if we include
Central / Eastern Europe) shape with the conclusion of key agreements with
“High North” countries (Canada, Norway and the rest of the Joint Expeditionary
Force partners) and other important deals concluded with partners in the Middle
East, with India and in Asia. </span></p>
<p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle"><span lang="EN-GB">The Future Commando Force
is reflecting this double focus by forming two Littoral Response Groups but it
is clear to me that the Army must add its weight to ensure each region benefits
from a more capable and credible UK forward presence. </span></p>
<p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle"><span lang="EN-GB"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; text-indent: -18pt;"><!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri;"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">-<span style="font: 7pt "Times New Roman";">
</span></span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB">Finding and Striking is going
to be key in the future. This is an assumption we hear all the time, and which
the previous Chief of Defence Staff constantly repeated, but there is little to
no evidence of any real action being taken to ensure British forces can Find
and Acquire targets quickly and hit them at long range. The upgrade to M270B1
launchers and the acquisition of longer range GMLRS rockets and new payload
options is an excellent start but is not sufficient. </span></p>
<p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle"><span lang="EN-GB">Key to my proposal is the
repurposing of multiple infantry battalions into composite units which, taking
example from 30 Commando IX in 3 Commando Brigade, will assume a long-range “Recce-Strike”
and Brigade HQ support role. These units will also become responsible for Mini
UAVs and suitable Uncrewed Ground Vehicles once these will become available, in
particular combat UGVs compatible with Conceptual Force 2035’s aim of using
autonomous vehicles to “push reconnaissance forth to the point of destruction”
in order to increase op tempo.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span></span></p>
<p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle"><span lang="EN-GB">With mini-UAVs being
distributed out directly to the infantry, 32 Royal Artillery regiment will
instead convert to lightweight GMLRS launchers. </span></p>
<p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle"><span lang="EN-GB">The official Future
Soldier plan assigns 1 Royal Irish to 16 Air Assault brigade in such a role,
although detail is still scarce and my proposal might still be significantly
different. Each brigade will get such a battalion under my plan. </span></p>
<p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle"><span lang="EN-GB"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; text-indent: -18pt;"><!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri;"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">-<span style="font: 7pt "Times New Roman";">
</span></span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB">The British Armed Forces
already possess most of the expensive “ingredients” needed to build up a
powerful Air Mobile force. Future Soldier seems to (finally) have noticed and
has started exploiting them with plans for the “Global Response Force”, but i’m
urging an even greater focus on this area. </span></p>
<p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle"><span lang="EN-GB"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; text-indent: -18pt;"><!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri;"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">-<span style="font: 7pt "Times New Roman";">
</span></span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB">My alternative plan keeps the
Army Special Operations Brigade and the Rangers, but sacrifices the Security
Force Assistance Brigade in favour of resourcing the manoeuvre brigades. I
think the Rangers, being meant from the start as a capable fighting force that
will <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">accompany </b>local allies and
carry out SOF raids, can carve a useful role for themselves even though the
Joint Force would be hard pressed to supply the wide panoply of supports that
would be needed for the concept to truly work. I’m far less convinced by the
usefulness of the SFAB, because I simply don’t think courses in basic
soldiering skills are what partners need.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span></span></p>
<p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle"><span lang="EN-GB"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpLast" style="mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; text-indent: -18pt;"><!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri;"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">-<span style="font: 7pt "Times New Roman";">
</span></span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB">I hope the Reserve can provide
more formed units and more capabilities in the future, but i’m not prepared to
make one of already way too few brigades dependent on Reservists showing up
when and as required. The core BCTs must be manned by regulars and provided
with sufficient CS and CSS support. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size: 20pt; line-height: 115%;">1<sup>st</sup> Division <o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">In my Army proposal, 1<sup>st</sup>
Division is devoted to Forward Presence and Rapid Reaction. Forward Presence
being a major, national strategy and involving the Future Commando Force and
the indispensable support of Navy and Royal Navy units, the Division becomes a
joint unit, effectively absorbing Joint Task Force HQ and integrating 3<sup>rd</sup>
Commando Brigade in its mechanism of force generation to cover the North and
South tasks. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">1<sup>st</sup> Division will take command
of 1<sup>st</sup> Aviation BCT, 16 Air Assault BCT, 3 Commando and 7<sup>th</sup>
Mechanized BCT. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">1<sup>st</sup> Division will become a High
Readiness, highly active deployable HQ, integrating in itself Joint Task Force
HQ functions (and resources). It will be strengthened to account for the fact
that it will be expected to oversee permanently forward deployed forces and
command quick reaction operations. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">30 Signal Regiment has the single Aviation
Support comms Sqn, but sits in 1st Signal Brigade and under ARRC. Why has
everything got to be this convoluted? Why can't the British Army just put
things where they are needed, and cut down some of the intricacy?</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">30 Signal Regiment, which is primarily
tasked with JTFHQ and JHC support already, will consequently become an organic
element of the Division’s Information Maneouvre Component, alongside 2 Signal
Regiment and an Intelligence battalion integrating joint force elements. 244
Aviation Support Signal Sqn will go directly to the Aviation Brigade. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">A Recce and Fires Group will be formed
around 32 Regiment Royal Artillery as it re-equips with a lightweight, rapidly
deployable new missile launcher, either LIMAWS(R) resurrected or the USMC’s
ROGUE/NMESIS. These lightweight launchers, which will be able to deploy by air,
move long distances by road and being carried under slung by CHINOOK, would add
that “strategic” dimension to both the air mobile and future commando force
that is currently missing. Compatibility with GMLRS ammunition, up to the
Precision Strike Missile to come (with ranges of 500 Km or more) and even to
Naval Strike Missile (the NMESIS solution) would massively expand the
usefulness of the light raiding forces, and make them lethal. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">One note i will add here is that plans to
acquire and develop new warhead and payload options for GMLRS rockets are the
one truly good news of Future Soldier and i hope the Army will truly prioritize
this. The acquisition of the Alternative Warhead for Convention-compliant area
attack is crucial to restore the M270’s destructive ability, and the intention
to add “explosive and non-explosive barriers to constrain vehicle movement; missile-deployed
sensors; and radio frequency effects” are to be welcomed. Russia leads NATO by
a mile in this kind of advanced artillery capability, and if the UK manages to
develop effective payloads it could not only improve the Army’s position but
potentially secure huge export wins across NATO. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">The Recce and Fires Group will also include
one Electronic Warfare regiment: Future Soldier already plans to convert 21
Royal Signal in a second EW formation. In my plan 14 Regt would focus on 1<sup>st</sup>
Division (it already includes the LEWTs for 16 Air Assault) and would maintain
an EW Sqn for each brigade (3 Commando already provides its own EW) plus a
Divisional Sqn. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">Unlike the Deep Recce & Strike Group at
present, which is a mammoth formation of 2 heavy cav, 2 light cav, 2 GMLRS
regiments, 2 AS90 regiments and a STA regiment absurdly without any organic RLC
unit to carry the immense amount of ammunition and supplies required, the Recce
and Fires Group will absolutely need to have at least one organic, regular logistic
regiment, plus a Reserve transport regiment specifically focused on ammunition
and in particular GMLRS pods. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">With each Division having equal “dignity”
even if not equal weight, Air Defence needs will be equal as well. In my plan,
12 and 16 Regiments will be assigned one per Division and will become mixed
regiments comprising SHORAD and MRAD batteries. Being based on the very same
installation and very much working side by side, there shouldn’t be excessive
issues in adopting a mix that, in the field, would be inevitable anyway. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">An additional Surveillance and Target
Acquisition regiment will need to be formed, so each Division has access to
indispensable sensors including counter-battery radars. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">The Recce and Fires Group for 1<sup>st</sup>
Division will have 2 scout battlegroups formed around Light Cavalry, initially
with Jackals and, one day, with an enclosed light vehicle better suited to
operations including in extreme cold. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-GB">1<sup>st</sup>
Aviation Brigade Combat Team changes<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">1<sup>st</sup> Aviation BCT will expand and
rationalize its organisation. Elements of one infantry battalion, plus 244
Signal Squadron (from 30 Signal Regiment) and Landing Zone reconnaissance and
communication parties from the current Joint Helicopter Support Squadron will
be used to create a Command and Support Battalion that will deliver deployable
HQs, communications, ground reconnaissance and force protection.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">The RAF Chinook Squadrons will formally
come under the BCT’s command, organized into a Heavy Regiment through the
formation of appropriate ground life support teams for operations in the field,
on the model of existing AAC regiments. At the moment, the RAF Support Force is
more tied to established airbases and does not come with the kind of organic
life support found in AAC Regts. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">The same would happen with the new Medium
helicopters, to be organized in a Medium Regiment which will have 2 of its
Squadrons forward based by default (84 Sqn in Cyprus, 667 Sqn in Brunei). </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">The RAF Tactical Supply Wing will merge with
132 RLC Sqn and elements of the current JHSS to form a single, integrated
Aviation Sustainment Battalion. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">7 REME will lose command of 132 RLC Sqn and
carry on focusing only on Aviation Maintenance. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">158 Aviation Support Battalion RLC
(Reserve) will become organic to the BCT it is meant to support.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">47 Royal Artillery with its WATCHKEEPER
batteries would be part of the Aviation Brigade due to the sizeable ground
footprint required by the drone. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-GB">16
Air Assault Brigade Combat Team changes <o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">Largely the same changes already planned in
Future Soldier: a third logistic squadron and artillery battery to be formed so
that each battlegroup (2 PARA, 3 PARA, 1/2 GURKHA) is supported. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">1 R IRISH joining the brigade as a Recce
and Strike Formation. Keeping pace with my conception of this unit, which
should in no small part reproduce what 30 Commando successfully does for 3
Commando, this battalion will effectively also absorb 216 Signal Sqn and the
Brigade’s deployable HQ, to ensure its force protection and life support. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">R IRISH will also supply patrols / a
mounted Brigade Reconnaissance and Surveillance Sqn, effectively integrating
the Pathfinders into what will really be a composite unit, no longer a “true”
infantry formation. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">An EW battery and a Light Air Defence
Battery will complete this battlegroup, on permanent alignment from 14 Royal
Signal Regiment and 12 Royal Artillery Regiment respectively, much as already
happens today. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">The priority for the brigade would be the
acquisition of CHINOOK-portable light vehicles to increase its mobility on the
ground. The new Battlegroup Organic Anti-Armour solution should obviously
include a scaled-down launcher option compatible with these light vehicles; the
current trailer-mounted EXACTOR can be the stopgap on the way there. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-GB">7<sup>th</sup>
Brigade Combat Team <o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">In my plan, this brigade becomes “joined at
the hip” with the Future Commando Force’s Littoral Response Groups, forming a
North group, with focus on Norway and the Arctic, and a South group focused on
Middle East and beyond. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">The brigade will still be “light
mechanized”, but it would receive the VIKING as its primary fighting vehicle,
because it is amphibious and proven both in Arctic scenarios and in hot, sandy
and muddy ground. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">The brigade will technically be quaternary,
but its 4 battalions will be split into two groups, one for forward deployment
in Oman, and the other focused on Norway deployments. Each group having 2
battalions enables a yearly rotation to spread out the pressure. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">In combination with the afloat LRG provided
by the Royal Marines, these heavier, mechanized battlegroups ensure the UK has
a more credible force at readiness in both regions. Obviously the Artillery
regiment would have 4 batteries to ensure proper battlegrouping, and the Close
Support Logistic regiment should ideally receive, over time, at least a basic
fleet of all-terrain, Arctic-compatible heavy duty cargo carriers able to
ensure appropriate intimate support even in the most demanding terrain. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">4 Artillery Regiment would receive the
Mobile Fires Platform in the 2030s, replacing the L118. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">The brigade will have, as per my
introduction, a “Recce-Strike” battlegroup delivering brigade reconnaissance in
deep, screening, communications and force protection for the HQ in the field.
The unit will integrate the deployable brigade HQ and its Signal Sqn. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">32 Royal Engineers will provide close
support engineering, and a Close Support RLC regiment will, over time, acquire
at least a basic fleet of heavy duty logistic platforms compatible with snow
and the atrocious terrain of the high north. Budget restrictions mean this will
have to be a gradual transformation, but if priorities were steady, progressive
improvements would be possible. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-GB">3
Commando Brigade changes <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">The Commando brigade would undergo some
level of change by continuing its already ongoing split into two Groups, North
and South. Specifically, i’m advocating 42 and 47 Commando to mix their
respective capabilities. Right now, 42 Commando concentrates all of the ship
boarding and ship force protection teams, as well as Mentoring tasks and a Sqn
assigned to Joint Personnel Recovery role; 47 Commando groups the Landing Craft
Sqns and the boat raiding Sqn. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">I think it would be beneficial to split the
capabilities across the two units and have them assigned to the two geographic
focus points. Each “maritime Commando” will deliver: <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span></span></p>
<p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpFirst" style="mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; text-indent: -18pt;"><!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri;"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">-<span style="font: 7pt "Times New Roman";">
</span></span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB">Boarding Teams and Force
Protection with the adequate force and equipment mix for the relative areas. In
general, most boarding happens in the LRG (South) area, normally. </span></p>
<p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; text-indent: -18pt;"><!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri;"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">-<span style="font: 7pt "Times New Roman";">
</span></span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB">Boat / Raiding Sqn, to be
equipped with more capable combat boats as soon as practicable</span></p>
<p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; text-indent: -18pt;"><!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri;"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">-<span style="font: 7pt "Times New Roman";">
</span></span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB">Landing Craft Sqn</span></p>
<p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpLast" style="mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; text-indent: -18pt;"><!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri;"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">-<span style="font: 7pt "Times New Roman";">
</span></span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB">Joint Personnel Recovery</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>LRG
(North) would be delivered by 45 and 47 Commando plus supports; (South) would
be the remit of 40 and 42 Commando. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size: 20pt; line-height: 115%;">3<sup>rd</sup> Division <o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-GB"><o:p> </o:p></span></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">The Iron Division will continue to be the
Heavy division (or “warfighting” if you like the Americanism) and will have 3
manoeuvre brigades: 12 and 20 armoured BCTs and 4<sup>th</sup> Light BCT. The
inclusion of the Light BCT can appear counter-intuitive, but it was always
planned that 3<sup>rd</sup> Division, on deployment, would call on the services
of the Vanguard Light Brigade for rear area security, prisoners management and
all sort of other supporting tasks. In my proposal, 4<sup>th</sup> BCT would
also be Light Mechanized, anyway, by inheriting the Foxhound (and Mastiff /
Ridgback) from 7<sup>th</sup> BCT as the latter gets VIKINGs. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">The divisional enablers will include of
course a Recce and Fires Group centered on 26 RA (and 101 RA of the Reserve)
with M270B1 GMLRS. 5 RA delivering STA, 16 RA delivering SHORAD and MRAD, 21
Royal Signal delivering EW. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">The one difference from 1<sup>st</sup>
Division’s Group would be the 2 Recce-Strike battlegroups which, in this case,
would be square Combined Arms Regiments comprising a cavalry “battalion” with 2
AJAX Sabre Sqns plus supports and an infantry “battalion” of two rifles
companies on BOXER, plus a regimental support company with mortars, long range
ATGWs (to be acquired under the Battlegroup Organic Anti-Armour project). </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-GB">Armoured
BCTs<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">This model of Combined Arms Regiment would
be the core of the Armoured BCTs as well, for the reasons explained at length in
the introduction. You’ve heard me talk of the Combined Arms Regiment in a
multitude of articles in the past, so i won’t repeat it all here. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">I will just note that, due to the
“particular” situation of today’s British Army, needing to combine AJAX and
BOXER to, effectively, replace effects normally associated to the IFV alone,
i’m keeping the tank regiments separated. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">Instead of a single Type 58 regiment, each
brigade would have 2 smaller tank regiments (ideally Type 44, with a slight
increase to the total number of CHALLENGER 3 to be acquired over time), to go
along with 2 Combined Arms Regiments. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">The Armoured BCTs would need to be,
virtually, at the same level of readiness for the deployment of both to be
feasible in a Division-level operation, but in truth we’ll have to assume a
more graduated cycle of readiness and engagement. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">One brigade at “higher” readiness could be
committed to central-eastern Europe, with elements of one Combined Arms
Regiment plus tanks and supports in Estonia for operation CABRIT and the other
Combined Arms Regiment and tank regiment in Germany. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">The other brigade could, in the same year,
rotate its battlegroups through Oman’s training area to deliver the heavier
element of Forward Presence in the (South) sector and to exploit greater
training spaces and maintain experience of operations in arid climates. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">The Close Support Artillery regiments with
AS90 (and then MFP) would be organic to the BCTs in my plan, as well as Close
Support Logistic. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">The Armoured BCTs would have their own
Recce-Strike formation to support the HQ, deliver reconnaissance in deep and
UAV support and organic tactical intelligence. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">If Future Soldier is to truly deliver BCTs
that are more capable of independent action, this is simply indispensable. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-GB">4<sup>th</sup>
Light Mechanized BCT<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">That 4th Light Brigade Combat Team as
envisioned in the current Future Soldier is not a (reliably) deployable brigade
is evident by the fact that the totality of its Combat Support and Combat
Service Support roles are to be covered by the Reserve. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">With all due respect for the Reserve and
with all possible optimism in the expansion of their role and ability to field
formed units, it appears to me that this arrangement will too often not work
satisfactorily. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">That 4<sup>th</sup> BCT is yet another
brigade becoming an undeployable paper tiger due to the Army’s obsession to
cling on to more infantry battalions than it can possibly support is further
evidence by the fact that 1st Division has a single Signal regiment. 3rd
Division has 1 divisional regt and 2 "brigade" regts. The current
ORBAT is just NOT built around what is needed to deploy force in the field.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">We KNOW that a Bde needs, at a MINIMUM, a
Signal Sqn for its HQ and Comms. Army currently assigns a whole regt to its
(few) decent bdes, with 1 Sqn delivering Armoured HQ (where applicable) and 1
delivering Network, plus Sp Sqn. A Bde is nothing if it can't command &
communicate.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">"We need X battalions of infantry
because there is the Cyprus and Publid Duty rotation, you know" is
technically true, but the Army cannot continue to use this shield to defend a
constant erosion of the CS and CSS elements that make a Brigade a meaningful
combined arms formation.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">21 Signal Regt becomes EW, and that's
fantastic. More EW is needed. But can price of some more EW really be leaving
4th Brigade without Signal support? 3 RHA becomes a GMLRS regiment, and again
that's good, but the price can't be leaving 4th Bde depending wholly on the
Reserve.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">My solution to all of these problems is the
Recce-Strike combined arms formation at brigade level, as it combines a combat
role suited to infantry and cavalry with indispensable current capabilities
including a Signal Sqn for the brigade’s C2 needs and a tactical UAV unit. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">The remaining Signal resources, grouped in
regiments assigned to the Divisions, can deliver theatre-wide network support
while the Signals organic to the brigades deliver the BCT’s intimate needs. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">With 32 RA no longer being the lone
custodian of mini UAVs, it can convert to Light GMLRs as said earlier, and 3
RHA can continue in the close support artillery role. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">4<sup>th</sup> Brigade will be based around
4 Light Mechanized battalions on deployment, but will have more battalions at
its command to account for the needs of Cyprus. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">Cyprus absorbs 2 battalions, one of which
is a garrison force while the other, from several years already, is a Theatre
Reserve Battalion, effectively forward based on the island for rapid insertion
in the Mediterranean and Middle East area. This would make it one of the 4
primary manoeuvre units of the brigade. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">The brigade would also control the garrison
battalion, but that would be additional to the manoeuvre strength, not
considered part of it proper. The Cyprus-task would continue to be rotated
through the brigade’s battalions. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">3 RHA would still be aiming for the Mobile
Fires Platform, in my plan. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-GB">The
Reserve <o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">Future Soldier is a bit contradictory on
how best to organize the Reserve to ensure it can force-generate for
deployment. Several Reserve units are organic to Regular BCTs, while many more
are assigned to 19<sup>th</sup> Brigade, which will resurrect in 2022 to take
care of the reserve force generation cycle. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">Personally, i’m going to recommend going
with specific brigading of the Reserve, outside but alongside Regular BCTs. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">As i’ve said from the beginning, 11<sup>th</sup>
Brigade will <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">not</b> take a Security
Force Assistance role in my plan. Instead, it will become a Reserve brigade
(Heavy), assigned to 3<sup>rd</sup> Division to support primarily the armoured
BCTs. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">It will take ownership of units that Future
Soldier currently assigns directly to the Armd BCTs, from 104 Royal Artillery
to the Royal Wessex Yeomanry, moving through the Reserve battalion counterparts
to the BOXER-mounted regulars. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">19<sup>th</sup> Brigade will be the Reserve
brigade for 1<sup>st</sup> Division, taking command of 103 Royal Artillery and
the reserve infantry battalions as well as the reserve CS and CSS units
currently assigned to 4<sup>th</sup> BCT. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-GB">Public
Duty<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">Future Soldier has started a welcome
revolution in how Public Duties are provided, reducing the requirement from 2
regular battalions to 1, thanks to the creation of “Public Duties Teams”,
presumably based on the current Incremental Guards Companies. There will be 8
teams, apparently, with up to 3 on duty at any one time. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">Support will be provided by the reserves of
the LONDON regiment, which is receiving the Guards title. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-GB">In
conclusion<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">My plan would impact the Infantry quite
severely. Many battalions would need to become “hybrid” formations less about
traditional infanteering and more about UAVs, patrols, surveillance and target
acquisition. I believe this is in the interest of the Army’s capability,
however, and an inevitable consequence of having to accommodate the largest
number of capable Combined Arms Formations into a constrictive ceiling of
73.000 regulars. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">Emphasis is put on ensuring regular CS and
CSS support, as well as Surveillance and Target Acquisition, are available more
widely and assuredly across the formations. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">Note that these are all things that the
Army and Secretary of State for Defence say are needed; the problem is that
Future Soldier as currently published does not follow those directions. </span></p>Gabrielehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/01623558391676151582noreply@blogger.com26tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-442909239199162925.post-46807969233487927972021-10-10T18:02:00.001+02:002021-10-11T19:41:46.230+02:00Time for courage <p> </p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">The British Army is expected to reveal more
details about its future plans sometime “in the autumn”, which in theory means
sometime soon. The internal work to define the way forward is known as Project
EMBANKMENT and is meant to put meat on the bones of the Future Soldier
announcement that came together with the Defence Command Paper. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">The Army’s Future Soldier position at the
time was articulated as follows: </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: 36pt; mso-list: l8 level1 lfo1; tab-stops: list 36.0pt; text-indent: -18pt;"><!--[if !supportLists]--><span face=""Arial","sans-serif"" lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-font-family: Arial;"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">•<span style="font: 7pt "Times New Roman";">
</span></span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB">An additional <b>£3bn </b>will
be invested in new Army equipment over the next ten years on top of the £20bn
already planned.</span><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: 36pt;"><span lang="EN-GB">[<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">NOTE:</b> we have to assume it is part of
this money that has been used to announce the GMLRS upgrade and new munitions,
at 250 million, and the Mobile Fires Platform, replacement for AS90 and part of
the L118s, at “over” 800 million. Both these projects already existed before,
but clearly they didn’t have any funding line before the Review. The 120
million investment in the RANGER regiment, the planned 2023 purchases of new
mini UAVs to replace Desert Hawk III and of new C-UAS weapons; plus plans for
CAMM ER to beef up ground based air defence are probably all funded from this
pot. “Over” 200 million have also been promised to beef up Electronic Warfare
capabilities.] </span><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB"> </span><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: 36pt; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo2; tab-stops: list 36.0pt; text-indent: -18pt;"><!--[if !supportLists]--><span face=""Arial","sans-serif"" lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-font-family: Arial;"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">•<span style="font: 7pt "Times New Roman";">
</span></span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB">By 2025 the Army will be <b>72,500
regular and 30,100 reserve</b> personnel.</span><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: 36pt; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo2; tab-stops: list 36.0pt; text-indent: -18pt;"><!--[if !supportLists]--><span face=""Arial","sans-serif"" lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-font-family: Arial;"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">•<span style="font: 7pt "Times New Roman";">
</span></span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB">There will be <b>no loss of cap
badges </b>and <b>no redundancies </b>of Regular soldiers.</span><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: 36pt; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo2; tab-stops: list 36.0pt; text-indent: -18pt;"><!--[if !supportLists]--><span face=""Arial","sans-serif"" lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-font-family: Arial;"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">•<span style="font: 7pt "Times New Roman";">
</span></span></span><!--[endif]--><b><span lang="EN-GB">The Army will continue to
recruit </span></b><span lang="EN-GB">in large numbers the diverse talent that it
needs to maintain a competitive advantage now and in the future. </span><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: 36pt; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo2; tab-stops: list 36.0pt; text-indent: -18pt;"><!--[if !supportLists]--><span face=""Arial","sans-serif"" lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-font-family: Arial;"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">•<span style="font: 7pt "Times New Roman";">
</span></span></span><!--[endif]--><b><span lang="EN-GB">1 MERCIAN </span></b><span lang="EN-GB">and <b>2 MERCIAN </b>will be merged.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>In time they will form one of the new Boxer-mounted battalions in the
new structure.</span><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: 36pt;"><b><span lang="EN-GB">[NOTE: 1<sup>
</sup></span></b><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">MERCIAN</span></b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"> was earlier planned to be a WARRIOR-mounted
battalion. With WARRIOR going out of service and a lot of garage and barracks
space, sometimes literally newly built, becoming available in Tidworth and
Bulford, we have to assume earlier plans for BOXER battalions will be
completely torn apart. There is little to no sense in putting BOXER in
Catterick, as once planned, when Salisbury Plain is now “empty”.) <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB"> </span><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: 36pt; mso-list: l4 level1 lfo3; tab-stops: list 36.0pt; text-indent: -18pt;"><!--[if !supportLists]--><span face=""Arial","sans-serif"" lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-font-family: Arial;"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">•<span style="font: 7pt "Times New Roman";">
</span></span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB">A new <b>Army Special
Operations Brigade </b>based around a new <b>Ranger Regiment </b>able to
operate in high threat environments to train, advise and accompany
partners.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>This will be initially seeded
from the current Specialised Infantry Battalions: <b>1 SCOTS</b>,<b> 2 PWRR</b>,
<b>2 LANCS </b>and<b> 4 RIFLES</b>.</span><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB"> </span><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: 36pt; mso-list: l1 level1 lfo4; tab-stops: list 36.0pt; text-indent: -18pt;"><!--[if !supportLists]--><span face=""Arial","sans-serif"" lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-font-family: Arial;"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">•<span style="font: 7pt "Times New Roman";">
</span></span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB">A new <b>Security Force
Assistance Brigade </b>to complement the Army Special Operations Brigade,
operating in lower threat environments, routinely deployed across the globe to
develop the capacity of partners and allies.</span><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: 36pt;"><span lang="EN-GB">[<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">NOTE:</b> effectively this means turning
another 4 battalions into Specialised Infantry. One of them will probably be 3<sup>
</sup></span><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">GURKHA RIFLES,
which was being built up as 5<sup>th</sup> of the Specialised units when the
new Army plan appeared]<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB"> </span><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: 36pt; mso-list: l6 level1 lfo5; tab-stops: list 36.0pt; text-indent: -18pt;"><!--[if !supportLists]--><span face=""Arial","sans-serif"" lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-font-family: Arial;"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">•<span style="font: 7pt "Times New Roman";">
</span></span></span><!--[endif]--><b><span lang="EN-GB">2 YORKS </span></b><span lang="EN-GB">will become a new prototype warfighting and <b>experimentation
battalion</b>. [This has now happened, with 2 YORKS, while based in Cyprus,
busy testing new equipments including Dismounted Situational Awareness tablets;
Robotic Platoon Vehicles and the new Assault Rifle In-line Low Light Sight,
ARILLS]</span><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: 36pt; mso-list: l6 level1 lfo5; tab-stops: list 36.0pt; text-indent: -18pt;"><span lang="EN-GB"><br /></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: 36pt; mso-list: l6 level1 lfo5; tab-stops: list 36.0pt; text-indent: -18pt;"></p><table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj6Sr2qe9i_rS4rAPUC4Qq3SanYuaBx8z_4II5iN-tDfpGM594WJ7nnb4WR7yGkQ2el0E19U0FtyhEVPlO0a1ZJ0DtVlTZPGU77duP_JkboyfZc6UmOYdviFhxU_mp8QMBvEE-UYTsNr10/s2048/ARILLS+Assault+Rifle+In+Line+Low+Light+Sighting+system.jpg" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="1536" data-original-width="2048" height="300" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj6Sr2qe9i_rS4rAPUC4Qq3SanYuaBx8z_4II5iN-tDfpGM594WJ7nnb4WR7yGkQ2el0E19U0FtyhEVPlO0a1ZJ0DtVlTZPGU77duP_JkboyfZc6UmOYdviFhxU_mp8QMBvEE-UYTsNr10/w400-h300/ARILLS+Assault+Rifle+In+Line+Low+Light+Sighting+system.jpg" width="400" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><i>Clipped on in front of the Day sight, the ARILLS "fuses" thermal imagery and image intensification for maximum performance at night and in all low light conditions. </i></td></tr></tbody></table><br /><p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: 36pt; mso-list: l6 level1 lfo5; tab-stops: list 36.0pt; text-indent: -18pt;"><!--[if !supportLists]--><span face=""Arial","sans-serif"" lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-font-family: Arial;"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">•<span style="font: 7pt "Times New Roman";">
</span></span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB">The Infantry will be
reorganised into <b>four Divisions of Infantry </b>with a more balanced number
of battalions and offering a wider range of infantry roles.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span></span><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: 36pt;"><span lang="EN-GB">[Each infantry
division will be aligned to one of the RANGER battalions and, presumably, one
of the Specialised battalions as well. Each infantry division will probably get
1 mechanised battalion as well, so each division can offer a wide range of
opportunities to new recruits] </span><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: 36pt; mso-list: l3 level1 lfo6; tab-stops: list 36.0pt; text-indent: -18pt;"><!--[if !supportLists]--><span face=""Arial","sans-serif"" lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-font-family: Arial;"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">•<span style="font: 7pt "Times New Roman";">
</span></span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB">The Army will reorganise into <b>Brigade
Combat Teams </b>(BCTs), including permanently assigned supporting elements
like artillery, engineers, electronic warfare, cyber and UAS. </span><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB"> </span><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"></p><table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhBtvLwRv4jM71mIfL4qEjCqn9c6bgo_x684ycS1AH70NBm3kx3RYN9zClEE607KZkCe9vNhuS3CYho3veK-6df3pjb0zz87CmO__FKEbHpN6soHlcYn8z4qG9Fkx4fq6zCsRsACRY0p1E/s2048/E608GweXMAQbFjN.jpg" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="1144" data-original-width="2048" height="224" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhBtvLwRv4jM71mIfL4qEjCqn9c6bgo_x684ycS1AH70NBm3kx3RYN9zClEE607KZkCe9vNhuS3CYho3veK-6df3pjb0zz87CmO__FKEbHpN6soHlcYn8z4qG9Fkx4fq6zCsRsACRY0p1E/w400-h224/E608GweXMAQbFjN.jpg" width="400" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><i>Plans to upgrade GMLRS, reactivate some of the ones in reserve (44 launchers will be upgraded, compared to 35 now in use) and acquire new, long range and more advanced munitions is extremely welcome, but much of this was supposed to be funded already before the Review. </i></td></tr></tbody></table><br /><p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: 36pt; mso-list: l7 level1 lfo7; tab-stops: list 36.0pt; text-indent: -18pt;"><!--[if !supportLists]--><span face=""Arial","sans-serif"" lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-font-family: Arial;"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">•<span style="font: 7pt "Times New Roman";">
</span></span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB">A very-high-readiness <b>Global
Response Force </b>of 16 Air Assault Brigade and the newly formed 1<sup>st</sup>
Aviation Brigade, which will be ready to respond from humanitarian relief
through to crisis response and warfighting.</span><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: 36pt;"><span lang="EN-GB">[The British
armed forces have a formidable array of capabilities needed to build and
sustain an excellent air mobile brigade: 8 C-17, 22 A-400M, 60 Chinook, 50
Apache helicopters, a new Medium Lift Helicopter to come, plus Wildcat. It’s a
shame it took years to notice. The formation of the Aviation brigade was a much
welcome step and further refinement of the combined capabilities of the two
brigades would deliver a truly excellent tool. On the other hand, the loss of
C-130J is regrettable, as it reduces the airlift capability. It’s very much
contradictory to cut cargo aircraft while expanding the role of the air mobile
force, but coherence in UK defence planning has never been a factor...] </span><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB"> </span><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: 36pt; mso-list: l10 level1 lfo8; tab-stops: list 36.0pt; text-indent: -18pt;"><!--[if !supportLists]--><span face=""Arial","sans-serif"" lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-font-family: Arial;"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">•<span style="font: 7pt "Times New Roman";">
</span></span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB">The <b>Land Industrial Strategy
</b>will strengthen our partnerships with industry to unlock and rapidly
exploit the potential of innovation and spiral development, delivering the kit
we need when we need it, as part of the Army’s contribution to UK prosperity.</span><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB"> </span><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">In terms of timelines, the Future Soldier
briefing noted: </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB"> </span><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: 72pt; mso-list: l9 level2 lfo9; tab-stops: list 72.0pt; text-indent: -18pt;"><!--[if !supportLists]--><span face=""Arial","sans-serif"" lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-font-family: Arial;"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">•<span style="font: 7pt "Times New Roman";">
</span></span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB">The Army will use spring and
early summer 2021 to refine and test the designs, capabilities and structure
below BCT-level. It will plan carefully to maximise the potential of limited
resources, particularly key equipment. </span><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: 72pt; mso-list: l9 level2 lfo9; tab-stops: list 72.0pt; text-indent: -18pt;"><!--[if !supportLists]--><span face=""Arial","sans-serif"" lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-font-family: Arial;"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">•<span style="font: 7pt "Times New Roman";">
</span></span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB"> This work will be
presented to the Army Board in late June 21.</span><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: 72pt; mso-list: l5 level2 lfo10; tab-stops: list 72.0pt; text-indent: -18pt;"><!--[if !supportLists]--><span face=""Arial","sans-serif"" lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-font-family: Arial;"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">•<span style="font: 7pt "Times New Roman";">
</span></span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB">The MOD Reserve Forces 30
review will be published in May 21. </span><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: 72pt; mso-list: l2 level2 lfo11; tab-stops: list 72.0pt; text-indent: -18pt;"><!--[if !supportLists]--><span face=""Arial","sans-serif"" lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-font-family: Arial;"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">•<span style="font: 7pt "Times New Roman";">
</span></span></span><!--[endif]--><b><span lang="EN-GB">Detailed programming and
balanced decisions about the optimum resourcing and sequencing of this
institutional change will follow, enabling CGS to issue orders to the Army in
early autumn</span></b><span lang="EN-GB">.</span><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></p><p class="MsoNormal">In terms of
Force Structure, the Future Soldier plan as published at the time of the
Defence Command Paper was as unimaginative as they come. The "new"
Army linearly fell from a planned 4 mechanized brigades (2 armoured, 2 STRIKE) to
just 2 mechanized Brigade Combat Teams, ugly and inevitable hybrids pieced
together with the surviving pieces of Armoured Bdes (Challenger 3) and STRIKE
(AJAX, which was originally meant for Armour anyway; and BOXER).</p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">1 Cavalry
regiment with AJAX, 1 tank regiment, 2 infantry battalions on BOXER. If this
plan will be confirmed, it couldn’t possibly be any more foregone than it already
is. You lose WARRIOR, you end up here. That's literally it. I was writing about
it <a href="http://ukarmedforcescommentary.blogspot.com/2021/02/the-british-army-where-do-we-go-from.html…" target="_blank">back in February</a>. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The only
"innovation" at the time was the attempt to turn 1st Artillery
Brigade into a 3rd manoeuvre bde by putting the 2 "orphaned" AJAX
regiments into it, alongside GMLRS but without infantry. The Army calls this formation Deep
Recce Strike Brigade Combat Team. This is not new per se, but it's new to see
it as an organic, permanent formation: the Deep Strike Recce BCT is, really,
the comfortable choice that lets the British Army hang on a couple of Cavalry
regiments otherwise at risk, while adopting a familiar, reassuring mix that was
used in Op GRANBY in 1991, grouping 16/5 Lancers with 32 and 39 Heavy regts RA
as Divisional Artillery Group. What is old is new again. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The other 2
manoeuvre brigades were inevitably downgraded to Light BCTs, with the
assumption that one would be Lightly Mechanized thanks to the use of FOXHOUND.
Apparently, even in the middle of this disaster, the Army remains uninterested
in hanging on to MASTIFF and RIDGEBACK, and we really should ask ourselves why,
especially since these vehicles have received a quick, painless, cheap but
important mobility upgrade and have been sent to Mali where they have an
important role. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">At a macro
level, the new organization is purely born out of despair and can’t have taken
more than 5 minutes to design. Literally. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none;"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Where innovation is <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">supposed</i> to happen is at lower level, and we have to hope that the Army will be bold enough to truly change its ways, and go back to the drawing board in regard to the organization of the brigades. </span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none;"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The british BCT is described
as a formation which <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none;"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none;"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">“will be structured to
integrate capabilities at the lowest appropriate level with supporting
capabilities routinely assigned including artillery, Un-crewed Aerial Systems,
cyber, air defence, engineers, signals and logistic support. This will create
more self-sufficient tactical units with the capacity to work with partners
across government, allies and industry.”<o:p></o:p></span></i></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none;"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><o:p> </o:p></span></i></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none;"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The internal brief insists: “</span><span lang="EN-GB">A Land force structured to <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">integrate
capabilities at the lowest appropriate level</b> creating more self-sufficient
points of presence”. </span><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none;"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">This is
perfectly in tune with assumptions about the future that have been in Army
thinking for several years now. The </span><span lang="EN-GB"><a href="https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/922969/20200930_-_Introducing_the_Integrated_Operating_Concept.pdf"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Integrated Operating Concept 2025</span></a></span><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"> has notoriously listed the
necessary attributes of the future force as:</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Have
smaller and faster capabilities to avoid detection</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Trade
reduced physical protection for increased mobility</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Rely more
heavily on low-observable and stealth technologies</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Depend
increasingly on electronic warfare and passive deception measures to gain and
maintain information advantage</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Include a
mix of crewed, uncrewed and autonomous platforms</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Be
integrated into ever more sophisticated networks of systems through a combat
cloud that makes best use of data</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Have an open
systems architecture that enables the rapid incorporation of new capability</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Be markedly
less dependent on fossil fuels</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Employ
non-line-of-sight fires to exploit the advantages we gain from information
advantage</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Emphasize
the non-lethal disabling of enemy capabilities, thereby increasing the range of
political and strategic options</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The Army’s
own <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">Conceptual Force 2035</b> doubles
down on the same kind of design drivers. This study imagined an army of 3
smaller but capable divisions made of lighter, faster, more deployable, largely
independent battlegroups, with dispersion being the norm. Conceptual Force 2035
specifies that the disaggregated fighting requires <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">Combined Arms capabilities to be organic at lower level</b>, to ensure
the dispersed Battlegroups do not have to wait for a superior echelon to make
supports available. This includes having more organic Indirect Fire capability
and employing it alongside greater ATGW capability to offset the capability
currently delivered by MBTs through “lighter” vehicles.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The BGs
will be expected to carry out, and I quote, <b>deeper, more risky and
aggressive manoeuvre</b>. Robotic, sacrificial systems will be used to press on
reconnaissance, and I quote again, to the point of destruction, in order to
enable the BG to use frenetic op-tempo to make up for the lack of mass.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The
resulting BGs would be around 500-strong but are supposed to match the current
mission set of a 1250-strong armoured BG though the use of robotics and higher
op-tempo. The Conceptual Force imagined that, from the then objective force of around 82.000 regulars, the
British Army would be able to form some 48 such Combined Arms battlegroups. The
organization would work to the Rule of 4, with an Assault Force, Covering
Force, Echelon Force and Reserve Force. These BGs would be grouped in Brigades
with enough CS and CSS elements to fight, again, largely independently from the
Division level.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB"><o:p> </o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB"></span></p><table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiH97CIpBfZt5fWpnJ4G9YoIgQa1yLyKIJHP_Pa3leIriszrkSYqd48SKqRLNrw-qPWI1hmu7EvROLAV5bwYoqOC32yrxipwL26YNrpgox71q1pCdWrbw_EJ5WtM8kzjGJMtJa9JhpZdRs/s951/CF2035.JPG" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="892" data-original-width="951" height="375" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiH97CIpBfZt5fWpnJ4G9YoIgQa1yLyKIJHP_Pa3leIriszrkSYqd48SKqRLNrw-qPWI1hmu7EvROLAV5bwYoqOC32yrxipwL26YNrpgox71q1pCdWrbw_EJ5WtM8kzjGJMtJa9JhpZdRs/w400-h375/CF2035.JPG" width="400" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><i>Conceptual Force 2035's key points</i></td></tr></tbody></table><span lang="EN-GB"><br /><o:p><br /></o:p></span><p></p><p class="MsoNormal">We can agree or disagree with the
assumptions above, but there is no denying that, at a conceptual and doctrinal
level, the scenario has been set. This is the future force that the Army thinks
is needed in the future.</p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">Now the real question is whether the Army
has any appetite to reorganize its Force Structure accordingly, and let go of
some old, deeply ingrained tribalism that has been allowed to put up all sorts
of avoidable problems. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">The examples that could be made when
referring to that “tribalism” are many, at all levels, but my favourites<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>are always the same because they perfectly
illustrate the avoidable stupidity that permeates the British Army’s structure.
</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">First example: when “battlegrouping”,
Cavalry / Tank squadrons or demi-squadrons are mixed with companies of
infantry. A battlegroup based on an Infantry Battalion comes with the very
significant advantage of having a Fire Support Company with mortars, snipers
and anti-tank platoons. A BG based on a tank formation does not get a Fire
Support Coy, because Tank regiments don’t have them. The AJAX regiments
organized as “Medium Armour” formations, mirroring Tank regiments, would also
not have had one. The cavalry regiments have anti-tank capability in their
Guided Weapons Troop, but normally have no mortars. One of the “innovations”
that the Household Cavalry Regiment was (is?) pursuing as part of STRIKE and of
its transition to AJAX, is the creation of a mortar troop. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">This, for me, is tribalism. That in this
age of warfare we are still looking at these baby steps is insanity. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">The use of UAVs is also very stovepiped,
with 32 Regiment Royal Artillery holding the Mini-UAS capability and parcelling it out upon battlegrouping. This frankly won’t do in the future. Capability must
spread out across formations and go down the ladder of formation size; combined
arms must be the norm, not the on-deployment mixing of today. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">If the Army
is to move in any way closer to its own Concept Force 2035 ambition, it needs
to find the courage to gut its current, increasingly nonsensical structure, mix
Infantry & Cavalry and redistribute capabilities with no deference to
capbadges and outdated Corps separations, creating Permanent Combined Arms
Battlegroups.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Such a radical reform is no longer avoidable, since the Army is trying to modernize in the context of a regular manpower cap moving
down from a theoretical, never-achieved 82,000 to 72,500 by 2025. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The regular
Army is going to be smaller, and positions will be lost, and units will need to
change. In particular, the Infantry is bound to take a hit, simply because
Combat Support and Combat Service Support formations have already been cut back
so much that most of the Army’s brigades are make-believe formations comprising
only infantry, with no artillery, communications, engineering or logistics. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">1st Division's brigades, with the exception of one which gets some supports on rotation, are next to
useless paper bags containing infantry battalions to parcel out in the never
ending quest to rob Peter so that Paul can be outfitted in a decent way for
deployment. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">This has to change. The Army will continue to
drown in its own chaos otherwise. </span></b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"></span></p><table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiJsmUQ2ZpMInGL75GyEfxISXc6bCAr3SDPzMa-izXod3CWT3I1aUMwHup9FnvlKUI5ujYYQmD_rL7Q6ysN5fK-w_EXqbbyMkvrD2TNrt0ritHFzCW5nFHRYbvSDCrL3QBOVRvhWwplCCM/s703/BOXER+variants+and+sub-variants.png" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="703" data-original-width="659" height="400" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiJsmUQ2ZpMInGL75GyEfxISXc6bCAr3SDPzMa-izXod3CWT3I1aUMwHup9FnvlKUI5ujYYQmD_rL7Q6ysN5fK-w_EXqbbyMkvrD2TNrt0ritHFzCW5nFHRYbvSDCrL3QBOVRvhWwplCCM/w375-h400/BOXER+variants+and+sub-variants.png" width="375" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><i>While BOXER is an excellent base vehicle, it is not a complete, coherent capability unless the right mix of variants is achieved, and the equipment fit is decent. At the moment, the British Army's equipment fit plans are dismal, with, for example, the mortar carrier being literally just an APC carrying a L16 81mm mortar that will only be able to fire once dismounted. Same for the Observation Post Vehicle, which at the moment is not planned to be equipped with its own sensors and target marker to enable target designation from under armour. Key variants are missing entirely; others could now be a duplication (Engineer Section Vehicle and the ARGUS vehicle of the Ajax family seem to be in open conflict now that only 2 brigades remain), the number of infantry carriers is ridiculously small, firepower on the vehicles is absysmal. Change is urgently needed. </i></td></tr></tbody></table><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /><o:p><br /></o:p></span><p></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US">As the
reveal date for Embankment draws nearer, the leaks to the press have begun,
with the Daily Mail </span><span lang="EN-GB"><a href="https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-10074159/Army-plans-huge-cuts-infantry-troops-axed.html"><span lang="EN-US">writing</span></a></span><span lang="EN-US"> about incoming reductions to the
Infantry, which is said to be destined to shrink from 16,500 to 11,000.
Apparently, the Rifles regiment didn’t take well to the news and promptly
leaked the internal memo to the press. Either the leaker or, more likely, the
Daily Mail itself, have also immediately felt the need to point out that the
plan will be “overseen by the new Chief of the Defence Staff, Admiral Sir Tony Radakin. The evil Royal Navy
is already out to get the Army’s scalp, seems to be the narrative that we will
be force-fed over the coming months.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;">The fact that the Admiral is not yet in post, and that Embankment is
the Army’s own plan formulated over the last several months is, naturally, a
detail of no importance: never let facts get in the way of a good tale! <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;">The reduction in the Infantry numbers is not and cannot possibly be a
surprise to anyone who read the Defence Command Paper and Future Soldier
brochure. Where did people think that the manpower reduction would hit? On the
last few enablers left to ensure that the Army can scrape together 4 brigades
somewhat deployable? <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;">It was inevitably going to come to this. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;">And if the Army was to finally pursue its own imagined Future Combat Team,
around 500 strong, it would again be inevitable that Infantry numbers
would be further affected. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;">It was all always under our eyes. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;">The impact on the Infantry’s effectiveness is the only thing that isn’t
yet clear. Some reductions will be pretty much automatic since
mechanized battalions are larger than Light Role formations. As WARRIOR
disappears and only 4 Mechanized battalions remain, a few hundred posts will
disappear naturally. Several hundred more will vanish as 4 (or rather 3,
assuming 3 GURKHA RIFLES carries on) battalions are cut down from 500/600 to
250-or so to form the new </span><span lang="EN-GB" style="mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;">Security Force Assistance Brigade.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB" style="mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;">2 MERCIAN
effectively disappears with the merging into 1 MERCIAN, accounting for several
hundred more. And the rest will have to be shaved off with some other change to
the structure of the remaining Battalions. </span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB" style="mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;">Unfortunately the Army has once more tied its
hands up by insisting that no capbadge will be lost and that no other
battalions will disband, so this inexorably means <b>every remaining battalion
will get smaller.</b> <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB" style="mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;">How, and
with what “capability compensation”, is the only question that remains on the
table. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB" style="mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB" style="mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;">Army 2020,
in 2011, attempted to absorb the manpower cut by removing a Platoon from every Rifle Company in every Light Role battalion. This proved unworkable, so a whole Company was removed instead, with the assumption that the hole would be filled by a formed company of reservists from the </span>paired Reserve battalion.</p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB" style="mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;">This
arrangement on paper makes a lot of sense in what is supposed to be a fully integrated force of Regulars and Reservists, but unfortunately proved unworkable because the availability of reservists is, understandably, not very good and not very predictable. </span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB" style="mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;">The number of times the Reserve has been able to deploy a formed Company probably fits on the fingers of one hand. I can think of 4 PARA deploying one to the Falklands, and a case in Cyprus. </span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB" style="mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;">Day to day efficiency of the regular battalions was badly impaired, as was their ability to train. It became normal to put together companies of two battalions to make one, which obviously defeats the point of keeping so many tiny battalions in the first place. </span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB" style="mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;">Eventually, </span>in 2015, the missing
companies were rebuilt, redistributing the manpower obtained by inventing the
Specialised Infantry battalions and downsizing them to just around 250 personnel.</p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB" style="mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;">But this
time, manpower cannot just move around. It will be shed for good. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB" style="mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;">And there
are just two ways in which this can happen: <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpFirst" style="margin-left: 42.55pt; mso-add-space: auto; mso-list: l5 level3 lfo10; text-indent: -14.2pt;"><!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri;"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">-<span style="font: 7pt "Times New Roman";">
</span></span></span><!--[endif]--><b><span lang="EN-GB">The Stupid, Capbadge-driven
way: </span></b><span lang="EN-GB" style="mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;">insist in
holding on to Infantry battalions more or less as they are, and go back to the
(failed) Army 2020 model. This is unfortunately highly likely to happen, if
recent Army history is any indication. <b><o:p></o:p></b></span></p>
<p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpLast" style="margin-left: 42.55pt; mso-add-space: auto; mso-list: l5 level3 lfo10; text-indent: -14.2pt;"><!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri;"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">-<span style="font: 7pt "Times New Roman";">
</span></span></span><!--[endif]--><b><span lang="EN-GB">The Conceptual Force 2035
way: </span></b><span lang="EN-GB" style="mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;">remove the
artificial separations between Infantry, Cavalry, Armour, etcetera, and build
up permanent, Combined Arms Battlegroups which will probably have the
equivalent of just 2 Infantry companies, again, but will at least be designed
from the ground up to include armour-support, UAVs, Robotic vehicles when they
eventually happen, and beefed-up organic Fires. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB" style="mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB" style="mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;">The most
common counter-argument deployed against <b>Permanent</b> battlegrouping is
that, supposedly, maintaining the separation of roles enables each component to
pursue excellence in its field, and battlegrouping only for deployment
safeguards “flexibility”. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB" style="mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;">Personally,
I think this is an extraordinarily weak argument. It could be countered in all
sorts of ways, but i once again will go back to the example made earlier:
keeping the specialties separated results in incomplete battlegroups simply
because, to make one example, the Cavalry absurdly does not have mortars. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB" style="mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;">The
separation only enables and sometimes mandates the proliferation of capability
gaps that require ever more “robbing Peter to pay Paul”: a stupefying
number<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>of separate formations sending
bits and pieces to one another to build <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">something</i>
that actually works. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB" style="mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;">I don’t see a single genuinely good reason why we should continue to keep
separate formations that will <b>never</b> deploy on operations without being
broken apart and reassembled in combined arms battlegroups. </span><span lang="EN-GB" style="mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;">All too often, when looking back to operations, the post-action analysis
contains the passage “the units in the battlegroup had only been together for a
short time and didn’t know each other enough”, or similar remarks. Lieutenant
M. Dewis, on TANK 2020 (volume 102, No 801) makes a series of recommendations
to try and save the Regimental system while enabling the creation of effective
Combined Arms Teams.</span><span lang="EN-GB" style="mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;">He stops short of advocating for permanent overarching formations, but he
underlines the need for broader, more stable affiliations and more
cross-training. At the same time he can’t help but note that Battlegroup level
training is expensive and an increasingly rare commodity at a time in which it
is more desperately needed than ever. It’s all good to insist on social
networking and “forming and storming” by “intruding” in each other’s low level
training events as much as possible, and simulation and tabletop wargames
obviously help, but I don’t think half-measures are adequate. C</span>ertainly not in the context of a further shrinking Army.</p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;">The Army’s Conceptual Force 2035 is clear in its working assumption that
the future is the combined arms Future Combat Team. It is time for the Army to
move in that direction in a serious way, if it believes its own innovative
thinking. There is absolutely no rational reason to claim that more
self-sufficient formations wouldn’t be flexible and able to cooperate and re-ORBAT as
necessary.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;">The Army insists that “</span><span lang="EN-GB" style="mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;">the future battlefield will be different. It will be harder to hide and weapons
will destroy with greater accuracy, range and precision. People will retain
their centrality in the battle of wills, while robots and UAVs will
increasingly reduce the number of people engaged in the front line. Legacy
capabilities are becoming obsolete ever more rapidly”. </span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB" style="mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;">To counter that, the
Army says it needs faster, agile, well integrated, combined arms formations
able to aggregate and disaggregate across a vast battlefield. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB" style="mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;"><b>If this
is the assumption, act on it. </b></span><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The
attributes of the Future Combat Team are the key to the whole concept: if you
want to fight dispersed and be lighter but still capable, you <b>must</b> pack
a serious punch and have far more capability pushed down the levels of command.
This is something that in STRIKE was never done in any meaningful way.
Firepower has been dead last in the list of priorities so far, and that made
the whole thing not credible.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">In fact,
what is most striking about the Conceptual Force 2035 is that <b>it is so
entirely alien to what the British Army actually looks like today, in
structure, “culture” and programmes</b>. <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">Permanent</b>
Combined Arms Battlegroups are anathema in today’s British Army and among the
purists of capbadges and specialty separations. CS and CSS are a scarce
resource completely out of balance with the number of infantry battalions.
Indirect Fires and ATGWs are weaknesses, not strengths. The Rule of 4 is
nowhere to be seen, and indeed resources in multiple areas are spread so thin
than even the Rule of 3 is dubious, with infantry battalions that could
literally shed a rifle company soon. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"></span></p><table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgYIDrjhOXi0gfeKogqwY53QT6UUMUMCAHCA9MHdvz9j4eQlnuHOtNusUs8UeFUUUCgp5Fu2GJ5dhPewP-8z6zJcfI5tDuWyF31mnKy1BVQ6UiFV3in6nt6T1ZzURDQJF3cp7qFARorJ7o/s960/PHOTOI%257E1.JPG" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><i><img border="0" data-original-height="960" data-original-width="720" height="400" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgYIDrjhOXi0gfeKogqwY53QT6UUMUMCAHCA9MHdvz9j4eQlnuHOtNusUs8UeFUUUCgp5Fu2GJ5dhPewP-8z6zJcfI5tDuWyF31mnKy1BVQ6UiFV3in6nt6T1ZzURDQJF3cp7qFARorJ7o/w300-h400/PHOTOI%257E1.JPG" width="300" /></i></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><i>British Army armour leaving BATUS. The end of an era, happening largely behind curtains of shame-induced silence. </i></td></tr></tbody></table><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /><o:p><br /></o:p></span><p></p><p class="MsoNormal">Embankment
is an opportunity for change. The reduction to regular manpower margins will be
painful, there is no way to deny it will be. Trying to absorb the reduction
while hanging on to 31 battalions will only make the pain worse and result in
31 ever more unusable formations.</p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB" style="mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;">It is
time to be courageous, and end the tribalism and the excuses. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB" style="mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB" style="mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;">Change is
desperately and urgently needed in equipment plans as well: AJAX and BOXER
purchases as currently planned, in consequence of the disappearance of WARRIOR,
no longer integrate each other. BOXER variants mix and equipment fit must
change to lessen the devastating impact of losing WARRIOR. For a wider
discussion about this aspect, see: </span><span lang="EN-GB"><a href="http://ukarmedforcescommentary.blogspot.com/2021/06/the-good-bad-and-ugly-of-boxer-purchase.html"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">http://ukarmedforcescommentary.blogspot.com/2021/06/the-good-bad-and-ugly-of-boxer-purchase.html</span></a></span><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;">and<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB"><a href="http://ukarmedforcescommentary.blogspot.com/2021/05/combined-arms-regiments-on-way-to.html">http://ukarmedforcescommentary.blogspot.com/2021/05/combined-arms-regiments-on-way-to.html</a></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB" style="mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB" style="mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;">In the
Global Response Force, investment is needed to ensure 16 Air Assault acquires
organic vehicle mobility to complement the helicopter mobility. Light,
Chinook-portable vehicles would enable the PARAs to manoeuvre quickly out of a
landing zone, allowing the helicopter to drop troops off further away from a
target and thus hopefully away from enemy air defences. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB" style="mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;">In terms
of organisation, there is obvious scope for a greater integration of the
all-important Chinook force into the Aviation Brigade. Since the Chinook is
RAF-owned and operated, it is currently not an integral part of the brigade
and, moreover, the Squadrons are not equipped with the same wealth of organic
life support on the ground. At the moment, APACHE and Wildcat squadrons can
operate on the battlefield in a way that Chinook cannot replicate, being more
tied to well established airbases. This difference is unhelpful at best, and
would need correcting. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB" style="mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;">There is
also obvious scope for rationalising the current separated bits and pieces of
ground support units: the current 7 REME, 132 Sqn Royal Logistic Corps,
Tactical Supply Wing and Joint Helicopter Support Squadron could and should be
re-organized to cut down duplication and maximize the number of complete task
lines covering everything from ammunitioning, fueling, equipment maintenance and Landing Zone
management. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB" style="mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;">It seems
also obvious that 244 Signal Squadron, the one unit tasked with
providing communications to the Joint Helicopter Command, really belongs
organically into the Aviation Brigade. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB" style="mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;">They are
not big changes, and in several cases they would probably generate efficiencies
and savings, but they will require the cancellation of some redundant HQs and
the removal of barriers between Army and RAF and between RLC, REME and Royal
Signals. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB" style="mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB" style="mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;">The
barrier between Royal Logistic Corps and REME might indeed be brought down more
or less completely. There have been suggestions that the Army might be headed
towards integrated Close Support Regiments, possibly including also the medical
capability. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB" style="mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;">Defence
already has one such integrated regiment, the Commando Logistic Regiment of 3
Commando Brigade, although this is admittedly a somewhat special case as the Royal Marines have the intimate support of ship-borne assets and stores. </span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB" style="mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;">However, the STRIKE Brigades were also going to have a CSS battalion
obtained by merging a RLC formation with a REME one. There’s a possibility that
this integration will now become a target army-wide. There are resistances, but
such integration is the norm in multiple allied armies, including the US, and
it’s increasingly difficult to claim the British Army cannot adapt. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB" style="mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB" style="mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;">Change
will also be needed in wider strategy and purpose as Forward
Basing is finally embraced beyond the persistent presence of Specialised
Infantry Companies. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">Lieutenant General Chris Tickell, Deputy
CGS, revealed at DSEI what the Army is doing to increase its responsiveness in
key regions of the world. The BATUS training area in Canada has been quietly
“robbed” of its large, permanent fleet of armoured vehicles, which have been
brought back from February this year. Some 112 vehicles between Challenger
tanks, AS90 guns, Warriors and “T2” (Titan bridgelayers and Trojan AVRE of the
Royal Engineers) have been moved out and are heading towards Sennelager, in
Germany, which will act both as the de-facto main training area for the
mechanized force, and a Forward Base which will be better able to project heavy
forces towards Eastern Europe. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB" style="mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;">The </span><span lang="EN-GB">Omani-British Joint Training Area near Duqm, which we have been promised
will be “tripled in size” with additional investment, will become the other
main training ground for british mechanized forces. Units will deploy to Oman
for “Khanjer Oman” exercises and will remain for a few months, rather than just
for the duration of the exercise. In so doing, they will become a Forward Based
force to complement the afloat Littoral Response Group (South) that the Royal
Navy and Marines will base at Duqm from 2023. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">The BATUK training area in Kenya,
similarly, will see light / air assault battlegroups spending 2-3 months at a
time in the area, rather than weeks as currently happen for the “Askari Storm”
exercises. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">BATUS, de facto, is no more. Although it is
not closing down entirely, its era appears to have ended, and it would have
deserved a more dignified goodbye, but the Army, MOD and Government presumably
don’t like admitting that there just aren’t enough armoured
vehicles left to sustain a training fleet based in Canada. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">Training fleets in Sennelager and Oman can
be realistically “double-hatted” as rapidly deployable, forward based forces.
An armoured battlegroup stuck in the Canadian prairie cannot. At the end of the
day, this is the one explanation for the move. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB"><o:p> </o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB"></span></p><table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiU9yJ-n3coSmUzl6hfSRzWchQScCehKODIsT6MICK3Kh2D0ylq1V1WXuoFO-jo3hVxb25wuO6C9zKFEeL0mcJKGR3cccnGkj9OZfm0ctoWVJoKWLQnHNdK-wByIj_8ZyON3D5pqGtDsEU/s709/BATUS+absence.JPG" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="463" data-original-width="709" height="261" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiU9yJ-n3coSmUzl6hfSRzWchQScCehKODIsT6MICK3Kh2D0ylq1V1WXuoFO-jo3hVxb25wuO6C9zKFEeL0mcJKGR3cccnGkj9OZfm0ctoWVJoKWLQnHNdK-wByIj_8ZyON3D5pqGtDsEU/w400-h261/BATUS+absence.JPG" width="400" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><i>BATUS was notable for its absence in the graphics about Forward Presence. There was a reason for it, as has since become apparent. </i></td></tr></tbody></table><span lang="EN-GB"><br /></span><p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">But given the premises, it is the right
move, for once. I encourage the Army to insist on this path, and invest on it,
and work closely together with the Royal Marines so that the Oman-based
contingent is closely integrated with the LRG(S) and with its ships, that are
the key element to enable the forward based force to move quickly across a
theatre which is dominated by the sea. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">What is still missing from the picture is
an Army formation equipped and trained with the High North in mind. As the UK
reinforces its strategic commitment to Norway and the wider Arctic, and makes
the Littoral Response Group (North) one of the two main prongs of its
international engagement strategy, there is obvious scope for the Army to
provide a heavier force to back-up the afloat Royal Marines component. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">It’s an obvious step to synchronize the
Army with the Nation’s strategy. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">But it will take courage. <span style="mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;"><o:p></o:p></span></span></p>Gabrielehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/01623558391676151582noreply@blogger.com27tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-442909239199162925.post-68481723127084290952021-07-25T18:04:00.005+02:002021-07-25T18:06:18.363+02:00The Maritime Electronic Warfare Programme
The Maritime Electronic Warfare Programme (MEWP) has entered the Major Projects spreadsheet for the first time in the issue published earlier this month. This project has been in existence for multiple years already, but only now that various portions of it are about to progress it has started to be covered by the annual report. <div><br /></div><div> MEWP is actually split into two Category A (which means their value is greater than 400 million) projects: MEW System Integrated Capability and EW Countermeasures Project.
MEWP is described as a project intent on modernizing the Royal Navy’s Electronic Warfare capability through the adoption of open architectures with the potential to contribute to the development of shared Situational Awareness and Automated Cooperation in responding to missile attacks. </div><div><br /></div><div>Increment 1 of the Maritime Electronic Warfare System Integrated Capability (MEWSIC) should go under contract in the third quarter of this year, according to the report. Increment 2 is in its Concept Phase, while a 3rd Increment has not yet seen activities begin.
We don’t know much about what these Increments involve, but we can assume that Increment 1 is likely to be the open architecture command and control element of the EW suite, to enable the later integration of new sensors and of the new countermeasures to come from the parallel project. </div><div><br /></div><div>Back between 2017 and 2018, two different industrial teams formed up to pursue MEWSIC and the wider MEWP opportunities: BAE Systems, CGI and Thales form one team; Lockheed Martin and Elbit form the other. Elbit UK is not too subtly offering its eM-e dominate system of systems for maritime EW. This is an adaptive, open architecture system split in its Command and Control element, sensors element and countermeasures element. </div><div><br /></div><div>The Royal Navy is unlikely to be giving maximum priority to the sensors at this stage since it has already completed some efforts in the previous decade to modernize these elements, mainly through adoption of the Thales VIGILE D fully digital Radar ESM system. </div><div><br /></div><div>On the other hand, a notice has been published calling for a new Communications ESM (CESM) capability for the Type 23s, under Project ARDENT WOLF. Invitation to negotiate is expected in September 2021 with contract signature penciled in for April 2022.
The new CESM will be fitted to a minimum of 7 frigates (accounting for the fact that, while it will happen over more than a decade, the Type 23 fleet is on its sundown path) and will replace the HAMMERHEAD CESM, which is around one decade old. </div><div><br /></div><div>It will be very interesting to see exactly what Increment 1 will cover. It is obviously intriguing to see the Royal Navy hanging on to hopes to develop a better capability for automated cooperation against missile attacks. The Navy notoriously wanted the US Cooperative Engagement Capability on the Type 45 destroyers but was never able to fund its adoption. The requirement has not gone away, however, and the Navy probably wants to acquire the means to connect into today’s Naval Integrated Fire Control-Counter Air architecture at the heart of the US Navy efforts. </div><div>Cooperative engagement prominently features in the slides published a while ago by the Navy and highlighting its priorities on the way to 2030. </div><div>In may and june, during exercise FORMIDABLE SHIELD in the Hebrides range, both SAMPSON and ARTISAN radars were put to the test tracking ballistic and supersonic sea skimming targets, but it was the dutch HNLMS De Zeven Provinciën that was able to share tracking data from its upgraded SMART-L MM/N radar to enable the “launch on remote” of an SM-3 missile from the USS Paul Ignatius.
It is important that the ability to cooperatively deploy countermeasures and fire interceptors timely is developed as soon as possible. </div><div><br /></div><div>Coming to the EW Countermeasures project, we are told that Increment 1A should see the competition start in September this year ahead of a full business case in August 2022. </div><div><br /></div><div>This first increment involves the acquisition of a “trainable launcher” for the decoys.
Currently, the Royal Navy uses fixed, six-barrel launchers bolted on deck which cannot “aim” autonomously to launch a decoy in the most convenient direction to face an incoming threat. The ship thus has to manoevre to make best use of the cloaking effect generated by the deployed countermeasures, but this wastes precious time that, in particular against supersonic, and even more so hypersonic, threats is simply not available.
The trainable launcher is a key upgrade to enable a quicker and more effective deployment of countermeasures. </div><div><br /></div><div>This is a requirement the Navy has felt for many years now and which generated response in the industry: Chemring notoriously developed the CENTURION system and SEA developed its own take. From France, Lacroix can offer its DAGAIE / New Generation Dagaie Systems (NGDS®), while Italy employs the SCLAR, marketed today in its ODLS incarnation by Leonardo.
The Chemring and SEA products might be favorite in the Royal Navy contest because they are designed around the 130 mm decoy that is the standard caliber for the RN, US and multiple other countries, while the DAGAIE goes hand in hand with SEACLAD rounds also from Lacrois, and SCLAR / ODLS is mostly about 105 to 118 mm rockets, although it wouldn’t be surprising to see both producers offering a variant compatible with the 130 mm SeaGnat format.
<div class="separator" style="clear: both;"><br /></div><table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgTYGqJzIJYrS_hz1a_Yd2p1G9V-_6w0Z8mOIN-RP6y59X22xVhzPIOm7ezo-JD0HrXpfIigl3YbkmQ0EuwVj1kFS4_f95b6i_6Z0GyzHr68u1lgdk4e4h3xgmutgJwmDBBAnnf-_15vdA/s2048/Centurion.bmp" style="display: block; margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; padding: 1em 0px; text-align: center;"><img alt="" border="0" data-original-height="1727" data-original-width="2048" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgTYGqJzIJYrS_hz1a_Yd2p1G9V-_6w0Z8mOIN-RP6y59X22xVhzPIOm7ezo-JD0HrXpfIigl3YbkmQ0EuwVj1kFS4_f95b6i_6Z0GyzHr68u1lgdk4e4h3xgmutgJwmDBBAnnf-_15vdA/s400/Centurion.bmp" width="400" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">The CENTURION launcher delivers a beneficial impact on Radar Cross Section. It has also been demonstrated as a missile launcher, firing JAVELIN back in 2013 as an anti-FIAC option. </td></tr></tbody></table><div class="separator" style="clear: both;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both;"><br /></div>
Increment 1B remains “subject to the outcome of a feasibility study”. </div><div>A november 2020 tender gives us a pretty good idea of what Increment 1B might be about because it was split in two parts: a trainable launcher and a new Radio Frequency Active Decoy.
For the Trainable Launcher, Invitation to Negotiate was expected in May 2021 with Contract Award in December 2022. The Major Projects spreadsheet suggests these timelines have slipped, but hopefully not by too much. </div><div><br /></div><div>For the Radio Frequency Active Decoy (which would effectively replace the current MK251 SIREN) the notice said 2021 would see a Feasibility study, with an Invitation To Negotiate target of April 2022 and Contract Award expected in August 2023.
Overall, things match. </div><div><br /></div><table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhBTeLFwTy75TLEyWzZKubC9lbNxBkxN_cRJXbZQpk3jbCFaZwUTYqELSzEr77fJQw2yGRRIhmcvaSoXVvfqQvuuzEuT6umB-Z_nIj3sFrDWQ9tYvh43sZr1GIfXfgbVjOwURKCnZyDr0Y/s524/loading+SIREN.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="518" data-original-width="524" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhBTeLFwTy75TLEyWzZKubC9lbNxBkxN_cRJXbZQpk3jbCFaZwUTYqELSzEr77fJQw2yGRRIhmcvaSoXVvfqQvuuzEuT6umB-Z_nIj3sFrDWQ9tYvh43sZr1GIfXfgbVjOwURKCnZyDr0Y/s320/loading+SIREN.jpg" width="320" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">Loading of a MK251 SIREN decoy in the current fixed launcher barrels. </td></tr></tbody></table><br /><div><br /></div><div><br /></div><div>The Royal Navy has been working on a new active RF jammer decoy for multiple years. Under the ACCOLADE project, France and UK collaboratively designed a Manoeuvring Expendable Airborne Carrier round fitted with a Thales-developed RF ECM payload. The ACCOLADE round was test fired on Salisbury Plain, but the technology demonstrator phase ended in February 2016 and was not followed by adoption.
The RF payload from ACCOLADE is still around, however, and in 2019 was actually demonstrated to the Royal Navy installed on the HALCYON Unmanned Surface Vehicle, the prototype of the USV that is the core of the MMCM counter-mines system. This was a demonstration of the concept of Recoverable Offboard Decoy System which might well bring results in the coming years, although, of course, an 11 meter USV is clearly oversized in comparison to this particular payload. The choice of boat was probably made out of sheer convenience; a much smaller one would be used in an operational system. Or, conversely, one could seek a much larger payload. </div><div><br /></div><table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEg92KLU04Tr156z8a-SaxXlZ5LwEHNCEET5PywMjkG2UR5tf74BWmils6SlIirG4gb027Qah1T0MS4yT-3qsqih1lbxqvJ2GraktkzyGlaaTynwkpkGWMneV7jHKd1FkApJ_UlLQ2PLq9w/s710/Accolade+launch+trial+at+Salisbury+Plain.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="300" data-original-width="710" height="169" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEg92KLU04Tr156z8a-SaxXlZ5LwEHNCEET5PywMjkG2UR5tf74BWmils6SlIirG4gb027Qah1T0MS4yT-3qsqih1lbxqvJ2GraktkzyGlaaTynwkpkGWMneV7jHKd1FkApJ_UlLQ2PLq9w/w400-h169/Accolade+launch+trial+at+Salisbury+Plain.jpg" width="400" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">ACCOLADE test firing on Salisbury Plain </td></tr></tbody></table><br /><div><br /></div><div>During 2019 the Royal Navy had also put up a notice for the replacement of the current Outfit DLF (3B) inflatable floating decoy. A Naval Passive Off-Board Decoy (N-POD) of similar concept is wanted from 2023. </div><div><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgtWkuJ00lwUxF7t0mE8KnrV4qcdu6xY6Rp5J4TyptT96WdoZ8qL2jxYzQGNh9fQKNMXI7rU6SDVUNsHW43jYmhyphenhyphenEAhuzcZMqjVEYRrM9G0pyuMre0iT3J8b7m2GnIULfs0RYxtAVkSPms/s680/Packed-FDS-decoy-and-gassing-system-plus-low-RCS-launcher.png" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="437" data-original-width="680" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgtWkuJ00lwUxF7t0mE8KnrV4qcdu6xY6Rp5J4TyptT96WdoZ8qL2jxYzQGNh9fQKNMXI7rU6SDVUNsHW43jYmhyphenhyphenEAhuzcZMqjVEYRrM9G0pyuMre0iT3J8b7m2GnIULfs0RYxtAVkSPms/s320/Packed-FDS-decoy-and-gassing-system-plus-low-RCS-launcher.png" width="320" /></a></div><br /><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhQqhBajeo0-dvMemZd30lJuTD6m5KuDFgR66anwdx0HuglcXBI4g70Ah3RA1-hSmZj2keGISE6r6s3gLRRjdlLxVbgLr6B_1q6nQpCLJpl0snhPCU2177VCDhSwzxDSKR1DlEV7mZP2jU/s597/new_20150715-dlf%25281%2529.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="447" data-original-width="597" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhQqhBajeo0-dvMemZd30lJuTD6m5KuDFgR66anwdx0HuglcXBI4g70Ah3RA1-hSmZj2keGISE6r6s3gLRRjdlLxVbgLr6B_1q6nQpCLJpl0snhPCU2177VCDhSwzxDSKR1DlEV7mZP2jU/s320/new_20150715-dlf%25281%2529.jpg" width="320" /></a></div><br /><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEho_pWkl1pN2XXVlJXRXbKsY6pL6F5F7pHSyzi2P95J55qRzNjoX7vGrLUP_Lbm9jaqHLSsxNXtWUIqpeAfikwfCjwbeQoxiWLJf5jbobU_gDgqylWcuYWwxRSvRaviKLw-5pihf1st2As/s1024/missile-launching-e1479310794796-1024x984.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="984" data-original-width="1024" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEho_pWkl1pN2XXVlJXRXbKsY6pL6F5F7pHSyzi2P95J55qRzNjoX7vGrLUP_Lbm9jaqHLSsxNXtWUIqpeAfikwfCjwbeQoxiWLJf5jbobU_gDgqylWcuYWwxRSvRaviKLw-5pihf1st2As/s320/missile-launching-e1479310794796-1024x984.jpg" width="320" /></a></div><br /><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjMvkE6XD6jduk2Sv2Ku7wNnd0eQ0ILQKHEHEJ2W77tHVLjgjUXoFyi4CArB7L6MT8-ExYhBYnXV_y7UlcI8RKJyQNaR-pupL6uqZaMUtWLfsb_dmx-U50gbP3CYLJDlchpLuTmmbFgBB0/s749/FDS3-decoy-inflated-on-surface-e1481126819819.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="559" data-original-width="749" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjMvkE6XD6jduk2Sv2Ku7wNnd0eQ0ILQKHEHEJ2W77tHVLjgjUXoFyi4CArB7L6MT8-ExYhBYnXV_y7UlcI8RKJyQNaR-pupL6uqZaMUtWLfsb_dmx-U50gbP3CYLJDlchpLuTmmbFgBB0/s320/FDS3-decoy-inflated-on-surface-e1481126819819.jpg" width="320" /></a></div><br /><div><br /></div><div>An airborne corner reflector decoy, of similar concept to the DLF (3B), has possibly entered service. A DSTL document mentions a MK217 “mini corner reflector” decoy round.
In 2018 Chemring unveiled its TORERO 130 mm ammunition which, fired into the air, deploys a Fast-Inflating Airborne Corner Reflector to passively seduce missiles away from the ship.
Airborne Systems and Rheinmetall offer their ADS 103 round, very similar in concept. The corner reflector begins its seduction in the air and floats on the surface of the sea after coming down.
</div>Gabrielehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/01623558391676151582noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-442909239199162925.post-57849715362966571772021-06-09T22:52:00.002+02:002021-06-09T22:59:31.742+02:00The Good, the Bad and the Ugly of the BOXER purchase <p> </p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">A Written
Answer has finally provided interesting details about the british purchase of
BOXER vehicles. Minister Jeremy Quin, on 9 June, said: <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"></span></i></p><blockquote><p class="MsoNormal"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Details of the variants of Boxer currently on
order by quantity can be found in the table below. The Department is looking to
enhance and uplift the size of the total UK Boxer order as we work to implement
the Integrated Review. This may include new variants and partnering
opportunities with industry and our Allies.<o:p></o:p></span></i></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p></blockquote><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">First, the
Good: the Minister gives up new hopes that an expansion of the order might
still happen. For a while, MOD talk had pretty much killed off any hope in this
sense, but the answer is pretty univocal in suggesting that there will be
adjustments. <o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiIAKbR2Tn_7l1hEKi60ywgz-UzklICbnc7h7SO1wSp5LQ-mfrI0bcGj_hpG1LB03LBYubBVJvggDC2y1Jvm7BAeoTdz-fEJeCbzEiCOeNf2sQA2cSa0NrcNbynKXQrN_mGXxw-2CjVAdo/s703/BOXER+variants+and+sub-variants.png" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="703" data-original-width="659" height="400" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiIAKbR2Tn_7l1hEKi60ywgz-UzklICbnc7h7SO1wSp5LQ-mfrI0bcGj_hpG1LB03LBYubBVJvggDC2y1Jvm7BAeoTdz-fEJeCbzEiCOeNf2sQA2cSa0NrcNbynKXQrN_mGXxw-2CjVAdo/w375-h400/BOXER+variants+and+sub-variants.png" width="375" /></a></div><br /><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span><p></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The list
offers many surprises because so far we had been given very little reason to
believe there would be such a wide range of sub-variants. An Engineer Section
vehicle was expected, but nothing had so far been heard about a Mortar Carrying
vehicle. A Repair sub-variant is also an interesting semi-surprise. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">It is
interesting to note that the “Command Post” is expected to come in a
significant number of sub-variants as well, including OPV (a surprisingly old
fashioned definition) for Fires direction; an Electronic Warfare & SIGINT
sub-variant and a BLOS comms carrier. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The
inclusion of these sub-variants is, for the most part, Good. How good, we will
only know when the effective mission fit becomes known. The mortar carrying
vehicle, for example: will it an APC giving mobility to a L16 81mm mortar team?
Will it at least have a turntable and roof port for firing from inside the
vehicle, or not even that…? Or maybe there is scope to finally adopt a
turreted, heavy mortar…? Unlikely, but it would be a great capability boost
and, for the moment, we just don’t know what might or might not happen.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The “Recce /
Fire Support Vehicle” is probably the APC “up-gunned” with JAVELIN on the RWS.
Around 50 such enhanced fits were expected, and the removal from service of
WARRIOR has given new impetus to attempts to further improve the otherwise
pretty dismal firepower of MIV. <o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US">A notable
aspect is that several of these sub-variants will bring entirely new
capabilities that the BOXER family, at present, does not offer. The development
of the relevant modules should happen in the UK, according to know commercial
agreements, and there could be some genuine export potential as well, if the
resulting product is valid. <o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US"><br /></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"></p><table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjExgRMPF8hOxn_kvgZqshdrGWCgthjVklj04UJxUGdD3PFpzI2ctCbNnMExwnoto6HNYrR4wuuKgrypL5j8f4AjEViEUA8c5FTGCqPLpxaYnOyj2qg9fFdRGGkUtROXgB3crlJmLYrG8o/s1782/EukruEyXYAMIluA.jpg" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="1012" data-original-width="1782" height="228" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjExgRMPF8hOxn_kvgZqshdrGWCgthjVklj04UJxUGdD3PFpzI2ctCbNnMExwnoto6HNYrR4wuuKgrypL5j8f4AjEViEUA8c5FTGCqPLpxaYnOyj2qg9fFdRGGkUtROXgB3crlJmLYrG8o/w400-h228/EukruEyXYAMIluA.jpg" width="400" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">While it remains dubious, at best, that BOXER's modularity will ever have a usefulness in terms of "on the battlefield re-roling", the possibility of developing mission modules in isolation from the base vehicle should greatly ease the creation of new variants and sub-variants </td></tr></tbody></table><br /><p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The Bad is
undoubtedly the tiny number of Infantry Carriers, an incomprehensible 85. Even
assuming the Fire Support Vehicle is effectively an upgunned infantry carrier
despite being counted in with the “Specialists”, the combined number of 147
vehicles is still insufficient to equip 4 infantry battalions. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">They are
numbers more appropriate to just 2 battalions… which is what Army 2020 Refine
needed, since the plan specifically called for the ability to deploy only <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">one</b> of the 2 STRIKE brigades at a time.
1 Brigade, 2 battalions. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Indeed, this might be the explanation for the
tiny number of ICVs in the order. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The loss of
WARRIOR means that such a plan no longer makes any sense, and adjustements are
indispensable. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">And this
leads us straight to the Ugly side of this list: the overlap / confliction with
AJAX. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Until a
short time ago, the UK was of course planning to equip 2 armoured brigades and
2 STRIKE brigades on top. Although AJAX itself was going to be in the STRIKE
Brigades for the most part, it appears clear that the support variants of the
family (ARGUS for the engineers, ATHENA command posts, ARES, APOLLO, ATLAS)
were primarily destined to units aligned with the tracked, armoured brigades. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">ARGUS would
work alongside TITAN and TROJAN in the two heavy engineer regiments, for
example, with BOXER ESV working with the 2 engineer regiments of the STRIKE
brigades instead. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Now,
however, there will only be 2 heavy mechanized Brigade Combat Teams in total,
with the other two BCTs being Light Role. Clearly, you are not going to put the
engineers in BOXERs while the infantry of the brigade moves, at best, in
FOXHOUND with JACKAL for fire support. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">This means,
effectively, that the 52 ARGUS and the 60 BOXER Engineer Section Vehicles are
now virtually overlapping directly, as there are only 2 Engineer regiments of
this weight class to re-equip, not 4. The OPV variant, similarly, is
increasingly overlapping with the number of AJAX to be kitted for Joint Fires
direction. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The sum of
112 ATHENA command posts and 123 between BOXER command posts and
command-utility vehicles also leads to a frankly absurd situation in which the
UK will have a Command Post vehicle virtually for every single Infantry
Carrying vehicle in service army-wide (up to 147 BOXER, as discussed earlier,
plus 93 ARES, vs 112 + 123 command posts). A 1:1 ratio is clearly insane. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">I think it
unavoidable that this overlap will need correcting, somehow. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">We have all
been following with increasing despair and rage the embarrassing situation of
AJAX and it is hard not to muse about the implications of these sub-variants. if
there are only two “heavy” regiments to equip, you suddenly only need one of
the two sub-fleets, not both. In practice, if AJAX was to be cancelled, the
loss of ARGUS would not be an immediate issue. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">This
generates unpleasant thoughts. <o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></p><table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgOeEB1I12D8xGH2lqnc3hPYsy8fVWNjc4Yabp_Jsiez7-3Yoeiz9CmjNOeOeAC6c3lbaAhoJhAA9Tpb8YAH5_fYUhAqH7r68UtTQXqF5k88a1jyJw3iDLCs1oMQ5UTayxaNAibKbj6eQo/s648/19.jpg" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="469" data-original-width="648" height="290" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgOeEB1I12D8xGH2lqnc3hPYsy8fVWNjc4Yabp_Jsiez7-3Yoeiz9CmjNOeOeAC6c3lbaAhoJhAA9Tpb8YAH5_fYUhAqH7r68UtTQXqF5k88a1jyJw3iDLCs1oMQ5UTayxaNAibKbj6eQo/w400-h290/19.jpg" width="400" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"></td></tr></tbody></table><br /><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><br /></div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">A more
optimistic way of looking at it is that, if AJAX survives and the BOXER
sub-variants are acquired in these numbers,<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>the Army then “only” needs to procure more Infantry Carriers to get back
in a position in which it can properly mechanize all 4 Brigade Combat Teams. The
2 armoured brigades would keep the AJAX-based support variants, for obvious
reasons, while the “Light BCTs” could be progressively uplifted with BOXER to
become fully-wheeled formations. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Third
option: the current balance of variants and sub-variants is modified,
drastically reducing the number of BOXERs to be used as “Command Posts” and
Engineer Section Vehicles, in favor of more ICVs / FSVs. <o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhvof4FXeWvu5vxGxc_LXQexEuryfcI6N_IO31sjls1aYsgAhmMfgyCTI5-6OQL3ZAutr2XrSUn3oB2w1Ygq0nMsMBtd1PKrJF8zhZUCPNaCnB4XJYv5mJNh2_ARb79ZAHnKe26icej3Is/s480/hqdefault.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="360" data-original-width="480" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhvof4FXeWvu5vxGxc_LXQexEuryfcI6N_IO31sjls1aYsgAhmMfgyCTI5-6OQL3ZAutr2XrSUn3oB2w1Ygq0nMsMBtd1PKrJF8zhZUCPNaCnB4XJYv5mJNh2_ARb79ZAHnKe26icej3Is/s320/hqdefault.jpg" width="320" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">One thing is clear: this is the Army's position in regards to BOXER at the moment </td></tr></tbody></table><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /><br /></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Judging
from the list, an increase in the number of ICVs is both urgent and
unavoidable. What’s left to be discovered is what adjustments will be adopted
to make that increase possible.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p><br /><p></p>Gabrielehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/01623558391676151582noreply@blogger.com10tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-442909239199162925.post-61884143007736354362021-05-09T17:30:00.001+02:002021-05-09T17:30:10.911+02:00Combined Arms Regiments on the way to the Future Combat Team <p>I’ve already
written a <a href="http://ukarmedforcescommentary.blogspot.com/2021/02/the-british-army-where-do-we-go-from.html">first
piece</a> about the (limited) options available to the Army for the future in
light of the cut of the whole WARRIOR fleet, but it’s time to go a bit more in
detail about the topic. The reason to return on this topic is the fact that we
have basically been told in no uncertain terms that there is no additional
purchase of BOXERs on the way, and that out to at least 2030, AJAX and BOXER in
the current numbers and shapes are all there is to work with.</p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">As we try
and think of where the Army might go from here, we cannot ignore what the minds
of the Armed Forces have indicated, in the </span><a href="https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/922969/20200930_-_Introducing_the_Integrated_Operating_Concept.pdf"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Integrated Operating Concept 2025</span></a><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">, as the necessary attributes of the
future force:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Have
smaller and faster capabilities to avoid detection<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Trade
reduced physical protection for increased mobility<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Rely more
heavily on low-observable and stealth technologies<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Depend
increasingly on electronic warfare and passive deception measures to gain and
maintain information advantage<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Include a
mix of crewed, uncrewed and autonomous platforms<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Be
integrated into ever more sophisticated networks of systems through a combat
cloud that makes best use of data<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Have an
open systems architecture that enables the rapid incorporation of new
capability<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Be markedly
less dependent on fossil fuels<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Employ
non-line-of-sight fires to exploit the advantages we gain from information
advantage<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Emphasize
the non-lethal disabling of enemy capabilities, thereby increasing the range of
political and strategic options<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"> <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The Army’s
“Conceptual Force 2035”, which very much doubles down on the same kind of
design drivers. This study imagines an army of 3 smaller but capable divisions
made of lighter, faster, more deployable, largely independent battlegroups,
with dispersion being the norm. Conceptual Force 2035 specifies that the
disaggregated fighting requires Combined Arms capabilities to be organic at
lower level, to ensure the dispersed Battlegroups do not have to wait for a
superior echelon to make supports available. This includes having more organic
Indirect Fire capability and employing it alongside greater ATGW capability to
offset the capability currently delivered by MBTs through “lighter” vehicles.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjkaTO4UiXSbUU_0OM3lSLWhcfd44aexVVZvKldmB_vnDiw-RbJOm6M3OBMFko09daR-b-BS0fE4n-FgbxtXcwlTaZr7mSG7igJAUuD5v6t0VpjUGBsAdPBgApQE433CYRTrZhZkmnvEow/s951/CF2035.JPG" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="892" data-original-width="951" height="375" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjkaTO4UiXSbUU_0OM3lSLWhcfd44aexVVZvKldmB_vnDiw-RbJOm6M3OBMFko09daR-b-BS0fE4n-FgbxtXcwlTaZr7mSG7igJAUuD5v6t0VpjUGBsAdPBgApQE433CYRTrZhZkmnvEow/w400-h375/CF2035.JPG" width="400" /></a></div><br /><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span><p></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US">The BGs
will be expected to carry out, and I quote, <b>deeper, more risky and
aggressive manoeuvre</b>. Robotic, sacrificial systems will be used to press on
reconnaissance, and I quote again, to the point of destruction, in order to
enable the BG to use frenetic op-tempo to make up for the lack of mass.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US">The resulting
BGs would be around 500-strong but are supposed to match the current mission
set of a 1250-strong armoured BG though the use of robotics and higher
op-tempo. The Conceptual Force imagines that, from around 82.000 regulars, the
British Army would be able to form some 48 such Combined Arms battlegroups. The
organization would work to the Rule of 4, with an Assault Force, Covering
Force, Echelon Force and Reserve Force. These BGs would be grouped in Brigades
with enough CS and CSS elements to fight, again, largely independently from the
Division level.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US">The key
attributes described above, for me, are the key to the whole concept: if you
want to fight dispersed and be lighter but still capable, you <b>must</b> pack
a serious punch and have far more capability pushed down the levels of command.
This is something that in STRIKE we are just <b>not</b> seeing in any
meaningful way. Firepower has been dead last in the list of priorities so far,
and that makes the whole thing not credible.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US">In fact,
what is most striking about the Conceptual Force 2035 is that <b>it is so
entirely alien to what the British Army actually looks like today, in
structure, “culture” and programmes</b>. For example, Permanent Combined Arms
Battlegroups are anathema in today’s British Army and among the purists of
capbadges and specialty separations. CS and CSS are a scarce resource
completely out of balance with the number of infantry battalions. Indirect
Fires and ATGWs are weaknesses, not strengths. The Rule of 4 is nowhere to be
seen, and indeed resources in multiple areas are spread so thin than even the
Rule of 3 is dubious.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US"><br /></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><b><span lang="EN-US">Future Combat Team</span></b></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US">2035 is not
that far away, especially in terms of defence procurement timelines. The
current BOXER procurement effort will end in 2030, for example (having been
accelerated, as we know: it was 2032 until a short while back). It is not clear
if the Integrated Review has actually done anything to accelerate the Mobile
Fires Platform program to replace AS90, which had once aimed at 2026 but then
had IOC moved to 2029. For all the hints dropped so far, the Review has <b>not</b> changed the 2029 target. CHALLENGER
3 itself starts going operational only in 2027, and so on. <o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US">The
Conceptual Force 2035 is not a far flung future: is the <b>immediate</b> future that is being slowly built right now. The glacial
pace of Defence procurement means that this decade plus equals to a virtual “tomorrow”.
<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US">We have to
face one painful reality: BOXER and AJAX are what the Army must work with.
Before 2030 there is little to no possibility of seeing any major addition, such
as a second batch of BOXERs being ordered. <o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US">Trying to
reconcile the equipment available and the current army structure with the above
described aims is thus the most urgent undertaking facing the Army. <o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US">The STRIKE
brigade is dead, but many of the underlying concepts live. This is not a bad
thing in itself: the British Army is small and does need to try and fight in a
different, more “insurgent” way. So long as it doesn’t lie to itself about what
is achievable, and the means it would take to fight in that different way, the
drive for innovation is commendable. <o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US">My readers
know that I’ve opposed the STRIKE brigades relentlessly over the years. I did
it because, the more the project “progressed”, the clearer it became that it
did <b>not</b> deliver a formation that
matched the idea. Moreover, it was clear that it would bring about disaster in
an already overheated modernization plan. And sadly, the cancellation of WCSP
followed, as was entirely predictable. <o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US">My readers
already know that I do not believe that wheels in themselves are key to
adopting a more dispersed kind of fighting, and certainly I will never side
with the British Army in pretending that having wheels is sufficient to change
battle dynamics. Fighting dispersed is complex, dangerous and demanding. It requires <b>more</b> capability,
not less. It requires capabilities currently relegated at higher command levels
to be distributed far more widely, at far lower level. One such example is air
defence: dispersion alone, in the age of the UAV and airpower in general,
cannot possibly be a solution to anything if the dispersed groups have little
to no ability to defend themselves from threats from the air.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US">I also do
not agree with the Army’s latest apparent pretention that it can just decide to
“fight the deep” with less care for the “close”. It started with STRIKE itself,
of course: depending on the day and on who you talked to, STRIKE sounded
exactly like a force pushing deep into a disorganized enemy rear line, but
without an earlier phase of combat to punch a breach in the enemy’s positions.
And as I’ve written many, many times, I just don’t see how you could do that:
having BOXER riding on wheels is definitely not enough to think that, however
fluid the battlespace might be, your battlegroups can just infiltrate unseen
and always pick their targets at leisure in an imaginary rear area where you
get to target A2AD platforms without the enemy picking you apart. <o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US">However
dispersed notional Russian battlegroups might be in a region, after all, they
have access to such amounts of artillery that they will have a much easier time
closing up “gaps” than the British Army in trying to exploit them. Not to
mention that most, if not all peers and near peers have wheeled formations of
their own, invariably more heavily armed by far, which can at least match, if
not exceed, any perceived mobility advantage given by BOXER. <o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US">Wheels,
however, do have unquestioned merits in making a ground force element more
readily capable to move independently over long distances without depending on
semi-trailers and trucks. Wheeled armour also tends to be less thirsty, which
means it can do with a smaller logistic train. For a small Army with a
(relatively) small budget, wheels can represent a serious advantage.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US">I have not
changed my mind: ideally, tracks go with tracks and wheels go with wheels, so
that each formation can maximize its best characteristics. I’ve always
criticized the STRIKE brigade’s half-track nature, and I continue to think it
is a mistake. <o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US">Yet I’m
about to call for the permanent, organic mixing of AJAX and BOXER. <o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US">I do it
purely because I don’t think there is a better alternative possible with what
the Army has and will have in the future. If there is no chance to get any
significant new purchase of combat vehicles of either kind before 2030 at the
earliest, then I don’t think there is a way to keep AJAX and BOXER apart,
because taken in isolation they are both inadequate. <o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US">One could
envisage an effort to maintain separate tracked, heavy formations, but not
without tweaking and probably expanding the AJAX order. If AJAX was an IFV, it
could replace Warrior. But AJAX has no room to carry infantry and there is no
real way to change this fact. The structure of the vehicle and the vast turret
ring (specified in part because there once was to also be a Medium Armour
variant with 120mm smoothbore gun) prevent any conversion to an IFV. It is also
probably next to impossible to pursue a “rewriting” of the contract that
de-scopes some of the AJAX to make room for a new IFV variant, which General
Dynamics is ready to offer and has tried (and failed) to sell to Australia.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US">However,
the ARES APC already on order could easily be delivered with internal
arrangements for carrying 7-8 dismounts. If more ARES were ordered and
configured accordingly, it would be possible to create Combined Arms
Battlegroups by mixing AJAX and ARES. Such BGs of AJAX and ARES carrying
infantry could become a prototype for the Future Combat Team of 2035, adopting
the Rule of 4 and beginning to develop true “Find, Fix and Strike” mechanisms
by adding in organic Indirect Fires.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US">If more
ARES could be squeezed in to make this happen, it would be possible to hang on
to the superior all-terrain mobility of tracks and ensure that the remaining
CHALLENGER 2s have appropriate intimate support. The two Heavy brigades could
thus consist each of a single tank regiment and 2/3 AJAX/ARES BGs.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US"><br /></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj2R5MKvq9s10jbzRf2PvuZthpr_MFbTb0fJnH39MHUsiJ45DsHZpDsu8G4ZexoM1H6UXmpKklBBXoP7ve0CF91mlwJCEYiTbrrjMbz5s8FBP5705wScSV2B7JTb4KmsgQe_ALAQAu-3zc/s1168/EuRfx4EXUAAxFTs.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="877" data-original-width="1168" height="300" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj2R5MKvq9s10jbzRf2PvuZthpr_MFbTb0fJnH39MHUsiJ45DsHZpDsu8G4ZexoM1H6UXmpKklBBXoP7ve0CF91mlwJCEYiTbrrjMbz5s8FBP5705wScSV2B7JTb4KmsgQe_ALAQAu-3zc/w400-h300/EuRfx4EXUAAxFTs.jpg" width="400" /></a></div><br /><table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEijnZANjLjdzu_YxTGQUGW1QByLgJIs3qxCqzL1dWKN_75bPOo5ePmeCc3miiP1KibiBDNHglstPQuOTHcrJVmHjpuGYcjBxkZlwjc4r73q-dSr3KJFB8WpXJNs0aFwlvmAE2uscoX9i_4/s830/2.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="436" data-original-width="830" height="210" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEijnZANjLjdzu_YxTGQUGW1QByLgJIs3qxCqzL1dWKN_75bPOo5ePmeCc3miiP1KibiBDNHglstPQuOTHcrJVmHjpuGYcjBxkZlwjc4r73q-dSr3KJFB8WpXJNs0aFwlvmAE2uscoX9i_4/w400-h210/2.jpg" width="400" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">FRES SV could have been a true engine of evolution for the armoured component, but that ship has now sailed and the Army has jumped into the wheels camp </td></tr></tbody></table><br /><p></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US">But sadly
every evidence at the moment suggest that this is not going to happen. <o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US">And even if
that option was to materialize, it would be very difficult to create wheel-only
battlegroups out of the current BOXER purchase because plenty of key variants
are not included (above all, nobody seems to have thought about what happens with
the mortars, for example). The Army has quickly killed off any hope that a
significant change might be on the cards. While heavier weapons on some of the
APCs are likely (alleluia!), we have been told in no uncertain terms that there
will be no big turret and cannon retrofit. <o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US">The BOXER
battalion will in other words continue to lack the means to support the
infantry fight directly onto the target; and will also lack the superior
sensors and communications fitted to the AJAX. While it is to be hoped that
MORPHEUS and LeTacCIS will upgrade army comms and make it much easier to
coordinate indirect fires from just about any combat vehicle, the BOXER
battalion will continue to have limited capabilities in this sense. <o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US">I can’t
imagine BOXER fighting “on its own”, organized in battalions of extremely
lightly armed APCs. The resulting formation is way too weak, and BOXER takes
the place of WARRIOR but does <b>not</b>
replace it, as the Army insists it can’t be an equivalent IFV. <o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US">As for the
tracked counterpart, the AJAX “cavalry” regiment with little to no dismounts is
not a credible formation, in my mind. We have to face the truth: AJAX has been
purchased as a like for like CRV(T) replacement, only much larger and heavier.
ARES is just a supersized SPARTAN, with the same number of dismounts. The
regiments have been planning to essentially keep the Sabre squadron structure
unchanged, with a tiny number of dismounts in ARES/SPARTAN APCs supporting the
Troops of AJAX/SCIMITAR. For all the talk of innovation, the AJAX project is
one of the most conservative ones in history. <o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US">The
difference with what the US Army is doing, to make just one example, is stark:
the cavalry variant of the BRADLEY, the M3 with only 2 dismounts, has been
progressively abandoned and the Squadrons are moving to the 6-36 model with 6
BRADLEY IFVs each with 6 dismounts in the back. <o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US">AJAX looks
even more retrograde if compared with plans for Italian cavalry formations
combining a squadron of CENTAURO 2 8x8 tank destroyers with 120/44 supported by
a combination of FRECCIA 8x8 in Far and Close variants, the first equipped with
battlefield surveillance radar and optics for use dismounted or on telescopic
mast, the latter with UGV and SPIKE anti-tank missiles. <o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US">The STRIKE
designers had already realized that, given the characteristics of the two purchases,
AJAX and BOXER would have to operate together. Sadly, while this remains
suboptimal in many ways, it remains in my opinion true. Neither of the two
fleets can go far on its own. <o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US">Where I diverge
from the Army on this point is on the belief that, once we have accepted this
is the reality, we should not insist in keeping the units apart during “peacetime”.
Especially since, as we have been told in no uncertain terms in the Review,
there no longer is a peacetime. We are in the age of constant competition: if
we accept this is true, then we need to adapt. <o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US">The
increasingly artificial separation of “cavalry” and “infantry” in the British
Army causes all sorts of historical limitations that really have no reason to
exist. During the whole STRIKE brigade experience, to make but one example, it
was tacitly understood that the Battlegroup to be formed on the base of the
single Cavalry regiment on AJAX would have no Support company with mortars,
snipers etcetera. Why? Because it is not needed? No, of course not. Because
infantry battalions have those things; cavalry doesn’t. <o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US">The
Household Cavalry regiment, truth be told, has been laboring for several years
now to “experiment” with an added Sniper troop and, incredible innovation, a
mortar troop that it was “trying” to stand up back in 2019. Reading of these “groundbreaking”
innovation measures, year after year, has been frankly incredibly depressing. It
gives a sense of an army that really, really struggled to move on past deeply
ingrained but often utterly stupid habits. <o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US">I can
already hear the many voices that will insist that we keep the infantry
battalion and cavalry regiment well separated, and rely on battlegrouping to
mix the pieces together only “in time of need”. But I personally insist on
saying that this practice is no longer acceptable, as it seems to only ever
perpetuate bad army habits and tribalism between capbadges. <o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US">I don’t see
a single genuinely good reason why we should continue to keep separate
formations that will never deploy on operations without being broken apart and
reassembled in combined arms battlegroups. <o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US">All too
often, when looking back to operations, the post-action analysis contains the
passage “the units in the battlegroup had only been together for a short time
and didn’t know each other enough”, or similar remarks. Lieutenant M. Dewis, on
TANK 2020 (volume 102, No 801) makes a series of recommendations to try and
save the Regimental system while enabling the creation of effective Combined
Arms Teams. <o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US">He stops
short of advocating for permanent overarching formations, but he underlines the
need for broader, more stable affiliations and more cross-training. At the same
time he can’t help but note that Battlegroup level training is expensive and an
increasingly rare commodity at a time in which it is more desperately needed
than ever. It’s all good to insist on social networking and “forming and
storming” by “intruding” in each other’s low level training events as much as
possible, and simulation and tabletop wargames obviously help, but I don’t
think half-measures are adequate. <o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US">The Army’s
Conceptual Force 2035 is clear in its working assumption that the future is the
combined arms Future Combat Team. It is time for the Army to move in that
direction in a serious way, if it believes its own innovative thinking. <o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US"> </span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><b><span lang="EN-US">Combined Arms Regiment: the stepping stone to
the Future Combat Team <o:p></o:p></span></b></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US">The main
physical problem to overcome in creating a permanent Combined Arms Regiment is
the fact that AJAX and BOXER will not be based in the same place. <o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US">Or will
they…? BOXER was heading to Catterick until WARRIOR was supposed to carry on,
but now I’m finding it hard to imagine that the plan won’t change. I’m
expecting the WARRIOR barracks in and around Salisbury plain to become the
BOXER barracks under the new plans. <o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US">If I’m
right, the number one problem disappears as BOXER ends up living next door to
the AJAX. <o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US">The rest is
primarily a matter of Regimental tribalism and career management. <o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US">Does the
Regiment need to vanish to allow the formation of the permanent Combined Arms
Team? The US Army experience suggests that it is not necessary, as the Regiment
could still connect together elements that are parceled out into the Combined
Arms Teams. <o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US">Indeed,
such parceled elements are smaller than a current, formed regiment/battalion, but
not by too terribly much. There should be plenty of options to preserve career options,
if not to improve them. The geographical proximity in basing should also alleviate
any perceived damage to regimental unit and ethos. <o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US">The Combined
Arms Regiment I propose bear resemblance to the Combined Arms Battalion of the
US Army of a few years back, and are essentially permanent Square battlegroups,
immediately familiar to the British Army as well. 2 Squadrons of AJAX
supporting 2 infantry companies in BOXERs, with a third AJAX squadron for
reconnaissance and screening (borne out of what would have once been the Recce
platoons of WARRIOR battalions) and a Fire Support Company. <o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US">Since then,
the US Army has taken the, debatable, decision to go from Square to Triangular
organization in no small part in order to move one company of M1 MBTs into the
Brigade’s cavalry Squadron, to beef up its ability to fight for information. <o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US">In
practice, the Combined Arms Regiment would be composed by 2 closely integrated
and aligned “battalions”, one of infantry, one of cavalry. Each battalion could
maintain its ties to its own Regimental system, but on the battlefield it would
of course be the CAR that would be in control. <o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US">JAVELIN
missiles would be pushed down to the companies, with at least some of the
BOXERs also equipped with the single launcher on the RS4 PROTECTOR RWS.
Apparently some 50 such up-armed RWSs are planned, and their number might
increase. <o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US">About 50%
of the BOXER APCs should come equipped with the Grenade Machine Gun, and in
Germany they have developed <a href="https://www.defenseworld.net/news/25952/Germany_to_get_Kongsberg_s_Counter_Drone_System#.YJft9rUzaUk">a
system</a> that couples the RWS with GMG to a Spexer 2000 3D Mk III AESA radar.
Using air-bursting grenades, this combination is able to provide anti-UAV
defence, and the British Army should urgently adopt it. It is a very basic
solution, pretty limited, but it is at least a first step in the right
direction and one that can be brought online with minimal expenditure and
impact on the BOXER procurement. <o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US"><br /></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEijTin2B4jQquez6KDH4PfDWWoRYNzBC4VusfU3zvdneGlnuOBbIg-5jKZ13zchCr7Je6Cr5dlLeqY9AmVCBWz5C8JTt5IX68FOVt_YOxE7CBLbhrMhDsLh1LyfyLXbWjCJ2BQbpr5WVzA/s1024/1595729888_hensoldt-spexer_3d_1.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="454" data-original-width="1024" height="178" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEijTin2B4jQquez6KDH4PfDWWoRYNzBC4VusfU3zvdneGlnuOBbIg-5jKZ13zchCr7Je6Cr5dlLeqY9AmVCBWz5C8JTt5IX68FOVt_YOxE7CBLbhrMhDsLh1LyfyLXbWjCJ2BQbpr5WVzA/w400-h178/1595729888_hensoldt-spexer_3d_1.jpg" width="400" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">The AESA radar, coupled with the GMG with airburst grenades, offers some protection from incoming drones / loitering munitions </td></tr></tbody></table><br /></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US">The Army
hopes to “improve” firepower on some of the BOXERs in as-yet undecided ways.
The adoption of the M230LF light 30x113 mm gun might be an option; if we are
really lucky they will consider going with a Moog modular turret that would
open up possibilities to boost not just anti-surface capability, but anti-air
as well. The STRYKER for Manoeuvre SHORAD, the “MARAUDER” for the US Army, is
an example of what can be achieved with such systems. <o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US">The Support
Company will ensure that each CAR has its own mortars, snipers, UAVs / UGVs in
good time, and missile Overwatch. With JAVELIN pushed forth into the infantry
companies, the current anti-tank platoons would instead operate the Mounted
Close Combat Overwatch capability which is to come from the <a href="https://www.army-technology.com/features/uk-outlines-future-anti-armour-requirements/">Battlegroup
Organic Anti-Armour programme</a>. <o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US">To ensure
the group has access to better organic Indirect Fire capability, the aim would
be to acquire a turreted 120mm mortar as well, keeping pace with what is by now
a standard pick for mechanized formations. <o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US">Like in the
STRIKE brigades, the task for AJAX would be in no small part to intimately
support the infantry. An IFV without ability to carry infantry, by all means.
Its sensor suite, in addition, would have to be exploited to the max to ensure
that Indirect Fires, organic and non-organic, can timely be brought to bear. <o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US">The “Cavalry
battalion” would thus have up to 3 Squadrons, 2 of which aligned with the
infantry companies and another “free” to scout ahead and provide screening and
targeting. <o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US">The “infantry
battalion” would have responsibility for the 2 infantry companies and the
Support Company. <o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US">It should
be possible, without acquiring any additional BOXER or AJAX, to form at least 6
such CARs. Not “cavalry”, not “infantry”. Permanent, combined arms BGs that
will have to deliver that mix of “Find, Fix and Strike” capability by
progressively integrating more indirect fire options, and the ability to target
them from, if not any soldier, certainly from pretty much any squad and combat
vehicle.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US">These BGs
will have to progressively evolve towards those “Future Combat Teams” envisaged
by the Conceptual Force 2035. A key capability to bring in as quickly as
possible to enable that evolution is the Land Precision Fires system, which is
meant to succeed EXACTOR MK2 and eventually expand striking range towards the
60 km mark. Land Precision Strike is an Artillery program, but this should not
be allowed to stovepipe it away from the combined arms BGs. Land Precision
Strike must become an Army-wide effort to give battlegroups a <b>new</b> <b>and
enhanced lethality</b>.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US">Short Range
Air Defence will also need to move forwards to become an organic component of
the dispersed battlegroups, because UAVs are going to be everywhere. The SHORAD
platform, ideally, must become a more multi-purpose system. Equipment-wise,
STORMER HVM already is a multi-purpose system since LMM MARTLET missiles would
be plenty good against surface targets as well, but there does not seem to be
any real willingness to exploit this possibility. It is no good to claim that
air defence is too complex and specialized and must remain stovepiped within
specialist formations: if there is one thing we must squeeze out of digital
technology and potentially AI is the ability to spread out “complex” mission
capabilities across a wider user base. Otherwise there will never be enough to
truly pursue dispersion. <o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US">The Army
has lost mass and has lost many tanks as well; lethality cannot continue to be
an afterthought. It is time to seriously approach the problem of how to
increase it to compensate the other weaknesses. It is no good to only ever talk
about compensating loss of armour with Indirect Fires while doing absolutely
nothing to make it a reality. The Army needs to demonstrate that it is doable
and that it is committed to a dramatic increase of firepower at lower command
levels.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US">In order to
ensure that as much money as possible goes towards the new capabilities,
vehicle variants and additional vehicle purchases needed, the Army will have to
get better at setting its priorities.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US">It remains
foolish, in my opinion, that the British Army has prioritized ambulance and
command post variants for the BOXER over more “fighty” frontline roles. I’ve
already asked this question in the past, but I will formulate it again: does
the ambulance vehicle really <b>need </b>to be a BOXER…? I fully
understand it is <b>desirable</b>, but I don’t think it is <b>necessary</b>.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US"><br /></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjRaPLtbOcfQeCjmvxze8hludUE1ppMgYtlPRwZ1hxJhRWJGRFbw7_GL_PDh3X9z8fJTwDT6qIJGwPU9KzQ4g9O1tte1SfzaurOmLpVgbrQeqAXdzeYTSLYLzLmC0quKurEyLBxtC91D90/s680/Eiq8MPjXkAM-WRo.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="426" data-original-width="680" height="250" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjRaPLtbOcfQeCjmvxze8hludUE1ppMgYtlPRwZ1hxJhRWJGRFbw7_GL_PDh3X9z8fJTwDT6qIJGwPU9KzQ4g9O1tte1SfzaurOmLpVgbrQeqAXdzeYTSLYLzLmC0quKurEyLBxtC91D90/w400-h250/Eiq8MPjXkAM-WRo.jpg" width="400" /></a></div><br /><span lang="EN-US"><br /></span><p></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US">Again, a
priority for me would also be to re-evaluate the variants of MIV to be
procured, reducing to the bare minimum the number of ambulances and command
posts in favor of instead pursuing, with maximum urgency, a 120mm mortar and an
ATGW variants. With a wiser choice of priority on the variants to include in
the order, the 508 BOXERs already on order could equip more than just a paltry
4 battalions. I’ve written about this in greater detail in a </span><a href="http://ukarmedforcescommentary.blogspot.com/2019/12/of-compromises-and-priorities.html"><span lang="EN-US">previous article</span></a><span lang="EN-US">. </span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US"> The
Ambulance role and, wherever possible, the C2 role should be “offloaded” onto
much cheaper Multi Role Vehicle Protected (MRV-P) variants.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US">I
understand the allure of having everything on the same vehicle base, and I
realize that there is no safe rear echelon when fighting dispersed and dealing
with enemies who can contest, if not win control of the air and dominate the
Fires battle. But I still don’t see “BOXER-for-everything” being in any way a
solution.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US">Moreover,
it is painfully obvious that the money is not and will never be enough for such
an approach. Surely it makes sense to be very selective when it comes to what
should ride in an extremely expensive BOXER and what can make do with something
else. In fact, this is exactly what already happens in other countries: France
definitely does not have an ambulance variant for VBCI, but rather for the less
expensive GRIFFON. Italy, similarly, has limited its FRECCIA 8x8 almost
exclusively to combat, frontline roles, using the Iveco ORSO for the supporting
roles.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US">BOXER and
Multi Role Vehicle – Protected should, similarly, ensure they work together to
cover all bases, so that the BOXER purchase can be laser-focused on the combat
roles, maximizing the mechanization of the army while keeping costs as low as
practicable.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US">In the
previous article, already mentioned and linked, I offer a more detailed
discussion of what France and Italy are doing, so I won’t repeat the same
things here. I will note that, finally, the British Army has last year tested
the Elbit RHINO armoured shelter / container kitted out as command post. I’d
like to see a lot more effort going in this direction, rather than in hundreds
of super-expensive BOXER and ATHENA vehicles.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US">What practical
problem is solved by putting the command post into a BOXER, at the end of the
day? The main enemies of the command post in a high intensity scenario are
Fires and Air attacks, and BOXER is not really going to give you a relevant
survivability boost against those.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US">Being able
to command and communicate on the move by ensuring the new data-radio systems
have the relevant capabilities is going to make much more of a difference than
BOXER’s armour does.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US">If the Army
truly believes in innovation, it must be ready to truly revolutionize the
command post, exploiting modern comms on the move and the possibility to reach
back for support. Last year, the Royal Marines had their experimental exercise
in Cyprus and their command and control on the ground was both slimmed down and
revolutionized, and enabled by reach-back all the way not just to the ships,
but to the homeland. The 1<sup>st</sup> Sea Lord himself was able to
connect directly from his own station.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US">There are
increasingly effective ways to ensure that the command function can be
disaggregated, dispersed, handled faster and on the move, and with the support
of staff physically located far enough from the battlefield to be safe.
Naturally, this opens up new vulnerabilities in broadband, communications, risk
of jamming and cyber attacks, but the Army itself is saying they prefer to
wrestle in this domain rather than in the physical one. They did so in the
moment they wrote down their guidance for the future by claiming that
disaggregate operations and indirect fires are to counter the lack of heavy
armour. That approach will inexorably mean the ability to communicate and share
data and targeting third-part weapons becomes even more crucial than it already
is.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US">Like everything
else in life, it’s a compromise, but perfect solutions don’t exist. There are
just good and bad compromises.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US">
</span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US">Combined
Arms Regiments are needed to truly drive on this revolution within the Army, by
unifying the efforts and ensuring historical, unreasonable divisions are
effectively removed. <o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></p>Gabrielehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/01623558391676151582noreply@blogger.com20tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-442909239199162925.post-57949460246008621952021-04-01T08:17:00.003+02:002021-04-01T08:19:59.082+02:00"After the Wall Came Down": a journey through decades of constant change<div class="separator" style="clear: both;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEh-UPUBEkfNRet5HGl5fQhjc-JuoEJN3CWeG4FmiI-gnk5IoAhb502D7wXnujznh6qkiCUv5yYgOHevFGInxrZKeEMfmPiBRdfB94PEso9cZMi5c_VUdo1olpg2DzuPw88HisovcKt3p8g/s1000/9781612008301.jpg" style="display: block; padding: 1em 0px; text-align: center;"><img alt="" border="0" data-original-height="1000" data-original-width="660" height="400" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEh-UPUBEkfNRet5HGl5fQhjc-JuoEJN3CWeG4FmiI-gnk5IoAhb502D7wXnujznh6qkiCUv5yYgOHevFGInxrZKeEMfmPiBRdfB94PEso9cZMi5c_VUdo1olpg2DzuPw88HisovcKt3p8g/s400/9781612008301.jpg" /></a></div>
Andrew Richards retired from the Army in 2002, but the Army never really leaves you. It is an experience that inevitably leaves memories, some of which dear, some less so. And so, keeping in touch with other soldiers and friends made during Service, and following the events of the last two decades, he has come to realize that the British Army has, truly, gone through a period of change the like of which was never seen before. <div><br /></div><div>In his book, aptly titled “After the Wall came down”, he leads us on a journey through these decades of frenetic action and constant change, thanks to interviews to dozens of soldiers from across every Corps. It is a journey that begins in the last few years of what was, overall, a period of strategic and organizational stability with little precedent in history.
Between 1945 and the fall of the Berlin Wall, despite the progression of technology, the Army was largely the same. Successive intakes of soldiers were instinctively familiar with an organization that had enjoyed a long period of stability and carried on in its traditions.
And so in the 1980s the reasons to join were often reasons of true loyalty to the historical regiment your family had served into in generations past. It was a matter of pride and adventure, especially as the campaign to retake the Falklands focused and galvanized the Country’s interest in the Armed Forces. </div><div><br /></div><div>The rhythm of change has become faster and faster since the late 80s. The bullying scandals of 1987 were a major drive for change in some of the Army’s ancient ways, but the focus on more or less improper “initiations” and bullying of rookies nonetheless pale in front of everything that followed.
With the dramatic reduction in size and the restructuring of the Army’s very fabric with “Options for Change” and the hunt for the Peace Dividend afforded by the sudden fall of the Soviet Union begin a spiraling series of new wars, new scandals, budget cuts, constant reorganizations and a race to keep pace with a changing society. </div><div><br /></div><div>The Gulf War of 1991 is followed not just by the shock of 1994 as redundancies hit hard, severing many of those historic ties between families, counties and Regiments, as 50 infantry battalions turn to 38 and the proud Cavalry and RAC are hit just as hard between disbandment and amalgamations that changed the Army’s cosmos forever. The aftermath of the Iraq war is also the impact with the “Gulf War Syndrome” and with the mental scars of that experience, which have taken a long time to be understood and accepted rather than belittled and frowned upon. </div><div><br /></div><div>The experience of peacekeeping in Bosnia comes across as another shock to the system, as the reality of the thankless, dangerous job of trying to prevent genocides while being restricted by Rules of Engagement sinks in. The experiences of The Cheshires of Lieutenant Colonel Bob Stewart, and the reportages from burnt, deserted villages of Martin Bell for the BBC put the Country, and not just the Army, in front of the shock of the worst war crimes since the Holocaust perpetrated by Nazi Germany, and the failure of the UN and of the international community to put a timely stop to the atrocities. </div><div><br /></div><div>The Army at the same time has to deal with war at home in the 38 years of Operation BANNER, and soldiers faced for many more years, and still face, the shock of being hounded for alleged crimes while hundreds of convicted terrorists have been given an easy way out as a price to pay for the Belfast agreement.
Afghanistan and Iraq loom large in the 2000s, with all their implications, from the shameful failure of the “mobile coffins” kept on the frontline for far too long despite their inadequacies in a world of mines and Improvised Explosive Devices to new cuts and downsizings in the middle of such a demanding campaign. </div><div><br /></div><div>And still, in the middle of it all there are the Commission for Racial Equality and the transformation of the army in an inclusive force, opening up the door for minorities that for many years were concentrated away in a few specific regiments, and subject to undeniable discrimination.
The long march of change touched the Service of homosexual personnel as well, and in parallel there is the long process of opening up the Army to women. From the disbandment of the Women’s Royal Army Corps in 1992 and the full integration of women in non-combat roles, all the way to the announcement in the recent 2018 that all combat roles will also be open. </div><div><br /></div><div>Even so, much remains to be done for example to eliminate the stigma and coldness that faces too many soldiers suffering from PTSD who feel that they have been left along to walk out of the door, forgotten and ignored. And a common theme is the burden that Army life places on families: a burden that can unite even further, but can also in many times be destructive. </div><div><br /></div><div>The last few decades have been a frenetic succession of change and upheavals. Yet, the author finds that many, indeed most of the soldiers he asks the question to, say that they would join all over again if given the chance. Even those who choose not to answer, or those who are adamant that they would not, tend to have at least some form of special, deep bond that the Army experience generated. </div><div><br /></div><div>This book tries to show why. </div><div><br /></div><div><br /></div><div>For more info: <a href="https://www.casematepublishing.co.uk/after-the-wall-came-down.html">https://www.casematepublishing.co.uk/after-the-wall-came-down.html</a>
</div>Gabrielehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/01623558391676151582noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-442909239199162925.post-32279050469411290902021-02-28T15:02:00.005+01:002021-02-28T18:25:59.394+01:00The British Army: where do we go from here...? <p><b>The reckoning </b></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">We are
weeks away from the publication of the long awaited, much anticipated and very
much feared Integrated Review and, in particular, of the Defence White Paper
which should provide “details”. I think that previous experiences have made us
all wary about what the MOD considers “details” and one of my greatest fears is
that we will, in fact, be given vague promises that will keep us all wondering
for the next few years. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Most of the
other fears have, as was always predicted, the British Army at their centre. My
increasingly exasperated battles in the last 5 years over the shocking
self-harm that the Army was committing in pursuing the half-formed STRIKE at
the expense of everything else are, sadly, looking likely to be vindicated. The
questions that I’ve been formulating for 5 years are still without an answer,
and the Army is reportedly about to pay dearly for its failure. If the leaks to
the press are accurate, the British Army will disband at least 4 infantry
battalions and will progressively settle downwards to a trained strength target
of around 72.000, rather than 82.000. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">And if that
seems a painful price to pay, be wary that there will potentially be far more
pain caused by the other reported cut: the loss of the whole WARRIOR fleet,
mitigated apparently by a wish to “accelerate” the procurement of BOXER. <o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgtuclYbqggBm8s_WXS_NTdU-e9nvVUrIZte5gdmz8SiUmwT3QTjEFda1Eg5j9fhCaCz4jIrbHO24iDkJHHjiOVjIHTi3wlVzduiud454lgnWvJPJZJlTCFzDXzSQgJP9JWv5HwWoHTxaM/s1600/EuM_N_NXYAIcvvV.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="622" data-original-width="1600" height="155" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgtuclYbqggBm8s_WXS_NTdU-e9nvVUrIZte5gdmz8SiUmwT3QTjEFda1Eg5j9fhCaCz4jIrbHO24iDkJHHjiOVjIHTi3wlVzduiud454lgnWvJPJZJlTCFzDXzSQgJP9JWv5HwWoHTxaM/w400-h155/EuM_N_NXYAIcvvV.jpg" width="400" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">I made this scheme in November 2015. The ink on the SDSR's pages was virtually not dry yet, but already there were questions and risks evident in the just announced Force Structure. The following years have not provided answers; just evidenced further problems. </td></tr></tbody></table><br /></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">There are
key things we still don’t know, so estimating the full magnitude of what will
happen is not yet possible. Chiefly, we do not know if there will be additional
purchases to expand the BOXER fleet. This becomes the absolutely key question,
followed by the determination of which roles BOXER will go on to cover. Will a
turreted variant be added? Will a mortar variant appear? <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The MBT –
IFV combo is the heart of any modern army. CHALLENGER 2 LEP+ appears to be
going ahead, according to the latest reports, and this is a great relief.
Apparently, around 150 tanks will receive the new turret with the smoothbore
120mm cannon and all the new sensors and electronics. This is a remarkably
small number but not truly surprising: the British Army has been planning for
just 2 regular tank regiments for the best part of 5 years now. As the Army
pursued its STRIKE dream, it instructed the 3rd MBT regiment, the King’s Royal
Hussars, that it would eventually convert to AJAX. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEg_MGBgTxpECPRE7Dw_USbIs8N7_aNzf_GCR3RpdizCFk-AJbhUjQVi2MhXtw7d6tlLYcZQmlPoIS-1MrHZRYaz9ovGu2gCV5raJ6U8VnMMP-YNpe5NfEig-qz1ClBMpfNRlTdNW6v_GyQ/s2508/Scrapping+tanks.JPG" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="1254" data-original-width="2508" height="200" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEg_MGBgTxpECPRE7Dw_USbIs8N7_aNzf_GCR3RpdizCFk-AJbhUjQVi2MhXtw7d6tlLYcZQmlPoIS-1MrHZRYaz9ovGu2gCV5raJ6U8VnMMP-YNpe5NfEig-qz1ClBMpfNRlTdNW6v_GyQ/w400-h200/Scrapping+tanks.JPG" width="400" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">A more recent scheme i produced to try and help people realize just how far the ripples travel through the armour if you cut CHALLENGER 2, WARRIOR, or both. They are the heart of everything the Army is, and you can't expect to rip the heart out without causing consequences. </td></tr></tbody></table><br /><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></p><p class="MsoNormal">The British
Army has recently reverted to its traditional Type 58 structure for MBT
regiments, so the regular fleet will number 116 tanks, with a small reserve
fleet on top. Too small, in fact, to even contemplate the possibility of
rebuilding a third frontline regiment from the single Reserve MBT formation,
the Royal Wessex Yeomanry.</p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">A very
questionable approach to that “regeneration” capability that the Army only ever
pays lip service to, but this is how things stand. After the LEP+ upgrade, at
least, the CHALLENGER 2 will finally live up to the otherwise largely
undeserved hype that surrounds it.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Losing the
IFVs is however going to create massive headaches and a ripple of problems that
will travel far and wide. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The above
graphic, which I first made back in august 2020, hopefully helps in visualizing
the ramifications of such a cut. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Just how
bad it will get, we will only know once we are told if new BOXERs are
happening, or not. The British Army will be keenly hoping for permission to
commit money towards additional BOXER purchases and more variants. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">They have
always hoped that this would eventually happen: the MIV programme tender
documents specify that arrangements have been made to keep the door open for
the purchase of more vehicles. There are enough options for getting to a fleet
of some 1500 vehicles in total, with specific mention that more variants could
be added, and indeed developed in the UK. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">All the way
back in 2018, when those documents were published, </span><a href="http://ukarmedforcescommentary.blogspot.com/2018/07/british-army-going-wheeled.html"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">I wrote a post</span></a><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"> about it, noting that it very much
suggested a serious appetite within the Army to “go wheeled”, the way the French
did with VBCI and then with GRIFFON/JAGUAR/SERVAL. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Back then I
noted: <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"></span></i></p><blockquote><p class="MsoNormal"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The notice specifies that additional variants
and requirements could follow, and it specifically mentions the adoption of a
“medium gun”, basically implying an IFV variant.<o:p></o:p></span></i></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Moreover, the notice specifies that the MOD is
asking for the option of ordering up to 900 more vehicles, for a total of 1500.<o:p></o:p></span></i></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">1500 does not appear to be a casual number: the
Army has been planning for 380 upgraded Warriors; declares on its website 409
FV432 still in use; and fields / stores a fleet of 305 Mastiff Troop Carrier
Vehicles plus 127 specialistic variants (Enhanced Communications Variant,
Interim ECM, Interim EOD [possibly 23], ambulance, Protected Eyes / Praetorian)
plus 118 Ridgback Troop Carrier Vehicles and 51 specialistic variants (Command,
Ambulance), supported by 125 Wolfhound (Utility and at least 44 between Military
Working Dog and EOD).<o:p></o:p></span></i></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The total is 1515. Coincidence? Probably no.<o:p></o:p></span></i></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">It seems more and more likely that the troubled
Warrior CSP will, in the end, be cancelled. This MIV notice seems to prepare
for a WCSP cancellation scenario by making provision for the numbers and the
addition of a medium gun.</span></i></p></blockquote><p class="MsoNormal"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><o:p></o:p></span></i></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><o:p> </o:p></span></i></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">In 2018,
the increasingly dire situation of the Army’s plans was already pretty
painfully evident and I urged the then Modernizing Defence Program to take a
good, hard look at the whole mix of Army capabilities and choose a direction of
travel. If tracks and wheels can’t be properly funded at the same time, <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">and it was absolutely clear that they could
not be</b>, it only takes rationality to know that <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">you have to pick one</b>. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The French
consciously picked the wheels side and have put all of their resources in
building up a powerful wheeled force around their MBT fleet, which is pretty
much the last tracked element in the Armee de Terre simply because it remains
unreplaceable, regardless of the usual takes on how MBTs are supposedly
obsolete. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The British
Army could well have taken a similar decision. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">But, and
again I quote from my 2018 post, because the reality of facts is unchanged: <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"></span></i></p><blockquote><p class="MsoNormal"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The replacement of WCSP with more MIV would put
the British Army on the same path chosen by France with the VBCI, which
entirely replaced their own tracked IFVs. Moreover, the replacement of FV432
with MIV variants would represent a rather dramatic shift in favor of wheels,
completely changing the scenario that currently exists within the British
Army. <o:p></o:p></span></i></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Such a change of heart would do wonders for
commonality and obsolescence removal from what is an aging fleet of fleets, but
<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">it would also sideline Ajax even
further, leading to further questions about where the tracked heir to FRES
should sit.<o:p></o:p></b></span></i></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Ever since the SDSR
2015 was published, Ajax has looked more and more lost, ultimately resulting in
its “re-branding” into a “medium armour” capability which has, it is fair to
say, convinced very few people.</span></i></b></p></blockquote><p class="MsoNormal"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><o:p></o:p></span></i></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><o:p> </o:p></span></i></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">AJAX, not
WARRIOR, is the problem the British Army has created for itself. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">To
understand Army's pain in trying to shape its own vision for the Integrated Review,
consider this: its absolute most expensive program is for a tracked family of vehicles,
the AJAX gang, which delivers only a few roles, and is no Infantry Fighting
Vehicle. In itself, it solves "nothing”, because you need WARRIOR,
carrying the infantry, to give true meaning to the whole force. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The second most
expensive program is for a wheeled APC which, by itself, also solves
"nothing" because out of 523 BOXER, 15 are training vehicles and the
508 frontline ones are split between APCs, APCs with different internal
arrangement for carrying engineers, artillery fire directors, JTACs and other
“specialists” with related equipment, ambulances and command posts. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Once you
put AJAX and BOXER together, you have burned over 10 billion pounds of budget
room, but are left with a dysfunctional mix. There are a ton of tracked roles
left uncovered, beginning with the absolutely key IFV but expanding to mortar
carriers and supporting roles currently covered by FV432 in the hundreds. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">And a ton
of wheeled roles remain just as uncovered . <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">And the
money is not enough to do both. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">What is now
happening in the Review was entirely predictable. As i've been writing for 5
years, the problem of how to mix AJAX and BOXER in a force structure that makes
some kind of sense while also preserving at least the CHALLENGER MBTs is
demanding an urgent answer. And poor WARRIOR is the designated victim at this
point, because unlike BOXER and AJAX it is not yet under production contract. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">It is
merely the simplest one to cancel. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">But make no
mistake: WARRIOR is not the problem. AJAX is. Or BOXER, depending on whether
you side with the track or with the wheel. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The truth
is that the Army had the money and "ingredients" to outfit at least 3
excellent tracked, heavy brigades. In September 2014 it put AJAX under
contract, and 2-3 more billions would have seen enough WARRIOR and CHALLENGER
2s upgraded to complete the renewal of 3<sup>rd</sup> Division as had been
imagined in the original Army 2020 plan (published 2011). <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Alternatively,
the Army could have chosen to “go French” and bet big on wheels, beginning a
wholesale restructuring by going for a huge BOXER purchase to effectively drive
WARRIOR, FV432 and CRV(T) out of the door over N years. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">But the
Army did not want to pick just one side. The Army wanted to have both, and
while I can see why they would want that, I cannot forgive them for ignoring
the evidence and putting themselves into this mess. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">In
September 2014 they committed the biggest chunk by far of their future budget
on AJAX. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">In November
2015 they made wheels their absolute priority, and ever since, STRIKE had
dominated the Army’s vision, all the way up to the signing of the BOXER
contract at the end of 2019. Just in time to arrive at the Integrated Review
with CHALLENGER 2 LEP+ and WCSP still uncommitted and thus extremely
vulnerable. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">In the
middle there was the whole saga of the “delayed Review” and the Review to stop
the Review, also known as “Modernizing Defence Program”. What that saga did was
signal, without any possible doubt, that the money was not there to pursue
both tracks and wheels at once. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The Army
made its choice in late 2019, putting all the money on BOXER. Considering the
situation, this was a suicidal choice. With AJAX in place, the Army needed WCSP
and CR2, not BOXER. Splitting an already insufficient budget inexorably
condemns the Army to a sub-optimal mixture of tracks and wheels which will drag
on for decades into the future. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The time
for a big change of heart was <b>before</b> the AJAX contract was signed. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The moment AJAX was put under contract it should have become a fact of life that the time
for adding an 8x8 fleet could only ever come after WCSP and CR2 LEP had been secured.
<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">And the
British Army itself used to know this basic reality: up to 2015, the MOD Major Projects Spreadsheet contained a single title that
summarized the whole modernization of the Army’s armour fleets. The Mounted
Close Combat Capability Change super-program was started March 16, 2010 with a
Project End Date set for December 21, 2033. The budget over that timeframe was
given as 17.251,81 million pounds. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">In April
2014 that colossus was split into its different components: Armoured Cavalry
2025 (AJAX), Armour MBT 2025, Armoured Infantry 2026 (WCSP and ABSV) and
Mechanised Infantry <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">2029</b>. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">A telling
indication, which the SDSR 2015 and the STRIKE obsession eventually turned on
its head, trying to get MIV into service from 2023, with operational capability
for the new brigades in 2025. This change of heart is now having its entirely
predictable consequences. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Now we are
in the worst possible limbo, with a force that doesn’t have the tracked
vehicles it needs for holding on to Armoured Brigades and at the same time
doesn’t have the wheeled vehicles needed for a true Medium, wheeled force.
Where do we go from here? <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"> </p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">A look at the budget figures</span></b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The annual
major projects spreadsheet from the MOD helps us track what the situation is. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">Armour MBT 2025</b> program started in 2014
and currently has a Project End date set for July 31, 2028. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">This
represents a 791 days extension<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>on the
previous target of June 2026 and is due to the fact that in Financial Year 2019
the Army turned the original CHALLENGER Life Extension Program in LEP+. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Specifically,
the latest </span><a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/mod-government-major-projects-portfolio-data-2020"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Major Project spreadsheet</span></a><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">, released in July 2020 and current
to September 2019, reports on the sudden realization within the army that just
upgrading the thermal sights was not going to do much. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br style="mso-special-character: line-break;" />
<!--[if !supportLineBreakNewLine]--><br style="mso-special-character: line-break;" />
<!--[endif]--><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"></span></i></p><blockquote><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The scheduled baseline project end date at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019)
is 31/07/28, has lengthened by 791 days since last year's Q2 1819 date of
01/06/26, due primarily to the following factors;<o:p></o:p></span></i></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><o:p> </o:p></span></i></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">In this period the programme's scope was expanded from obsolescence only
to include enhancements to its lethality and survivability. The expanded scope
has also lengthened the time to complete the work and increased cost over the
assessment, demonstration and manufacture phases. These dates are
currently subject to negotiation and will be confirmed when the full business
case has been approved. <o:p></o:p></span></i></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><o:p> </o:p></span></i></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The baseline Whole Life Cost at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is
£1,304.19 m, due primarily to the following factors;<o:p></o:p></span></i></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><o:p> </o:p></span></i></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>This reflects the financial
position following the capability uplift endorsed by HMT. This sees a
capability uplift and extension to the Main Battle Tank out to 2035.<o:p></o:p></span></i></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><o:p> </o:p></span></i></p></blockquote><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><o:p></o:p></span></i></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><o:p> </o:p></span></i></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The above restructuring of the
program was confirmed in an utterly shambolic intervention of the Chief of the
Defence Staff, previous Chief General Staff and mastermind of Army 2020 and
Army 2020 Refine, General Sir Nick Carter, in front of the Defence
Committee. From </span><a href="https://committees.parliament.uk/oralevidence/652/pdf/"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">his words</span></a><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">, it appears the Army was essentially unaware
of the lethality issues of the multi-piece ammunition of the current cannon
until 2019. This is, of course, completely false, considering that the Army was,
in fact, looking for solutions already in the early 2000s, when the Challenger
Lethality Improvement Programme was tentatively launched. It was in 2006 that a
CHALLENGER 2 was first retrofitted with a 120mm smoothbore gun, in fact.
Swapping the gun was never an issue: the issue was in the complete redesign
needed to fix ammunition storage spaces and make room for the much longer
single-piece rounds. This is the main issue to this day, and the chief reason
for swapping out the entire turret. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Have they forgotten everything about
that phase? Was Carter being overly kind to his political masters, to the point
of having the Army shouldering more blame that necessary? He was not shy
earlier in the same hearing saying that some decisions depend on money: why,
then, say something as hopelessly stupid as this about CR2 lethality problems
suddenly "dawning" on an oblivious Army...? <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">It’s one of the many mysteries of
the last few years of Army decisions. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;"> </p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Armoured Cavalry 2025</span></b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">, also launched in 2014, is supposed
to end on April 30, 2025 although this seems optimistic considering the current
delays in acceptance for the turreted AJAX variant and the fact that only
handfuls of ARES, APOLLO and ATLAS have been delivered. Fair to assume that the
end date will change. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Budget over
the period is given as 6.288,95 million. As of 19, despite the deliveries
having barely started at all, the MOD had already paid 2,78 billion pounds,
which is part of the reason why AJAX is not being cancelled. In 2019/20, the
MOD paid 643 million, down from a planned 694, exactly because of the delays
with AJAX and with the consequent cancellation of expenditure connected with
getting training in BATUS up. <o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Armoured Infantry 2026</span></b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">, also started formally in 2014, is
due to end 31 December 2026. The last time we were given an indication about
the total budget for WCSP is in the Spreadsheet released in 2017. Back then,
the expectation was for 1612,72 million pounds. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Up to 2016
the budget had been 2176,45 million pounds. The difference was caused by the
decision, in 2016, to de-scope the Armoured Battlegroup Support Vehicle, which
remains an “aspirational” requirement. Essentially, the Army has no clue how it
will replace the ancient FV432. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">From 2017
onwards, the numbers associated with the WCSP programme have been hidden for
commercial interest as negotiations have dragged on to try and get to a
contract. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">As of
financial year 2019, at least 474 million pounds have already been expended on
WCSP. It is extremely likely that, if the program is indeed cancelled, the Army
will have wasted another half a billion in exchange for nothing. <o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Finally, <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">Mechanized Infantry Vehicle</b>, launched
in April 2018 and with a currently planned end date of 31 December 2032. Budget
over the period: 4663,31 million pounds. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">It is
painfully evident that the money committed on MIV would have gotten WCSP and
ABSV going. There was room to go with the 2010 target of 6 WARRIOR battalion
sets, in fact, rather than the 4 that have been the reduced ambition since 2015
in order to accommodate STRIKE. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">It also
seems that some of the money once associated to the Mounted Close Combat
Capability Change program is missing. The current budgets add up to 13,867
billion, rather than 17,251. This apparently vindicates the Army’s claims that
it has been robbed of money to pay for cost overruns in the other Service’s
programmes. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">However,
the budgets listed above give us no visibility on how much money was expended
between 2010 and 2014 (admittedly unlikely to be very high as all programs were
in very early stages) and also leave out several years. The 17,251 billion were
to be expended out to 2033, while the current projects end dates (2028, 2026,
2025, 2032) all stop well short of that point. It is entirely reasonable to
assume that the missing 3,384 billion will be expended across the various
fleets in those missing years. Indeed, might even be more. We also do not know
where programs like Multi Role Vehicle – Protected have their budgets: it seems
reasonable to assume that this program in particular might have originally been
part of what used to be “Mechanized Infantry 2029”. This adds further
uncertainty. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Also,
there’s no way to tell if the Army received formal indications in 2015 that it
would get more money, and this eventually failed to happen soon afterwards. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">We can’t
say for sure if the total out to 2033 has really shrunk, and if so by how much.
We can be sure that the Army has seen significant fluctuations in the amount of
money allocated to it year on year, which might well have complicated project
management and forced delays to the signing of contracts. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">But I’m not
prepared, given the figures above, to side with those who claim the Army’s woes
are due to the other Services and to Government. I’m not sure they have had it
that much worse than the other Services, nor are we in a position to determine
if, and how much, the totals available out to 2033 have truly changed. The data
available to us outside of the MOD is, simply, insufficient for determining
that. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The data
that is available is incomplete, but suggests the Army bears enormous
responsibilities for its own troubles. AJAX is the most painful and undeniable
demonstration that the Army’s own inability to set priorities has been
destructive: the fact that, while deliveries have barely even started, the
vehicle already is basically a square peg in a world of round holes, is
damning. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Whatever is
done now, AJAX is here to stay. But in the Army that is taking shape with the
loss of WARRIOR, it looks like a orphan. Something that no longer has a truly
good collocation anywhere in the force. And this is an obscenity. Your biggest,
most expensive programme CANNOT be a problem. That it now is, is the measure of
your failure. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">What next? <o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Decisions
should, as I already said, have been taken earlier. Now it is very difficult to
imagine a truly “good” outcome. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Things will
get spectacularly ugly if there are no further BOXER / AJAX purchases. Such a
scenario would truly mutilate the Army, which would see a net 50% cut in the
already insufficient number of infantry battalions it planned to mechanize. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The
original Army 2020 Refine, in 2010, was based on 6 armoured and 3 heavy
protected / mechanized battalions. In other words, 6 on WARRIOR and 3 on
MASTIFF, later to be replaced by an 8x8 around 2029. Each of the 3 armoured
infantry brigades would have 2 battalions on WARRIOR and a battalion riding on
wheels, not unlike what happens in the German army where a single JAGER
battalion (on BOXER APC) is integrated in heavy brigades. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">But as we
know, in 2015 Carter decided that the future was all about STRIKE, even though
right from the start the cost of such a change was heavy: one tank regiment to
go; one AS90 regiment gone; one armoured engineer regiment also gone. The Army
2020 Refine plan now called for 4 brigades, albeit individually smaller. Of
these, two would be armoured and would have 2 battalions on WARRIOR each, and 2
would be STRIKE brigades, each with 2 BOXER battalions. Net result was a drop
to 8 mechanized battalions in total. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Now, as
Army 2020 Refine falls apart, if there are no new vehicle purchases, the Army
will have managed the spectacular feat of crashing all the way down from 9 to 4
mechanized battalions, and all of them on lightly armed APCs, thus with an even
more dramatic loss of firepower. And as we have seen in the Budget section of
the article, it won’t be for lack of spending, to add insult to injury. It will
have paid a sweet 10+ billion pounds to create this mess. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">With just 4
mechanized battalions, it is likely the Army will collapse all the way down to
a force of just 2 brigades worth of their title. Brigades with 2 infantry units
are already sub-optimal; splitting 4 battalions across more than 2 brigades
appears pretty much impossible. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">I can only
think of one way to do it in an acceptable fashion, and that is by adopting
Permanent Combined Arms Battlegroups: instead of forming 4 AJAX regiments, as
planned under Army 2020 Refine, some of the AJAX would instead be assigned
directly to the infantry battalions, to create “square” battlegroups with 2
AJAX Squadrons in support of 2 Infantry companies on BOXER APCs. This, in
theory, allows you to form 6 permanent BGs, which you can then spread across up
to 3 brigades. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">But this
is, literally, the math of despair. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">New
vehicles are desperately needed for the Army to remain functional. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The French way…? <o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The British
Army is likely to be headed the French way, since BOXER is all the rage these
days. This will however happen more by accident than by design, with AJAX
destined to remain pretty much an orphaned oddity in such a “new” army. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">As I’ve
written multiple times, I think the “French model” is very much an acceptable
compromise. Not perfect, but good enough <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">provided
that the Army buys many more BOXERs, and suitable wheeled vehicles (through a
revamped MRV-P) to support it, over the coming years.</b> The last 30 years
have seen the Army change its mind constantly, with utterly disastrous results:
it has run around in a tortuous circle which has brought it back literally to
the starting block (the BOXER saga is absolutely terrifying), but with several
missing limbs and a scrawny body which has lost all muscle along the way. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">If the Army
is to recover, it will need to stabilize its aims. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">My readers
already know that I do not believe that wheels are key to adopting a more
dispersed kind of fighting, and certainly I will never side with the British
Army in pretending that having wheels is sufficient to change battle dynamics.
Fighting dispersed is complex, dangerous and demanding. It requires <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">more</b> capability, not less. It requires
capabilities currently relegated at higher command levels to be distributed far
more widely, at far lower level. One such example is air defence: dispersion
alone, in the age of the UAV and airpower in general, cannot possibly be a
solution to anything if the dispersed groups have little to no ability to
defend themselves from threats from the air. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Wheels,
however, do have unquestioned merits in making a ground force element more
readily capable to move independently over long distances without depending on
semi-trailers and trucks. Wheeled armour also tends to be less thirsty, which
means it can do with a smaller logistic train. For a small Army with a
(relatively) small budget, wheels can represent a serious advantage. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Moreover,
as we try and think of where the Army might go from here, we cannot ignore what
the minds of the Armed Forces have indicated, in the </span><a href="https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/922969/20200930_-_Introducing_the_Integrated_Operating_Concept.pdf"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Integrated Operating Concept 2025</span></a><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">, as the necessary attributes of the
future force: <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"></p><blockquote><p class="MsoNormal">Have smaller and faster
capabilities to avoid detection</p><p class="MsoNormal">Trade reduced physical
protection for increased mobility</p><p class="MsoNormal">Rely more heavily on
low-observable and stealth technologies</p><p class="MsoNormal">Depend increasingly on
electronic warfare and passive deception measures to gain and maintain
information advantage</p><p class="MsoNormal">Include a mix of crewed,
uncrewed and autonomous platforms</p><p class="MsoNormal">Be integrated into ever more
sophisticated networks of systems through a combat cloud that makes best
use of data</p><p class="MsoNormal">Have an open systems
architecture that enables the rapid incorporation of new capability</p><p class="MsoNormal">Be markedly less dependent on fossil
fuels</p><p class="MsoNormal">Employ non-line-of-sight fires
to exploit the advantages we gain from information advantage</p><p class="MsoNormal">Emphasize the non-lethal
disabling of enemy capabilities, thereby increasing the range of political
and strategic options</p></blockquote><p class="MsoNormal"></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Arguably,
the above aims are not conceptually too far apart from the same drivers that
were being FRES and the US Future Command System. Even in more recent times, If
we take a look back at what FRES SV/AJAX was originally meant to eventually
grow into, we can easily identify a future in which all capabilities, potentially
including the MBT role, would have been delivered with FRES SV/AJAX variants.
Tracked, but still much lighter than current MBTs (although very much not
lighter than WARRIOR). <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The AJAX family
was supposed to be just the first capability Block within a larger programme
that should have eventually included another two Blocks, introducing more
variants. One such variant in particular, the ambulance, had been close to
being purchased. It had already been named, even, as the ASCLEPIUS. But then
2015 happened, and any hope of further Blocks for the AJAX family has
evaporated. <o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj2MT7Yx4cFbaXsmzaF1-NnX__GabfvH_K2Lne3AzERAa8s0VwN_4vkDgwK8PeLSZP1giUYaR2zvL9xOcvTsWoLHZ87wct1vOOkFrwDzXQ6NAUOeP06Qlt0dMQTIm0qYEaioqpFUy1Nlm0/s1168/EuRfx4EXUAAxFTs.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="877" data-original-width="1168" height="300" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj2MT7Yx4cFbaXsmzaF1-NnX__GabfvH_K2Lne3AzERAa8s0VwN_4vkDgwK8PeLSZP1giUYaR2zvL9xOcvTsWoLHZ87wct1vOOkFrwDzXQ6NAUOeP06Qlt0dMQTIm0qYEaioqpFUy1Nlm0/w400-h300/EuRfx4EXUAAxFTs.jpg" width="400" /></a></div><table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiM4MDPeO4skEfe-UD8zn4KPg450_EOvmpjR0V00S3fGYZKGN2MwGQeG_88vqsMWfl96aNukbvRNKsRv7RJgQxGvprQs-fFAZfabSoYoFElb0T_zDebC7MrZbuLVeqbWM0-RO752mnWwVE/s830/2.bmp" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="436" data-original-width="830" height="210" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiM4MDPeO4skEfe-UD8zn4KPg450_EOvmpjR0V00S3fGYZKGN2MwGQeG_88vqsMWfl96aNukbvRNKsRv7RJgQxGvprQs-fFAZfabSoYoFElb0T_zDebC7MrZbuLVeqbWM0-RO752mnWwVE/w400-h210/2.bmp" width="400" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">Looking back at what the Specialist Vehicle (then AJAX) was meant to be is a painful exercise. Had the Army persevered in this direction, very capable tracked brigades would be taking shape right now. It is very hard not to get Future Combat System vibes from this scenario. </td></tr></tbody></table><br /><p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">It is
fascinating to think of what the British Army could have achieved by carrying
on with the original FRES SV/AJAX plan, indeed expanding it to replace WARRIOR
as well. Such an approach would very much replicate what the US Future Combat
System used to be like. As you might remember, FCS was all about medium-weight
tracked platforms. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">While the IOC2025
directions do not openly favor wheels above tracks, however, the additional
logistic weight imposed by tracked vehicles the size of AJAX, and the
consequent financial penalty, very much suggest that, just like France, the UK
would not be wrong in settling for wheels instead. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">If we
accept the design drivers identified by IOC2025, BOXER is probably the correct
vehicle for the future. It is not “light” in a literal sense (the UK’s BOXER,
built to the latest A3 configuration, can reach 38.5 tons) but it does come
with greater, “faster” ability to move to and across the battlefield, while
also being “lighter” in logistical terms. A battle force made up of BOXERs
would certainly be easier to deploy and sustain than a tracked one, even one
built entirely on AJAX as base. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">This is
especially true if we also consider the Army’s “Conceptual Force 2035”, which
very much doubles down on the same kind of design drivers. This study imagines
an army of 3 smaller but capable divisions made of lighter, faster, more
deployable, largely independent battlegroups, with dispersion being the norm.
Conceptual Force 2035 specifies that the disaggregated fighting requires
Combined Arms capabilities to be organic at lower level, to ensure the
dispersed Battlegroups do not have to wait for a superior echelon to make
supports available. This includes having more organic Indirect Fire capability
and employing it alongside greater ATGW capability to offset the capability
currently delivered by MBTs through “lighter” vehicles. <o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhXmmjqBD62YWI72-9YkxcN9BtIiTrDrXOZ3YfNh29ubECPw28tgeTLda5T_TMsPjv54fFI8PxYk0GUjCdipFZG10yi9ipwXTBu_n3arBsXglBGMhivMgqXps4hHbBFRLr7bZYgh-q1LQI/s951/CF2035.JPG" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="892" data-original-width="951" height="375" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhXmmjqBD62YWI72-9YkxcN9BtIiTrDrXOZ3YfNh29ubECPw28tgeTLda5T_TMsPjv54fFI8PxYk0GUjCdipFZG10yi9ipwXTBu_n3arBsXglBGMhivMgqXps4hHbBFRLr7bZYgh-q1LQI/w400-h375/CF2035.JPG" width="400" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">Conceptual Force 2035 described in the British Army Review, issue 177, Winter/Spring 2020</td></tr></tbody></table><br /><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></p><p class="MsoNormal">The BGs
will be expected to carry out, and I quote, <b>deeper, more risky and aggressive manoeuvre</b>. Robotic, sacrificial
systems will be used to press on reconnaissance, and I quote again, to the
point of destruction, in order to enable the BG to use frenetic op-tempo to
make up for the lack of mass.</p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The
resulting BGs would be around 500-strong but are supposed to match the current mission
set of a 1250-strong armoured BG though the use of robotics and higher
op-tempo. The Conceptual Force imagines that, from around 82.000 regulars, the
British Army would be able to form some 48 such Combined Arms battlegroups. The
organization would work to the Rule of 4, with an Assault Force, Covering
Force, Echelon Force and Reserve Force. These BGs would be grouped in Brigades
with enough CS and CSS elements to fight, again, largely independently from the
Division level. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The key
attributes described above, for me, are the key to the whole concept: if you
want to fight dispersed and be lighter but still capable, you <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">must</b> pack a serious punch and have far
more capability pushed down the levels of command. This is something that in
STRIKE we are just <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">not</b> seeing in any
meaningful way. Firepower has been dead last in the list of priorities so far,
and that makes the whole thing not credible. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">In fact, what
is most striking about the Conceptual Force 2035 is that <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">it is so entirely alien to what the British Army actually looks like
today, in structure, “culture” and programmes</b>. For example, Permanent
Combined Arms Battlegroups are anathema in today’s British Army and among the
purists of capbadges and specialty separations. CS and CSS are a scarce
resource completely out of balance with the number of infantry battalions. Indirect
Fires and ATGWs are weaknesses, not strengths. The Rule of 4 is nowhere to be
seen, and indeed resources in multiple areas are spread so thin than even the
Rule of 3 is dubious. <o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEggR460_8XmYWNjmDVRjK_23buVwD7wbhMxHBPCTClnatJ7qHPFV7Y3ME73-wZxhhb_KtUFcLdS3SyjAQ-aIyFQ4fXO_PzvgYw8B6c_p7PCg4GpkQCaH0lI_u1pNQ3hHwm9w2wvgjHVr-U/s630/1611264888631.png" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="630" data-original-width="504" height="400" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEggR460_8XmYWNjmDVRjK_23buVwD7wbhMxHBPCTClnatJ7qHPFV7Y3ME73-wZxhhb_KtUFcLdS3SyjAQ-aIyFQ4fXO_PzvgYw8B6c_p7PCg4GpkQCaH0lI_u1pNQ3hHwm9w2wvgjHVr-U/w320-h400/1611264888631.png" width="320" /></a></div><br /><table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEg_b41Yj_yG1_Xb0GElHJ6eEqLaImYS-D5Fr8JvAoNjZdFORT3tIhgliXgu6kOYE6z_ZAAaWyKp4UltTRYyk77r21VS8UKd5NiPDtuzBCWoSPZmXB4EGUtwaJSGhTqpfLIU6YDKu-3IF18/s852/1611266898506.png" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="692" data-original-width="852" height="325" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEg_b41Yj_yG1_Xb0GElHJ6eEqLaImYS-D5Fr8JvAoNjZdFORT3tIhgliXgu6kOYE6z_ZAAaWyKp4UltTRYyk77r21VS8UKd5NiPDtuzBCWoSPZmXB4EGUtwaJSGhTqpfLIU6YDKu-3IF18/w400-h325/1611266898506.png" width="400" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">A LM proposal for a vertical launch missile module for BOXER, complete with mast-mounted radar and EO/IR. </td></tr></tbody></table><br /><p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">One key
question ahead of the publication of the White Paper is whether the shock of
this Review finally gets the Army to move from its current indefensible
obsessions, or if the new manpower reduction results in just “more of the same”,
through the loss of yet another “brigade-set” of CS and CSS. As I said, the
sheer scarcity of combat vehicles to mechanize the infantry with suggest a
reduction to as few as 2 brigades. Currently the British Army has Combat
Support and Combat Service Support resources sufficient to aim for 4 brigades. My
worst fear is that, consequently, the Army will go for the “easy” solution of
removing up to 2 Engineer, Artillery and perhaps Signals and Logistic units,
rather than go for a wholesale rebalancing and reorganization. This would only
exacerbate the inbalance, rather than address it, and would inexorably prepare
the stage for a further manpower reduction a few years on, when politicians
will (<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">rightly</i></b>) observe that an output of some 2 brigades does not
require 72.000 personnel. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The Army
needs to decide, quickly, if it believes in the findings and directions of its
own studies for the future, and start acting accordingly, reorganizing its
structures and reassigning manpower to the capabilities that need to be
expanded. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">As a first
step in a transition process to something resembling the Conceptual Force 2035,
the Army should work to increase its ability to field combined arms brigades.
The Corps of 3 Divisions and 48 battlegroups imagined by the Conceptual Force
2035 is very hard to imagine, as manpower is just one ingredient and the other
expensive ones are all missing; but the British Army should be more than
capable to put together 6 brigades, spread under 2 divisional HQs, mirroring,
again, the French model. Each Division would have a Heavy, a Medium and a
Light/Air Mobile brigade, one a revamped 16 Air Assault Bde, the other built by
restructuring resources already available but tied down in the current 1st
Division. Such lighter brigades would seek to fight dispersed primarily by exploiting Light Cavalry support, Foxhound and, even more so, the RAF's very precious and very significant fleet of 60 CHINOOK. Obviously, they would be limited in what they could achieve in the highest intensity scenarios, but they could find plenty of use across a multitude of cases. <o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">A third Division would continue to group up the rest of the force: the battalions busy on garrison / forward presence roles; the Specialised Infantry Group. Ideally, said Division should also serve as a Regular core force which a restructured Army Reserve should "regenerate" for action in times of need. But this is a complex topic better left for future discussions. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The
resulting division would be lighter than the 3rd Division as envisioned by Army
2020 Refine, but it is more realistically sustainable and having 2 of them make
it possible to sustain an effort over time, rather than fire a silver bullet
once and have nothing else left. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>In order to achieve this, more vehicles will
be a non-negotiable requirement. Most likely, all efforts will go towards new
BOXERs, although this is not necessarily the only option on the table.
Obviously there will be no new tracked IFV purchased anytime soon (if ever
again) if WARRIOR is cut.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Even so,
one could envisage an effort to maintain tracked, heavy formations by ordering
more vehicles of the AJAX family. If AJAX was an IFV, it could replace Warrior.
But AJAX has no room to carry infantry and there is no real way to change this
fact. The structure of the vehicle and the vast turret ring (specified in part
because there once was to also be a Medium Armour variant with 120mm smoothbore
gun) prevent any conversion to an IFV. It is also probably next to impossible
to pursue a “rewriting” of the contract that de-scopes some of the AJAX to make
room for a new IFV variant, which General Dynamics is ready to offer and has
tried (and failed) to sell to Australia. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">However,
the ARES APC already on order could easily be delivered with internal
arrangements for carrying 7-8 dismounts. If more ARES were ordered and
configured accordingly, it would be possible to create Combined Arms
Battlegroups by mixing AJAX and ARES. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">I don’t
think, sadly that this is likely to happen. But it is a possibility worth
considering. Permanent Combined Arms Battlegroups of AJAX and ARES carrying
infantry could become a prototype for the Future Combat Team of 2035, adopting
the Rule of 4 and beginning to develop true “Find, Fix and Strike” mechanisms
by adding in organic Indirect Fires. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">If more
ARES could be squeezed in to make this happen, it would be possible to hang on
to the superior all-terrain mobility of tracks and ensure that the remaining
CHALLENGER 2s have appropriate intimate support. The two Heavy brigades could
thus consist each of a single tank regiment and 2/3 AJAX/ARES BGs. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Otherwise,
said BGs will inexorably have to be mixed, with AJAX supported by BOXERs. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">On the
BOXER front, an absolutely priority should be the acquisition of a turreted,
well armed variant. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Ideally, the
40mm guns already procured and paid for WCSP should be used to create this new
variant. The WCSP turret is, as we speak, close to completing extensive
reliability trials. There’s no way to know how the turret behaved, but if it is
doing well it would be wise to migrate the whole turret towards a suitable
module to be developed for BOXER. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"><br /></span></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"></span></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEi_1tXfKefp3bsiIUqC758HXdj7pU_xlM0hyuNkyU0mKnUJkGJUFH9Pve4w7dx5AcogVuR5JFaNQ7DApzU6SuEpK5Q6HrGzzHLfUwAaJ5hPsOWdYoXblkAhpMWFgGyKfKpmG04-epScTAU/s1079/Egkn5HhX0AAOY9j.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="814" data-original-width="1079" height="301" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEi_1tXfKefp3bsiIUqC758HXdj7pU_xlM0hyuNkyU0mKnUJkGJUFH9Pve4w7dx5AcogVuR5JFaNQ7DApzU6SuEpK5Q6HrGzzHLfUwAaJ5hPsOWdYoXblkAhpMWFgGyKfKpmG04-epScTAU/w400-h301/Egkn5HhX0AAOY9j.jpg" width="400" /></a></div><br /><table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgqyipKi5UPVTtj8ARgkasYqBcTkjYKzsXq-8kxNNu4nudbW5dEPBC2WZiHeD0o9B0ZQMd9wYDf8Y7x4YFqDjqOEpUXs3NQtK4UXD1Yqtg3hX7OLOaI1Q23hopncV9UIbSNf1L5M9W8Rk8/s1080/EgkoIc7WsAAM4ak.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="829" data-original-width="1080" height="308" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgqyipKi5UPVTtj8ARgkasYqBcTkjYKzsXq-8kxNNu4nudbW5dEPBC2WZiHeD0o9B0ZQMd9wYDf8Y7x4YFqDjqOEpUXs3NQtK4UXD1Yqtg3hX7OLOaI1Q23hopncV9UIbSNf1L5M9W8Rk8/w400-h308/EgkoIc7WsAAM4ak.jpg" width="400" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">LM's work in 2015 to demonstrate that a turret derivated from the WCSP's one could indeed work on BOXER. </td></tr></tbody></table><br /><p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Such an
enterprise would require some time, but should not be overly complex. Lockheed
Martin fit one of its turrets onto a BOXER and carried out some early trials,
including weapon firings, already as far back as 2015. While these industry-led
demonstrations involve integrations that are far less mature than one might
think, there should be no reason for the turret not fitting on a troop-carrying
module.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Acquisition
of such a turreted BOXER would enable AJAX, with its mobility penalty, to be
taken out of the “STRIKE” / Medium brigades without a loss of firepower. The
Medium force could then enjoy all of the advantages of being a purely wheeled
formation, with the same level of mobility across all of its components. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span> <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The
turreted BOXERs would have to be mixed with the APCs already on order with the
aim of forming the highest possible number of Combined Arms Battlegroups. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Not
“cavalry”, not “infantry”. Permanent, combined arms BGs that will have to
deliver that mix of “Find, Fix and Strike” capability by progressively
integrating more indirect fire options, and the ability to target them from, if
not any soldier, certainly from pretty much any squad and combat vehicle. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">These BGs
will have to progressively evolve towards those “Future Combat Teams” envisaged
by the Conceptual Force 2035. A key capability to bring in as quickly as
possible to enable that evolution is the Land Precision Fires system, which is
meant to succeed EXACTOR MK2 and eventually expand striking range towards the
60 km mark. Land Precision Strike is an Artillery program, but this should not
be allowed to stovepipe it away from the combined arms BGs. Land Precision
Strike must become an Army-wide effort to give battlegroups a <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">new</b> <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">and enhanced lethality</b>. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The Army
has lost mass and has lost many tanks as well; lethality cannot continue to be
an afterthought. It is time to seriously approach the problem of how to
increase it to compensate the other weaknesses. It is no good to only ever talk
about compensating loss of armour with Indirect Fires while doing absolutely
nothing to make it a reality. The Army needs to demonstrate that it is doable
and that it is committed to a dramatic increase of firepower at lower command
levels. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">In order to
ensure that as much money as possible goes towards the new capabilities,
vehicle variants and additional vehicle purchases needed, the Army will have to
get better at setting its priorities. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">It remains
foolish, in my opinion, that the British Army has prioritized ambulance and
command post variants for the BOXER over more “fighty” frontline roles. I’ve
already asked this question in the past, but I will formulate it again: does
the ambulance vehicle really <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">need </b>to
be a BOXER…? I fully understand it is <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">desirable</b>,
but I don’t think it is <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">necessary</b>. <o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjxr2dc9QxDLTR9RIBKmtHCikTk96VRCJbFrW_xSEbAU85zJbztXhio1qvJC_TR2IlBstzC6PWoJT72wpKteTMk0Wl4kqmYr7X-XbHZPCAFWeANaN9EvnWXDBaSv1IUFNEJQfuyjtRjd_U/s680/Eiq8MPjXkAM-WRo.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="426" data-original-width="680" height="250" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjxr2dc9QxDLTR9RIBKmtHCikTk96VRCJbFrW_xSEbAU85zJbztXhio1qvJC_TR2IlBstzC6PWoJT72wpKteTMk0Wl4kqmYr7X-XbHZPCAFWeANaN9EvnWXDBaSv1IUFNEJQfuyjtRjd_U/w400-h250/Eiq8MPjXkAM-WRo.jpg" width="400" /></a></div><br /><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span><p></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US">Again, a
priority for me would also be to re-evaluate the variants of MIV to be
procured, reducing to the bare minimum the number of ambulances and command
posts in favor of instead pursuing, with maximum urgency, a 120mm mortar and an
ATGW variants. With a wiser choice of priority on the variants to include in
the order, the 508 BOXERs already on order could equip more than just a paltry
4 battalions. I’ve written about this in greater detail in a </span><a href="http://ukarmedforcescommentary.blogspot.com/2019/12/of-compromises-and-priorities.html"><span lang="EN-US">previous article</span></a><span lang="EN-US">. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"> The
Ambulance role and, wherever possible, the C2 role should be “offloaded” onto
much cheaper Multi Role Vehicle Protected (MRV-P) variants. <o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiWD_QtEMfLYO-VjJ_EjXiO-KgZ4h2W-sTsQwemBn08jjQv3qrDwGU_jej4qEkwEwAzEsPhTebndVic69IkVLmZUIcJP-HBPQjhDmVESpJoth4_kyN_rkQ6xcxJFduNSObYhLZtlPL3yVo/s1200/ClUE3XXXEAAb8bT.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="675" data-original-width="1200" height="225" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiWD_QtEMfLYO-VjJ_EjXiO-KgZ4h2W-sTsQwemBn08jjQv3qrDwGU_jej4qEkwEwAzEsPhTebndVic69IkVLmZUIcJP-HBPQjhDmVESpJoth4_kyN_rkQ6xcxJFduNSObYhLZtlPL3yVo/w400-h225/ClUE3XXXEAAb8bT.jpg" width="400" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">The Iveco ORSO (Bear), on the left, is pretty much the italian equivalent to what Multi Role Vehicle - Protected Group 2 hopes to be. </td></tr></tbody></table><br /></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">I
understand the allure of having everything on the same vehicle base, and I
realize that there is no safe rear echelon when fighting dispersed and dealing
with enemies who can contest, if not win control of the air and dominate the
Fires battle. But I still don’t see “BOXER-for-everything” being in any way a
solution. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Moreover, it
is painfully obvious that the money is not and will never be enough for such an
approach. Surely it makes sense to be
very selective when it comes to what should ride in an extremely expensive
BOXER and what can make do with something else. In fact, this is exactly what
already happens in other countries: France definitely does not have an
ambulance variant for VBCI, but rather for the less expensive GRIFFON. Italy,
similarly, has limited its FRECCIA 8x8 almost exclusively to combat, frontline
roles, using the Iveco ORSO for the supporting roles. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">BOXER and
Multi Role Vehicle – Protected should, similarly, ensure they work together to
cover all bases, so that the BOXER purchase can be laser-focused on the combat
roles, maximizing the mechanization of the army while keeping costs as low as
practicable. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">In the
previous article, already mentioned and linked, I offer a more detailed
discussion of what France and Italy are doing, so I won’t repeat the same
things here. I will note that, finally, the British Army has last year tested
the Elbit RHINO armoured shelter / container kitted out as command post. I’d
like to see a lot more effort going in this direction, rather than in hundreds
of super-expensive BOXER and ATHENA vehicles. <o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgyy85RmpXCWeXKMPzkwnOrAua6AYUVPG1vTbyq7z0F3HC9pZSRNYZ8U44u-Gbf3UIuMsIQJOtv7Mn_icgzSzTNqRbVCu9pntXqMFJNkPnuVe3I-0XIVTPaevG0s67EHzHu3iDl3iob1Oo/s939/RHINO+mobile+HQ.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="625" data-original-width="939" height="266" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgyy85RmpXCWeXKMPzkwnOrAua6AYUVPG1vTbyq7z0F3HC9pZSRNYZ8U44u-Gbf3UIuMsIQJOtv7Mn_icgzSzTNqRbVCu9pntXqMFJNkPnuVe3I-0XIVTPaevG0s67EHzHu3iDl3iob1Oo/w400-h266/RHINO+mobile+HQ.jpg" width="400" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">The Elbit RHINO is built inside a protected shelter that can be moved by trucks like a normal container. The Italian Army, as well as others including recently the US Army, has been putting quite some work into HQs-in-shelters. </td></tr></tbody></table><br /></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">What practical
problem is solved by putting the command post into a BOXER, at the end of the
day? The main enemies of the command post in a high intensity scenario are
Fires and Air attacks, and BOXER is not really going to give you a relevant
survivability boost against those. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Being able
to command and communicate on the move by ensuring the new data-radio systems
have the relevant capabilities is going to make much more of a difference than
BOXER’s armour does. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">If the Army
truly believes in innovation, it must be ready to truly revolutionize the
command post, exploiting modern comms on the move and the possibility to reach
back for support. Last year, the Royal Marines had their experimental exercise
in Cyprus and their command and control on the ground was both slimmed down and
revolutionized, and enabled by reach-back all the way not just to the ships,
but to the homeland. The 1<sup>st</sup> Sea Lord himself was able to connect
directly from his own station. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">There are
increasingly effective ways to ensure that the command function can be
disaggregated, dispersed, handled faster and on the move, and with the support
of staff physically located far enough from the battlefield to be safe.
Naturally, this opens up new vulnerabilities in broadband, communications, risk
of jamming and cyber attacks, but the Army itself is saying they prefer to
wrestle in this domain rather than in the physical one. They did so in the
moment they wrote down their guidance for the future by claiming that
disaggregate operations and indirect fires are to counter the lack of heavy
armour. That approach will inexorably mean the ability to communicate and share
data and targeting third-part weapons becomes even more crucial than it already
is. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Like
everything else in life, it’s a compromise, but perfect solutions don’t exist.
There are just good and bad compromises.<o:p></o:p></span></p>Gabrielehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/01623558391676151582noreply@blogger.com22tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-442909239199162925.post-19801369815191659442020-08-30T13:14:00.007+02:002020-08-31T16:03:02.451+02:00The huge issues in the Integrated Review <p> </p><p class="MsoNormal"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">F-35 <o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";">Will the new Review provide an actual plan for
the UK's F-35 purchase? <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";">It is very much time to decide, because UK
purchases are only planned out up to the 48<sup>th</sup> airplane.
Specifically, the UK is acquiring: <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";">3 jets in LRIP 12 (Fiscal Year 2018; delivery
this year) <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";">6 in LRIP 13 (2019; delivery 2021) <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";">8 in LRIP 14 (2020; delivery 2022) <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";">7 in LRIP 15 (2021; delivery was to be in 2023
but got slowed down. Just 2 deliveries expected in 2023 now) <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";">6 in LRIP 16 (2022; delivery was to be in 2024
but got slowed down. Just 4 now expected in 2024. A total of 7 jets will thus
now only be delivered in 2025) <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";">The delay to deliveries was reported by the
National Audit Office: basically, the MOD decided to delay delivery to spread
out the expenditure across more financial years. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";">Note that Lot 15 and 16 are expected to be part
of a 3-lots Block Buy (15, 16 and 17). The final production contract for this
Block Buy, which will be as always concluded by the US Department of Defense on
behalf also of the international partners, has not yet been concluded but will
be in the near future. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";">The UK currently has no known plan for what to
do with Lot 17: will it contain any UK aircraft? Will it be a complete gap
year? <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";">In practice, beginning in 2023, the UK F-35
purchase is all up in the air. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";">The "138" number is probably entirely
unfeasible. Many observers have been aware of this for years now, and I’ve
written and tweeted about it many times over. Lately, with reports in the
Press, it has emerged that this awareness is becoming very much “official” with
the Integrated Review discussion reportedly focusing on having 70 accepted as
the “minimum credible fleet size” to be pursued. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";">To me, and to several other observers, this is
no surprise and no shock. Arguably, it is merely a measure of realism. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";">For several years now, the number 138 has
arguably had zero actual relevance in regard to what the operational fleet can
aspire to be. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";">The infamous key phrase to hang on to the number
138 was “the aircraft will be purchased over the life of the programme”, means
the numbers would be spread over many years. Thanks to the MOD’s usual
vagueness and deliberate murkyness, nobody even knows how many years. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";">The annual Major Projects Report has the F-35
programme end date as 31 March 2035, but how this should be interpreted is open
to debate. Would 2035 see the last delivery? If so, the last order would have
to be placed 2 years earlier, in 2033. Or would 2035 see the last order placed?
<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";">According to other interpretations, “over the
life of the programme” should be read as “out to the aircraft’s Out of Service
Date”, which is tentatively scheduled for 2048 as of these days (with the
understanding that this will move to the right by potentially decades, as
always happens). <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";">Clearly it would be spectacularly dumb to be
purchasing jets just before removing the fleet from service, and there cannot
be absolute certainty that the F-35 production line would still be open at all
by then. There are fair chances that F-35s will still be in production, but
it’s just an assumption. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";">Not knowing on how many years the purchases are
going to be spread out obviously makes it impossible to gauge the relevance of
the total number. If purchases are spread out over decades, the actual
available fleet will never grow beyond a fraction of the total. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";">Purchases very late on in the life of the
programme might well be replacement airframes to make up for operational
losses, or new-build machines purchased instead of replacing early production
lot aircraft on value-for-money considerations. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";">In short: 138 was <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">never</i></b> going to be the
F-35’s in-service fleet size. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";">138 F-35 would suffice for 6 or 7 squadrons,
maybe more, but there is no manpower and no infrastructure for that to happen.
That's why the number is meaningless and has been for years. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";">We have only ever been told there would be 4
F-35 squadrons.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";">And it would be very difficult indeed to create
more. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";">The RAF currently has 7 frontline TYPHOON
Squadrons and has repeatedly made clear that they want to try and squeeze an 8<sup>th</sup>
one out, from a fleet of 140 machines (160 have been procured in total, but 1
was written off after a belly landing at China Lake in 2008; 3 were
instrumented production aircraft for development and the Tranche 1 two-seaters
have been withdrawn and dismantled for harvesting spares). <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";">If you had 4 F-35B Squadrons, the total is 11 to
12 frontline Fast Jet units. The RAF hasn’t had this many from before 2010.
And, notoriously, in 2010 the RAF shrunk down by 5,000 posts. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";">There clearly does not seem to be any manpower
margin to create more Squadrons, even if there was the money to procure the
airframes. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";"><o:p> </o:p></span></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";">The fact that 70 F-35s are being described as
the bare minimum requirement offers hope that the number of squadrons to be
formed is still 4. A fleet of 70 to 80 jets should be enough to deliver that
kind of force structure. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";"><o:p> </o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";"></span></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhjyJOlQUygikjzKfLOQuhsAokFJ2PVOZcaFioylgxti0_5Sli5EqfXEWWQlZqJqhqMaRzTGdHmN-2LhHqCBmG9ytIXKbqa9ArtbXGAgoQEkYyHSWHmmjYeoOj7zD69bhBHa4CUPGMJ6VU/s2048/EHl-Eu_XYAE6crp.jpg" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="640" data-original-width="2048" height="125" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhjyJOlQUygikjzKfLOQuhsAokFJ2PVOZcaFioylgxti0_5Sli5EqfXEWWQlZqJqhqMaRzTGdHmN-2LhHqCBmG9ytIXKbqa9ArtbXGAgoQEkYyHSWHmmjYeoOj7zD69bhBHa4CUPGMJ6VU/w400-h125/EHl-Eu_XYAE6crp.jpg" width="400" /></a></div><br /><o:p><br /></o:p><p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span style="background-color: white; color: #14171a;">But again, there are too many things we do not
know. One being the number of years in which the force will be built up. If 70
merely replaces 138 as a “through life” objective, we might well </span><b style="color: #14171a;">never</b><span style="background-color: white; color: #14171a;"> see that many in service at the
same time, and thus the number of squadrons would have to reduce.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";">If purchases are slow, the last 2 Squadrons
might form only very late on, perhaps even beyond 2030. That would be very,
very late indeed. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";">“70”, “138”, or whatever other number of
airframes is individually almost meaningless. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";">If the
Review finally gives us a realistic plan for the formation of the last 2
planned Squadrons by 2030, I invite everyone to leap with joy.</span></b><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";"> 617 Squadron is operational, 809 will only
stand up in 2023. What we need to see mapped out is the road that brings us to
a third and a fourth frontline squadron. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";">The exact number of airframes is entirely
secondary. Obviously, the more are purchased the easier it will be to form and
sustain the fleet in the long term, but adjustements can be made. Less
“attrition” aircraft purchased might be balanced by a greater investment in
spare parts. Eventual losses should be faced with an eventual, occasional
future purchase from a hot production line rather than by acquiring spare
airframes early on, which will be difficult and expensive to keep up to date as
the aircraft evolves. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";">I will be happy, quite literally, if people stop
pestering us with a meaningless 138 number without dates attached to it in
favor of an actual plan to get to 80 in 4 squadrons in an acceptable timeframe.
<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";">In fact, the UK <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">should not</b> commit to a fixed number of F-35s, and especially not
such a high number. There will be time to make future purchases from a hot
production line (for example if TEMPEST encounters delays, which is, let’s be
honest, almost certainly going to happen; it always does) without having to
unnecessarily constrain the Equipment Budget right at this time.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";">My chief worry is that cutting back on the
distant, long-term total number is in itself going to generate zero savings in
the short term, were the financial problem sits. What needs to be settled
satisfactorily is the timeframe 2023 – 2030 (2035 at the very latest). <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";">This is especially true because the closer we
get to 2030, the more F-35 will have to contend with TEMPEST for the same slice
of budget. If you want TEMPEST by 2035 it means expenditure ramps up very
quickly indeed. The UK has pinned on TEMPEST the future of its Aerospace
industry and of its international credibility as a country able to lead a
programme of this complexity. As a consequence, TEMPEST is an absolute priority
and F-35 will inexorably tend to get crushed under its growing burden. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";">The real
question is: can the UK afford another circa 40 F-35B by 2030?</span></b><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";"> It would require the purchase of 5 jets per
year beginning in 2023. This should not be unfeasible (the UK has ordered 6 or
more jets in every year from 2019 to 2022) and is less aircraft per year than
several other F-35 countries regularly order, but we know that the Combat Air
budget is not looking very roomy in the next years and the RAF will have
TYPHOON upgrades to fund; TEMPEST to develop and, hopefully, the LANCA unmanned
loyal wingman to acquire. The same, small share of money will have to be cut up
among these main programmes. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";">The situation is thorny enough that, I will repeat
it again, 70 jets should make us all rejoice, provided that they are acquired
over a reasonably short timeframe. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";">The real nightmare scenario we face is the
impossibility to even do that. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";">Late 2020s and early 2030s will see TEMPEST
expenditure ramping up more and more. As a consequence, I feel that the bulk of
F-35 procurement will be over by 2030, by lack of money if not by design. Every
effort, in my opinion, should be directed on getting those other 2 Sqns of
F-35Bs by that date. And it is not going to be easy. It is in no way a given. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";">It is to be hoped that getting to 4 F-35B
Squadrons will still happen, and that it will happen in a reasonable timeframe.
The RAF will be severely short of Stealth capability until that happens, and
the aircraft carriers will have a very hard time embarking a meaningful air
wing. It would be a very embarrassing situation, as well as a dangerous one. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";">One welcome side effect of this much needed
injection of realism is the fact that, if the RAF is at all sane, this will be
the end of the ridiculous “Split Buy” idea. The fleet needs to be made up of
one type, the B, which can work from the carriers as well as from land. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";">The F-35A is individually less expensive, yes.
Has a slightly longer unrefueled range, yes. And can carry larger weapons in
its internal bays, yes. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";">While these justifications are all true, the
numbers (money, manpower and thus number of Squadrons, number of airframes)
were <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">never</b><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>sufficient to truly justify a split buy and
were never going to be unless there was to be no TEMPEST. Splitting the fleet
would result in tiny, operationally-ineffective fleets and in near-empty
aircraft carrier decks. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";">The F-35A’s “advantages” would be totally
illusory as well: the aircraft would be cheap, but there would be new costs
associated to running two separate sub-fleets. Despite much commonality, F-35A
and F-35B are not and will never be the same thing and there would be a
constant fratricide struggle for securing a slice of the budget for covering
the respective “unique” needs. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";">Moreover, the RAF does not own or plan a single
payload which would fit the F-35A’s larger weapon bays but not the B’s ones.
The large payloads are too large for both; the others fit the B just fine. So
that is, and has always been, a moot point. Looks good on paper but never meant
a thing in the UK’s context. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";">Hopefully, with the formation of the next two
Squadrons now officially in jeopardy (unofficially, they have been uncertain
for years to all who could look at the facts with the necessary realism) and
the total number of airframes being revised downwards by 50% or even more,
everyone will realize how utterly demented the idea of a split is. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";">The last time there was a 2-Squadrons small
fleet, said fleet was offered up for the ritual slaughter because it was “too
small to be sustainable and to support any sort of enduring operation, at sea
or on land”. And honestly, it was. 2 Squadrons are too few to rotate in and out
of task in a sustainable way. 4, ideally 5, is the number you are looking for. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";">That ‘s why the reduction of the number of
squadrons in 2009 sealed the fate of that fleet, well before the 2010 SDSR even
started. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";">That fleet was the HARRIER GR9 fleet. The number
of airframes, ironically enough, was still 72 when the cut was decided. The
number of crews and frontline squadrons operational on the type determined the
cut, not the number of airframes. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";">Whoever suggested that splitting the F-35
purchase in two to create not one but 2 barely-sustainable small fleets, both
too small to meet their requirements, was being very unwise when 138 jets were
still the assumption. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";">Whoever was to still insist on a split buy now would
be, and I will unapologetically say this no matter how many might feel
offended, an idiot. There really isn’t a kind way to say it. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";">CHALLENGER 2
Life Extension Programme <o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";"><o:p> </o:p></span></b></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";"><o:p>There is now a consensus on the fact that, if CHALLENGER 2 cannot be very decisively upgraded, it might be better to just remove it from service because it is suffering severe obsolescence, including in its main armament. The problem is well known: the rifled gun is a british oddity which has the drawback of employing two-piece ammunition. This means that the armor piercing rod cannot be lenghtened, creating a more effective round and putting an hard ceiling to the tank's lethality. It also means that there is no way to adopt the extremely flexible new generation of programmable, multi-mode explosive shells which are critical to counter reinforced positions and urban obstacles. </o:p></span></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";"><o:p>I do not disagree on this assessment. The CHALLENGER has aged badly. It is also underpowered: its 1200 HP engine was arguably already inadequate when still new, especially considering that the british tank is heavier than its 1500 HP-powered counterparts. More weight and less power are a bad combination, that even the hydrogas suspensions cannot balance. </o:p></span></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";"><o:p>What is extremely irritating, if not downright dishonest on the Army's part, is to come up with this radical assessment only now. Up to literally last year, the official position was that CHALLENGER 2 had no major lethality problems and only needed a refresh to optics, communications and electronics. </o:p></span></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";"><o:p>For years i've written about the CR2 LEP and campaigned for the Gun and Powerpack to be at the very heart of the programme,. I went so far to suggest that LEP had no real sense to exist if the main issues were not to be considered. I did so before it was even confirmed that Rheinmetall was bidding a re-gunned upgrade solution, as <a href="http://ukarmedforcescommentary.blogspot.com/2016/08/british-heavy-armour-for-future.html">this 2016 article shows</a>. </o:p></span></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";"><o:p>Yet, the Army initially launched LEP as a very limited obsolescence-removal effort, and it is only thanks to Rheinmetall's courage to show up with a new turret with the smoothbore 120/55 (what the Army wanted but did not dare asking for) that we are now looking at a LEP that, if it will progress, will actually mature the CR2 into that "world beater" it was falsely described as for all these years. </o:p></span></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";"><o:p>Specifically, the latest <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/mod-government-major-projects-portfolio-data-2020">Major Project spreadsheet</a>, released in July and current to September 2019, reports on the sudden "change of heart" regarding CR2 LEP: </o:p></span></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";"><o:p><br /></o:p></span></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span style="color: #14171a;"></span></p><blockquote><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span style="color: #14171a;">The scheduled baseline project end date at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is 31/07/28, has lengthened by 791 days since last year's Q2 1819 date of 01/06/26, due primarily to the following factors;</span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span style="color: #14171a;"><br /></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span style="color: #14171a;"> - In this period the programme's scope was expanded from obsolescence only to include enhancements to its lethality and survivability. The expanded scope has also lengthened the time to complete the work and increased cost over the assessment, demonstration and manufacture phases. These dates are currently subject to negotiation and will be confirmed when the full business case has been approved. </span></p></blockquote><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span style="color: #14171a;"></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><br /></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><br /></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"></p><blockquote><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;">The baseline Whole Life Cost at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is £1,304.19 m, due primarily to the following factors;</p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><br /></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"> - This reflects the financial position following the capability uplift endorsed by HMT. This sees a capability uplift and extension to the Main Battle Tank out to 2035.</p></blockquote><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"></p><div><br /></div><div><br /></div><div><br /></div><div>Speaking to the Defence Committee, the Chief of the Defence Staff, previous Chief General Staff and mastermind of Army 2020 and Army 2020 Refine, General Sir Nick Carter, <a href="https://committees.parliament.uk/oralevidence/652/pdf/">said</a> that it has been "realized" that the CHALLENGER 2 needs the lethality upgrade to effectively face russian armor. </div><div><br /></div><div><br /></div><div><div></div><blockquote><div>I think the requirement is now pretty clear, and that is one of the reasons why Challenger 2 is taking a long time. <b>It is because there was this realisation that the programme was not ambitious enough. It needed a smoothbore gun. It needed the ability to put a missile down that barrel to overmatch Armata, as you rightly describe.</b> It needed its protection levels to be significantly enhanced. So the requirement has evolved. I think the Army now has a very clear idea of what it needs. The trick now is to find the resources to get behind what</div><div>it needs.</div></blockquote><div></div></div><div><br /></div><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";"><o:p>[Note: the mention of a "missile" can be interpreted as a new requirement for a gun-fired ATGW missile, but it seems that Carter was just being very "byzantine" in describing what is just the APFSDS round, but the longer-rod one enabled by the smoothbore cannon]</o:p></span></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";"><o:p><br /></o:p></span></b></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span style="color: #14171a;"><span style="background-color: white;">Carter's words do not reflect positively on him and on the Army as a whole. If they couldn't see the need for upgrade before 2019 they were not doing their job properly. </span></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span style="color: #14171a;"><span style="background-color: white;">The Army, of course, knew perfectly well that the gun needed to change: it</span></span><span style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";"><o:p> was, in fact, looking for solutions already in the early 2000s, when the Challenger Lethality Improvement Programme was tentatively launched. It was in 2006 that a CHALLENGER 2 was first retrofitted with a 120mm smoothbore gun, in fact. Swapping the gun was never an issue: the issue was in the complete redesign needed to fix ammunition storage spaces and make room for the much longer single-piece rounds. This is the main issue to this day: the driver behind the need for a new turret. </o:p></span></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";"><o:p>Have they forgotten everything about that phase? Was Carter being overly kind to his political masters, to the point of having the Army shouldering more blame that necessary? He was not shy earlier in the same hearing saying that it depends on money: why, then, say something as hopelessly stupid as this about CR2 lethality problems suddenly "dawning" on an oblivious Army...? </o:p></span></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><br /></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";"><o:p>The handling of the whole CHALLENGER 2 saga is horrible, and it makes me think very unpleasant things of the Army and of the current Chief Defence Staff. </o:p></span></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";"><o:p>It strikes me as a binary choice: either there is staggering incompetence at play, or there is a fundamental dishonesty. </o:p></span></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";"><o:p>The sudden "extremism" on the CHALLENGER 2 LEP issue at a time in which the risk of seeing the whole fleet axed for real is staggeringly elevate is very puzzling indeed. Up to last year they were fine with doing little more than changing radios and thermal cameras; now it's all or nothing. </o:p></span></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";"><o:p>It's a terribly risky gamble. </o:p></span></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";"><o:p>If not a deliberate ploy to direct the incoming cuts exactly in that direction. </o:p></span></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";"><o:p>It feels like the 2009 reduction to the number of HARRIER Squadrons, which effectively made cancellation of the whole fleet the following year a foregone conclusion. </o:p></span></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";"><o:p><br /></o:p></span></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";"><o:p>Maybe i'm being overly harsh. Maybe my suspicions are unfunded. But it very much s</o:p></span></span><span style="background-color: white; color: #14171a;">mells to me like an underhanded move on the part of what i suspect is a "wheeled faction" which seems to have gained the upper hand within the Army since 2015. </span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span style="background-color: white; color: #14171a;">I've long suspected the existence of a fundamental disagreement at the heart of Army planning between Tracks proponents and Wheels supporters. The dramatic change of priorities in 2015, just after the massive AJAX contract was signed, will always have me wondering. </span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";"><o:p><br /></o:p></span></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";"><o:p>It is safe to say that, whatever the final outcome, as far as i'm concerned, the sooner General Carter's era ends, the better i'll feel. The original Army 2020 plan was a mess that had to be fixed with a long list of U-turns in the following years, and Army 2020 Refine now risks to destroy what's left of the British Army. It could hardly have gone any worse than it has. </o:p></span></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><br /></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";">The prospect of the Army losing its MBTs and
IFVs is one that is very hard to stomach. The destructive effect of such a
decision would ripple farther across the force structure than most realize. It
would be a life-changing injury for the Army. In the graphic below, I tried to
evidence some of the less immediately-evident ramifications of such a scenario.
<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";"><o:p> </o:p></span></p><table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEi1DfVXAcZDE6Fhp4zNlG5KXH-KvKsduy_LbadDCAHmO8aslbHO9mjNv3_ZMgxA6UWPxGpchmYc4XGQkWCZ0QasTGZGyTrPQ-_QIlt9TX-j1wXeG2fcsYuNckXPD1LDklPzhxW-vStD4OQ/s2509/Scrapping+tanks.JPG" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img alt="This graphic shows some (not all) of the true implications of doing away with the tank." border="0" data-original-height="1254" data-original-width="2509" height="200" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEi1DfVXAcZDE6Fhp4zNlG5KXH-KvKsduy_LbadDCAHmO8aslbHO9mjNv3_ZMgxA6UWPxGpchmYc4XGQkWCZ0QasTGZGyTrPQ-_QIlt9TX-j1wXeG2fcsYuNckXPD1LDklPzhxW-vStD4OQ/w400-h200/Scrapping+tanks.JPG" width="400" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">This graphic shows some (not all) of the implications of doing away with the tank. </td></tr></tbody></table><p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";">What is most infuriating about the tracked heavy
armour situation is that the Army has laid its head into the guillotine all by
itself. As we wait to see if the blade descends or not, we might contemplate the
fact that in late 2019 the MOD signed into a 2.8 billion pounds contract for
523 BOXERs, as part of a Mechanized Infantry Vehicle contract which has an
overall budget for procurement and first few operational years that is given as
4.6 billions in the latest Major Projects spreadsheet. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";">It is a fact that the Army put itself into this
thorny corner by making BOXER its absolute number 1 priority, despite knowing
that these 523 vehicles are a mere start, insufficient in numbers and variants
to cover the need of the 2 STRIKE brigades. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";">In an alternate universe, the British Army has
not strayed away from the 3 armoured <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>brigades
of Army2020; has not yet bought a Mechanized Infantry Vehicle (MIV) and is
making do with MASTIFF in its place but has but those billions into continuing
the job it had started on Armour, getting CHALLENGER 2 LEP and WARRIOR CSP under
contract and is, as a result, riding out the Integrated Review with a lighter
heart. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";">This is a fact, and no hindsight is required.
I’ve been shouting warnings for 5 years about the STRIKE adventure, as you will
know if you have been following me for a while. I’ve collected hate from
multiple corners, but I’m sadly, once again, proven right. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";">Believe me, I would very much like to be proven
wrong in these cases, but it does not happen. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";">In pursuit of a concept that remains
uncomfortably vague, the Army has put its core capabilities into a guillotine. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";">The MBT – IFV combo is the heart of any modern
army. As the graphic hopefully helps understand, the ramifications extend
across multiple formations and roles. All of that would have to be re-imagined
and re-built around new concepts and new vehicles. This would be very
expensive… and thus would likely not happen. Not anywhere near the scale that
would be required. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";">Doing away with MBTs would require a very honest
and very significant downgrade to national ambitions; a complete re-write of
how the Army fights and against what kind of enemy it can go; and the
rebuilding of the force structure around new and different vehicles and sources
of firepower. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";">The problem is the UK would probably do none of
the 3. Multiple governments have shown not to possess the necessary coherence
and honesty to admit that having less capability only ever means doing less,
not more. And the expenditure required to rebuild the army would be monstrous.
If the tanks are cut for lack of money, you cannot possibly expect big amounts
of money to be available right away, if ever, to launch a complete
reconstruction of the force. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";">The Army would be left with BOXERs for some 4
infantry battalions, and plans for 4 regiments on AJAX. And that would be it.
Half of 3<sup>rd</sup> Division would virtually cease to exist in one go, and
since 1<sup>st</sup> Division is mostly only an empty shell containing multiple
Light Role infantry battalions, there would be very, very little left to work
with. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";">This is not the time to lose the MBT. Such a
decision would also shut Britain pretty much out of any attempt to secure an
industrial role in future MBT programmes. One popular option that gets
mentioned a lot is “joining the franco-german Maing Ground Combat System”.
There are multiple issues with this: France and Germany are not really looking
for partners to treat with any equality. Industrial opportunities for other
countries will be extremely limited. The UK would be welcomed as customer, not
as partner. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";">And even if this was to change, the UK will have
very little chance to secure any important industrial role simply because the
relevant capabilities in this sector will have gone. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";">Rheinmetall BAE Land Systems is offering an
incredibly fascinating option for a deep modernization of CHALLENGER 2: a whole
new turret. This solves the ammunition problem of the CR2, which is the only
NATO tank that uses 2-piece ammunition, which prevents the armor-piercing rod
to be lengthened, thus hard-capping lethality. The CR2 ammunition is
increasingly obsolete and is an oddity that offers zero commonality to NATO
stocks and developments. No path to greater armor-piercing capability
(important in the light of new Russian developments) and no chance to adopt
modern programmable explosive rounds either. The new turret has been tested on
a CHALLENGER 2 hull armed with the NATO standard 120 mm smoothbore and the very
latest ammunition. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";">The new turret also comes fully digitalized and
with modern systems, including new optics shared with AJAX, offering logistical
commonality. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";"><o:p> </o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";"></span></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjSXtVla4HrDmrxmGvsDrKJonuNGAlNsNCAc2Zt4lOxS2JvVOEclvLAn0aE2mM7kO5Q65weTk5QZUNQRaW71DeERFfx-5D2CinhZ8Afm-6KhUE37c3WKtLQspHQiIGZI66EN9ppLmEyDt4/s1080/zh4lso6bhyo31.jpg" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="959" data-original-width="1080" height="355" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjSXtVla4HrDmrxmGvsDrKJonuNGAlNsNCAc2Zt4lOxS2JvVOEclvLAn0aE2mM7kO5Q65weTk5QZUNQRaW71DeERFfx-5D2CinhZ8Afm-6KhUE37c3WKtLQspHQiIGZI66EN9ppLmEyDt4/w400-h355/zh4lso6bhyo31.jpg" width="400" /></a></div><br /><table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjE4qH4cLX5sWAhqaTX7GwXqfDRTckleLAFUafnIkIWhQdivBSirHcJYpdjOM0P_QxzA_lNs0XoqUJa7TXqzGsRd5MeH4WxhykeBqc2W9AetQgCvVdY1MmYr1iW0I8M5wZDQiwsFFZNhOE/s1024/IMG_20190123_083947.jpg" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="683" data-original-width="1024" height="267" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjE4qH4cLX5sWAhqaTX7GwXqfDRTckleLAFUafnIkIWhQdivBSirHcJYpdjOM0P_QxzA_lNs0XoqUJa7TXqzGsRd5MeH4WxhykeBqc2W9AetQgCvVdY1MmYr1iW0I8M5wZDQiwsFFZNhOE/w400-h267/IMG_20190123_083947.jpg" width="400" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">The first LEP demonstrator by Rheinmetall (now RBLS) focused on a "conservative" approach by going with the standard 120/55 smoothbore. </td></tr></tbody></table><o:p><br /><br /></o:p><p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";"></span></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEidQQVi1FqaQ1RprrGBYLx5kmFyIs5tbGHHkRl3xl2IYMTmIGdfK8qf8T5N9VEHCy6PEPZi-DXh_hEQExphjG6O2WBeEB7xNiLEjE4mz3v1WH7jWfK0NNCMklKvoQljvCZOqkf5NunYN9Y/s914/IMG_20200731_114255.jpg" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="750" data-original-width="914" height="328" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEidQQVi1FqaQ1RprrGBYLx5kmFyIs5tbGHHkRl3xl2IYMTmIGdfK8qf8T5N9VEHCy6PEPZi-DXh_hEQExphjG6O2WBeEB7xNiLEjE4mz3v1WH7jWfK0NNCMklKvoQljvCZOqkf5NunYN9Y/w400-h328/IMG_20200731_114255.jpg" width="400" /></a></div><br /><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjohD8flbURyOWkuurWQiYCI2o9anJUJ5tL4w4xGeInSsajOtRrPz5nz6oU9z7aMI5u90ixzvdkC-8MX_T-2fv8nUk0lmGjocI7fFcapxbyXI8-d4uAkuNlcwqVDid5sDvzPJrXEscEsGY/s1190/IMG_20200731_114258.jpg" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="620" data-original-width="1190" height="208" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjohD8flbURyOWkuurWQiYCI2o9anJUJ5tL4w4xGeInSsajOtRrPz5nz6oU9z7aMI5u90ixzvdkC-8MX_T-2fv8nUk0lmGjocI7fFcapxbyXI8-d4uAkuNlcwqVDid5sDvzPJrXEscEsGY/w400-h208/IMG_20200731_114258.jpg" width="400" /></a></div><br /><table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjLDBYP6DTK9Eq7IkCjOpQi2Rs1tnYtc7MEEkL63TiuqtehWWnFgZMCgo5tTcRNlq3-o6-u_770F6U3vfuZ6Dn_K1RKGiP9Dap1Lg3p1MOxzXgCdCF1XW-iWpRc5EaJwPt3U4gRqnOkYeU/s640/IMG_20200731_145344.jpg" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="427" data-original-width="640" height="267" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjLDBYP6DTK9Eq7IkCjOpQi2Rs1tnYtc7MEEkL63TiuqtehWWnFgZMCgo5tTcRNlq3-o6-u_770F6U3vfuZ6Dn_K1RKGiP9Dap1Lg3p1MOxzXgCdCF1XW-iWpRc5EaJwPt3U4gRqnOkYeU/w400-h267/IMG_20200731_145344.jpg" width="400" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">The second demonstrator, publicly unveiled only last July, is more radically new as it comes with the 130/51 smoothbore. The turret is the same, but fitted with extra armour on the front and sides, possibly also as a form of counterweight for the cannon. Rheinmetall is betting big on this turret and this cannon; for them the CHALLENGER 2 LEP is an exciting opportunity, but the turret is very clearly aimed at future developments (MGCS) and at the LEOPARD 2 upgrade market. The first CHALLENGER 2 demonstrator was showcased at the NEDS show in the Netherlands in 2019, along with the 130 mm shell. It was a hint of what was coming, and a clear sign of the turret being meant for far more than just CHALLENGER. In the Netherlands, nobody cares about CHALLENGER. LEOPARD 2, on the other hand...<br /></td></tr></tbody></table><br /><o:p><br /></o:p><p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";">But more than that, the new turret is a product
that Rheinmetall is using to develop next-generation solutions that could find
a vast market in the future as LEOPARD 2 customers around the world take an
interest. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";">In July it was revealed that the new turret,
mounted on a CHALLENGER 2 hull (presumably the 2<sup>nd</sup> of the tanks
given originally to Rheinmetall to become demonstrators for LEP proposals) has
been trialed with the new 130/51 gun, which offers an estimated 50% lethality
boost. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";">This new cannon is not yet a given for the
franco-german MGCS, but is expected to eventually be officially picked, and it
is assumed it will become a NATO standard in time as a consequence. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";">Clearly there is a risk that, in the end, the
new gun won’t be so widely adopted. Or perhaps it will only be adopted over
many years. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";">Then again, every risk comes with an
opportunity. There is a more than real possibility that this new gun will only
grow in relevance in the future, and that it might pick up big export orders. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";">If the UK became the launch customer and got
RBLS to launch production of the turret, gun and ammunition in the country, the
heavy armour industrial capability of the country would go from moribund back
to very healthy. It would be much easier to secure a role into a future tank
programme too. Perhaps even have a leadership position into an alternative
programme to the franco-german one, with countries like Italy and Poland not at
all thrilled by the virtually inexistent role for their industries if they were
to buy into the MGCS. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";">Rheinmetall is likely to be sympathetic with a
UK base for the new turret and gun because London is less likely to impose bans
that prevent the company from bagging massive and lucrative middle east
contracts. The german parliament has killed off several opportunities that
Rheinmentall would have loved to pursue. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";">There is a huge opportunity within reach. In
order to make CHALLENGER 2 fit for the next 2 decades, the new turret is a
must. And whether it is armed with the 120 mm or the new 130 mm, new ammunition
will have to be part of the expenditure. Arguably, this is exactly the time to
be bold and adopt the new gun. <o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";"><br /></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span style="background-color: white; color: #14171a;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";">MIV and
WARRIOR <o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";"><o:p> </o:p></span></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";">MIV is a huge part of why the Army’s budget is
in trouble, but BOXER is a good vehicle, and there are understandable reasons
for wanting wheeled armour. Ideally, there should be both fully tracked and
fully wheeled brigades, but the British Army does not have the resources to
make it happen anytime soon, and so a different approach is required. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";">As I’ve written multiple times, I think the best
compromise that can be pursued from where the Army currently stands is the
French one. This means giving up tracked IFVs in favor of wheeled ones. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";">WARRIOR CSP is not yet under production
contract, and since the base hull, even after the upgrade, shows all the
limitations of age and of a powerpack that is not being replaced with a more
modern and powerful one, it might be wiser to just abandon the project and the
whole fleet. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";">The money (more than 800 million are earmarked
for the WCSP production), the 40mm gun and the turrets should instead be put
into BOXER. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";">Integration of the turret into a BOXER module
should not be overly complex. Lockheed Martin fit one onto a BOXER and carried
out some early trials, including weapon firings, as far back as 2015. While
these industry-led demonstrations involve integrations that are far less mature
than one might think, there should be no reason for the turret not fitting on a
troop-carrying module. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";">The turreted BOXERs would then be mixed with the
APCs already on order with the aim of eventually forming 8 battalions: 2 for each
Armoured and Medium brigade. There are many reasons for me to formulate this
recommendation, but they all more or less stem from the following main
considerations: the Warrior hull is old and tired and the CSP does not quite
solve that, nor does replace the old powerpack; an all MIV fleet helps
standardization; having the infantry on wheels helps the Army be more
self-deployable and means the precious few Heavy and Light Equipment Transports
(89 and 77 respectively) are free to focus on moving the MBTs and other tracked
platforms, such as AJAX and TERRIER; having at least a portion of the BOXERs
well armed with a 40mm gun means that, apart from being able to get to the
fight, they will also be able to fight. The current MIV, armed like a
SAXON, can get there but can’t get into a fight, only drop its infantry a safe
distance back. <o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";"><br /></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjoFiLpgiWn_h8kFefa4jpZcC4fJeQAcwFTAfO1qXYgZ3fa_TZQUog6PCDdc8xF2vyIs4b1vuhH-lIMQiQEXyR3JpYrEGIHLczqUEsYg_ryamVQpxGlF3fT12sD3IBEnr_RfjNfORyJ8CE/s1079/Egkn5HhX0AAOY9j.jpg" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="814" data-original-width="1079" height="302" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjoFiLpgiWn_h8kFefa4jpZcC4fJeQAcwFTAfO1qXYgZ3fa_TZQUog6PCDdc8xF2vyIs4b1vuhH-lIMQiQEXyR3JpYrEGIHLczqUEsYg_ryamVQpxGlF3fT12sD3IBEnr_RfjNfORyJ8CE/w400-h302/Egkn5HhX0AAOY9j.jpg" width="400" /></a></div><br /><table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEi017jd958LW8GYAEcu6ZpDPZfWPyDVZLZEbifeQqhM3jSJPJNA_9I6tkYRUa5_ijuuEqKiHJkaSRe5tOe8VbocBUCosBIQELurmd0b_eCjCiW_Omo81XM8OO4yIcEiuhj1VKeTACBaTbI/s1080/EgkoIc7WsAAM4ak.jpg" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="829" data-original-width="1080" height="307" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEi017jd958LW8GYAEcu6ZpDPZfWPyDVZLZEbifeQqhM3jSJPJNA_9I6tkYRUa5_ijuuEqKiHJkaSRe5tOe8VbocBUCosBIQELurmd0b_eCjCiW_Omo81XM8OO4yIcEiuhj1VKeTACBaTbI/w400-h307/EgkoIc7WsAAM4ak.jpg" width="400" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">With thanks to Jon Hawkes (@JonHawkes275) who dug up these old slides and posted them on his Twitter. He is a must-follow in the field of Armour. </td></tr></tbody></table><br /><p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";">Finally, plans for a new tracked support vehicle
to replace FV432 seem to have died entirely, and it would border on ridiculous
to field a 28 tons tracked Warrior supported by wheeled 8x8s weighting close to
40. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";">Boxer is a modern and well protected hull, and
if the Army cannot afford a proper split of tracks and wheels, on balance of
merits and defects, wheels should probably take precedence. This is what France
has done with the VBCI replacing the last tracked IFVs of the Armee de
Terre. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";">It is a compromise, since there a tracked IFV
will always have a greater ability to run down obstacles and dug-in positions
and will always have greater all-terrain mobility than a wheeled platform, but I
feel it would be a good compromise all the same. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";">Again, a priority for me would also be to
re-evaluate the variants of MIV to be procured, reducing to the bare minimum
the number of ambulances and command posts in favor of pursuing instead a 120mm
mortar and an ATGW variants as well as, potentially, more APCs / IFVs to
increase, if at all possible, the number of mechanized battalions in the Army.
With over 500 vehicles already on order, it should be feasible. I’ve written
about this in greater detail in a </span><span style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";"><a href="http://ukarmedforcescommentary.blogspot.com/2019/12/of-compromises-and-priorities.html"><span lang="" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">previous article</span></a></span><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";">. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";">The Ambulance role and, wherever possible, the
C2 role would be instead “offloaded” onto much cheaper Multi Role Vehicle
Protected variants. Regarding MRV-P, I’d personally urge the Army to finally
proceed with the programme with the aim of rationalizing the current dog’s
breakfast of multiple “mini” fleets, getting rid progressively of Husky,
Panther, DURO, Pinzgauer and part of the Land Rovers.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";">My favorite for Group 2 would be the Thales
Bushmaster, to be assembled in their Glasgow plant as promised by the company
and by the Australian government.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";">I do realize, however, that a quiet, unspoken
further delay to the whole of MRV-P is likely, as it defers expenditure into a
vague, undetermined future. <o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";"><br /></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";"><br /></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";">Further pre-Integrated Review reading material: </span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";"><br /></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";">- <a href="http://ukarmedforcescommentary.blogspot.com/2020/07/the-sad-farcical-pre-integrated-review.html">Amphibious without ships</a> - There is no amphibious capability without adequate ships and ship to shore connectors. A look at the USMC reforms and the question mark over the Future Commando Force</span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";"><br /></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";">- <a href="http://ukarmedforcescommentary.blogspot.com/2020/05/a-different-angle-to-difficult-choices.html">A different angle to "difficult choices"</a> - If the UK really doesn't want to spend money to maintain its capabilities, it needs to at least be wise on what it invests on. Building on strengths is more cost-effective than trying to reinforce weakness. </span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";"><br /></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";">- <a href="http://ukarmedforcescommentary.blogspot.com/2020/05/the-many-weaknesses-of-strike.html">The many weaknesses of STRIKE</a> - 5 years on, there is still not a consensun on what STRIKE is actually good for. And it is becoming painfully clear just how much it might cost the Army to pursue this plan. </span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";"><br /></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="" style="background: white; color: #14171a; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Segoe UI";">- <a href="http://ukarmedforcescommentary.blogspot.com/2019/12/towards-sdsr-2020.html">Towards the SDSR 2020</a> - This was written in December 2019, before the COVID spending generated the current psychosis around public expenditure. While we wait to understand if HMG chooses to obsess about Debt reduction and launches a new Austerity drive (hopefully not), the overview of the main issues remains valid. </span></p>Gabrielehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/01623558391676151582noreply@blogger.com19tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-442909239199162925.post-62147154812284272612020-07-05T12:28:00.001+02:002020-07-05T12:28:35.890+02:00The sad farcical pre-Integrated Review: amphibious without ships<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
One area of massive concern ahead
of the Integrated Review is the UK’s amphibious capability. Despite the
attempts to put up smiles and talk of “exciting” times ahead for the “Future
Commando Force”, it is impossible not to notice the horrendous persistence of a
question mark on the fate of the amphibious ships that give the Royal Marines
their meaning. Worse still, there are some very, very goofy attempts constantly
going on at laying justifications for the loss of amphibious ships, mainly the LPDs
of the ALBION class, using wildly inaccurate comparisons with the “USMC giving
up its MBTs” or even statements as absurd as “the days of storming a beach are
over".</div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
Let me be absolutely clear from
the very beginning: “the days of storming a beach are over" is another one
of those typical british nonsensical claims generated purely by fear that
budget cuts in an incoming SDSR are going to strip the capability to do so
away. It is simply not in any way true and it is ludicrous to see people
arguing otherwise.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
It shouldn’t be necessary to say
this, but sadly it appears many need to hear it: </div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
Nobody “storms the beach” because
it is a pleasant or easy thing to do. It is done because it is sometimes
beneficial and sometimes simply non discretionary to cross a significant body
of water to access strategically relevant territory. </div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
Amphibious maneuver might simply
be indispensable to dislodge an enemy from a position; in order to access a
theatre of operations; in order to force the enemy to spread out its forces along
its coast, weakening its defences in other areas as a result; or even to turn
the flank of an enemy front too solid to be dealt purely with through “frontal”
assault on land. </div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
Seas, islands and shores are not
going anywhere and so isn’t the need to be able to move significant force over
water, onto the shore and beyond. There will be occasions in which littoral
maneuver is simply non discretionary because geography, both physical and
political, dictates it. </div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
And why beaches? Simple: because
the enemy is not stupid enough to directly give up a port. If getting directly
into a port is an option, obviously everyone is very happy to go for the port
as unloading ships in port is countless times faster and safer and easier. But
the enemy will make sure the ports are well guarded and / or timely sabotaged.
Having the ability to land substantial force over an undeveloped beach and
maneuver from there enormously complicates the enemy’s defensive needs and
plans. </div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
There are legitimate concerns
about the ability to assault “defended beaches”, but first of all we should
better define what a "defended beach" is. Many seem to automatically
revert to images out of Omaha beach and imagine infantry charging in shallow
waters at Atlantic Wall bunkers. </div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
But nobody today would be able to
defend in that way. Not even China has enough army to do that, and if you
forced them to do it, it would be a victory in itself with how many troops and
resources it ties down along countless kilometers of shore. Not to mention that
precision weaponry of today means that the fortifications of a new Atlantic
Wall would quickly turn into large graves. </div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
A defended beach today is more
likely to be a stretch of coast which can only be approached from directions
which are covered by reconnaissance assets, perhaps with ground-launched
anti-ship missiles in range and with the threat of enemy air assets as well as
ground-based air defence such as long range Surface to Air Missiles. Enemy
ground forces over and in the immediate vicinity of the beach are unlikely to
be substantial, but mechanized units will be ready to move along the coast to
timely meet an invasion force. For example, Italy during the Cold War developed
the 8x8 tank-destroyer CENTAURO specifically to create wheeled, medium-weight
formations which could race along the coastal roads to contain a soviet
amphibious force landing (presumably) on the Adriatic coast. Now the TYPE 16
tank-destroyer being fielded by Japan is a continuation of that general idea. </div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
These overlapping layers of
defence are commonly identified as Anti Access; Area Denial (A2AD) “bubbles”,
although this arguably tries to attribute to these threats a degree of novelty
which they do not really have. A major feature of war has always been the need
to prevent the enemy from accessing / taking over an area. What was a fort, a
coastal battery, is not A2AD of its time? </div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
What is “new” to A2AD is that,
potentially, offensive weapons are currently seen as having better chances than
the defences. In the endless struggle between “sword” and “shield”, we
currently feel that the “sword” has the advantage. In other words, in the West,
we no longer trust our warships to be able to cope with enemy missile and air
attacks. We fear that modern technology has made it so much easier to detect,
track and attack ships out at sea that getting past the “coastal batteries”
might no longer be possible. </div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
As I’ve written already while
talking of the other commonly heard trope that “aircraft carriers are
obsolete”, it is not the carrier that has grown more vulnerable than it was in
the past, but it is our escort ships and embarked air wing that we no longer
trust. If we feel we can’t operate the carrier / amphibious ships safely, the actual
implication is that we do not expect the escort ships and embarked fighter jets
to be able to defend them. </div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
The answer to this fear cannot be
“let’s do without carriers and amphibs”, because that would weaken the fleet
even further (no air wing to fight the air battle with) and remove much of the purpose
of the whole fleet. If the carrier cannot be defended, what can we defend? If
warships cannot defend each other in a group, they won’t be able to prevent the
enemy from cutting off the sea lanes either. </div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
Basically it would mean we have lost
not just control of the sea, but the ability to make any use of it, tactically
and strategically. If we believe this, very urgent action is required to
improve the “shield”. </div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
But in truth, much of the
argument against carriers and amphibs is born more out of interservice rivalry
over insufficient budgets than by actual strategic and tactical thinking. If
the latter was driving the policy, we would be talking of how to improve escort
ships and their missiles as well as the capabilities of the embarked air wing.
To be fair, it must be noted that some in the US are actually calling for an
Air Wing rethink, but unfortunately they are an exception in a discourse which
is otherwise a completely partisan battle for the budget, not for the sea. </div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<b>But the USMC… </b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<b><br /></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
In this sad debate, largely devoid
of actual technical content, many will happily mention the USMC reforms and
their offer of their MBTs in sacrifice to free up funds for other capabilities
as a sign that “storming the beach” is a thing of the past.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
Some claim that the future is
“raiding” to be conducted with small boats, stealthy infiltrations of small
groups of Marines and helicopters for the rest, with little to no space for
surface maneuver. They want this to be the future of the Royal Marines and they
even claim this is what the USMC is doing.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
Thing is, the USMC is definitely
not giving up on surface maneuver. The moment an amphibious force does that, it
ceases to exist, or at least it ceases to matter. </div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
Using raids, stealthy infiltration
of small and agile combat elements and carrying out “Commando” work, sabotage,
reconnaissance and target acquisition in favor of the fleet is of course
important and it is right to pour more effort into improving tactics and
equipment for achieving greater effect. It is also rational to reduce the
vulnerability of the force by coming in smaller groups from multiple directions
at once: dispersion is an effective way to reduce vulnerability to the mass of
long range fires some enemies are able to deploy. </div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
Ultimately, however, raids and
long range insertions of small bodies of troops to push the enemy back from the
shore are pre-landing force work. The multiple pinpricks they directly deliver,
and the much greater damage they can cause by calling upon and coordinating
Joint Fires are meant to weaken the enemy defences and ideally drive them back
from the shore to allow the fleet more freedom of movement, eventually all the
way up to the landing of a mechanized force. All these activities (call them
Commando work, if you must) are not new, and while we might evolve them and
make them deadlier, they cannot, in isolation, in any way be the future of amphibious
capability. </div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
If you can raid but not land, you
are essentially arguing to become a master of foreplay but with no actual
capability to continue with the main act. </div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
The USMC is definitely not giving
up on its ability to go ashore with a significant force. It is not giving up on
beaches and it is not aiming for “helicopters and boats”. If you actually read
the papers about the USMC restructuring you will see that they actually intend
to sacrifice several helicopter and even some tilt-rotor squadrons in order to
free up funds. Specifically, Heavy Lift helicopter squadrons are due to drop
from 8 to 5; attack helicopter squadrons from 7 to 5 or less; Tilt Rotor
squadrons from 17 to 14.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
Some of the funds will go towards
one of the greatest priorities so far identified, which is the purchase of 30
more amphibious ships. Much smaller, simpler and “attritable” than current
large amphibs, but, interestingly, actually able to beach themselves like the
LSTs of old, and thus able to disgorge a significant load of vehicles or
stores, all the way up to MBT size. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
Why would they want that? </div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
Because their new concept of
operation definitely still requires the landing over the beach of significant
amounts of heavy equipment. While they recognize they must put the enemy in
front of a much greater number of individually less attractive targets (30
ships means almost doubling the current amphibious fleet) to begin to change
the dynamics, they know they can’t do that by turning amphibious capability
into 8 or 12 Marines in an Offshore Raiding Craft with little or nothing behind
them.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEghQK7M_vyLA7tdky6GFNqcT2TmzVeAkcLcUjMzwp8ml_RzepRgHg8awWLAf05gl2UBSI0SFuGQu1uEqvBycNINOLQp6U6ECGRQfJau6J2iz5DLH4oSMSbwTzBluPtdNbtZ3yCwp1r7kBM/s1600/https___api.thedrive.com_wp-content_uploads_2020_05_sts-stern-landing-top.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="810" data-original-width="1440" height="225" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEghQK7M_vyLA7tdky6GFNqcT2TmzVeAkcLcUjMzwp8ml_RzepRgHg8awWLAf05gl2UBSI0SFuGQu1uEqvBycNINOLQp6U6ECGRQfJau6J2iz5DLH4oSMSbwTzBluPtdNbtZ3yCwp1r7kBM/s400/https___api.thedrive.com_wp-content_uploads_2020_05_sts-stern-landing-top.jpg" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">While the exact shape of the new amphibious ships for the USMC's future concepts has yet to be decided, the concepts make clear that landing heavy stuff on a beach is far from a dead requirement. </td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
The USMC wants to create multiple
dispersed forward operating bases ashore, some of which equipped as forward
arming and refueling points for aircraft up to F-35B or even F-35C (the latter
is more complex, for obvious reasons, but the USMC has the capability to lay
longer AM-2 strips and install deployable arresting wire sets). The Forward
Bases will effectively become their own A2AD bubbles, armed with long range
rockets and missiles, including anti-ship weapons. Indeed, the USMC plans to
greatly reduce its holding of howitzers (from 21 to 5 batteries) but to treble
the number of HIMARS rocket launchers and missile batteries equipped with even
smaller launchers (from 7 to 21). Notably, the USMC is investing in an unmanned
vehicle, the ROGUE, which is a JLTV without crew and topped by a launcher for
GMLRS rockets or other munitions, including the Naval Strike Missile anti-ship
weapon. The ROGUE is smaller and more easily deployable than even HIMARS and,
obviously, is more remorselessly sacrificed. The USMC has also requested in the
2021 budget a first purchase of 48 TOMAHAWK missiles for launch from the
ground, with the expectation that they will go for the new TLAM MK 5A Maritime
Strike variant, aka the one fitted with an active seeker for use against
warships at sea as well as moving targets on land. While it might be feasible
to move ROGUE by helicopter (the USMC will have the massive CH-53K King
Stallion heavy lift machines, after all), it is clear that in order to actually
beef up and sustain the forward bases there will be an enduring need for
surface manoeuvre. Only landing craft, or the new beaching amphibious vessel,
will be able to deliver the quantity of stores, ammunition and combat vehicles
required. </div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhGGm0Uc69Wua4S9o3EYf_ULecAVIcbN1V-mRQEnSyxk9j5GZGGrRQi6lVSTQmU7jXbr_zPPsUH-ssbics5Co5yvO0m1Kswb-jMhAcC1tepu14-QA-8c_aRDidJAtfWZwV7qCiCaMLdmAw/s1600/EI5f7K5WsAYfiRT.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="351" data-original-width="600" height="233" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhGGm0Uc69Wua4S9o3EYf_ULecAVIcbN1V-mRQEnSyxk9j5GZGGrRQi6lVSTQmU7jXbr_zPPsUH-ssbics5Co5yvO0m1Kswb-jMhAcC1tepu14-QA-8c_aRDidJAtfWZwV7qCiCaMLdmAw/s400/EI5f7K5WsAYfiRT.jpg" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">Test firings of a NSM anti-ship missile from a ROGUE prototype are expected soon. This new launcher has the firepower of a HIMARS in a smaller, attritable package. </td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
The new USMC Marine Littoral
Regiment is still experimenting to find its final shape, but it is centered on
a slightly smaller but “more powerful” infantry battalion mixed with long-range
Fires, including anti-ship missiles. The Regiment obviously has its own
dedicated logistic battalion. And, very significantly, there is a Littoral
Anti-Air Battalion, which will be absolutely central to the success of the
plan. Let the full implication sink in: a battalion of infantry, a battalion of
air defence assets. That’s one special ratio of infantry to air defences.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
For now there has been very
little discussion about what exactly a Littoral Anti-Air Battalion will end up
looking like, but personally I expect the USMC will move to field ground based
anti-air capabilities with ranges and lethality going far beyond the remit of
the current Low-Altitude Air Defense (LAAD) Battalions. Investment currently is
focused on providing a modernized SHORAD and Counter-UAV capability with
weapons and sensors on JLTV vehicle bases, but it is reasonable to expect that
much longer ranged SAMs will follow. It is only logical: the USMC “A2AD”
bubbles will need to not only threaten ships but to help the fleet at sea in
the fight against enemy long range missile and air attacks. The USMC is already
working to ensure its ground-based radars can seamlessly share tracking and
targeting data with the Navy’s and with the Army’s own air defence networks,
but they will need to be able to put ashore their own long range SAMs, so I
fully expect substantial investment in this direction. </div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
The USMC forward bases, some of
which will be decoys and some of which will be used rotationally, with frequent
moves from one to another, are clearly meant to be “sponges” for enemy long
range fires. Imagine forward airfields that can enhance the striking range of
F-35Bs as well as fire Naval Strike Missiles, TOMAHAWK and other long range
guided weapons: they constitute a threat that no enemy can ignore. Dispersion,
movement in and out of bases and use of small and expendable weapon systems
such as ROGUE, with a great number of small, cheap vessels shuttling the force
around mean that suddenly, the target is much harder to eradicate and it starts
absorbing more and more long range fires and more missiles. Especially so if it
comes with its own anti-missile defences and can shoot down some of the
incoming weapons, as well as “taking the others on the chin” without becoming
combat-ineffective. </div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
Imagine a few of these deployable
A2AD bubbles forming a loose chain around a stretch of shore. Suddenly, the
defender is the one struggling to get troops into the area to hold it against a
force coming ashore. </div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
You can see how the new USMC
approach starts to change the picture.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
The USMC having no MBTs of its
own is more detail than substance when you realize that they will have the same,
or indeed a much greater ability to put MBTs ashore if they so need. The USMC
commander, General David Berger, has been very clear about what his thinking
actually is: “We need an Army with lots of tanks. We don't need a
Marine Corps with tanks.” </div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
That phrase, alone, is enough to
shoot down any wildly inaccurate claim that the USMC thinks the tank is
obsolete, or that “storming the beach” is no longer a thing. It makes sense for
the USMC to accept some sacrifices and a greater dependence on the Army’s own
formations, if it can lead to a better overall result by enabling investment
elsewhere. Not to mention that this is the United States of America that we are
talking about: Congress might still decide to provide additional money and
prevent some of the proposed cuts from even happening. </div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
Even if all cuts do take place, please
note that the USMC will no longer have tanks but it will have a very
significant number of 8x8 vehicles, both for reconnaissance and screening (a
LAV-25 replacement is in prototype phase) and for the infantry fighting. </div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
The new Amphibious Combat Vehicle
(ACV) destined to replace the AAV-7 will have far better on-land combat value
than its predecessor, and the USMC is acquiring not just the APC variant but an
IFV / Combat variant with turret and 30 mm cannon. This is an enormous
capability uplift from the .50 HMG plus 40 mm Grenade Launcher in the tiny
turret of the gigantic and vulnerable AAV-7. </div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
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<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
While it is notionally planned
that the number of Amphibious Assault Companies will drop from 6 to 4, this
still means the USMC will have the ability to move 4 full battalions of
infantry on 8x8s (note: each Amphibian Company of AAV-7s, and in the future of ACVs, is able to lift a whole battalion of Marines. The Amphibian companies are grouped in 2 battalions), maybe more considering that the individual battalion strength
is expected to go down around 200 elements from the current 850. Overall, the
number of infantry battalions itself is expected to go down from 24 to 21, so the reduction in vehicles is proportional to the overall force restructuring. </div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
The Reconnaissance Companies
(currently mounted on the lightweight LAV-25 8x8) are at the moment penciled
for an increase from 9 to 12, meaning that significant “cavalry” support will
also be available. </div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
In short: the USMC is certainly
not giving up its ability to land a substantial force and maneuver aggressively
inland. They will sacrifice their remaining 7 companies of MBTs, yes, but they
will gain more capability elsewhere and will still be more than able to put
ashore tanks. They will be army tanks, but that is secondary. </div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
The Royal Marines have given up way too early on trying to secure an amphibious 8x8 future for themselves. The UK could use that kind of capability in many ways and scenarios, including on the continent. The complete absence of any amphibious armour in the UK's inventory (beyond the modest VIKING) is twice as surprising considering how much experience the British Army has collected in the Second World War on the usefulness of amphibious armour in getting acrosss rivers, littorals and flooded areas. </div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<b>The Future Commando Force </b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<b><br /></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
It is very worrying instead to
observe the Future Commando Force work through a series of botched interviews
and news releases and endless rumors which all reinforce the unpleasant feeling
that we are staring at nothing more than a capability cut. </div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
It is widely speculated that the
ALBION-class LPDs will be lost at the Review table, and probably without any
kind of replacement. </div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
Not even the infamous Littoral
Strike Ships. </div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
In the last article on the
Telegraph, the Littoral Strike Groups (one in the North Atlantic / Arctic area
and one East of Suez) are described as nothing more than a Company-group held
afloat on a single BAY-class LSD each. The possibility of the LPDs going and
the LSS never happening is spelled out without much hesitation, and yet the annoyingly
false pretense of “evolution” is pushed forth in what would be, with those
premises, nothing but an insult to any thinking brain.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
Single company groups deployments
on lone BAY class LSDs, but also on the LPD at times, have been happening for
years under the heading “Special Purpose Task Group”. A SPTG based on HMS
Albion operated into the Pacific in 2018, for example, while one on Lyme Bay
operated in the Mediterranean. Eventually, the groups reconnected for an
operation at more meaningful scale during SAIF SAREEA 3 in Oman. </div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
Reorganize the Company-group all
you like, add some UAVs and cameras on the helmets and a new uniform and C8
rifles in exchange for L85A3s, but what are you actually going to achieve? </div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
Not much, frankly. It will still
be an SPTG, in the end. With the same limitations due to operating from the
very same ship it has been using for years. </div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiiTzbxKKNEpYPPJ7loXnmA3VkAAc19LGkT0Qn0KL6oyEN1UaWZBBA3dBdNpDAFOUYgp4wiKEN-KO_I3rsvIn-l5AosteHbOKKkJsvrt2_5504TKsPTWcmekQmf7-oNYywZbx1brh9EAJQ/s1600/cold41.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="426" data-original-width="640" height="266" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiiTzbxKKNEpYPPJ7loXnmA3VkAAc19LGkT0Qn0KL6oyEN1UaWZBBA3dBdNpDAFOUYgp4wiKEN-KO_I3rsvIn-l5AosteHbOKKkJsvrt2_5504TKsPTWcmekQmf7-oNYywZbx1brh9EAJQ/s400/cold41.jpg" width="400" /></a></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br />
What would be new if the loss of the LPDs was confirmed would be the inability
to do anything more than SPTGs. No ability anymore to do something at
battlegroup scale. No ability to put ashore a mechanized force of any
relevance. </div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
That is not an “exciting future
force”. That is a disastrous death for the UK’s amphibious capability. </div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
“Dealing with new threats” has
clearly nothing to do with the structure of such a force. A BAY is in no way
more survivable than the LPD. In fact it is built to more relaxed standards,
which make it even less of a hit-taker, in pure survivability terms. </div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
It is not any better armed than
the LPD. It does not come with new generation ship to shore connectors that
enable the Royal Marines to get ashore faster, from further away, or just more
stealthily. A forward deployed, one-ship Littoral Strike Group, or Littoral
Response Group, depending on who you listen to, is in no way more useable or
useful, than what could be done with the current amphibious ships. </div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
I can trust the Royal Marines’
judgement on what they are trying to do with tactics for 12-man groups
operating more dispersed, more “Special Forces-like” once ashore. But,
dramatically, I see little to no attention paid to how to put troops ashore in
the first place. Going back to what I wrote at the beginning of the article, it
feels like we are debating all sorts of details about pre-landing force work,
but completely ignoring the landing bit. </div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
What we really need to see is
ships, ship to shore connectors and vehicles talk. It’s impossible to take
seriously the hype about “future force” without the actual fundamentals being secured.
Until there is such a huge question mark over the fate of the ships and craft
needed to lift and insert and sustain the force, everything else is secondary
at best.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
In all seriousness, if an
amphibious force isn't even sure it will be able to hang on to its defining
capability for lack of shipping, throwing money at new uniforms and C8 rifles
is more infuriating than exciting. Is this expenditure truly necessary,
considering that the amphibious capability as a whole is hanging by a weak
thread…? </div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<b>What if the LPDs go but Littoral
Strike Ships come in? </b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<b><br /></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
Much would depend on what
capability the Littoral Strike Ships would come with. However, for what we have
seen and heard so far, the LSS was definitely heading into MV Ocean Trader
territory. That is, pretty much, a POINT-class RoRo with a flight deck and
hangar bolted on top, as well as an enlarged accommodation block added to the
superstructure. </div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
If this is the LSS, losing the
LPDs to purchase them would be madness. </div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
Let us be clear on one thing,
once and for all: the LSS concept was born as a (very) poor man's LPH replacement
because the current amphibious fleet's greatest weakness is the lack of
aviation facilities. </div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
The combination of ALBION and BAY
classes was originally conceived with the expectation that there would be 2 LPH
covering the aviation side. Of course, 2 LPH quickly became 1 (HMS Ocean) and
then 0 today.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
In absence of the QE-class carrier
at readiness, the LSS was (is?) going to provide a forward deployed group with
some hangar space, a big flight deck and extra lift to compensate, again, the
loss of the substantial capacity that Ocean ensured. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
You might remember that the
Commando Helicopter Force was thinking in terms of “Units of Action”, aka
modular sub-squadron groupings of helicopters, indicatively described as 4
MERLIN plus some WILDCAT for the reconnaissance, escort and light attack roles.
An air group similar to the one we can observe on RFA Argus right now in the
Caribbean. </div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhFFPZK70UaNlZmDfZP58kh2n4Jhq1pFo_TDLPEjnWOvJQAHi6stbxwd9CpSytwrf5_LVC8442xT4kcXKFMgitLph-GerwqW8LAwSv4pIbSJUeM2yTvqRlPC3Qlfw7MOJMp0uMqJsMdUkw/s1600/EDyfT5vW4AI4em7.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="769" data-original-width="1600" height="191" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhFFPZK70UaNlZmDfZP58kh2n4Jhq1pFo_TDLPEjnWOvJQAHi6stbxwd9CpSytwrf5_LVC8442xT4kcXKFMgitLph-GerwqW8LAwSv4pIbSJUeM2yTvqRlPC3Qlfw7MOJMp0uMqJsMdUkw/s400/EDyfT5vW4AI4em7.jpg" width="400" /></a></div>
<br />
<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEin95oHkm2zCM7hzLJuJSpUGSBupVEAP5hBo9Tgp_E78dzE7RRMrMhybB4P_LmHbR_GPXpE36v6Psg16QqNJeV3lRybz6k8eWANnywbbsB494VroKr8XKi1g04hOh_ElJAKAFXoYVN4C-g/s1600/Prevail-Partners-Flight-Deck.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="779" data-original-width="1600" height="193" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEin95oHkm2zCM7hzLJuJSpUGSBupVEAP5hBo9Tgp_E78dzE7RRMrMhybB4P_LmHbR_GPXpE36v6Psg16QqNJeV3lRybz6k8eWANnywbbsB494VroKr8XKi1g04hOh_ElJAKAFXoYVN4C-g/s400/Prevail-Partners-Flight-Deck.jpg" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">The PREVAIL concept is the best visualization we have been given of what an LSS could be. It would be a fantastic low cost floating base for forward presence, but makes very little sense as LPD replacement. </td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
A Littoral Strike Group of “2-3
ships”, centered on an LSS and comprising a BAY and eventually an LPD, would
have been a significant forward-deployed force, especially with an helicopter
“unit of action” on the LSS. </div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
When the idea was proposed in
these terms, it all made sense. </div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
But if you start to picture the
LSS as an LPD replacement, you are much better served by doing nothing and
keeping the LPDs you have. </div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
The LSS as imagined so far has nothing
particularly magic about it and while it might carry several boats / Offshore Raiding
Crafts it is highly unlikely to have any real ability to land heavy stores and
vehicles unless she can use a port or go real close to shore to make do with
Mexeflotes. It is no better than a normal POINT sealift vessel, in this
particular regard. </div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
Which means that, whatever kind
of fantastic insertion concept you want to imagine with RHIBs, "boats and
helicopters", the only thing the LSS has that other ships in the
amphibious flotilla don’t, is the hangar for maintenance on the helicopters.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br />
Even if there was anything truly smart to "using boats and helicopters only”
and withdrawing the LCU MK10 from service losing your heavy lift capability in
the process, and there is not, you could do that extremely well from the
existing LPD. You can fit plenty of boats in the well dock and vehicle deck;
the davits have already been tested with CB90 combat boats in place of LCVPs,
the flight deck can operate 2 CHINOOKs at once.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
Which also means, again, that the
LPD can do better than the BAYs as well. Whatever you can imagine doing from a
BAY with "boats and helicopters", you can do better from the LPD.
More boats and more helicopters, literally. </div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
Capability-wise there is exactly
ZERO reasons to lose those ships early, whatever concept of operation you want
to fantasize about. </div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
If the LSS is to be a replacement
and not an addition, again there is ZERO reason to bother.<br />
<br />
Beyond small boats, what defines amphibious capability is the possibility of
inserting ashore a mechanized force with meaningful combat power. A force
almost as agile as an airborne one in terms of deployability at range, but at
the same time one which comes with armor, with mobility, firepower and
sustainability that air insertion cannot give you. </div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
For this fantastic, unique
attribute to be true, however, you need LIFT. You need the right ships to carry
that force, and the right Ship to Shore connectors to send that force ashore. Lose
the LPDs and you've lost much of the LIFT (especially so if you get nothing at
all in exchange, obviously) and the very vast majority of ship to shore
capability. A single LPD operates 4 LCU MK10 and 4 LCVPs. The smaller well dock
on a BAY can handle a single LCU MK10. The whole fleet of 3 BAYs combined is
still one LCU short of what a single LPD gives you. <br />
It's really simple math.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
And since the carries thankfully
exist, i'd rather take the lack of aviation facilities in the forward deployed
element, knowing the carrier can at least be used when really needed, than go
for the lack of ship to shore, which nothing else in the fleet gives you.<br style="mso-special-character: line-break;" />
<!--[if !supportLineBreakNewLine]--><br style="mso-special-character: line-break;" />
<!--[endif]--></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
Talk money, if you have to. But
whoever thinks the LPDs are a problem capability-wise is clearly not in touch
with reality. Don't even try to spin it in capability terms, it destroys your credibility. </div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
Whoever thinks that using the
BAYs alone has anything to do with “new scenarios” and “A2AD making it impossible
to storm the beach like before” is equally living in fantasy. </div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<b>What is the aim, at the end of
the day? </b>
<br />
What is the actual aim of the Future Commando Force work carried out by the
Royal Marines? What is the desired end state, the actual thinking for the
future? </div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
Obviously the Royal Marines are
not in the financial position for pursuing their own anti-air formations and
follow the USMC lead, but what is being done, or at least thought of, to
improve the capability at least a bit? </div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
What does all the talk about “working
more closely with the Navy” actually entail? For what we are reading right now,
not much. Beyond the role change of 42 Commando, which has already happened, I don’t
see much. The forward presence through BAY ships is more of a Navy realignment
with the Royal Marines than the opposite, simply because the BAY class has been
increasingly called away from the amphibious role in order to cover all sorts
of other requirements, from disaster relief in the Caribbean to the enduring
requirement for a mothership in support of the MCM force in the Gulf. </div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
With 3 BAY ships in total, one of
which tied down in support of the MCM force, keeping up a constant routine of
forward deployments in the High North and East of Suez would exhaust the entire
fleet. It is a concept of operations which will entail unavoidable presence
gaps for lack of shipping whenever a BAY hits refit time. </div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
The loss of amphibious shipping
will also mutilate the role of 3 Commando Brigade in Norway and the High North,
just after the UK has committed itself to a 10 year plan of support to its
ally. Without the ships to lift a sizeable force and insert and move it with
agility along the Norwegian coast, 3 Commando brigade is just another Light
Infantry brigade with a problem of how to get to Norway in the first place and
how to move quickly around the country once there. Its actual usefulness in the
area drops down to minimum terms. </div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
I hope there is a bit more to
this Future Commando Force than cosmetics, but so far it looks like shuffling
of chairs on the deck of a sinking ship. None of the work we’ve heard about is
tackling any real requirement connected to actual amphibious work. The last
time there was an attempt at something genuinely helpful was almost 10 years
ago when the PACSCAT fast landing craft and the CB90 combat boats were extensively
tested. Those could have been engines of change. Adding this or that UAV is
helpful, and changing uniform might make a lot of difference to the individual soldier's comfort, but none of these small bits does a future force make. </div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
Ultimately, is there is going to
be no actual amphibious lift and capability left, the logical consequence must
be the immediate disbandment of 3 Commando brigade, with the transfer of 29 Royal
Artillery, 24 Royal Engineers and the Logistic Regiment and the VIKINGs to an
army brigade in 1st Division, so that at least one brigade can be rescued from
the current state of insignificance. If there is no capability to insert it
from the sea, there is no reason for it continuing and being a drain on the
Navy’s budget. Thanks to the VIKINGs, an Army brigade can take up the mountain
/ arctic role (if at least that is to be retained in some form, at this point
there is no telling what the UK is even trying to do anymore), while 40 and 45
Commando should just be disbanded. They would be reduced to the status of
infantry as expensive as Special Forces but not equally free of political
caveats on their employment. </div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
42 Cdo would remain to cover the “actual”
maritime roles, as it already does; 43 Cdo will stay as long as the nuclear
deterrent stays, in order to ensure its security; and 47 Cdo might still become
something useful if, out of the massacre, they can at least buy actual combat
boats for littoral / riverine support to the Navy. </div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
Imagine what an actual maritime
force multiplier a battalion more similar to the Swedish amphibious force, or
the US Navy riverine squadrons, could be: if 47 Commando was equipped with well
armed combat boats with decent range, something like CB90 or larger, it could
actually complement other warships. </div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
Imagine a BAY used as mothership
for a substantial number of combat boats, deployed to somewhere like the Gulf,
in a scenario of protection to commercial shipping, like we saw very recently.
Fast, highly mobile combat boats cannot beat back a major Iranian offensive on
their own, but they can virtually “multiply” HMS Montrose. In the vast majority
of realistic scenarios, the presence of a suitable Royal Marines combat boat
would be enough to dissuade attempts to seize the merchant vessel, even if the
nearest frigate was a long distance away. </div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
An expensive hollow force without
a clear role is not needed: the British Army already maintains a whole Division
of loosely put together infantry without supports, always on the lookout for a
reason to continue existing. 3 Commando brigade should not join the count of
the “fake” brigades. </div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
But if it does because the
disastrous decision to cut the amphibious ships is made, then I’m left to hope
that there is the dignity and courage to at least be honest about the implications
and follow through with reductions which can at least generate some actual
savings in terms of manpower and money to devote to other priorities. </div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
The worst
possible outcome is to mutilate amphibious capability to save the few dozen
millions spent yearly for the LPDs, but continue sinking money on a brigade no
longer able to carry out its mission. </div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
If you really need to save money,
at least do that decently. If you kill a capability to save pennies and gain no
real personnel / budget headroom to do anything else anyway, you are shafting
yourself twice.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
Ultimately, the UK needs to
decide what it wants to be. This is the one decision that constantly gets
skirted around.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
If the worst case scenario for
the Integrated Review, which has been leaked to the Times today, ever comes to
pass, the UK must be honest with itself and spell out the consequence: it is
finished as a military power of any relevance. Not global, not even regional. It will be a small player with some absurdly good capabilities still in the arsenal merely because they are the ruins of what existed before. The whole structure, however, is losing so much coherence and stability that the comparison with other countries is increasingly humiliating. </div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
What we absolutely not need is
the UK pretending to still be relevant and capable while mutilating itself. </div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
Exactly like we don’t need the
Royal Marines pretending to be an amphibious force for the future while
amphibious capability actually vanishes. </div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Sort out what you want to be, with honesty. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<br />Gabrielehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/01623558391676151582noreply@blogger.com33tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-442909239199162925.post-24141465607927731442020-05-31T16:40:00.000+02:002020-05-31T16:40:31.521+02:00A different angle to difficult choices <br />
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">First, a
premise. I really hate the “difficult choices” refrain that is constantly
brought up when talking about UK armed forces. It’s right up there with “sacred
cows” and other rhetoric figures which 99% of the time are empty of actual
meaning other than making the speaker sound real deep and wise. In the end, it seems to only ever lead to </span>arguing in favor of cutting off everything but your pet project of the day. </div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">If there is
something that years of cuts have made clear is that in the UK the problem is
not making “difficult choices” (its Draconian acts of self-mutilation are "admired" worldwide), but making difficult choices that make sense in
an integrated defence policy and not in isolation. </span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">What the UK constantly fails
at is taking difficult decisions that adhere to one coherent vision. Again and
again, Defence starts investing on one particular area, then eventually, when
it is more or less ready to reap the benefits of decades of work and
investment, ruins everything by going with another short-term knee jerk
decision in the desperate attempt to save some money. Savings which are often
ridiculous compared to the damage inflicted to capability. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">I’ve
already written some time ago a longer dissertation on the cyclical suggestion
of “cutting the PARAs and Royal Marines”, and explained just why that makes
very little sense, so I’ll just point you to <a href="http://ukarmedforcescommentary.blogspot.com/2020/01/">that article</a>,
while repeating once more that the really difficult and key question the UK
must finally find an answer to is what kind of country and military power it
wants to be. </span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">You can’t separate ambition from how much you are willing to
spend. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Once a
level of ambition is defined, the new SDSR should completely ignore the empty
rhetoric of sacred cows, which are mostly just the latest evolution of
inter-service bickering, and assess instead what the UK absolutely <b>needs</b> to
do, first of all, and immediately after determine <b>what it can do well</b>,
and specifically what it can do with what it already owns. Instead of wasting
capability that already exists in pursuit of nebulous new ambitions, it should <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">ensure that the maximum possible output
comes from what is already available</b>, for once. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">If it is
not possible to do everything, you should stick to what you are good at. If
your money is not enough to purchase all you’d need, at least start by using
well what you already have, and have already paid. The UK is extremely well
positioned to deploy a very competitive and powerful naval task force; and owns
most of the equipment needed to field a powerful airmobile army capability. It
would be absurd not to capitalize on strengths built up with much effort and expenditure
over decades. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">When you
are “poor”, the last thing you should do is waste what you do have. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Instead of
trying to convince the world that tanks are no longer needed; that wheeled APCs
are the future; that air manoeuvres are now unfeasible and amphibious
capability does not require landing craft and surface manoeuvre, and getting
offended when the world does not agree; the UK should use a bit of actual realism
and go for the real soul searching. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">There are
unpleasant questions that I never hear asked but that are staring us all in the
face. One is about the wisdom of sinking so much manpower and money into 1<sup>st</sup>
Division, which has more than half the Army’s infantry under command but that
will have absolutely zero supports once the last set migrates to 3<sup>rd</sup>
Division to enable the second STRIKE brigade. 4 Royal Artillery, 27 RLC, 2
REME, 2 Royal Signal and 32 Royal Engineer are the last CS and CSS resources
that remain to enable the “Vanguard Light Brigade” that is organized
rotationally from the 4 brigades that make up 1<sup>st</sup> Division (4<sup>th</sup>,
7<sup>th</sup>, 11<sup>th</sup> and 51<sup>st</sup>). <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">All of
those regiments, and indeed presumably one of the brigade HQs as well, are
going to be taken out to create the second STRIKE brigade, leaving 1<sup>st</sup>
Division as truly nothing more than a container for spare Light Role infantry
battalions that support Public Duty and Cyprus rotations and the “regional
stand-by battalion” commitment at home, which has been expanded all the way to
a 5 battalion requirement in recent times. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">One actual
difficult question to be asked is whether this use of precious finite resources
is in any way efficient and wise. Over half of the Army tied down in “fake”
brigades with no combined arms capability for complete lack of Combat Supports
and Combat Service Supports is, to me, a complete folly, regardless of how many
battalions you intend to justify by committing to penny packet presence
projects all over Africa, or sandbag filling in the UK during floods. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">And this
brings me to an even harsher question that needs to be formulated: are 16
Reserve infantry battalions in any way justifiable? <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Army 2020
hoped to squeeze more useability out of the Reserve. At one point, it literally
cut down several infantry battalions from 3 to 2 companies each with the hope
that Reserves would be sufficiently available to fill the gap. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">That
project never worked out, and eventually the Army has rebuilt the missing
companies thanks to the manpower removed from the Specialised Infantry
Battalions (which are just 267 strong and thus have released quite a few
soldiers back into the system). <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The Army
Reserve was supposed to relieve the regulars of a number of those standing commitments
that absorb so much manpower, but the results have been frankly far from
stellar. Reserves have in a few occasions provided much of the Falklands
Islands Roulement infantry company; and in February this year “<a href="https://www.army.mod.uk/news-and-events/news/2020/02/reservists-mobilise-for-operational-tour/">history
was made</a>” by building up a Company group, 240-strong, with reservists from
7 RIFLES and 5 RRF for a six month UN peacekeeping turn on the Cyprus Green
Line. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">I know I will
bring even more hate upon myself for posing this question, but I think it can
no longer be avoided: is this output actually enough to justify 16 reserve
Infantry Battalions? <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">I don’t
blame reservists: they should be rightly praised and thanked for offering their
spare time to their Country and I couldn’t respect them more. But the Reserve
must be re-assessed for overall value for money, and for functionality. The
problem is easily understood: a volunteer who depends on a civilian, full-time
job cannot, no matter how well meaning he might be, be available often for long
deployments and operations. It’s just unfeasible, unless the volunteers and
employers are supported in a whole different way, which however would make the
Reserve a whole lot less cheap. It is not an easily solved problem. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">But if
Regulars cannot be relieved in a meaningful, enduring and assured way from the
variety of secondary, enduring tasks, what is the point? <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Resilience
and Regeneration in times of major crisis is the other big reason for having a
Reserve, but again there is an enormous and majorly unpleasant question that no
one is considering: is it really feasible, for the UK, to Regenerate combat
mass in a crisis in this era? <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
What
magnitude of crisis would make it conceivable?</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">What would
the timeframes look like? <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Could it
realistically be done in any scenario short of an existential struggle? <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">If the UK
was to be involved in a large scale operation abroad, which required a Division
in the field for more than the 6 / 12 months at most that 3<sup>rd</sup>
Division could sustain, is there <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">any</i>
realistic chance of rebuilding enough mass to relieve the deployed Division
with another, for example?<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Obviously,
1<sup>st</sup> Division would have to be rebuilt into a formation capable of
actual Combined Arms Operations. What it would overwhelmingly need, however,
would be the CS and CSS units it does not possess, not 16 Reserve Infantry
Battalions. The Division already has regular infantry, it is everything else
that it lacks. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">What level of capability could be regenerated, beyond the lightest and most barebone of formations? There is
not any significant amount of equipment in storage that could be brought out
and issued to Reservists. For example, even assuming the Challenger 2 LEP goes
ahead, which in the current budget climate is in no way a given, the number of
vehicles being mentioned wouldn’t even be enough for fielding the Royal Wessex
Yeomanry in the field, no matter how dire the situation. The regiment has been
uplifted to have the capability to put into the field complete, formed crews,
but the UK would extremely quickly run out of tanks to give to those formed
crews. Do the math by yourself: we have been told numbers that range from
around 140 to 167. Even if every single vehicle was issued for operations, it
still wouldn’t suffice for a third Type 58 regiment to hit the field. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Warrior
CSP, assuming it goes ahead, also will deliver barely enough vehicles for the
Regulars, if that. There is zero margin built in into any purchase, and the UK,
unlike other countries, has the habit of getting rid of the fleets it removes
from active service, to avoid having to spend on its storage and upkeep. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">I’ve quoted
the heavy armour bits, but the situation does not in any way change by looking
at lighter AFV fleets, or other major bits of equipment. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The
cupboard is literally empty, there is nothing behind the glass to be broken in
case of emergency. What is in storage is needed to equip the regulars, and
considering that just four facilities held the majority of the stores, vehicle
fleets and munitions, it is hard not to think that in a major, existential
crisis the enemy just needs to land good long-range hits on Ashchurch, <span style="mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;">Monchengladbach, Kineton and Donington to not
only knock back any regeneration effort but to maim the regular force itself
into near paralysis. <o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><span style="mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;"><br /></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;">If we are not prepared to imagine a scenario in which an enemy will try
to hit those targets, by default it implies we are not prepared to imagine an
actual existential scenario / new major war. With all what descends from this. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEix3nefzDVWngwQcmY9Qzz74O0SVCh-ldbZIirLdbUtsBf6ESpAhal6bRCAPU_SWDHvZzcXaR0x4NvxqGhu3hLhgM2hKhfNb2TZMWBpTrgS25oQGoFXT4W5lB6RCzfwKKSmN3H885sQnZU/s1600/Controlled+Humidity+Storage.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="600" data-original-width="800" height="300" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEix3nefzDVWngwQcmY9Qzz74O0SVCh-ldbZIirLdbUtsBf6ESpAhal6bRCAPU_SWDHvZzcXaR0x4NvxqGhu3hLhgM2hKhfNb2TZMWBpTrgS25oQGoFXT4W5lB6RCzfwKKSmN3H885sQnZU/s400/Controlled+Humidity+Storage.jpg" width="400" /></a></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;">I always struggle, as a consequence, to imagine Regeneration actually
happening, regardless of whether the Army Reserve ever hits its 30.000 trained
personnel target (in the near term it won’t, by the way). <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"><br /></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Even if
Reservists were called out en masse and were to be actually available for
operations, the ability to kit them out for a meaningful operation is next to
inexistent. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">I am not in
a position to know whether Telford and <span style="mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;">Merthyr</span> Tydfil
could possibly be able to start producing whole new vehicles in a hurry in a
major crisis, but output and timeframes, if not overall feasibility, are
doubtful at best. Even if equipment could be sourced from the US (the only Ally
which might be in a position to help, thanks to the huge number of items it
keeps stored and its active production lines), a lot of precious time would
still be needed to actually train and prepare units. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">When it
comes to “difficult decisions”, instead of looking at chopping the best manned
and best recruiting regular units in the Armed Forces, I’d recommend looking at
how the Armed Forces actually plan to fight, and at their true resilience. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">A majorly
unpleasant decision to be taken might indeed involve the Army Reserve, because
those 16 infantry battalions look like a true white elephant. </span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The SDSR
might want to reassess Reserve numbers and, even more importantly, roles. </span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Excellent results come through reservists contributing their specializations to
the Army (medical units being just the most visible of examples); but the outcome
from the infantry units seems hard to justify. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Moreover,
Resilience / Regeneration should be approached in a more systemic and realistic
way. A good way to start could be to try and provide 1<sup>st</sup> Division
and its Brigades with the supports they lack, using Reserve or Hybrid
formations. </span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">If even that proves unfeasible because of low availability, the
future of the Reserve might be smaller and more niche. </span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">No matter how
comparatively “cheap” the Reserve is, if it can’t deliver a meaningful output
outside a few specific areas, it might still not be worth its cost. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<br />Gabrielehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/01623558391676151582noreply@blogger.com24tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-442909239199162925.post-24330186797901823772020-05-19T22:24:00.003+02:002020-05-23T20:17:36.378+02:00The many weaknesses of STRIKE <br />
<h2>
<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size: large; line-height: 115%;">An idea can
only ever be as good as its execution</span></b></h2>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">NOTE: </span></b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">this article was originally meant to appear
also on uklandpower.com, since it was initially conceived specifically as a
reply to one of their articles. This intention had to be abandoned since the
editor and the army voices on that portal feel that this article is too long
and the point it raises have already been “discussed ad infinitum”. I felt I could
simply not work along the lines that were asked of me. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br />
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">My
criticism of STRIKE has gained me the irritation of several Army figures, so
I’m now known as an Army hater as well as an RAF hater. Facts of life, I guess.
I actually care deeply for both, and want only the best for them. My critique
is purely due to the firm belief that in some areas the Services insist on
taking the wrong paths. <o:p></o:p></span><br />
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">There can
be no doubt that the “STRIKE prophet” who has written a new pro-STRIKE article on
UKLandPower.com is speaking primarily, if not only, to me. I am the one who
challenged “STRIKE prophets” to provide answers, after all. <o:p></o:p></span><br />
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">I will now
have to answer, and to once more clarify the exact nature of my critiques and
concerns, which again and again are reduced to the absurd rather than faced
head on. My critique is a bit more complex than “BOXER has no cannon and so is
useless”. <o:p></o:p></span><br />
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">I will
quote several passages of the article in question, and refer to its author as
“the Author”, but of course you should first of all go and read what </span><a href="https://uklandpower.com/2020/05/06/british-army-strike-an-inside-view/"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">he has to say about the STRIKEconcept</span></a><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">. As you can
tell I continue to have many reservations, but it is a more useful article than
most seen so far. <o:p></o:p></span><br />
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">I also need
to point out a fact which should be obvious, but evidently is not: the STRIKE
supporters that periodically try to prove me wrong have an easy time coming at
me from their individual background and push forward their own idea and
interpretation of STRIKE. <o:p></o:p></span><br />
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">I’m locked
in discussions with multiple people, however, and that means I am exposed to
multiple interpretations of STRIKE, including those who insist that the Armoured
Brigades should be sacrificed in order to go “full STRIKE” for the future. I
have to answer to everyone, not just to one person, so this will require some
extra space, and if it feels like I’m addressing things you haven’t said, it is
because someone else has. It is also a factor in my hostility to the concept: the
more STRIKE is presented as the One and Only Future for the Army, the more I
tend to disagree. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span>
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The
Author’s main point, in this case, is that: <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">In the simplest possible terms, [STRIKE] means
giving a UK Division and/or Allied Corps a Screening and Exploitation
Force. This has been publicly stated by the Army. <o:p></o:p></span></b><br />
<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">It has, and
it has never been in doubt. Screening and reconnaissance have always been part
of the STRIKE concept, and in truth, since building STRIKE means taking the Armoured
Cavalry element out of the Armoured Infantry Brigades, it can only be so. One
of the first sacrifices STRIKE has required has been the shifting of AJAX to
the “new” role and new formation, and the Armoured Brigades no longer will have
a recce cavalry element of their own, other than the Close Recce troops part of
the constituent Battalions and Tank regiment. Clearly, the requirement has not
gone away; just the vehicles have. <o:p></o:p></span><br />
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Screening,
reconnaissance and exploitation are extremely important in high intensity
warfare, and we are witnessing increasing interest in powerful formations for
this role also in the USA, where more and more often the old and extremely
powerful Armored Cavalry Regiment of Gulf War fame is mentioned as a kind of
formation that needs to return and might in fact provide a base for the future
structures. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The premise
is something I don’t disagree on. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br />
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The Strike mission requires highly dispersed
operations enabled by low signature, highly redundant C2 which can concentrate
effects in both time and space in ways far more detrimental to the enemy’s
scheme of manoeuvre than might otherwise be the case if conventional methods
were used.<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Strike is looking to add as much friction and
uncertainty to the enemy formation as possible by enabling Fires, Aviation, Air
and a whole range of joint effects to destroy, defeat, and inflict attrition on
enemy formations within a Division’s or Corps’ battlespace. Ultimately, this
allows Armoured Infantry Brigades and/or coalition Armoured formations to
conduct counterattacks and counter strokes under considerably better conditions
than if Strike Brigades were not present.<o:p></o:p></span></b><br />
<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The Author
is right. This is part of the concept and is an effect that the British Army
hopes to obtain through dispersion. From the RUSI Land Warfare Conference 2019
we have learned that the STRIKE Brigade is looking at covering “a front width
of 80 to 100 km, with a depth of up to 100 km, advancing on as many as 12 axis
at the same time”. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<iframe allow="accelerometer; autoplay; encrypted-media; gyroscope; picture-in-picture" allowfullscreen="" frameborder="0" height="309" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/3q7gp6QInOE?list=PLFAgO2TZWpwCPUeJSx2M2WoWrbnY7d_Dj" width="550"></iframe>
</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><i>Brigadier James Martin speaks from around minute
28:40. This is recommended viewing. </i><o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br />
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The
Author’s mention of “uncertainty” for the enemy can actually be further
developed. STRIKE is clearly the primary attempt of the British Army to fit
into the new Multi Domain concept pushed by the US Army. To understand what I
mean, I recommend reading </span><a href="https://mwi.usma.edu/putting-enemy-rock-hard-place-multi-domain-operations-practice/"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">this report</span></a><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"> (of course coming from the American
side. Unfortunately the British Army is terrible at this kind of communication
and rarely produces something which is both accessible and worth reading) from
WARFIGHTER Exercise 19-04. This massive wargame / simulation exercise held in
the US had 3<sup>rd</sup> (UK) Division involved and the article does an
excellent job at explaining just what this concept of “creating dilemmas for
the enemy” is all about. <o:p></o:p></span><br />
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">“A <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">single penetration, though conservative and
often effective, would not achieve the commander’s intent. The penetration
presents the enemy with one problem—a problem that other units have presented
repeatedly. Dilemmas are not the same as problems. A problem is a situation
regarded as unwelcome or harmful that must be dealt with and overcome. A
dilemma, by contrast, is a situation in which a difficult choice has to be made
between two or more alternatives, especially equally undesirable ones. To
present the enemy with multiple dilemmas across multiple domains and in
multiple locations, the Division combined penetrations with audacious turning
movements and tactical deceptions, complemented and reinforced with nonlethal
effects.”<o:p></o:p></i></span><br />
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><br /></i></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">“Conducted simultaneously, the penetrations,
turning movements, and tactical deceptions enabled the Division to achieve a
degree of irreversible momentum against the enemy. The armor penetrations kept
the enemy’s sensors engaged. The turning movements avoided the enemy’s
principle defensive positions and seized objectives behind the enemy’s current
positions causing the enemy to both dislocate from its positions and to divert
forces to meet the threat. The tactical deceptions, in particular feints, kept
the enemy fixed on sizable threats, which influenced the enemy’s decision to
prematurely unmask forces in sanctuary inside its underground facilities.
Additionally, the combat aviation Brigade was employed as an independent
maneuver organization focused on destroying enemy high-payoff targets—in
particular long-range artillery. Synchronizing all of these actions in time,
space, and purpose became a tremendously complex task and the primary focus for
the Division main command post.”<o:p></o:p></span></i><br />
<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">It is
pretty clear where the STRIKE concept fits in, and also the kind of
considerations that have driven the (incredibly welcome) development of the
British Army </span><a href="http://ukarmedforcescommentary.blogspot.com/2020/04/the-british-combat-aviation-brigade.html"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">finally forming a coherent aviation Brigade</span></a><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"> for Division-level ops. <o:p></o:p></span><br />
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span>
It is also
pretty clear, however, how different the US and British approaches are. The
British Army believes that this kind of warfare can be founded upon a wheeled
(in part…) Brigade, with the consequent reduced sustainment needs, while the US
Army has in no way identified a particular advantage for wheels or tracks. The
US Army has actually not yet wedded itself to a new Brigade Combat Team
structure for this kind of distributed warfare; but has actually started from
evolving its FIRES, and the sensors and communications needed to employ them to
strike out to 1,000 miles and beyond. The absolutely central role of FIRES is
something that the American article once again makes clear, reaffirming how
artillery is at the same time the main problem and the most promising solution.<br />
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The US is
especially not betting that they can somehow practice dispersion by using a Brigade
consisting of just 2 infantry Battalions to split across up to 12 axis of
advance on a front of 100x100 km. They do consider a level of dispersion and
wider fronts, but in much more realistic terms. Now, obviously the British Army
is in no condition to throw as many combined arms Battalions at a front as the
US Army can, but the worst possible thing to do is to pretend once again that
“less is more” and aim for stars that can’t be reached. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span><br />
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"><br /></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">It is no
mystery that I think the US Army approach is the more realistic one. And it is
no mystery that the main thing that remains mysterious is how the British
approach to dispersion is supposed to successfully work. It is more than
legitimate to have doubts. <o:p></o:p></span><br />
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">I will once
again reference one of the most interesting proposals for future army
formations in a Multi Domain Operations setting, which is the </span><a href="https://nealrauhauser.files.wordpress.com/2016/10/lrsgbriefing.pdf"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Reconnaissance and Strike Group</span></a><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"> put forward by US Army Colonel
(retd) Douglas MacGregor, of battle of 73 Easting fame. His RSG has obvious
points of contact with both the ACR of his days and with STRIKE. The formation
he proposes is meant to cover a very wide front of 60 to 80 kilometers, with a
depth of attack of 80 to 100 depending mostly on terrain. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
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<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><i>The Reconnaissance Strike Group is built around
its FIRES element. </i><o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br />
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">It differs
from STRIKE in many ways, however: it is founded upon a powerful FIRES
formation literally at its center, and puts 4 extremely powerful and tracked
Recce-Strike combined arms battalions all around it. It is a mobile fortress
which fights on a very vast area, finding and striking targets. Its Battalions,
in the proposal, are clearly meant to achieve infiltration by force, and lots
of it. MacGregor wants something lighter than an MBT, but with firepower at
least equal, and in fact superior: he urges the US Army to adopt a new
standardized tracked Armoured vehicle coming in IFV variant with 30mm and
Direct Fire variant with 120mm, if not with the new Rheinmetall 130 mm cannon. Moreover,
he also wants the Battalions to have numerous organic AMOS 120mm turreted
mortars on the same base hull. <o:p></o:p></span><br />
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Again, the
US Army clearly can afford to purchase more and better kit than the British
Army could ever afford, so a direct comparison of kit is not the point of this.
What I truly want people to reflect on is that the extremely powerful RSG is
meant to operate, with twice the mass and several times over the firepower, on
an area which is <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">smaller</i> than the one
STRIKE is supposedly meant to cover, against the same opponent. <o:p></o:p></span><br />
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">How can
this ever be realistic? If you can’t afford the equipment, you can’t cover the
area. If you can’t infiltrate by means of force and are extremely unlikely to
do it by means of stealth, what is left? This is my chief worry about STRIKE.
It is not about the “30 mm on BOXER” in isolation, it is the fact that I do not
see any real effort to make dispersion viable. STRIKE takes vehicles and
armaments of a Brigade that used to count on MBTs for the striking power, and
tells them, literally, to operate over a far greater area. How can spreading
insufficient resources on an even wider area be considered a solution is
mysterious. <o:p></o:p></span><br />
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">In TANK,
the Royal Tank Regiment journal, issue 2017, Lieutenant J. Benn writes after
involvement in STRIKE simulations and mentions, among other things, that “in
CATT, the AJAX Troop was spread up to 8 km apart, with commanders being able to
make decisions for themselves about Limits of Exploitation and what risks they
could take. Exploitation was the principle aim and if the threat picture became
too great we simply dissolved into the ether in order to concentrate
elsewhere”. <o:p></o:p></span><br />
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">This might
appear extremely bold and innovative to some, but it appears exceptionally
fragile in a multitude of ways, and I seriously struggle to imagine much room
for actual exploitation against a peer enemy with even the most basic of
competence in using its own sensors and weapons. It literally seems like a
desperate attempt to avoid annihilation via artillery by spreading out too
widely to present a good target, but without a real answer about how to preserve
a meaningful offensive potential. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">When people pontificate that “strike cannot
survive against a peer competitor,” they seem to do so from a standpoint which
does not reflect an understanding of Formation-, Division- or Corps-level
warfighting. So some people clearly think Strike is an alternative to an Armoured
infantry Brigade, which given the announcement made in December 2016, that the
Field Army would reorganise as two Strike Brigades and two Armoured Infantry Brigades
is hard to understand, as the intended role of the Strike Brigades, if not
immediately articulated, was obviously both different from and complimentary
to, the Armoured Infantry Brigades. Even the most casual observer should have
concluded that a Strike Brigade does not fight or operate like an Armoured
Infantry Brigade and has a totally different mission. If 50% of the formation
is reconnaissance vehicles, then logic would strongly suggest the role it
currently has is far from being as “vague and unclear” as some suggest.<o:p></o:p></span></b><br />
<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">We have
established in what contest STRIKE fits in. And while I can’t speak for others,
I have always had in mind the fact that 3<sup>rd</sup> Division is meant to
deploy as 2 Armoured Brigades and 1 STRIKE. But that does not in itself ease
the concerns about STRIKE being unsuited for the kind of fights it imagines. <o:p></o:p></span><br />
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Also, please
note that the British Army itself says that of the 2 AJAX-mounted regiments in
each STRIKE Brigade, only one is expected to be truly recce roled, with the
other called <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">Medium Armour</b>. The Army
has made extremely clear that AJAX is there to act as a medium tank of sort in
support of the infantry carried by MIV, and that the coupling of the two
vehicles is indispensable because, as we know, MIV is extremely lightly armed.
It is in fact an APC, and in other times this means it would have kept pretty
much out of the fight; in STRIKE this is not quite possible and MIV will be in
the very vanguard despite not being truly equipped for it. <o:p></o:p></span><br />
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">I would
avoid making the point that 50% of the vehicles are “recce” because it is not
quite as meaningful as the Author implies. While in the future the aspiration seems
to be that the line between “recce” and “striking” battlegroups will be
increasingly blurred, if not cancelled, to claim that the presence of AJAX
means everything is clear cut is not realistic. AJAX is there primarily because
it is what the Army has. It is the most expensive contract the army has entered
into for decades. There is no easy way out of it (if at all), and STRIKE needed
something with Direct Fire capability and good “eyes”. There never was a choice;
it was AJAX or nothing at that point in time. <o:p></o:p></span><br />
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
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<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><i>The AJAX family: variants, sub-variants and
procurement quantities. The Joint Fires sub-variant appears to be effectively
dead, while the status of Overwatch and Ground Based Surveillance is not known.
</i><o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">STRIKE will
not operate as a traditional Armoured Brigade and no one has tried to imply
otherwise. Or at least, I haven’t. </span><br />
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">But it is a fact of life that at the lower
levels, the cooperation between AJAX and MIV will still have to very closely
imitate the relationship between an MBT and an APC in a Mechanized formation.
AJAX being the armour, MIV being the APC which, unlike in a traditional scenario,
will have to do more than stay well back and drop its infantry some distance
away from the actual target. It is fair to say that at Brigade level the
concept is very different from that of “normal” Mechanized Infantry Brigades,
but deep down at platoon level the difference is far less. <o:p></o:p></span><br />
Again J.
Benn mentions: “in CATT, AJAX and MIV pairs worked alongside one another, with
the AJAX commanders under the direction of the Platoon Commander”.<br />
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">He goes on
to make a series of reasonable points about how this will have to be taken into
consideration in training both MIV and Platoon Commanders, which will have to
be particularly prepared in both fields. Intimate collaboration at all training
levels is also extremely relevant, but of course the STRIKE battlegroups only
form up in the field, and otherwise are well separated entities with the AJAX
half living in Tidworth and the MIV half in Catterick. Finding a way to create
permanent STRIKE BGs was too innovative for this innovative project. Capbadge
bunfights will have been in the way too, I bet. <o:p></o:p></span><br />
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Simulation
of course helps, but the cost and intricacies of training are going to be
massive if this has to work and it is another reason why I utterly despise the
argument that STRIKE is a cheaper alternative to legacy Mechanized Brigades. They
really aren’t, at no level, assuming you are serious about doing it right. <o:p></o:p></span><br />
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The Author
suggests elsewhere in his text that the renewed concept of screening began with
AJAX itself, and it is probably true, in a way. When it was still known as FRES
SV, there were going to be several other variants in a number of successive
production batches, with more vehicles ordered to cover more roles. Crucially,
there used to be an actual Medium Armour variant which was meant to be procured
to ensure the Scout variant would have intimate support of 120mm guns. You
might remember that a lot of happy noise was produced back then because AJAX came
with the large turret ring capability, ready to accept the turret and cannon
needed to create the Medium Armour variant. <o:p></o:p></span><br />
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span>
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
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<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhwvjAuDXoEedSJOIJYAfrb7Aa61BK6cIfWONvLORb5pmwDoHbNCS2rPXXAZAmklh7MswlcMzbT5EHWrkQLS-LkBPMOPmz9hXPYNYz693C5hmzASVb2XJWDvOtrk57Tx6P-oNHAvSaRpqA/s1600/2.bmp" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="436" data-original-width="830" height="210" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhwvjAuDXoEedSJOIJYAfrb7Aa61BK6cIfWONvLORb5pmwDoHbNCS2rPXXAZAmklh7MswlcMzbT5EHWrkQLS-LkBPMOPmz9hXPYNYz693C5hmzASVb2XJWDvOtrk57Tx6P-oNHAvSaRpqA/s400/2.bmp" width="400" /></a></div>
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<div class="MsoNormal">
<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><i>FRES SV clearly had plans that extended well
beyond what AJAX now delivers. Medium Armour was already planned back then. The
difference is that the previous plan had the firepower, not just the name. </i><o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">General
Dynamics has benefitted from that as it gave them a developed base to work on
to mature their proposal for the US Army’s Mobile Protected Firepower medium
armour programme (although armed with a 105mm rather than a 120, at least for
now). </span><br />
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span>
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The British Army, short of money, is stuck to saying that half of the
AJAXs will be “Medium Armour” even though they are the exact same vehicle with
the exact same armament. It is this kind of “magic” that I really can’t
support. At one point in this story, the dramatic loss of firepower that
intervened since the true Medium Armour and Overwatch (long range ATGW launcher
vehicle) variants that had to be part of FRES SV have both vanished, has been
brushed under the carpet. The firepower is no longer there, but the role is,
and the area to cover is still the same. Or indeed much larger. <o:p></o:p></span><br />
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
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<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><i>The latest image of General Dynamics’ offering
for the US Army Mobile Protected Firepower. These are intended to equip a
Squadron within each infantry brigade. The Stryker brigades have concentrated
their wheeled 105mm Mobile Gun Systems at Squadron level within their cavalry
element as well, while a Squadron of MBTs has been moved into the recce element
of Armored Brigade Combat Teams. <o:p></o:p></i></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><i>Italy assigns a similar number of CENTAURO to
the Cavalry regiment of each of its brigades. The challenges of urban warfare
and the recognized need for a stronger screening are part of the reason for
this firepower increase across various countries and brigade structures. </i><o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">What I
firmly believe was not planned before 2015 at the earliest was the eventual
split of the same Brigade between tracks and wheels. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">I don’t
think anyone can deny that there was a rather dramatic split in ideas between
the era of CGS Sir Peter Wall, which ended with tracks being the absolute
priority and the signing of the AJAX contract in its very last days, and the
era of CGS Sir Nicholas Carter which followed with the dawn of STRIKE. The
equipment programme shows the damage that the about turn from tracks to wheels
has caused, leaving the Army stranded in the middle with insufficient money to
do both and, moreover, to fund everything else in the contour. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span><br />
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"><br /></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">I believe there
can be little doubt that, had AJAX not been already on order, in the context of
STRIKE it would not have been pursued in its current form. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">We are
where we are at this point, but let’s not turn a blind eye to reality.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">This brings us to a key point about Strike,
which again some seem not understand. Strike is not a platform-centric idea.
Yes, Strike may have started with Ajax, but that was pure logic, based on the
fact that covering forces were in the formation recce business, as in CVR(T)
regiments. Ajax is the CVR(T) replacement. This means that criticism of Strike
is based on shallow technical analysis of Ajax and Boxer. The most simplistic
observations seem to focus on direct fire weapons and mobility.<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">High lethality is required, and any vehicle can
increase its capacity to offend by adding a weapon, but that comes with large
cost implications attached, and so the often heard comment that “Boxer needs a
30mm cannon” assumes the absolute need for such a weapon, or else Strike will
be a “hollow force.” For Strike, what gives the 30mm weapon its real value is
the sighting and detection system inherent to it. Thus, lots of people talk
about the 40mm cannon on Ajax. Almost no one talks about the Thermal Imager,
which is actually the key capability. The strike concept of operation clearly
puts primacy on sensors and communications. To paraphrase Wavell: “Amateurs
talk 30mm cannons. Professionals talk communications and sensors”.<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">As previously stated, lethality is clearly both
important and required, but as the current Strike Brigade Commander has pointed
out, what experience has shown is that for Strike to succeed it merely needs to
be competitive with the enemy, as opposed to superior to the enemy. You just
need to win the fight rather than the whole battle. Consequently, the plan has
always been to resource Strike units with both mounted and dismounted
ATGM and anti-armour weapons, which are obviously high pay-off in terms of cost
versus effect/ flexibility.<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">To some
measure it is true that final capability is not purely due to platforms. But
you cannot pretend platforms are not key. The idea might well be kind of
platform agnostic, but its realization cannot be. MIV was always going to be
wheeled, because it is felt that only wheeled armour has the kind of low
sustainment burden needed for dispersion to have a chance. Moreover, the British
Army selected the <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">absolutely most
expensive 8x8 on the market. </i>Why, if platform attributes are not that
important? Why has it insisted on having numerous ambulances and command posts
on this very expensive vehicle base rather than be “innovative” and offload
those to something less expensive, like MRV-P, in a fashion already seen in
other countries?<a href="file:///C:/Users/Killer/Desktop/STRIKE/Weaknesses%20of%20STRIKE/The%20many%20weaknesses%20of%20STRIKE.docx#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn1;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "calibri" , "sans-serif"; font-size: 11.0pt; line-height: 115%;">[1]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a> <o:p></o:p></span><br />
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><a href="file:///C:/Users/Killer/Desktop/STRIKE/Weaknesses%20of%20STRIKE/The%20many%20weaknesses%20of%20STRIKE.docx#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn1;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "calibri" , "sans-serif"; font-size: 11.0pt; line-height: 115%;"><br /></span></span></span></span></a></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Because, I
am told, you need the exact same protection and mobility level for those
elements for STRIKE to work, because everyone has to work dispersed and,
indeed, probably surrounded by enemies. There is no rear echelon anymore, is
the argument, which if pushed to the extreme introduces all sorts of
implications for the wider Logistic element too. I’ve seen people seriously
debating the opportunity of carrying supplies in BOXERs, but I hope no one is
seriously thinking about replacing MAN SV trucks with it. Some heavily
protected load carriers have been seen before, of course, but it’s unclear
quite how far the Army thinks it needs to go. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span><br />
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"><br /></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">For sure, it
is serious enough in its belief that BOXER is the only base vehicle that will
suffice, to bet its available budget on the current order. An order which is the largest ever made so far worldwide for BOXER vehicles. And yet, even though more than</span> 520 BOXERs are incoming, at most 4 infantry battalions will convert to it. Or possibly just 2 plus a training margin, since some say that the first BOXER order is only sufficient for the first STRIKE Brigade, not also for the second. The exact details are not known yet.<br />
In another European army such an order could have equipped about twice as many Infantry
Battalions, since other countries would have focused their attention on the combat variants.<br />
And yet, at the same time, key elements of combat capability
such as the mortars have received no equal attention, which is another aspect
that I find frankly incomprehensible.<br />
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The Author
writes “<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">This concept [STRIKE] then
allowed the British Army to buy BOXER. So, no Strike, no BOXER</b>.” I’d argue
that it is more factually accurate to say that the British Army has actually
decided “no BOXER, no STRIKE”: its procurement choices make clear that the one
thing the Army absolutely wants to have in order to declare STRIKE operational
is a large amount of wheeled APCs, “specialist” carriers, ambulances and
command posts. It has put the available budget into buying BOXER, not in
Satcom-on-the-move-enabled tactical headquarters, not on speeding up LeTacCis
to move beyond BOWMAN, not on curing the recognized, immense gap in FIRES and
not even on continuing the slow process of modernization of its Armoured Brigades,
putting their very future into jeopardy. The Army has chosen its overriding
priority in BOXER, and has accepted all sorts of limitations, both on the
equipment fit of the vehicles itself and in other areas of its capability, in
order to buy it. This is undeniable. Regardless of what the Author claims, the
Army has decided that it could not use MASTIFF, or FV432 for the first part of
the life of its new creature. It demands to have BOXER to declare IOC. So long
for not being platform and wheels centric! You can’t deny that this has been
the choice. The only question left to be answered is whether this was wise. If
you ask me, it wasn’t.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span><br />
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"><br /></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">And yes, we
have all been told about the wonder that the Thales ORION sight is, and how
AJAX will be an excellent target finder. But I’m afraid I am a little less
prone to believing in hype, and I don’t think the enemy’s own thermal cameras
will be that much worse to tip the balance. And that’s without even venturing
in how Thales thermal cameras have been supplied to Russia in the recent past. Or
in how, absurdly, AJAX needs to have that prodigious sight removed in case
fitting the RWS is felt necessary. Gods know how anyone could think this was a
good idea. <o:p></o:p></span><br />
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">I also do
agree in principle on “winning fights, not battles”. Battles are for the whole
force to win. But again, my arguments are being reduced to absurdity rather
than countered more factually. To win fights you still have to be equipped
sufficiently well to have good chances. Has someone taken a bit of time in the
last while to observe Armoured vehicle development in Russia (and indeed
elsewhere too), and appreciated that they tend to put ATGWs and 30mm guns
almost on everything? And even heavier guns on the rest, I’ll add. <o:p></o:p></span><br />
The Author
say it is enough to be “competitive”, but the gap in both direct and indirect
firepower is so vast that I’m far from convinced that even that modest
requirement is properly satisfied.<br />
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">I continue
to struggle to see how the dispersed groups of the STRIKE Brigade infiltrate
the enemy ground and win fights. Even assuming they can always evade the enemy
MBTs, they don’t compare well to enemy AFVs either, including the wheeled ones
which match of exceed STRIKE’s mobility and thus cannot be realistically
avoided. Will they infiltrate by strength? They don’t have that kind of
strength. <o:p></o:p></span><br />
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Are lightly
armed APCs and AJAXs going to slip undetected past people with mobile phones
which might be less than sympathetic, past UAVs, past enemy aviation and
sensors and Fires and EW and the whole range of Peer capabilities? Will they
infiltrate by stealth? It’s extremely unlikely, at best. <o:p></o:p></span><br />
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Will they
infiltrate by means of superior mobility? Both BOXER and AJAX are around 40
tons behemoths with some limits on the actual choice of road routes, yet they
are expected to disperse and concentrate at will. They are supposed to be both
able to stay dispersed enough to be a poor target for enemy artillery, yet
strong enough or at least able to concentrate when needed to be dangerous
enough to count as the already mentioned “dilemmas” for the enemy. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">I very much
struggle to see how. <o:p></o:p></span><br />
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Boxer is
not invisible. Its strategic mobility advantage is only true compared to what the
British Army already has, but there is no advantage whatsoever when the term of
paragon is enemy wheeled armor, better armed and supported by enormously
superior Fires. Not to mention how difficult / impossible it would be to
provide any kind of air defence to the distributed groups, and how easy it
would be for the enemy to cut them off and suffocate them one by one. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">And I’m not
even venturing in the endless scenarios that could be drawn up when considering
the many difficulties that would have to be faced in order to keep the
dispersed elements resupplied, and the absolutely uphill battle of Electronic
Warfare to enable the STRIKE elements to communicate and share data. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span><br />
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"><br /></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Another
point that I feel deserves a mention is that STRIKE’s unpredictability almost
completely ends as soon as a meaningful river is encountered. There is little
to no ability to cross unless a suitable bridge is secured, and that takes away
a lot of that unpredictability. I was astonished during one of my early
discussions at being told that STRIKE “does not anticipate having to bridge a
gap in the direct fire zone”, so ABLE alone, or REBS, would have to suffice. <o:p></o:p></span><br />
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">In more
recent times it seems someone has realized that this is truly asking for too
much luck and for an enemy truly too incompetent to be taken seriously, and
project TYRO (the renewal of bridging equipment) has sprung a requirement for a
Wheeled Close Support Launch Vehicle, aka an alternative, on wheels, to TITAN<a href="file:///C:/Users/Killer/Desktop/STRIKE/Weaknesses%20of%20STRIKE/The%20many%20weaknesses%20of%20STRIKE.docx#_ftn2" name="_ftnref2" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn2;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "calibri" , "sans-serif"; font-size: 11.0pt; line-height: 115%;">[2]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a>.
Again, note Army emphasis on wheels. Not a WARRIOR-based bridgelayer, or an
ARES-based one, even though industry has demonstrated both. But the years keep
passing, and TYRO is still without a contract, like so many other things. <o:p></o:p></span><br />
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Compare
this to the Russian philosophy. Even their latest Boomerang 8x8 has amphibious
capability, and while crossing a major river remains a complex operation, and
sustainment still requires a bridge to eventually go up, they do have options.
They can put some armour on the other side without waiting for the bridging
equipment to arrive. That allows them more unpredictability than STRIKE will
ever have. And it is yet another part of why I warn everyone that STRIKE does
not have any real tactical mobility advantage over the enemy, so “mobility” is
an extremely poor answer to the question “how does infiltration happen?”. <o:p></o:p></span><br />
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">From the
Land Warfare conference in 2019 we learn that STRIKE groups must be comfortable
with the awareness that they have no secure flank. I understand the idea, but
not the application of it: you need to have something that gives you the
confidence to be a mobile strike group and not a cut off group lost in enemy
land. É<span style="mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;">lan</span> alone is not the
answer. <o:p></o:p></span><br />
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">It is clear
to me that indirect FIRES are the primary, if not the only way to keep the
dispersed group “light” yet ensure it has the firepower to hit hard. Also,
getting back to the WARFIGHTER 19-04 report, once you have forced the enemy
artillery to open fire and reveal itself because of your dispersed groups, the
one thing you really want is to be able to timely hit it. This is not done
necessarily with capabilities organic to STRIKE, but the ability to do this is
very much organic to the wider concept. If this capability is not developed,
STRIKE does not achieve its aims. <o:p></o:p></span><br />
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">On the
specific topic of ATGWs, again it shows that I debate these issues with more
than one person. For years I have enquired about the Overwatch sub-variant of
ARES, which is meant to deploy ATGW within the AJAX formations. I was told in
no uncertain terms that money was not there to do more with it than kit the
interiors to carry dismounted Javelin teams. The once hoped for BRIMSTONE is
nowhere to be seen, and to my desperation I was told that there was no plan and
no money even for something as basic as putting a single JAVELIN on the
Protector RWS. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span>
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">In more
recent times, a couple of alternative army sources, including this Author, have
instead claimed that kind of capability is funded (at least for some of the
BOXER Specialized Carriers, still not sure about ARES…?), and I welcome that
change of heart. I hope it proves true, but I still don’t know for sure who has
it right. Unless the additional JAVELINs are yet another thing the Army plans
to rob out of that sad fellow which is today’s 1<sup>st</sup> Division, at some
point in the future we will be able to read a Foreign Military Sales document
from the US detailing the purchase of new launchers and new rounds, and then we
will know and have measurable data to judge. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span><br />
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"><br /></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">But again,
it really doesn’t look like such a game-changing capability. For the British
Army, absurdly, it is, but that’s only because under-armour ATGWs have not
existed in any shape in the arsenal ever since the STRIKER / SWINGFIRE
combination left active service. In comparison to what everyone else has had
for years, it is still really the poor man’s attempt, however. Doesn’t mean it
isn’t useful, the question is whether it is in any way sufficient. <o:p></o:p></span><br />
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">And of
course the enemy has its own missiles. On most vehicle platforms and in its infantry.
<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Your
dispersed group needs to be able to effectively wipe out or at least seriously
degrade some elements and positions of the enemy forces in order to be
meaningful. You need to be lethal to screen, and you need to be lethal to
create dilemmas. It’s all good delivering myriads of pinpricks to “overwhelm
the enemy C2”, but those pinpricks must be meaningful enough to demand
reactions and cause worry. If any amount of escorting infantry with a basic
allocation of ATGWs are too much to overcome, you are pretty literally going to
make no difference to enemy plans. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">How
dispersed STRIKE elements deliver meaningful hits by concentrating and then
“dissolving into the ether” before being plastered by the superior enemy
artillery remains not clear. <o:p></o:p></span><br />
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">How many
times in Afghanistan have we seen Company Groups with plenty of air support
constantly overhead struggle to dislodge an enemy that was maybe numerous and
holed up in a great defensive position, but also kitted with extremely poor
equipment and few offensive options. STRIKE cannot afford to get bogged down in
struggles that last for hours and if it concentrates too much it is artillery
strike time once again. <o:p></o:p></span><br />
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The
infantry hasn’t changed much from back then. AJAX will hit harder than
SCIMITAR, and BOXER is roomy and mobile, and well protected for its category’s
standards. On the other hand, all other supports are unlikely to be as readily available
in a peer scenario and the peer enemy has plenty of its own ATGWs, UAVs,
artillery and even access to its own air support. As well protected as MIV is, its
protection matters not one bit against anti-tank missiles. If you think that
issuing more JAVELINs and spreading them out over a vast area is enough to
change the rules of warfare, you should wait and see the enemy issue more
KORNETs to pick apart your dispersed vehicles at any chance while they travel
around alone or in pairs / Troops. <o:p></o:p></span><br />
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">So why are
we expecting to obtain such good results? “Willingness to take risks” and
“boldness” help, but if the whole plan revolves on “bold measures” and the
willingness to take losses, I’m afraid it won’t last long. How quickly will the
dispersed groups become combat ineffective? <o:p></o:p></span><br />
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Jane's
attempt to wargame STRIKE with DSTL's own kit, which even includes capabilities
that lay well into the future and have yet to be procured (new 155mm howitzers,
for example) went very badly, and the enemy was a Russian force based around
their parachute forces<a href="file:///C:/Users/Killer/Desktop/STRIKE/Weaknesses%20of%20STRIKE/The%20many%20weaknesses%20of%20STRIKE.docx#_ftn3" name="_ftnref3" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn3;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "calibri" , "sans-serif"; font-size: 11.0pt; line-height: 115%;">[3]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a>.
Which are the Russian units with the best training, but are also about as
“light” as Russian troops come. That is not very encouraging. <o:p></o:p></span><br />
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The already
mentioned Lieutenant J. Benn also writes in his article on TANK about STRIKE
experimentation that as soon as the simulated enemy took on the characteristics
of an “East Ukraine-scenario” near peer formation, “STRIKE began to struggle”.
AJAX becomes the only thing between tanks and BMPs and the infantry in
vulnerable MIVs, and even with the backing of JAVELIN it is a “fight that
could, commander depending, go AJAX’s way but is not one that I would want to
risk unnecessarily”. And also: “MIV must be comfortable operating on its own,
inside a red picture and outgunned”. <o:p></o:p></span><br />
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">I’m afraid
that all this rather dramatically cuts down the number of Russian targets, even
in the “rear echelon”, that can be engaged successfully. And this is assuming
the enemy does not embrace dispersion himself, or at least its consequences,
and insists on having a “well defined” rear echelon to penetrate while we seek
to not have one ourselves. I think it is unlikely and Ukraine shows it. You
will have to fight to get there. <o:p></o:p></span><br />
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">How does
infiltration happen, and how do dispersed groups of AJAX and BOXER achieve
enough lethality to be “dilemmas”? How do they survive and fight, disperse and
concentrate in the contested environment? If there is no answer to this
question, we are heading into a dead end. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">What it also means is that lots of the
equipment-based criticism and commentary on Strike are simply nugatory and
ill-informed. For example, Strike doesn’t have to have organic fires to use
fires, so arguing about which wheeled gun the Strike Brigade needs misses the
point. It might or it might not. It doesn’t matter, and the best answers lie
above that of the Strike concept in the wider evolution of Land and Joint
Fires.<o:p></o:p></span></b><br />
<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Organic or
not, FIRES are absolutely essential to this concept of operation. STRIKE’s dispersed
operations are in no small part meant to find targets and put the enemy’s own
FIRES at risk. Remember that we are talking in the context of near peer and
peer enemies (has anyone realized that it is the UK that is a Russia near-peer
and not the other way around, by the way?) and of A2AD. Anti Access Area Denial
has been part of Carter’s discourse and idea from the start. <o:p></o:p></span><br />
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">STRIKE is
meant to Self-Deploy because A2AD means some traditional ways of accessing
Theatre might not be viable. <o:p></o:p></span><br />
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">STRIKE is
meant to fight dispersed because the artillery part of the enemy A2AD
capability would otherwise destroy the massed groups, as Brigadier Martin
himself remarks in the opening phase of his RUSI intervention. <o:p></o:p></span><br />
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">STRIKE
needs fires because A2AD means air support is not an option and, again I quote
the Army itself, it is now the “Land that has to enable the Air” in some cases,
by weakening enemy defences. <o:p></o:p></span><br />
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">How can
FIRES not be an absolutely critical part of the discourse? Any discussion on
STRIKE which does not focus on FIRES and how to timely direct them almost
literally from every single vehicle is a discussion that is ignoring reality. <o:p></o:p></span><br />
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The already
mentioned “dilemmas” are actually primarily meant to force the enemy artillery
into fights it does not want, because we know how lethal Russian artillery is
and we need to silence it somehow. Unless STRIKE is seriously expecting to
charge for the guns and take them out with AJAX’s gun, FIRES are front and
center. <o:p></o:p></span><br />
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The
“dilemmas” are meant to create the conditions for counter-battery, for taking
out enemy sensors, and to allow Land Forces to strike, destroy or force out of
position enemy air defence elements, so that in turn allied Air Power can truly
land the blows. The Author himself suggests it earlier in his own article. <o:p></o:p></span><br />
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<a href="https://wavellroom.com/2017/11/02/21st-century-war-strike-as-an-isr-enabler/"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">An article</span></a><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"> on Wavell Room previously also put
the focus on STRIKE as an ISR enabler and as a way to move artillery detection
sensors up-threat. <o:p></o:p></span><br />
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">STRIKE
absolutely needs significant organic FIRES, and moreover ready access to long
range, hard hitting FIRES at higher levels. Which means that Sensors, Networking
and FIRES need some real serious development. <o:p></o:p></span><br />
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The US Army
has made FIRES its absolute top priority in the context of Multi Domain
Operations. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The Royal
Artillery also has a series of very sensible requirements to contribute to this
“new” way of fighting, but unfortunately has had them for sometimes close to 2
decades, without any of them getting funded. Longer range and more flexible
rockets for GMLRS are now penciled in for 2030, while a Land Precision Strike
requirement exists for a long range (60+ km) “overwatch” missile that can,
among other things, lend lethality to dispersed groups (assuming target
hand-over is well thought out), with EXACTOR partially filling this area until
then. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiuA9TzrNo2kQgx1rT0AinkvrK490x_2bK84bbjyz5QaA37QzZ6WPP6edq6WtSyWAqAuYOFbtH5D9KX_lX8yBDXB4AVNj_2Yx36PqbVbO_A34wEjrKae-WcWUyc7vNXDfqicLvr0YAUI3s/s1600/4.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="642" data-original-width="1024" height="250" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiuA9TzrNo2kQgx1rT0AinkvrK490x_2bK84bbjyz5QaA37QzZ6WPP6edq6WtSyWAqAuYOFbtH5D9KX_lX8yBDXB4AVNj_2Yx36PqbVbO_A34wEjrKae-WcWUyc7vNXDfqicLvr0YAUI3s/s400/4.jpg" width="400" /></a></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><i>Industry is quick to exploit what is perceived
as a “BOXER for everything” hunger in some quarters of the Army. Here MBDA and
RBLS push their vision for Land Precision Strike. Arguably, it should be easier
to keep the missile launcher away from counterbattery threats, so a cheaper,
and ideally more nimble vehicle base would do, in my opinion. </i><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Closing the
lethality and range gap should be the absolute priority, but unfortunately is
not, and the casual way in which this factor is constantly brushed aside, as if
it was utterly secondary, is a recipe for disaster and one of the primary
reasons why I cannot support STRIKE, or at least the way in which it is being handled.
<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span><br />
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"><br /></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The Author
rightly mentions the importance of sensors. I actually absolutely agree. I’ve
been screaming from the rooftops for years that an Army as well aware as the
British Army is of the enemy’s utterly crushing superiority in terms of FIRES
cannot still field only 34 light counter-mortar radars and 5 MAMBA artillery
locators in total. <o:p></o:p></span><br />
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">As I’ve
said in few characters on Twitter: <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">“Problem is UAV plans still very vague, EW and
sensors are a sore spot (those poor lonely 5 MAMBA radars are a punch in the
face)”<o:p></o:p></span></i><br />
<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">2012 was
supposed to bring new radars. That became 2026 with the current SERPENS
programme. Do we think this will be the right time…? Unfortunately, I’m not
optimistic. <o:p></o:p></span><br />
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">As for the
debate on “which wheeled gun”, this goes on because the British Army has
initiated the Mobile Fires Platform programme to procure 98 new mobile howitzer to replace AS90 and the
currently entirely inadequate L118s of 3 RHA and 4 RA Regiments, the STRIKE
units, and the selection of a wheeled platform is seen as overwhelmingly likely.
I think it is an important capability and thus worthy of serious debate, but at
the same time I’m not as dogmatically committed to just one solution as I’m
made out to be. </span><br />
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span>
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The Reconnaissance Strike Group I already mentioned earlier,
for example, actually does not have any 155mm howitzers at all, but has
replaced them in the Close Support role by massively uplifting the allocation
of 120 mm mortars, while organic GMLRS and Loitering Munitions / Suicidal
Drones give it its Deep Fire capability. It might well be that this is the
future, or at least part of it. What is absolutely certain is that High Intensity
warfare in the future will have more FIRES, not less. Everyone has accepted
this, except apparently the British Army. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhNkQjSYmhPvoqrH7obvSuFD4qDExxQcKix3e490Mb1sWW78GpPOv43pkjj1qjUpaZLOHO41kyP6vIqa8hSANiYMQ7Q_cELU9vBkF-XA6VwW2JvWWnmkraGKm3H1fPvXXi5glOqJbX0W38/s1600/5.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="640" data-original-width="960" height="266" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhNkQjSYmhPvoqrH7obvSuFD4qDExxQcKix3e490Mb1sWW78GpPOv43pkjj1qjUpaZLOHO41kyP6vIqa8hSANiYMQ7Q_cELU9vBkF-XA6VwW2JvWWnmkraGKm3H1fPvXXi5glOqJbX0W38/s400/5.jpg" width="400" /></a></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><i>The Royal Artillery ran an experimentation
already years ago exploiting the French army’s CAESAR autocannons. Here gunners
from 1 RHA get trained in its use. </i><o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEi49gO6H4DCKrDZaQV15JXhWMP2-WHEgoYPIWMj3AKVqluD7jI7KGOpQgtB4in2fmjxdRlygInd4nh71l55P98AIqtI2NrvQfxRgWqUxU9Or5jTradZKbfjI6vKYrtt2h4AKv879Xbifb8/s1600/6.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="736" data-original-width="1200" height="245" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEi49gO6H4DCKrDZaQV15JXhWMP2-WHEgoYPIWMj3AKVqluD7jI7KGOpQgtB4in2fmjxdRlygInd4nh71l55P98AIqtI2NrvQfxRgWqUxU9Or5jTradZKbfjI6vKYrtt2h4AKv879Xbifb8/s400/6.jpg" width="400" /></a></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><i>RBLS’s entry for the new howitzer for the Royal
Artillery has good chances of being selected. It is a step up from CAESAR as it
offers more traverse and does not need the crew to dismount in the open to fire
the gun. Frankly, I would rather have the howitzer on the BOXER hull and the
Land Precision Strike missile on the more fragile truck base, since the gun is
more likely to be exposed to counterbattery, and over longer periods of time. </i><o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Funnily
enough, the Royal Artillery could have had the Fire Shadow loitering munition
already in service. The British Army was briefly in the vanguard in the field
of Loitering Munitions, and I was one of the (few, at the time) supporters of
that idea. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Like 99% of
modern day Royal Artillery programmes, however, it ended up cut. <o:p></o:p></span><br />
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Until the
pitifully weak FIRES are cured, I can’t imagine STRIKE going anywhere. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The other odd claim is that “wheels and tracks
don’t mix,” which is clearly a reference to Ajax being tracked, and Boxer being
wheeled. Again, this can only be a lack of experience and/or understanding. For
example, from the 1970s and 80’s the Bundeswehr had Divisional Reconnaissance Battalions
which mixed Luchs wheeled recce vehicles with Leopard 1 tanks at the sub-unit
level. Clearly, you can mix tracks and wheels, and people do. The French
Army routinely mixes tracks and wheels at the unit level with Leclerc, VBCI and
VBL. There are many more examples including Soviet Divisional-level anti-tank Battalions
and combat reconnaissance patrols which routinely mixed tanks, tracked IFVs and
Armoured cars. Soviet wheeled BTR Regiments had organic tank Battalions. Tracks
versus wheels is largely a false dilemma which is supposedly about mobility,
but is actually more about cost and sustainment.<o:p></o:p></span></b><br />
<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">It is of
course true that there are plenty of examples out there of tracks and wheels
mixes, but they don’t prove anything unless they are taken in context. Is
carrying infantry in wheeled APCs or IFVs in support of tanks a major problem?
I don’t think it is. The wheeled vehicle will not always be able to traverse
the same terrain the MBT could, but most of the time will and it comes with its
own advantages, so it is overall an acceptable compromise. Wheels have their
own merits, including a much higher degree of self-deployability. It makes
sense to reduce a Brigade’s cost and sustainment burden by having infantry
riding on wheels. <o:p></o:p></span><br />
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">I have
indeed recommended several times now that the cash strapped British Army might
want to settle for less ambitious plans and move BOXER towards being a WARRIOR
replacement, considering the bleak financial position.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
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<div class="MsoNormal">
<i><br /></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><i>An inviting demo BOXER with Lockheed Martin’s
“export” variant of the Warrior CSP turret. </i><o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Obviously,
my suggestion was met with plenty of outrage from British Army figures and
experts of all kinds because it mixes tracks and wheels, and that is bad for
all sorts of good reasons they were eager to school me in. Which was really
amusing after other Army figures had schooled me and continue to school me in
why mixing tracks and wheels is not a problem at all and STRIKE will work just
fine. <o:p></o:p></span><br />
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">I assume
the Author of this particular article is not one of those who protested, but
again, as I’ve warned at the beginning, I debate these issues with multiple
figures, and part of my frustration comes exactly from that. Anyone you speak
to gives you a different interpretation of what STRIKE is, and of whether
tracks and wheels mix well or not, whether FIRES are key or not, etcetera. I am
never afforded the luxury of debating a solid and enduring interpretation of
STRIKE, which in itself is a further proof that the concept is not clear and
not well understood, not even within the Army. The supporters of STRIKE come
across as being supportive not of STRIKE how it is, but of how they imagine it.
<o:p></o:p></span><br />
It very
much seems, and the Author himself in some ways confirms it in his piece, that
the Army is at war with itself with various factions in disagreement over the
direction of travel.<br />
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The Author
also mentions examples of wheeled scouts being used in support of tracked Armoured
formations. Again, context is everything, and I think those cases make sense.
There are many examples in the world: France, USMC, Italy, Germany, Australia
and others use variations on the theme of wheels scouting in favor of tracks. I
think it is a decent solution because it allows the reconnaissance element to
be a lot more sustainable, self-deployable and nimble. The screening element
can move around with quite some freedom, with more endurance and less
sustainment concerns. <o:p></o:p></span><br />
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">So why do I
criticize the “half-tracked” nature of the STRIKE Brigade? <o:p></o:p></span><br />
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Because the
tracked element of STRIKE is the only one with serious Direct Fire capability.
Moreover, it is the Scout, in the British case, that needs to ride on
semi-trailers for as much of the travel as possible. It is the “eyes” of the Brigade
that are most difficult to deploy and sustain, and this for me is an absurdity.
And, tellingly, it is the exact opposite of what happens in the Countries
mentioned before. <o:p></o:p></span><br />
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Moreover we
have been told, including from then CGS Carter himself, that these Brigades are
meant to self-deploy over great distances on road. The infamous 2,000 km self
deployment march is an Army claim, not something I put into the Army’s mouth. Brigadier
Martin reaffirms it in the RUSI Land Warfare Conference. <o:p></o:p></span><br />
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">But by
including AJAX in your “self-deploying” Brigade you are making things
considerably harder for yourself. And since the British Army has few HETs and
LETs (89 + 3 recovery vehicles the former, 77 the latter), you have limited
options to move AJAX, and even fewer to move the heavy armour that has to
“exploit the conditions that STRIKE creates”. STRIKE is supposed to get there
early, infiltrate, scout, secure ground, again “create the conditions” for the
rest of the force to enter battle on more favorable terms. If it takes ages to
get there, and the rest of the Force does not arrive for an even longer time,
it’s a serious issue. <o:p></o:p></span><br />
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">STRIKE is
also meant to be the British Army’s primary option for “SERVAL-like operations”
in geographically vast battlefields such as the ones that might be encountered in
Africa. Cue many mentions of Mali. <o:p></o:p></span><br />
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">France of
course did not mix tracked and wheeled vehicles in Mali: it does not need to.
The French counterpart to STRIKE is not the Armoured Brigades because they have
VBCIs alongside LECLERCs, but their Medium Weight Brigades which will have
GRIFFON APCs, JAGUARs Cavalry vehicles and also a Battalion on VBCIs for the
hardest jobs. Indeed, the French Medium Brigade has 2 cavalry regiments on
JAGUAR, like STRIKE has 2 units on AJAX, which has always come across as an
interesting coincidence. Of course, the French Brigade has more infantry
battalions, and French formations are built to the rule of 4 and are larger. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Those same Brigades
today have AMX-10RC, SAGAIE and VABs, which means they have a very healthy
amount on firepower and sensors running on wheels and can indeed self deploy
over very significant ranges and go straight into fighting, as they did in the
early hours of Operation SERVAL. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span><br />
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"><br /></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">With STRIKE,
if you don’t deploy AJAX you are missing out on both the firepower and the
sensors. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The Author
does not get into this side of the debate, but it exists, and many STRIKE
supporters regularly bring STRYKER Brigades, or the French or Italian Medium Brigades
into the discourse. And every time they do I will point out that it is a poor
comparison, and one in which STRIKE loses on several fronts. It has less of
everything, apart from tracks, when compared to those units, and it is an
easily demonstrable fact. <o:p></o:p></span><br />
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">In the end,
regarding “tracks and turrets”, just to further clarify what my actual
complaint is: STRIKE has its (limited) firepower all riding on tracks. Wheels,
which are reasonably expected to be faster and better at self-deploying, have
little to no firepower. It is simply counter-intuitive. <o:p></o:p></span><br />
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">STRIKE,
when described as this great opening act self-deploying over 2,000 km, alwa</span>ys
reminds me the original Italian CENTAURO Brigades of Cold War years, which were
meant to race down Italy’s roads ahead of heavy armour following on trailers. Those
Brigades had to contain a soviet breakout and, more specifically, any soviet
amphibious landing on the long and exposed Italian coast. They had to get there
quickly, on their own, and once there they were expected to delay, to screen
and to hold, slowing down the enemy and allowing allied heavy armour to get
into position. But to do that, they had CENTAURO with its 105mm gun and
MBT-level of firepower, plus ATGW and SAM teams riding on Puma wheeled APCs. The
cheap, light Puma 4x4 and 6x6 have eventually given way to today’s FRECCIA 8x8.<br />
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Wheels get
there quick, and need the firepower to be meaningful once they arrive. STRYKER Brigades
are adding 30mm guns, more JAVELINs, and grouping 105mm and Anti-Tank vehicles
in their recce squadron to increase their punch. Japan has the Type 16 8x8 with
105mm gun. Italy has CENTAURO and is replacing it with CENTAURO 2 with a 120/45
(the ballistics are the exact same of the universally common 120/44, with the
extra caliber compensating the pepperpot muzzle brake). Every Italian FRECCIA
8x8 comes with a 25mm, and the Brigade has a healthy allocation of SPIKE
anti-tank missiles, Medium Range at Coy level and Long Range at Battalion level.
France has AMX-10RC and, as it downgrades to 40mm on the JAGUAR, it made at
least sure to put long range ATGWs in box launchers on the new vehicle to
compensate. Poland has lots of 30mm and SPIKE missiles and proposals for 105 or
120mm cannons on ROSOMAKs periodically resurface. All of these Brigades also
have 120mm mortars and 155 mm howitzers. And less ambitious CONOPS. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">And then
there is AJAX, MIV, 81mm mortars, L118s and the most ambitious of CONOPS. The
problems should be evident to everyone. <o:p></o:p></span><br />
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">If you are
still stuck to tracked vehicles for firepower, you might as well be stuck to
MBTs, then. At least once they arrive they'll be able to take on everything. But
that brings us right back to already existing Mechanized Brigades constructs,
such as Germany’s </span><span lang="EN-GB" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-GB;">Jäger
</span><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Battalions on BOXER which
are slotted into Brigades built around LEOPARD 2s. Which in fact is exactly the
space that MASTIFF, and later MIV, were going to fill in the original, pre-2015
Army 2020 plan. A single infantry Battalion on wheels as complement to those on
WARRIORs. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span><br />
But STRIKE
is supposed to be something different, innovative and lighter, with less of a
sustainment challenge.<br />
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">In short:
if you are putting wheels into a heavy formation that comprises MBTs, you are
driving some of the sustainment burden out; but if you add tracks to a Medium
Weight Brigade meant to operate over extremely long distances, you are instead
adding a whole lot of sustainment burden in. And in fact, Medium Brigades in
other countries are entirely wheeled, and a wheeled solution was indicated from
day 1 for MIV in the context of STRIKE as well. And I go back to how wheels are
now a requirement in TYRO and the near certain winners in the AS90 replacement<a href="file:///C:/Users/Killer/Desktop/STRIKE/Weaknesses%20of%20STRIKE/The%20many%20weaknesses%20of%20STRIKE.docx#_ftn4" name="_ftnref4" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn4;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "calibri" , "sans-serif"; font-size: 11.0pt; line-height: 115%;">[4]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a>.
Coincidence? Clearly no. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span><br />
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"><br /></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">It is
undeniable that the mixture of wheels and tracks in this particular concept and
in this particular fashion is sub-optimal at best.<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"> </i>You can’t simultaneously claim that STRIKE is different from
existing Armoured / Mechanized Brigades and then use those very Brigades with
their much different CONOPS as justification for your platform mix. <o:p></o:p></span><br />
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">In passing,
I must drop a bitter mention of (dis)honor for the decisions in 2010 – 2011
that have nearly killed off the Army’s ability to use railways to move its
vehicles and kit across Europe. By 2023 some kind of U-turn is apparently going
to come to maturation with some form of capability rebuilt and I welcome that,
but in general the issue of deploying STRIKE, and moreover the Division itself,
seems to be getting a lot less attention than it should, along with the
enduring failures of Whole Fleet Management in ensuring vehicles come out of
storage in good conditions. Fixing WFM would do more to speed up the Army’s
deployment time than BOXER self-deploying on its wheels. But this is another
story, even if tightly entwined with the wider argument about how the Army
chooses its priorities.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Given its remit to “redefine how the British
Army fights,” is Strike the future of the British Army? The answer is “yes,”
not “it depends” or “too early to tell.” It simply is.<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Why?<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Firstly, because there aren’t any other
options, and secondly, thirdly and fourthly, money! The force structure
descended from Cold War Armoured Divisions or even the short live multi-role Brigades,
and now Armoured infantry Brigades might no longer be competitive for the cost.<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">In the eyes of some of the kit-junkies, an
ideal UK Armoured Infantry Brigade would have Leopard-2 MBTs, CV-90 MkIV and
some wheeled 155mm. In essence, all you would have is a more expensive version
of what was causing the problem in the first place and avoids asking the hard
questions about how to evolve or transform. The question that will eventually
have to be asked is what comes after the Armoured Infantry Brigades? How can
they transform in line with cost and effect.<o:p></o:p></span></b><br />
<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">This is
where things get really slippery. </span><br />
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">We have established early on that STRIKE is a
supporting tool. A screening and reconnaissance and exploitation force that is
meant to “help others win”. <o:p></o:p></span><br />
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The “others”
being the Armoured Brigades, for the foreseeable future at least. But, in the
very same article, the Author casts doubts on the future and affordability of
those very same Brigades. Unfortunately he is not the only one. Other STRIKE
supporters have more or less openly urged the Army to get rid of its heavy
armour in order to continue funding STRIKE. It is an alarming suggestion I
encounter more and more frequently in UK circles and which has made RUSI pages
in William F. Owen’s paper “War without tanks”<a href="file:///C:/Users/Killer/Desktop/STRIKE/Weaknesses%20of%20STRIKE/The%20many%20weaknesses%20of%20STRIKE.docx#_ftn5" name="_ftnref5" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn5;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "calibri" , "sans-serif"; font-size: 11.0pt; line-height: 115%;">[5]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a>. </span><br />
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span>
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Literally no one else thinks it is a good idea, at all, and before you mention
the USMC I will remark that they are abdicating running their own tanks but
count on the US Army to deploy lots of them<a href="file:///C:/Users/Killer/Desktop/STRIKE/Weaknesses%20of%20STRIKE/The%20many%20weaknesses%20of%20STRIKE.docx#_ftn6" name="_ftnref6" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn6;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "calibri" , "sans-serif"; font-size: 11.0pt; line-height: 115%;">[6]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a>,
and they are now more than ever trying to think of a very specific role in a
very specific environment. They make for an utterly irrelevant comparison. <o:p></o:p></span><br />
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">To his
defence, the Author here does not quite venture into saying out loud that armour
should go, unlike others. He talks about STRIKE being in support of “2-3 other Brigades”,
and leaves the rest to the classical “we should think about how they evolve in
the future”, which is an extremely open ended approach. Well, I’d really like
this point to be a lot clearer, though. This is no small issue. If the cost of
this supporting tool is such that the formations it is meant to support have to
vanish to free up money, we clearly have encountered a huge problem. <o:p></o:p></span><br />
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">What price
should the Army pay for pursuing this concept? This is THE key question. If
CHALLENGER 2 LEP and WCSP and indeed the Armoured Brigades end up paying the
price in the new Review, and unfortunately this is far from unlikely, is it
worth it? <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The Army
has already accepted to cut 1/3 of its tank regiments, convert an Armoured Brigade
and deprive 1<sup>st</sup> Division of <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">all
</i>Combat Support and Combat Service Support formations<a href="file:///C:/Users/Killer/Desktop/STRIKE/Weaknesses%20of%20STRIKE/The%20many%20weaknesses%20of%20STRIKE.docx#_ftn7" name="_ftnref7" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn7;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "calibri" , "sans-serif"; font-size: 11.0pt; line-height: 115%;">[7]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a>
in order to eventually create 2 STRIKE Brigades. It is an hefty price as it is,
but it looks like it is nowhere near enough to cover the costs yet. <o:p></o:p></span><br />
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Ultimately,
if there is no real plan for the “2-3 other Brigades”, what becomes of STRIKE?
Does it magic itself into no longer a supporting tool but a battle winning
asset without any change to its structure, just like AJAX became “Medium
Armour” without any real modification? <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span><br />
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"><br /></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Please, note
that I’m not dogmatically opposed to doing things differently, but I want to be
given reasons to believe that the new approaches work. <o:p></o:p></span><br />
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">I will exploit
the occasion to repeat something I’ve already said on Twitter about how the
wider army transformation might go. The latest issue of the British Army Review
sheds some light on the thinking for the Conceptual Force 2035<a href="file:///C:/Users/Killer/Desktop/STRIKE/Weaknesses%20of%20STRIKE/The%20many%20weaknesses%20of%20STRIKE.docx#_ftn8" name="_ftnref8" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn8;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "calibri" , "sans-serif"; font-size: 11.0pt; line-height: 115%;">[8]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a>,
and tells us that by then there will be Future Combat Teams of just 500 men,
permanently Combined Arms in nature, with robotics & autonomy and
substantial organic indirect and direct fires, built to the Rule of 4. Less
logistic weight, yet punch comparable to that of a 1250-strong Armd BG. It
doesn’t say openly that there will no longer be “tanks”, but goes close to it
in implying weight and sustainment burden has to go down. It says there will be
a substitutive capability delivered by lighter vehicles, in no small part
through ATGWs, although I guess that also leaves a chance that there will still
be some form of lighter “tank”. <o:p></o:p></span><br />
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">This is actually
extremely fascinating because BAR calculates that today’s Army authorized
strength of 82,000 would then be able to field 48 such units, to spread across
3 Divisions in a British Corps. It is a beautiful image, but I don’t know how
it could ever be resourced in the real world considering that the poor 1<sup>st</sup>
Division is reduced to a mere container of Light Role Infantry Battalions
without any CS and CSS element left (102 Logistic Brigade is planned to
disband; 2 Signal Regiment and 4 Royal Artillery, currently in line for the
single Vanguard Light Brigade are needed for the second STRIKE Brigade when it
eventually happens, along with engineers and everything else). But if it could
be done, it would be wonderful. <o:p></o:p></span><br />
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Capability-wise,
however, this idea smells of FRES and of US Future Combat System take 2, even
more ambitious and possibly even more doomed to failure and/or unaffordability.
How these units would actually achieve that kind of output for their size is
still very, very vague and Autonomy and Robotics are nowhere near as mature as
they’d have to be to easily imagine that kind of future in little more than a
decade, which is very a very short time in defence procurement terms. <o:p></o:p></span><br />
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">However, we
won't know until we try, right? But I mean try really seriously. I’m absolutely
all in favor of taking a Battalion, immediately, and turn it into a permanent Combined
Arms Battlegroup. Give it absolute freedom to change its organic capabilities
and structure. For example: wants organic EXACTOR missiles? Try it out. Wants a
platoon back to 4 sections of 10 each? Try it<a href="file:///C:/Users/Killer/Desktop/STRIKE/Weaknesses%20of%20STRIKE/The%20many%20weaknesses%20of%20STRIKE.docx#_ftn9" name="_ftnref9" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn9;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "calibri" , "sans-serif"; font-size: 11.0pt; line-height: 115%;">[9]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a>.
Wants LMM on vehicles to have a degree of anti-air / anti-UAV capability as
well as a flexible anti-surface weapon which is light yet gives you extra reach
and lethality?<a href="file:///C:/Users/Killer/Desktop/STRIKE/Weaknesses%20of%20STRIKE/The%20many%20weaknesses%20of%20STRIKE.docx#_ftn10" name="_ftnref10" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn10;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "calibri" , "sans-serif"; font-size: 11.0pt; line-height: 115%;">[10]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a>
Go for it. <o:p></o:p></span><br />
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Start
gradually driving out weight and personnel to see if it is feasible at all to
go down to 500 and to the mythical light logistical footprint. Use this experimental
BG as OPFOR in exercise, pitting it against free thinking Armoured BGs enhanced
with simulated foreign capabilities. Make it the main “customer” of AWE
experiments, and use it to bring coherence in all the little innovation
attempts going on all the time, which today frankly often seem a bit
disconnected one from the other. Let the field trial of this new experimental
unit dictate what kind of robotic help is more promising and more necessary to
cut down on manpower requirements. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span><br />
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The result
of the exercises shapes the following round of slimming down and capability
insertion. </span><br />
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span>
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">And please, do not repeat the STRIKE experiment, which if we are
honest has never been about developing a concept, but purely about trying to
find a way to make something already decided beforehand "work".
Remarkably, the Brigade structure has not changed at all from what </span><a href="http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/defence-committee/sdsr-2015-and-the-army/oral/34418.html"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Carter described in June 2016</span></a><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">, before the experimentation group
was even stood up, in April 2017. For all I’ve been able to gather, even the
STRIKE battlegroup does not show any evident innovation and its structure is
immediately familiar<a href="file:///C:/Users/Killer/Desktop/STRIKE/Weaknesses%20of%20STRIKE/The%20many%20weaknesses%20of%20STRIKE.docx#_ftn11" name="_ftnref11" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn11;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "calibri" , "sans-serif"; font-size: 11.0pt; line-height: 115%;">[11]</span></span></span></span></a>.
In one image of the tabletop wargaming exercises, the BG visible is pretty much
literally a formation straight out of the 90s, but with AJAX / ARES in the
place of SCIMITAR and SPARTAN, and MIV for the infantry. Of course, the Army
might not want to share its newer ideas and perhaps is keeping something under
his hat, but this is what we know and it isn’t particularly impressive.</span></div>
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<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEg_EuCT70F6kbdRmyL5-wI7XS0Kl3tmyWgHzyU6ZtxQoTJHM3nWHt8MrU83KXJE3FQNA-5dCdd0nLMOBDnDOjLYtpQj_nBgKzNiDMGka2YJPoibxXPFlK0-HgC-f1RvQLsZQWSvAjf8NIY/s1600/8.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="900" data-original-width="1600" height="225" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEg_EuCT70F6kbdRmyL5-wI7XS0Kl3tmyWgHzyU6ZtxQoTJHM3nWHt8MrU83KXJE3FQNA-5dCdd0nLMOBDnDOjLYtpQj_nBgKzNiDMGka2YJPoibxXPFlK0-HgC-f1RvQLsZQWSvAjf8NIY/s400/8.jpg" width="400" /></a></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<i><br /></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><i>The battlegroup being played in this tabletop
wargame exercise does not seem to have anything truly innovative about its
composition. </i><o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">If it is
proven, in a realistic fashion, that a good alternative to MBTs exists, then we
can move on in that direction. But don’t go all-in on an unproven concept. <o:p></o:p></span><br />
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">And when your
budget is so tight, don’t throw away what you have counting on jam to arrive
tomorrow, especially if, as in this case, you don’t really know what color the
jam might even have. <o:p></o:p></span><br />
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">It has been
pointed out to me that most of the capabilities that need to be built up into
and around STRIKE are for the benefit of the whole Field Army, and this is
absolutely true and very clear. Things like LeTacCis, to evolve the
communications side beyond BOWMAN; SERPENS and Mobile Fires Platform and others
are very clearly whole-of-the-army programs. STRIKE, supposedly, adds urgency
to them and helps getting them moving. <o:p></o:p></span><br />
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">In
practice, I’m afraid it does not. It’s literally a fact that several other programs
could have been funded and started out if the available money hadn’t been put
on BOXER instead. <o:p></o:p></span><br />
It seems to
me at times like the Army, after criticizing the Royal Navy for many years over
the decision to pursue the aircraft carriers as epicenter of its future, has
now decided to create its own “Strike Carrier” flagship programme in the hope
that more money will be made available to advance it and kit it out for
success. This approach isn’t really working wonders for the Navy and is unfortunately
highly unlikely to do any better for the Army.<br />
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">I hope
people understand that the British Army runs the very real risk of turning,
with its own hands, what was meant to be a decent Division into nothing more
than a Reconnaissance and Screening contribution to a NATO Corps which will
have to be made up by someone else’s Brigades. It will be a very different
Army, and a very diminished country output, no matter how innovative and
sophisticated it might be in its core idea. We have to be honest in debating
this point, because as the Author himself reminds us, money is very much a
problem and the last few decades of British Army Armoured vehicle programmes
have been an unmitigated disaster that cannot be repeated one more time. <o:p></o:p></span><br />
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">There is no
real reason why the British Army, starting further west than almost everyone
else, should necessarily be the one to race east and try to get there first to
maneuver as the “Multi Domain” recce and screen element. Considering how many
capability gaps it suffers, starting with sensors and FIRES and going up to what
unfortunately remains one of the most pitifully weak ground based air defences
elements in the whole of NATO, it is very badly positioned for something so
ambitious. Unlike many other NATO countries, it has to build up its Medium
Weight force from scratch and misses out on several decades of 8x8 experience
that others instead posses. </span><br />
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span>
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Many are eager to describe STRIKE as a cheaper
option to “legacy” Brigades. Unfortunately, STRIKE is not the cheap option at
all, and reducing the number of compromises it has to live with in its force
structure and equipment will cost immense amounts of money. <o:p></o:p></span><br />
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Nobody
forces the British Army to deliver necessarily that kind of contribution: the
one demand NATO has formulated is “30-30-30-30”<a href="file:///C:/Users/Killer/Desktop/STRIKE/Weaknesses%20of%20STRIKE/The%20many%20weaknesses%20of%20STRIKE.docx#_ftn12" name="_ftnref12" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn12;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "calibri" , "sans-serif"; font-size: 11.0pt; line-height: 115%;">[12]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a>.
The UK can contribute to NATO in other ways. Why go for the most ambitious and
expensive possible concept, because this is what STRIKE is, at least in
Carter's description of its aims? Is it purely for prestige reasons, because
the British Army has to be seen as the one NATO ally “able” to follow the US
into Multi Domain Operations right from day one? <o:p></o:p></span><br />
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Mind you, I
think Prestige is a plenty good thing to aim for, but you have to be careful
not to “volunteer for Helmand” again. <o:p></o:p></span><br />
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">You can
secure prestige by being able to provide some genuinely solid Brigades, able to
cover less ground but do it reliably and autonomously with British troops and
British supports. That kind of force would be less of a support tool in nature
and more of a flexible instrument that would simultaneously preserve that
degree of independent action capability that the Secretary of State for Defence
has been begging to see retained. </span><br />
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span>
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">There are arguably better ways to use the
money and all the manpower and resources of 1<sup>st</sup> Division too, to
form an army which is less of a unitary silver bullet and more of a force that
can sustain a complex task over a long period. It is no mystery, again, that
I’ve spent years looking with interest at France’s “Au Contact” plan for two
identical divisions which are clearly lighter than the currently imagined 3<sup>rd</sup>
Division but that on the other hand ensure the Army does not exhaust itself in
one single 6 to 12 months “make it or break it” kind of effort. <o:p></o:p></span><br />
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">By definition,
STRIKE without the FIRES, the sensors, and the “2-3 other Brigades”, can only
ever be an ARRC asset that needs Allies to field everything else. <o:p></o:p></span><br />
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">If your
concept is predicated on supporting Armoured Brigades (or whatever form of
“evolved” Brigade you want to imagine) that you risk losing in order to fund
the concept; if it depends on Artillery programmes you are likely not going to
be able to fund; Communications and Sensors you don’t have a line of sight (and
funding) on; and a big question mark over how to be lethal while so widely
dispersed, maybe you have to accept that the concept you are pursuing is not
actually suited to you and your purse. <o:p></o:p></span><br />
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span>
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div style="mso-element: footnote-list;">
<!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><br clear="all" />
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<!--[endif]-->
<br />
<div id="ftn1" style="mso-element: footnote;">
<h3 style="background: white; line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<a href="file:///C:/Users/Killer/Desktop/STRIKE/Weaknesses%20of%20STRIKE/The%20many%20weaknesses%20of%20STRIKE.docx#_ftnref1" name="_ftn1" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn1;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "calibri" , "sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; line-height: 115%;">[1]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a><span style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"> <span lang="EN-US" style="font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-size: x-small;">France’s VBCI fleet of 600
vehicles does include 100+ command vehicles, but no ambulance, and equips 8
regiments, all individually larger than british Battalions. Italy’s FRECCIA
family includes an extremely low number of command posts and no ambulance
either. The British Army does get a lot of money, even in these days; it is
often how it decides to spend it that downsizes the end result.</span></span></span></h3>
<h3 style="background: white; line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span style="font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-size: x-small;"><a href="file:///C:/Users/Killer/Desktop/STRIKE/Weaknesses%20of%20STRIKE/The%20many%20weaknesses%20of%20STRIKE.docx#_ftnref2" name="_ftn2" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn2;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "calibri" , sans-serif; line-height: 115%;">[2]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a><span style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"> </span><a href="http://bidstats.uk/tenders/2018/W50/692977856"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">http://bidstats.uk/tenders/2018/W50/692977856</span></a><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"> The Wheeled Close Support Launch
Vehicle was not there before the December 2018 re-issuing of the notice.</span></span></span></h3>
<h3 style="background: white; line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span style="font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-size: x-small;"><a href="file:///C:/Users/Killer/Desktop/STRIKE/Weaknesses%20of%20STRIKE/The%20many%20weaknesses%20of%20STRIKE.docx#_ftnref3" name="_ftn3" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn3;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "calibri" , sans-serif; line-height: 115%;">[3]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"> Jon Hawkes and his team played the
game; he and Sam Cranny plan to write a report about the experience. (@JonHawkes275
; @Sam_Cranny)</span></span></span></h3>
<h3 style="background: white; line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span style="font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-size: x-small;"><a href="file:///C:/Users/Killer/Desktop/STRIKE/Weaknesses%20of%20STRIKE/The%20many%20weaknesses%20of%20STRIKE.docx#_ftnref4" name="_ftn4" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "calibri" , sans-serif; line-height: 115%;">[4]</span></span></span></a> <span lang="EN-US">The requirements for the new
Mobile Fires Platform do not specifically include wheels but a generic “increased
range and mobility”. They are required to travel 520 km in 24 hours, including
200 km on unbounded roads and 30 km off road without assistance. The selection
of a tracked platform is universally seen as very unlikely.</span></span></span></h3>
<h3 style="background: white; line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<a href="file:///C:/Users/Killer/Desktop/STRIKE/Weaknesses%20of%20STRIKE/The%20many%20weaknesses%20of%20STRIKE.docx#_ftnref5" name="_ftn5" style="font-size: small; font-weight: normal;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "calibri" , sans-serif; line-height: 115%;">[5]</span></span></span></span></a><span style="font-size: x-small; font-weight: normal;"> </span><a href="https://rusi.org/publication/rusi-newsbrief/war-without-tanks" style="font-size: small; font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">https://rusi.org/publication/rusi-newsbrief/war-without-tanks</span></a><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size: x-small; font-weight: normal;">, the report requires membership to
be accessed</span></h3>
<h3 style="background: white; line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span style="font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-size: x-small;"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><o:p></o:p></span><a href="file:///C:/Users/Killer/Desktop/STRIKE/Weaknesses%20of%20STRIKE/The%20many%20weaknesses%20of%20STRIKE.docx#_ftnref6" name="_ftn6" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn6;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "calibri" , sans-serif; line-height: 115%;">[6]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a><span style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"> <span lang="EN-US">“We need an Army with lots of
tanks. We don’t need a Marine Corps with tanks” is the quote from Marine<br />
Corps Commandant General David Berger himself.</span></span></span></span></h3>
<h3 style="background: white; line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span style="font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-size: x-small;"><span style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><span lang="EN-US"><a href="file:///C:/Users/Killer/Desktop/STRIKE/Weaknesses%20of%20STRIKE/The%20many%20weaknesses%20of%20STRIKE.docx#_ftnref7" name="_ftn7" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn7;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "calibri" , sans-serif; line-height: 115%;">[7]</span></span></span></span></a><span style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"> <span lang="EN-US">I’m firmly convinced that one
of the highest priorities for the Army at the Review table should be to
re-balance itself, cutting some infantry (no matter the capbadge tears) to
rebuild the supports needed for actual combined arms operations.</span></span></span></span></span></span></h3>
<h3 style="background: white; line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span style="font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-size: x-small;"><span style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><span lang="EN-US"> <o:p></o:p></span></span><a href="file:///C:/Users/Killer/Desktop/STRIKE/Weaknesses%20of%20STRIKE/The%20many%20weaknesses%20of%20STRIKE.docx#_ftnref8" name="_ftn8" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn8;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "calibri" , sans-serif; line-height: 115%;">[8]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a><span style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"> <span lang="EN-US">BAR Issue 177, Winter/Spring
2020; </span></span><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><a href="https://www.army.mod.uk/media/9038/bar177-winter-spring-2020.pdf">https://www.army.mod.uk/media/9038/bar177-winter-spring-2020.pdf</a></span></span></span></h3>
<h3 style="background: white; line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span style="font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-size: x-small;"><a href="file:///C:/Users/Killer/Desktop/STRIKE/Weaknesses%20of%20STRIKE/The%20many%20weaknesses%20of%20STRIKE.docx#_ftnref9" name="_ftn9" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn9;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "calibri" , sans-serif; line-height: 115%;">[9]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a><span style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"> <span lang="EN-US">A recent experiment seeking
to modernize the platoon tested the return to a 4 Sections structure, but was
constrained by the order to keep it absolutely manpower neutral. The Rule of 4
was unsurprisingly liked a lot by the troops involved, but just as
unsurprisingly, Sections of 6 men proved too small…</span></span></span></span></h3>
<h3 style="background: white; line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span style="font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-size: x-small;"><a href="file:///C:/Users/Killer/Desktop/STRIKE/Weaknesses%20of%20STRIKE/The%20many%20weaknesses%20of%20STRIKE.docx#_ftnref10" name="_ftn10" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn10;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "calibri" , sans-serif; line-height: 115%;">[10]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a><span style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"> <span lang="EN-US">Check out the WARRIOR VERDI
demonstrator, in the days when Britain still had its own AFV industry and was
still genuinely innovative.</span></span></span></span></h3>
<h3 style="background: white; line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span style="font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-size: x-small;"><a href="file:///C:/Users/Killer/Desktop/STRIKE/Weaknesses%20of%20STRIKE/The%20many%20weaknesses%20of%20STRIKE.docx#_ftnref11" name="_ftn11" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn11;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "calibri" , sans-serif; line-height: 115%;">[11]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a><span style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"> </span></span></span><span lang="EN-US"><span style="font-size: x-small;"><span style="font-weight: normal;">By default, expect a STRIKE BG to consist of 2x Mech
Inf Coys, 1x Medium Armour Sqn, 1x Arty Tac Gp, 1x Engr Sqn and BG ech. The 2 BGs
formed on the Mech Inf Battalions will have a Support Coy with mortars,
JAVELINs, Snipers etcetera; but the one formed on the Medium Armour regiment
won’t have a Support Coy, since MA is, you will have guessed already, modeled
on a Tank Regiment. Information comes from @E</span></span><span style="font-size: x-small; font-weight: normal;">dOBrien, who is working on British
Army combat capability development.</span></span></h3>
<h3 style="background: white; line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span style="font-size: x-small; font-weight: normal;"><a href="file:///C:/Users/Killer/Desktop/STRIKE/Weaknesses%20of%20STRIKE/The%20many%20weaknesses%20of%20STRIKE.docx#_ftnref12" name="_ftn12" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "calibri" , sans-serif; line-height: 115%;">[12]</span></span></span></a><span lang="EN-US"> 30 Battalions, 30 ships and 30 Fast
Jet squadrons within 30 days.</span></span></h3>
</div>
</div>
<br />Gabrielehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/01623558391676151582noreply@blogger.com41tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-442909239199162925.post-86467041806558390912020-04-02T21:50:00.000+02:002020-04-02T23:31:56.006+02:00The British Combat Aviation Brigade <br />
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">It has been
in the works for quite some time, and will be a building site for several years
still, but the UK is finally standing up its own Combat Aviation Brigade to
bring some order in the convoluted and overlapping command arrangements of its
helicopter forces. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">I’ve known
about this plan for many months, but couldn’t really talk about it before some
sort of official announcement was released. This finally happened yesterday,
even if, primarily because of the pandemic, it was an extremely low-key news. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">I’ve been
and I remain extremely critical of much of what the Army is doing and saying
about its future, but for all it’s worth I can certainly say I am a big
supporter of this one move. It is arguably long, long overdue and the brigading
of the units involved in fielding aviation groups in support of british land
forces has long featured in my recommendations for the future structures of the
Army.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"><br /></span></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"><br /></span></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"><br /></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The Wings
of what once was 24 Air Mobile Brigade have been chosen as the TRF for the new
1 star command, 1<sup>st</sup> Aviation Brigade (1st Avn Bde). Fun fact: in </span><a href="http://ukarmedforcescommentary.blogspot.com/2013/05/my-alternative-proposal-for-army-2020.htm"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">my proposals for the future</span></a><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">, as far back as 2013, I </span><a href="https://i.pinimg.com/originals/f6/1a/a6/f61aa6d41689aac3078450292cf56231.jpg"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">had seen this coming</span></a><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">. It has to be admitted, however,
that it was a relatively easy guess: the other likely candidate was the
Striking Eagle badge that used to be 16 Air Assault Brigade’s symbol until the
return of Pegasus In 2018 and which has stuck around since as badge of the
Attack Helicopter Force. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Back to serious
matters, 1<sup>st</sup> Aviation Brigade is the main component of a wider
restructuring of Army aviation (known as Project COLINDALE) which has been
very, very slowly progressing ever since 2015. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Primary
drivers for change are the need to generate efficiencies; the need to build a
C2 construct capable to brigade aviation elements in support of a Divisional
deployment, rather than penny-packet groups only suited to brigade or
sub-brigade deployments; and the ongoing review of the infrastructure footprint
of the Army Air Corps. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Notoriously,
all three Services have had to craft a plan to divest a lot of bases, barracks
and land in an effort to achieve savings and enable the modernization of the
remaining infrastructure. Army Aviation is supposed to do its bit in this
project, but decisions on the future footprint remain elusive. Essentially, the
biggest dilemma is whether to close down Middle Wallop or Wattisham, since
Yeovilton is going nowhere and there isn’t a real alternative to keeping
Aldergrove for operations in Northern Ireland. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
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<br />
<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgiXppZRmdbp6OXyOMF-GxkvvoegSgWBjazsmkV5k5Q80Im70pOmfsNX7vHwgzDQzzTXgXfKWbVCULr3yxvr-Qool5SCatBAL7KiDfMs1Hk1cgEoEBX5HoBiWMboq7TWHNpXB8OlZ40O40/s1600/EQmsZFMXUAI-SUr.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="400" data-original-width="800" height="200" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgiXppZRmdbp6OXyOMF-GxkvvoegSgWBjazsmkV5k5Q80Im70pOmfsNX7vHwgzDQzzTXgXfKWbVCULr3yxvr-Qool5SCatBAL7KiDfMs1Hk1cgEoEBX5HoBiWMboq7TWHNpXB8OlZ40O40/s400/EQmsZFMXUAI-SUr.jpg" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">Operations in Arctic conditions have been intense between 2019 and 2020, with the debut of british Apaches in Norway and their first arctic use of Hellfire missiles. This is part of the as yet unpublished "UK Defence in the High North" strategy in which the UK committs to a much increased role on the Norway flank of NATO for the next decade. </td></tr>
</tbody></table>
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</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">From what
can be observed from the outside, the closure of Wattisham with the migration
soutwards of the Apache squadrons is the desired outcome, but clearly the
complexity and cost of the move are very much preventing the sealing of a
definitive plan. It is clear that the time for such a move is now, if not
yesterday, since the transition between the current AH1 standard and the new
Block III standard is soon to begin on the flightline, with the first
remanufactured helicopters arriving this year. The Army would like to co-locate
all Apache training phases, currently split between Conversion To Type carried
out by 673 AAC at Middle Wallop and Conversion To Role<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>done by 653 AAC, Wattisham, with the ultimate
objective of also merging the 2 squadrons into a single one (653 AAC). <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">3 and 4
Regiments will remain otherwise relatively unchanged, each with its two
frontline squadrons and with an uplift to manpower in the ground element to
sustain an higher operational tempo for high intensity operations. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">In terms of
Command and Control, aviation groups have so far deployed under the control of
HQs pieced together from disparate Joint Helicopter Command resources, assigned
to the commander of one of the constituent forces. The Commander of the Attack
Helicopter Force has been the core for one such “makeshift” Aviation Task Force
(ATF-1); Commando Helicopter Force provides another (ATF-2) and Support
Helicopter Force (RAF Chinook and Puma 2 squadrons) provide the basis for a
third. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The use of
Force Commanders and augmentees from JHC is no longer judged sufficient as it
lacks the command capacity and battle staff power needed to </span><span lang="EN-GB" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-GB;">plan, refine and execute multiple
tasks at the necessary speed, concurrency and endurance. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-GB;">The
formation of a permanent 1-star command with associated staff also offers the
benefit of providing a “plug-in point” that better enables integration with
international forces and, primarily, with the US Army’s own Combat Aviation
Brigades. Most countries the UK will be working with, have long had a 1-star
Aviation HQ directing employment of Aviation Battlegroups, and others, like
France, have in recent times gone in the same direction. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-GB;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-GB;">1<sup>st</sup>
Aviation Brigade, based in Middle Wallop, will be born out of the progressive
merging of the current Attack Helicopter Force (AHF) command element (the
overarching command sitting above 3 and 4 Regiments AAC) with the Aviation
Reconnaissance Force (ARF, essentially the overarching command element
overseeing 1<sup> </sup></span><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">and
5 Regiments AAC) and later of the Watchkeeper Force (WKF) as well. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Instead of
having separate AHF and ARF forces, the Avn Bde will instead be a deputy
commader in chief for the ATTACK and one for the FIND functions. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiwhmfk0C5nLe8SntOUYQErm9LEsSJf-4xjMFtTZ6ElEJQVqMXn-aQ73B6-IQbztQpq8XNYL_Tj66fxxDHwdbohSon8JlWXG2j1f-PDWTxGg4g5LQpPBaQMlSchBWwqr7EhMDeg1EgNhU0/s1600/Joint+Warrior+13.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="640" data-original-width="960" height="213" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiwhmfk0C5nLe8SntOUYQErm9LEsSJf-4xjMFtTZ6ElEJQVqMXn-aQ73B6-IQbztQpq8XNYL_Tj66fxxDHwdbohSon8JlWXG2j1f-PDWTxGg4g5LQpPBaQMlSchBWwqr7EhMDeg1EgNhU0/s320/Joint+Warrior+13.jpg" width="320" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">In preparation for the more ambitious role of Aviation in future Divisional operations, several large scale operations have seen whole AAC Apache squadrons flying long range strikes across the UK and even deep into France. The teaming of Wildcat and Apache, including the use of the first to laser-mark targets in favor of the Hellfire missiles of the latter, has also been tested and validated </td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Watchkeeper
will continue to be operated by 47 Regiment Royal Artillery, which continues to
work on equipping and training 4 equipment batteries. The change of command
won’t be particularly dramatic since 47 RA has been under Joint Helicopter
Command control already since 31 august 2016, when it resubordinated from 1<sup>st</sup>
ISR Brigade as part of efforts to overcome the problems that have tormented
this UAV capability in its work up to full service readiness. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Under the
31 (HQ) Bty, 10 (Assaye) Bty and 43 (Lloyd’s Company) Bty were the first
subunits to become operational with Watchkeeper, and have since been joined by
74 (The battleaxe Company) Bty and finally by 57 (Bhurtpore) Bty, which
resubordinated from 32 RA during 2019. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj0uPODEO44xxyzSoAXWRQqnIlyJNijRf74u1MZyJoG3St1C2lFdYRQol2RZ4CFocOVMvIDbC9o1FO_wI1NQ7GC_zROO0J3ogC8ExMafPjG-Pl2oDzoIBYZ8P3Vg6KoVwGn6FhnHg5uNB0/s1600/10+Bty+Watchkeeper+ops+Akrotiri.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="945" data-original-width="1348" height="224" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj0uPODEO44xxyzSoAXWRQqnIlyJNijRf74u1MZyJoG3St1C2lFdYRQol2RZ4CFocOVMvIDbC9o1FO_wI1NQ7GC_zROO0J3ogC8ExMafPjG-Pl2oDzoIBYZ8P3Vg6KoVwGn6FhnHg5uNB0/s320/10+Bty+Watchkeeper+ops+Akrotiri.jpg" width="320" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">From 2019, Watchkeeper is finally cleared to fly from Boscombe Down. Intense operations are ongoing also from Akrotiri, Cyprus.</td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">1 Regiment
AAC has had to abandon all ambitions of eventually re-activating 669 AAC and
672 AAC squadrons on AW-159 WILDCAT, as had once been planned. These ex Lynx
units have now disbanded, leaving the Regiment composed of 661 and 659
Squadrons, plus 652 as training unit delivering both Conversion to Type and to
Role. The regiment will have the ability to force generate as an Aviation
Battlegroup for deployment. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">4 Regiment
AAC has under command 656 and 664 Squadrons on Apaches. The first is the
specialist in Apache shipboard operations and the primary supplier of Attack
Helicopter support to 3 Commando Brigade. 664 is primarily aligned to 16 Air
Assault Brigade. The regiment will increasingly contributed to the max output
required by Division scale operations, however. It should eventually take
responsibility also for the combined CTT and CTR training unit, 653 Sqn. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">3 Regiment
AAC has the Apache squadrons 662 and 663. Both Attack Helicopter regiments will
have the ability to force generate as Aviation Battlegroups for deployment. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">5 Regiment
AAC will oversee internal security operations (essentially, Northern Ireland
and Special Forces support) and will also oversee aviation support to training
overseas (7 Flight in Brunei and 29 Flight in BATUS). The regiment is otherwise
made up by 2 squadrons; 665 AAC operates Gazelle helicopters from Aldergrove,
while 651 AAC operates fixed wing ISLANDER and DEFENDER aircraft from the same
base. Since 1 April 2019, however, 651 Sqn has been transferred to the RAF and
once the new arrangements eventually reach Full Operational Capability, 651 will
be removed from the Army’s order of battle. 665 AAC is instead intended to
re-equip with a new helicopter replacing Gazelle. The expectation is that a
small number of H-145 helicopters will be acquired for the role. Some could
also replace the Gazelles of 29 Flight in BATUS, Canada. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">658
Squadron, which operates in support of the SAS with Dauphin helicopters, will
sit under the regiment but clearly its actual line of command is somewhere
else. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The Brigade
also commands 6 Regiment AAC with its 4 squadrons of reservists (675. 677, 678
and 679) who backfill ground support roles positions and provide war
establishment uplift to the manpower of regular squadrons. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The
training regiments (2, 7 and 9) of the Army Air Corps will not be included in
the brigade. With WILDCAT training delivered directly by 1 Regiment AAC via 652
Sqn and with the same approach eventually planned for adoption by 3 and 4
Regiments with 653 AAC taking over all phases of APACHE training, it is
expected that 7 Regiment AAC will fold its remaining functions into 5 Regiment
AAC (training for the successor to Gazelle and oversight of overseas flights)
and then disband. There are no firm official dates yet for this to happen; the
main obstacle being the enduring inability to agree on whether to vacate
Wattisham. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">2 Regiment
will carry on delivering the early phases of AAC personnel training in 668 and
676 Squadrons. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">9 Regiment
has been recently stood up at RAF Shawbury as part of the Defence Helicopter
Flying School and has taken under command 670 AAC and 60 RAF Squadrons. It
works alongside 2 Maritime Air Wing which delivers training through 660 AAC and
705 NAS squadrons. This arrangement will carry on. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"><br /></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The aviation
brigade will deploy under 3(UK) Division for major divisional operations and
will deploy scalable C2 elements and associated Aviation Battlegroups or Units
of Action for smaller scale contingencies. The Brigade will be resourced to
operate with “at least” 4 Avg BGs and will be able to take under command
non-british formations. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">In
particular, it is assumed than in any “max effort” scenario requiring 3(UK)
Division to be fielded, 1<sup>st</sup> Aviation Brigade would have to deploy
the vast majority of all frontline helicopter fleets, as it is expected than
the Littoral Manoeuvre helicopter force (the Commando Helicopter Force with the
MERLINs of 845 and 846 NAS plus the WILDCATs of 847 NAS, reinforced by 656 AAC
with APACHEs and some CHINOOKs for heavy lift) would be required to operate as
the same time as the main ground-based force. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Air
mobility up to Company level is also assumed as requirement for Rear Area
security: during a Divisional deployment, a Light Brigade formed out of units
from 1<sup>st</sup> (UK) Division would deploy with Rear Area security roles. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">It is
assumed that 2 Squadrons of CHINOOKs, for up to 26 helicopters in total, would
be deployed for such a large scale operation. If massed together for a primary
operation, these helicopters could easily airlift a whole air assault battalion
in one wave. If realized, this ambition would mean deploying more Chinooks than
are found normally in American CABs. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">24 Apache
would also be the target, same number as are found in an attack battalion
within an American CAB. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
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<div class="MsoNormal">
The main
weakness of british aviation is naturally Medium Lift. Wildcat has extremely
limited lift capability, while the small number of Puma HC2s is expected to be,
for the most part, busy with Special Forces requests. The Americans,
conversely, employ large numbers of Black Hawks, including several permanently
tasked with CASEVAC / MEDEVAC role. French, Italians, Germans and others count
on large numbers of NH-90 for the medium lift, but, with the sole exception of
Germany, are in turn much weaker in terms of heavy lift.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
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<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiKjOZT2CkWePumYX-UIT4iArmYB-15XUc0b9cy8LzhMABkfiNxnbBX5bKXzxjRtKf_l6b4Gccg-n6EiAH-IcS4yIWNJUMdR8OgMflTTNrdfKcRkH_mV2qxbE2iYzlB_15oA7uAmUL0eJI/s1600/EK4kcOpW4AAxp-P.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="961" data-original-width="1600" height="240" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiKjOZT2CkWePumYX-UIT4iArmYB-15XUc0b9cy8LzhMABkfiNxnbBX5bKXzxjRtKf_l6b4Gccg-n6EiAH-IcS4yIWNJUMdR8OgMflTTNrdfKcRkH_mV2qxbE2iYzlB_15oA7uAmUL0eJI/s400/EK4kcOpW4AAxp-P.jpg" width="400" /></a></div>
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<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Apart from
the new and enhanced capabilities of command and execution of multiple
concurrent operations, the Brigade will benefit from a substantial
restructuring of 7 Battalion REME, which also includes 132 Squadron, Royal
Logistic Corps, combining Equipment Support and repair with logistic
sustainment of the deployed force. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Regimental REME
workshops within 1, 3 and 4 Regiments will be restructured and strengthened
with their own Equipment Support platoons and vehicle platoon for sustaining
increased tempo of operations in the field. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiSm91VwGCXlPzqPtcs2f_-b39IaXjF0IuYQsqgzAOSBVaqLivcBuixJPzikCDWObTmrwT2HpKy7k4_YzZUDynrYdK8m-M4Gkd8Y3aXRcujAVm8gmjdCEU03FrLUOpgNgHt-qB-d19xEVQ/s1600/After+more+than+a+year%252C+CH-47+Chinook+helicopters+Mali+Barkhane++7%252C052+soldiers%252C+475+tonnes+of+freight+in+over+1%252C192+total+flying+hours.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="720" data-original-width="1080" height="266" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiSm91VwGCXlPzqPtcs2f_-b39IaXjF0IuYQsqgzAOSBVaqLivcBuixJPzikCDWObTmrwT2HpKy7k4_YzZUDynrYdK8m-M4Gkd8Y3aXRcujAVm8gmjdCEU03FrLUOpgNgHt-qB-d19xEVQ/s400/After+more+than+a+year%252C+CH-47+Chinook+helicopters+Mali+Barkhane++7%252C052+soldiers%252C+475+tonnes+of+freight+in+over+1%252C192+total+flying+hours.jpg" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">The 3 british Chinooks deployed in Mali give much needed Heavy Lift support to the french forces in the region. In their first year of deployment they flew for 1192 hours, lifting 7,052 soldiers and 475 tonnes of freight </td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">On top of
those organic resources, 7 REME will provide a 2<sup>nd</sup> line of Aviation
Close Support in the field, with two Aviation Companies (71 and 72) and a Field
Company specializing in Recovery (70 Fd Coy). 73 Aviation Coy relocated to
Yeovilton in the last few years and will merge with 1 AAC regiment’s workshop
elements to provide organic support. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">1<sup>st</sup>
Aviation Brigade is very much inspired by the US Army’s own CABs, but, for the
moment at least, will continue to suffer of some of the typically british
over-convoluted and overlapping layers of command and inter-service
arrangements. </span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Somewhat counter-intuitively, for example, the brigade does not
seem destined to include 244 Signal Squadron, the designate aviation support
comms units, which remains more loosely at JHC level, despite the unquestioned
need for Communication and Information Support. I fully expect experience in
the field to eventually lead to the resubordination of said squadron into the
brigade, regardless of what the assumptions are right now. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">More
significantly, while 1<sup>st</sup> Avn Bde will have very significant organic
FIND and ATTACK capabilities thanks to WILDCAT, WATCHKEEPER and APACHE, it
won’t have direct day to day control over Manoeuvre helicopters as the CHINOOK
and PUMA Squadrons are part of the RAF. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Connection
with these crucial elements will be maintained through the higher level of
command (Joint Helicopter Command), and deployed support helicopters will fall
under 1<sup>st</sup> Avn Bde control during operations. Even then, it is acknowledged
that “support helicopter squadrons have less organic life support than attack
and recce formations and are not expected to manoeuvre in the same way”. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Similarly,
the brigade won’t have direct control of the Tactical Supply Wing and Joint
Helicopter Support Squadron. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">This once
again brings into focus the unhelpful awkwardness of having the troop carrying
helicopters, quite frankly, sitting under the “wrong” Service. I don’t intend
to denigrate the RAF’s commitment to the Support Helicopter Force, much as I
will be inexorably accused of doing exactly that. I believe I’m simply stating
a fact of life. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">I will also
immediately acknowledge that it is, at the moment and in the foreseeable future
at the very least, almost unthinkable to prospect a transfer of CHINOOK and
PUMA in Army hands. The effects on manpower could admittedly be disastrous if a
well established RAF “family” was broken up, dramatically changing the career
prospects of those who serve into it. Moreover, the Army is the Service that is
most severely struggling with recruitment and retention, as well as grappling
with decades of accumulated obsolescence across its structures and vehicle
fleets, leading to a budget which is already broken as it is. As a consequence,
I am NOT recommending a transfer at this time, although I will forever remark
that it should be an objective for the future, perhaps to be incrementally
implemented alongside the purchase of new build CHINOOKs to replace the oldest
airframes in the coming years (assuming that the ongoing CHINOOK Capability
Sustainment Programme does survive the new Integrated Review, of course). </span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Transferring
capabilities is difficult, but not impossible: the already mentioned case of
651 AAC is an example, and the transfer of MERLIN HC3 to the Navy is another. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">What I am
unashamedly urging is the immediate consideration of alternative joint
solutions to bring the Support Helicopter Force into the Aviation Brigade and
to restructure CHINOOK and PUMA 2 ground support / life support elements to
deliver a more homogeneous capability for manoeuvre and flexible basing. As of
now, APACHE and WILDCAT units are aiming for an increased ability to deploy
forward and switch between Forward Operating Bases and multiple FARPs to
operate in bitterly contested scenarios, while CHINOOK and PUMA 2 remain more
decisively tied to availability of a better established Main Operating Base. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">In
addition, I believe that any honest appraisal of the resources available would
conclude that creating a coherent Aviation Sustainment Battalion by combining
Tactical Supply Wing, JHSS and 132 RLC Sqn is the sound thing to do. 7 REME
could then focus entirely on Equipment Support. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Finally,
proper planning should go into an integrated plan for adjusting / expanding the
warfighting establishment as required, with Reserve support coming both from 6
AAC Regiment and from Royal Auxiliary Air Force formations. 1<sup>st</sup>
Aviation Brigade will indeed include 6 AAC Regiment in its structure exactly
for that purpose, and RauxAF elements connected to the Support Helicopter Force
will, in a way or another, end up involved in any case. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Better to
properly develop the arrangements in peacetime than scramble later when
deployment time comes. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<br />Gabrielehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/01623558391676151582noreply@blogger.com45tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-442909239199162925.post-24505468959192250462020-01-25T17:06:00.001+01:002020-01-25T22:18:50.358+01:00The cringeworthy debate pre-SDSR <br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">I’ve already <a href="http://ukarmedforcescommentary.blogspot.com/2019/12/towards-sdsr-2020.html">written out my thoughts</a> about the
SDSR 2020 and, despite the enduring noise about Cummings and cuts and other
unpleasant news, i’m sticking to that description, for now at least. You can
find my predictions here, if you haven’t yet read them and want to know what my
position is. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">This post, which I hope I’ll be able to keep
short, is more of a comment to the circus of rumors, leaks and “suggestions”
coming from experts ahead of every contemporary SDSR. It’s a cry of agony in
front of the increasingly empty rhetoric of “sacred cows” and an expression of
the deep incredulity and frustration with which Allies observe the painful
process with which Britain, more often than not, commits self-harm. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The gut feeling is that those who profess the
loudest objectivity are actually the most partisan, and that the “sacred cow”
catchphrase has become an easy and good-looking way to advocate for cuts to
fall on anything other than the pet project of the day. It makes it look like you are being all innovative and hard nosed about things. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Most of those “sacred cows” are, in fact, valid
capabilities than nowhere else in the world are subject to the same kind of
denial. Moreover, these “sacred cows” are actually UK capabilities which work,
which have cost billions to build up and which are competitive and respected
worldwide. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">I’ve already written about the <a href="http://ukarmedforcescommentary.blogspot.com/2019/12/of-carriers-obsolescence-and.html">absurdity ofclaiming that aircraft carriers are somehow obsolete</a>, and I won’t go over that
subject again. In this occasion I will only remark that no one else in the
world, nowhere, would ever consider chopping the legs off from under a key
national capability at the dawn of its service life, after 20 years of efforts,
sacrifices and expenses to build it up. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The UK has a history of throwing away billions
of pounds in exchange for absolutely nothing, and the Nimrod MRA4 fiasco is
there to remind us all of how majestic the wasted sums can get. But Nimrod
MRA4, according to what we are told at least, did not work and was “never going
to work”. Personally, I doubt it, but we have to take it at face value. If we
do, the question then becomes why it wasn’t stopped earlier, before wasting
over 3 billion pounds, and who is responsible and why nobody is paying for such
a disaster, but this is another story. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The carriers work. There is no excuse in the
world that will justify turning them into pure waste, because it will be due
only to self-harm, if it ever happens. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">I will rather focus on the 16<sup>th</sup> Air
Assault Brigade and 3<sup>rd</sup> Commando Brigade, which have increasingly
become THE sacred cows, together with the capabilities they represent:
parachuting and air assault, and amphibious capability. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">This is the third SDSR in a row that begins
with calls to “merge” the two brigades and / or drastically cut back on both
capabilities, withdraw the amphibious ships etcetera. It is as illiterate a
proposal as they can be. Merging the two brigades to achieve savings would
almost certainly mean disbanding the brigade supports: either 7 RHA or 29
Commando RA; either 23 or 24 Engineer Regiments, and so along. The result would
be the net loss of yet another set of Brigade enablers, which are already the
true weakness of the British Army, which has already taken this path in 2010,
with the result that there are 31 infantry battalions but only about a third of
those sit within a brigade with any realistic chance of deploying and operating
as a combined arms force. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">It is true that it is increasingly dangerous to
employ parachute assaults or even employ helicopters and operate in the
littoral in a world of long-range SAMs and anti-ship missiles, but it is not
true that either capability has ceased to be relevant. Nobody else is giving up
on them: France has used small-scale parachute assaults as early as 2013 during
Operation Serval; Russia and China are nowhere near considering giving up such
manoeuvre capabilities, despite being the countries which are supposedly
causing both capabilities to become obsolete. Russia and China are also
pursuing massive strengthening of their amphibious forces. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Littoral manoevre and air manoeuvre remain as
critical as they have ever been. It is true that capabilities and tactics must
evolve as the sword and the shield battle it out for superiority, as it has
been ever since warfare began. Just like I said for the carriers, it is not the
ability to put troops ashore from the sea or from the air that becomes
“obsolete”: you still need to be able to do that. What might become obsolete is
your methods of doing it, and, above all else, the instruments you employ to
make your way through enemy defences. It is not the amphibious ship that has
become obsolete, per se: it is your ability to protect it from enemy missiles
that you no longer trust. What undoubtedly needs modernization is the Ship to
Shore connection. Slow and vulnerable landing craft need to be succeeded by
connectors which can defend themselves and move much faster and over longer
distances to restore the unpredictability of littoral manoeuvre. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The quality of the debate on both air and
littoral manoeuvre has dropped to such desperately low levels that we have
“experts” that sometime literally argue, at the same time, that air assault is
now impossible due to the proliferation of surface to air missiles, but that
the Marines should become a lighter force which gives up on surface manoeuvre
in favor of long range raids enabled by helicopters. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Have you spotted the problem? <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">If helicopters are the future of Littoral
Manoeuvre, they can’t be simultaneously obsolete. If air assault is no longer
feasible, why helicopters coming from the sea are an answer? It’s absurd. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">It’s what happens when your argument is
actually nothing but a call for the cuts to fall on anything but what you care
about. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Several of the UK defence commentators and
experts have fallen in love with the nebulous STRIKE concept, for reasons that
remain mysterious. There have even been repeated suggestions that STRIKE makes
littoral manoeuvre unnecessary, because you can just land the STRIKE brigade in
a friendly port and then drive on road to the front. This has even been offered
as a solution to avoid the risks connected with facing the Anti-Access, Area
Denial capability of a peer enemy, which supposedly make the Royal Navy
incapable to operate in the area. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">How is that a sane argument to make? </span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">If you are
dealing with an enemy sophisticate and powerful enough to keep the Royal Navy
and Royal Air Force out, how the hell are you going to create trouble for them
by driving wheeled APCs up to their border? <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Moreover, in a war scenario, will a country
nearby to your enemy want to get involved, and let you land your forces there
and then drive all the way to the border, exposing itself to all sorts of
dangers? Sometimes they will. Sometimes they won’t want to get involved at all.
<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">And ultimately, if you are landing in a safe
port and then driving up to the front, why not do it with heavier, more
credible armour than with expensive but nearly unarmed BOXERs? This is not a
replacement for littoral manoeuvre and amphibious capability: it’s normal land
warfare. Nothing at all new here. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">5 years on I’m still waiting for a single
rational explanation of how a mixture of BOXERs and AJAX somehow changes the
reality of modern warfare. UAVs will spot and possibly attack tanks and IFVs,
but not BOXERs…? They are not invisible hover-tanks, they are enormous 8x8s
with very little armament on top. They are don’t have a firepower advantage.
They do not solve the reality, finally admitted by the Commander Field Army
himself in a <a href="https://wavellroom.com/podcast/interview-with-commander-field-army-lieutenant-general-ivan-jones-cb/">recent interview with Wavell Room</a>, that the British Army is
outgunned and outranged. It faces a dramatic disadvantage in weight and reach
of Fires. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The STRIKE brigade will have some degree of
self-deployability, and that is good. It will require less HETs, less LETs,
less of a logistic train. And that is good and desirable. But pretending that
they will somehow revolutionize warfare is absurd. The British Army is
purchasing an 8x8 armored vehicle 30 years after everyone else, and that is it.
There are much better equipped and armed wheeled, medium brigades within NATO
already today, but nobody in their sane minds pretend they can not only
maneuver quickly up to the fight and along it, but split up into platoon
packages and rampage deep behind enemy lines. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The British Army and some commentators insist
on saying that STRIKE will do that. It is not credible. Not unless something
truly new and revolutionary comes to these formations. STRIKE as of now comes
with no advantages over a peer / near peer enemy capability. None at all. If
there is no rational reason to expect success, all that is left is hope and
dreams. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The increased strategic mobility of wheeled
armor is a step forwards from what the British Army has, but is not a new thing
compared to wheeled formations which have been around for decades. At the end
of the day, British Army 8x8s are not going to be any more unpredictable in
their road moves than the enemy’s own 8x8s. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Actually, Russian 8x8s are lighter and often
amphibious, so you could actually legitimately claim that their strategic and
tactical mobility is superior, as they can use more routes, more bridges (BOXER
and AJAX are over 38 tons behemoths) and even, with some limitations, move
across rivers without seeking a bridge at all. They are less protected than
BOXER, but on the other hand are far more heavily armed. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
These are all factors that routinely get
ignored when STRIKE is promoted as the best thing since sliced bread.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">For all its merits, STRIKE is a capability that
is far more limited than its supporters want us to believe. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Moreover, the British Army as a whole is
currently outgunned and outranged and full of capability gaps. If you want to
fill those gaps and make it more competitive, you must find many more billion
pounds to invest. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Is it worth it? Is it something the UK actually
needs? <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The Royal Navy and RAF are small, but are <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">already</b> globally competitive. They line
ships and aircraft which are on par, or superior to peer and near peer rivals.
The Army, unfortunately, is not in as good a shape. It is small and also faces
severe obsolescence issues in its equipment. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
In an ideal world, those deficiencies need to
be corrected, but this is not an ideal world: if the corrections are only
possible by robbing Peter to pay Paul, is it worth it?</div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
In my opinion, no. Why should you cut funded,
existing capabilities which are useful and globally competitive in order to
pursue the new fashion of the day?</div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The Army says it needs STRIKE to contribute to
NATO, to be able to rush to the aid of Eastern Europe in case the Russians lash
out. The first question that should be asked is: is in the UK’s interest to
rush to the East for a major land campaign? Does it need to be “the first” to
get there (even with STRIKE, it would not be…)? Why should the UK’s
contribution take <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">that</i></b> shape? Why not give priority to completing the
modernization of the heavy armour, and perhaps invest on more HETs and in
rebuilding railway mobility capability which was so unwisely demolished in the
SDSR 2010…? <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Why not focus on providing other capabilities,
which the UK is better equipped to deliver without having to find extra billion
pounds, simply? <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">I go back to 16<sup>th</sup> Air Assault
Brigade: the UK owns 60 Chinook, 23 Puma HC2 and is getting an excellent,
globally competitive Apache block III fleet. It owns 8 C-17, which in Europe
are an unique, high value capability. In addition to those, it owns 22 A-400M
and 14 C-130J. All these high value items are funded, operational, proven. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Nobody in Europe is
currently as well equipped as the UK to build up a powerful air mobile force. </span></b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Instead of babbling about the
parachute regiment being a “sacred cow”, the UK should look at the excellent
ingredients it owns, and think about how they can more effectively be
exploited. Those 60 Chinooks are a treasure that other NATO countries would
kill for. You can easily imagine the frustration of the French, for example,
whenever they look at that fleet and think what they could do with it. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Many UK commentators apparently consider it not
a treasure, but an expensive obstacle to throwing money on something new. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Wouldn’t it make far more sense to think about
how to get more out of what you already have? You probably can’t launch an
helicopter-borne force deep behind a peer enemy lines, but there is still
enormous usefulness for a fleet of 60 Chinooks that could be used to quickly
move whole battalions of infantry to hold ground and plug gaps in a modern,
contested, wide-area combat zone. Especially with 50 Apache in support. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Instead, we get the “sacred cow” rhetoric. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
Thankfully, in its interview with the Wavell
Room, the Commander Field Army has demonstrated greater wisdom than the various
“experts” and said that they are indeed rethinking the contribution of 16<sup>th</sup>
Air Assault to a Divisional fight, or even a Corps operation at NATO level. It
might look more like the old air mobile force of BAOR days, or take yet another
shape. <b>What matters is making good use
of the very expensive ingredients that are already on the table.</b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<b><br /></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Similarly, the UK has excellent maritime
capabilities, including the amphibious and heavy sealift vessels needed to move
a capable littoral manoeuvre force, which NATO values. <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">Why should you cut back on something that is already there, already
funded, and that can deliver plenty more usefulness well into the future? </b><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><br /></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Such a sacrifice would only make sense if it
resulted in some kind of truly revolutionary leap forwards in other areas, or
if it resulted in plugging a capability gap that just cannot be allowed to
continue. But this is not the case.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Watching british SDSRs unfold is a cringeworthy
experience. The arguments thrown around, with calls for cuts of this or that
expensive, precious capability are painful to listen to. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">It’s like watching a guy with only very vague
notions of cooking suddenly put into a kitchen with a table covered in all
sorts of expensive, precious ingredients. Some of those precious ingredients he
completely disregard, others he even wants to throw away (but it’s fine, so
long as he describes them as sacred cows that hold back “innovation”). Some
others get mashed together into some sort of half-cooked, disappointing recipe
(BOXER and AJAX, I’m looking at you). Some other recipes, he starts without
having all ingredients for and without being able to afford them (STRIKE). Some
other recipes are started out with great enthusiasm, then abandoned halfway in
(the modernization of heavy armour, which was thrown into disarray by taking
Ajax out of it and might other blows via WCSP and CR2 LEP). Some other precious
ingredients get kind of forgotten and are abandoned in a plate to the side,
certainly not without some usefulness for the future, but not mixed together in
any kind of rational recipe ( 1<sup>st</sup> Division and its incomplete
brigades without CS and CSS).<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">It’s a painful spectacle of waste and
indecision. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
Sometimes someone manages to buy at bargain
price some of what is thrown away (RFA Largs Bay, swiftly picked up by
Australia; next time will it be Wave class tankers taken up by Brasil, or
perhaps even some Type 23s…? Maybe Sentinel R1, too. I’m sure someone would
gladly buy those). Sometimes it ends literally in the garbage bin.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">We should all be very careful when labeling
existing capabilities for deletion and sacrifice, for many reasons. First of
all, the efforts of thousands of people and billions of taxpayer money are
invested into them, for a start. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Second, deletion of existing capabilities never
recoups much money at all. You are certainly not getting back the billions it
cost to build them up. You lose far more than you can purchase with what little
money is recouped. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Third, any deletion of capability comes with a
depressive effect on the force that suffers it. How much manpower is going to
bleed out, and how much is the perception of your force’s future and relevance
going to be impacted? <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Last but not least, you have to be very, very
sure that what you are going to invest in is worth the sacrifice. We have to be
rational and admit that the British Army is unlikely to ever be truly
competitive again. It can be improved, certainly, but it is not going to be a
main continental force, not even if several more billions a year are poured
into it. Does the UK need to cut back on its existing capabilities to try and
reinforce the army? Why? What influence and effect is that going to buy, at the
end of the day? <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The new SDSR should completely ignore the empty
rhetoric of sacred cows, which are mostly just the latest evolution of
inter-service bickering, and assess what the UK absolutely <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">needs</b> to do, first of all, and immediately after it should
determine <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">what it can do well</b>, and
specifically what it can do with what it already owns. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">If there are new capabilities that absolutely
must be funded – and there might well be – then the first place where to look
to make room is in the long list of programmes which haven’t yet started and
are not yet under contract. You might have to delay, delete, prioritize. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">If I had to point my finger at some kinetic
capabilities that might urgently need attention, for example, I’d have to
mention anti-ballistic missile defense and air-defence in general, since this
is an enormous weak spot in the whole of the UK’s forces. As ballistic
anti-ship missiles and theatre ballistic missiles become more and more common
in the tactics and strategies of enemies and rivals worldwide, having no BMD
defence at all will soon simply become unacceptable. The ability to fire back,
and thus some truly powerful and modern Fires, would be by big second. The US
Army has made Fires its number one priority, and it’s no mystery that I think
they have got that right. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">In order to make room for investments in those
areas, the UK might have to cut pieces of its future-years equipment programme,
and that is why the Army is worried, since most of its programmes have yet to
be put under contract. According to the official schedule, after all, in this
very year alone the Army should get to decisions for Warrior CSP production,
JLTV procurement, Multi Role Vehicle – Protected Group 2 selection (between
Bushmaster and Eagle 6x6) and Challenger 2 LEP. It’s easy to understand why the
Army is particularly nervous. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The alternative is to drastically cut back on some
of the stuff that is already under contract or even in service, even if it
means wasting a lot of still perfectly valid capabilities and throw in the
garbage bin all the money it cost to procure them. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">But I hope that the actual decision makers at
the SDSR table will prove more reasonable than the voices of the informal
debate we are hearing in the last while. If it is not possible to do
everything, you should stick to what you are good at. If your money is not
enough to purchase all you’d need, at least start by using well what you
already have, and have already paid. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">If the UK can do well guarding the North flank,
reinforcing Norway and keeping the Atlantic supply routes open, that is a
plenty valid contribution. If it can supply modern, competitive airpower, from
sea and from land, that is plenty good contribution. If it can also deploy a
decent heavy armor force, that is good. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">If you pursue a “revolutionary approach”,
you’ll better make damn sure your revolution is real and workable. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Because you know what you lose, but not what
you might or might not gain. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<br />Gabrielehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/01623558391676151582noreply@blogger.com10tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-442909239199162925.post-81180021914409117482019-12-24T19:40:00.001+01:002019-12-24T19:40:38.917+01:00Of Carriers, Obsolescence and Vulnerability <br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">An aircraft carrier is<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"> </b>a sovereign, mobile air base that
ensures you can apply airpower at a point of your choosing. It ensures the
fleet can have its own intimate air support, and its own timely air cover. It
allows the surface fleet to launch its own quick reaction alert fighter jets
and have its own CAPs to protect itself from enemy air attack. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Incidentally, allow me to say that one
of the biggest mistakes the Royal Navy has made in the past was to refer to the
carriers as “strike” carriers. That actually downplays the <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">immense</b> importance the carrier air wing plays in the survivability
of a surface task group. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">“Strike” is just one of the many
missions of the Air Wing and is actually in some ways the least important one.
Much (not all of it, but certainly much of it) <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>of the “strike” role could be carried out with
Tomahawks or other ship and submarine-launched missiles, if you just funded
enough VLS cells and missiles. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Air defence, reconnaissance,
flexible close air support, anti-submarine warfare through the use of groups of
helicopters, etcetera. These are the really defining roles of the carrier air
wing. There are many alternative ways of putting 500 to 1000 lbs of explosive into
a target, especially in the age of air to air refueling, drones and cruise
missiles. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Put putting air defence patrols up
above the fleet deployed far away from friendly shores? That definitely
requires the carrier. You can’t sustain any sizeable air umbrella for any
meaningful amount of time by trailing fighter jets thousands of miles via air
to air refueling. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The aircraft carrier enables you to
do that, because it is a fighter jets base that you can position as needed. As
such, it can only ever become truly obsolete if A) jets themselves are obsolete
and no longer needed. Already in the 50s the UK imagined a world where aircraft
would become almost pointless because of missiles. It was wildly wrong at the
time, and still is in many ways, but maybe a combination of drones and missiles
will indeed take the place of jets one day. Not today, nor tomorrow, though. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Option B is that jets somehow grown
such combat endurance and range that you can launch them from home and have
them reliably and persistently overhead out at sea, or anyway at a great
distance from a friendly air base. This is still technically unfeasible and it
will be so for many, many more years. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Is the carrier vulnerable? Yes, it
is relatively fragile. It is a ship. It has very little available estate, no matter how large it is, and that makes it difficult to work around battle damage. If
the flight deck is damaged, you can’t simply fill up the crater with dirt and
plate it up with AM-2 mat like you’d do on land. And if enough holes are opened
in the hull, it will inexorably sunk. That’s the reality of being a ship. But that’s
nothing new, and shouldn't be blown out of proportion either, because finding an aircraft carrier at sea and then assaulting it successfully, going through the various layers of its defences, remains actually a very challenging task. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Whenever you say the aircraft
carrier is “too vulnerable”, what you are actually implying is not the
obsolescence of the carrier, but <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">the
fact you don't trust your AAW and ASW capabilities</b>. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">From a purely british point of view,
the aircraft carrier is surrounded by Phalanx CIWS, Aster missiles from the
Type 45 and Sea Ceptor from Type 23, 26 and 31.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Add the embarked jets supplying air
defence, and the carrier is literally
the best defended place in the whole of the UK and its armed forces. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">In comparison, Land forces and land
airbases have access to just a few STARSTREAK and Land Ceptor missiles
(replacement from Rapier, coming into service beginning in the new year). <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">If you feel you can’t protect the
aircraft carrier from “drones”, it is not a carrier problem. It is a
forces-wide problem, because it means other ships, the army and the RAF jets
when on the ground are all even more vulnerable. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Clearly, your problem is not the
carrier being “obsolete”, but your air defences. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<br /></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiJynb7xVf2bTX5rnBFWO4xEpp5KaChGTmrSjC2f36Ca9zzhmlspUvFUEtTW4gt_4Z44TlwaC_eukGsK0eJIfQrT5hy3i3Zy97Jw6b0tYUD_XN1XBrP4MaHwsXwTfjW08eV3kV8bsa-q-Q/s1600/EKzSWZZX0AICQIv.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="896" data-original-width="1500" height="238" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiJynb7xVf2bTX5rnBFWO4xEpp5KaChGTmrSjC2f36Ca9zzhmlspUvFUEtTW4gt_4Z44TlwaC_eukGsK0eJIfQrT5hy3i3Zy97Jw6b0tYUD_XN1XBrP4MaHwsXwTfjW08eV3kV8bsa-q-Q/s400/EKzSWZZX0AICQIv.jpg" width="400" /></a></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><o:p><br /></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><o:p><br /></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Naturally, the carrier is exposed to
submarine threats which are particularly scary. An air base on land, no. Then
again, the land base is subject to a whole lot of other threats, including lack
of host country authorizations and cooperation, protests, disruptions of the
supply routes and potentially indirect fire at all levels (from ballistic
missiles down to mortars and rockets). </span>Airbases on land can also be assaulted by suicidal attackers with various tactics. </div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
There is a reason why the RAF continues to integrate the equivalent of 2 infantry battalions in the form of 6 RAF Regiment Squadrons for Force Protection. Without expanding beyond the last decade alone, we have
witnessed the Taliban attack on Camp Bastion, repeated disasters in Pakistani airbases
stormed by terrorists and various attacks in Syria which are all good examples of additional threats to land bases. </div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">A base on land cannot sink, but it
remains very vulnerable to disruption and, moreover, any aircraft when parked
on the ground is very fragile. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">A swarm of UAVs cannot sink an air base ashore, but it can put it out of commission all the same, and destroy the aircraft on the ground with relative ease. </span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Yet nobody would argue that the airfield is "obsolete". You'd argue, correctly, that better defences are required. </span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The submarine threat is perhaps the
most terrifying of all, but if you don’t think you can keep the aircraft
carrier safe, the implication is that surface operations as a whole are doomed
to failure, because nothing else will be as well defended. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Again, <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">it implies you don’t trust your ASW technology, tactics and resources
as a whole to be up to the task</b>. If this is the case, the problem is not the carrier, or at least definitely not limited to it. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhD_oo1Be2XnFK519j0K5WHi3UHivmEHOoUNpCSKhEM7OSMS8YnHvSB_perUYUOkh4GpSZNBd7w76rd064GRH2uPuoYjf8DmViB3LuxdD6F9hVQypyVxx38ZGMolZZkklA-8IpJlDNlyQI/s1600/First.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="1067" data-original-width="1600" height="266" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhD_oo1Be2XnFK519j0K5WHi3UHivmEHOoUNpCSKhEM7OSMS8YnHvSB_perUYUOkh4GpSZNBd7w76rd064GRH2uPuoYjf8DmViB3LuxdD6F9hVQypyVxx38ZGMolZZkklA-8IpJlDNlyQI/s400/First.jpg" width="400" /></a></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Ultimately, if the carrier was not
there with its jets and helicopters, both your AAW and ASW instantaneously gets
even weaker. Maybe the fleet will still have access to Airborne Early Warning
(the one saving grace of having helicopter-borne AEW is that it can work from
pretty much any ship at all), but it will no longer enjoy intimate air support.
It’ll have to restrict its movements to where land-based airpower can provide
sufficient cover. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj9euBgOba6jeJgg7qADRT90MkGafCi5gKK0_Dq67LpsF5X7UTjJshAKzCxEXt5SAkGsjHiSvI7u0V7dSjyZ3DhwZH0tyo22t76d8EQOVga5Pyjghkb-aZvLxmoQ1YtfNRm6cFR_P2e1Sk/s1600/Flying+Tigers+exercise+their+skills.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="658" data-original-width="560" height="400" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj9euBgOba6jeJgg7qADRT90MkGafCi5gKK0_Dq67LpsF5X7UTjJshAKzCxEXt5SAkGsjHiSvI7u0V7dSjyZ3DhwZH0tyo22t76d8EQOVga5Pyjghkb-aZvLxmoQ1YtfNRm6cFR_P2e1Sk/s400/Flying+Tigers+exercise+their+skills.jpg" width="340" /></a></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Remove the ASW helicopters embarked
on the carrier, and your ASW defences are also immediately weakened. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Threats are getting more difficult
to counter, that’s undeniable, but the war between the “sword” and the “shield”
is as old as war itself. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">It is not the carrier that you are
calling into question if you believe you can’t defend against the enemy “swords”.
It is your “shields”. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<br />Gabrielehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/01623558391676151582noreply@blogger.com12tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-442909239199162925.post-74988903408313441612019-12-18T11:14:00.000+01:002020-07-09T19:57:19.379+02:00Towards the SDSR 2020<br />
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">5 years
ago, I ran a series of articles ahead of the SDSR 2015 in which I highlighted
what, in my opinion, were the priorities to be tackled in the review.
Admittedly, it was perhaps easier back then, because some major requirements
were well evident and it didn’t take much imagination to call for the plugging
of those holes. But my predictions proved remarkably accurate, and so I want to
write a short piece ahead of the incoming SDSR 2020 as well, pointing my finger
at what I see as main issues to be tackled. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">First of
all, I will expose myself and say that I am, for now at least, somewhat at
peace with the idea of the incoming review. I’m relatively confident that it
won’t bring big cuts: I’m expecting the targets of the SDSR 2015 to overall
hold steady. The Conservatives have committed to the 2% of GDP base figure, and
extended the 0.5% annual growth above inflation for the duration of the new
Parliament, which is progress, however modest, since that commitment was
otherwise going to expire by 2022. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">This gives
the MOD a degree of certainty about the budget that will be available, and
means that the uncertainty mainly stems from the exact entity of the rumored
“black hole” in the future years programme. That “black hole” is not really
easy to actually define, as its effective magnitude depends on a huge variety
of factors that go from Foreign Exchange variations to cost growth in ongoing
programmes, to variations in GDP etcetera. In the 2018 estimates of the Black
Hole, it is possible, and actually pretty likely, that the 0.5% growth above
inflation was not factored in beyond 2022, and that will have contributed to
the “worst case scenario” figure. Estimates supplied in 2018, in fact, had a
pretty dramatic range, going from a modest 2,8 billion to nearly 15 or more
over the 10 years of the programme. Clearly, 15 billion would be a big problem.
3, not so much. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The MOD
secured a much needed injection of cash recently, as we know, and that helped
overcome the short term problems and avoided the old and highly ineffective
solution of delaying expenditure, which inexorably results in an even higher
cost further down the line. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The budget
pressure is indeed mostly, if not exclusively, concentrated on the next few
years since a multitude of programmes are supposed to start and, at the same
time, several others are already under contract at the same time. What is
already under contract cannot, obviously, be easily tampered with, leaving
limited flexibility to deal with money shortages. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">In future
years the problem is less dramatic simply because much of the expenditure is
planned, but not contracted, and can be simply be pushed to the right. Of
course, this has an impact on capability as kit is not procured, but on the
other hand does not require the frantic cutting of what is already there, which
is what happened in 2010.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Much, if
not everything, will depend on the real width of the “black hole” and on the
flexibility available to deal with it. Obviously, the most vulnerable
programmes are the ones which haven’t yet started: Multi Role Vehicle
Protected, for example, could very easily slip further to the right despite
decisions on both Group 1 and Group 2 being currently expected in 2020. WCSP
production, Challenger 2 LEP, but also purchases of F-35s after 2025, the
Future Fleet Solid Support ships for the Royal Navy and the procurement of
Typhoon upgrades (AESA, Litening 5…) and the purchase of new build Chinook
Block 2 are all exposed to delays and variations and potentially even
cancellation. Contracts which have not been signed yet are, obviously, the
easiest ones to remove from the 10 year programme, and they make for cuts which
are quite “stealthy” and do not expose politicians to as much criticism. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">In other
words, despite the noise on some newspapers about Dominic Cummings’ previous
comments about the carriers, it is not the Queen Elizabeth class which is
exposed. Both ships are now in service and the acquisition programme is nearly
entirely complete, so (thankfully) any further political meddling (like the delay
imposed by Gordon Brown which resulted in a cost growth of over 1 billion, or
the 2011 mess) is out of question. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The
carriers can of course still be hurt indirectly by, for example, stopping the
Fleet Solid Support project, but this is relatively unlikely given how
unusually high a profile shipbuilding has played in the Election. Labour had
promised to amend the shipbuilding strategy to<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>ensure RFA vessels are built in the UK, and while the Conservative
manifesto does not contain such a promise, the Prime Minister has promised more
shipbuilding work. While I don’t expect the optional 3<sup>rd</sup> Solid
Support Ship to ever be contracted, I’m optimistic that 2 will eventually come
and I think building them in the UK is almost a certainty at this point. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Some other
programmes are much more secure despite the lack of a contract. An easy
example: apart from the capability rationale, Type 26 Batch 2 would be
political dynamite to tamper with, due to the tensions with Scotland. SKYNET 6
satellites are also unlikely to suffer much, simply because they really are the
kind of equipment which just HAS to be procured. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Space is
expected to be a winner, in general. The Manifesto promises a Space Command,
which might or might not grow into or from 11 Group, Royal Air Force, which is
currently in charge for space activities, along with 23 Sqn, resurrected to be
the first “space squadron”. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">News coming
out on some newspapers ahead of the Election suggest there will soon be
announcements about a national Global Positioning System, aligned with the 5
Eyes organization (Australia, in particular, is expected to be involved in the
project), which will give the UK a sovereign alternative to GPS and Galileo. If
confirmed, this would be an exciting development, even if, with the pricetag
being given at around 5 billions, I’m not sure should have been granted such a
great priority. Much will depend on exactly <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">how</i>
alternative it is to the existing GPS and “clones”. To be truly worth it, it
should come with different technical approaches, hopefully obviating to some of
the known vulnerabilities of the existing systems. With the UK’s (but
Airbus-owned) Surrey having build the navigation system payload of the Galileo
satellites themselves, know-how definitely exists. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">What I
truly hope to see is a bold and meaningful commitment to projects ARTEMIS and
OBERON, in connection with the spaceports in Scotland and Cornwall. Both
programmes have received some initial funding but are currently experimental: I
hope there will be a solid commitment towards growing up both constellations to
give the UK a sovereign space-based imagery intelligence capability (<a href="https://www.sstl.co.uk/media-hub/latest-news/2019/team-artemis-sstl-signs-mou-with-the-raf">ARTEMIS</a>)
and a sovereign Radar and Electronic Surveillance capability (OBERON), so to
drastically reduce what is currently pretty much a 100% dependency on Allies
(mostly the US) in both areas. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">ARTEMIS and
OBERON are bold because they want to pack high definition imagery and Inverted
SAR radar capability in small satellites. Since Britain is among the biggest
producers of small satellites in the world, this makes sense in more ways than
one. And since the UK will soon have two spaceports able to put small
satellites into space from UK soil, this is even more exciting. ARTEMIS, in
particular, includes provisions to demonstrate the ability to put satellites
into space with short notice, exploiting the air-launched rocket and the
modified Boeing 747 “Cosmic Girl” taking off from Newquay in Cornwall. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEh35bc4GJw8b7T2SydtpgzSKWmoh3BaMv0KeqAnqekeHaJMkcHxwYicVHNV8x3EtwYZ_tefWDOjpctG4j-i9w9XPcAczSngap5FkbCtpUVo6gy5M2fIhBXNdlMqMU9sqGfgxfS0AzaAyxU/s1600/p06z9npl.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="405" data-original-width="719" height="225" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEh35bc4GJw8b7T2SydtpgzSKWmoh3BaMv0KeqAnqekeHaJMkcHxwYicVHNV8x3EtwYZ_tefWDOjpctG4j-i9w9XPcAczSngap5FkbCtpUVo6gy5M2fIhBXNdlMqMU9sqGfgxfS0AzaAyxU/s400/p06z9npl.jpg" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">The UK-developed "origami antenna" which should allow OBERON small satellites to have a powerful Inverted SAR radar sensor, with a resolution normally associated to much larger and heavier satellites </td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">This is
extremely promising and potentially very, very significant, because
(relatively) cheap ARTEMIS satellites could be launched at short notice to improve
coverage in the future and, crucially, timely replace space-based sensors
destroyed or denied by enemy action, kinetic or otherwise. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Britain-made,
Britain-owned satellites, launched from UK soil, potentially with the Orbex’s
british made rocket. That would be a great capability to have, and it would go
quite some way towards healing the disastrous decisions of the past which put
UK space on a dramatic capability holiday just after the UK had become one of
the few nations in the world to put a sovereign satellite into space with a
sovereign rocket (PROSPERO satellite and BLACK ARROW rocket, in 1971). <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The RAF
putting one first pilot into Virgin’s space programme is also a welcome step
going in this very direction. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiNTD4xvDqiXjqnrM_7OD4fJVU8g_hLTJt6V_lz2X_9hr5j9KWgcdZV5JQbV9WBECJtXxU2cRO6HYATpxVKGdXSut4wRGtqYjbsAfKrtltilB8yeLEFrfKuY6nIEbP1PeYvGrW07USatT0/s1600/webuk-high-tech-announcements-image-2-jul191.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="540" data-original-width="1100" height="196" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiNTD4xvDqiXjqnrM_7OD4fJVU8g_hLTJt6V_lz2X_9hr5j9KWgcdZV5JQbV9WBECJtXxU2cRO6HYATpxVKGdXSut4wRGtqYjbsAfKrtltilB8yeLEFrfKuY6nIEbP1PeYvGrW07USatT0/s400/webuk-high-tech-announcements-image-2-jul191.jpg" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">UK built satellites, launched from the UK, potentially with a RAF pilot at the controls. As early as 2021</td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Obviously,
further support for the SABRE engine is to be auspicated. The recent RAF
contract for studies into the potential benefits coming from integrating the
pre-cooling technology of SABRE into the EuroJet engine of the Typhoon is a
very welcome development and hopefully it’ll be just the first of many
applications. SABRE is a true potential revolution in the making, so I’d like
to see support to this exciting project being front and centre. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">In general,
Space should be a winner in the coming review and beyond. Space investment is
in no way a Defence exclusive, and the UK has already confirmed a substantial
uplift of investment into ESA projects, in exchange securing lead roles in a
number of key initiatives. Further investment into space tech for the military
sector is likely to be guided in large part by the Space Strategy document
which was announced back when Gavin Williamson was still Secretary of State for
Defence. The document has not been published yet, but we can expect much of its
content to migrate into the new SDSR. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Much the
same can most likely be said for the Arctic Strategy as well, which saw the UK
committing to a 10 year programme of support, primarily to and in Norway, which
will become very apparent with the large scale 3<sup>rd</sup> Commando Winter
Deployment 2020 (WD2020) which is in preparation. The Northern Flank of NATO
should, for obvious reasons, be confirmed as an absolute priority engagement
area for the UK. The North Sea is the UK’s exposed flank in any Russia
scenario, and this is enough of a reason to ensure appropriate attention is
pinned on this sector and on key capabilities such as Anti Submarine Warfare. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">A welcome
step was the revitalization, back in November, of the NATO Channel Committee to
oversee plans for the protection of vital shipping routes across the North Sea
and the English Channel. A document was signed on November 7 between the Navies
of UK, Germany, France, Belgium and Netherlands to breathe new life into the NATO
Advisory Body - Channel Committee (CHANCOM), and it is in the UK’s best
interest, for reasons I hope are obvious to everyone, to play a key role in
this organization. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">With the
Type 31 under contract and the Type 26 being a top priority as well as
politically red-hot things no one will want to mess with, I’m expecting the
Royal Navy to fare well in the review, despite whatever grievance Dominic
Cummings might have against the carriers. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The First
Sea Lord will go to the SDSR table with the Future Commando Force as one of its
top priorities this time, and hopefully that will help the amphibious flotilla
and the Royal Marines survive another round of political meddling. This
remains, however, the most exposed area for the Senior Service, so it is where
the hardest battles will be fought. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">I’m
relatively optimistic about the Littoral Strike Ships eventually materializing
since I expect that this requirement will be put in close relationship to well
known ambitions for “disaster relief / hospital ships” which will be at least
partially funded with Foreign Aid money. According to the latest reports, Boris
Johnson is much more open towards the idea of using Foreign Aid to fund
programmes which more directly benefit UK interests. The Department for
International Aid is said to be heading for incorporation within the Foreign
Office, in fact, and in general I expect that Defence will be aided with some
of this very budget, where possible. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgaGAqCGIfGr8KrwHviEHEK_lpxwRa1ImashoGHBmSi3MYC1meI6_4RtHFiCzdXtMaygIh74DTHnpLjAcyZrqqaAdJ8j6JtkYOuFxDd0dTdztzxrkO1FHkCWAk0UYt-8GXrMdq6Z5Fg8eQ/s1600/EDyfT5vW4AI4em7.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="769" data-original-width="1600" height="191" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgaGAqCGIfGr8KrwHviEHEK_lpxwRa1ImashoGHBmSi3MYC1meI6_4RtHFiCzdXtMaygIh74DTHnpLjAcyZrqqaAdJ8j6JtkYOuFxDd0dTdztzxrkO1FHkCWAk0UYt-8GXrMdq6Z5Fg8eQ/s400/EDyfT5vW4AI4em7.jpg" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">Littoral Strike Ships will hopefully still happen. Their flexibility will be key, in particular when it comes to their large flight deck and hangar. With the loss of HMS Ocean, UK amphibious capabilities suffer badly from a shortage of helicopter capability, unless a carrier is deployed. </td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">According
to the Press, Ben Wallace might soon lose his role of Secretary for Defence,
but until then we have to take due consideration of the priorities he has given
in debates ahead of the Election. For the Royal Navy, the absolute priority is
making better use of what is already available, and it’s impossible not to
agree. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Ships that
have been tied up in harbor should be returned to full operational status as
soon as possible, and every effort should be made to put a brake on the delays
to refits and maintenance periods which are keeping too high a proportion of
the existing fleet tied up. The gains will take time, however, and not
everything can be affected at all: Type 23 Life Extension refits are demanding
and time consuming, and the Type 45s are going to have to circle one by one
through Birkenhead to have their Diesel gensets replaced under Project NAPIER.
Every effort should be made to ensure that the refits stick to the schedule,
however, and even more effort should go into ensuring that all ships in the
fleet are used as much as possible. This, of course, means also putting further
effort (and money, if necessary) into filling up the manpower deficit. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">If
sacrifices cannot be avoided, I feel that the first “victims” should be the
WAVE and FORT classes. Fort Austin and Fort Rosalie have a dismal record for
sea days in the last several years, and 6 tankers are probably too many for the
fleet that remains in Royal Navy service. At any one time, several RFA vessels
are actually tied up into Birkenhead, inactive and effectively mothballed, and
the cause of this should be finally identified and cured. If the RFA cannot
actually crew and use the WAVEs, I think they should be sold while they have
still value. As for the two oldest FORTs, they have not received the
modifications given to Fort Victoria to make them compatible with the new
aircraft carriers and thus their usefulness is limited. If there is no way to
put them back at sea quickly, it might be better to just sacrifice them. It
would not save much money at all, but neither it would hurt the Service that
much, since they are mostly only ever parked up in port anyway. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Going back
to the Future Commando Force, instead, one priority I’d set if it depended on
me would be to bring back into full service the mothballed LPD. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">It would be
a major win for the Navy and it would reflect the priority of using to the max
everything that the Navy already has. Moreover, it would greatly help in
achieving one of the key targets of the Future Commando Force, which is to have
more Marines forward deployed at sea. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Forward
basing in general is likely to be a key theme for the Navy in the new Review.
Two 1<sup>st</sup> Sea Lords in a row have, correctly in my opinion, identified
it as the only option to increase presence abroad without an increase in the
number of ships. HMS Montrose in the Gulf for 3 years is the first of,
hopefully, a few more long-term forward basing arrangements, with the Royal
Navy looking in particular at the Caribbean and at South East Asia. The 1<sup>st</sup>
Sea Lord would like to “initially” put a couple of OPVs in Asia, and while this
might seem low key, it would be a very significant first step, which Type 31
might in future make more meaty. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">It will be
important, however, to secure a further extension to the operational life of
the 3 River Batch 1 ships to cover home water needs and let the more capable
Batch 2s free to show the flag abroad and complement actual frigates. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">It would be
easy to ask for more frigates, but I won’t even waste the time it would take me
to write about it, because there are no real chances of it happening any time
soon, I’m afraid. Apart from increasing the readiness rate of the existing
fleet and expanding its footprint with Forward Basing and Littoral Strike Ships
and accompanying groups, my priorities for the naval sector would be: <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoListParagraphCxSpFirst" style="mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; text-indent: -18.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri;"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">-<span style="font: 7.0pt "Times New Roman";">
</span></span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Unmanned
vehicles. Some good experimentation is ongoing thanks to 700X NAS and the Royal
Marines respectively, but every effort should be made to finally move beyond
the experimentation phase. The Royal Navy and Marines both need UAVs to
increase their ISTAR collection capability. I’d like to see more work going
towards unmanned surface and sub-surface vehicles configured for ASW tasks as
well. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Among known projects, the Royal Navy is seeking a few PAC-24 RHIBS
converted into USVs, and project MINERVA is working on a large quad-copter
which will be able to locate a man at sea and drop a SAR raft and smoke
markings to aid rescue efforts. MINERVA, if successful, could greatly reduce
the need to tie up an helicopter as plane guard during every launch and
recovery evolution on the aircraft carriers, for example, resulting in significant
efficiencies in the use of precious and finite assets. The PAC-24 USV could be
a precursor to more ambitious surface combat assets for inspection and force
protection and, eventually, for ASW. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Another option immediately available is insisting with either ARCIMS or
Halcyon from the unmanned MCM solutions: those are already able to tow sonars,
and could complement the scarce frigates. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">It’s also time to look again at plans for a rotary wing tactical UAS,
which would also be very important for the future of the Yeovil factory.
Leonardo was given 8 millions for studies back in 2017, but only ominous
silence has followed. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; text-indent: -18.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri;"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">-<span style="font: 7.0pt "Times New Roman";">
</span></span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Force
Protection / Combat Boats. These would be essential not just for the Future
Commando Force’s needs, but for the wider Navy. Well armed, enclosed, all
weather combat boats with a good operational range could truly open up raiding
opportunities along great lengths of enemy coast and even up rivers. Moreover,
said boats, deployed from a Bay, a LPD or a Littoral Strike Ship or even a Type
26 or 31 could extend the influence radius of those units by hundreds of miles.
Imagine, for example, well armed force protection crafts supporting the few
frigates in the Gulf in the challenging task of escorting merchant shipping in
and out. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; text-indent: -18.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhWI0jE6V2PlJ4jbe7mAC_9yRe-h09nSG1pBLyWJBNGJKG82-DwDk2ulvmr59vDGC3G06NbJmC5DkKDFbVHeEgdFg4QdNMk0JQz6NoMs1GLpPkGsXuYqN8stF4qTNS-0HV62slpcJLjkKA/s1600/maxresdefault.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="720" data-original-width="1280" height="225" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhWI0jE6V2PlJ4jbe7mAC_9yRe-h09nSG1pBLyWJBNGJKG82-DwDk2ulvmr59vDGC3G06NbJmC5DkKDFbVHeEgdFg4QdNMk0JQz6NoMs1GLpPkGsXuYqN8stF4qTNS-0HV62slpcJLjkKA/s400/maxresdefault.jpg" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">Combat Boats such as the Mark VI, or the swedish CB90, would hugely boast the capabilities of the Navy and Royal Marines in the littoral </td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<div class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><o:p><br /></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; text-indent: -18.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri;"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">-<span style="font: 7.0pt "Times New Roman";">
</span></span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Ship
to Shore Connectors. Much as “raiding” seems to be the sexy word of the week,
the future of the Royal Marines still lies with their ability to put an enemy
coast at serious risk, forcing enemy units to mount guard along hundreds or
thousands of miles of littoral. Moreover, the amphibious capability of the
Royal Navy is only truly valid until it is dimensioned in such a way to enable
the landing of heavy, mechanized force elements. New Ship to Shore Connectors,
much faster and thus more survivable, are a key component of the future
Commando Force, which means that resurrecting the LCU Mk 10 replacement
programme as soon as possible should be high up on the list of priorities. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; text-indent: -18.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri;"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">-<span style="font: 7.0pt "Times New Roman";">
</span></span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Investment
in helicopters. Data links for WILDCAT and the addition of LMM missiles and radar
on the Army variant of the AW-159. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The Commando Helicopter Force would also like to more heavily arm the
Merlin HC4 (miniguns fit) and introduce the ability to refuel in flight. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoListParagraphCxSpLast">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Finally, in an ideal world the number of Merlin helicopters would be increased
by repairing and updating as many of the remaining, stored HM1s as possible.
This would be expensive, but everybody knows that 30 Merlin HM2 doing ASW and
AEW at once are too few. The pressure on the fleet is very intense.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">For the Air
Force, with the deliveries of Typhoon now completed, the only combat aircraft
still being acquired is the F-35, and this review will have to look at what
happens after the first 48 jets have all been acquired. With the Block Buy
contract for lots 12 to 14 having been signed, focus now shifts to reaching a
deal for Block Buy II, covering lots 15 to 17. These lots will complete the
purchase of the first 48 jets and include an unknown number beyond those. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The
questions still without answer are many. We don’t know over how many years the
MOD proposes to acquire the famous 138 jets. We also do not know whether the
RAF can, and if yes how, absorb that many jets and form additional squadrons
from the manpower it has. Officially, the Typhoon Tranche 1 is now going to stay
all the way to 2035, but that continues to sound pretty suspect to me, and I
wouldn’t be surprised to see those 2 squadrons eventually becoming F-35 units
with the very limited Tranche 1 heading out of service. By 2023 there should be
7 Typhoon and 2 F-35B Squadrons, and this is about as many fast jet units as
the RAF has had in recent times. Where is the manpower margin to form
additional units? <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjbAiugpu1HWmasTacV-ni61hImxSDMPLJY2F2ZaLufX-LgX4FDVwfMHNYHWXqAS_Gj1cZaZnnDq900_UUv_Ebe4NVUH8sRe47O7CuZd3OUqdo-cykSx2LVTnFSoq_ezJUo2KGXJi_pa2E/s1600/EL1c_BBWwAIxT8F.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="1200" data-original-width="1600" height="300" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjbAiugpu1HWmasTacV-ni61hImxSDMPLJY2F2ZaLufX-LgX4FDVwfMHNYHWXqAS_Gj1cZaZnnDq900_UUv_Ebe4NVUH8sRe47O7CuZd3OUqdo-cykSx2LVTnFSoq_ezJUo2KGXJi_pa2E/s400/EL1c_BBWwAIxT8F.jpg" width="400" /></a></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">How many
F-35 will the UK be able to purchase, year on year? The largest yearly order
currently planned is for 8 jets in Lot 14; if the UK purchased 8 aircraft per
year after 2023 it would still take more than eleven years to procure the other
90 jets, meaning that the last british F-35 could be delivered in 2035.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">In that
same year, rather optimistically, Project TEMPEST should deliver the first jets
to RAF service.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">I believe
the UK will never acquire 138 F-35. The actual number will be lower than that,
because expenditure on Project TEMPEST will have to ramp up over the same years
and something will have to give. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">This is not
necessarily a “bad” thing, however, simply because there does not seem to be
the manpower to form additional squadrons anyway. With today’s manpower
figures, I don’t think the RAF can actually <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">use</i></b> 160 Typhoons and 138
F-35s.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Another
question yet to be answered is, of course, the make up of the F-35 fleet. The
RAF would love to switch the purchase to the A model, but if that happened
immediately after the first 48 jets, it would make it <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">impossible</b> to ever fill up even just one of the two aircraft
carriers. Moreover, it would make it very challenging to embark, with any sort
of regularity, the objective airwing of 24 jets. It would mean embarking 100%
of the frontline fleet, and that is unlikely to be feasible for obvious
reasons. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The Review
should determine how many fast jet squadrons can realistically be formed,
manned and supported. Until recently, the target was to eventually field 4 F-35
squadrons. If this number is confirmed, splitting them 50/50, B model and A
model, would be pretty horribly ineffective, leaving two small fleets, none of
which truly able to meet all needs, which will inexorably be at each other’s
throats all the time over finite budgets for updates, maintenance and support. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The last
time the RAF had a 2-squadrons fast jet type, it ended up cutting the whole
fleet because it was “not efficient”, remember? I would very much like to avoid
going there again. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">While the A
does have some kinetic and range advantages over the B, I would very much
recommend going for 4 squadrons of a single type rather than 2+2. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The
reasons, I’ve already explained in detail in other occasions in the past. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">To complete
the Combat Air section of the review, I would of course like to see continued
support for capability insertions into Typhoon. The adoption of STRIKER 2
helmets, LITENING 5 pods (with some reconnaissance capability making up at
least in part the loss of RAPTOR) and SPEAR would definitely add a lot of
capability to the fleet and I hope to see all of those confirmed. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The other
and biggest capability enhancement is the AESA radar, with the UK busy
developing a “R2 variant” which is expected to have a significantly greater EW
capability than the R1 and R1+ chosen by Germany, Spain and Qatar. The timeline
for the retrofit is still a question mark and, while Germany has now
officialized its intention to retrofit all its Tranche 2s as well as the
Tranche 3s, the UK’s plan remains obscure. Extending the Retrofit to the
Tranche 2s is incredibly important, longer term, since that is the standard of
most of the aircraft in the fleet. There are just 40 Tranche 3s. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Beyond
Combat Air, one question which needs answering is what happens in 2021 to the
wide area radar ground surveillance capability. A further extension to the
Sentinel R1’s service life? A capability gap with their withdrawal going ahead?
Or a replacement through the purchase of AAS radar pods for the P-8 Poseidon fleet,
ideally along with a few extra airframes? <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">My favorite
option would be withdrawing Sentinel but adding to the P-8 numbers and adopting
the air to surface radar gondola. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">For the
unmanned portion of the ISTAR fleet, the Review will have to consider how many
PROTECTOR to purchase. 16 are currently on order, with the stated aim of going
beyond 20 with follow-on orders. Will those be confirmed? <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Apart from
purely financial considerations, manpower margins will play a part in the
decision. It should also be noted that the recent spate of UAVs shot down (over
Libya and Yemen, but also the Global Hawk shot down by Iran over the Gulf) has
reminded everyone that these systems are currently completely (or in some case
almost completely) defenceless. Even against enemies which are in no way peers,
such as the militias in Libya, the UAVs are quite vulnerable. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">I think a
pause in the orders would definitely not be a tragedy. Indeed, it might be
better to put some money into defences for the PROTECTORs already on order. In
particular, I wonder if the defensive pods that came off Tornado GR4 and which
saw considerable investment right up to the end of their service life, couldn’t
be adapted for PROTECTOR. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Eventually,
I would also like to see investment in the proposed ASW capability for
PROTECTOR, with SEASPRAY radars and sonobuoys pods eventually becoming part of
the fleet’s equipment to give the type a maritime role in support of the
precious few P-8 Poseidons. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhFCXyRXxSqHbhj8TLdXhoBWIw3OpcMyyPdM0UxzxgjhJqBYV0oTZubYelprzCDsLHThQhr8pnBLL-ETBLegco_PrWssMmLsotCjUoE2ziRNpMM5uKGIOu6fAF8YGMADtDhuaSpaUnMYAI/s1600/ELlpQ_CWwAcr-lQ.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="340" data-original-width="680" height="160" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhFCXyRXxSqHbhj8TLdXhoBWIw3OpcMyyPdM0UxzxgjhJqBYV0oTZubYelprzCDsLHThQhr8pnBLL-ETBLegco_PrWssMmLsotCjUoE2ziRNpMM5uKGIOu6fAF8YGMADtDhuaSpaUnMYAI/s320/ELlpQ_CWwAcr-lQ.jpg" width="320" /></a></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
One
expensive programme which has made very little noise so far but which will
undoubtedly be reviewed is the Chinook Capability Sustainment Programme. The UK
basically intends to procure new build Chinooks, ideally at the latest Block II
standard, to progressively replace the oldest airframes. It has already secured
in 2017 the authorization to purchase up to 16 such machines and according to
Boeing a contract for 14 could come soon. Review permitting, obviously. This
would be an expensive endeavour and it might well be postponed in a hurry to
ease the pressure on the budget. </div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">If it does
instead proceed, the authorization document suggests the UK has requested
helicopters at the MH-47G standard, so the full-optional Special Forces one,
with just one very evident item missing: the air refueling probe. In the
meanwhile, however, the US have offered the probe for export to Israel and
Germany both, so the UK should have no problem obtaining them. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Ideally, it
should. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Putting
probes on Merlin HC4 and Chinook, however, is only half the job. The UK would
then have to procure either C-130J tanker kits, or A400M pods. The A400M is
basically “tanker-ready” and recent tests with the reworked pods, carried out
in France, suggest that the capability will indeed become available, so
procuring a few pods should not be overly complex or expensive. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The C-130
tanker kit is an alternative, but the KC-130s are all short fuselage models,
and the RAF is retaining only one short C-130. Converting just one aircraft
wouldn’t be great. Had more short fuselage been retained, the ideal solution
would have been to procure some HARVEST HAWK kits from the USMC, adding not
just air refueling capability, but weaponry. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">This would
have fit into the spirit of the “VENOM” project announced by Gavin Williamson
but never detailed. Assuming VENOM is not quietly cancelled, this should see
the integration of a non better specified “kinetic strike” capability on some
of the RAF ISTAR / support aircraft. HARVEST HAWK kits would be the absolute
best fit among what is already out on the market, and the Special Forces would
no doubt appreciate. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">This whole
initiative, however, is one of the easiest to cancel and will undoubtedly
quietly vanish away if saving money fast is imperative. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">My list of
priorities for the RAF would include: <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoListParagraphCxSpFirst" style="mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; text-indent: -18.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri;"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">-<span style="font: 7.0pt "Times New Roman";">
</span></span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Expanding
216 Squadron activities and capabilities (the unit is standing up to work with
Swarming UAVs)<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoListParagraphCxSpFirst" style="mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; text-indent: -18.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; text-indent: -18.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri;"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">-<span style="font: 7.0pt "Times New Roman";">
</span></span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Investing
in the LANCA “loyal wingman” development, including the requirement for “runway
independence” to ensure they can readily be embarked in support to the F-35Bs
of the carriers as well. Maturation of the LANCA capability should be pursued
with decision, because this is probably the only truly feasible way to expand
the number of aircraft in service <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; text-indent: -18.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgd0gAcfyUr4-SgbEkEyykRVMx-dkoVVIVxck0UJ7zZprRYw7T33oI4epUXk54R-QKamLdcHu51OhyphenhyphenKoEpV5RyLhP4K2kDr70mpbAWaYXxiH8hP6n3tya8pb6OUZNRSnN1t3Ms-NzR8ZHE/s1600/LANCA.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="900" data-original-width="1200" height="240" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgd0gAcfyUr4-SgbEkEyykRVMx-dkoVVIVxck0UJ7zZprRYw7T33oI4epUXk54R-QKamLdcHu51OhyphenhyphenKoEpV5RyLhP4K2kDr70mpbAWaYXxiH8hP6n3tya8pb6OUZNRSnN1t3Ms-NzR8ZHE/s320/LANCA.jpg" width="320" /></a></div>
<div class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; text-indent: -18.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; text-indent: -18.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; text-indent: -18.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri;"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">-<span style="font: 7.0pt "Times New Roman";">
</span></span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">A
plan to get to a total of 4 F-35B squadrons. Avoid a fleet split, especially if
no more than 4 Sqns can be expected to stand up in total. A reduction in total
number of airframes is not only acceptable, but borders on the advisable, in
order to free up funding for Project TEMPEST<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; text-indent: -18.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; text-indent: -18.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri;"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">-<span style="font: 7.0pt "Times New Roman";">
</span></span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Project
TEMPEST should be supported and nurtured and every effort should be made to try
and involve more countries, beginning with Japan in particular. Speaking of
Japan, continued support to joint development of the Joint New Air to Air
Missile (evolved Meteor with AESA seeker) should be a priority. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; text-indent: -18.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; text-indent: -18.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri;"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">-<span style="font: 7.0pt "Times New Roman";">
</span></span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">AESA
retrofit extended to cover Tranche 2 Typhoons as well; STRIKER 2, SPEAR and
Litening 5 to be adopted as soon as practicable<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; text-indent: -18.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"><br /></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; text-indent: -18.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri;"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">-<span style="font: 7.0pt "Times New Roman";">
</span></span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Investigate
adding some self-defences on PROTECTOR; ASW capability if financially
possible.</span></div>
<div class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; text-indent: -18.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; text-indent: -18.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri;"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">-<span style="font: 7.0pt "Times New Roman";">
</span></span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Acquiring
2 to 4 sets of AAR pods for the A400M fleet once they have been proven workable</span></div>
<div class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; text-indent: -18.0pt;">
<span style="text-indent: -18pt;">i </span></div>
<div class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; text-indent: -18.0pt;">
<span style="text-indent: -18pt;"> Ideally,
go ahead with the Chinook CSP, including AAR capability for at least a portion
of the fleet</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">If money
could be secured, I would recommend investing further in capability aiming at
the suppression and destruction of enemy air defences. In particular, an
anti-radar missile derived from Meteor (MBDA has already proposed such a
development) and eventual adoption of Escort Jammer pods for use on Typhoon
would be my favored investments. An anti-radar weapon derived from Meteor would
come with the key advantage of being compatible with internal carry into the
F-35, while escort jammers would give better chances to the Typhoons to stay
relevant well into the future. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Finally,
the Army. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">While for
the other Services I auspicate a continuation of current programmes and
approaches, I would recommend a wide ranging rethink of the Army plans. As I’ve
written many times, in multiple articles, the Army plans for the future are by
far the messiest and less convincing. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">To this
day, few seem to have awakened to the fact that more than half of the Army’s
infantry battalions are “parked” within 4 “brigades” which have no artillery,
no signals, no logistic, no engineering units of their own. The whole 1st
Division is a container for “spare” infantry and some Light Cavalry. For me,
this is an unacceptable waste of finite resources. I can accept some “spare”
battalions (the UK needs a few just to cover rotating, standing tasks including
Public Duty, Brunei and Cyprus), but maintaining a ghost division and parking
in it around two thirds of the available Infantry is in no way acceptable. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Fixing 1<sup>st</sup>
Division, and indeed the wider imbalance within the Army, should be priority
number one perhaps of the entire Review. The plans that Carter left behind
himself are in large part unworkable and should definitely be rewritten. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Re-balancing
the Army will require the courage to tackle head on the one and only true
Sacred Cow in Defence: the british fetish for the infantry battalions and their
capbadges. Courage will be needed to merge and / or disband a few more
battalions in favor of beefing up what remains and in favor of standing up more
supporting units, to ensure that the brigades that remain are actually able to
deploy into the field with their own communications, logistic, engineering and
artillery support. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">In
particular, I would recommend adopting an army structure similar to the one adopted
by France with the recent “Au Contact” restructuring. In practice, instead of
having all deployable brigades in 3<sup>rd</sup> Division and “everything
that’s left” into 1<sup>st</sup> Division, I’d encourage the formation of two
more equally resourced Divisions, each one comprising an Armoured Infantry
brigade, a Medium brigade (STRIKE, if you truly must insist with that rather
empty title) and a Light brigade. In the past I had attempted a detailed look
at such a possibility, and while today I’d go a slightly different way about
it, that </span><a href="http://ukarmedforcescommentary.blogspot.com/2017/02/a-different-refining-process.html"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">article</span></a><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"> remains interesting to see, in detail, what
would be needed and what is instead already available.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">One of said
Light Brigades might have to be 16 Air Assault. This would cut down to a
minimum the need to raise new Artillery, Logistic, Engineer and Medical
formations, since 16AA already has these formations (albeit with just a couple
of sub-units each).<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">On the
other hand, ideally I’d want 16 Air Assault and 3<sup>rd</sup> Commando and the
Specialized Infantry Group (which could well be given a Brigade identity, since
it is a 1-star command anyway) sitting together under a Joint Divisional
Command specializing in unconventional warfare and theatre opening. The
reasoning behind such a grouping is simple: Specialised Infantry is meant to be
constantly deployed abroad, building security but also local knowledge of
various reasons which might one day be theatres of action. 16 AA and 3<sup>rd</sup>
Commando are early entry forces and, in particular with 3<sup>rd</sup>
Commando, a raiding / unconventional warfare force which could be used to
create the conditions for a subsequent deployment of a larger Army force. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">I’d alter
the (too) ambitious Carter target of being able to deploy a Division of 2
Armoured and 1 Strike brigade, which does not appear realistic, in favor of
being able to deploy either one of the two “identical” divisions instead. They
would be individually lighter, but they could rotate in and out of operations
and ensure the Army is not just a single use silver bullet which, if ever
expended, is then out of the picture nearly completely for years. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">On the
equipment front, I’m recommending that the MoD does <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">not</b> proceed with a production contract for the Warrior Capability
Sustainment Programme. If the decision was in my hands, that budget would be
immediately moved across to the MIV programme to purchase further BOXERs, which
would then be equipped with the WCSP turret (the only part of the program which
is already under contract). The turreted BOXERs would then be mixed with the
APC variants to form 8 battalions: 2 for each Armoured and Medium brigade. There
are many reasons for me to formulate this recommendation, but they all more or
less stem from the following main considerations: the Warrior hull is old and tired and the
CSP does not quite solve that, nor does replace the old powerpack; an all MIV
fleet helps standardization; having the infantry on wheels helps the Army be
more self-deployable and means the precious few Heavy and Light Equipment
Transports (89 and 77 respectively) are free to focus on moving the MBTs and
other tracked platforms, such as AJAX and TERRIER; having at least a portion of
the BOXERs well armed with a 40mm gun means that, apart from being able to get
to the fight, they will also be able to fight. </span>The current MIV, armed like a SAXON, can get there but can’t get into a fight, only drop its infantry a safe distance back. </div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Finally, plans for a new tracked support vehicle to replace FV432 seem to have died entirely, and it would border on ridiculous to field a 28 tons tracked Warrior supported by wheeled 8x8s weighting close to 40. Boxer is a modern and well protected hull, and if the Army cannot afford a proper split of tracks and wheels, on balance of merits and defects, wheels should probably take precedence. This is what France has done, by the way, with the VBCI replacing the last tracked IFVs of the Armee de Terre. </div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjqbhocEFe0-CIhUdQak0HhMxtoSdSBPWtTsAsYrL5xoP5XcTeCrhOUqKneBe5Rawy8NT92q8KC-KQBCDdjicWZzf1FZUBfuQd-UNaX4Qg71vkjyZ9Bbh_GbHTsRYo8Gx9ugOvaNpJvCnM/s1600/EI1tE2-XYAEwUxF.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="1023" data-original-width="1535" height="266" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjqbhocEFe0-CIhUdQak0HhMxtoSdSBPWtTsAsYrL5xoP5XcTeCrhOUqKneBe5Rawy8NT92q8KC-KQBCDdjicWZzf1FZUBfuQd-UNaX4Qg71vkjyZ9Bbh_GbHTsRYo8Gx9ugOvaNpJvCnM/s400/EI1tE2-XYAEwUxF.jpg" width="400" /></a></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Again, a
priority for me would also be to re-evaluate the variants of MIV to be
procured, reducing to the bare minimum the number of ambulances and command
posts in favor of pursuing instead a 120mm mortar and an ATGW variants as well
as, potentially, more APCs / IFVs to increase, if at all possible, the number
of mechanized battalions in the Army. With over 500 vehicles already on order,
it should be feasible. I’ve written about this in greater detail in a </span><a href="http://ukarmedforcescommentary.blogspot.com/2019/12/of-compromises-and-priorities.html"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">previous article</span></a><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The
Ambulance role and, wherever possible, the C2 role would be instead “offloaded”
onto much cheaper Multi Role Vehicle Protected variants. Regarding MRV-P, I’d
personally urge the Army to finally proceed with the programme with the aim of
rationalizing the current dog’s breakfast of multiple “mini” fleets, getting
rid progressively of Husky, Panther, DURO, Pinzgauer and part of the Land Rovers.
<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">My favorite
for Group 2 would be the Thales Bushmaster, to be assembled in their Glasgow
plant as promised by the company and by the Australian government. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Unfortunately,
the near totality of the Royal Artillery modernization attempts are not under
contract yet and are thus exposed to silent cancellation. It would be a repeat
of the “lost decade+” that saw the previous programme of evolution nearly
entirely killed off by budget cuts. The Royal Artillery’s main priorities for
the new decade are pretty much the same as the previous decade: <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoListParagraphCxSpFirst" style="mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; text-indent: -18.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri;"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">-<span style="font: 7.0pt "Times New Roman";">
</span></span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Land
Precision Strike. Initially delivered by EXACTOR MK2, it is meant to evolve
towards a weapon system with a much greater range (at least 60 km, eventually).
EXACTOR has a provisional OSD of 2023, but might be the successor of itself
through a Mid-Life Upgrade. The Land Precision Strike system should be mounted
on a vehicle, and EXACTOR itself (currently launched from a small trailer)
might end up retrofitted onto a vehicle base in the next few years if the MLU
happens. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjfPOWVxiYPsvR0qvhSdUIqAbFGXmXKh7pdwFdO2E1mdIOeHmyO-2HwbdQi1_9OOxLiKFcRy_KiFGXL3F2VTmnvTE1_C_B0W6KmwJtR3J21T6k1i93rPCeBkxNw_a1xWbZx1OxPrzhqE6Q/s1600/Exactor+firing.JPG" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="313" data-original-width="462" height="270" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjfPOWVxiYPsvR0qvhSdUIqAbFGXmXKh7pdwFdO2E1mdIOeHmyO-2HwbdQi1_9OOxLiKFcRy_KiFGXL3F2VTmnvTE1_C_B0W6KmwJtR3J21T6k1i93rPCeBkxNw_a1xWbZx1OxPrzhqE6Q/s400/Exactor+firing.JPG" width="400" /></a></div>
<div class="MsoListParagraphCxSpFirst" style="mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; text-indent: -18.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; text-indent: -18.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri;"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">-<span style="font: 7.0pt "Times New Roman";">
</span></span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Deep
Fires Rocket System. This modernization / eventual replacement of MLRS should
expand the striking range and introduce a greater variety of ammunition and
effects. The Royal Artillery hopes to procure the GMLRS Extended Range rockets
being developed, which would double the current range (to above 150 km) and it
should also pursue the Alternative Warhead developed by the US as replacement
to the old submunitions to restore an area suppression capability. Procurement
of the new Land Precision Strike missile developed in the US or of a national
alternative would enable strikes to 500 km or potentially beyond, reducing the
gap against Russian systems, primarily ISKANDER. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; text-indent: -18.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri;"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">-<span style="font: 7.0pt "Times New Roman";">
</span></span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">SERPENS.
This key programme is about procuring replacements for the handful (literally)
of MAMBA artillery locating radars and the sound ranging equipment. High
priority should be attached to this programme and to the Army’s Surveillance
and Target Acquisition capability in general. Ideally, “basic” STA should be
pushed down into the Close Support Artillery regiments, while 5 Royal Artillery
Regiment should focus on Theatre-wide / Divisional level STA. More and better
radars are a key upgrade the Army cannot do without if it has to be taken
seriously in a peer scenario. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; text-indent: -18.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri;"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">-<span style="font: 7.0pt "Times New Roman";">
</span></span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Mobile
Fires Platform. The replacement for AS90 and for the L118 Light Gun in the
“STRIKE” regiments. Around 98 systems for equipping 4 regiments, with initial
capability expected in 2026. This programme is also very vulnerable to stealth
cancellation, but it should be accorded high priority because the British
Army’s artillery is truly in bad shape. In this very early phase of the
programme, the Army has essentially looked at autocannons (CAESAR and ARCHER
above all) but I’d recommend a more careful evaluation of the options. The US
are about to move on to a 58 caliber 155mm gun system, while in Germany
Rheinmetall is now working on a 60 caliber retrofit option. It would be very
unwise for the Army to procure (with so great delay) a 52 caliber system only
to still lag well behind both Allies and Enemies in terms of range. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; text-indent: -18.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri;"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">-<span style="font: 7.0pt "Times New Roman";">
</span></span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Precision
/ Near precision 155 mm ammunition and, ideally, a smart shell with top-attack
capability for use against enemy armour on the move. The Army had selected
SMART shells for this requirement but the procurement was just one of the many
programmes to be cancelled in the lost decade. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoListParagraphCxSpLast">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Other
priorities, Army-wide, include finally pressing home the reorganization of the
Army Air Corps and Joint Helicopter Command. Plans have been ongoing since at
least 2015, including a seemingly endless review into the possibility /
opportunity of moving the Apache helicopters out of Wattisham to rationalize
the AAC bases. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Plans were
well advanced, but implementation has largely been put on hold. It is now likely
that the plan will be brought into the SDSR 2020 and the formation of a Combat
Aviation Brigade on the American model will be part of the final document. Next
year, a UK combat aviation battlegroup will deploy in Europe together with a US
CAB during the mega exercise DEFENDER EUROPE 2020, and this is likely to be a
key test for the new structures and methods. The implementation of the Combat
Aviation Brigade plan should be a priority and it should, obviously, involve
the RAF Chinook and Puma squadrons. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Finally,
I’d urge the Army to proceed with the Challenger 2 LEP, because the
obsolescence of the type can no longer be denied. The new turret put forwards
by Rheinmetall BAE Land Systems will cure the problems and turn Challenger into
one of the very best tanks within NATO, ensuring its validity for the next
couple of decades. Ideally, a powerpack change should also be funded, however,
since the current engine has too little power for such a heavy machine, and is
getting increasingly unreliable. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Rather than
cutting the number of tank regiments from 3 to 2, I’d encourage the Army to set
up 4 tank regiments, albeit individually smaller (Type 44 instead of Type 56,
for example), to ensure that the two Armoured Infantry brigades can have a
solid “square” base and assign a tank formation in support of each infantry
battalion. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Ideally, in
a more courageous Army, I’d urge the reorganization of the Tank and Armoured
Infantry regiments / battalions into Combined Arms Battalions, similar to the
American ones, permanently combining tank squadrons and IFV companies. With
Armour now being all concentrated in the Salisbury Plain area, this should not
prove overly complex. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">In terms of
Commands, I remain unconvinced by the restructuring last August which saw Force
Troops Command dismembered and renamed. While I recognize that the “spare infantry”
of 1<sup>st</sup> Division would be used to secure the rear in a Divisional
deployment and would provide security to theatre opening activities, I still
don’t think 104 Logistic Brigade, 2<sup>nd</sup> Medical Brigade and 8 Engineer
Brigade belong there. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">As I said,
in my “ideal” army, a Joint Rapid Reaction divisional HQ would group together
16 AA, 3 Cdo and Specialised Infantry, while 1<sup>st</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup>
Division would be nearly identical in structure and would alternate into
readiness (and deployment, when necessary). <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Force
Support units would probably sit under a command focusing on logistics. However
close the liaison would have to be with the “fighting” divisions, I don’t think
the current arrangement is a good idea. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Conclusion <o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">This piece
is a summary of my expectations and opinions ahead of the SDSR 2020. As such,
it might well be proven wrong in multiple areas. Things might end up being a
lot rougher. I would lie if I said I was relaxed and solely confident in the
outcome of the review. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">I am,
however, moderately optimistic. I’m expecting something upbeat, more similar to
2015 than 2010. There will be less big programmes launched, compared with 2015,
and much of the focus will be on Cyber (thus on area where progress is hard to
visualize and even harder to measure, allowing loud and cheap claims) and on
Space. In general, I think the 2015 targets will be maintained as much as
possible, and I hope there will be room for a few welcome adjustements and
boosts in key areas. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">As I’ve
made clear in the article, pain is likely to be felt mostly in the less
glamorous programmes which are part of the 10 years plan but are not really
known by the public and are not yet under contract. Stealth cuts are a constant
at the MOD, and this review will not be an exception. I don’t think Boris
Johnson will want to associate himself and his government with draconian cuts
to what is left of the Forces, so I’m trying to focus on the positive. The one
area in which I think a revolution is necessary is the Army. Unfortunately, it
is the one area which is most resistant to change. There is often much talk
about “sacred cows” in defence, but as often happens, what is talked about the
most is the smokescreen, not the problem. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Sacred cows
are not the Paras, or the Marines. The one Sacred Cow is the Army’s insistence
in clinging on to its regiments and infantry battalions, even at the cost of
maintaining a ghost Division with very low actual combat capability. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">This is the
one sacred cow I’d want to slay right at the start of the Review. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoListParagraph">
<br /></div>
<br />Gabrielehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/01623558391676151582noreply@blogger.com29tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-442909239199162925.post-88382699472150541072019-12-02T19:30:00.000+01:002019-12-04T16:04:08.927+01:00Of compromises and priorities <br />
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
</div>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The
signing of the contract for the Mechanized Infantry Vehicle for the army is
something to be cheered, of course, but i don’t think it should be welcomed
without critique. This hugely expensive contract comes decades late, and it
ends (hopefully) a whole 3 decades of disasters in army vehicles procurement.
Almost everyone knows that BOXER, today’s MIV, is yesterday’s MRAV. The British
Army was a founding member of the programme and had a big input in the design
of the vehicle, which was originally meant to be the wheeled part of a
comprehensive modernization programme for the Army, which included a tracked
counterpart. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj60nItIrmA7f4DRqweVyzWe0ZAKcAlz-TxFD1OvIPSlFTXQjLHetewgIvd5_anXfa42o2NkqKvTbgk-5k5Mp_cl9lN-0ajxVQUdRbRhyphenhyphensnNP9zHXwNQ0RyhfDfC4Q_gSpagdAtMplXEXQ/s1600/EI1tE-lWkAIDQEo.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="1021" data-original-width="1535" height="265" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj60nItIrmA7f4DRqweVyzWe0ZAKcAlz-TxFD1OvIPSlFTXQjLHetewgIvd5_anXfa42o2NkqKvTbgk-5k5Mp_cl9lN-0ajxVQUdRbRhyphenhyphensnNP9zHXwNQ0RyhfDfC4Q_gSpagdAtMplXEXQ/s400/EI1tE-lWkAIDQEo.jpg" width="400" /></a></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Equally
notoriously, the whole programme fell apart and was succeeded by that utter
disaster that was FRES. A whole 3 decades on, the original requirements are
still only partially covered, and neither AJAX / WCSP nor MIV have yet managed
to define a path towards complete replacement of all FV432 variants. To say
that this saga has been a colossal failure is still an understatement, and the
army cannot and should not pretend that all blame lays with politicians.
Moreover, the Army should stop pretending that the blame lies on the
expenditure for the Aircraft Carriers, or some other piece of equipment of the other two services. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">In this
article, however, I want to focus on the present, not the past. The past can’t
be fixed, anyway. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The Army
secured a sizeable first purchase: after initial talks of 300, up to heights of
600, down to an expected 508 in the final phases of the negotiation, it
eventually signed for 523 series production vehicles and 5 prototypes. This is
already enough to make it the world’s biggest BOXER operator, since even Germany
only acquired 403 in two batches (a recent one for 131 and an earlier one for
272).<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">In the
tenders published in the run-up to the contract, the MOD specifically sought to
include options for further variants and successive purchases of vehicles, to
get to a total of up to 1,500. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">This
enormous number is not expected to translate into a large number of mechanized
infantry battalions, because many of the BOXERs would be used to replace FV432s
and other vehicles across a multitude of supporting roles. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">In fact,
supporting variants are likely to make up a very significant portion of the 523
vehicles on order, even though we do not know yet the exact partitioning of the
order. Known STRIKE plans involve just 4 battalions of infantry to be mounted
in MIV vehicles, and this can be achieved with fewer than 250 – 300 vehicles.
The exact number entirely depends on how many supporting variants are included:
a WARRIOR battalion, for example, will have WARRIOR hulls for the infantry
platoons, tactical HQ elements, ATGW platoon, recovery and repair (FV512 and
FV513 variants). Mortar carriers, ambulances, HQ support vehicles and some
other roles are covered by FV432s since the relevant WARRIOR variants were
never acquired. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The current
MIV order includes just 4 variants: APC, Command Post, Ambulance and a
“Specialist” carrier whose role is not yet entirely clear. It is understood to
be derived from the Dutch engineer variant, so it basically comes with less
seats and more storage space for equipment. It might come with racks for
Engineer recce teams but also come in, for example, a variant equipped to carry
JAVELIN missile teams. In other words, it looks like a wheeled counterpart to
the ARES (at least in some of its configurations) and ARGUS vehicles from the
AJAX family. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">In other
words, not too many roles within a battalion will be actually covered by MIV
variants, at least in the foreseeable future, and so it is even more likely
that only between 250 and 300 vehicles are needed for the 4 battalions. 300
having been, not casually i dare adding, the first number thrown about for MIV. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The rest
will be made up of ambulances, command posts and specialist carriers destined
to other units. MIV Ambulances are most likely headed for the Armoured Infantry
battalions mounted on WARRIOR, since the Armoured Battlegroup Support Vehicle
(ABSV) programme seems to be dead and the AJAX family has not, in the end,
included an ambulance variant. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">MIV
ambulances will obviously go to the Medical battalions of the Armoured and
STRIKE brigades; MIV Specialist carriers <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">could</b>
be headed for the Engineer regiments of the STRIKE brigades. I say could
because the exact role of these “specialist” variants is far from clear yet and
because there is already the ARGUS variant from the AJAX family. It might be
that ARGUS will be concentrated in the two regiments aligned with the Armoured
brigades, mainly tracked, and MIVs in similar configurations will go to the
STRIKE engineers. It is yet to be discovered. The “Specialist” might also equip
STRIKE artillery units, to give mobility to their Fire Support Teams as they
track and designate targets. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">In practice,
the British Army is approaching MIV in a way that is a hybrid of Germany’s and
Netherland’s approaches: the Dutch, in fact, procured 200 BOXERs in various
Support Role configurations as replacement for their tracked M113s. They have
no infantry mounted in BOXERs at all. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Germany has
procured mostly APCs to equip its </span><span style="background-color: white; font-size: 14px;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Jäger</span></span> (Light) infantry battalions, and some
support vehicles to go along with them.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The result
of this hybrid approach is that Germany will have mounted more infantry
battalions in BOXERs than the British Army, despite purchasing less vehicles. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">This is not
necessarily wrong in entirety, but it is the result of different compromises. Germany clearly thinks that such a
massive, expensive and capable vehicle is mostly to be destined to frontline,
combat role, while support roles, with some exceptions, can be entrusted to
less expensive machines. The UK is currently planning to increase protection
levels massively for a wider range of roles, but at the cost of leaving most of
its infantry battalions standing literally on their feet. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">There is a
discussion to be had on whether the British Army’s priorities are the right
ones for a cash-strapped force which is currently aiming for a grand total of 8
(small) battalions with some form of mechanization (4 on WARRIOR, 4 on MIV as of
today’s plans). Wouldn’t it be better to reserve BOXERs for frontline roles,
and have less expensive vehicles for supporting roles wherever this is
reasonable? <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Other
armies clearly think it is a good proposition: France procured 630 VBCIs in
just 2 variants: IFV (510) and Command (120) and equipped 8 regiments with
them. And please, take due note of the fact that French regiments are based on
4 rather than 3 Companies and are much, much bigger than british battalions. Supporting
vehicles today are mostly VABs, and tomorrow will be GRIFFON 6x6 vehicles,
immensely cheaper than a top-class 8x8 and purchased in literal thousands. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Italy gets
often overlooked, but actually fields impressive and very active armed forces,
especially considered the tiny budget the service chiefs have to work with. It
is also one of the most active western players when it comes to wheeled armour,
and 8x8 in particular, thanks to the CENTAURO tank destroyer and then to the
FRECCIA family. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The FRECCIA
family is an interesting case of prioritization completely different from the
British Army’s approach. FRECCIA orders are still coming and production is
still (slowly) progressing due to the already mentioned tiny budget, and it is
worth noting that almost the entire purchase is devoted to frontline combat. In
fact, between delivered, ordered and planned, the vehicles of the family
include 335 IFVs, 72 anti-tank vehicles (with SPIKE missile pods on the sides
of the turrets), 34 120mm Mortar Carriers, 40 Recovery vehicles, 60 Reconnaissance
vehicles in FAR configuration and 60 in CLOSE configuration, and just 26
command vehicles in 2 different variants (note: some of the IFVs are kitted for
infantry company command). <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">16
Ambulances were envisaged at one point, but the idea was abandoned in favor of
less expensive alternatives. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">What
alternatives? And why so few command posts? <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">This is
arguably the most interesting part. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
On the
ambulances front, the answer is that the role has essentially been pushed down
onto the Italian counterpart to the Multi Role Vehicle – Protected (MRV-P) that
the British Army hopes to acquire. For those who don’t remember what MRV-P is,
I’ll mention that it is a large programme meant to replace (part of) the
unprotected Land Rover variants; the Pinzgauers, the PANTHERs and eventually
the HUSKYs. To do this, two “Groups” are envisaged: Group 1 is for a 4x4
vehicle, so (relatively) small, while Group 2 is for a larger vehicle, with
effectively only 6x6s left in the races, for more demanding roles.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">For Group
1, the British Army has expressed its favor for the American Oshkosh Joint
Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) and has already secured, back in 2017, the US
approval for a purchase of up to 2,747 vehicles and associated kits and
equipment. Back in April this year, a 2-year demonstration phase has been
authorized to test and develop british-specific fit-outs and work out
integration and mission safety features. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Up to at
least this September, government reiterated in Written Answers that it expects
decisions on MRV-P during 2020: in particular, the JLTV purchase could get the
go ahead while a selection should also be made between the two contenders left
in the race for Group 2.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">These are
the Thales BUSHMASTER and the General Dynamics EAGLE 6x6. The BUSHMASTER is
sponsored by Australia, which through its defence minister has promised that
production of the vehicles would happen in the Thales facility up in Glasgow.
BUSHMASTER is seen as the favorite, but while a selection is supposedly due in
“early 2020”, all timings are obviously always doubtful when it comes to the
army and even more so now that there is an SDSR coming after the elections. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">There is
(was?) also a “Group 3” requirement, which is specifically about a Lightweight,
air portable Recovery vehicle, which is required not just to service MRV-P
itself, but to support units mounted in other “light” vehicles, such as
JACKAL/COYOTE and FOXHOUND. At the moment, apart from a few HUSKYs partially
fitted out for the role by the REME, there is no real alternative to the MAN SV
Wrecker, a 32 tons behemoth that is, for obvious reasons, actually very poorly
suited to supporting Light Cavalry and Light Mechanized Infantry on FOXHOUND. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The
Lightweight recovery vehicle was very much craved by 16 Air Assault and 3
Commando brigades and was supposed to be a funded requirement, but even so it
has not progressed to a selection and contract award, despite a number of
interesting entries, led in particular by SUPACAT’s own product based on the
same high-mobility family that spawned the JACKAL. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Said of the
british MRV-P, let’s talk about the Italian one, which arguably provided the
inspiration for the Group 1 and 2 split. In fact, Italy’s Group 1 is made up by
thousands of Iveco LINCE (Lynx, the vehicle that was the base for the british
PANTHER variant), while Group 2 is made up by the much larger, but still 4x4,
Iveco ORSO (Bear, or more specifically Grizzy, especially in the german 6x6
variant, which however has been more or less abandoned). <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhI-Ib4nuRkcMQ8eyKKEKubQYEwGWtuSGjYSJBYsoZbdti5329riwiiVhPvKaNLQH6KqcGqfZ5-0ulx0E53v_m4MSKEOKjMXKz6s7sq7eSdehVhVtezfA2IRaB4KuJwVgapQlrccD4ShQU/s1600/ClUE3XXXEAAb8bT.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="675" data-original-width="1200" height="225" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhI-Ib4nuRkcMQ8eyKKEKubQYEwGWtuSGjYSJBYsoZbdti5329riwiiVhPvKaNLQH6KqcGqfZ5-0ulx0E53v_m4MSKEOKjMXKz6s7sq7eSdehVhVtezfA2IRaB4KuJwVgapQlrccD4ShQU/s400/ClUE3XXXEAAb8bT.jpg" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">ORSO and LINCE (long wheelbase variant) ambulance variants </td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Due to the
insufficient budget (Italy unfortunately spends much, much, much less than the
fabled 2% of GDP on defence) the purchases are very slow, but the ORSO is meant
to cover a huge variety of roles including Ambulance, Command Post, Comms and
EW, EOD and Route Clearance.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">It does,
and increasingly will as more are acquired, offload most supporting roles from
more expensive fleets, such as the FRECCIA, while enabling a standardization of
the various existing fleets. The Route Clearance package based on the ORSO, for
example, is allowing the Italian Army to let go of the US COUGAR-based MRAPs
that it had urgently procured for operations in Afghanistan. One route
clearance package is being assigned to the Engineer regiment in each brigade. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The ORSO
will also be supporting the tracked DARDO (Dart) IFVs since the Italian Army
has given up its M113 fleet to save money. This will be somewhat sub-optimal
due to the mixing of wheels and tracks, but at least it won’t be quite as
ridiculous as having a behemoth BOXER ambulance literally dwarfing the WARRIOR
IFV it will support. The maximum mass of BOXER in the latest variant, which is
the one the British Army will acquire, is 38,5 tons. Probably the ambulance
won’t weight quite that much, but a baseline WARRIOR at FV520 standard (the new
post-CSP designation) weights around 27… <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhlWb7MZB4pL3X7MawNvqf8sFBcSACTZQ5yX_9FWH2bpDkogU3lvL53ZV4YrVaUTjuibLlnoSA4LP0dARPxYqiZ4ozfv_ZIkiSNohX2HW_QpO2bCEhrcDeiUgtZN4_VZVOxQaId9D3dGYk/s1600/exfar-eye-3-160420.png" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="728" data-original-width="1280" height="227" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhlWb7MZB4pL3X7MawNvqf8sFBcSACTZQ5yX_9FWH2bpDkogU3lvL53ZV4YrVaUTjuibLlnoSA4LP0dARPxYqiZ4ozfv_ZIkiSNohX2HW_QpO2bCEhrcDeiUgtZN4_VZVOxQaId9D3dGYk/s400/exfar-eye-3-160420.png" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">A Route Clearance package based on the ORSO, with ground penetrating radar, anti-mine rollers, mast-mounted sensors for situational awareness and then the vehicle with the rummaging arm for anti-IED checks. One such package will be assigned to each brigade of the italian army for Mobility support. </td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<br />
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEi9JNbnCBXdZoXfd6OBgMg65LeUqIGifT6As5iAl89YVG6f5csbzbMl4nyx-xe4TkVsiEnM1gcrV1XN0d3D9p_AH784Ly1nsLHkOWnaeQWLlHCT3y2hdLstaKplKQtkwsXXcHqEncpb1yA/s1600/IVECO_MPV_640_002.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="424" data-original-width="640" height="265" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEi9JNbnCBXdZoXfd6OBgMg65LeUqIGifT6As5iAl89YVG6f5csbzbMl4nyx-xe4TkVsiEnM1gcrV1XN0d3D9p_AH784Ly1nsLHkOWnaeQWLlHCT3y2hdLstaKplKQtkwsXXcHqEncpb1yA/s400/IVECO_MPV_640_002.jpg" width="400" /></a></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">I make no
mystery of the fact that I’m much more attuned to the Italian priorities than
to the british ones. The British Army is about to splash a lot of money on a
big number of massive 8x8 ambulances, while, at the same time, having still no
plan at all for what vehicle will carry the battalion’s mortars after the FV432
finally retires. The problem is common to both WARRIOR and BOXER battalions,
and it amazes me. Add to this the fact that the british battalions continue to
have access to nothing more than hand-loaded 81 mm mortars while everyone else
has long had 120mm mortars, more often than not semi-automatic, and you might
understand why I’m utterly perplexed. Surely BOXER hulls with full protection
would be better spent for this key role…? <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The British
Army is also still without an under-armour launch capability for anti-tank
guided weapons. It last had one in the early 2000s, before the last CVR(T)
STRIKERS armed with SWINGFIRE missiles were withdrawn without direct replacement.
The only ATGW capability is given by dismounted JAVELIN teams, or
soldier-carried NLAWs. There is a possibility that some PROTECTOR RWS will get
a single JAVELIN launcher strapped on (the option is readily available and was
trialed successfully in the UK from a modified SPARTAN already years ago), but
this is still quite underwhelming to what is the norm elsewhere. The FRECCIA
ATGW variant carries dismounted SPIKE teams in the back, but also has SPIKE
Long Range missiles in box-launchers on either side of the turret, for example.
<o:p></o:p></span><br />
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">WCSP, AJAX
and now BOXER have all failed at trying to bring any progress in this area,
despite their enormous cost. And again I wonder if this shouldn’t have been
granted a much, much higher priority. If you ask me, yes, it should have. Especially
since you are exhausting most of your budget for the next few years on this
purchase, and effectively ensuring that these capability gaps will not go away
anytime soon. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgPfTIxBzlkGMpo2je8TyWf9hbRNxY3KgPnU5rH7SFpwnbTiY_7-VY7oIAgOmdvdIIx5_sWQKHS7GiV84YtkRIeiiGRyPU2GF-1xhks1VZq3xSZMWu-23spANGA2kyKg7zYM5x7slD21QY/s1600/Thales_Bushmaster_IAV_2018_925_002.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="997" data-original-width="1024" height="388" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgPfTIxBzlkGMpo2je8TyWf9hbRNxY3KgPnU5rH7SFpwnbTiY_7-VY7oIAgOmdvdIIx5_sWQKHS7GiV84YtkRIeiiGRyPU2GF-1xhks1VZq3xSZMWu-23spANGA2kyKg7zYM5x7slD21QY/s400/Thales_Bushmaster_IAV_2018_925_002.jpg" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">The latest BUSHMASTER evolution is seen as the favorite in the MRV-P race. Some BUSHMASTERS are already in use, including in Syria, with the UK Special Forces. The selection of BUSHMASTER would also be a "returned favor" after Australia jointed the Type 26 Global Combat Ship project. </td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">MRV-P Group
2 is mainly composed of “Troop carriers” (2+6 seats) and Ambulances, yet it is
evidently felt that these will mostly be about replacing Land Rover-based
ambulances, we have to assume. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEi-aJy7INPQsb7cHhMWqRnNLJWul61wyX0uc3sk9Z7Q7241aGG4g1YzSN-kiAn-wt_x7HGXOrDA5AnZ7c6srQ6RPiQ5jwbv996xxlmz6Midb5qDqDfYyQMpA8ns9WW0aRhLJmZthMKyvs4/s1600/Eagle_6x6_light_tactical_wheeled_armoured_vehicle_General_Dynamics_Land_Systems_variants_details_001.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="480" data-original-width="640" height="300" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEi-aJy7INPQsb7cHhMWqRnNLJWul61wyX0uc3sk9Z7Q7241aGG4g1YzSN-kiAn-wt_x7HGXOrDA5AnZ7c6srQ6RPiQ5jwbv996xxlmz6Midb5qDqDfYyQMpA8ns9WW0aRhLJmZthMKyvs4/s400/Eagle_6x6_light_tactical_wheeled_armoured_vehicle_General_Dynamics_Land_Systems_variants_details_001.jpg" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">The EAGLE 6x6 is the other Group 2 aspirant </td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">When it
comes to Command Posts, the discussion to be had is even more urgent and more
complex. I’ll again look at the Italian Army, because for all its shortcomings
and budget problems it has been one of the most innovative in the last several
decades and has been carrying on impressive experimentation and development. In
particular, it has been working very hard on digitalization, and is seeking to
truly modernize the command posts on the field. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">In its
Network Enabled force plans, the Italian Army has sought to define various
levels of command / access to information. Tier Zero is the Sensor, which might
well mean a small unattended, automated sensor on the ground. T1 is the
individual soldier, then T2 is the Section, T3 the Platoon, T4 the Company, T5
the Regiment and T6 the Brigade. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Most of
these command levels have <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">relatively</b>
low need for data and information. Things start getting interesting at T2
level. Digitalization, of course, is supposed to make even Sections much more
capable by allowing them to know more about their surroundings, collect and
share more data, access more directly to supports. The Italian Army is thus
investing heavily on Software Defined radios and Satcom On the Move (SOTM).
SOTM, in particular, means your command post can continue to communicate while
it is moving, while “normal” HQ are only able to access most of the data On The
Halt. Obviously, the more command and comms function work while on the move,
the more your battle rhythm can be quickened, at least in theory. Your command
also becomes enormously more survivable as it does not need to stop, set up
tents, camouflage itself, wire itself into gear etcetera. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">T2 to T4
tiers are getting LINCE vehicles outfitted with software defined radios and
SOTM X-band comms where necessary, to expand their capability. </span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgMuBm8CKRQm-wT3OjSmn-wZEeUSZIbmlMJ1Ne33O7I1aApCcWGq9E29cX58x3D88Jbcy4XRI-QaNFkx2W25rh0FZ-gSP4lc1eUUEUl0wb1ZOI025HsIQtcUBsoOIygDRD9gEaT89xm6m0/s1600/p1693542_main.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="423" data-original-width="752" height="225" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgMuBm8CKRQm-wT3OjSmn-wZEeUSZIbmlMJ1Ne33O7I1aApCcWGq9E29cX58x3D88Jbcy4XRI-QaNFkx2W25rh0FZ-gSP4lc1eUUEUl0wb1ZOI025HsIQtcUBsoOIygDRD9gEaT89xm6m0/s400/p1693542_main.jpg" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">A LINCE 2 (the current production standard, much improved and more roomy than the original LINCE) equipped as command post. The flat antenna on top of the rear is the SOTM X-band antenna. </td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
At higher
levels, company commanders riding in FRECCIA do not really need a specific
command variant, because digitalized comms on the FRECCIA, integrated with a
JANUS panoramic EO/IR sensor ball, are sufficient to build situational
awareness and exercise command. At a slightly higher level of complication in
battle command, the Command variants of the vehicle do step in. As I mentioned
earlier, there are actually 2 command variants to the FRECCIA: one is for
tactical command, when the officers need to be close to the action, and comes
with turret and 25mm gun, like the other IFVs.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
The “Main”
command post is a FRECCIA APC with more room in the back and just an HITROLE
RWS for self defence. This distinction is of course not necessarily “new” in
itself. The British Army itself of course mixes WARRIORs or, where applicable,
CHALLENGERs for “tactical” HQ to FV432 / 436 kitted out to form the main HQ
element. An interesting image tweeted by a British Army officer and showing a
tabletop wargaming exercise with STRIKE ORBATs shows that with AJAX and MIV the
situation will be much the same, with a couple of AJAX for the tactical element
supported by ATHENA vehicles for the actual command.<br />
<br />
<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhiMtC0KH6NuQmv18a-G07_Zi-zfOD_tZlHzDaKrdAnDS-UF-o7Rlm9AwOMtMDVzQ5PRgQmtxbp5Vvv341MRPdUgtQ1Ct_jLpvoZV1UFebfyo3h-Cj_nkRKzSOph67y_unpmd2cM11z07E/s1600/IMG_20191102_084614.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="900" data-original-width="1600" height="225" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhiMtC0KH6NuQmv18a-G07_Zi-zfOD_tZlHzDaKrdAnDS-UF-o7Rlm9AwOMtMDVzQ5PRgQmtxbp5Vvv341MRPdUgtQ1Ct_jLpvoZV1UFebfyo3h-Cj_nkRKzSOph67y_unpmd2cM11z07E/s400/IMG_20191102_084614.jpg" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">A glimpse of the STRIKE wargames offer a vision of some company level organisation. The most notable thing is that the ORBATs are actually very, very traditional. The AJAX Sqn literally swaps SPARTAN for ARES and SCIMITAR for AJAX, with no other visible change. Note "GW Troop", Guided Weapon Troop, on ARES: this will be JAVELIN missile teams. What is not yet clear is whether there still is a dedicate "Overwatch" sub-variant of ARES and whether this includes at least a JAVELIN on the RWS, to have at least a hint of under-armour ATGW capability. There does not seem to be any mortar at all in sight in the ORBAT. The only possible surprise is the very recognizable shape of FOXHOUND wherever a CLV (Command and Liaison Vehicle) appears in the ORBAT. This might or might not provide a hint of where FOXHOUND is next headed. It might also be a shape used semi-randomly to indicate the yet-to-be-procured MRV-P, however. </td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">What is
interesting in the Italian army’s approach is that the number of such commands
is more limited. Digitalization is exploited to reduce the need for dedicate
command vehicles. The AJAX family already includes 112 ATHENA vehicles, and the
first MIV purchase is likely to add quite a lot of its own C2 variant. Is this
really unavoidable, or even tactically sound? <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">In the
Italian army, again the ORSO steps into the fray. Forza NEC, the
network-enabled force project of the Italian Army, has invested into other ways
to create command posts that are both connected and mobile, capable and
survivable. One such fully mobile HQ model is built upon 4 ORSO vehicles, 2
built for the Command role and 2 specializing in communications. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">At brigade
level, the new model of digitalized command post is based on 6 ISO expanding
shelters, fully mobile once carried on trucks. Of the 6 shelters, one is for analysis
and planning, one for the management of ongoing manoeuvre, 2 are for comms and
EW, one for Artillery and one for Logistics. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">This
shelterized HQ is fully mobile, is faster into action than a classical tented
solution and cheaper than a solution based on armoured vehicles. It is also
arguably easier to hide “containers” among normal logistic movements and keep
the enemy guessing about where the HQ is. This kind of shelter can also
relatively easily be equipped with ballistic and CBRN protection. The Italian
army has anyway developed a tented variant, which can be used when the HQ is
not at risk and can be static for longer, and there is even an hybrid variant
which combines tented spaces and shelterized equipment to cut down on assembly
and wiring times. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Unfortunately,
the British Army does not appear to have approached the issue of command posts
anywhere near as seriously and comprehensively. In recent times there have been
some low-budget experiments within infantry battalions which have sought to
make their HQs more survivable by mounting the equipment into MAN SV trucks,
cutting down the wiring time. The HQ in this experiment was still essentially
an old-style affair, just quicker in relocating to enhance its chances of survival.
Those who took part, predictably, noted that shelters thought specifically for
the purpose would, of course, work better. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">In 2017,
finally, the British Army started experimenting with something more ambitious
and adequate to the modern world with the Tactical HotSpot experiment which has
seen a couple of PANTHERs and then also FOXHOUND kitted out to deliver both
SATCOM On The Move and bubbles of secure data connectivity. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The HotSpot
is meant to enable processing, exploitation and dissemination (PED) of ISR data
as well as high capacity line of sight meshed networks; it employs Satcom On
the Move (SOTM) and Mobile Ad Hoc Networking (MANET) support air and land
operations in an integrated way. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Its
deployable masts give it FALCON connectivity as well as BOWMAN reach, and there
are 4G networking and Link 16 also involved. Amazingly, it all fits on a
PANTHER. These demonstrators have been followed by the HAWK, which is a similar
HotSpot development packed into a FOXHOUND instead, and first showcased and
demonstrated to the Army in 2018. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj9GTnjMW5Gm-HOQjg_ozWoGYnpMJt7UjPC3POqvyakaJeZjGXsd1qjHlcjP0olQR_UmRUj-ByIr3-7u7r616oAkaszgFcqRCnIwiGVPTBsyM58N9e6fQwBdYMNrh9SagZUPIqtTKNTcjc/s1600/DXJIkZXXcAARZDw.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="640" data-original-width="480" height="400" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj9GTnjMW5Gm-HOQjg_ozWoGYnpMJt7UjPC3POqvyakaJeZjGXsd1qjHlcjP0olQR_UmRUj-ByIr3-7u7r616oAkaszgFcqRCnIwiGVPTBsyM58N9e6fQwBdYMNrh9SagZUPIqtTKNTcjc/s400/DXJIkZXXcAARZDw.jpg" width="300" /></a></div>
<br />
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgWMJssmID4XQpLRZBC2JhObbCSRMarr9O4vpYwN5s9lCBioEuHGE21-f6fsf9CthRubL8lPMzXwr8yQt-HocYNUc9iALJubP2CkTIJ81Lwg5BK3_Myws8MX2BnGbGko9XYf-Vd24twh9w/s1600/p1703976.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="930" data-original-width="1240" height="300" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgWMJssmID4XQpLRZBC2JhObbCSRMarr9O4vpYwN5s9lCBioEuHGE21-f6fsf9CthRubL8lPMzXwr8yQt-HocYNUc9iALJubP2CkTIJ81Lwg5BK3_Myws8MX2BnGbGko9XYf-Vd24twh9w/s400/p1703976.jpg" width="400" /></a></div>
<br />
<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEg0AuSrBy-6Owq8tT-oXGFe2_2jE7wS-UlVjJVFsZnt7VzG7JKzofGGNctIpFW4ObUhY7jK0Skd0NxIBHl73UvaSUtvuwRwNDvh2_0lItTGOW3Gd2hVRyVJPV-CISEdgKwasRwIgS9_gZ8/s1600/Tactical+Hotspot+Panther.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="1200" data-original-width="1600" height="300" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEg0AuSrBy-6Owq8tT-oXGFe2_2jE7wS-UlVjJVFsZnt7VzG7JKzofGGNctIpFW4ObUhY7jK0Skd0NxIBHl73UvaSUtvuwRwNDvh2_0lItTGOW3Gd2hVRyVJPV-CISEdgKwasRwIgS9_gZ8/s400/Tactical+Hotspot+Panther.jpg" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">The PANTHER HotSpot demonstrator, with the very evident telescopic masts at the rear </td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Agile
Command, Control and Communications is the theme of the Army Warfighting
Experiment for 2020, and both HotSpot demonstrators are highly likely to
feature at the event, hopefully alongside other solutions including shelterized
command posts, which in the meanwhile </span><a href="https://www.armytimes.com/news/your-army/2018/07/26/from-shelters-to-vehicles-to-rucks-heres-how-the-army-is-changing-its-command-posts/"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">have been gaining ground in the US</span></a><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"> as well. It is to be hoped that the
experiments in this AWE edition will lead, this time for real, to a true
modernization effort for how the army sees, deploys and employs command posts. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">A final
note on the FRECCIA reconnaissance variants, because they are a very
interesting topic: both are armed with the usual 25mm gun turret, but they are
otherwise complementary due to the sensors and systems they carry. The FAR
variant is equipped with the VIRESS sensor suite on a telescopic mast,
combining a radar LYRA 10 and a HORIZON HD long-range EO/IR optic, as well with
HORUS UAVs which are launched from boxes on the sides of the turret, similar to
normal SPIKE missile launchers. Both sensors are also man-portable for
dismounted use away from the vehicle. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The CLOSE
variant has the SPIKE missiles in the boxes and carries an Unmanned Ground
Vehicle RTP-2 in the back. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Procurement
is moving slowly, but the eventual ambition is to equip almost every brigade in
the Italian army with a recce Cavalry regiment which will have one Squadron of
CENTAURO 2 tank destroyers (120/45 mm smoothbore gun on 8x8) and 2 mixed
squadrons of FRECCIA FAR and CLOSE. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgLJjS4NQrNnXDhVmqX0_Ie9tSUzlTSDqAcYmh_hFII79LhMdULTChJ5dGu758QJD-FRwsMCPy5B9QX_1AvRbK8Hhgw4L8Qg8PnCZ8BqLcb5JWm-B4ekq1-AjdQXCrjZ99J5a9ghpxNlAA/s1600/5e285813a0c98b1d1213175264c2144f--army-vehicles-armored-vehicles.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="265" data-original-width="564" height="187" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgLJjS4NQrNnXDhVmqX0_Ie9tSUzlTSDqAcYmh_hFII79LhMdULTChJ5dGu758QJD-FRwsMCPy5B9QX_1AvRbK8Hhgw4L8Qg8PnCZ8BqLcb5JWm-B4ekq1-AjdQXCrjZ99J5a9ghpxNlAA/s400/5e285813a0c98b1d1213175264c2144f--army-vehicles-armored-vehicles.jpg" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">The CENTAURO 2 prototype (left) next to a current CENTAURO with 105 mm gun </td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">There was a
time in which the AJAX family was expected to be similar, with a Medium Armour
variant with the 120mm in support of the base AJAX and of the few, still
mysterious “Ground Based Surveillance” variant which, assuming it is still
planned at all, should carry some additional sensors. Today, the AJAX in its
basic Scout variant is being asked to “impersonate” the defunct Medium Armour
variant within the STRIKE brigades, with no uplift to its firepower or sensors.
<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><o:p><br /></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Standardization? <o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The first
(and pretty much only) objection that was formulated against my doubts about
the expenditure on so many BOXER support variants is that having “everything”
on the same vehicle base simplifies logistics. I can see that by myself, but
what I can also see is that the British Army is nowhere near to any degree of
true “standardization” and won’t be for many more years, if ever. As already
mentioned, only a very limited number of variants of BOXER are funded, and they
are insufficient to achieve a complete standardization even within the
MIV-mounted infantry battalions. Elsewhere in the Army, you’ll have a few lone
BOXERs into a WARRIOR or AJAX battalion, because there is no new tracked
ambulance. And nobody knows yet what will be done about the mortars, I’ll again
remark. Something that, to me at least, is unconceivable. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
BOXER-standardization
is a dream that entirely rests upon those nearly 1000 options for future
purchases. It is the quintessential example of living on a prayer, hoping in
the jam that will come tomorrow. And “tomorrow”, even in the very best case,
means several years further down the line. We all know just how many things
could go wrong. The Army has selected the most expensive 8x8 on the market
while knowing full well that there are many other requirements desperately
calling for funding. The British Army does not have the budget to use “Rolls
Royce” cars for everything, and will never have it. Just as the Navy and to a
lesser degree even the RAF have accepted that they can’t use high end platforms
for everything, the Army needs to also get real.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Multi Role
Vehicle – Protected, if properly funded and finally allowed to begin, could
bring about a wider standardization than BOXER ever could. HUSKY, PANTHER,
PINZGAUER, DURO and some of the old, tired Landies could all be replaced by 2
fleets, more modern, more protected and more reliable. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgbzoS_eGo44BAl20rEWmaxj15gEdOu94quNS6_BN0tQq4alDog9pddMgnUYo3Jw3TkL55CC1vJPFzOV_863_CaMWaghPTtuntbcW0nB5bwy9ilZiZtF6rnELXi-GHrqzuk8zvP_FDmKcs/s1600/2l-image.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="600" data-original-width="800" height="300" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgbzoS_eGo44BAl20rEWmaxj15gEdOu94quNS6_BN0tQq4alDog9pddMgnUYo3Jw3TkL55CC1vJPFzOV_863_CaMWaghPTtuntbcW0nB5bwy9ilZiZtF6rnELXi-GHrqzuk8zvP_FDmKcs/s400/2l-image.jpg" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">The JLTV family. New variants and mission fits have already started to appear, which is one of the advantages of going with a vehicle that will be in so widespread use in the US Armed Forces </td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Everything
in life is some sort of compromise, and in my opinion it is better to
compromise on your ambulance vehicle than on your mortar carrier, or on the
fact of having one more battalions riding into battle over BOXER rather than on
foot, or on seats strapped in the back of an HX60 truck.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Speaking of
compromises and standardization, the situation in the British Army is getting
so ridiculous due to the enduring problem of how to replace FV432 and get
WARRIOR into the 21<sup>st</sup> Century that perhaps the greatest priority I’d
personally associate to BOXER is replacing WARRIOR itself. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The WARRIOR
CSP production deal has not been signed yet. Only the turrets and cannons are
under contract, and this, in my opinion at least, is a blessing. What better
standardization than to replace those tired WARRIOR hulls with BOXER hulls,
modern, well protected, with much more room available and seats for 8 dismounts
even when a turret is fitted. Use the WCSP budget to procure some 245 new hulls
(in theory at least the cost would be exactly around a billion pounds) and have
the turrets installed onto those. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Then spread
those 245 turreted vehicles spread across 8 battalions, mixing them with the
cheaper APC variant being procured under the current deal. Is it ideal? No, it
is a compromise. We all know that the tactical mobility of tracks in atrocious
terrains is probably never going to be entirely matched by wheels. But the
British Army has no path to a fully tracked force since ABSV appears dead, so
rather than have BOXER ambulances dwarfing the IFVs they support while struggling
to match their mobility in the mud, I’d very much rather “go french” and give
up the tracked IFV fleet. Again, everything is a compromise. But is it a better
compromise than 4 battalions on WARRIORs and 4 battalions on APCs armed with
nothing more than a .50 HMG? In my opinion yes; it is a massive improvement in
my eyes. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">It also
fixes, at least partially, another flaw with the BOXER purchase as it is
currently planned: the incredibly light armament. The MIV Troop Carriers are,
for now at least, expected to be armed just with a PROTECTOR RWS, which can
take machine guns up to the .50 HMG, or a 40mm GMG grenade launcher at best. This
is in line with the dutch BOXERs (which however are not troop carriers at all,
as we have seen) and with Germany’s own, which however were originally procured
as battle taxis for the german army’s <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">light</b>
infantry. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">It should
be noted that according to the latest news the German army is actually about to
procure 30mm turrets for its BOXERs. This follows similar moves by the US (30mm
on STRYKERs) and Poland (which put 30mm guns and anti-tank missiles on the
portion of its ROSOMAK fleet it had originally procured in APC form). <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The British
Army’s plan is for the BOXER-borne infantry to be the very vanguard of the
Army, as well as, laughable as it sounds, its countermeasure to Anti Access;
Area Denial (A2AD) tactics. In the Army’s thinking, these vehicles, which are
in no way more mobile than Russia’s own wheeled force while being enormously
weaker in terms of firepower, will “disperse” over a wide area, “dance” around
main enemy forces and strike at will at vulnerable points to “complicate the
enemy’s C2 picture”. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">I think it
is utter nonsense, as I’ve made plenty clear in many other articles. But it
would be a little less unbelievable if the BOXER battalions had their own share
of 40mm guns to fight back against enemy AFVs (note: Russia puts 30mm guns AND
anti-tank missiles on nearly anything that moves) without having to stick close
to the tracked AJAX. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">It would
also bring forth some serious standardization. For real, this time. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">It is no
mystery that the STRIKE concept does not convince me at all. Especially with
the kind of equipment and mass that the British Army has and will realistically
have. Every time I think that the army owns just 89 Heavy Equipment Transports
(plus 3 recovery vehicles) and 77 Light Equipment Transporters, and any STRIKE
fantasy immediately dies, together with much of the feasibility of deploying
the fabled “warfighting division” in a meaningfully short timeframe. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">As I’ve
said elsewhere, I’d rather “STRIKEIZE” the existing brigades by replacing
WARRIOR than pursue STRIKE brigades in the way that has been imagined so far. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoListParagraphCxSpFirst" style="mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; text-indent: -18.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri;"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">-<span style="font: 7.0pt "Times New Roman";"> </span></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">A BOXER for everything? <o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Ultimately,
the question for the cash-strapped British Army is: does it make any kind of
sense to even try and purchase BOXER for all roles? The modularity of BOXER
does not change the fact that it is a behemoth, and an expensive one at that.
There have already been all kinds of pitches for further variants, including an
armoured LEAPP / Skykeeper module complete of its own Saab 1X radar or the Land
Precision Strike pitch by MBDA. This variant, in particular, would be a launcher
for missiles with a range requirement of at least 60 km. Land Precision Strike,
in the interim, is delivered by the EXACTOR (SPIKE NLOS) missile, currently
launched from a tiny trailer-launcher. The Royal Artillery would like to update
this capability by extending its range and by having the missiles mounted on a
vehicle, but should that vehicle be a BOXER? <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">This
vehicle will spend most of the time hiding. It will fire missiles from a great,
“safe” distance and then it’ll seek to vanish away before the enemy can react.
Does it NEED to be a BOXER? I’d rather have it installed on an inconspicuous
and ideally very light vehicle, to preserve, as much as possible, the good
attributes of the tiny trailer: complete air mobility and ease of concealment.
Indeed, while a vehicle-mounted launcher would be a great addition, I’d
personally recommend the Army to retain the trailer launchers as well, because
their ease of movement on the battlefield is an awesome characteristic in
itself. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"></span></div>
My
recommendation to the Army is: think very carefully about what <b><i>needs</i></b>
to be a BOXER, and what does not. Don’t waste finite millions on trying to
BOXER-ize everything. Moreover, start from the most dangerous roles. I come
back to the Mortar Carrier, or ATGW vehicle. These two roles certainly require
the best mobility and protection and firepower that can be acquired. A 120mm
mortar should be an absolute priority. An urgency, even. A mobile, under-armour
ATGW capability is also an urgency.<br />
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">A 60+ km
Land Precision Strike missile, if it’ll ever truly be funded (the past decade
saw nearly all Artillery modernization programmes mercilessly killed by budget
cuts, not sure this decade will be any different…) might not need to be on a
BOXER hull. It will be one of the least exposed to direct and indirect fire
simply because it’ll hide, fire very quickly, hide again. Its worst enemies
will be of the flying kind, and being on a BOXER hull won’t be really decisive
in ensuring survivability against those. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Conversely,
it seems the Army is happy with having its future 155mm howitzer based on a
lightly protected truck. Wouldn’t it make more sense to have it on a better
protected platform, since guns, unlike rocket / missile launchers, tend to end
up firing very frequently and, critically, for extended periods of time? <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhgw1kRhWGvgsh9LhBcXm-HNaOWq0oVS8v7eSgrS8K1umtBAlSHytG9axDg51Um6S2Zj3lIiC1u7iWTOkZqD31zRjuegydCWWSU-nA3eNBizgi0Sy3m0dGK4oLK4JiEvC0VZ14eFX5qZFY/s1600/archer_hx2_01.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="736" data-original-width="1200" height="245" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhgw1kRhWGvgsh9LhBcXm-HNaOWq0oVS8v7eSgrS8K1umtBAlSHytG9axDg51Um6S2Zj3lIiC1u7iWTOkZqD31zRjuegydCWWSU-nA3eNBizgi0Sy3m0dGK4oLK4JiEvC0VZ14eFX5qZFY/s400/archer_hx2_01.jpg" width="400" /></a></div>
<br />
<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjsArcLIkqVqj7Xn-5F4u4e3-JbyYXoH3hQLl5Dl0Ch0WvByl40vWS8HlCzYww-AIcPbmO8Qc_GLpLameDtZ6UQzmbpXjGXug16Yh5JafUQlc2cJIKRzkKnLTUKMcLgGg8Akmlukt0KVEQ/s1600/DneKG31X4AEmfn0.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="642" data-original-width="1024" height="250" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjsArcLIkqVqj7Xn-5F4u4e3-JbyYXoH3hQLl5Dl0Ch0WvByl40vWS8HlCzYww-AIcPbmO8Qc_GLpLameDtZ6UQzmbpXjGXug16Yh5JafUQlc2cJIKRzkKnLTUKMcLgGg8Akmlukt0KVEQ/s400/DneKG31X4AEmfn0.jpg" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">ARCHER automated gun module on HX truck base (Top) and MBDA's Land Precision Strike pitch. Wouldn't it make more sense if the base vehicles were inverted...? The ARCHER on MAN SV base is one of the main contenders for the Mobile Fires Platform programme which should re-equip 4 Royal Artillery regiments, replacing AS90 and part of the L118 Light Guns. Land Precision Strike is the evolution of the current EXACTOR capability. </td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">I think a
honest assessment of relative risks will agree with me that the howitzer is
more likely to end up framed by counterbattery fire than the Land Precision
Strike launcher. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">A decision
on “what does what” is overdue. The Army has spent the last decade dodging the
question of how to make AJAX, WCSP, MIV and MRV-P fit together in a way that
makes sense and allows the FV432 and all CRV(T) to leave service without
capability gaps opening all over the place. Billions of pounds of contracts
later, it still does not have an answer yet. It is time to formulate one which
is more realistic than expecting repeated BOXER purchases for the next X
decades until most of the army is equipped with it. Even if it was financially
feasible over the long term, it’ll take so long that the BOXER will be an old
vehicle before deliveries even conclude. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><o:p><br /></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Realism, please <o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">News have
already started to appear in the press about how things are moving in the MOD
Main Building ahead of the expected SDSR 2020. Some reports are less credible
than others, but one line in a recent Times article has caught the attention by
suggesting that the current Chief of General Staff, <span style="mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;">General</span> Sir Mark Carleton-Smith, is in open contrast with the
Chief of Defence Staff, General Sir Nick Carter, which preceded him at the helm
of the Army and crafted the initial Army 2020 Refine plan. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">According
to the Times, Carleton-Smith is warning CDS that said A2020R ambitions are
unachievable, at least in the near future and with the resources planned. Carter,
on the other hand, is said to be adamant that things must progress in the way
he had envisioned them. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">It’s hard
to say whether the Times has got it right and what is the exact state of play,
but many aspects of Army 2020 Refine made no sense at all, and continue to make
no sense. The whole STRIKE concept as initially crafted is simply not
believable; the mixture of tracks and wheels is sub-optimal at best and is only
possible by robbing RECCE cavalry away from the Armoured Brigades, and the
demand to the army of being able to deploy a Division of 2 Armoured and 1
STRIKE brigades is arguably unachievable. It would require deploying 100% of
the heavy armour complement and 50% of the Medium armour at once, and anyone
who remembers previous Divisional deployments, when the army was larger than it
is now, will most likely confirm that it is next to impossible to do. Even
though such a scenario would be a literal “silver bullet”, fired only once and
after a sizeable preparation time. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The
cupboard would be wholly and miserably empty once all that is out of the door. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Back in
august, when the Army once more moved chairs around in its frankly
dysfunctional force structure, it did one thing that makes a whole lot of
sense: concentrated 1<sup>st</sup> Division’s infantry in fewer brigades by
removing <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">all</b> infantry units from 160
and 38 Brigades. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">1<sup>st</sup>
and 6<sup>th</sup> Rifles (regular and paired reserve) moved from 160th to 7<sup>th</sup>;
2<sup>nd</sup> and 8<sup>th</sup> RIFLES from 38<sup>th</sup> to 51<sup>st</sup>;
2<sup>nd</sup> and 6<sup>th</sup> SCOTS from 51<sup>st</sup> to 4<sup>th</sup>,
1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> IRISH from 160<sup>th</sup> to 11<sup>th</sup>
and 3 PWRR from 7<sup>th</sup> to 11<sup>th</sup>. Earlier still, the Army had
done away with 42<sup>nd</sup> Brigade. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Gone are
the (frankly utterly ridiculous) 7 “adaptable” brigades of wildly variable
structure and size, replaced by a somewhat more realistic nucleus of 4 brigades.
This allows a more realistic “concentration” of the force, but still does
nothing to solve <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>the fact that none of
these brigades include anything beyond some infantry and, in a couple of cases,
Light Cavalry. There is no artillery, no logistic unit, no medical unit, no
engineer unit. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">An
injection of realism is urgently needed in matters of Force Structure as well
as in the choice of vehicles and priorities for equipment. </span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">France, with a
considerably larger army and far more vehicles available and on order, has 6
brigades in total (7 if you want to count the Franco-German binational brigade
as well). <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Excluding
16 Air Assault, which anyway is no longer a “complete” brigade itself as its
supporting elements are only large enough for supporting 2 battlegroups, one of
which always at readiness, the British Army has 7 other Brigades, plus 38th and
160th "Brigades" as 1-star regional commands, plus the Specialised Infantry Group as another
1-star command. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">It however
has only 4 artillery regiments, medical units, logistic groups, signal
formations etcetera, because these were the first units to be cut in 2011, due
to the need to preserve the precious infantry cap badges, the only real sacred
cow in Defence. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">For what is
worth, I continue to urge the Army to rebalance its force structure. Perhaps go
more “French”. </span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">France’s new Army structure is perfectly rational: two homogeneous
Divisions, each with a strong Armoured brigade, one Medium, Wheeled brigade and
a Light / Specialist brigade (Mountain and PARA respectively). Individually,
the French Division is less capable than the “Warfighting Division” imagined by
Carter. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgzYQ61v7fZ3Cr9go9A0HQTbZSyX5fsuHDOZXbBi4j-U0QsREvAlFeWps19nvRrlC1aV-z-M94klvKZOeciCk5wkwLfObr-6nUbnmyhoetAe9V7sSmzkm404ShrcQHF3uMITRRErK8nXz0/s1600/With+roles+and+equipment.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="1037" data-original-width="1600" height="258" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgzYQ61v7fZ3Cr9go9A0HQTbZSyX5fsuHDOZXbBi4j-U0QsREvAlFeWps19nvRrlC1aV-z-M94klvKZOeciCk5wkwLfObr-6nUbnmyhoetAe9V7sSmzkm404ShrcQHF3uMITRRErK8nXz0/s400/With+roles+and+equipment.jpg" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">Armee de Terre under "Au Contact" structures. I've added some color notes to evidence some of the roles and equipment of the units. This is a far more rational Force Structure, which matches Manoeuvre units and Supports in a more realistic way. </td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">But, unlike
Carter’s Division, the French ones exist, are being kitted out, and can both
deploy across the spectrum of operations. While the British Army’s 3<sup>rd</sup>
Division is a one-shot silver bullet with nothing behind it, the French
Divisions can rotate in and out and ensure the Army’s output <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">lasts</i></b>.
<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">While the
British Army has an abyss separating the capabilities of 3<sup>rd</sup> and 1<sup>st</sup>
Division, the French have chosen near perfect balance, and have sought to
ensure that every brigade can take on a whole multitude of tasks. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The
brigades in 1<sup>st</sup> Division are “containers” of useful infantry
battalions, some of which are rotationally committed to a variety of roles such
as Cyprus and Brunei. This is clear and understood. But they are extremely,
extremely limited in their ability to do much of anything else. The 4 brigades
within 1<sup>st</sup> Division can only look forwards to Rear Line security,
prisoner guarding and security tasking in support of a 3<sup>rd</sup> Division
deployment. It is not by pure chance that, back in August, 104 Logistic Brigade was
moved into 1<sup>st</sup> Division: its role is to set up the Theatre access
for 3<sup>rd</sup> Division to come through, and elements of a scraped together
“Lead Light Infantry Brigade” would be used to cover the security requirements connected to that.
While that too is a requirement, I would urge the Army to use its manpower
better. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">It’s absurd
to relegate the majority of your precious infantry into ghost brigades, part of
a “fake”, undeployable Division good only for other-than-war tasks. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">In the new
SDSR, Carter’s horrendously unbalanced plan should be picked apart, and the
pieces put back into a more realistic balance. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Even if it
means some infantry battalions must go. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<br />Gabrielehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/01623558391676151582noreply@blogger.com20tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-442909239199162925.post-50726987664721033962019-06-22T19:25:00.001+02:002019-06-23T11:10:09.849+02:00RUSI tries to fix STRIKE, but can it be fixed? <br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="color: #00051c; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: HelveticaNeueLTStd-Lt;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="color: #00051c; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: HelveticaNeueLTStd-Lt;">RUSI has published the Occasional Paper “STRIKE – From
concept to Force”, and in many ways its authors agree with me on the problems
of STRIKE and, partially, even on what is needed to correct them. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="color: #00051c; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: HelveticaNeueLTStd-Lt;">The Paper actually does mention me, albeit in passing,
by saying that I’m “confused” by the lack of communication from the army and I
haven’t realized that the problem that STRIKE addresses is real. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="color: #00051c; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: HelveticaNeueLTStd-Lt;">I disagree. I can see there is a problem, but I can
also see that STRIKE, while being in theory a solution to it, really is not.
The authors actually agree with me more than they realize, since they go on to
basically destroy the Army’s plan for MIV and the STRIKE brigades, rewriting
much of it with new approached and new vehicle variants and a renewed emphasis
on STRIKE. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="color: #00051c; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: HelveticaNeueLTStd-Lt;">Those changes, while not quite in the same form, are
something I’ve campaigned for since at least 2016/17, when my fears about the
direction of travel for the project were confirmed by the first details coming
out. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="color: #00051c; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: HelveticaNeueLTStd-Lt;">RUSI notes: <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span lang="EN-US" style="color: black; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri;">This paper is an attempt to
conduct an independent assessment of the missions that a Strike Brigade may
plausibly be expected to undertake, the capability and training requirements
for the force to fulfil its missions, and the systems and platforms available
that meet these requirements. The paper hopes to provide an independent
evidence base to inform policymakers examining the army’s procurement plans to
deliver the Strike Brigade. This paper is not a study of the merits of the
Strike concept as a purely theoretical force. It does not, for instance,
re-tread the well-worn debates over Ajax’s suitability for the concept. With
two regiments in 1 Armoured Infantry Brigade already receiving the vehicle, the
useful question is how Ajax can be integrated into the force. Nor is this study
a comparison of Strike with other potential formations. It is a narrow study of
the non-discretionary requirements to make the Strike Brigade a viable force in
fulfilling a set of identified missions.</span></i></blockquote>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="color: black; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri;">I appreciate that this has been their choice of method, but trying to
fix the biggest logic holes in the plan might just not be the best way to
proceed. It might simply be unaffordable to apply such corrections, indeed. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="color: black; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri;">So, unlike RUSI, I’m not giving STRIKE as a concept an automatic pass,
and then thinking about how it can be fixed. I’m yet to be convinced that the
concept itself is actually valid. The mission concept and the results that are
expected from Dispersion appear completely devoid of realism. The army expects
from this wheeled brigade (actually, half-tracked brigade) things that have
never been achieved, or even asked to, existing wheeled brigades in other
countries, even though those are, in many ways, better and more coherently
resourced. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="color: black; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri;">Dispersion is supposed to cure all problems and allow Platoons to
perform Company-level independent actions, without providing a single rational
explanation of how that would happen. I’ve written about this topic many times
already, but once again I felt the need to go through what has emerged. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="color: black; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri;">It is recommended to give the RUSI report a read: </span><a href="https://rusi.org/publication/occasional-papers/strike-concept-force"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">https://rusi.org/publication/occasional-papers/strike-concept-force</span></a><span style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"> <span lang="EN-US"><o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">I quote some passages from it, to
expand on some very important aspects. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="color: #00051c; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: HelveticaNeueLTStd-Lt;">It is also recommended to page through FANTASSINS,
Issue 42, Summer 2019. It is published in a helpful bi-language paper, French and
English, and contains a lot of interesting material on the role of all Corps in
support to the future manoeuvre warfare, as well as an overview of Army
programmes in allied countries, including UK, Germany and Italy. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="color: #00051c; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: HelveticaNeueLTStd-Lt;">In pointing you to it, I will shamelessly exploit the
occasion to beg the British Army to consider publishing something comparable,
in which actual military themes are discussed in some details. We all love
reportages from adventure training and exotic training exercises and they are
good for Recruitment, but it would be nice to have a British Army voice and
source of discussion on contemporary themes other than the “immaterial” ones,
such as endless discussion of what constitutes Innovation, or Leadership. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="color: #00051c; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: HelveticaNeueLTStd-Lt;">Talking about how the army actually works and expect
to work in the future is not a bad idea! </span><a href="https://amicale8rpima.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/2019_n42_fantassins.pdf">https://amicale8rpima.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/2019_n42_fantassins.pdf</a><span lang="EN-US" style="color: #00051c; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: HelveticaNeueLTStd-Lt;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-US" style="color: #00051c; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: HelveticaNeueLTStd-Lt;">An introduction to
STRIKE, from France <o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="color: #00051c; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: HelveticaNeueLTStd-Lt;">In order to collect some literature on the STRIKE
concept one has to hunt for unlikely sources, since the British Army is one of
the least talkative organizations on Earth. It so happens that a brief
explanation of STRIKE has actually appeared on a French Army magazine, the
journal of the infantry [FANTASSIN], within a special issue talking about the
modernization of the Armee de Terre (project SCORPION) and similar programmes
in Europe. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="color: #00051c; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: HelveticaNeueLTStd-Lt;">Thanks to the regular exchange of information between
the two armies, the French have compiled a short piece which is, nonetheless,
more than we have heard from the British Army itself. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="color: #00051c; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: HelveticaNeueLTStd-Lt;">Among the things we read is this list: <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
<blockquote class="tr_bq" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none;">
<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span lang="EN-US" style="color: #00051c; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: HelveticaNeueLTStd-Lt;">The Strike brigade is greatly inspired
by the US Strike model or the French SERVAL and must be able to defeat hybrid
enemy forces, in difficult terrains, thanks to powerful assets and above all
through innovative courses of action.</span></i><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span lang="EN-US" style="color: #00051c; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: HelveticaNeueLTStd-Lt;">The key word to understand Strike is
mobility. This brigade is designed to advance independently against the enemy
over great distances. It should be able to fight in a dispersed manner to
dominate a larger battlefield, to concentrate quickly to make the best of its
infantry strength in difficult terrain and facilitate the division’s deep
operations.</span></i><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span lang="EN-US" style="color: #00051c; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: HelveticaNeueLTStd-Lt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></i><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span lang="EN-US" style="color: #00051c; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: HelveticaNeueLTStd-Lt;">The required capabilities and the
courses of action which are currently</span></i><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span lang="EN-US" style="color: #00051c; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: HelveticaNeueLTStd-Lt;">contemplated are the following:</span></i><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span lang="EN-US" style="color: #00051c; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: HelveticaNeueLTStd-Lt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></i></blockquote>
<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none;">
<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span lang="EN-US" style="color: #00051c; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: HelveticaNeueLTStd-Lt;">- the ability to advance against the
enemy from Tidworth to Tallinn (2719 km) or from Tidworth to Bucarest (2730 km)</span></i></blockquote>
<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none;">
<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span lang="EN-US" style="color: #00051c; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: HelveticaNeueLTStd-Lt;">- the durability to carry out its tasks
during more than 10 days,</span></i></blockquote>
<br />
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<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span lang="EN-US" style="color: #00051c; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: HelveticaNeueLTStd-Lt;">- the ability to coordinate joint fires,</span></i></blockquote>
<br />
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<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span lang="EN-US" style="color: #00051c; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: HelveticaNeueLTStd-Lt;">- the flexibility to operate with 50%
supplies,</span></i><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span lang="EN-US" style="color: #00051c; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: HelveticaNeueLTStd-Lt;">- the ability to operate COTS electronic
equipment beside the military equipment,</span></i></blockquote>
<br />
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<span lang="EN-US" style="color: #00051c; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: HelveticaNeueLTStd-Lt;">- <i>the confidence to operate with a unique command through a common display
equipment,</i></span></blockquote>
<br />
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<span lang="EN-US" style="color: #00051c; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: HelveticaNeueLTStd-Lt;"><i>- the ability to integrate 3 (UK) DIV, a US division or a division CJEF1
staff.</i></span></blockquote>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="color: #00051c; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: HelveticaNeueLTStd-Lt;">Tidworth being, indicatively, the home of the
AJAX-equipped elements. MIV-equipped elements will actually be Catterick based,
so their ride will be longer. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="color: #00051c; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: HelveticaNeueLTStd-Lt;">About MIV, the French write: <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="color: #00051c; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: HelveticaNeueLTStd-Lt;"><i>Although the buy has not been definitely concluded,
Great Britain should procure the BOXER. The MOD has announced the purchase of
500 vehicles in September (2018).<o:p></o:p></i></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="color: #00051c; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: HelveticaNeueLTStd-Lt;"><i>- 460 vehicles pro STRIKE brigade<o:p></o:p></i></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="color: #00051c; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: HelveticaNeueLTStd-Lt;"><i>- 4 different versions<o:p></o:p></i></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="color: #00051c; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: HelveticaNeueLTStd-Lt;"><i>- the armament is currently limited since it will be
equipped first with machine guns and automatic grenade launchers.<o:p></o:p></i></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="color: #00051c; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: HelveticaNeueLTStd-Lt;"><i>- <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">A
reconnaissance and fire support version should nevertheless be equipped with
the Javelin</b><o:p></o:p></i></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="color: #00051c; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: HelveticaNeueLTStd-Lt;"><i>- Key milestones:<o:p></o:p></i></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="color: #00051c; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: HelveticaNeueLTStd-Lt;"><i>- beginning of deliveries in 2022<o:p></o:p></i></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="color: #00051c; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: HelveticaNeueLTStd-Lt;"><i>- IOC 2023 for the first mechanised company<o:p></o:p></i></span></div>
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<span style="color: #00051c; mso-bidi-font-family: HelveticaNeueLTStd-Lt;"><i>- IOC 1 STRIKE
brigade from 2025 on<o:p></o:p></i></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="color: #00051c; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: HelveticaNeueLTStd-Lt;"><i>- End of vehicle deliveries by 2032</i><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="color: #00051c; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: HelveticaNeueLTStd-Lt;">The French article seems to suggest that a number of
MIV vehicles will get a single JAVELIN missile attached to the RWS, something
already tested in the UK on a modified SPARTAN. It is not much at all, but
better than nothing. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="color: #00051c; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: HelveticaNeueLTStd-Lt;">The same RWS HMG + JAVELIN might also go to the
Overwath variant of ARES, the APC in the AJAX family.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiXt3hgkiIMrwryFdwYGXLeQw-bek4MDC9dEb3MTyk-cWOh-23POaskxJLlOrAj5V80DgmX-tozGZlnZHQvS7IHwCvTPpkj4-Ww6fha0PxeUEMekr_K9CHKetkMAXdGP8BbWxd72TRyhRE/s1600/DUdtPuUXUAIChYS.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="800" data-original-width="1200" height="266" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiXt3hgkiIMrwryFdwYGXLeQw-bek4MDC9dEb3MTyk-cWOh-23POaskxJLlOrAj5V80DgmX-tozGZlnZHQvS7IHwCvTPpkj4-Ww6fha0PxeUEMekr_K9CHKetkMAXdGP8BbWxd72TRyhRE/s400/DUdtPuUXUAIChYS.jpg" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">DefencePhotography.com gave us a rare glimpse into Army thinking regarding STRIKE </td></tr>
</tbody></table>
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<br /></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="color: #00051c; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: HelveticaNeueLTStd-Lt;">The article wording seems to suggest a single STRIKE
brigade would field 460 BOXERs, but I suspect this is a bad choice of words
only. With just 2 battalions on MIV in each brigade; even assuming the Medical
regiment gets plenty of MIV Ambulances and throwing in some for the Engineer
Regiment as well, the numbers are much lower. I’m pretty sure 460 are for both
brigades, and even then it still seems a high number. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="color: #00051c; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: HelveticaNeueLTStd-Lt;">The 4 variants are expected to be the APC, Command,
Ambulance and an “Equipment Support” variant which probably combines Recovery
and Repair. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="color: #00051c; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: HelveticaNeueLTStd-Lt;">Like with AJAX, there might be sub-variants. One could
be an “Overwatch” one with the “pimped” RWS with JAVELIN, and maybe another
might be kitted out to carry the L16 81mm mortar. Unfortunately, it seems
highly unlikely that the British Army will procure a 120mm mortar variant, no
matter how many times that is recommended. RUSI, in its report, recommends it,
if you are wondering. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="color: #00051c; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: HelveticaNeueLTStd-Lt;">The rumor going around is that the MIV order will be
for 508, with 408 to be built in Britain and the first 100 coming from Germany.
Options for up to 1,500 have been included in the Request, but we’d better not
dream too far. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="color: #00051c; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: HelveticaNeueLTStd-Lt;">Even at 508, the order would be the greatest in the
history of BOXER, surpassing the total purchases of Germany. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="color: #00051c; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: HelveticaNeueLTStd-Lt;">Just in case, the French note <i>“1 STRIKE brigade should
be combat ready by 2025. Uncertainties about </i></span><span style="color: #00051c;"><i>the second brigade are still remaining, the future of
which will depend on budgetary decisions to come”</i>.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="color: #00051c; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: HelveticaNeueLTStd-Lt;">After the latest changes, the STRIKE brigades (1<sup>st</sup>
Bde, converting from Armoured Infantry, and another brigade HQ to be chosen)
structure is the following: <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none;">
<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-US" style="color: #00051c; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: HelveticaNeueLTStd-Lt;">1<sup>st</sup>
STRIKE Brigade <o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none;">
<br /></div>
<table border="1" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="MsoTableGrid" style="border-collapse: collapse; border: none; mso-border-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-padding-alt: 0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; mso-yfti-tbllook: 1184;">
<tbody>
<tr style="mso-yfti-firstrow: yes; mso-yfti-irow: 0;">
<td style="border: solid windowtext 1.0pt; mso-border-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; padding: 0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; width: 97.75pt;" valign="top" width="130"><div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
Unit </div>
</td>
<td style="border-left: none; border: solid windowtext 1.0pt; mso-border-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-left-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; padding: 0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; width: 97.75pt;" valign="top" width="130"><div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
Current role</div>
</td>
<td style="border-left: none; border: solid windowtext 1.0pt; mso-border-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-left-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; padding: 0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; width: 107.6pt;" valign="top" width="143"><div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
Future role </div>
</td>
<td style="border-left: none; border: solid windowtext 1.0pt; mso-border-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-left-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; padding: 0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; width: 88.0pt;" valign="top" width="117"><div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
Current Base</div>
</td>
<td style="border-left: none; border: solid windowtext 1.0pt; mso-border-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-left-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; padding: 0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; width: 97.8pt;" valign="top" width="130"><div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
Future Base</div>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow: 1;">
<td style="border-top: none; border: solid windowtext 1.0pt; mso-border-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-top-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; padding: 0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; width: 97.75pt;" valign="top" width="130"><div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
Household Cavalry</div>
</td>
<td style="border-bottom: solid windowtext 1.0pt; border-left: none; border-right: solid windowtext 1.0pt; border-top: none; mso-border-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-left-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-top-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; padding: 0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; width: 97.75pt;" valign="top" width="130"><div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
Recce Cavalry on CVR(T)</div>
</td>
<td style="border-bottom: solid windowtext 1.0pt; border-left: none; border-right: solid windowtext 1.0pt; border-top: none; mso-border-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-left-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-top-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; padding: 0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; width: 107.6pt;" valign="top" width="143"><div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
Ajax regiment – reconnaissance </div>
</td>
<td style="border-bottom: solid windowtext 1.0pt; border-left: none; border-right: solid windowtext 1.0pt; border-top: none; mso-border-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-left-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-top-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; padding: 0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; width: 88.0pt;" valign="top" width="117"><div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
Windsor</div>
</td>
<td style="border-bottom: solid windowtext 1.0pt; border-left: none; border-right: solid windowtext 1.0pt; border-top: none; mso-border-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-left-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-top-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; padding: 0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; width: 97.8pt;" valign="top" width="130"><div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
Salisbury Plain</div>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow: 2;">
<td style="border-top: none; border: solid windowtext 1.0pt; mso-border-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-top-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; padding: 0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; width: 97.75pt;" valign="top" width="130"><div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Royal Dragoon Guards<o:p></o:p></span></div>
</td>
<td style="border-bottom: solid windowtext 1.0pt; border-left: none; border-right: solid windowtext 1.0pt; border-top: none; mso-border-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-left-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-top-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; padding: 0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; width: 97.75pt;" valign="top" width="130"><div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
Recce Cavalry on CVR(T)<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
</td>
<td style="border-bottom: solid windowtext 1.0pt; border-left: none; border-right: solid windowtext 1.0pt; border-top: none; mso-border-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-left-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-top-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; padding: 0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; width: 107.6pt;" valign="top" width="143"><div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
Ajax regiment<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
</td>
<td style="border-bottom: solid windowtext 1.0pt; border-left: none; border-right: solid windowtext 1.0pt; border-top: none; mso-border-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-left-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-top-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; padding: 0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; width: 88.0pt;" valign="top" width="117"><div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Catterick<o:p></o:p></span></div>
</td>
<td style="border-bottom: solid windowtext 1.0pt; border-left: none; border-right: solid windowtext 1.0pt; border-top: none; mso-border-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-left-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-top-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; padding: 0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; width: 97.8pt;" valign="top" width="130"><div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Warminster<o:p></o:p></span></div>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow: 3;">
<td style="border-top: none; border: solid windowtext 1.0pt; mso-border-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-top-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; padding: 0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; width: 97.75pt;" valign="top" width="130"><div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span style="background: white; font-family: "arial" , "sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt;">1<span style="border: none windowtext 1.0pt; mso-border-alt: none windowtext 0cm; padding: 0cm;">st</span> Battalion Scots Guards</span></div>
</td>
<td style="border-bottom: solid windowtext 1.0pt; border-left: none; border-right: solid windowtext 1.0pt; border-top: none; mso-border-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-left-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-top-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; padding: 0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; width: 97.75pt;" valign="top" width="130"><div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
Mechanized Infantry on Mastiff</div>
</td>
<td style="border-bottom: solid windowtext 1.0pt; border-left: none; border-right: solid windowtext 1.0pt; border-top: none; mso-border-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-left-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-top-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; padding: 0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; width: 107.6pt;" valign="top" width="143"><div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
Mechanized Infantry on MIV</div>
</td>
<td style="border-bottom: solid windowtext 1.0pt; border-left: none; border-right: solid windowtext 1.0pt; border-top: none; mso-border-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-left-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-top-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; padding: 0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; width: 88.0pt;" valign="top" width="117"><div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
Aldershot</div>
</td>
<td style="border-bottom: solid windowtext 1.0pt; border-left: none; border-right: solid windowtext 1.0pt; border-top: none; mso-border-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-left-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-top-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; padding: 0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; width: 97.8pt;" valign="top" width="130"><div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
Catterick (?)</div>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow: 4;">
<td style="border-top: none; border: solid windowtext 1.0pt; mso-border-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-top-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; padding: 0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; width: 97.75pt;" valign="top" width="130"><div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">3<sup>rd</sup>
RIFLES<o:p></o:p></span></div>
</td>
<td style="border-bottom: solid windowtext 1.0pt; border-left: none; border-right: solid windowtext 1.0pt; border-top: none; mso-border-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-left-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-top-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; padding: 0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; width: 97.75pt;" valign="top" width="130"><div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Light Mechanized
Infantry on Foxhound<o:p></o:p></span></div>
</td>
<td style="border-bottom: solid windowtext 1.0pt; border-left: none; border-right: solid windowtext 1.0pt; border-top: none; mso-border-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-left-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-top-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; padding: 0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; width: 107.6pt;" valign="top" width="143"><div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
Mechanized Infantry on MIV<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
</td>
<td style="border-bottom: solid windowtext 1.0pt; border-left: none; border-right: solid windowtext 1.0pt; border-top: none; mso-border-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-left-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-top-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; padding: 0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; width: 88.0pt;" valign="top" width="117"><div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Edinburgh<o:p></o:p></span></div>
</td>
<td style="border-bottom: solid windowtext 1.0pt; border-left: none; border-right: solid windowtext 1.0pt; border-top: none; mso-border-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-left-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-top-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; padding: 0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; width: 97.8pt;" valign="top" width="130"><div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Catterick (2021)<o:p></o:p></span></div>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="height: 13.3pt; mso-yfti-irow: 5;">
<td style="border-top: none; border: solid windowtext 1.0pt; height: 13.3pt; mso-border-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-top-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; padding: 0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; width: 97.75pt;" valign="top" width="130"><div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">3<sup>rd</sup> Royal
Horse – Not organic; part of 1<sup>st</sup> Artillery Bde Artillery<o:p></o:p></span></div>
</td>
<td style="border-bottom: solid windowtext 1.0pt; border-left: none; border-right: solid windowtext 1.0pt; border-top: none; height: 13.3pt; mso-border-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-left-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-top-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; padding: 0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; width: 97.75pt;" valign="top" width="130"><div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Light Gun regiment<o:p></o:p></span></div>
</td>
<td style="border-bottom: solid windowtext 1.0pt; border-left: none; border-right: solid windowtext 1.0pt; border-top: none; height: 13.3pt; mso-border-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-left-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-top-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; padding: 0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; width: 107.6pt;" valign="top" width="143"><div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Medium Gun regiment<o:p></o:p></span></div>
</td>
<td style="border-bottom: solid windowtext 1.0pt; border-left: none; border-right: solid windowtext 1.0pt; border-top: none; height: 13.3pt; mso-border-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-left-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-top-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; padding: 0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; width: 88.0pt;" valign="top" width="117"><div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="background: white; font-family: "arial" , "sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt;">Albemarle Barracks, Newcastle-upon-Tyne</span><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
</td>
<td style="border-bottom: solid windowtext 1.0pt; border-left: none; border-right: solid windowtext 1.0pt; border-top: none; height: 13.3pt; mso-border-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-left-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-top-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; padding: 0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; width: 97.8pt;" valign="top" width="130"><div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="background: white; font-family: "arial" , "sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt;">Albemarle Barracks, Newcastle-upon-Tyne</span><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="height: 13.3pt; mso-yfti-irow: 6;">
<td style="border-top: none; border: solid windowtext 1.0pt; height: 13.3pt; mso-border-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-top-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; padding: 0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; width: 97.75pt;" valign="top" width="130"><div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">5th Medical Regiment<o:p></o:p></span></div>
</td>
<td style="border-bottom: solid windowtext 1.0pt; border-left: none; border-right: solid windowtext 1.0pt; border-top: none; height: 13.3pt; mso-border-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-left-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-top-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; padding: 0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; width: 97.75pt;" valign="top" width="130"><div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Medical regiment<o:p></o:p></span></div>
</td>
<td style="border-bottom: solid windowtext 1.0pt; border-left: none; border-right: solid windowtext 1.0pt; border-top: none; height: 13.3pt; mso-border-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-left-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-top-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; padding: 0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; width: 107.6pt;" valign="top" width="143"><div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Medical regiment<o:p></o:p></span></div>
</td>
<td style="border-bottom: solid windowtext 1.0pt; border-left: none; border-right: solid windowtext 1.0pt; border-top: none; height: 13.3pt; mso-border-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-left-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-top-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; padding: 0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; width: 88.0pt;" valign="top" width="117"><div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
Catterick </div>
</td>
<td style="border-bottom: solid windowtext 1.0pt; border-left: none; border-right: solid windowtext 1.0pt; border-top: none; height: 13.3pt; mso-border-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-left-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-top-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; padding: 0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; width: 97.8pt;" valign="top" width="130"><div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
Catterick </div>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="height: 13.3pt; mso-yfti-irow: 7;">
<td style="border-top: none; border: solid windowtext 1.0pt; height: 13.3pt; mso-border-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-top-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; padding: 0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; width: 97.75pt;" valign="top" width="130"><div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">21 Royal Engineer<o:p></o:p></span></div>
</td>
<td style="border-bottom: solid windowtext 1.0pt; border-left: none; border-right: solid windowtext 1.0pt; border-top: none; height: 13.3pt; mso-border-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-left-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-top-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; padding: 0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; width: 97.75pt;" valign="top" width="130"><div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Adaptable Force<o:p></o:p></span></div>
</td>
<td style="border-bottom: solid windowtext 1.0pt; border-left: none; border-right: solid windowtext 1.0pt; border-top: none; height: 13.3pt; mso-border-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-left-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-top-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; padding: 0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; width: 107.6pt;" valign="top" width="143"><div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Engineer regiment <o:p></o:p></span></div>
</td>
<td style="border-bottom: solid windowtext 1.0pt; border-left: none; border-right: solid windowtext 1.0pt; border-top: none; height: 13.3pt; mso-border-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-left-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-top-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; padding: 0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; width: 88.0pt;" valign="top" width="117"><div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Catterick<o:p></o:p></span></div>
</td>
<td style="border-bottom: solid windowtext 1.0pt; border-left: none; border-right: solid windowtext 1.0pt; border-top: none; height: 13.3pt; mso-border-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-left-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-top-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; padding: 0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; width: 97.8pt;" valign="top" width="130"><div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Catterick<o:p></o:p></span></div>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow: 8;">
<td style="border-top: none; border: solid windowtext 1.0pt; mso-border-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-top-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; padding: 0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; width: 97.75pt;" valign="top" width="130"><div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">1 RLC Regiment<o:p></o:p></span></div>
</td>
<td style="border-bottom: solid windowtext 1.0pt; border-left: none; border-right: solid windowtext 1.0pt; border-top: none; mso-border-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-left-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-top-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; padding: 0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; width: 97.75pt;" valign="top" width="130"><div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Close Support in 101
Log Bde; aligned with 20<sup>th</sup> Armoured Infantry Brigade<o:p></o:p></span></div>
</td>
<td rowspan="2" style="border-bottom: solid windowtext 1.0pt; border-left: none; border-right: solid windowtext 1.0pt; border-top: none; mso-border-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-left-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-top-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; padding: 0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; width: 107.6pt;" valign="top" width="143"><div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Merged into a single
Strike CSS regiment – will it become organic to the brigade? <o:p></o:p></span></div>
</td>
<td style="border-bottom: solid windowtext 1.0pt; border-left: none; border-right: solid windowtext 1.0pt; border-top: none; mso-border-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-left-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-top-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; padding: 0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; width: 88.0pt;" valign="top" width="117"><div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Bicester<o:p></o:p></span></div>
</td>
<td rowspan="2" style="border-bottom: solid windowtext 1.0pt; border-left: none; border-right: solid windowtext 1.0pt; border-top: none; mso-border-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-left-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-top-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; padding: 0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; width: 97.8pt;" valign="top" width="130"><div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Catterick <o:p></o:p></span></div>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow: 9; mso-yfti-lastrow: yes;">
<td style="border-top: none; border: solid windowtext 1.0pt; mso-border-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-top-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; padding: 0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; width: 97.75pt;" valign="top" width="130"><div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">1 Close Support
Battalion REME<o:p></o:p></span></div>
</td>
<td style="border-bottom: solid windowtext 1.0pt; border-left: none; border-right: solid windowtext 1.0pt; border-top: none; mso-border-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-left-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-top-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; padding: 0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; width: 97.75pt;" valign="top" width="130"><div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Adaptable Force;
part of 102 Log Bde<o:p></o:p></span></div>
</td>
<td style="border-bottom: solid windowtext 1.0pt; border-left: none; border-right: solid windowtext 1.0pt; border-top: none; mso-border-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-left-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-top-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; padding: 0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; width: 88.0pt;" valign="top" width="117"><div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Catterick<o:p></o:p></span></div>
</td>
</tr>
</tbody></table>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">As yet unidentified STRIKE Brigade <o:p></o:p></span></b><br />
<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></b></div>
<table border="1" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="MsoTableGrid" style="border-collapse: collapse; border: none; mso-border-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-padding-alt: 0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; mso-yfti-tbllook: 1184;">
<tbody>
<tr style="mso-yfti-firstrow: yes; mso-yfti-irow: 0;">
<td style="border: solid windowtext 1.0pt; mso-border-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; padding: 0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; width: 97.75pt;" valign="top" width="130"><div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Unit <o:p></o:p></span></div>
</td>
<td style="border-left: none; border: solid windowtext 1.0pt; mso-border-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-left-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; padding: 0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; width: 97.75pt;" valign="top" width="130"><div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Current role<o:p></o:p></span></div>
</td>
<td style="border-left: none; border: solid windowtext 1.0pt; mso-border-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-left-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; padding: 0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; width: 97.8pt;" valign="top" width="130"><div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Future role<o:p></o:p></span></div>
</td>
<td style="border-left: none; border: solid windowtext 1.0pt; mso-border-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-left-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; padding: 0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; width: 97.8pt;" valign="top" width="130"><div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Current base<o:p></o:p></span></div>
</td>
<td style="border-left: none; border: solid windowtext 1.0pt; mso-border-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-left-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; padding: 0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; width: 97.8pt;" valign="top" width="130"><div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Future base<o:p></o:p></span></div>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow: 1;">
<td style="border-top: none; border: solid windowtext 1.0pt; mso-border-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-top-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; padding: 0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; width: 97.75pt;" valign="top" width="130"><div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
King’s Royal Hussars</div>
</td>
<td style="border-bottom: solid windowtext 1.0pt; border-left: none; border-right: solid windowtext 1.0pt; border-top: none; mso-border-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-left-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-top-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; padding: 0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; width: 97.75pt;" valign="top" width="130"><div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
Type 56 Challenger 2 regiment</div>
</td>
<td style="border-bottom: solid windowtext 1.0pt; border-left: none; border-right: solid windowtext 1.0pt; border-top: none; mso-border-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-left-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-top-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; padding: 0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; width: 97.8pt;" valign="top" width="130"><div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
Ajax regiment </div>
</td>
<td style="border-bottom: solid windowtext 1.0pt; border-left: none; border-right: solid windowtext 1.0pt; border-top: none; mso-border-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-left-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-top-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; padding: 0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; width: 97.8pt;" valign="top" width="130"><div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
Tidworth</div>
</td>
<td style="border-bottom: solid windowtext 1.0pt; border-left: none; border-right: solid windowtext 1.0pt; border-top: none; mso-border-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-left-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-top-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; padding: 0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; width: 97.8pt;" valign="top" width="130"><div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
Tidworth</div>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow: 2;">
<td style="border-top: none; border: solid windowtext 1.0pt; mso-border-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-top-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; padding: 0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; width: 97.75pt;" valign="top" width="130"><div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Royal Lancers<o:p></o:p></span></div>
</td>
<td style="border-bottom: solid windowtext 1.0pt; border-left: none; border-right: solid windowtext 1.0pt; border-top: none; mso-border-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-left-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-top-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; padding: 0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; width: 97.75pt;" valign="top" width="130"><div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
Recce Cavalry on CVR(T)<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
</td>
<td style="border-bottom: solid windowtext 1.0pt; border-left: none; border-right: solid windowtext 1.0pt; border-top: none; mso-border-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-left-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-top-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; padding: 0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; width: 97.8pt;" valign="top" width="130"><div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
Ajax regiment<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
</td>
<td style="border-bottom: solid windowtext 1.0pt; border-left: none; border-right: solid windowtext 1.0pt; border-top: none; mso-border-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-left-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-top-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; padding: 0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; width: 97.8pt;" valign="top" width="130"><div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Catterick<o:p></o:p></span></div>
</td>
<td style="border-bottom: solid windowtext 1.0pt; border-left: none; border-right: solid windowtext 1.0pt; border-top: none; mso-border-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-left-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-top-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; padding: 0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; width: 97.8pt;" valign="top" width="130"><div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Warminster<o:p></o:p></span></div>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow: 3;">
<td style="border-top: none; border: solid windowtext 1.0pt; mso-border-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-top-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; padding: 0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; width: 97.75pt;" valign="top" width="130"><div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">1<sup>st</sup> YORKS<o:p></o:p></span></div>
</td>
<td style="border-bottom: solid windowtext 1.0pt; border-left: none; border-right: solid windowtext 1.0pt; border-top: none; mso-border-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-left-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-top-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; padding: 0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; width: 97.75pt;" valign="top" width="130"><div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Armoured infantry on
Warrior<o:p></o:p></span></div>
</td>
<td style="border-bottom: solid windowtext 1.0pt; border-left: none; border-right: solid windowtext 1.0pt; border-top: none; mso-border-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-left-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-top-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; padding: 0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; width: 97.8pt;" valign="top" width="130"><div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
Mechanized Infantry on MIV<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
</td>
<td style="border-bottom: solid windowtext 1.0pt; border-left: none; border-right: solid windowtext 1.0pt; border-top: none; mso-border-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-left-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-top-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; padding: 0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; width: 97.8pt;" valign="top" width="130"><div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Warminster<o:p></o:p></span></div>
</td>
<td style="border-bottom: solid windowtext 1.0pt; border-left: none; border-right: solid windowtext 1.0pt; border-top: none; mso-border-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-left-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-top-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; padding: 0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; width: 97.8pt;" valign="top" width="130"><div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Catterick (2020) <o:p></o:p></span></div>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow: 4;">
<td style="border-top: none; border: solid windowtext 1.0pt; mso-border-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-top-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; padding: 0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; width: 97.75pt;" valign="top" width="130"><div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="background: white; font-family: "arial" , "sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt;">The Highlanders, 4<span style="border: none windowtext 1.0pt; mso-border-alt: none windowtext 0cm; padding: 0cm;">th</span> Battalion The Royal Regiment of Scotland</span><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
</td>
<td style="border-bottom: solid windowtext 1.0pt; border-left: none; border-right: solid windowtext 1.0pt; border-top: none; mso-border-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-left-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-top-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; padding: 0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; width: 97.75pt;" valign="top" width="130"><div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Mechanized Infantry
on Mastiff<o:p></o:p></span></div>
</td>
<td style="border-bottom: solid windowtext 1.0pt; border-left: none; border-right: solid windowtext 1.0pt; border-top: none; mso-border-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-left-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-top-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; padding: 0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; width: 97.8pt;" valign="top" width="130"><div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
Mechanized Infantry on MIV<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
</td>
<td style="border-bottom: solid windowtext 1.0pt; border-left: none; border-right: solid windowtext 1.0pt; border-top: none; mso-border-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-left-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-top-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; padding: 0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; width: 97.8pt;" valign="top" width="130"><div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Catterick<o:p></o:p></span></div>
</td>
<td style="border-bottom: solid windowtext 1.0pt; border-left: none; border-right: solid windowtext 1.0pt; border-top: none; mso-border-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-left-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-top-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; padding: 0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; width: 97.8pt;" valign="top" width="130"><div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Catterick<o:p></o:p></span></div>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow: 5;">
<td style="border-top: none; border: solid windowtext 1.0pt; mso-border-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-top-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; padding: 0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; width: 97.75pt;" valign="top" width="130"><div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">4<sup>th</sup> Royal
Artillery – Not organic; part of 1<sup>st</sup> Artillery Bde<o:p></o:p></span></div>
</td>
<td style="border-bottom: solid windowtext 1.0pt; border-left: none; border-right: solid windowtext 1.0pt; border-top: none; mso-border-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-left-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-top-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; padding: 0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; width: 97.75pt;" valign="top" width="130"><div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Light Gun regiment<o:p></o:p></span></div>
</td>
<td style="border-bottom: solid windowtext 1.0pt; border-left: none; border-right: solid windowtext 1.0pt; border-top: none; mso-border-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-left-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-top-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; padding: 0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; width: 97.8pt;" valign="top" width="130"><div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Medium Gun regiment<o:p></o:p></span></div>
</td>
<td style="border-bottom: solid windowtext 1.0pt; border-left: none; border-right: solid windowtext 1.0pt; border-top: none; mso-border-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-left-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-top-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; padding: 0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; width: 97.8pt;" valign="top" width="130"><div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Topcliffe<o:p></o:p></span></div>
</td>
<td style="border-bottom: solid windowtext 1.0pt; border-left: none; border-right: solid windowtext 1.0pt; border-top: none; mso-border-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-left-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-top-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; padding: 0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; width: 97.8pt;" valign="top" width="130"><div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="background: white; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Albemarle Barracks,
Newcastle-upon-Tyne (2026)</span></span><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow: 6;">
<td style="border-top: none; border: solid windowtext 1.0pt; mso-border-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-top-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; padding: 0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; width: 97.75pt;" valign="top" width="130"><div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><span style="font-size: 13.3333px;">3rd</span> Medical Regiment<o:p></o:p></span></div>
</td>
<td style="border-bottom: solid windowtext 1.0pt; border-left: none; border-right: solid windowtext 1.0pt; border-top: none; mso-border-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-left-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-top-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; padding: 0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; width: 97.75pt;" valign="top" width="130"><div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Medical regiment<o:p></o:p></span></div>
</td>
<td style="border-bottom: solid windowtext 1.0pt; border-left: none; border-right: solid windowtext 1.0pt; border-top: none; mso-border-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-left-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-top-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; padding: 0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; width: 97.8pt;" valign="top" width="130"><div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Medical regiment<o:p></o:p></span></div>
</td>
<td style="border-bottom: solid windowtext 1.0pt; border-left: none; border-right: solid windowtext 1.0pt; border-top: none; mso-border-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-left-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-top-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; padding: 0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; width: 97.8pt;" valign="top" width="130"><div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Preston<o:p></o:p></span></div>
</td>
<td style="border-bottom: solid windowtext 1.0pt; border-left: none; border-right: solid windowtext 1.0pt; border-top: none; mso-border-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-left-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-top-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; padding: 0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; width: 97.8pt;" valign="top" width="130"><div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Catterick<o:p></o:p></span></div>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow: 7;">
<td style="border-top: none; border: solid windowtext 1.0pt; mso-border-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-top-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; padding: 0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; width: 97.75pt;" valign="top" width="130"><div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">32 Royal Engineer<o:p></o:p></span></div>
</td>
<td style="border-bottom: solid windowtext 1.0pt; border-left: none; border-right: solid windowtext 1.0pt; border-top: none; mso-border-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-left-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-top-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; padding: 0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; width: 97.75pt;" valign="top" width="130"><div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Adaptable Force<o:p></o:p></span></div>
</td>
<td style="border-bottom: solid windowtext 1.0pt; border-left: none; border-right: solid windowtext 1.0pt; border-top: none; mso-border-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-left-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-top-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; padding: 0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; width: 97.8pt;" valign="top" width="130"><div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Engineer regiment <o:p></o:p></span></div>
</td>
<td style="border-bottom: solid windowtext 1.0pt; border-left: none; border-right: solid windowtext 1.0pt; border-top: none; mso-border-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-left-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-top-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; padding: 0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; width: 97.8pt;" valign="top" width="130"><div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Catterick<o:p></o:p></span></div>
</td>
<td style="border-bottom: solid windowtext 1.0pt; border-left: none; border-right: solid windowtext 1.0pt; border-top: none; mso-border-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-left-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-top-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; padding: 0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; width: 97.8pt;" valign="top" width="130"><div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Catterick <o:p></o:p></span></div>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow: 8;">
<td style="border-top: none; border: solid windowtext 1.0pt; mso-border-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-top-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; padding: 0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; width: 97.75pt;" valign="top" width="130"><div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">27 RLC Regiment<o:p></o:p></span></div>
</td>
<td style="border-bottom: solid windowtext 1.0pt; border-left: none; border-right: solid windowtext 1.0pt; border-top: none; mso-border-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-left-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-top-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; padding: 0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; width: 97.75pt;" valign="top" width="130"><div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Theatre Support in
101 Log Bde; aligned with 12<sup>h</sup> Armoured Infantry Brigade<o:p></o:p></span></div>
</td>
<td rowspan="2" style="border-bottom: solid windowtext 1.0pt; border-left: none; border-right: solid windowtext 1.0pt; border-top: none; mso-border-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-left-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-top-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; padding: 0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; width: 97.8pt;" valign="top" width="130"><div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Merged into a single
Strike CSS regiment - – will it become organic to the brigade?<o:p></o:p></span></div>
</td>
<td style="border-bottom: solid windowtext 1.0pt; border-left: none; border-right: solid windowtext 1.0pt; border-top: none; mso-border-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-left-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-top-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; padding: 0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; width: 97.8pt;" valign="top" width="130"><div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Aldershot<o:p></o:p></span></div>
</td>
<td rowspan="2" style="border-bottom: solid windowtext 1.0pt; border-left: none; border-right: solid windowtext 1.0pt; border-top: none; mso-border-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-left-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-top-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; padding: 0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; width: 97.8pt;" valign="top" width="130"><div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Catterick (2 CS REME
moving in 2021)<o:p></o:p></span></div>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow: 9; mso-yfti-lastrow: yes;">
<td style="border-top: none; border: solid windowtext 1.0pt; mso-border-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-top-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; padding: 0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; width: 97.75pt;" valign="top" width="130"><div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">2 Close Support
Battalion REME<o:p></o:p></span></div>
</td>
<td style="border-bottom: solid windowtext 1.0pt; border-left: none; border-right: solid windowtext 1.0pt; border-top: none; mso-border-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-left-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-top-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; padding: 0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; width: 97.75pt;" valign="top" width="130"><div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Adaptable Force;
part of 102 Log Bde<o:p></o:p></span></div>
</td>
<td style="border-bottom: solid windowtext 1.0pt; border-left: none; border-right: solid windowtext 1.0pt; border-top: none; mso-border-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-left-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-top-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; padding: 0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; width: 97.8pt;" valign="top" width="130"><div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Leuchars<o:p></o:p></span></div>
</td>
</tr>
</tbody></table>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none;">
<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-US" style="color: #00051c; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: HelveticaNeueLTStd-Lt;">Long range
deployment <o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none;">
<br /></div>
<blockquote class="tr_bq" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none;">
<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span lang="EN-US" style="color: black; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri;">[…] speed of deployment is
critical in modern conflict. Extensive analysis by the UK’s Defence Science and
Technology Laboratory has concluded that the force ratio required to be
reliably successful in the attack without suffering significant losses has
climbed from 3:1 to 6:1 in urban operations. It is worth noting – when
considering deterrence – that Russian doctrine has shifted from expecting to
need a 4:1 advantage in attacking urban areas to a 6:1 force ratio
requirement. Seizing complex terrain is gruelling, costly and slow. The force
that can first occupy key terrain with infantry therefore has a significant
advantage. Britain’s armoured infantry brigades are expected to take more than
60 days to deploy to the Baltics. In all probability, an adversary could
achieve its objectives within this time.</span></i></blockquote>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none;">
<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span lang="EN-US" style="color: black; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri;"><o:p> [...]</o:p></span></i></div>
<blockquote class="tr_bq" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none;">
<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span lang="EN-US" style="color: black; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri;">The inclusion of Ajax in Strike
has caused conjecture as to the viability of Strike’s speed of deployment. With
a top speed of 70 kph and a range of 500 km, Ajax is far slower than MIV. At 42
tonnes, there is less infrastructure suitable to sustain its weight. Moreover,
as a tracked vehicle, the rate of mechanical failure over a 2,000-km march
would be unacceptable. Its size also limits options for getting Ajax vehicles
across the English Channel. Once the Rail Baltica project is completed in 2026,
there will be a single train route capable of transporting Ajax from France to
NATO’s eastern flank. This, however, would represent a single point of failure
that is highly vulnerable to conventional or cyber sabotage. The only reliable
way of deploying Ajax over a 2,000-km march is by modified light equipment
transporters (MLETs) or heavy equipment transporters (HETs).</span></i></blockquote>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="color: #00051c; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: HelveticaNeueLTStd-Lt;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="color: #00051c; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: HelveticaNeueLTStd-Lt;">At the moment the Army has a fleet of 91 Heavy
Equipment Transporters, delivered through a PFI. 3 are equipped as recovery
vehicles, so on the very best day there are 89 transporters for MBTs and
derivatives in the whole army. RUSI says 71 are available. Up to 30 have been
recently been made available to the US Army forces in Europe to aid their own
transfers across the continent, and I’m not sure whether the loan is still in
place. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="color: #00051c; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: HelveticaNeueLTStd-Lt;">On 1<sup> </sup>July 2024, the HET PFI comes to an end
and it will be crucial to invest in an increased capability in this area,
whatever approach is chosen for the future. The Army cut one of its 2 Tank
Transporter squadrons back in 2014, leaving the sole 19 Sqn RLC in the role.
Despite recent, small expansions to the manpower allocated to the role, this is
a big point of failure. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="color: #00051c; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: HelveticaNeueLTStd-Lt;">There are 77 Light Equipment Transporters, which are
Oshkosh tractors taken out of the Close Support Tanker fleet and re-roled to
pull trailers good for loads up to 44 tons. These trucks would be used to move
AJAX, WARRIOR and TERRIER. The number is clearly not something to be
particularly proud of, either. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="color: #00051c; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: HelveticaNeueLTStd-Lt;">The LET fleet will be crucially important in deploying
AJAX as part of the STRIKE brigade, but 77 vehicles won’t be enough to carry
all the AJAX-family vehicles of the two regiments part of a single STRIKE
brigade, either. Moreover, tying them down to deploy what is supposed to be the
vanguard, self-deploying brigade would obviously slow down even further the
movements of the battle-winning armour that should follow. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="color: #00051c; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: HelveticaNeueLTStd-Lt;"><br /></span></div>
<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjZft7QUYepILGkt1V2I_ikHuLLKwvgrltBA29Ma1py5qkhEb3-KR-EcjXP016oqhPtU6B45QFTI5JZNpN13HOPBRK8C_DUpGohQRGhyO4G3LkYoIql6S8vxf7EnLmdO8KgezMm9-n1U6k/s1600/savoia-blindo-centauro-186046.660x368.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="368" data-original-width="660" height="222" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjZft7QUYepILGkt1V2I_ikHuLLKwvgrltBA29Ma1py5qkhEb3-KR-EcjXP016oqhPtU6B45QFTI5JZNpN13HOPBRK8C_DUpGohQRGhyO4G3LkYoIql6S8vxf7EnLmdO8KgezMm9-n1U6k/s400/savoia-blindo-centauro-186046.660x368.jpg" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">Whenever it is possible, even wheeled armoured vehicles catch a lift to cover great distances. In general, the less km you have to drive to get there, the more kms you'll have available to drive in the battle area before something breaks down... These italian CENTAUROs are heading to Germany for an exercise. But we also saw the same with french VBCIs heading to the Baltic. </td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="color: #00051c; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: HelveticaNeueLTStd-Lt;">Finally, the Army notoriously disbanded what little
was left of its Railway capability in the cuts of 2010, and is now scrambling
to regenerate some kind of capability (the details are not publicly know) by
2023. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none;">
<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-US" style="color: #00051c; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: HelveticaNeueLTStd-Lt;">There is no
solving the deployment problem without tackling these areas, and arguably a
much smaller investment than that necessary for the STRIKE brigade, poured into
these strategic enablers, would actually achieve more. <o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="color: #00051c; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: HelveticaNeueLTStd-Lt;">While it is overall rational to depend on the armoured
brigades for the decisive clash, the STRIKE brigade must be adequately
resourced to at least hold ground and screen effectively. Moreover, the STRIKE
brigade is supposed to solve the “deployment problem”, but it won’t unless
adequate investment goes to the ability to move said armoured brigades forwards
faster. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="color: #00051c; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: HelveticaNeueLTStd-Lt;">The biggest equipment problem with STRIKE is really a
FRES problem. At the end of 2014 the Army entered the biggest contract in its
modern history to procure a capable scout for its tracked armoured infantry
brigades. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="color: #00051c; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: HelveticaNeueLTStd-Lt;">In 2015, when STRIKE emerged, the army realized that to
put some firepower into the new brigades it would have to use the only “medium
armour” it was able to fund. And that was AJAX. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="color: #00051c; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: HelveticaNeueLTStd-Lt;">An unfortunate series of decisions within an Army
which evidently cannot agree with itself on its future role and shape, has led
us to a concept that in some ways copies the role of the wheeled brigades
envisaged by the Italian army in the 80s. The Italian problem was how to defend
the Adriatic coast from soviet amphibious assaults, since heavy armour was
based and committed elsewhere. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="color: #00051c; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: HelveticaNeueLTStd-Lt;">The solution was the CENTAURO wheeled tank destroyer,
followed by the PUMA APC. Brigades equipped with these wheeled vehicles would
race south along the many roads available and would quickly contain the soviet
assault, while heavy armour followed on Heavy Equipment Transporters and
trains. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="color: #00051c; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: HelveticaNeueLTStd-Lt;">The British Army’s Adriatic coast is the Baltic.
Unfortunately, the British Army’s CENTAURO is AJAX. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-US" style="color: #00051c; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: HelveticaNeueLTStd-Lt;">Dispersion and
firepower <o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="color: #00051c;"><i>STRIKE is not
designed to defeat an enemy during symmetrical operations. This role is
entrusted to the armoured brigades. Its aim is really to take advantage of the
mobility, the speed, the connectivity, a better situational awareness, the
fires, the cyber assets, the electronic warfare, a better sustainability and a
reduced logistic load to overwhelm the enemy C2, confront it with confused
situations through isolated operations at numerous locations, to employ
deception and avoid mass commitments. STRIKE brigades can be committed
autonomously or to support armoured brigades.</i></span><span lang="EN-US" style="color: #00051c; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: HelveticaNeueLTStd-Lt;"><o:p><i> </i></o:p></span><span lang="EN-US" style="color: #00051c;"><i>[FANTASSINS, issue
42; Summer 2019] </i></span></blockquote>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="color: #00051c; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: HelveticaNeueLTStd-Lt;">The Army has been working to a concept of dispersion
centered on groups of 8 vehicles, normally 4 AJAX and 4 MIV. This would result,
effectively, in a Platoon group, with 32 dismounts (a full section on each MIV)
supported by 4 AJAX acting as “medium armour”, providing intimate fire support
like an MBT would in a mechanized operation. The MIVs, being APCs, however
large, and having, under current plans at least, very limited firepower, would
seek to stay back and avoid direct fighting wherever possible. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="color: #00051c; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: HelveticaNeueLTStd-Lt;">Considering AJAX’s armament, this ultimately means
that each group would, effectively, be equivalent to a slightly larger Armoured
Infantry platoon. It would have more dismounts (32 versus probably 24) but the
same kind of fire support as a Platoon of 4 WARRIORs (the same 40mm gun).<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span lang="EN-US" style="color: black; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri;">The British Army has examined whether
Ajax and MIV can operate in mixed platoon/troop-sized combat teams. This is
problematic. Ajax has CSS requirements that MIV does not. While a standard MIV
can recover a standard MIV, it cannot recover Ajax. Furthermore, Ajax is not
capable of peer-to-peer recovery in the event of breakdown or mobility kill and
must rely on a specialised recovery vehicle. It is not possible to attach Atlas
and Apollo recovery vehicles to every troop as it would require too many
recovery vehicles and increase the size of the combat teams beyond what is
manageable by a troop commander. However, given Strike’s dispersed deployment,
without these attached recovery vehicles, mixed platoons/troops could be fixed
simply by one of their attached Ajax suffering a mobility kill.</span></i></blockquote>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="color: #00051c; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: HelveticaNeueLTStd-Lt;">In its report RUSI correctly notes that such a group
is both under-equipped and logistically constrained by the fact that AJAX is
large, heavy and tracked. It cannot self-recover, nor be towed around by a MIV.
According to RUSI, it is instead feasible to self-recover a MIV using another
MIV. I have doubts on this statement and I suspect it is only true in benign
circumstances, but unfortunately I don’t have access to any good data from
current BOXER users, so I will assume RUSI knows best. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="color: #00051c; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: HelveticaNeueLTStd-Lt;">Including AJAX in the group immediately increases the
logistic burden by requiring more fuel and more frequent refueling, and
introduces a recovery problem. As soon as a vehicle suffers a mobility kill, it
is lost unless ATLAS and APOLLO vehicles of the REME are nearby. They’d have to
be included in every dispersed group, but that would be completely unfeasible. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="color: #00051c; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: HelveticaNeueLTStd-Lt;">RUSI recommends the use of AJAX in all-AJAX groups as
advanced screens, and groups of all-MIV vehicles, upgunned to be able to tackle
a firefight on their own. RUSI recommends the following mix: <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="Default">
<br /></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size: 11.0pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri;"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;"><span style="font: 7.0pt "Times New Roman";"> </span><span style="font-family: "times new roman"; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: normal;"><i>
</i></span></span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size: 11.0pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><i>A command MIV with a heavy machine gun (HMG) remote
weapon station (RWS) <o:p></o:p></i></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;"><span style="font-family: "times new roman"; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size: 11pt;"><i>A MIV with a 25-mm Gau-22 or BK -27 RWS </i>– thought
primarily for a counter UAS role, waiting for laser to be viable <i><o:p></o:p></i></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><i><span style="font-size: 11.0pt; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri;"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;"><span style="font-family: "times new roman"; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span></span><!--[endif]--><span style="font-size: 11.0pt;">2 MIVs with HMG
RWS <o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size: 11.0pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri;"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;"><span style="font-family: "times new roman"; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size: 11.0pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">2 MIVs with turreted 40-mm cased telescoped cannons
and twin ATGMs <o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><i><span style="font-size: 11.0pt; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri;"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;"><span style="font-family: "times new roman"; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span></span><!--[endif]--><span style="font-size: 11.0pt;">A MIV with 120-mm
mortar <o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size: 11.0pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri;"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;"><span style="font-family: "times new roman"; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size: 11.0pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">An engineering MIV with dozer blade and HMG <o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size: 11.0pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri;"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;"><span style="font-family: "times new roman"; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span></span><!--[endif]--></i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size: 11.0pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><i>Four Javelin teams among the combat team’s dismounts. </i><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size: 11.0pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri;"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;"><span style="font: 7.0pt "Times New Roman";">
</span></span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size: 11.0pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><o:p> </o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">RUSI goes on to say: <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span lang="EN-US" style="color: black; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri;">Ajax may be better employed in
three ways. One Ajax regiment should conduct formation recce, establishing
listening posts in advance of the brigade to ascertain the adversary’s axes of
advance and to direct strikes on high-value targets with the EXACTOR missile
system and/or MLRS. The second regiment should form a medium-armour reserve to
bring concentrated lethality to reinforce success, or to evade enemy axes of
advance and thereby strike advancing enemy CS and CSS elements.</span></i></blockquote>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="color: black; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri;"><br /></span>
<span lang="EN-US" style="color: black; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri;">The Army already plans to have in each Strike Brigade a “reconnaissance”
regiment with AJAX and a “medium armour” regiment organized and acting like it
was an MBT formation, but the assumption for the latter, for all we know, was
to be broken down into Troops to be assigned to the various 4+4 groups. <o:p></o:p></span><br />
RUSI, sensibly, recommends to drop that approach, and in general I have
to agree with their recommendation. What RUSI does is exposing yet once more
the basic flaw of the pairing: the Army has entered the biggest contract in
many decades to procure hundreds of tracked vehicles, and soon after that has
decided that what it really wants is wheels. Fearing not to be able to fund
turrets and cannons for MIV itself, they resorted to this pairing mechanism,
despite all the defects it implies, and at the cost of leaving the Armoured
Infantry brigades bare of their own Recce Cavalry formation.</div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="color: black; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri;">Regarding the novel AJAX Recce formation type, the Household Cavalry is trying to shape up the new concept, being the first regiment that will convert to the new vehicle. They have identified the need to reinforce, in particular, the organic "ISTAR" Squadron (which actually includes Snipers Troop, Guided Weapons (JAVELIN, essentially) Troop, a "Manoeuvre" Troop and, only real new thing, a "Drone troop". </span><br />
<span lang="EN-US" style="color: black; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri;">During 2018, a number of WARRIORs were used to "simulate" AJAX (they are similar in size) and enable some experiments before deliveries began (with some ARES variants at first). </span><br />
Unfortunately, experimentation is progressing slowly due to lack of resources and the deficit in manpower. The Drone Troop will be particularly important, especially keeping in mind that the Army plans to disband 32 Royal Artillery Regiment in 2021 and withdraw its Desert Hawk III from service. Plans for the post DH III era are unclear, although a number of PUMA All-Environments mini-UAS have been procured. Battlegroup-level reconnaissance will make a huge leap backwards in time and capability unless a new UAS system is chosen for the future and a new operator is found. If the Royal Artillery loses the BG-level UAS mission, who picks it up? The cavalry appears to be trying, but the plan seems very much up in the air still.<br />
<span lang="EN-US" style="color: black; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri;"><br /></span>
<span lang="EN-US" style="color: black; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri;">Going back to the dispersed mini-groups, RUSI’s proposed group would obviously present a far greater danger to
any enemy than the original 4+4 construct imagined by the Army, but it would still
amount to a very, very small manoeuvre component. I must ask, once again, what
is the rationale for believing that fighting in multiple dispersed group this
small will be a sufficient nuisance for the enemy. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="color: black; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri;">I don’t even want to spend much time on debating on how these groups are
supposed not just to be nuisances, but even to open holes in an A2AD bubble
strong enough to keep the RAF and/or the Royal Navy out of range. An enemy with
Fires powerful enough to keep out a force protected by Type 45s and spearheaded
by F-35s and Typhoons is never going to be thrown into disarray by a reinforced
platoon of infantry riding on 8x8s. There really is no other way to say it: it
is not going to happen. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="color: black; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri;">Such groups can perhaps be a disturbance, even a danger in some
circumstances, and sometimes might get lucky and land a few good hits, but
there is no rational reason to believe that the concept can achieve anything
more. Dispersion has merit, but I think that going below Company-group size at
the least will hardly be workable. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="color: black; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri;">Wheeled brigades, much better armed than the british ones seem set to
be, have existed for decades, yet no one else would ever think of splitting
down platoons over a dozen different lines of approach and call it a
revolutionary concept. The BOXER is an 8x8, not a novel, invisible,
revolutionary hover-tank. It will not be able to sneak up on anyone in the age
of drones and social media. There are millions of ways in which the dispersed
group could be localized, and then attacked. It is also just too small to
attack any meaningfully sized target, and with so few dismounts in it, it will
become combat ineffective really, really quickly. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="color: black; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri;">The proposed group would be far, far smaller than even the Mobile
Operations Group that carried out the ill-fated raid against Jugroom Fort in
southern Helmand in 2007. Far smaller. We have to be realistic about what can
actually be achieved. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="color: black; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri;">Even the smallest tactical group employed by the French in Mali was
larger than that, and it was fighting against an enemy which was, with all due
respect for the French valiant and admirable efforts in Op SERVAL, about as
incompetent as they come. I’ve read reports that say that the Mali groups were
literally incapable to use proficiently a mortar. An enemy of this kind cannot
be a planning benchmark. And certainly the concept cannot go from Mali to peer
warfare against an A2AD kind of opponent. It’s just completely unrealistic. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="color: black; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri;">Why the dispersed platoon-group should “evade superior enemy fires” or
be “too small to be targeted”, yet achieve any significant offensive result?
How does that happen? What has changed to make such a concept realistic? As far
as we know, the infantry embarked on the BOXERS will have nothing particularly
new at its disposal. Even if a few UAVs and UGVs were added in, it would still
not be anything truly different from what is already available. How do we go
from a platoon of infantry on lightly armed APCs to “fight dispersed to
dominate a larger battlefield”? Unless MIV procurement plans change, the
vehicles won’t be anything special either, so what is the reason for assuming
success? <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="color: black; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri;">I am still waiting for a good explanation to this one. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="color: black; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri;">The British Army has not invented the 8x8. It is coming to the party
with 30 years of delay, if not more. It cannot seriously think that, without
any real innovation at all, it can achieve completely unfeasible results, and
somehow move around the battlefield, concentrating and dispersing at will
without being caught. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="color: black; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri;">The Russians have more and better armed 8x8 than the STRIKE brigade has.
Even assuming the dispersed elements can indeed “dance” around massed heavy
armour and avoid contact, how will they avoid to be caught by enemy wheeled
elements matching, if not exceeding, BOXER’s mobility? Especially if we think
about MIV “as planned”, so armed with nothing but a HMG or GMG in a remote
weapon station. The Russians have 30mm guns and ATGWs on the vast majority of
their combat vehicles. BTRs are less protected than BOXER (but what about the
incoming BOOMERANG, by the way?) but are much better armed. What is STRIKE’s counter
to those groups, with at least equal mobility but greater firepower? <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="color: black; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri;">Other than dispersion and camouflage where possible, how do these
dispersed groups survive to enemy air attacks, both with UAVs and helicopters
or fast jets? The British Army is extraordinarily weak in terms of air defence
and has only short range systems in service. With only 4 batteries of SkySabre
(CAMM) planned, of which one permanently Falklands based; and with 3 mechanized
batteries of Starstreak / LMM for vSHORAD, how do these dispersed group get any
degree of air protection? They are supposed to operate in an A2AD area where,
by definition, air support will not be available, or will be available with
many limitations. This also means that air <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">cover</b>
won’t be available, so the usual “the RAF will handle it” doesn’t hold. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="color: black; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri;">RUSI has recommended having at least one MIV in each 8-vehicle group
equipped with a GAU-22 (the 25mm gun used by the F-35) or a BK-27 (the Mauser
27m of Typhoon) as a C-UAS solution, at least until a laser solution is
properly mature. This is certainly better than nothing. But nothing, as far as
we know, is what MIV includes to face this problem. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-US" style="color: black; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri;">Fires <o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="color: black; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri;">Operating in absence of air support, or at least where air support might
well not be able to come, requires access to powerful organic fires. At the
moment, the “STRIKE” artillery regiments are the “Adaptable” regiments of Army
2020, which means they are actually incredibly weak (12 L118 Light Guns) and,
amusingly enough, they contain an extra helping of JTACs to direct air attacks.
<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="color: black; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri;">Of course, the Strike Brigade itself does not exist yet, so the glaring
contradiction doesn’t mean much at this stage, but it is imperative to
dramatically change and improve these units. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="color: black; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri;">The Army has launched the search for its next 155mm howitzer, under the
name Mobile Precision Firepower, looking for a system with long range (52
caliber barrel at a minimum; notoriously the Americans are working on Extended
Range Artillery Cannon demonstrating a 58 caliber gun) and, most likely,
installed on wheels. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="color: black; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri;">MPF is meant to replace both AS90 and part of the L118. Specifically,
the L118s of the Strike Brigades, which is why it is fair to assume it will be
a wheeled system. Hopefully it will be something a bit more ambitious than
Frances’s CAESAR. Even in its latest 8x8 variant, CAESAR is an autocannon, not
a true self propelled system. The crew no longer needs to dismount in the open
to fire the gun, but traverse and protection remain limited. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="color: black; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri;">Moreover, even though the program is now formally in existence, we can’t
be overly confident it will deliver. The past decade saw the cancellation of
nearly the totality of Royal Artillery programmes. One hopes this time things
will go better, but at the moment that’s all we have: a hope. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="color: black; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri;">On the rocket artillery front, when 16 Bty, 26 RA went into suspended
animations months ago we were given an unusual hint about the battery reforming
“in the 2020s” to operate a “new capability” in the Deep Strike capability
area. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="color: black; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri;">The specific capability should be the a long range, large missile for
MLRS, which in the 2020s almost certainly means whatever missile the US Army
selects for its own Precision Strike Missile requirement for the replacement of
ATACMS. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="color: black; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri;">Again, the Royal Artillery has been trying to produce ATACMS for two
decades or more, without any success. This time might or might not be
different. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="color: black; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri;">Depending on how optimistic you are feeling, you could be excused to
think that the standing up of a new battery would imply new launcher vehicles
as well (otherwise you’d just give the missile to the existing, tracked
batteries, don’t you think?), and given the new wheels obsession, you could
imagine a Foreign Military Sales request for a number of HIMARS along with the
new missiles. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="color: black;">If </span><span lang="EN-US" style="color: black; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri;">that
happens, the STRIKE Brigade could get a very potent Fires capability, not
organic but certainly at least aligned. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="color: black; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri;">The British Army also desperately needs to put into service more and
better STA sensors, beginning with artillery locating and battlefield
surveillance radars. It is unthinkable to go to war over the Baltics with 5
MAMBA WLRs in the entire Army. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="color: black; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri;">The crucial Fires area, at the moment, is all about hopes for the
future. The present is very bleak. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Communications, EW, logistics and combat engineering <o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">If mobility must be the key weapon,
the Brigade HQ and all other command layers below will need to be mobile as
well, in ways that have no current equivalent in the army. Indeed, the British
Army arguably lags behind several other players in terms of HQ mobility and
communications in general. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">In recent times, some interesting
trials have taken place with semi-mobile HQs obtained by putting the essential
command tools on MAN SV trucks, reducing to the bare minimum the amount of
assembly / disassembly required and cutting down on tent erection times. Most
of these trials have been carried out on the (very) cheap and while some
problems were solved, much more work will be required to field a truly mobile
HQ, which will require On-the-move communications currently not available to
the British Army. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">More ambitious work has been carried
out regarding mobile Hotspots, tactical alternatives to FALCON to create ad-hoc
networks for deployed formations. BAE has notoriously developed a
PANTHER-carried FALCON + SATCOM hotspot, and General Dynamics has a
demonstrator of its own, into a modified Foxhound. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Fixing the shortcomings will depend entirely on how the big projects in the Land Environment Tactical Communications and Information System (LeTacCIS) mega-project go. Moving beyond FALCON, replacing BOWMAN (project MORPHEUS), finally fielding a final Dismounted Situational Awareness tool, etcetera. </span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhFGWG3bc0SI4Sa_k5qQEB8WVSj9RKk0BkDdH_8PtNzjX7h6CunKkV43ab-aPIZNpAnErH5jTSMY1Ss0sMq3t1fsQUZel9NwMZTvGTrj1tlCyAV1kIVj9QQDz1Hf96m7qWqOy5sckE_DOo/s1600/DXJIkZXXcAARZDw.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="640" data-original-width="480" height="400" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhFGWG3bc0SI4Sa_k5qQEB8WVSj9RKk0BkDdH_8PtNzjX7h6CunKkV43ab-aPIZNpAnErH5jTSMY1Ss0sMq3t1fsQUZel9NwMZTvGTrj1tlCyAV1kIVj9QQDz1Hf96m7qWqOy5sckE_DOo/s400/DXJIkZXXcAARZDw.jpg" width="300" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">Tactical Hotspot PANTHER, with the big masts folded down, during a trial </td></tr>
</tbody></table>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Dispersion will not cut down
communications needs. If anything, it will add complexity, if not additional
voice and data traffic. Such tactical hotspots will be a key backbone for the
entire operation. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">This, in turn, will open up
vulnerabilities in the EW sector, exactly one of those areas where the Russians
have invested. The British Army lags horrendously behind in EW, especially from
when Soothsayer was cancelled without replacement. LandSeeker, or whatever it is called this week, will have to be funded to deliver some competitive capability if the army is to do decently in the future. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Finally, logistics. Even with its
remarkable operational range and carrying capacity, the BOXER will need
resupply, and the volumes to be moved around will be very significant. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="color: black; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri;">The investment the army is making in autonomous systems will help, but
unmanned vehicles might prove vulnerable, again, to enemy EW. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="color: black; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri;">The army is pursuing both a “last mile resupply” system using UAVs and
UGVs of small dimensions, for small but time-critical transports by air and
land. This will be useful, but the current payloads are far from what is
required to keep even a 8-vehicles group moving. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="color: black; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri;">More relevant is the joint project with the US Army for semi-autonomous
convoys, in which a number of unmanned trucks drive along with a limited number
of manned vehicles, freeing up precious manpower for other roles, including
force protection. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="color: black; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri;">On the combat engineering front, it is not yet clear what shape the
organic regiment will take, and what capabilities it will have on call. At
least initially it seems very likely that it will be a largely tracked
formation, since there is no Engineering variant of MIV in the planned purchase
while substantial investment has gone into ARGUS (the engineer’s AJAX-family
variant) and, of course, TERRIER. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="color: black; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri;">The
Rapidly Emplaced Bridge System (REBS) originally procured as UOR for
Afghanistan and mounted on the back of a MAN HX77 8x8 truck, has been used in
training and STRIKE-related trials, but the Royal Engineers are probably trying
to procure something more capable, with a much greater Military Load capability
and maybe with a better protected launch vehicle. Specifically, in the latest
tender put out for the Close Support branch of Project TYRO (renewal or
replacement of BR90 bridging equipment) a new vehicle type has emerged alongside
TITAN (tracked, notoriously) and the tank transporter truck. There is now a
requirement for between 14 and 36 “</span><span lang="EN-US" style="color: black; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Lucida Sans Unicode";">Wheeled Close
Support Launch Vehicles”. <o:p></o:p></span><br />
<span lang="EN-US" style="color: black; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Lucida Sans Unicode";"><br /></span></div>
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</div>
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span lang="EN-US" style="color: black; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Lucida Sans Unicode";">Provision of Close Support
Bridge sets with a Military Load Classification of at least MLC100(T)
which can be rapidly launched and recovered by the TITAN Armoured Vehicle
Bridge Launcher. Any modifications to the TITAN Launch Mechanism to meet the
detailed technical requirement is also included in the CSB scope. <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">Provision of a suitable Wheeled
Close Support Launch Vehicle (CLV)</b> and Wheeled Support Vehicles/Trailers to
transport bridging components.</span></i></blockquote>
<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span lang="EN-US" style="color: black; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Lucida Sans Unicode";">
<!--[if !supportLineBreakNewLine]--><br style="mso-special-character: line-break;" />
<!--[endif]--></span></i><span lang="EN-US" style="color: black; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri;"><o:p></o:p></span><br />
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<span lang="EN-US" style="color: black; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri;">Surprisingly,
though, the requirement for the General Support Bridge (ABLE) have been cut
back a lot, to the point that only 7 to 13 launch vehicles are now requested. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">STRIKE in the US <o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The closest thing to what STRIKE
hopes to be is probably the Reconnaissance Strike Group proposed for the US
Army by Colonel (ret) Douglas McGregor, who is very evidently influenced by his
experience of those incredibly powerful formations that were the Armored Cavalry
Regiments of the “old” US Army. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">His concept (</span><a href="http://douglasmacgregor.com/rsggeneralpublic.pdf">http://douglasmacgregor.com/rsggeneralpublic.pdf</a>) for a 6,000-strong “All
Arms, All Effects” battalion is, in my opinion at least, the most realistic
take on “dominating a larger battlefield” and contrasting A2AD. He imagines
this force as a self-contained “STRIKE – ISR” force operating across a front of
80 – 100 Km, very possibly while “surrounded” by enemies on all sides in a
fluid, vast battlespace without a clearly defined rear area.</div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The deployment problem, the A2AD
aspect and the “larger, complex, contested” battlefield assumptions are very
much the same. According to McGregor, the RSG operates on a range of 1,800 km
with 10 days of endurance without replenishment. STRIKE aims for the same 10
days, but for 2,000 or more km of transfer. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Despite the points of contact, the
proposed solution is very much different, however. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Rather than seeking the solution in
wheels, McGregor seeks the solution by reducing the number of different
vehicles types (he recommends a new family of combat vehicles based on the
german PUMA IFV, tracked) and improving access to sensors and Fires. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">He envisions a 120mm-armed PUMA
derivative as a “medium armour” substitute for ABRAMS, and mixes it in along
with the IFV variant within each Manoeuvre Battalion. In support, he envisions
a large number of 120mm mortars. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Each battalion also gets a number of
PUMA armed with 35mm turrets for low-level air defence and, crucially,
counter-UAV defense. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">NASAMS surface-to air is used at RSG
level to provide a mobile, local area air defence bubble. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">McGregor puts FIRES at the center,
literally. When necessary, the RSG forms a “mobile bubble” of its own, with
FIRES and Air Defence at the center of a 360° “front” held up by 4 homogeneous
All-Arms battalions. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjzWqE5g_-j820Q_C3eA0ZMDcoVXYDYBwLHqgoVCnsrKz-0CBeKYY0WrG8Sk6ZD5jDAuhn0c0kux9eTUOull2sZwSay_65iG_Ns1wDAEQKwPu_AGjruiCXyhLnSiqkD_R4xH4YG4hbrpRA/s1600/RSG.png" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="823" data-original-width="761" height="400" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjzWqE5g_-j820Q_C3eA0ZMDcoVXYDYBwLHqgoVCnsrKz-0CBeKYY0WrG8Sk6ZD5jDAuhn0c0kux9eTUOull2sZwSay_65iG_Ns1wDAEQKwPu_AGjruiCXyhLnSiqkD_R4xH4YG4hbrpRA/s400/RSG.png" width="368" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">RSG's idea of dominating a vast battlefield </td></tr>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Rather than the “afterthought” that
artillery seems to be not just within STRIKE but within the British Army in
general, long range fires are key within the RSG, with organic MLRS and a vast
number of reconnaissance and strike drones / loitering munitions. Moreover, the
RSG would have significant organic Surveillance and Target Acquisition (STA),
so that the battalions fighting “dispersed” can call in devastating fires to
destroy the enemy and really break off pieces of an A2AD bubble. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The US Army’s future formation might
or might not reflect some or all of McGregor’s suggestions. That has yet to be
decided. One thing is certain, though: the Americans are putting Fires at the
centre. Their Multi Domain experimental force is a Field Artillery Brigade and
much of the effort and funding is going to artillery and sensors. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">While the US Army has STRYKER, there
is no sign that Multi Domain will have any particular connection to wheeled
armour. Quite the opposite, in fact, considering the kind of enemy vehicles
that can be expected in an A2AD scenario. The wheels obsession is a very, very
british thing, not really shared by anyone else. Most countries have capable
mechanized, wheeled brigades and have had for many years now, but no one thinks
that a concept of employment on the british lines is how you use said
formations. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Clearly, the kind of resources
available to the US Army are not a luxury the British Army shares and we should
never forget this fact. However, McGregor puts forwards a concept that has
rational merits. Long range fires act as glue between the dispersed groups and
give the RSG real offensive weight. The combination of infantry and MBT-levels
of direct firepower make the battalion, while lighter than an ABRAMS-Bradley
combination, exceptionally dangerous. There are organic sensors and organic air
defence. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The STRIKE Brigade, even in the
widely changed and corrected flavor put forwards by RUSI, has a more tenuous
rationale. Mobility is supposed to be its secret weapon, but even in the best
case that mobility will be equal, not superior, to that of many and better
armed enemy formations, supported by overwhelming massed fires. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">If the RUSI-recommended changes
(which, by the way, differ from mine and other’s in detail more than in
sentiment)<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>are not funded, the situation
remains even worse, because we’ll be literally talking about plain, lightly
armed APCs as an anti-A2AD tool. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Conclusion <o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">RUSI decided to give the STRIKE
concept the thumbs up, even while effectively recommending the Army to dramatically
rethink brigade structure, and MIV variants. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Personally, I remain full of doubts
about not just MIV variants and brigade structure, but even about the concept
itself. A wheeled, self-deploying brigade can certainly solve part of the
“deployment problem” and carry out several important missions. That is
self-evident, and it is why other countries have had wheeled armour for decades
already. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Even dispersion has merits and is
probably a key component of future warfare. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">But even agreeing on these points, I
still cannot give the thumb up to STRIKE. For what it is worth, I must insist
on the fact that there are so many and so large capability and conceptual holes
in the whole idea that I cannot see how it could ever work. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">To achieve its ambitious aims, the
STRIKE brigade needs more resources and a better plan. Operating in multiple
tiny groups is not going to solve any problem, nor cancel any existing
vulnerability. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">I agree with RUSI that the passage
from concept to force is difficult, expansive and long. We cannot expect
everything to be perfect from day one. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">But we should not support a concept
with so many logical chasms in it. If even the concept looks unworkable, the
Force that follows will not do any better. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Ultimately, if the passage from Concept
to Force is too expensive and can’t be resourced, it might just be better to
work on a different concept. It comes down to how many compromises it is worth
accepting to carry on with a project that, everyone agrees, cannot go in the
direction it should be going. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Is dropping to 2 tank regiments an
acceptable cost for this new force? Is the truncated modernization of Heavy
Armour (ABSV again lost in the mist, WCSP cut back to the bare minimum, AJAX
robbed out of the armoured brigades to build up STRIKE…) a fair price to pay to
build up another kind of brigade, equally incomplete / sub-optimal? <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">RUSI has very quickly liquidated the
very important question “why should it be the UK that races a lightly armed
brigade all the way to the Baltic in a crisis?”. I appreciate that showing
unwavering commitment to Article 5 is a priority, but no one has ordered the UK
to do it through this method. The UK has much to give and its credibility as a
NATO member can be maintained, or even enhanced, investing in other areas. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">I’ve mentioned HETs and LETs. Having
a powerful, large transport element capable to project forwards a large
armoured formation via road, and restoring an effective railway capability,
would arguably be even more important, as well as cheaper. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">If we are convinced that wheels are
truly the future, there are other ways to get to them. Instead of using the
STRIKE brigade as a stepping stone, the Army could use the armoured brigades
themselves. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The WARRIOR CSP could be sacrificed,
its turrets put on BOXERs, and the Armoured Brigades could be “STRIKE-ized”, at
least in part, with a strong road-mobile infantry element, followed closely by
AJAX, back in the role for which it was designed and procured, and upgraded
CHALLENGER 2s riding on new, more numerous HETs. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">It is not a perfect scenario either,
but arguably makes more sense in many ways. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<br />Gabrielehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/01623558391676151582noreply@blogger.com12tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-442909239199162925.post-28051521968077025962019-04-20T15:37:00.002+02:002019-04-20T15:58:19.510+02:00Challenger 2 numbers: don't waste time on the wrong ones <br />
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The Times,
almost certainly thanks to someone “leaking” from within the Army, has thrown the
bombshell news of the British Army sinking even lower in the global league by
preparing to see another massive reduction in the numbers of MBTs at its
disposal.</div>
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The news is
unfortunately not surprising in the slightest: for years we have known that there
is a very real possibility that only around 150 MBTs will go through the Life
Extension Programme (LEP). It has become an almost foregone conclusion as soon
as Army 2020 Refine came out, inclusive of plans to convert 1 of the 3
remaining tank regiments into an “imaginative” Medium Armour formation equipped
with AJAXs. I do not think the AJAX idea, and STRIKE in general, in its current form, are good ideas, but i've already made that plenty clear in other occasions.<br />
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<span lang="EN-US">The Army
currently still has 3 tank regiments, with a fleet of 227 “operational” MBT
remaining after the earlier round of cuts in 2010 and 2011, but the King’s
Royal Hussars are still scheduled to begin converting to Ajax as soon as next
year. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US"><br /></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US">The Times
report has caused a predictable eruption of discussions around the numbers and
their meaning. Is mass important? Absolutely, it is. Is “mass” clearly defined
and easily compared? Not quite. How should we read the numbers? It is pointless
to compare MBT numbers with Russia, or Turkey, or the US. It is even arguably
pointless to compare with nations with more comparable mass (France, Italy,
Germany to a degree), because the british situation is, as often happens,
particular. The numbers that matter in order to understand what the British
Army can or cannot do are others. In this short article I will provide a few
key information needed to have a clearer idea of how many tanks the British
Army is actually able to field. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgSd4_m3_WGtyaVR3bdw1iDvqBYdWtj-IiIh_iLPtVX0vqICDBCbv3LPVb70_aHh93Rr8hSh6ROkyXu_Lor7c_IoE2dDJ8_jF2W-xOZIPu4yAv36d2WMywn1iuN4Cpo1n00pVLQKz1ADMM/s1600/DxjFvfdUcAE63BM.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="683" data-original-width="1024" height="266" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgSd4_m3_WGtyaVR3bdw1iDvqBYdWtj-IiIh_iLPtVX0vqICDBCbv3LPVb70_aHh93Rr8hSh6ROkyXu_Lor7c_IoE2dDJ8_jF2W-xOZIPu4yAv36d2WMywn1iuN4Cpo1n00pVLQKz1ADMM/s400/DxjFvfdUcAE63BM.jpg" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">Challenger 2 weaknesses do not stop at numbers. Non NATO-standard and obsolescent 2-piece ammunition and arguably underperforming powerpack are the biggest problems of the tank. Yet, the LEP might address none of the two problems. Rheinmetall has proposed a whole new turret, with smoothbore L55 cannon and NATO-standard ammunition, including latest high-tech programmable rounds and long-rod anti-armout capability. One has to hope the funding allows the selection of this solution. (in the photo, Rheinmetall's unmanned firing trials of the new turret in late 2018) </td></tr>
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<span lang="EN-US">At the
moment, the british tank regiment is known as Type 56 because it has a total of
56 tanks. Of these, 2 sit in the Regimental Headquarters, leaving the others
spread on 3 squadrons of 18 tanks each. Each squadron is indicatively
structured upon 4 Troops, each with 4 tanks, plus 2 MBTs in the Sqn HQ. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US">These are
the paper numbers: manpower shortages already mean that some Troops might be
understrength, while changes in the ORBAT are always possible. A smaller Troop
of 3 tanks is a possibility, in order to form additional troops from within the
regiment, for example. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US"><br /></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US">We are, of
course, talking about the Regular formations. The British Army’s only MBT
Reserve Regiment has been expanded to 5 squadrons, but is not meant to be
equipped and operated as a tank regiment in the field. It trains individual
crew members and crew replacements in favor of the regular regiments and,
following recent uplifts, can prepare formed crews as well, ready to be put on
a tank and sent out on operations. The Royal Wessex Yeomanry regiment, in other
word, is unlikely to ever see a whole regimental park of tanks and is not
counted as a 4<sup>th</sup> Type 56 regiment. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US"><br /></span></div>
<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgvZ_lB3qil2WPsuTzaJPijhReNO4o3yqyEh_JxjwHyH7aDYP_q_6dDKGn7xvK89yTawUSOH4K9-hmUw6FxZM0rpJgBs5IOdfYhYEBoneCpfqAAoFGFlTaAZ3zOiLc6hLzPFRkSf8HqoPo/s1600/CR2+LEP+at+UK-Ger+minister+meeting+in+Brize+Norton+28+Feb+2019.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="900" data-original-width="1200" height="300" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgvZ_lB3qil2WPsuTzaJPijhReNO4o3yqyEh_JxjwHyH7aDYP_q_6dDKGn7xvK89yTawUSOH4K9-hmUw6FxZM0rpJgBs5IOdfYhYEBoneCpfqAAoFGFlTaAZ3zOiLc6hLzPFRkSf8HqoPo/s400/CR2+LEP+at+UK-Ger+minister+meeting+in+Brize+Norton+28+Feb+2019.jpg" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">Rheinmetall's new turret being inspected by Williamson at RAF Brize Norton during the recent meeting with his german counterpart. The new turret would solve the obsolescence of optics, electronics and main weapon system. The powerpack could really do with a change, too. </td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US">Each
regular tank regiment is assigned to an Armoured Infantry Brigade, in support
to 2 battalions of armoured infantry, mounted on WARRIORs. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US">In the
field, regiments and battalions typically end up splitting in sub-units that
are then combined into Combined Arms Battlegroups which are the actual unit of
manoeuvre you want to employ during an operation. The ORBAT of said BGs can vary
pretty wildly, but I will use the most orderly of the base BG schemes to help
you visualize what might happen: t</span>he 2
infantry battalions might form the basis for 3 battlegroups, each one with 2
Companies of WARRIOR IFVs and infantry. In turn, the single Tank regiment will
split its Squadrons into “demi-squadrons” of 9 tanks, assigning one demi-squadron
to each infantry company.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US">The result
is a “square” battlegroup of 2 tank and 2 infantry companies. These are the
real measure of the fighting power of the Brigade, as you pretty much never
want armoured infantry to operate without intimate MBT support. There was a
time in which it would have been normal to have a 1:1 ration between MBT and
IFV in the battlegroup, but in the british army that is no longer feasible and
hasn’t been for a while. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US">The issue
of numbers gets more complicated when geography and <b>Whole Fleet Management</b> come
into the picture. I apologize if the numbers in this section get speculative,
but the Army does not like to reveal its workings in the detail, or keep
information up to date, so what follows can only be indicative. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US">The British
Army, many years ago now, adopted the so-called Whole Fleet Management
approach, which is supposed to reduce costs, spread wear and tear from usage
across the whole fleet and ensure there are always vehicles “ready to go” when
the call for a deployment comes. WFM hasn’t been exactly a success and it is a source
of endless debates in itself, but that is a story for another time. </span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US">For now,
what you need to know is that British Army regiments are no longer assigned a
whole fleet of vehicles. A formation has, instead, daily ownership of a greatly
reduced portion of equipment, the Basic Unit Fleet (BUF). The make-up of a BUF
can vary a lot, but for tank regiments I believe it is something like 20 tanks.
Aka, 1 Sqn plus RHQ, the bare minimum needed for sub-unit level training
(Collective Training level 1, CT-1). <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US">When the
time comes to train the regiment to an higher level of Collective working, the
unit moves out to a training area (Salisbury, or Sennelager, all the way up to
BATUS in Canada) where it “borrows” additional tanks from the resident Training
Fleet. At the end of the exercise, said tanks are handed back to the TF depot,
and wait for the following formation to arrive. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US">The rest of
the vehicles sit in Controlled Humidity Storage, preserved for assignment to
formations deploying for operations. In theory, said vehicles are meant to come
out of storage in perfect material state and ready to go, but this has often
not been the case. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US"></span></div>
<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjXwICKbvBHj2zYF638PLlRNHFVBWPHhadjVC750Zm1FPxNXmfI0-mxBSfm1lNVFrioeCsZEiAmOZuKIKs9aZvzhS79gCnmGe4-AJDhPYHrczRzCrMgcTmJYMQ7p4NV6EVcDlHWXyUY2es/s1600/10394777_10154801906460615_8855139262481187728_n.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="640" data-original-width="960" height="266" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjXwICKbvBHj2zYF638PLlRNHFVBWPHhadjVC750Zm1FPxNXmfI0-mxBSfm1lNVFrioeCsZEiAmOZuKIKs9aZvzhS79gCnmGe4-AJDhPYHrczRzCrMgcTmJYMQ7p4NV6EVcDlHWXyUY2es/s400/10394777_10154801906460615_8855139262481187728_n.jpg" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">Whole Fleet Management and geography are two factors to consider when reading the numbers<br />
<div>
<br /></div>
</td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<div class="MsoNormal">
What does
this mean, in practice? Well, the Times suggests that just 148 Challenger 2s
might be updated and life extended. This is even less than expected (168 was a
number that circulated for quite a while). In theory, it is plenty for an army
with just 2 Type 56 regiments, so with an active fleet of, in theory, 112
tanks, (more or less as many as were deployed in Operation TELIC).</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US">However,
the Whole Fleet Management approach and simple considerations about geography,
training needs and logistics mean that 148 are not “plenty”, not even for an
army with just 2 MBT regiments. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US">The 2
regiments might have on-site Basic Unit Fleets of 20 tanks each, for a total of
40. Then there should be a Training Fleet allocation at Warminster, for use in
exercises on Salisbury Plain. I have no clue how many tanks might be part of
it, but at the very least I’d expect enough to equip at least a second
squadron. Maybe enough to bring a visiting regiment up to full ORBAT, which
would mean as many as 46 (without considering any spare). If we are anywhere
near the true figure, we have already allocated 86 tanks out of 148. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US">Then there
is BATUS. Considering the difficulty and cost of carrying tanks from the UK to
Canada, the near totality of the vehicles used during Battlegroup exercises in
BATUS are kept in a Training Fleet held on site. There are probably only enough
MBTs for a 2-squadrons BG, but that means as many as 40 vehicles, still. And
that would bring us to 126, leaving just 22 other tanks to allocate. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US">Sennelager?
The Army is withdrawing from Germany, but does not want to vacate the
Sennelager training area and will maintain a permanent presence there, to support exercises by visiting units coming from the UK. However, having tanks on site as Training Fleet risks
being impossible. The numbers are merciless. Moreover, the British Army intends
to continue using the Controlled Humidity Storage site of Ayrshire Barracks in
Mönchengladbach. This depot is arguably ideally placed to ensure there are
stored MBTs already on the continent, so that crews can pick them up and
swiftly drive east if it ever becomes necessary. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US">The problem
is that 148 tanks are nowhere near enough to have tanks everywhere. WFM, if
done well, has merits, but those do <b>not</b>
include reducing the overall fleet requirement, because geographic spread
complicates things terribly. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US">With 148
tanks, the British Army will not be able to have stored tanks ready to deploy <b>and</b> appropriately sized and well placed
training fleets. The whole concept will have to be reworked, and since the
numbers are merciless, there is probably no real way to fix it. Ahead of any
deployment, the British Army will have to literally collect its tanks from a
multitude of different locations, raiding all training fleets to be able to put
the 2 regiments in the field. And with virtually zero possibilities of <b><i>ever</i></b>
rushing the Reserve regiment onto the field as a formed unit. <o:p></o:p></span><br />
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US">This only
adds to the already numerous doubts about the Army’s ability to ever realize
its ambition of being able to resource a Division-level deployment with 100% of
its armoured brigades. The British Army claims that, in the future, it will be
able to deploy 3rd Division for a complex operation with 2 armoured and 1 strike
brigade, out of a total of 2 and 2. Respectively 100 and 50% of the total
component, deployed at once. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US">The
possibilities of it ever being feasible are very slim. And even if the ambition
is realized, there will be literally nothing behind the deployed division. It will be a silver bullet that can be fired only once. After 6 months or so, if the need for Armour in theatre has not ceased, some other country will better show up, because the British Army does not have any other armoured formation to rotate. </span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US">All that remains is a bunch of Light Role infantry battalions (with no supports) coming from the
semi-imaginary “1<sup>st</sup> Division”. I say semi-imaginary because a Division
which will include literally zero Artillery, Signals, Engineers and Logistic
assets is <b>not</b> a division. It's an administrative construct, and nothing more. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US"><b>The British
Army does not need just to reassess the number of MBTs to maintain. It needs,
as I will repeat to the end of times if necessary, to reassess 1<sup>st</sup>
Division, and the best use of the manpower and resources it currently absorbs. </b><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US">As useful
as Infantry Battalions are, I don’t think that maintaining 27 infantry
battalions </span>is wise, when it is painfully evident that <b>the Army is horribly imbalanced and completely unable to provide them with communications, logistics, MBTs and artillery support.</b></div>
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<b>Note:</b> the number 27 is due to me leaving out of the total the 5 tiny “specialized infantry
battalions”, including the newly formed 3 Royal Gurkha Rifles, as they are
literally Company-group sized and have a completely different role). </blockquote>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US">16 of those
battalions are small Light Role formations (or at most Light-mechanized with
some Foxhounds) and are undersized even when fully manned (and they definitely
aren’t fully manned, due to the 6+ % manpower deficit in the army). Britain
loves its infantry battalions, but reality doesn’t. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US">It is time
to admit that, if the resources do not increase, the army needs to rebalance
its priorities and structures. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US">Or change
its ambitions and settle sights on a different mission. The tiny light role infantry battalions are okay for securing the
rear lines and fill gaps between manoeuvre formations fielded by allies. They
are also good for a variety of stabilization tasks and “other-than-war” commitments.
Is this what the British Army wants to be? Because it is what it will become if
the current force structure and equipment choices carry on. <o:p></o:p></span><br />
<span lang="EN-US"><br /></span></div>
Gabrielehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/01623558391676151582noreply@blogger.com3tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-442909239199162925.post-2447679594081194152019-02-23T19:20:00.000+01:002019-02-23T21:27:30.342+01:00The Aachen Treaty and Great Power Competition <br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">First of all, a due premise: if it wasn’t
already clear, I will warn that I am a convinced Atlanticist. I literally have
a NATO star mosaic in the alleyway leading to the door of my home, designed by
me and built by my ever skilled father, who has worked so much and for so long
in his life to pick up an amazing breadth of abilities. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">This week, at my new job at Rivista
Italiana Difesa (Italian Defence Magazine, if you want a tentative translation),
arguably the best defence-themed periodic in Italy and one with a long
tradition, I’ve been reviewing an important geopolitics article titled “The
return of Charles the Great?”, authored by an Italian defence commentator with
decades of experience. He is most clearly not an Atlanticist, so we cooperate
but also regularly disagree, even quite vehemently, since his opinion of the
United States is about as moderate of that of Vladimir Putin himself. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">For once, though, we are in complete
agreement on what is the current direction of travel in Europe. The title of
his article should already have given you a clue, and I’ll give you another by
telling you that the recent Aachen Treaty is the key element at the center of
the reasoning. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Of course, while we read the
implications of the event almost in the exact same way, we do completely
disagree on whether it is a good or a bad development. He thinks it is a good
thing in an anti-american optic; I am horrified. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Another thing we do essentially
agree upon, however, is the fact that there has been way too little talk about
the Aachen Treaty, what it says and moreover on what it implies without saying
it aloud. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">While at first glance the Aachen
Treaty provisions might sound just like “more of the same”, reaffirming things
that have been already said in the past, there is every reason to take it very
seriously. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Germany and France are aligning
their policies, with defence front and centre, in new and far more ambitious
ways. The closeness envisaged by the Treaty in economics and defence and
foreign policy matters approaches the terms of a Confederation, and effectively
impresses a whole new dynamic and speed to the maturation of an European project.
Note that I use “an” European project and not “the” European project because
the direction of travel taken by France and Germany actually goes so far past
the current EU integration that it might end up finding resistance coming
exactly through current EU organizations. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">If you have followed the political
debate in the last while you will not have missed the repeated claims that an European
army is coming. Claims that now come from the like of Merkel and Macron themselves, although some Remain-inspired media continues to approach the issue as if it was fantasy and conspiracy theorism from this or that association. It can no longer be denied that things are moving, and that they are indeed accellerating. </span><br />
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">It might not be EU-wide for many years still, but the Aachen
Treaty sure goes a long way towards forming one military force composed of France and Germany.
Joint decision-making, joint meetings of ministries, a new joint council, and
joint deployments are all part of the Treaty. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">You should moreover not have missed the
part about France “loaning” its seat at the UN Security Council to Germany. The
issue has been reported almost as badly as the “EU Army” one, which is caught
between the two extremes of the “absorption by stealth” and “it’s not true at
all!”. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">France might or might not let
Germany sit in its seat for a while, but what France has promised to do is to
campaign within the Security Council to obtain the addition of a new and
permanent seat specifically for Germany. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">While this is unlikely to succeed,
it is an unequivocal signal that Germany thinks that its period of repentance
for the past is over, and France agrees. It is actually pretty easy to imagine the current hopelessly confused political class in Britain giving support to the initiative just as a way to show that they really still side with Europe. <o:p></o:p></span><br />
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">You might not have heard about the <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/could-france-take-the-lead-in-europes-nuclear-security/a-47549878">musings
coming from the Munich Security Conference</a> about the role that France’s
nuclear deterrent “should” play in “Europe”. Or at least, I’ll correct, in the
context of the Aachen Treaty. This aspect gained even less air time on the media, and most of the comments were quick attempts to once more hide the evidence. </span><br />
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">France already tried to get Germany to pay some
of the costs of its 'Force de Frappe', but in 2007 there weren’t the conditions
for such a move. Not yet. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Now, however, Aachen goes a long way towards
opening the door for such a development. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">While the European Union is a
superpower on paper but not in fact due to its inner divisions, a combination
of Germany’s economic might and France’s nuclear deterrent is a major world
power from the day one. When you hear all the speeches and comments about the new age of
inter-state competition, you’ll better start counting in the France-Germany combination. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">You might not have heard in the
generalist news about the renewed and stronger than ever push in Germany
against NATO Nuclear Sharing, and against the presence of dual-key American B61-12
nuclear bombs in the country. But it is highly likely that you will hear about
this more and more frequently in the future. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Germany has already started landing
blows on Nuclear Sharing by arbitrarily excluding the F-35 from the race for
the replacement of its remaining Tornado bombers. The F-35A is the intended
carrier (together with the F-15E, but that is relevant only to the US) of the
B61-12 bomb, with an integration programme already ongoing and other NATO
Nuclear Sharing partners already on board. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Germany, on the other hand, is
restricting its choices for the replacement of the Tornado to the Typhoon and
Super Hornet, both aircraft with no nuclear strike capability and no defined
path towards ever acquiring it. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Keeping the Super Hornet as
candidate effectively means, with 99.9% certainty, that the “race” is a
complete farce, and Typhoon it is. Germany has literally forced the head of its
Air Force and a few other high officers to leave post over their publicly
stated preference for the F-35, and this tells you something. Considerable political pressure was applied on Belgium as well NOT to chose the F-35, although in this
case Germany and France were eventually rebuffed.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The Tornado was European-built and
carries the B61, so there is no definitive reason why Germany couldn’t simply add
B61-12 integration to the cost of its new Typhoons, but I’d be very, very
surprised if the attempt to do this didn’t lead to protests over the cost and,
right afterwards, to accusations against the US of making it “more complex and
more expensive” than it should be, as a punishment for not purchasing the F-35.
It’s really, really easy to see coming. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
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<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj75GmoBx09BFuSaY5lHwzy50TBwUPmq5bnBI0L-ZDQtjSGGEcLflXVjqQQpPv18C1fthuKgO4JLMT-YpLuQB717d8Ks1IKZpzUnLRAEe46awIsexR1MV59rOcFuBtijF4flnbD3taEv4w/s1600/image.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="334" data-original-width="594" height="223" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj75GmoBx09BFuSaY5lHwzy50TBwUPmq5bnBI0L-ZDQtjSGGEcLflXVjqQQpPv18C1fthuKgO4JLMT-YpLuQB717d8Ks1IKZpzUnLRAEe46awIsexR1MV59rOcFuBtijF4flnbD3taEv4w/s400/image.jpg" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">Ghedi air base: american nuclear bomb, Italian Tornado bomber. NATO Nuclear Sharing is a key component of Europe's security. </td></tr>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">And while Germany has formally sided
with the US on the withdrawal from the INF treaty, it has also made clear that
new American missile systems in Europe are not welcome, which is kind of a contradictory position to take. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The disagreements on B61 and on the
way ahead post INF are a perfect excuse for Germany and France to press on with
their greater alignment. Germany might soon decide to pull out of Nuclear
Sharing altogether, and that would be a huge blow to NATO and the obvious first
step towards seeking refuge under France’s own nuclear umbrella. Which,
naturally, the two countries will then try to present as Europe’s nuclear
umbrella, seeking financial contributions from the other European countries as well. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">It might take time, but this is the
direction of travel.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Whoever thinks that
France has committed to giving Germany a seat at the UN Security Council virtually
for free is either willfully blind or a complete fool. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The bilateral nature of Aachen means
that it does not technically affect EU members, which on the other
hand have no effective way to counter or influence it in any way. It is immediately clear, however, that this level of integration between Paris and Berlin is going to have immense consequences for the whole European Union. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Italy, through Prime Minister Conte,
has remarked that the new UN seat should, if ever created, go to the European Union
as a whole and not to Germany, which is an eminently sensible observation to make,
albeit complex to turn into reality. Naturally, his remark was played down,
despite being arguably very pro-EU, because he is, of course, “the puppet of Salvini” and
thus just another sovranist enemy. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Yes, the sovranists. The new enemy of
the EU is Sovranism. Populism was an earlier phase, now the threat is
sovranism. Because sovranism means that other countries will try to resist the
de-facto instauration of an economic and military hegemony of France and
Germany, united politically and economically and shielded by a credible,
non-american nuclear umbrella. Sovranism is a reaction against external control and globalisation, and as such it is an obstacle. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">America, and not Russia, is the
untrustworthy side for many in Europe. European and American media alike will tell
you that it is because of president Trump, but this is, in good measure, a lie
or, at best, an half-truth. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Trump is not the beginning of anti-american
feelings in Europe, nor is he the end of them. He is a convenient figleaf, a
perfect excuse to press on with the new global ambitions of Germany and France
while throwing the blame on the Atlantic side. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">It is not Trump that is abandoning
Europe. He has actually reversed, at least partially, years of American drawdown in Europe,
which Obama happily accelerated. He has been extremely tough on the INF breach.
He has committed to more American troops in Europe and he keeps asking for a stronger NATO
through investment from the European partners (he's been more vocal, but he is not the first to do so). He opposes the Nord Stream 2
pipeline, too, which is in the interests of Russia and damages those of
Ukraine. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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And that is exactly the problem. He
is doing too much. The truth, I fear, is that there are very strong currents of
thought in Europe which were far happier when American troops were traveling
towards CONUS, rather than coming from CONUS to Europe.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">We know which side is co-funding
Nord Stream 2 and holding hands with Putin. And it is not Trump. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">And then there is Brexit. Brexit is
the "mother of all sovranisms", the greatest-ever form of resistance against the constant expansion of centralised european powers. This makes it the supreme evil. And yet, on the other hand,
Brexit brings the UK away from Veto powers in Europe, which are now one of the
greatest problems that Germany and France face. The truth? Brexit is a blessing
for France and Germany. </span><br />
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Their hegemonic project in Europe is now free from a
heavy anchor which was holding it back. And they have pretty much said as much, haven’t they? The UK’s
constant prudence on European initiatives, especially in the field of defence,
has been remarked more than once, in most rude form in the last few weeks. The "british friends" rethoric is incredibly hollow, and one of the most amazing things about Brexit is how many britons helplessly drink from that poisoned spring. <o:p></o:p></span><br />
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">There have actually been remarkably unfriendly accusations coming from Europe, and the side which has tried to put up walls is not led by London. The amazingly long time it took for Europe to begin reciprocating the promise of rights for british citizens on EU soil is plenty noticeable, yet the Remain side is strangely willing to let it all pass. For some, the EU seems to have turned into some sort of divinity. </span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">I get the feeling that many in the
UK and the US, including most if not all the media, do not realize how much
hostility there is in some quarters against America’s perceived control over
Europe. And against the UK, historically seen as America’s agent within the European Union.
I am amazed to see the naivety with which the issue is debated in the USA and
in the UK. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">You would be shocked to see the
ferocity of the arguments and words used by my illustrious colleague in the
article I’ve mentioned. But what you especially don’t seem to realize is that his thoughts
are shared by many. Too many, perhaps. Sadly, for many the UK is still the "Perfidius Albion" of fascist memory. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The UK and US have not yet awakened
to the truth. This is NOT a reaction to Trump and Brexit. Trump and Brexit are
welcome excuses that are being used to camouflage a sharp acceleration in plans
to truly make Europe, or at least the Paris-Berlin core, an increasingly
antagonist side to the US. Alignment is over. Disagreements are going to be far
more frequent in the future. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">When I see American media and commentators
wondering if the alliance with Europe “can survive Trump”, I bitterly remark that
the alliance has been changing and dying from well before Trump. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Going back to my colleague, he
openly talks of NATO as a novel<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Delian
League, with the US playing the part of Athens and exploiting the alliance to
control the other cities / European countries. Do you remember how the Delian
League ended? <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">It is a sorry state of affairs, years in the making. And it is not going to heal easily. If at all. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Regardless of whoever will be
elected after Trump, it is indeed unlikely that things will ever go back to the
way they were, simply because it is not an issue of Trump or no-Trump to start
with. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The same is true of Brexit. Regardless
of who is prime minister, regardless of Customs Union or not and regardless of
how much London promises to do against Russia in the Baltic and in Norway,
relationships with the new center of Europe will stay tense. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Nothing is ever universal, of
course, but let me remark that there is a political current,
Europe-wide, which is all too happy to have London’s veto out of the way. The
feeling is that America’s “undercover agent” is now out of the room. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The use of inflammatory language over
Gibraltar and many other controversies will remain in the long term, regardless
of what the UK might do or say. The US and UK should both stop being so
penitent about Trump and Brexit and realize that a new phase has begun. Great power
competition it is, but China is not the only rival to be worried about. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Germany-France are a rival. And the
EU as a whole will be, if the new center can win over the resistences of the
periphery. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The EU is a Superpower,
economically. It isn’t a great power politically and militarily because it is still
divided. But the new France – Germany alignment, on its own, and particularly
if the nuclear deterrent situation goes as we imagine it, will generate a voice
that will more often<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>than not become the
de-facto “european” position. Exactly as is happening with the new FCAS fighter jet, France
and Germany are trying to “define the project” and then have “partners” tag
along. In front of an essential "fait accompli", the Union will follow the hegemons. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">And as a major power with a major voice, it will increasingly speak against America and the UK. The sooner the anglosphere
realizes this, the better. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">If you can’t see what is happening,
you are pretty blind. You can either be happy with it, like my colleague, or be
worried by it, like me. But please, don’t pretend it isn’t happening! <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The next phase of the struggle
internal to Europe is now officially between Germany-France and the periphery of
Europe. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The periphery means Poland and in
lesser measure the rest of East Europe, which are great NATO supporters as they
do not trust (for very good reasons, if you ask me) France and Germany to be
able and willing to defend them from Russia. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Poland has already said that it will
gladly take those US troops, missiles and nukes that Germany would really like
to be gone. Poland has even dared voicing support for the UK, too. Poland is sovranist.
Poland is an obstacle. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The next few years might end up
seeing Germany and France increasingly in disagreement with the US, increasingly
hostile on the economic front, increasingly calling for European “autonomy”
from the US, while still effectively defended by US troops, based in Poland. While
still blaming the US for the fracture, in fact. Regardless of<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>what the president’s name will be. Just like
now: shame Trump, but demand he does not leave Syria. Protest his every plan
and request, but do not contemplate the option of using European soldiers to
secure what is, in words at least, seen as a key security crisis right on
Europe’s threshold. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Hegemony is an addicting thing: it
is not likely that we will see a climbdown from Aachen. There will be
disagreements and difficulties between Paris and Berlin (defence export is just
one of many potential thorns on this rose), but the axis will hold because it
is clearly advantageous for both countries. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The periphery also means Italy. It
is not a case that the new “public enemy number 1” is now Sovranism. The
greatest danger, specifically, is represented by sovranists with veto powers within the EU. Sovranists
which might soon fill a great number of seats in the EU parliament after the
elections of May. Sovranists that might turn the EU into a brake, rather than a tool in the hands of Paris and Berlin. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Salvini is a sovranist: he does not
quite advocate leaving the EU (not anymore, or perhaps not yet depending on how
you look at it…), but he is certainly a source of resistance and opposition.
And he is popular. He, and Italy, are the next big obstacle. Italy either has
to be won over (and already years ago Paris tried by proposing a treaty to
Italy which would have looked a bit like Aachen) or silenced in some ways. And
make no mistake: the international media campaign against Salvini will keep
getting more virulent. And Spread attacks against Italy will continue, too.
They worked in 2011, after all, when the last Berlusconi government was
effectively forced to resign and was replaced by unelected, appointed Mario
Monti and the semi-elected leftist, europeist governments that followed. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The same left that went into the
2018 elections under “+ Europa” and “United States of Europe” banners, only to
be savagely punished by the electorate. <o:p></o:p></span><br />
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Italy is in the Eurozone. It has joined the currency that was custom-tailored over Germany's needs. And because of it is greatly vulnerable. </span><br />
In the political battle for Italy, even Berlusconi has now resumed
usefulness in the eyes of the EU: babysitted by Antonio Tajani, president of the EU Parliament, he is
(so far unsuccessfully) trying to simultaneously ride on Salvini’s wake by
formally siding with him in regional elections, while savagely opposing the
government and sticking to an Europeist agenda. Berlusconi and the candidates
of the Left all aspire to being the Italian Macron, defeating the evil
sovranism / populism and climbing on a stage with blue flags waving and
Europe's anthem blaring in place of the national anthem.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span>
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Don’t undervalue the role that Italy
has to play, even unknowingly, in the next chapter of Europe’s history. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Regardless of what your misguided
media like to tell you, Salvini is probably your most important ally in the
next few years. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">But you have to awaken from your self-defeatist,
absurdly repentant “it’s all our fault” slumber. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<br />
<br />
<br />Gabrielehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/01623558391676151582noreply@blogger.com7tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-442909239199162925.post-25959961573001489442019-02-17T21:17:00.000+01:002019-02-17T21:48:01.548+01:00A look at the Equipment Programme and an ear for the Secretary of State's speech <br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Equipment Programme 2017: Category A and B projects <o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The MOD has published a <a href="https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/767228/06390.pdf">FOI
answer</a> in which it details the names of the projects of category A (value
exceeding 400 million pounds) and B (from 100 million to 400). The list does
not provide any additional detail, but even so it is simply invaluable to better
understand the 10 Years Equipment Programme. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The fact that the MOD is fine with
revealing this list if specifically asked to do so, but does not include
anything comparable in the EP document itself, is extremely irritating, and it
proves once again that there is no security reason whatsoever for publishing
such a vague EP document. As I’ve fully embraced the cause of greater
accountability and transparence by the MOD in the handling of the defence
budget, I will remark that in the future it should no longer be necessary to
use FOIs to get this level of information. It would be very helpful to include
it in the EP document itself. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Getting to the document, in
addition to the really big programmes that are well known and expected to figure, the list does contain a
number of voices worth touching upon. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Complex Weapons <o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">There are several voices here that
are of enormous interest. One is the Category A project unimaginatively named “<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">Battlefield Weapon</b>”. It is hard to
guess what this is, exactly. With the JAVELIN anti-tank missile having a
notional OSD of 2025, the development of a new, more multi-role missile for the
infantry might well be what’s hiding under this name. The British Army also has
(or had?) a requirement for a “Reusable Multi-Role Medium Range Shoulder
Launcher (MRSLs)” to introduce into the platoon to increase anti-structure and
anti-infantry firepower and, effectively, replace the outgoing 60mm mortar. The
expected date for contract award has however passed months ago without a
selection being announced. The contenders were (are?) the Carl Gustav, which is
enjoying a major renaissance being selected by both US Army and USMC as new
Squad weapon; and the C90 Reusable. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">MRSL might be hiding behind
“Battlefield Weapon” as well, in theory, but it is not likely, also because even
an Army-wide purchase of Carl Gustav would still not get anywhere near the 400 million mark. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">There is also a “<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">Tactical Guided Munition – Indirect</b>”,
which appears as a voice both under Procurement and under Support. This could
hide the decade-old requirement for a guided 155mm shell solution for the Royal
Artillery’s AS90 howitzers. <o:p></o:p></span><br />
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">We also have, however, “<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">Land Precision Strike</b>”, which, if I had
to guess, would be related to the GMLRS rockets. Again, there is no way to tell
for sure. These are both Category A procurement programmes, so we are talking
about sizeable projects for new capability. It would be hugely beneficial for
the Army to procure the new GMLRS “Alternative Warhead” which restores area-effects lost with the demise of traditional sub-munitions, but I’m not
sure an area-effect weapon would fit very well within the project name. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Finally, we have the “<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">Deep Fire Rocket System</b>”, again a
Category A project. To comment on this one we have to note that for well over a
decade the Royal Artillery has wanted a long range weapon, namely the ATACMS
large rocket for the M270B1 launchers. </span><br />
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">We must also go back to the end of last
year, when 16 RA Bty went into suspended animation, but with a most unusual </span><a href="https://www.forces.net/news/royal-artillery-battery-says-farewell-now"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">promise of a relatively swift return</span></a><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"> to active service to operate a new
Deep Fires capability. In the occasion it was said: <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<blockquote class="tr_bq" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><o:p> </o:p></span><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">“There is a plan in the middle of the 2020s around 2024 when we develop
a new capability for the British Army and enhance some of our deep fire
capabilities as part of a divisional fires regiment.”</span></i></blockquote>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">While there is no way to confirm it,
it seems very likely that the British Army intends to procure the new missile
that the US Army is developing to replace ATACMS, the Long Range Precision
Strike munition for GMLRS launchers. The standing up of a new battery for it,
however, suggests that the launcher vehicle might also be new, and it is
relatively easy to imagine that the army might be thinking of the wheeled
HIMARS launcher, which would complement the tracked, heavier (but with more
rockets ready for launch) M270. This solution would deliver wheeled GMLRS
capability for the Strike Brigades and introduce a 500 km precision strike
capability (or maybe even more than that if the INF treaty collapses for good.
The LRPF is a prime candidate for quick range extension in that case). <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgY95OmqfpTmVQ7fB8-xmxgr5sh4QxAlqASI2uLmPAdv-WPtZOGEWNhMoqNqklz1HaPfrgytqFKjpdJ-jisjsqZljPdEa8meCxDDhG6fIGF41VTyeag_SQ_diL_ZnjVFajQOyDmywTYVP0/s1600/1l-image-DeepStrike-Missile.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="600" data-original-width="800" height="300" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgY95OmqfpTmVQ7fB8-xmxgr5sh4QxAlqASI2uLmPAdv-WPtZOGEWNhMoqNqklz1HaPfrgytqFKjpdJ-jisjsqZljPdEa8meCxDDhG6fIGF41VTyeag_SQ_diL_ZnjVFajQOyDmywTYVP0/s400/1l-image-DeepStrike-Missile.jpg" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">HIMARS and LRPF for the Royal Artillery in the early 2020s? </td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Curiously, the <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">integration of Meteor on the F-35</b> also appears in the “Complex
Weapons” budget rather than in the “Combat Air” one, as happens instead for
weapons integration on the Typhoon. This might be due to the fact that the
missile is to receive a new set of “clipped” wings as part of the integration.
It might also have to do with its further development (GaN AESA radar seeker)
under the name “Joint New Air to Air Missile”, a bi-national programme with
Japan. JNAAM does not appear in the FOI: it is either part of “LII (Lightning
II) Meteor integration” or is too small a budget to enter in category A and B. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">There is a “<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">Next Generation SPEAR</b>” voice as well, which is not readily
identified. Brimstone 2 Capability Sustainment Progamme (also known as
Brimstone 3), SPEAR Cap 3 and Future Cruise and Anti-Ship Weapon are all listed
separately, so this might revolve around the Paveway IV spiral development, or
represent a whole new system. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">In the Category B list it is worth
noting two large purchases of Paveway IV bombs for arsenal replenishment: 1200
and 3500 bombs respectively. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">There are also a “<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">Javelin follow-on buy</b>” voice, which
might or might not include the purchase of the latest, multi-role Javelin F
with improved blast-fragmentation effect for roles other than anti-tank. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">4<sup>th</sup> Tranche of High Velocity Missiles</b> (Starstreak) is
also listed as Category B. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">There is a Category A “<b>Future
Systems</b>” which is as vague as it could be but no doubt covers all sort of
studies. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">Storm Shadow Mid Life Refit</b> is a Category A equipment support
project. There is a “Future Ground Based Air Defence contingency” voice which
is probably connected to FLAADS Land Ceptor (now Sky Sabre). <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Complex Weapons budget includes also
a “Medium Range Radar” voice which is probably ARTISAN. The inclusion of this
and most of the Sea Ceptor costs in the Weapons budget explain why the
Type 23 CSP appears so cheap. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Future Cruise and Anti-Ship Weapon</span></b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"> is quoted as two programmes: FLRDFC is
(probably) the replacement for Storm Shadow, but the exact meaning of the
horrible acronym is uncertain. FC/ASW FOSUW should be the Future Offensive
anti-Surface Weapon, the replacement for Harpoon on ships. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><o:p><b>Brimstone 2 CSP</b> is worth a mention as this programme should deliver a "Brimstone 3" round which is expected to replace Hellfire on the British Army's Apache Block III helicopters in the 2020s. By then the US Army will be transitioning to JAGM, and while Hellfire will remain a plenty big player for many more years, it will become progressively harder to support as the main customer moves on to the new system. Brimstone, on the british side, is the obvious solution. Brimstone 3 is also offered to France for the TIGER attack helicopter modernisation, but it is pretty easy to imagine that Paris will go with a MMP development or some other non-british solution, especially since a british purchase of VBCI has well and truly gone with the wind. </o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><o:p>It would be very interesting if Brimstone 3 added a launch mode that sees the missile dropped before the rocket ignites: this modification would enable integration of the 3 inside the F-35's bays. Currently, Brimstone is rail launched so is not compatible with confined spaces... </o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><o:p><br /></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">LAND <o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">In the Land Sector the big disappointment is the
disappearance of the <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">Armoured
Battlefield Support Vehicle</b> which brings the issue of replacing FV432 in
armoured formations back to square one. It had been present up to the 2016
edition. Not for the first time I’m left wondering how the “Armoured Infantry
2026” overarching programme is supposed to ever deliver full operational
capability if the Warrior CSP is not supported by a replacement for FV432. If
they are looking at having MIV covering the role, I can only repeat my
suggestion: bin WCSP and put the new turret on MIV. It would be absurd to have,
say, the mortar team in support to a battalion of Warriors traveling on a
wheeled AFV larger and heavier than the IFV itself…<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">MITER</span></b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"> and <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">NAV-P</b> are both present, however. <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">MITER</b> is a large Category A programme
which aims to unify, in the 2020s, the provisions of the current C Fleet,
Protected Plant fleet and Mechanical Handling Fleet. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The C Fleet comprises of engineering,
construction and plant equipment to enable manoeuvre, construction, logistics,
force protection engineering and life support. It is currently provided under a
Private Finance Initiative contract which will end in 2021. The current small
protected construction plant fleet is owned by the MOD and is mainly the result
of UORs. It is now supported by industry under a contract also ending in 2021.
The Defence Mechanical Handling Equipment is currently almost entirely provided
under the DMHE contract, ending in 2020. The equipment fleet, composed of pure
Commercial Off The Shelf kit, is owned by the contractor and provided to MOD on
a period lease basis. Under MITER, the future contractor will manage and
sustain the combined construction and mechanical handling equipment fleet in
the United Kingdom, on deployed operations and overseas environments.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">Non Articulated Vehicle Programme </b>is the replacement of DROPS. In
July 2018 the MOD ordered the conversion of </span><span lang="EN-US" style="background: white; color: black;">382 of its MAN SV HX-77 trucks to be converted into Enhanced Pallized
Load Systems EPLS, including 33 winterised/waterproofed for Royal Marines
operations. 40 deliveries are planned early this year with final deliveries by
the end of march 2021. Around 180 had been procured earlier on. NAVP will build
on this interim solution to hopefully finally complete the DROPS replacement. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="background: white; color: black;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="background: white; color: black;">One notable absence, not easily explained, is the <b>Multi Role Vehicle - Protected</b> voice. The Foreign Military Sale authorization for up to 2,747 Joint Light Tactical Vehicles is dated 10 July 2017, so the programme was definitely ongoing already. But, up to that point it might, for internal accounting reasons, have been reported as a smaller-budget project? After all, no MRV-P candidate, not even the JLTV, is still fully and definitively selected. </span><br />
<span lang="EN-US" style="background: white; color: black;">JLTV should cover the Group 1 requirement, while Bushmaster and Eagle 6x6 are still battling it out for the Group 2 requirement for a larger vehicle (selection might take place this year). Group 3 should cover the Light Recovery Vehicle. </span><br />
<span lang="EN-US" style="background: white; color: black;">The absence of MRVP from the list is curious, but not necessarily concerning. However, MRVP does seem a remarkably vulnerable programme which might well be delayed once again in the near future as far too many priorities battle over a far too tight budget. </span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="background: white; color: black;">Worth a mention is the Category B project <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">TYRO</b> for the upgrade or replacement of
BR90 equipment, both Close Support (Titan-launched scissor bridges) and General
Support (the ABLE system. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="background: white; color: black;">The latest variant of contract notice published for <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">TYRO – Close Support</b> adds a new vehicle
requirement: a <span style="mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;">Wheeled Close Support
Launch Vehicle that must be able to launch the same bridges as operated by
Titan. <o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="background: white; color: black;">As of today, the Close
Support bridge does not have anything like this: the supporting vehicle is a
Unipower trucks that carries spare bridges but is not meant to launch them. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="background: white; color: black;">Up to 36 Wheeled Close
Support Launch Vehicles are requested, and the inclusion of “Close Support” is
significant because, keeping pace with army doctrine and definitions, it
requires a vehicle that can operate in the Direct Fire zone. In other words,
something offering a decent level of protection, because it is expected that
there will be a fight going on while launching the bridge. <o:p></o:p></span><br />
<span lang="EN-US" style="background: white; color: black;"><br /></span>
<br />
<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhSJeYsC2cBV6kZsrgdwvOPZ5NiS12ZhSwWwExk1u2dG3TI6L1hGpBXN4BfiBebvHd6FxnolSPCy_-ujN2cYlVNEGU2EgV79f71D3gfLbjSqeMjxXvAKE_mi4CYc56A_jov9gTAANATsSs/s1600/58f53debdf4ff2cdc46da7ca4f3846ef.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="683" data-original-width="1024" height="266" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhSJeYsC2cBV6kZsrgdwvOPZ5NiS12ZhSwWwExk1u2dG3TI6L1hGpBXN4BfiBebvHd6FxnolSPCy_-ujN2cYlVNEGU2EgV79f71D3gfLbjSqeMjxXvAKE_mi4CYc56A_jov9gTAANATsSs/s400/58f53debdf4ff2cdc46da7ca4f3846ef.jpg" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">Not just Tank Bridge Transporters anymore. Under TYRO, a wheeled close support launch vehicle is now requested. The number of ABLE General Support bridges, on the other hand, shrinks to compensate. </td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="background: white; color: black;">It is pretty evident that
such a vehicle would deliver greatly enhanced bridging support to the Strike
Brigades when compared to the Rapidly Emplaced Bridge System (REBS) which spans
a smaller gap, is launched by a lightly protected MAN SV EPLS and has a
Military Load Class limited to 50. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="background: white; color: black;">TYRO requests that all
bridge elements are certified at least for MLC 100 (Tracked), which means that
pretty much everything has to be able to cross. </span><span lang="EN-US" style="background: white; color: black;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="background: white; color: black;">There is no <b>Project TRITON</b> in sight yet, but it might
just be because of timelines. The TRITON project for the procurement by 2027 of
a replacement for the M3 rigs for Wide Wet Gap Crossing has been unveiled in
late 2018 in the new Army’s newsletter. It probably hadn’t been firmed up yet
in the 2017 plan. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">ISTAR <o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">ISTAR big projects are dominated by
communications, and in particular <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">Future
Beyond Line of Sight</b>, or SKYNET 6, the successor to the current
constellation of comms satellites. As is know, a first “transitional”
satellite, SKYNET 6A, has been ordered in summer 2017. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Many of the other voices are part of
the Land Environment Tactical Communication Information Systems mega-programme
for the renewal of comms at pretty much all levels. <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">FALCON 2 EXPLOIT</b> and <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">EVOLVE</b>
both figure in the Category A programmes, and it is meant to expand on the
capabilities of the current FALCON, which is the deployable High Bandwidth
Backbone Network for the joint force, and primarily for the army. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Importantly, <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">Dismounted Situational Awareness </b>appears as a Cat A programme. It
is part of the MORPHEUS communication system (data and voice radios and display
for situational awareness) meant to progressively replace BOWMAN. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">PICASSO</span></b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"> also
figures, and in this case we are talking of the national capability for
strategic Imagery Intelligence (IMINT) and GEOInt, which provides commanders
with information obtained from the analysis of date coming from national and
multi-national collectors. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The Increment 1 and 2 of the <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">Aliied Systems for GEOINT (AGS)</b> are
also included. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Combat Air <o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<br /></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The elephant in the room, due to the
current uncertainty surrounding it, is the <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">UK-France
Future Combat Air System</b>, aka the UCAV for the 2030s. If we believe the
press reports, France was ready to progress into a funded Demonstration phase
and proceed with the building of prototypes, but the UK has refused to commit
funding to that. Whether the programme survives, and in which form, is
currently hard to say. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Then we have, of course, the
national <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">FCAS</b>, better known in
public as Project TEMPEST. Connected to it is also project <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">PYRAMID</b>, which is meant to develop the solutions for the MOD’s Mission
System Reference Architecture for future Air Systems. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Worth of mention is <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">Typhoon RADAR 1</b>, a category A project
meant to deliver a workable AESA radar for Typhoon Tranche 3 (and hopefully
Tranche 2 too). The radar 1, or R1, is the baseline AESA in development for the
consortium, but the UK’s intention is to eventually use a more ambitious R2
standard, with Electronic Warfare capability. R2 does not appear in the list,
but this might simply be because the additional investment so far authorized
over and above R1 funding does not yet qualify into Cat B. Some 60 millions
were given to BAE Systems. A more recent version of the list might or might not
display R2 since the Secretary of State for defence, speaking at RUSI on
February 11, mentioned that the Transformation Fund includes another 60 million
for the Typhoon radar. The 100 million mark, in other words, might now have
been passed. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">One notable Cat A project is the <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">Watchkeeper Mid Life Update</b>. Given the
pricetag, it should include some serious improvements and additions. The Army has finally declared Full Operational Capability for Watchkeeper, but it is actually still struggling to secure the certifications needed to operate it from Boscombe Down as intended. Training on Salisbury Plain, in non-segregated air space, was the big promise of Watchkeeper and on this one point there isn't yet a happy ending. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
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<br /></div>
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<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Air Support<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">One surprising absence is ASDOT,
which should more than qualify as Category A. It might, however, have been
included into the rather incomprehensible “<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">DCS+S
- DOTC-A- Core System + Services</b>”, which stands for Defence Operational
Training Capability – Air. Its core component is the development of a Common
Synthetic Environment that enables the connectivity between different
simulators, in different locations, to enable articulate, large-scale
simulations. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Another byzantine acronym is <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">MSHATF PFI</b>, but this is the well known
40-years Private Financing Initiative with CAE for the delivery of the Medium
Support Helicopter Aircrew Training Facility in RAF Benson. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">Sentry CSP</b> makes an appearance, but as we know the MOD’s preferred
approach is not so much a Capability Sustainment Programme anymore, but rather
replacement with new build E-7 Wedgetail. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
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<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Sentinel R1 capability</span></b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"> and its “project team” are both Cat A programmes. Its mid-life update,
with the addition of maritime radar mode and other upgrades, might be the
explanation. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The Secretary of State for defence’s speech at RUSI <o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<br /></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">While it is clear that the
uncertainty around the budget has not gone away, the Secretary’s speech should
be welcomed as it signals that the armed forces have finally found a champion
who truly has a vision for the UK’s role in the world. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">For one, I was particularly pleased
with it because it attempts to change a narrative of decline into a rather
happier one in which the armed forces return to the center of the UK’s
visibility in the world. I was of course particularly happy also because, in
the last few months, defence policy has been heading in a direction which I had
identified years ago and for which I’ve been campaigning as relentlessly as I could,
while admittedly having a lot less time for blogging than in the past. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">I was incredibly pleased to see the
removal from service of the <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">River Batch
1s</b> being pushed to the right. My readers will known that ever since the
River Batch 2s were ordered earlier than necessary, I’ve <a href="http://ukarmedforcescommentary.blogspot.com/2014/10/opvs-that-come-with-lots-of-questions.html">been saying</a> that the
only way to make them into a genuinely good story was to also keep in service
the earlier ships. While at the moment it is a short-term promise only (a
couple of years), the Royal Navy has confirmed that it will try to man them
with the help of the Reserve, and if the scheme can be made to work
successfully it will prove to be a massive force-multiplier. I believe that
there are good chances that the three vessels will stay into service well
beyond the next two years if the experiment is successful. In turn, this will
allow some of the newer Batch 2 to be employed in constabulary tasks far away
from home. You might have noticed that, following the experimental deployments
of two River Batch 1s in the Caribbean in the last couple of years, the North
Atlantic Patrol tasking is regularly quoted as part of the Batch 2’s missions.
This is all the more likely to become routine if the Secretary’s “ambition” of
restoring a more permanent and sizeable presence (or a “base”, even) in the
Caribbean is realized. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The other massively welcome development,
which I’ve also auspicated for a very long time, is the announcement of two “<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">Littoral Strike Ships</b>”. The image
released on Twitter by the 1<sup>st</sup> Sea Lord is virtually identical to
the American MV Ocean Trader, and so very, very similar to <a href="http://ukarmedforcescommentary.blogspot.com/2016/03/whats-type-31.html">my proposal for aconverted Point-class RoRo</a> vessel. However, at this stage the programme is
still in concept phase and the exact look of the ship, as well as the decision
for whether it will be newly built or perhaps converted from an existing
vessel, is still up in the air. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">While the announcement came a little
“out of the blue” after months of gloomy reports of cuts, it was actually in
the air from a while. Back in 2017, Jane’s reported that a concept study for a <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">Multi Role Support Ship</b> had been
launched, to firm up options for a vessel with utility for amphibious, forward
repair, and medical capability work. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">More recently, during a hearing in
front of the Defence Committee, the MOD’s deputy chief of staff for Military
Capability, </span><span lang="EN-US" style="background: white; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">Lieutenant General<span style="color: #222222;"> </span>Sir
Mark William Poffley, said that a new programme for “support ships” was being
considered for launch ahead of the Solid Support Ships, something i discussed in depth <a href="http://ukarmedforcescommentary.blogspot.com/2018/06/of-ships-and-shipyards-type-31-and.html">here</a>. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="background: white; color: #222222;">Finally, reports emerged of
two “hospital ships” to be jointly funded with DFID. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="background: white; color: #222222;">The Secretary’s speech, most
evidently, is just the culmination of a quiet but determined campaign which has
been progressing within the MOD for at least a couple of years. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="background: white; color: #222222;">It is pretty likely that
these new vessels will cost the Navy the “optional” third Fleet Solid Support
ship, but this is not a bad trade-off. Two supply vessels are enough to support
the single large task group that the Royal Navy is able to generate, while
these two new vessels will greatly help in a number of areas which would
otherwise be very problematic. The loss of RFA Diligence without replacement,
the lack of a realistic plan for replacing RFA Argus in 2024 and the fact that
up to two thirds of the Landing Ship Dock hulls are actually unavailable for
amphibious operations at any one time are 3 major concerns which I’ve been
highlighting constantly over the years. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="background: white; color: #222222;"><br /></span></div>
<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjGpTiRjktxB1kfpf3xe7aXpeHtRPwrywK_6QZxuCA4lS1BQra2LYzYfThf3fsb6AxGg3C2hSie4jRSr1bwsleH2HWW7avroYiyTYiMOsK-3SKtHwjWgSrWFmOhKDSDfD035ZaJJ05FYeo/s1600/DzH1hI0WkAIIe7_.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="772" data-original-width="1370" height="225" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjGpTiRjktxB1kfpf3xe7aXpeHtRPwrywK_6QZxuCA4lS1BQra2LYzYfThf3fsb6AxGg3C2hSie4jRSr1bwsleH2HWW7avroYiyTYiMOsK-3SKtHwjWgSrWFmOhKDSDfD035ZaJJ05FYeo/s400/DzH1hI0WkAIIe7_.jpg" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">The Littoral Strike Ship's first concept art as posted by the 1st Sea Lord on Twitter. The MV Ocean Trader vibes are evident. </td></tr>
</tbody></table>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="background: white; color: #222222;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="background: white; color: #222222;"><o:p> <table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhl348XQua_nY8QiG2FtP3p69iDn-cC5ibCreQCqTj8YUJ3bvx4HYUDTG2joBPgmXdHePtNB2j-owEMtqbcGQCz1YCVZG5ydQpv7zINciqzosp5XyDC1MbyBIKRl81mY41-JyI3qKMjkjI/s1600/Point+escort+carrier_text.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="1144" data-original-width="1600" height="285" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhl348XQua_nY8QiG2FtP3p69iDn-cC5ibCreQCqTj8YUJ3bvx4HYUDTG2joBPgmXdHePtNB2j-owEMtqbcGQCz1YCVZG5ydQpv7zINciqzosp5XyDC1MbyBIKRl81mY41-JyI3qKMjkjI/s400/Point+escort+carrier_text.jpg" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">All the way back in 2016 i made my very own "mad" suggestion for something similar to the MV Ocean Trader, but a bit more ambitious and even more flexible. If the Littoral Strike Ship was newly built rather than a conversion of an existing ship, it would not be impossible to incorporate all of these changes. </td></tr>
</tbody></table>
</o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="background: white; color: #222222;"><o:p><br /></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="background: white; color: #222222;">The name “Littoral Strike
Ships” is kind of misleading, as we are most likely looking at something which
will be done on the cheap and will thus not be quite adequate for the more “fighty”
operations that “strike” suggests. Multi Role Support Ship, while far less pyrotechnic,
is probably still the best definition for these units. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="background: white; color: #222222;">The “new” Littoral Strike
Groups announced by the Secretary, in fact, might not be based on the new
ships, but rather on the existing Bay-class LSDs that these new hulls might end
up releasing from the Caribbean and the Gulf respectively. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="background: white; color: #222222;">The Littoral Strike Groups
will, realistically, be the continuation of the semi-experimental “Special
Purpose Task Groups” that the Royal Marines have been sending out at sea in the
last couple of years. These formations, normally of Company-group size and
embarked on a single amphibious vessel, have been sent all the way to Pacific
(HMS Albion’s tour of last year) and have repeatedly traveled in and out of
Mediterranean and Indian Ocean (RFA Lyme Bay, most recently). The Littoral
Strike Group should be a more capable evolution of the SPTG, hopefully enabled
by the availability of extra supports, including escort vessels. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="background: white; color: #222222;">The new Littoral Strike
Group will probably embark significant amounts of Marines and is likely to beat
the Bay-class in aviation facilities (the MV Ocean Trader used as example has a
two-bays hangar for medium helicopters and a two-spot flight deck that can take
anything up to the gigantic CH-53), but is unlikely to have a dock in the
stern. It will still be plenty useful, however, and if a RoRo / container ship
hull is used, it will have enormous utility as additional strategic sealift. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="background: white; color: #222222;">With the right people and
modular facilities on board it could also do decently as a Forward Repair and
Support vessel, and it could be able to replace Argus in the medical role if
able to embark a modular Role 3 hospital, for which the Navy could work
alongside the Army for maximum efficiency. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhIQQxCtk3qs8XGIYkBx_UQQ6nBwUkDexwX23Mpc0qx3_DQDrxxB6m-NO0moj0m2h2qUI5B7iyJymCqdTw9YriIPKaanJov0Pk1s6v2raW3BHmDJKR3KJMYYaHJe21F7VuVVnqk2z1Ge8k/s1600/irving-mss.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="453" data-original-width="605" height="298" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhIQQxCtk3qs8XGIYkBx_UQQ6nBwUkDexwX23Mpc0qx3_DQDrxxB6m-NO0moj0m2h2qUI5B7iyJymCqdTw9YriIPKaanJov0Pk1s6v2raW3BHmDJKR3KJMYYaHJe21F7VuVVnqk2z1Ge8k/s400/irving-mss.jpg" width="400" /></a></div>
<br />
<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhKWWZGCjF5_a1Vl4Mu51wIhRtKptBD6gW2xl95v45l-iLLU4NB5EM9Wt6X2rB7AYLLfD7YfXujvhW0YYywc-6UfgM_mAOgpi1iDBurXvpUrY5nRw7k-4usEj1hBr6VO2W-D6jPEC6ohuw/s1600/MV+Ocean+Trader+with+Insitu+UAV+catapult+and+Combat+Assault+Craft_2.bmp" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="781" data-original-width="1433" height="217" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhKWWZGCjF5_a1Vl4Mu51wIhRtKptBD6gW2xl95v45l-iLLU4NB5EM9Wt6X2rB7AYLLfD7YfXujvhW0YYywc-6UfgM_mAOgpi1iDBurXvpUrY5nRw7k-4usEj1hBr6VO2W-D6jPEC6ohuw/s400/MV+Ocean+Trader+with+Insitu+UAV+catapult+and+Combat+Assault+Craft_2.bmp" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">The MV Ocean Trader, ex MV Cragside, after being modified for use by the US forces </td></tr>
</tbody></table>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="background: white; color: #222222;"><o:p><br /></o:p></span></div>
<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiJuZNKh3uVsN8WJhz0iteEPSkZWLQZ-oQKlnBJTGjgany2lJr4PRgjYkSGm9QQJKi-Dez4yPpIWz008KOUAex5DV4Ng9Pq_uSh1o7JWu988_e0CI7fsO_fBd9R91tQmwPHl0iNnG_9qZk/s1600/MV_Cragside_in_Mobile%252C_AL_on_Oct_31_2015.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="900" data-original-width="1600" height="225" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiJuZNKh3uVsN8WJhz0iteEPSkZWLQZ-oQKlnBJTGjgany2lJr4PRgjYkSGm9QQJKi-Dez4yPpIWz008KOUAex5DV4Ng9Pq_uSh1o7JWu988_e0CI7fsO_fBd9R91tQmwPHl0iNnG_9qZk/s400/MV_Cragside_in_Mobile%252C_AL_on_Oct_31_2015.jpg" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">MV Cragside undergoing her transformation in Mobile, Alabama</td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="background: white; color: #222222;"><o:p><br /></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span style="background-color: white; color: #222222;">The announcement of a RAF
Squadron equipped with Swarming Drones is also a welcome development. The
mention of this by the Secretary fueled a lot of comments, especially since he
made it sound like the whole system would be ready by the end of the year. The MOD
has subsequently clarified that it Is more a three years effort, and at the
moment we can only speculate on the final form that this capability will take.
The “end of 2019” mentioned by the Secretary might actually be for the
formation of the squadron, which I figure could well start out as an
experimental unit, much like the Fleet Air Arm’s own 700X NAS.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="background: white; color: #222222;">At the moment it is impossible
to say if the LANCA (Lightweight Affordable Novel Combat Aircraft) low-cost
UCAV, which was sought last year in a call for proposals to industry, is part
of this effort or a parallel development. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="background: white; color: #222222;">The UK, however, was already
experimenting with unmanned loyal wingmen back in 2008, when a modified Tornado
took control, in flight, of a BAC 1-11 modified to serve as UAV; plus 3 other
simulated unmanned aircraft. There clearly has been an interest in the
capability for many years, and this fits into the wider campaign of
experimentation ran by UK industry, which includes of course TARANIS, but also
the very interesting BAE MAGMA which replaces flaps, ailerons and other moving
surfaces with blown air taken from the engine. In other words, there are the
capabilities to put together some good capability. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="background: white; color: #222222;">The result might be
something like the Kratos XQ-58 Valkyrie intended to be used as part of the
Low-Cost, Attritable Strike Unmanned Air System Demonstration for the USAF. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="background: white; color: #222222;">It will also be a step
forwards on the way to unmanned companions for FCAS / TEMPEST. Replying to a House
of Lords written question by Lord West on 14 february, Earl Howe <a href="https://qnadailyreport.blob.core.windows.net/qnadailyreportxml/Written-Questions-Answers-Statements-Daily-Report-Lords-2019-02-14.pdf">wrote</a>
that “t</span><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">he combat air
acquisition programme is looking at the replacement of Typhoon's capabilities
and any new combat air system will need to be interoperable with the Carrier
Enabled Power Projection (CEPP) programme. The concept phase of the acquisition
programme will consider QEC basing for any unmanned force multipliers which may
form part of the future combat air system.” <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">This reads as if the TEMPEST will
not be carrier-capable (sadly, not a surprise and one of the reasons why the
lack of catapults on the QE class remains regrettable) but the unmanned part of
the future combat air system might be. This is very interesting, but it’s very
early days and I’m somewhat skeptical still. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjl7BjYpyYF0928c_hOUTyPhZxt4FTkzKG2jHOysLw4gd6BEVuUjBm-KlbDwbA5jwP5Y4vq-2oGjhoiR5PHMcgOjcwW_zIwhLKoaowc5ggI82GvaBtKHTyKqVCOOJL65iQgFCOkCh-1Zrk/s1600/kratos-xq-222-valkyrie-utap-22-mako-combat-drones-10.png" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="347" data-original-width="616" height="180" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjl7BjYpyYF0928c_hOUTyPhZxt4FTkzKG2jHOysLw4gd6BEVuUjBm-KlbDwbA5jwP5Y4vq-2oGjhoiR5PHMcgOjcwW_zIwhLKoaowc5ggI82GvaBtKHTyKqVCOOJL65iQgFCOkCh-1Zrk/s320/kratos-xq-222-valkyrie-utap-22-mako-combat-drones-10.png" width="320" /></a></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Williamson also mentioned a non-specified
“<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">VENOM kinetic strike capability</b>”
which is meant to give an attack capability to “ISTAR platforms”. UK Defence
Journal says that, according to MOD sources, the platforms in question are the
C-130J and the SHADOW R1 (soon to be R2 after the ongoing mid-life update
programme). <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The C-130J is not properly an ISTAR
platform, but like the SHADOW R1 is commonly used in support to the Special
Forces and there are several good options readily available for its armament. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">It has now been <a href="https://www.janes.com/article/86426/uk-hercules-centre-wing-box-replacement-effort-gets-under-way-for-completion-in-2027">confirmed
that at least one C5</a> short-fuselage C-130 is being retained as part of the
14 that the RAF is going to keep in the long term. This is important because the tanking kit has only ever been installed on short-fuselage C-130s and might not be adaptable to the stretched ones. The HARVEST HAWK kit has been developed to equip short C-130s in tanker configuration (KC-130J). </span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt;">
<span lang="EN-US">HARVEST HAWK originally swapped out one Air Refueling pod and replaced it with a quadruple launcher for Hellfire missiles. In addition, a palletized console is embarked into the cargo bay and a 10-cell launcher for GRIFFIN lightweight missiles was installed on the ramp. A TSS EO/IR turret is provided thanks to a modified external fuel tank. </span></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt;">
<span lang="EN-US"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt;">
<span lang="EN-US">HARVEST HAWK evolution is continuing, however, and the USMC is replacing the TSS with a MX-20 EO/IR turret mounted under the nose, to restore the full fuel load. Moreover, with the Outer Wing Station 430 modification (OWS430), by 2020 they will have added two additional underwing pylons, doubling the capacity for externally-carried missiles while allowing the return of the Air Refueling pod. The new and improved HARVEST HAWK will restore 100% of its tanking potential while doubling its fire power at the same time. </span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt;">
The missile launcher on the cargo ramp has been replaced by an enclosed launcher in a modified side door ("Derringer Door") which enables the launch of the missiles without requiring decompression and ramp opening. That also ensures that cargo capability is retained and requires less preparations before a mission. </div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US"></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt;">
The USMC is also integrating the INTREPID TIGER II Electronic Warfare pod, while Hellfire will be replaced by JAGM. </div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt;">
The RAF has only activated two pylons on its C-130J-30s so far, adding external fuel tanks to them in the last few years. </div>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
In an ideal world, at least a second
C5 should be retained and HARVEST HAWK kits, including AAR capability, should
be procured for the pair. That would deliver a great firepower boost while also
introducing in service a couple of tankers able to refuel helicopters. The
Merlin HC4 is AAR capable and the Commando Helicopter Force wants to tap into
that latent capability since extra range would obviously help a lot in all
missions, including Joint Personnel Recovery.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgs2Q2AZgWVDcPrhcadByZ8Vb6UhJLWm2nd7nUlGOPIX8GeE9MfcNbAW-N2er6c6TZcS_8KkLVVMHanPhu3oFrWgNmyKhQxP4TzUVnOs9vAavuRQ1oKGluNaBQjIce4Lr83gO4PytUu5Cs/s1600/kc-130J+Harvest+Hawk.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="309" data-original-width="600" height="205" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgs2Q2AZgWVDcPrhcadByZ8Vb6UhJLWm2nd7nUlGOPIX8GeE9MfcNbAW-N2er6c6TZcS_8KkLVVMHanPhu3oFrWgNmyKhQxP4TzUVnOs9vAavuRQ1oKGluNaBQjIce4Lr83gO4PytUu5Cs/s400/kc-130J+Harvest+Hawk.jpg" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">Harvest Hawk in its original configuration. The 30mm gun pallet is on hold. </td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
The Special Forces are also known to
want the capability, ideally on CHINOOK, and the SDSR 2015, in theory, promised
them “longer range helicopters”.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Putting a couple of pylons and
lightweight munitions such as MBDA’s VIPER-E on SHADOW R1 wouldn’t be
difficult, either. But if I was in a position to make the choice, my priority
would definitely be converting two C5 into KC-130Js and getting a pair of
HARVEST HAWK kits for them at the same time. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">PROTECTOR</span></b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">
deserves a mention too, because we have recently been given the first official
indication that maritime patrol capability could feature in the intended second
batch (16 are on order, but there are 10 options as well and the stated
intention remains to get to “at least 20”). Leonardo has <a href="https://www.monch.com/mpg/news/unmanned/4870-ga-hosts-industry-showcase.html">showcased</a>
its SEASPRAY radar, which is ready for adoption on the centerline pylon
(PROTECTOR will have 9 pylons overall, up from 5 on REAPER, or 7 counting the
low-payload external ones, which in practice have never been used so far but
would be good for, say, Sidewinder / ASRAAM). ULTRA is continuing work on its
ASW sonobuoy-dispensing pods. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">It is now contractually confirmed
that PROTECTOR will be armed with Brimstone and Paveway IV and fitted with the Due
Regard Radar, which was initially only going to be Fitted For But Not With. On
the other hand, deliveries will happen later, and entry in service will arrive
in 2023 rather than 2021, while the RAF is in the process of <a href="https://www.janes.com/article/86418/uk-removes-one-reaper-from-service">“decommissioning”
one of its 10 Reapers</a>. A curious development, might be because the UAV has
suffered damage that is deemed not worthy to try and repair. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">In his speech, Williamson briefly
touched on the issue of <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">Warrior upgrades</b>,
indirectly confirming that WCSP is going ahead. 2017 and 2018 have been tough
and unpleasant years for the programme, which was called into serious question
over the big delays accumulated (entry in service now to start in 2023 when it
had once been 2018, then 2020…), but the ongoing trials at Bovington seem to
have been positive enough that cancellation is no longer a possibility. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"><br /></span></span></div>
<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEi7BDpsS-31v-VX7LDrApZyiK8h2xXelhj4w1der1njVpeClAv1L492sz02V_MProtaF3_qMR7LCr5zsyIOh-k6Y2zGxe9__ESxfn6ej37z2cV7kQYoslrJMvUMmitwvrtvmUngks9wNVs/s1600/image.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="598" data-original-width="900" height="265" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEi7BDpsS-31v-VX7LDrApZyiK8h2xXelhj4w1der1njVpeClAv1L492sz02V_MProtaF3_qMR7LCr5zsyIOh-k6Y2zGxe9__ESxfn6ej37z2cV7kQYoslrJMvUMmitwvrtvmUngks9wNVs/s400/image.jpg" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">A remotely operated, unmanned TERRIER was used to breach anti-tank obstacles during a demonstration ran by the US Army which also included unmanned M113s laying smoke to cover the action. The US Army is already seeking an Optionally Manned IFV for replacing Bradley. </td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"><br /></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
Also for the army, the Secretary
remarked that he supports the fielding not just of <b>unmanned logistic support vehicles</b>, which have so far gotten most
of the attention, but <b>unmanned combat
vehicles </b>too.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">At the latest AWE event, <a href="https://www.janes.com/article/84989/first-showing-of-a-remote-operated-uk-warrior">a WarriorIFV was converted into a remotely operated</a> combat vehicle and I thinkt the
demonstration opens up interesting possibilities. If I had to put my money on
something in this area, it would be on surplus CRV(T) Scimitar to be converted
in unmanned combat vehicles. Their insufficient protection would no longer be
quite as concerning, while their awesome strategic and all-terrain mobility, as
well as air mobility, would make them incredibly flexible in support of manned
AFVs and infantry alike. The RARDEN is not a good weapon for an unmanned
vehicle due to manual reloading and lack of stabilization, but there a few good
options out there for replacing the turret and introduce an autocannon+missile
combination that would be enormously capable. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<br /></div>
<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgJUYzGpE_F2v2PPpzI_XoR_QC-lzW8NmlXinOjGzn-_oQjuJJPc9GWzSqc4z55KNSiE0gNrETJ7yz-pqIJ9dQVTWKfREZpY5oLXfUPnXFTLk287UTr9d5VQMK74ExFyU0a0d8NtM6Jxsg/s1600/kastet_x.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="540" data-original-width="960" height="225" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgJUYzGpE_F2v2PPpzI_XoR_QC-lzW8NmlXinOjGzn-_oQjuJJPc9GWzSqc4z55KNSiE0gNrETJ7yz-pqIJ9dQVTWKfREZpY5oLXfUPnXFTLk287UTr9d5VQMK74ExFyU0a0d8NtM6Jxsg/s400/kastet_x.jpg" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">Jordan's KADDB's proposal for upgunning CRV(T). Add remote control. The first British Army unmanned companion for much larger and less deployable manned AFVs? </td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><o:p><br /></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
The Secretary also announced that
funding will go towards equipping all infantry (including Royal Marines and RAF
Regiment) with <b>advanced night vision
equipment</b> which so far was reserved to Special Forces. This follows on
similar decisions in the US and will go a long way in ensuring the Army can
truly own the night. It could be argued that night vision is a major
asymmetrical advantage over non-peer enemies, but that so far it hasn’t been
exploited as much as it should have been. </div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Some growth <o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">In the coming months, <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">23 Amphibious</b> Engineer Troop, in
Germany, will be growing into a Squadron. Mothballed M3 rigs are being
reactivated and the new ORBAT is being defined. With its M3 rigs, it will
remain forward based in Germany, alongside its german counterpart and well
positioned to continue training on the river Weser. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgZnhOpLNcFfKeuc4ms20nj4w0BP_t_Fu_qcc5O4rgqgXEv8x1h5J1LaW0ThL6_fkNGFWmuCs4i-zGFhUmFDFGqKAqpp-L7Wp4r1MqKpIhjtFteQrXHEB4zYGFC_dSyPXe45-hSX_iaxjM/s1600/British-Army-Corps-of-Royal-Engineers-75-ER-23-Amph-Eng-Tp-412-Amph-Eng-Tp-with-M3-rig-apog-2017-095-amphibious_partnership_40-123-Crown-Copyright-2017-880.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="430" data-original-width="860" height="200" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgZnhOpLNcFfKeuc4ms20nj4w0BP_t_Fu_qcc5O4rgqgXEv8x1h5J1LaW0ThL6_fkNGFWmuCs4i-zGFhUmFDFGqKAqpp-L7Wp4r1MqKpIhjtFteQrXHEB4zYGFC_dSyPXe45-hSX_iaxjM/s400/British-Army-Corps-of-Royal-Engineers-75-ER-23-Amph-Eng-Tp-412-Amph-Eng-Tp-with-M3-rig-apog-2017-095-amphibious_partnership_40-123-Crown-Copyright-2017-880.jpg" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">M3 rigs, british and german, in action during NATO exercises</td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">This is also the year of the return
of <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">28 Royal Engineer Regiment</b> as a
joint C-CBRN regiment is reformed after the idiotic SDSR 2010 cut. 28 RE Regt
will take under command 77 Field Squadron, ex armoured squadron, which was part
of 35 RE Regt until this converted into an EOD unit. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">FALCON Sqn Royal Tank Regiment, with
its FUCHS reconnaissance vehicles, will join the regiment in July. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">27 Squadron RAF Regiment, the
current CBRN specialist, will also join the new unit; 64 Headquarters &
Support Squadron will form up this year and 42 Field Squadron will be
re-established in 2020. There are also tentative plans for a reserve squadron
to follow in 2022. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The Brigade of Gurkhas in particular
is growing quickly to fill some gaps and help with the manpower deficit. This
too is a U-turn on disastrous 2010 and 2011 choices. The Gurkhas now man <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">Gurkha Company (Tavoleto) </b>in its role
of Training Support Company, part of the Specialist Weapons School at the Land
Warfare Centre in Warminster. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Moreover, the <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">Queen’s Own Gurkha Logistic Regiment</b> is growing and two additional
Gurkha sqns are appearing, one within 9 RLC Regt and one within 4 RLC Regt. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">Queen’s Gurkha Signals</b> are growing by two squadrons as well, with
247 Sqn within 16 Signal Regt and 249 Sqn within 3 Divisional Signal Regiment. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">Queen’s Gurkha Engineers</b> could also see growth in the near future.
They have taken up significant roles within the ARRC support battalion,
beginning in 2014 with the Close Support Troop and Engineer element. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<br />Gabrielehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/01623558391676151582noreply@blogger.com13tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-442909239199162925.post-59180895342157088032018-12-02T13:45:00.002+01:002018-12-03T00:58:30.511+01:00About that Split Buy idea... <br />
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Not long
ago, Johnny Mercer, tory MP for Plymouth, made a vehement plea for honesty in
the handling of Defence issues. I cannot possibly overstate how important it is
to bring back some honesty in this sector, because there is a clear shortage of
it. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">I’ve
written in other occasions that the way the Defence planning and budgeting is
handled in the UK institutionalizes dishonesty and makes it endemic. It also
ensures that the leaking of news to the press will continue, forever and ever,
no matter how many times the practice is scolded. Watch any hearing of the
Defence Committee with serving top brass; and then any of the many hearings
with retired top brass. Compare and contrast. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Some of the
most gigantic problems with the UK’s way of handling defence are: <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoListParagraphCxSpFirst" style="mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; text-indent: -18.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri;"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">-<span style="font: 7.0pt "Times New Roman";">
</span></span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">What
little the MOD says publicly about what it plans to procure, how and when is
only ever published with 12 months of delay. Parliament gets little to zero
actual say on the matter. Compare this to what even the Italian Parliament, not
to mention the French or American one, get to do about the defence budget of
their own countries. I don’t think I need to add more, it should be pretty
obvious that there is an immense problem of accountability. Parliament gets a
(very partial) letterbox view on the MOD plans, months after things have
already taken place. Obfuscation about future intentions is sometimes complete.
<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoListParagraphCxSpFirst" style="mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; text-indent: -18.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; text-indent: -18.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri;"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">-<span style="font: 7.0pt "Times New Roman";">
</span></span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The
defence committee is a total paper tiger with little actual power. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; text-indent: -18.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; text-indent: -18.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri;"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">-<span style="font: 7.0pt "Times New Roman";">
</span></span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Whatever
little power the committee has is most commonly not exploited because serving
top brass are literally not allowed to speak their mind freely in front of it.
They must always stick to the official line, which is why as soon as they
retire they seem to change from doctor Jekyll into mr. Hyde. It makes them look
stupid and it makes the committee hearings look like bad comedy. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; text-indent: -18.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoListParagraphCxSpLast" style="mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; text-indent: -18.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri;"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">-<span style="font: 7.0pt "Times New Roman";">
</span></span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Without
a defence committee to speak to, officers are dangerously short of options for
fighting back against a developing situation inside the MOD that they feel is
potentially disastrous. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoListParagraphCxSpLast" style="mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; text-indent: -18.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">This is, in
ultra simplified form, the main reason why leaks to the press are constant and
why the MOD constantly ends up mired in such disasters and embarrassing
U-turns. This is something that the UK absolutely needs to change, sooner rather than later. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The lack of
clarity over future plans seem to extend all the way to the narrow circles of officers
defining requirements for the future of the services. Looking at certain decisions, or indecisions, makes one wonder whether one project office talks to the other at all. </span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">There are quite a few
things to say about Strike, for example, or about the never-ending saga of the
Warrior CSP and its relationship with Ajax and MIV, which the army seems
incapable to settle in a rational way. </span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Today, however, I want to write about
the F-35 programme because <span style="mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;">Deborah
Haynes</span>, foreign affairs editor at Sky News, has given voice to a worried
leak, coming from the Navy, about the RAF’s intention of splitting the F-35
purchase, abandoning the carrier-capable, short take off and vertical landing B
variant in favor of the A variant, which can only operate from fully
established land airbases.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"><br /></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The report
sadly comes as no surprise although, for the very first time, it goes as far as
suggesting that not even the first 48 aircraft are “safe”, as the RAF is
reportedly pushing to switch to the A variant possibly already with the next
contracts in line, which will cover production Lot 15 (UK expected to procure 7
aircraft) and Lot 16 (6 aircraft). <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The UK has
just taken delivery of its 17<sup>th</sup> F-35, BK-17, the third to be
delivered this year and also the last. It concluded the 3 aircraft purchase for
the UK in Low Rate Initial Production lot 10. Next year, a single F-35B will be
added, from LRIP 11. The UK has also confirmed mere days ago that, as part of
the first-ever “Block Buy” contract in the F-35 programme, it will procure the
expected 17 airframes over lots 12, 13 and 14 (3, 6 and 8 respectively). This
is perfectly in line with what was earlier approved with Main Gate 5 and
already reported on by the NAO. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Lot 15 is
expected to include a further 7, leading the fleet to a total of 42 by the end
of 2023, as was promised in the SDSR 2015, with Lot 16 adding 6 more to get to
48 by January 2025. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">No purchase
plan has been detailed for the year 2025 and beyond. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">I don’t
believe that Main Gate 5, which authorized the procurement of these first 48
aircraft, will be re-opened and modified. I think it is highly unlikely. But
from 2016 onwards the noise about the RAF purchasing the A variant has only
ever gotten louder. To ignore it would stupid, because it is a fact that the RAF is interested and in favor of the split. They have said as much, despite some indignant reactions to the latest Sky News report. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjbAYXyZA-BjpvXw3oyDEQjzAh-y3F00ngS1jlhjkmNfj20CcYlM0Q-xz_LT8ximUeKH7-5V0s-BgZV-V0oZclVCKjxbFHS8CNO83mGDYsQONHB2G15v8aj6QUQk7fctZXy1ECBs7aJ-Kw/s1600/busy-flight-deck.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="1600" data-original-width="1477" height="400" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjbAYXyZA-BjpvXw3oyDEQjzAh-y3F00ngS1jlhjkmNfj20CcYlM0Q-xz_LT8ximUeKH7-5V0s-BgZV-V0oZclVCKjxbFHS8CNO83mGDYsQONHB2G15v8aj6QUQk7fctZXy1ECBs7aJ-Kw/s400/busy-flight-deck.jpg" width="368" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">The first F-35B embarkation on HMS Queen Elizabeth has just concluded, and it was a great success. Trials progressed faster than planned and some test points originally meant for next year's deployment were brought forwards. 15 short rolling vertical landings were also carried out. Two USMC aircraft were employed because the only 3 test-instrumented F-35Bs the UK has are based in Edwards, on the Pacific coast of the US. As they are busy with tests of their own ahead of the IOC declaration next month, it would have made little sense to interrupt their work and fly them across the US. Next year, some 7 british F-35Bs are expected to embark for a new WESTLANT deployment and more elaborate trials. </td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Unfortunately,
the prospect of a split buy is not properly understood or debated. Much
dishonesty surrounds the implications that a split buy would have. Some have
been led to believe that 48 aircraft are all the carriers need. Some believe
that, since the carrier can embark 36 and there will be 48, there is no problem
at all and the air wing will be there. Unfortunately that is not how it works,
and if only 48 aircraft are procured, and only two frontline squadrons formed,
it must be made very clear that the carrier will most likely <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">never</b> be given a full air wing unless
the USMC, Italy, or maybe Japan, which is reportedly to join the F-35B train
soon, fill the holes. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Any honest
debate about the split buy must be clear on the fact that the carriers face
severe repercussions from a change of plans. It is a 100% certainty. Some
people believe the UK will form more squadrons as a result of a split buy. This
is almost certainly false. Any debate about the possibility of a split buy must
acknowledge facts, not dreams. You might believe that never having a full air wing at sea is acceptable, and i will disagree vehemently but at least appreciate the honesty. What you can't do is pretend that the split buy will not make semi-empty decks a reality. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><o:p><br /></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">A change of approach <o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Much has
been said about how the Royal Navy will need to change its approaches, going
back to generating task groups from years in which its focus was primarily on
multiple single-ship deployments. Much has been written about the difficulties
of ensuring that enough escort ships are available to sail together with the
aircraft carrier and even more has been suggested about how this will impact
the residual ability of the tiny escort fleet to generate hulls for other
standing tasks. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Surprisingly,
despite much “aircraft carrier with no planes” rethoric on the socials, very few have actually
taken some time to acknowledge that it is imperative for the RAF, or part of it
anyway, to change its own methods if Carrier Enabled Power Projection is to
work. When was the last time that a RAF squadron deployed with its nominal
strength of 12 aircraft? We have to go back many years. These days it does not
happen, not even on operations. Op SHADER, for example, is about a Squadron
(minus) of Tornado GR4 (8 aircraft) and an even smaller Typhoon contingent, of
6 aircraft. Major exercises, such as the recently concluded Saif Sareea 3,
normally see 8, 10 aircraft at most. Events including 30 aircraft at once are
literally extremely rare; the RAF 100 Typhoon contingent was literally one of
few events that have seen so many real Typhoons flying together, ever since the
type entered service. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The
“carrier with no aircraft” rhetoric is sadly anything but empty. If the current
approaches do not change, even the Navy’s minimum ambition of having a full
squadron of 12 embarked for every deployment (that means once a year, for perhaps 6 or
more months at a time) will simply not materialize. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">F-35B
squadrons will have to be resourced with more manpower and more equipment packs
(spares) and the Joint Lightning Force will have to size its plans on squadrons
of 12 deployed aircraft, not on smaller packages. They will have to deploy in
greater numbers, and more frequently. There will be impacts on harmony for the manpower
involved and there will be impacts to consumption of spares and maintenance of
aircraft in general. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">This, in
itself, is a revolution and it is not going to be any easier than the Task
Group challenge the Navy faces. The difference is priority: while there is no
doubt that the Royal Navy will try hard to make its capital ship programme
work, it is fair to wonder whether the RAF is genuinely interested in making a
change of this kind. If it is not committed to it, the decks won’t see many
aircraft. It is that simple. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Across the
Channel, France does manages to generate an air wing of 20 or more combat jets
roughly once per year. When the Charles De Gaulle deploys, a couple of
squadrons are regularly embarked. With the recent demise of the last squadron
of Super Etendard, the French are heading for a navy-owned, all-Rafale M fleet numbering
44 jets in 3 squadrons plus a small OCU element within a larger OCU squadron,
joint with the air force. Two of these three squadrons of Rafale M will be
embarked every year. And before anyone tries to belittle the Charles de Gaulle
availability, I’ll remark that she <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">does</i></b> deploy, although her deployments
tend to be frequent but short; probably also as a consequence of being a “lone
wolf”, with no second hull available to ease wear and tear and cover periods of
maintenance in port. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">A brief history of some notable CdG recent
cruises<br /> </span></b><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">February –
May 2010<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>deployment included “Brilliant
Mariner” exercise in the Arctic Circle, embarked group of 12 Super Etendard and
7 Rafale M</span><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">June 2010 –
training in the Mediterranean alongside USS Truman<br /> </span><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">13 October
2010 – 21 february 2011 – “Agaphante” deployment to Indian Ocean, flew 240
sorties over Afghanistan while there. 12 Super Etendard and 10 Rafale<br /> </span><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">20 March
2011 – 12 August 2011 – “Armattan”, 1350 sorties; 8 + 2 Rafale M and 6 Super
Etendard</span></blockquote>
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">March –
June 2012, training deployment with 8 Rafale and 7 Super Etendard</span><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Refit
period durint January – August 2013<br /> </span><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">20 November
2013 – 18 february 2014; “Bois Belleau”, deployment in the Indian Ocean in
support to CSG-10, USS Truman<br /> </span><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">13 january
– 19 may 2015; “Arromanches 1”, Indian Ocean then retasked against ISIS; 12
Rafale and 9 Super Etendard</span></blockquote>
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">18 November
2015 – 16 March 2016 “Arromanches 2”, 18 Rafale and 8 Super Etendard</span></blockquote>
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">30
September 2016 – 14 December 2016; “Arromanches 3”, 24 Rafale M, first
deployment without Super Etendard </span></blockquote>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The Royal
Navy has publicly voiced a plan for routine deployment of a squadron of 12, with
a two-squadrons major deployment / exercise roughly once every two years. A
number of RAF officers, serving and retired, have told me in no uncertain terms
that they do not think the RAF subscribes to even this humble and unimpressive
plan, and that we should <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">not </i></b>expect it to be the norm. They
fully expect less aircraft to be embarked, and if they are right it will be difficult
not to feel that the whole project is a failure and that the ships are indeed
too large and should not have been built in their current form. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">We are
heading for a force of 48 jets that deploys a smaller air wing than a force of
44 jets. It will please no one. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The
carriers have been built to comfortably embark three F-35 squadrons at once,
but there is now a very real risk that the UK won’t ever have three squadrons
at all. The F-35 plans have, for most if not all the history of the programme,
rotated around a target of 4 frontline squadrons. Air Cmdr. Harvey Smyth, the
commander of the U.K.’s Lightning Force </span><a href="http://aviationweek.com/defense/uk-planning-four-front-line-f-35-squadrons"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">went on record as recently as May
2016</span></a><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"> describing
plans for four squadrons of 12 jets, plus the OCU which would, over time, also
grow to number 12 aircraft. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
It is obvious
that with four B squadrons it would be much more realistic to aim to “routine”
2-sqns embarkations and it would be much easier to eventually surge up to three
for a major operation.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">We have to
go back to Operation Telic in 2003 to get to see 30 Tornado GR4 deployed (plus
20 Harrier, a few Jaguars and 14 Tornado F3 for air defence). Focusing on
regenerating the ability to deploy such a substantial air wing and <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">doing it with much greater frequency</b> would
be a revolution in itself. If training exercises are seen as a separate event
from embarkation and deployment on the carriers, the deck will be even more
empty. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"><br /></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">138
aircraft (and 150 before that) seem too many to sustain "just" 4 squadrons. The
Typhoon fleet was, at one point, going to have 107 aircraft and five squadrons
(plus OCU, OEU and Falklands detachment), despite having to cover the
all-important QRA requirement. With the retention of 24 Typhoon tranche 1 in
the longer term, the plan is now for 7 squadrons from 130-some. But, as we’ve
seen earlier, the actual deployable size of these squadrons is debatable at
best, and that has to be taken into account. On the other hand, the Typhoon
sustainment fleet is supposedly dimensioned to ensure that the fleet can be
maximized was it ever needed in its air defence role. </span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Those who say that a 138
aircraft buy should support the formation of more than 4 squadrons might have
some merit. Note, however, that just saying it won’t make those extra squadrons
appear. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">What is
certain is that splitting the purchase will make it difficult, if not
impossible, to ever increase the number of squadrons. F-35B airframes are of
little use as sustainment fleet in support of F-35A squadrons, and vice versa.
Inexorably, there will need to be two separate sustainment fleets, and this
means an higher net number of aircraft parked into hangars. Parked F-35As will
not enable F-35B squadrons to deploy, and vice versa. Two squadrons of B and
two squadrons of A risk to never match the availability of deployable assets
that would come from 4 squadrons of a single type. This is a fact. And while
F-35B squadrons could always replace or supplement F-35As operating from a land
base during an operation, particularly an enduring one requiring multiple squadron
rotations, the F-35A squadrons will not be able to replace the B ones at sea or
in smaller / austere air bases. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Some spares
will be common, but many others won’t be. Much of the training will be common,
but some of it won’t be. The engines are similar, but not at all the same.
Whenever in the future there will be a need for upgrades, there will be two
(small) fleets fighting for the same (small) budget, and it is extremely,
unpleasantly likely that we will end up going through new versions of the
fratricidal battles between Sea Harrier and Harrier GR7/9, or between Harrier
and Tornado. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">To say “it
is going to be different this time” is, I’m afraid, pure naivety. The very same
reasons now put forwards in favor of an F-35A purchase will be used again in
the future to ensure that it gets first dibs. One of the two fleets risks to
become the poor cousin, the one who has to beg all the time because it is the
last of the line. And it is easy to see which one is most likely to end that
way. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><o:p><br /></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Honesty required <o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">It is true
that the unitary cost of the F-35A is significantly lower than that of the B,
and that the sustainment cost is probably going to be substantially different
as well. This is probably the most compelling argument in favor of an A
purchase, for obvious reasons. The price of all three variants has been
decreasing steadily, lot after lot, and the latest LRIP 11 unitary prices stand
at: <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">89,2
million USD for an F-35A<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">115,5
million USD for an F-35B<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Some supporters
of the A argue that the purchasing 90 As will generate a substantial saving
that can be reinvested in other priorities, possibly beginning with more spare
parts to sustain the two fleets. These supporters are, in my opinion, the only
ones speaking with honesty, because the small differences in combat range,
maximum G and weapon bays dimensions are far less credible motives to pursue an
A purchase. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Can we
first of all start the debate from honest premises for once? Let’s admit it:
the MOD needs to save money, and the RAF (the F-35 budget holder) believes it
has a way to save money that will only hurt the carriers, and “not the rest”.
From their perspective, that’s entirely fine. It depends on whether or not you
agree with that sentiment. I do not. There is already Typhoon, and a single
fleet of land-only platforms is enough. I’d very much rather build up the
ability to deploy at sea an air wing large enough to enable complex operations.
This is, after all, the whole reason why there are a Queen Elizabeth-class and
a Joint Combat Aircraft programme. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">I’ve said
it in other occasions and I will keep saying it: it was an <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">enormous mistake</b> to call them “strike” carriers. To virtually
restrict their usefulness to the realm of strike, deep or not, is to undersell
their usefulness. If Strike was the problem, it could be tackled in many ways,
from expanding the Tomahawk arsenal and the number of launching platforms to
adopting long endurance UCAVs. </span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">What aircraft offer over waves of cruise
missiles is flexibility. The carrier air wing is a shield as well as a sword.
The Navy needs it to be able to push with confidence into contested
environments where there is an enemy air threat. Aircraft are needed to support
the fleet in all kinds of missions, not just for “strike”. Strike is possibly
the dead last on the list of why the ability to deploy airpower not just <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">near</i> the sea but <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">at the center</i> of a naval task group is so important. Whenever there
is a debate on the survivability of carriers my argument is simple: what would
the survivability of a surface task group be like <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">without</i> the carrier? That is the real heart of the matter. </span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">For
close to two decades western armies have battled with a technologically
inferior enemy, completely devoid of air power of its own, only in presence of
overwhelming, readily available air support. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The fact
that anyone could ever argue for navies to fight a pear or near pear enemy
without assured, organic access to air support is mind-boggling. However good
you might believe a Type 45 to be at shooting down enemy missiles and aircraft,
you do not want it to operate without the outer bubble of security represented
by the air wing operating at range. It is exactly because I’m a believer in air
power that I support aircraft carriers. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The
differences in raw performance between B and A are not enough to make an
argument. The B can be carried and potentially based closer to its targets,
more than compensating any range difference. Air to Air refueling will do the
rest, as it always has. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">In
addition, the RAF literally does not have a single weapon, in service or
planned, which would fit the A’s bays but not the B’s. The largest weapons such
as the Future Cruise and Anti-Ship Weapon will almost certainly internally fit
neither (it is a Storm Shadow and Harpoon replacement and it is pretty hard to
imagine, given the requirements, that it could get that much smaller); all
others will fit both. The advantage is absolutely virtual, and development or
procurement of weapons specifically sized for the A will only further expand
the differences between the two fleets. “But this one carries XY, the other
can’t”. We have already seen this movie. This is actually part of why I think a
split buy can only result in trouble further down the line.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEha0KVnuK_hjjNPH2aPZ5sEfD8eK_aPIOoU2O1v5flXzuHeNdW5NaamedvzoaKv_ld9YsGOBQlCD_OTgwI4x68nxmKq8w3UKx6EzNdDLTgPLtF-FrxKh-ETSzJ1j3oTXRdLEA3QMusrhvo/s1600/f35weaponarrangementdb5.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="299" data-original-width="400" height="298" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEha0KVnuK_hjjNPH2aPZ5sEfD8eK_aPIOoU2O1v5flXzuHeNdW5NaamedvzoaKv_ld9YsGOBQlCD_OTgwI4x68nxmKq8w3UKx6EzNdDLTgPLtF-FrxKh-ETSzJ1j3oTXRdLEA3QMusrhvo/s400/f35weaponarrangementdb5.jpg" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">The F-35B has weapon bays which are 14 inches shorter than those found on A and C and a payload limitation to two of the external pylons. </td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhLuSXT6HfVK_zllsuzRY6FU-c2sOHH3lasig_S7SI9oQuBSX8FMyjuuTt_ObBPTztYZl39aJKWqO0K3hVrzzkgOFUU8VDWkacwdJjbWeb4KpRSXLpPnJqgKWb94dcf3BeKJqMAaAhCc7I/s1600/F35+payload+data+2012.bmp" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="781" data-original-width="1097" height="283" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhLuSXT6HfVK_zllsuzRY6FU-c2sOHH3lasig_S7SI9oQuBSX8FMyjuuTt_ObBPTztYZl39aJKWqO0K3hVrzzkgOFUU8VDWkacwdJjbWeb4KpRSXLpPnJqgKWb94dcf3BeKJqMAaAhCc7I/s400/F35+payload+data+2012.bmp" width="400" /></a></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><o:p> <table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgc1glCligS8wqznkmV_A2k6438USOyUfUMY45gWa-tmazpyYDrMBzbOWZergaU_Ejg9Dln7QrFxfmOIisCzahWIiv2KzgTIgMyYwIoOV6UwRYaXEQJhoDs3d9OdW26kj2O28PaXlWp9B4/s1600/F-35+by+variants.JPG" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="888" data-original-width="1297" height="273" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgc1glCligS8wqznkmV_A2k6438USOyUfUMY45gWa-tmazpyYDrMBzbOWZergaU_Ejg9Dln7QrFxfmOIisCzahWIiv2KzgTIgMyYwIoOV6UwRYaXEQJhoDs3d9OdW26kj2O28PaXlWp9B4/s400/F-35+by+variants.JPG" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">The difference between variants. Both B and C use a special pod containing the gun and 225 rounds, mounted on the central pylon under the fuselage. The A variant has the same gun but installed internally and with 180 rounds. </td></tr>
</tbody></table>
</o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><o:p><br /></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The smaller
unitary cost of the F-35A is definitely attractive, and I’m not blind to it.
However, there are good reasons to doubt of the exact extent of the savings to
be reaped. The need for two separate sustainment fleets will eat away part of
it; the need to procure two different stocks of spares will be another cost to
contend with. Training differences will have their own cost too. Notably, as of
today, the F-35A is only equipped for Boom air-air refueling, which the RAF is
not equipped for. Money will be required to either fit Booms to Voyager or to
add the probe on the F-35A. Space is reserved on the A for such an adaptation
and in theory it can be done easily, but even if it worked without a single
hitch, it would still require a budget. The purchase of booms for Voyager would
be a most desirable investment as it would also benefit the C-17, Rivet Joint
and Poseidon fleets and, possibly, the Wedgetail fleet if the new AWACS
procurement proceeds. But there will be a substantial cost to this solution,
however, and a new training burden to absorb.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEg8JvRBT4Z4-nNYVDaXQ7Ry2m0n6Tf3jxRiN0to7lipvvkrx5ZoTAWG4k-nLTgD0m9eLz1E7NK0t_xDpG3PUFDJuIaGsjEwRE4M1nTtPAKfO4MBFjnDD3EzKx23tpydY9XNEG7JlxDWL2w/s1600/drag+chute+and+probe.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="301" data-original-width="400" height="300" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEg8JvRBT4Z4-nNYVDaXQ7Ry2m0n6Tf3jxRiN0to7lipvvkrx5ZoTAWG4k-nLTgD0m9eLz1E7NK0t_xDpG3PUFDJuIaGsjEwRE4M1nTtPAKfO4MBFjnDD3EzKx23tpydY9XNEG7JlxDWL2w/s400/drag+chute+and+probe.jpg" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">There is a possibility to retrofit the A with refueling probes, but as of today nobody has gone in this direction</td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
When all these
factors are considered, is the saving still noticeable? Can it in any way
compensate the negative implications of a split buy? In my opinion no, it
can’t. <b>Not unless the number of
squadrons ends up higher than 4. </b>A split buy will do nothing to increase
the number of deployable combat aircraft; it will only split that number across
two variants, not interchangeable. It will, de facto, turn “carrier without
aircraft” from social media slogan to cold, hard fact.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">If there
was a realistic hope to get six squadrons, 4 of B and 2 of A, I might
sympathize with the idea, even though even in that case I’d still be wondering whether
maximizing the number of deployable assets from a single fleet wouldn’t be more
efficient. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The biggest
problem of all is that, already as things stand, even getting to four squadrons
looks increasingly challenging.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><o:p><br /></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><o:p><br /></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<b><span lang="EN-US">Manpower and TEMPEST</span></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<b><span lang="EN-US"><br /></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Honesty is
required when it comes to manpower and timeframes as well. The UK will only
complete its first 48 F-35 purchases in 2025, and a further 90 would have to
follow to complete the intended 138 aircraft purchase. There has been no
official indication about when the procurement effort will end. A "project end date" in a Major
Projects spreadsheet suggest 2035, but in Written Answers the ministers have
suggested that purchases could end in 2048, the year in which the F-35 is
supposed to leave active service. </span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Now; I think nobody believes, even for a
second, that the 2048 OSD will hold true, just as the 2030 OSD for Typhoon
didn’t stick, but I encourage every reader to ponder the seriousness of
purchasing the last few aircraft in the very same year currently assumed as the
end of the service life of the type. Clearly, the minister is not being honest
in his answer, even assuming that the idea was to purchase less “sustainment
fleet” aircraft by relaying on the fact that the production line can be
expected to be open and active for many years into the future. You’d still not
be procuring your last few replacement aircraft in the literal OSD year, would
you? </span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Besides, the formation of further F-35 squadrons, regardless of the
variant employed, will depend on a range of factors, and one is clearly the <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">rate of further purchases</b>. It could
take many years for a third squadron to stand up, and there is no telling when
the 4<sup>th</sup> might follow. The last two equipment programme documents do
not exactly promote optimism: the graphic of the EP 2017 show the Combat Air
procurement budget nose-diving into 2027, suggesting very small purchases in
2025, 26 and 27, and possibly beyond. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjOdxLHZCPO6dSi4fh2KaSiVKdX8bba3Zy5UROt3XZiwWnnozaINHfcczAJuHyEjE_6LB7H_r7J3PerQ-nw7Xl2tTI70w0TuW6rZu-zjAwvvtyAy0G81gWBnDGim7zj13vuhB04-0qmucw/s1600/Combat+Air+Budget+2017.JPG" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="826" data-original-width="861" height="382" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjOdxLHZCPO6dSi4fh2KaSiVKdX8bba3Zy5UROt3XZiwWnnozaINHfcczAJuHyEjE_6LB7H_r7J3PerQ-nw7Xl2tTI70w0TuW6rZu-zjAwvvtyAy0G81gWBnDGim7zj13vuhB04-0qmucw/s400/Combat+Air+Budget+2017.JPG" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">Please note how the procurement budget allocation for Combat Air nearly vanishes into the 2020s. This is going to be the elephant in the room. </td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">In order to
have all 138 aircraft by 2035 (considering two years of production time, the
last aircraft would need to be ordered in 2033 to arrive in 2035), the UK would need to order at
least 8 F-35 per year, dropping to six+ if the last <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">order</i>, rather than <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">delivery</i>,
took place in 2035. At the moment, the purchase of 8 aircraft in a single year is
only expected to happen once, in year 2020. It is not necessary to sit within
the MOD’s high level meetings and be given classified briefings to see that it will be difficult, at best, to up
the purchase rhythm. Typhoon procurement will soon be over; but its spiral
development is here to stay (thankfully, too, but it will have a cost). <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Mind you,
it is not <i>impossible</i>, but it is
pretty hard to imagine, right now.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">In its
infinite talent for making its budget unreadable, the MOD has this year changed
the format of the Equipment Plan and cut back on the graphics, only putting up
one, the aggregate for Air Command as a whole, which puts together, with
uncertain consequences, what, up to the 2017 edition, was shown separated in Combat
Air, Air Support and Helicopters. By the look of it, anyway, there is no reason
to assume the Combat Air budget situation has seen any improvement. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgXcv6uCciHUpuEB44lZhIy50jHmQ0rELCQ0E-D9yUP2wzbLihU20VTMaz9ClazbPMmzZS84xiJQE5wmqUIYMdSzPpKFNVTd5aiBU5mpnZqJY40-NqngAKRHRg9yTGJ1Uz1YRG8vYdjPFk/s1600/Air+command+2018.JPG" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="777" data-original-width="879" height="282" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgXcv6uCciHUpuEB44lZhIy50jHmQ0rELCQ0E-D9yUP2wzbLihU20VTMaz9ClazbPMmzZS84xiJQE5wmqUIYMdSzPpKFNVTd5aiBU5mpnZqJY40-NqngAKRHRg9yTGJ1Uz1YRG8vYdjPFk/s320/Air+command+2018.JPG" width="320" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">There no longer is a separate Combat Air graph, unfortunately, but the Air Command aggregate published early this month does not suggest any improvement. </td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Moreover,
the UK is now supposed to develop its own new generation fighter, and project
TEMPEST has been launched with great fanfare. The secretary of state for
defence says the new fighter should enter service in 2035, and that means that
development costs will have to compete for room in the budget with ongoing F-35
purchases. If the 2035 date is to be taken seriously (honestly, i think few do, but it is an official line and we can't ignore it), not just the development
but also the production of TEMPEST (or whatever fighter jet will come out of
it) will overlap with procurement of F-35. The implications for the budget are
obvious. Can both things fit the Combat Air budget? Not if the nose-dive in
funding levels evidenced by the last two EP documents holds true.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
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<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">Project TEMPEST will need funding, in the same years in which the next batch of F-35s is due to be procured. Can both squeeze in the same budget? </td></tr>
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This, of
course, is before any further reduction or change is forced upon the whole
effort as an effect of the affordability gap between budget and procurement
ambitions.<br />
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The
implications for manpower are also important. Who is going to man the next F-35
squadrons? <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The RAF is
disbanding its last two Tornado GR4 squadrons next year, but is standing up two
Typhoon squadrons in their place. IX and 12 are standing up respectively at
Lossiemouth and at Coningsby; 31 Sqn<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>will become the first of at least two Protector
squadrons. Tornado is a manpower intensive machine, but even so I doubt the
margin is enough to suddenly enable a proliferation of combat air squadrons. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">2017
Fast Jet Fleet (frontline squadrons only; OCU and OEU excluded) </span></b></blockquote>
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">Typhoon</b></span></blockquote>
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">3(F) Sqn</span> <span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">1(F) Sqn</span><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">
XI Sqn</span><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">
6 Sqn</span><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">
II(AC) Sqn</span></blockquote>
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">Tornado GR4</b></span></blockquote>
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">IX(B) Sqn</span><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">
12(B) Sqn</span><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">
31 Sqn</span></blockquote>
<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">F-35B</b></span></blockquote>
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">617 Sqn (building up)</span><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><b>Near future plans </b></span></blockquote>
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Tornado GR4 bows out in early 2019</span></blockquote>
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Two
additional Typhoon squadrons, IX and 12, to gradually build up.<br /> </span><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">617 Sqn
achieves FOC, expands into a “super-squadron”, then splits into two as 809 NAS
returns, by 20203</span></blockquote>
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<br /></div>
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<br /></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">In the
meanwhile, Protector is supposed to “double” the current Reaper fleet. If that
holds true (for now "only" 16 are on orderer and 16 is not the double of 10), at least one of the current Reaper squadrons (XIII and 39 Sqns) will transition to the
new type; maybe both. Note that a Protector squadron might have a lower
manpower requirement as the new type introduces autonomous launch and recovery
capability, but don’t let the absence of a cockpit fool you: unmanned assets
are actually pretty manpower intensive as their extra-long mission cycle
requires multiple shifts. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">14 C-130J
are to stay in the long term, and it is a very welcome move, but they will need to be
manned. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The number
of AWACS crews is supposed to grow to 12; the Shadow R1 fleet is growing from 5
+ 1 unconverted airframe to 8; Two P-8 Poseidons squadrons will have been stood up by the
time 809 NAS is up and running. If Sentry is replaced by new E-7 Wedgetail
there might be a positive impact on AWACS manpower totals, but it is hard to say. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">11 Group
has just been reformed and extra personnel is heading for Cyber and Space
related posts. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Next year,
after a delay (should have been this year), the RAF will take over the Islanders
and Defenders of 651 Sqn Army Air Corps. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Current
fleets in the Military Training System are demonstrably too small, and the RAF
will be sending a hundred trainee pilots to the US, after also signing a 3-year
deal with a civilian provider for additional multi-engine training as the
system simply cannot cope. In 2019 one of the stated priorities of DE&S is
to find a solution to the problem, which, if it materializes, will probably
require more trainer aircraft. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">It has been
recently confirmed that by 2020 the RAF will disband its lone bomb disposal squadron,
releasing manpower for other roles. The Army has just reorganized EOD by
eliminating hybrid regular – reserve regiments; concentrating reserve squadrons
back into 101 RE; transitioned 35 Royal Engineer into EOD role, re-organizing
regular squadrons and bringing back 49 Sqn from disbandment. The current RAF
Bomb Disposal role will be absorbed by units within the army’s growing EOD
force; overall a reasonable solution, but it is unrealistic to expect it will be enough to open new and great manpower margins. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The newly
reformed 28 Royal Engineer regiment will be taking back control of the CBRN mission during 2019,
but probably 27 Squadron RAF Regiment will become one of its sub-units
(alongside Falcon Sqn, Royal Tank Regiment) rather than disband, so the effect
on RAF manpower is unlikely to be significant, even as 20 CBRN Wing disbands,
which is what I assume will happen. <o:p></o:p></span><br />
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span>
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">There might or might not be some manpower recouped thanks to ASDOT (Air Support to Defence Operational Training) which from 2020 will replace the current "aggressor" squadrons and the Cobham-provided, Falcon 20-based electronic warfare training aids. </span><br />
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">736 NAS, the Navy's aggressor squadron on Hawk T1, is expected to disband in 2020 and depending on how ASDOT will work and who will man the new system, some manpower might be able to migrate towards the F-35. </span><br />
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The RAF own aggressor unit, 100 Sqn, is instead expected to carry on to 2027; after that, as the Hawk T1 era comes to an end, there might or might not be a shift of manpower to other areas. </span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Where are
the manpower margins coming from? The SDSR 2015 authorized only a small boost to
overall manpower figures, which sadly remains on paper anyway, since the RAF has a
sizeable manpower deficit and the balance of inflow / outflow remains negative.
So I have to ask again, where is the manpower coming from? <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">I do not
think the RAF is currently awash with bored personnel with nothing to do, so I can’t help
but wonder who is going to man additional squadrons. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">My belief
has always been that the two additional Typhoon Sqns enabled by the partial
reprieve for the Tranche 1 aircraft would be nothing more than placeholders to
be sacrificed come 2025+ in favor of F-35 squadrons number 3 and number 4, but
the official line is that Tranche 1 is here to stay for the long term, well
into the 2030s if not out to 2040, current OSD for the Typhoon as a type. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">I keep
believing that Tranche 1 will not actually survive that long; but if it does it will only make me wonder all the more how the whole thing is supposed to work. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><o:p><br /></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Long range strike needs? Why was FCAS
abandoned? <o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">If you don’t
accept that it is about money, let’s talk about capability. Requirements-wise,
what problem does the F-35A solve that the B can’t? <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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Is the RAF
suddenly obsessed by the marginal range advantage? Has a crucial requirement
been identified for some kind of 2000 lbs new weapon that is too long to fit
into the B’s weapon bays (there is a 14 inches difference in length between the
B’s bays and those of the A and C variants)?</div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">In that
case, why did the UK suddenly shy away from further developing Taranis and / or
continuing with the much advertised Future Combat Air System project for an
unmanned combat aircraft to be developed alongside France? The UK’s refusal to
carry on with the project and give the go ahead to the demonstration phase has
all but turned into a diplomatic embarrassment and has allowed France to behave
like the victim despite having earlier killed the joint MALE project (Telemos)
and caused years of delay to the FASGW-Heavy (Sea Venom) anti-ship missile. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
The RAF has (thankfully) not completely abandoned the UCAV realm as it has launched a new
initiative called LANCA which aims to come up with a “low cost” UCAV “made in
Britain”. There is no telling, of course, what LANCA is supposed to be able to
do, at the moment, whether it will ever enter service, in which numbers or manned by who. The MOD, naturally, does not feel we are entitled to any indication in that sense. </div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">If there is
such a pressing need for a longer ranged aircraft with a larger weapon bay,
surely the UCAV path has to be explored as answer to that need. Naturally, factors such as budget availability
come back to the fore, but i don’t think the F-35A is the right answer. Not in
the current procurement scenario. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">These are
the kind of things that the Combat Air Strategy should have clarified, but,
just like the Shipbuilding Strategy before, it has only made the waters
murkier. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><o:p><br /></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><o:p><br /></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Desperation? <o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Is the MOD
desperately looking for a way to reduce F-35 procurement costs without, for a
few more years at least, admitting officially that the UK is never going to
procure 138 F-35? </span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Is the government afraid that a cut in F-35 commitment will
result in an immediate American backlash against british industry involvement
in the programme? </span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">In particular while Trump is at the helm, there is little
doubt that the US would be extremely displeased by further cuts from the only
JSF Tier 1 partner. A switch of variant (again) would probably cause some disbelief and some irritation, particularly within the USMC which has collaborated with the UK in all ways possible so far, but would "hurt less" than a net cut. </span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">There can also be no doubt at all on the fact that all other partners
are eager to secure as much additional involvement for their own industries as
possible, and any reduction of the british share is a potential gain for them.
If the disastrous handling of Brexit negotiations proves something is that
allies will still happily take away everything they can from you, if you allow
them to. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Importantly, the vast majority of regional work for maintenance has yet to be assigned to the various countries. The UK secured some <a href="https://ukaviation.news/mod-sealand-chosen-global-f-35-repair-hub/">valuable work for MOD Sealand </a>but literally hundreds of other components have yet to be assigned to this or that location and contractor and it is not difficult to imagine british bidders losing some luster if the news from the MOD turn sour. </span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Some say that the british Tier 1 status has
been secured forever and ever by the original 2 billion pounds contribution to
the design phase, but allow me to be <i>extremely</i> skeptical about that.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"><br /></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">I’m
starting to fear that the MOD might allow its plans to become distorted by the
mirage of F-35A-generated savings, and rush down the split buy path without
having an actual, half decent plan. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Timeframe
of further purchases and the overlap with the costs associated with TEMPEST are
two enormous factors that make it very hard to imagine that the UK will ever
procure all 138 aircraft. Would it be a tragedy? Depends on how deep the axe
hits. But splitting a force of a mere 4 squadrons across two fleets, or worse
still ending up splitting the purchase and then downsizing even further below the target of 4 Sqns, would be a complete disaster. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><o:p><br /></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><o:p><br /></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">And to close, a deliberately inflammatory tease below <o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">You know
what also costs less than the F-35B? </span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The F-35C. The unitary cost dropped to
107,7 million as of LRIP 11. And it has longer legs than even the F-35A, and
the same weapon bay size and already comes fitted with AAR probe. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">In an
alternate universe there is a UK which built the carriers (from the start, not
from 2011, when it was too late to change minds without paying the price for it)
with catapults and procured 90 or so F-35C and also replaced Sentry with the latest
Hawkeye. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Hindsight and dreams, as
they say. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<br />Gabrielehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/01623558391676151582noreply@blogger.com8tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-442909239199162925.post-59823029482004240912018-07-21T23:06:00.000+02:002018-07-22T00:15:32.639+02:00British Army going wheeled? <br />
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">British Army going wheeled? <o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The MOD has released to the public a
<a href="https://ted.europa.eu/TED/notice/udl?uri=TED:NOTICE:314073-2018:TEXT:EN:HTML&src=0">voluntary
ex ante transparency notice</a> in which it reveals that it has asked the Organisation
for Joint Armament Cooperation (OCCAR) to enter a contract for the delivery of
between 400 and 600 Boxer 8x8 for the Mechanised Infantry Vehicle programme. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The notice says that 4 variants are
requested, in addition to driver training vehicles, reference vehicles and
related support. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The four variants are not detailed,
and subsequent reports are not in complete agreement. APC and Command variants
are a given, and there seems to be a consensus on the third variant being the
Ambulance, but the fourth variant is given as either a Mortar Carrier or an “Equipment
Support Vehicle”, which presumably would combine Recovery and Repair functions
in a single vehicle. It must be noted that both Mortar and Recovery/Repair
variants of the Boxer aren’t yet in production and have not been ordered by
anyone, although the development of both is a distinct possibility and one of
the latest Boxer customers, Slovenia, has expressed a mortar requirement. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Naturally, the development of new
mission modules is a possibility and could indeed represent a chance for the
british industry to develop something that could be exported to other users. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">What is most interesting in the
notice is the number of vehicles that are anticipated: a first batch of at
least 400 vehicles is significantly larger than the expected 300 – 350 that
were commonly mentioned in recent times. 400 vehicles would comfortably cover
the “Strike” requirement of 4 battalions, with substantial room for additional
vehicles which would cover, probably, the replacement of FV432 variants in
other formations; beginning, judging from the variants, with the FV432
ambulance which is found in tank regiments, armoured infantry battalions and
armoured medical regiments. The Warrior CSP requirement is understood to be for
380 vehicles, of which 245 IFVs and the others in Joint Fires direction (FV524
variant) and the 522 and 523 REME variants. The number of battalions is the
same, 4, so it is immediately evident that even the lowest quantity mentioned
in the notice includes vehicles for roles outside the STRIKE infantry; or, less
likely, an ambition for additional mechanized battalions. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The notice specifies that additional
variants and requirements could follow, and it specifically mentions the
adoption of a “medium gun”, basically implying an IFV variant. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Moreover, the notice specifies that
the MOD is asking for the option of ordering up to 900 more vehicles, for a
total of 1500. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">1500 does not appear to be a casual
number: the Army has been planning for 380 upgraded Warriors; declares on its
website 409 FV432 still in use; and fields / stores a fleet of 305 Mastiff
Troop Carrier Vehicles plus 127 specialistic variants (Enhanced Communications
Variant, Interim ECM, Interim EOD [possibly 23], ambulance, Protected Eyes /
Praetorian) plus 118 Ridgback Troop Carrier Vehicles and 51 specialistic
variants (Command, Ambulance), supported by 125 Wolfhound (Utility and at least
44 between Military Working Dog and EOD).<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The total is 1515. Coincidence?
Probably no. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">It seems more and more likely that
the troubled Warrior CSP will, in the end, be cancelled. This MIV notice seems
to prepare for a WCSP cancellation scenario by making provision for the numbers
and the addition of a medium gun. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Moreover, it clearly includes
numbers sufficient to cover the replacement of all remaining FV432 variants as
well, which means that the Armoured Battlegroup Support Vehicle, officially “descoped”
in 2016 as part of cost-growth management measures within the programme “Armoured
Infantry 2026”, might just be dead for good, in favor of a huge MIV purchase. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The Warrior CSP has repeatedly
missed its target dates and remains without a manufacture contract. Work is
advanced on the turret and the 245 CTA40 guns are under contract, but it is not
impossible to imagine a scenario which migrates the turrets onto Boxer hulls. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Lockheed Martin, perhaps genuinely
aiming at future MIV requirements or perhaps shielding itself from the
possibility of a WCSP cancellation, has already showcased its Export version of
the turret on a Boxer. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The replacement of WCSP with more
MIV would put the British Army on the same path chosen by France with the VBCI,
which entirely replaced their own tracked IFVs. Moreover, the replacement of
FV432 with MIV variants would represent a rather dramatic shift in favor of
wheels, completely changing the scenario that currently exists within the
British Army. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Such a change of heart would do
wonders for commonality and obsolescence removal from what is an aging fleet of
fleets, but it would also sideline Ajax even further, leading to further
questions about where the tracked heir to FRES should sit. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Ever since the SDSR 2015 was
published, Ajax has looked more and more lost, ultimately resulting in its “re-branding”
into a “medium armour” capability which has, it is fair to say, convinced very
few people. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">I’ve been and I continue to be a
huge critic of the idea of leaving the armoured infantry brigades devoid of
their own recce cavalry, especially if the reason to do so is to use the Ajax’s
40mm gun in support of toothless APCs in Strike Brigades. That, in my opinion,
is the way to ruin both brigade types at once, destroying the capability of
both. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEihdszzO6XCjflbyWW2p-Res9V4N_rGaT_5lJAnNoW8yytRv-1aOoWhcEsxydp7Cx0ALD56cN8pnA1X1_jWihCKbxthlnNdC3CwSlAADr74_pXX7MoCZuOniRedEGPuGuHXCBIZN8UVutQ/s1600/Boxer+with+LM+turret+derived+from+Warrior%252C+plus+Javelin.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="734" data-original-width="1200" height="243" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEihdszzO6XCjflbyWW2p-Res9V4N_rGaT_5lJAnNoW8yytRv-1aOoWhcEsxydp7Cx0ALD56cN8pnA1X1_jWihCKbxthlnNdC3CwSlAADr74_pXX7MoCZuOniRedEGPuGuHXCBIZN8UVutQ/s400/Boxer+with+LM+turret+derived+from+Warrior%252C+plus+Javelin.jpg" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">Boxer showcased with the LM Export turret with CTA 40mm and double AT missile pod. </td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<br />
<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEg9TuwWByHvYe_q51gVwJVI5obOerxwhYO5CNvZaF2klLnFhyphenhyphenrJ3Z07mu2eyr8l4L_VGjTzD7kdU2LQE92oOPWeWd5BkI2164fYReq6xTmtAy__2gL9w_4NzXHShP8MUhiavl_y06CclVs/s1600/DJdOSDGW0AA8VSq.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="795" data-original-width="1200" height="265" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEg9TuwWByHvYe_q51gVwJVI5obOerxwhYO5CNvZaF2klLnFhyphenhyphenrJ3Z07mu2eyr8l4L_VGjTzD7kdU2LQE92oOPWeWd5BkI2164fYReq6xTmtAy__2gL9w_4NzXHShP8MUhiavl_y06CclVs/s400/DJdOSDGW0AA8VSq.jpg" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">Boxer with the LANCE turret with 30mm and Missiles, as selected by Australia. The module is being lifted out of the craddle. Or lowered in, depending on how you want to see it! </td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
A reassessment of how the various
fleets will work together and how the various requirements can be covered has
been a clear necessity for years, and has been a recurring theme in my posts on
armour plans. A “full-MIV” scenario is not a bad outcome, and this notice seems
to prepare the ground for such an approach, but it is absolutely regrettable
that in the meanwhile hundreds of millions will have been expended for near
zero return. If WCSP is cancelled, the Army will have once more wasted years
and hundreds of millions for nothing.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Moreover, it is extraordinary that
Ajax took less than a year from contract award to become a “problem”; a
platform desperately looking for a role and place which is not in conflict with
everything else. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Another rational alternative would
be to renegotiate the Ajax contract if possible and add an IFV variant, which
is being offered by General Dynamics for export, including to Australia. If
Warrior CSP was cancelled in favor of an Ajax IFV variant, the british army
could then concentrate all tracks in the armoured brigades and all wheels in
the Strike brigades, which would enable the two formations to truly exploit
their own strengths without the compromises imposed by a sub-optimal mix. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">I can’t help but say it again: that
the army has gotten this far without being able to formulate a comprehensive plan
is an extraordinary failure, born not so much out of lack of money (Ajax is
anything but cheap) but out of lack of long term vision. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">I’d “gladly” sacrifice WCSP if it
meant finally making a choice and getting on with it. This is the kind of thing
that the Modernising Defence Programme should be about, but any residual bit of
confidence in the process has been disintegrated by the insultingly pointless “statement”
released this past week. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgaHQxODmsMWPmKIAJ51AUO2itRazOTq0W6LsXLKyEWoFNWePE2uv-ocMYrlRgnS8WnYhbsUSEW4nJ3uTLVjo7OK4UFzm6meOViguy5esQLkRv0Qau5ix4LY4KtlF5G47JPD5vY-gorleM/s1600/Manned+LANCE+%252B+8.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="674" data-original-width="1200" height="223" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgaHQxODmsMWPmKIAJ51AUO2itRazOTq0W6LsXLKyEWoFNWePE2uv-ocMYrlRgnS8WnYhbsUSEW4nJ3uTLVjo7OK4UFzm6meOViguy5esQLkRv0Qau5ix4LY4KtlF5G47JPD5vY-gorleM/s400/Manned+LANCE+%252B+8.jpg" width="400" /></a></div>
<br />
<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhpD-_kfu1xIs8UVF9FaxjNH_YJoEIs8qC-OwufNaF8dsXPNdJqc7VIiyrkwBWCMQjrb_ug_EsyZv5OJrGI5klS_-HYlnfGTMBlaPyL1tarDlLmafRvEHGuF0nkBFLfZA94LVibmEOmRlg/s1600/Manned+LANCE+and+8+dismounts.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="673" data-original-width="1200" height="223" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhpD-_kfu1xIs8UVF9FaxjNH_YJoEIs8qC-OwufNaF8dsXPNdJqc7VIiyrkwBWCMQjrb_ug_EsyZv5OJrGI5klS_-HYlnfGTMBlaPyL1tarDlLmafRvEHGuF0nkBFLfZA94LVibmEOmRlg/s400/Manned+LANCE+and+8+dismounts.jpg" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">A variety of internal arrangements are offered. The Australian CRV comes with four dismounts, but an IFV variant with manned turret and a full team of 8 dismounts is also a possibility. Warrior CSP would have six dismounts; if replaced by more MIV it might allow an uplift in the number of dismounts without armoured infantry battalions</td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<br />
<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjZ7oUBK4tQCDrVxXcGbhPjsTmuR6JQjcy7d_8SlITsNh1dfWAMlz9co4IITrEp4buURQeyBj_Unh8HxDgFi1UQPG_q-99nc3J6Qq3EG1BdnwqPvlh8v9LGt5NiO-CWs0Qgm5hSQtcsxHc/s1600/Boxer+load.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="695" data-original-width="1023" height="271" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjZ7oUBK4tQCDrVxXcGbhPjsTmuR6JQjcy7d_8SlITsNh1dfWAMlz9co4IITrEp4buURQeyBj_Unh8HxDgFi1UQPG_q-99nc3J6Qq3EG1BdnwqPvlh8v9LGt5NiO-CWs0Qgm5hSQtcsxHc/s400/Boxer+load.jpg" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">The Germans giving a visual demonstration of the payload of a Boxer APC</td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The notice notes that a 1500
vehicles programme could mean an expenditure of 11.5 billion over two decades.
Is this unaffordable? For sure it would be challenging. However, in April 2014,
the MOD decided to split the massive “Mounted Close Combat Capability Change”
programme into four:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">- Armoured
Cavalry 2025<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">- Armoured
Infantry 2026<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">- Armour;
Main Battle Tank 2025<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">- Mechanized
Infantry 2029<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The date at the end indicates the
desired completion time. The budget for the Mounted Close Combat super-programme
was 17.251,83 million pounds, with a project end date set for 31 december 2033.
<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Data released this year, and current
to September 2017, reveals that the Armoured Cavalry programme has a budget of
6258,19 million, for procuring, putting in service and supporting for the first
few years the Ajax fleet.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The Armoured Infantry programme was
composed by Warrior CSP, but was also meant to include the Armoured
Battlegroup Support Vehicle programme. The budget was consistently given as
higher than 2 billion, even when ABSV was descoped and pushed to the right with
the ambition of becoming its own Categoary A programme. In the latest report,
pretty much all data, including the budget value, is not disclosed for reasons
of “commercial interest”, as the MOD is locked into discussions with Lockheed
Martin, the prime contractor for WCSP. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The budget for the Challenger 2 LEP
is also not disclosed although in previous years it danced between 700 and 900
million. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Mechanized Infantry 2029 seems to
now be just “MIV”, and naturally, all numbers for it are hidden as well. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">A part of those 17 billions has been
of course expended, but the new “super-MIV” programme would extend past 2033
(significant costs are related to support in the long term, not to
procurement). In theory, there were always going to be significant sums
available for armour programmes, but keeping track of it is simply impossible
due to the insufficient and often contradictory information released by the
MOD. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiW72m5iqio0jDKD7Tsy8opyu0I5Fd-jSfVF0eE_AseO82BVgyukP0hFT-9djeTsG7pBjoKOGCF97ALclT554rBuJexAYXZ1SBSdjQIWzraLX8X38Qhimlj23mYQNMd5HmqKQe5HPipEuY/s1600/Boxer+modules.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="675" data-original-width="1200" height="225" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiW72m5iqio0jDKD7Tsy8opyu0I5Fd-jSfVF0eE_AseO82BVgyukP0hFT-9djeTsG7pBjoKOGCF97ALclT554rBuJexAYXZ1SBSdjQIWzraLX8X38Qhimlj23mYQNMd5HmqKQe5HPipEuY/s400/Boxer+modules.jpg" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">Boxer modules already ordered by other countries. </td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj4jP4ye6USfkvZfWaIdcjSJP1ZokINp_QFZ_s2iJhDhOUnb-D-xEMQBqlArfopjXTnIUoLI_eVfR9KRBlghiACFaJDKLvMMNYBKtIyE3OJvuOY7OT3jnv2C74hVM_Lo-Qx26xJDQ5v38s/s1600/Boxer+module.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="768" data-original-width="1024" height="300" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj4jP4ye6USfkvZfWaIdcjSJP1ZokINp_QFZ_s2iJhDhOUnb-D-xEMQBqlArfopjXTnIUoLI_eVfR9KRBlghiACFaJDKLvMMNYBKtIyE3OJvuOY7OT3jnv2C74hVM_Lo-Qx26xJDQ5v38s/s400/Boxer+module.jpg" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">A Boxer module</td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<br /></div>
<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEheksmCc9ipNQV1a3vwUrfiytLIkXSMpasq1cAb1_KZjUznv7tfv_EpFFp01-HrI1e3f2FKEtxPEUFiTQTZqa34WorrNdGEqz0FQDtDhjJ-BjviKTDBt4mRBvPF4fGsskaNwWeqG12zoO0/s1600/Boxer+module+transport.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="1200" data-original-width="1200" height="400" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEheksmCc9ipNQV1a3vwUrfiytLIkXSMpasq1cAb1_KZjUznv7tfv_EpFFp01-HrI1e3f2FKEtxPEUFiTQTZqa34WorrNdGEqz0FQDtDhjJ-BjviKTDBt4mRBvPF4fGsskaNwWeqG12zoO0/s400/Boxer+module+transport.jpg" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">Boxer module on its container-like frame for transport </td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
Industrially, Rheinmetall / ARTEC
have put together an impressive proposal, with 100% assembly in the UK and a commitment
to manufacture 60% of the vehicle value in the country. Before the MOD choice
was announced, one of the two partners in the ARTEC consortium, Krauss-Maffei
Wegmann (KMW), had already funded new tools at William Cook’s Sheffield and
Leeds factories to prepare to manufacture the high strength steel castings,
bullet and blast proof, for the Boxer.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">A production line will be stood up
in the UK, where “most” of the design work for eventual new, British-specific
mission modules would take place, along with construction and integration of
modules and final assembly of the vehicle. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">ARTEC has taken onboard BAE Systems,
Pearson Engineering, Raytheon U.K. and Thales U.K as partners for the Boxer
programme, and a sizeable production run would bring a lot of work to the
sector, for many years. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">So far, Germany has ordered 272
BOXER starting in 2009, with a follow-on order recently for another 131. The
Netherlands purchased 200 and the last delivery has just taken place. Lithuania
ordered 88; Australia selected Boxer for its army reconnaissance vehicle
requirement for 211 vehicles and 223 modules and Slovenia has selected the
Boxer for its battlegroups and plans a first batch of 48 IFV. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The UK’s order will at least equal
Germany’s and could, depending on follow-on decisions, become by far the
largest. Indeed, if the options were to be exercised, the UK’s order would swell
the Boxer fleet until it is the second largest 8x8 programme in NATO after the
US Stryker. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">This, obviously, would have a
technical and economical impact on UK’s capability in the armoured vehicle
sector. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEifxzkoHwf0NMBaiDfhochcCNiHG5LrObzoTIUSM7ELGAFg-wj3OfIhqHanXhWaTA8HZxrWNR6Hbz5wudIRMdvDtrg9C8EPPLzBoEQ5rP59YQuuxMr7Ytk9GUExG_GWnhMs0J6VSgBJiyc/s1600/DZcdeJGXkAAt6vw.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="822" data-original-width="1200" height="273" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEifxzkoHwf0NMBaiDfhochcCNiHG5LrObzoTIUSM7ELGAFg-wj3OfIhqHanXhWaTA8HZxrWNR6Hbz5wudIRMdvDtrg9C8EPPLzBoEQ5rP59YQuuxMr7Ytk9GUExG_GWnhMs0J6VSgBJiyc/s400/DZcdeJGXkAAt6vw.jpg" width="400" /></a></div>
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<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEikmbqOIDjn-O_E25XSVprRGdK0GO8Ch4vQl1HjyiiJcNUODSspO9-QHnt5Ra1DKoimt_3uw8cOOF2-CvGkJC8jPhR1FJA2ZNQ2-elvScEuMaaGqQYUlDFolEyqYXpuk5bJXDAHVVFi4FA/s1600/DZ5FEdUU8AA9Bcc.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="899" data-original-width="1200" height="298" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEikmbqOIDjn-O_E25XSVprRGdK0GO8Ch4vQl1HjyiiJcNUODSspO9-QHnt5Ra1DKoimt_3uw8cOOF2-CvGkJC8jPhR1FJA2ZNQ2-elvScEuMaaGqQYUlDFolEyqYXpuk5bJXDAHVVFi4FA/s400/DZ5FEdUU8AA9Bcc.jpg" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">Boxer's win in Australia after a long selection process was an important factor in the British Army's own decision. It could be another key area of cooperation after Type 26</td></tr>
</tbody></table>
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<br /></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Capability-wise, the Boxer is a
proven solution and was all along the candidate with the best growth margins.
Reportedly, the UK will go from the start with the “full-fat” variant sized for
38.5 tons gross weight, giving ample margin to add new capability, including
turrets and weapons. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The Boxer notoriously uses a common
hull which is “missionized” thanks to modules installed in the back cradle. This
modularity is unlikely to ever be a major factor during operations (“swap
module and role mid-way through an operation”) but greatly eases the addition
and evolution of capabilities during the service life. The modules can be detached
from the hull and mounted in container-sized cradles for transport or to be
operated inside bases, once hooked up to power and services. This potentially
eases training and can reduce somewhat the requirement for hulls: the
Australian Army, notably, somewhat downsized its planned purchase (from 225 to
211 vehicles) and procured more mission modules than hulls. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Generic Vehicle
Architecture-compliant modules for the UK can be developed and installed over
the common hull. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><o:p>If Warrior CSP ends up cancelled, one particularly important variant to be acquired would be the Joint Fires variant, and Australia's work in this area could bring beneficial lessons. </o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><o:p><br /></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
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<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">A different British Army? <o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The Army could be the service
bringing the most changes to the MDP table. <a href="http://www.janes.com/article/81826/uk-to-recruit-more-gurkha-soldiers">Jane’s is reporting</a> that Gurkha
numbers will swell further, probably because there is never a shortage of
willing Gurkhas to recruit. The biggest novelty is that next year Gurkhas will
stand up their own Specialised Infantry Battalion. Not clear yet if it’ll be
the “optional 5th” which was always given as a possibility or if they will
replace 2 LANCS as the 4<sup>th</sup> such unit. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">2<sup>nd</sup> PWRR converted to
Specialised Infantry role this year, following 4 RIFLES and 1 SCOTS. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The rebuilding of the Gurkha numbers after the cuts ordered in 2011 had already been announced and i had <a href="http://ukarmedforcescommentary.blogspot.com/2016/08/good-news-and-confirmation-of-bad-habit.html">written about it</a> already two years ago. </span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">What has since been detailed is that 2 additional Gurkha squadrons will
be raised to strengthen 10 Queen’s Own Gurkha Logistic Regiment, while 2 extra
signal squadrons are standing up: one within 3<sup>rd</sup> UK Division Signal
Regiment (249 Sqn) and one within 16 Signal Regiment (247 Sqn). Gurkha
engineers growth is also expected, perhaps with a new squadron to be formed
within 36 RE. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">It is also now official that the
Wide Wet Gap Crossing capability is to grow, with the stored M3 being
reactivated, and it has been announced that the capability will stay put in
Germany, along with vehicle storage and a presence at the Sennelager training
facility. Details are still scarce: in particular, the M3 permanence in Germany
means a change of plans for 75 Royal Engineers. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The Royal Signals are about to
disband the short-lived 2 Signal Group, which was created within 11 Signal
Brigade to control the reserve signal regiments under Army 2020. Reserve signal
regiments are being resubordinated as their roles expand (notably with FALCON
training and equipment). 32 and 39 Signal Regiments, of the reserve, have
resubordinated to 1 Signal Brigade in support of ARRC and High Readiness
formations. Further changes might follow as the Royal Signals looks at the
creation of hybrid regiments of regulars and reservists. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">10 Signal Regiment, given its specialized
roles (from reserve ECM to installation specialists), is resubordinating
directly under 11 Signal Brigade, while 37 and 71 joint the regular regiments
within 7 Signal Group, 11 Signal Brigade. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The Army’s Information Manoeuvre
Strategy which was half-announced by Fallon has not surfaced yet, but could
bring great changes. According to what Fallon said at the times, it would bring
together the Corps of Signals with the Military Intelligence Corps, and also
bring the creation of a second EW regiment. Nothing has been heard or seen
since, but hopefully one day we’ll know more. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The Royal Engineers are about to
reform 35 RE into an EOD & Search regiment, joining 33 RE in the role, at
the cost of one armoured close support engineering formation. 33 and 35 RE will
contain the Regular EOD squadrons, while Reserve EOD will be once more
centralized in its own regiment, 101 RE. This reverses, once more, an Army 2020
decision which had turned 33 and 101 into Hybrid regiments. One can’t help but
notice the completely different directions followed by Signals and Engineers… <o:p></o:p></span><br />
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">In the meanwhile, 12 HQ & Support Sqn has stood up anew in 23 (Parachute) RE, after the regiment took in some extra manpower as part of Army 2020 Refine. 12 had disbanded in 2013 as part of Army 2020 changes. </span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Next year it is expected that 28
Royal Engineers will stand up as CBRN formation, presumably pulling in FALCON
Sqn, Royal Tank Regiment (Fuchs and wide area surveillance) and the Light
capabilities of 27 Squadron, RAF Regiment, which has already absorbed 26 Sqn
and is now standing up a Parachute capability for support to high readiness
formations. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The formation of a (joint?) CBRN
regiment is, of course, another U-turn over 2010 decisions. Did you notice the
trend yet…? <o:p></o:p></span><br />
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span>
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">26 Royal Artillery is now 3rd Division's Fires specialist, with GMLRS and Exactor, which means there is one less AS90 regiment and that a number of batteries have resubordinated (such as 176 (Abu Klea) Bty moving from 19 to 26 RA, or H Bty (Ramsay's Troop) moving from 1 RHA to 26 RA, rallying under the flag of 19 (Gibraltar) Bty</span>), while others have gone into suspended animation, namely <a href="https://www.forces.net/news/parade-marks-17-corunna-batterys-departure-suspended-animation">17 (Corunna) Bty</a> and <a href="https://www.forces.net/news/army/royal-artillery-bids-farewell-centuries-old-unit">38 (Seringapatam) Bty</a>. <br />
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">This reverts the de-centralization of GMLRS which had taken place under Army 2020. I'll be honest and say that this was one of the very few things of Army 2020 which i actually appreciated, because having a wider spread of GMRLS and Exactor meant putting the capability where it needs to be. </span><br />
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">26 RA will still end up parcellized all the time, sending out batteries to be battlegrouped to support this or that brigade, and while there are probably advantages to having all GMLRS training and management in the same place, the mixed artillery regiment is, i believe, the right way to go. Notoriously, i'm a champion of the approach "structure and train as close as possible as to how you fight", and i've already said more than once that i'm also all in favor of permanent combined arms battalions with tanks and armoured infantry working shoulder to shoulder. </span><br />
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">I'm also a huge supporter of Exactor and would very much like to see it employed more widely, perhaps not by the Royal Artillery but directly by infantry and cavalry. For now at least, the Army is not "listening". But it eventually turned back on many of the decisions of Army 2020 that i thought made no sense, so perhaps one day... </span><br />
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span>
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Meanwhile, 42 Air Defence Support Bty has been disbanded and 12 and 16 Royal Artillery regiments will rebuild their own dedicate support elements to be able to deploy independently. They had been joined at the hip by Army 2020 cuts and related force structure changes, but, once again, a U-turn has followed. </span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">These are mostly good news, but we
might find unpleasant truths later on. The long-delayed report on the future of
the Army Air Corps bases is still not coming out, and the promised 4 squadrons
of Wildcat helicopters are still only 2, even though deliveries have ended.
This is worrying. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">There could be big changes coming if
Warrior CSP is given up and an “all-MIV approach” is approved. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">My own advice to the British Army is
to consider a wide-ranging rethink of Cavalry, reconnaissance and ISTAR. The
confusion over Ajax’s role and deployment within the brigades and the fact that
the future of battlegroup ISTAR is up in the air with no endorsed path to a
Desert Hawk III replacement is alarming, and shows that FIND doesn’t have
enough of a voice, or of a direction. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The Royal Artillery and the Cavalry
are reportedly sparring over who should be responsible for the post DH III FIND,
and depending on who you listen to, the spar seems to be about staying OUT of
the role. I had a discussion with a cavalryman who said that “playing around
with toy aircraft” is not a Cavalry role. I think and hope he doesn’t speak for
the whole Corps, but it certainly left me with the worst of impressions. FIND
is a key function which deserves a lot more effort. Brigades without a dedicate
reconnaissance unit are a terrible idea which shouldn’t even have been put
forwards. And it is ridiculous to think that the British Army can seriously think
about high intensity warfare while fielding a grand total of 5
counter-artillery radars, and short ranged too. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">If it takes a specific “ISR Corps”
to bring a more rational approach in the sector, so be it. Each brigade will
need its own ISR formation which can conduct reconnaissance,
counter-reconnaissance and surveillance of the area of operations. Most nations
have been organizing their cavalry according to these requirements or forming
specific battlefield surveillance brigades in the case of the US Army.
Mast-mounted sensors, radars and unmanned vehicles, both air and ground, have
become part of the cavalry mission pretty much anywhere, with the UK as the
only notable exception. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Ajax, and with it the whole recce
cavalry concept, seem to have bogged down somewhere midway between the Squadron
of American Brigade Combat Teams and the 8x8-based cavalry squadrons planned by
the Italian army.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The US Army cavalry squadron in
armoured BCTs is now composed of a tank company with 14 Abrams MBTs and the “6x36”
model, in which each Troop has two platoons of 6 Bradley IFVs, each carrying 3 crew
and 3 dismounts. One every two vehicles in the Troop is fitted with a <a href="https://www.armytimes.com/news/your-army/2018/02/26/shovel-or-rpg-army-upgrades-will-help-scouts-better-identify-targets/">LRAS
long-range sensor</a>, and the Squadron has its UAV platoon with RQ-7 Shadow
drones, plus HUMINT/IMINT intelligence element. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Wheeled BTCs on Stryker replace the
MBTs with the Mobile Gun System and TOW variants of Stryker. Notoriously, the
US Army is moving towards the introduction of 30mm guns on the other Strykers. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">In practice, the American recce
cavalry has moved towards greater firepower and a greater number of dismounts. The
Americans also hold on for dear life to mounted 120mm mortars. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjlG81peDCFW7kBJlKN4V4R3RBRG08nOI_qV1TJfubSrUZCZp1eITuehlAbGi7QWvtFHBLFfgPwAKkfXhlbqt9Afwn4pBN2OlMix95exqseKXzGJcSx5FlHIj1IIlZ1Y60zwPOKTBn173s/s1600/Poindexter2.png" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="320" data-original-width="520" height="245" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjlG81peDCFW7kBJlKN4V4R3RBRG08nOI_qV1TJfubSrUZCZp1eITuehlAbGi7QWvtFHBLFfgPwAKkfXhlbqt9Afwn4pBN2OlMix95exqseKXzGJcSx5FlHIj1IIlZ1Y60zwPOKTBn173s/s400/Poindexter2.png" width="400" /></a></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><o:p><br /></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><o:p><br /></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The Italian army intends to
restructure its cavalry on homogeneous regiments each containing a squadron of
8x8 Centauro II tank-destroyers, with 120/45 mm cannons; 2 squadrons of Freccia
8x8 in two variants, FAR and CLOSE; and another squadron of supporting
elements. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The Freccia FAR closes equipped with
HORUS tube-launched UAVs and a combined radar-EO sensor which can be dismounted
or deployed on a telescopic mast; while the CLOSE carries dismounts plus an
unmanned ground vehicle UGV, while replacing the HORUS tubes with SPIKE
anti-tank missiles. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjGn8bSNneYbMUutVdhikICVrNclbpXxnrwsJY46t2-pYeePl71ZikO44FIfV0BxFSf_iCMIgNLLlXXEOW7Q3f6Zvm8wjMGfavswGBABsW4LdBjgb74Ab9E5TCem28y9En55tioy9yTuBo/s1600/Freccia+recon+FAR.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="534" data-original-width="1442" height="147" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjGn8bSNneYbMUutVdhikICVrNclbpXxnrwsJY46t2-pYeePl71ZikO44FIfV0BxFSf_iCMIgNLLlXXEOW7Q3f6Zvm8wjMGfavswGBABsW4LdBjgb74Ab9E5TCem28y9En55tioy9yTuBo/s400/Freccia+recon+FAR.jpg" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">An early Freccia Recon FAR shown with the LYRA radar selected for it, in dismounted mode. It will also employ the HORIZON optical sight. </td></tr>
</tbody></table>
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<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEh0cEhar3aHNfiMS7J-XfQ1hvnrs25laTJU4e3HkSLpwHsHdW12Kt3dgWjt76u_EZ9mnxXxwBrqFACwS_5QqM6vj7QTYJuQaOUGqmTY7XwSoDZaTAYNSckHiXk6FzmquJ9nipS8MbDfa7A/s1600/sans-t18.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="500" data-original-width="332" height="400" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEh0cEhar3aHNfiMS7J-XfQ1hvnrs25laTJU4e3HkSLpwHsHdW12Kt3dgWjt76u_EZ9mnxXxwBrqFACwS_5QqM6vj7QTYJuQaOUGqmTY7XwSoDZaTAYNSckHiXk6FzmquJ9nipS8MbDfa7A/s400/sans-t18.jpg" width="265" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">The UGV seen on the CLOSE's ramp </td></tr>
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<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjCEj9UC00I8YsnmKhBNcN8TiJ8CJqpIJ6ssGhz_4k4f3Rpzb6GMDAJKu5KHX6gXFFBRYGChhuvOCQwg1Nyef0bFPI4QARL7ZgdG0e4ggx_MLbMySOviG1p1gKZ7iGlHNcm3W8HwcIPh3Y/s1600/2i117h2.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="1066" data-original-width="1599" height="266" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjCEj9UC00I8YsnmKhBNcN8TiJ8CJqpIJ6ssGhz_4k4f3Rpzb6GMDAJKu5KHX6gXFFBRYGChhuvOCQwg1Nyef0bFPI4QARL7ZgdG0e4ggx_MLbMySOviG1p1gKZ7iGlHNcm3W8HwcIPh3Y/s400/2i117h2.jpg" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">This image shows the UGV, the Lyra radar and HORIZON sight near a Freccia Recon CLOSE</td></tr>
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<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhWSVwFfDJPxkQT3njU2Zi1fMNT4MGE2DX0HcH6hAYDFE7N1GAU-WFJQTeqmn3-I_wi09Z220PRDYMPb38ViNu_r-ubUun0troQtD8XKRyrWllbFMd9vgQhHhI7jmiKr8QESrSXaPnkn5U/s1600/sans-t17.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="399" data-original-width="600" height="265" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhWSVwFfDJPxkQT3njU2Zi1fMNT4MGE2DX0HcH6hAYDFE7N1GAU-WFJQTeqmn3-I_wi09Z220PRDYMPb38ViNu_r-ubUun0troQtD8XKRyrWllbFMd9vgQhHhI7jmiKr8QESrSXaPnkn5U/s400/sans-t17.jpg" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">HORUS drone seen coming out of its launch box on the Freccia Recon FAR </td></tr>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The Ajax is similar to the Bradley
used by the American squadrons, but does not carry dismounts. Each Sabre Sqn
will continue to have a support platoon with dismounts riding in Ares
APCs, replacing the current Spartan, but it will be a small component. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">We were told that there would be
around 20 vehicles in a “Ground Based Surveillance” sub-variant of Ajax but it
is not clear if it is still the case and what additional sensors, if any, this
sub-variant will be able to bring to bear. Mast-mounted long range sensors are
still nowhere to be seen, leaving Ajax essentially only with its main sight,
which because of very questionable design decisions needs to be removed if a
Protector remote weapon station is deemed necessary. Taken all together, these
weaknesses expose just why I feel that the focus of the Ajax programme was
sadly not really on ISR at all. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">With the rush to Strike in 2015,
Ajax is now attempting to re-invent itself as a “medium tank”, with at least
half of the regiments literally leaving recce behind in favor of a combat role
more akin to a real MBT. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">This continues to be a rash and
irrational decision, that the MDP should reverse. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Despite claims to the contrary, it
looks like the Ajax family has been purchased as a one-for-one replacement of
the Scimitar / Spartan combination, just much larger and heavier. Ajax as the
dismount-less “tank”, with more protection and firepower but less deployability
and stealth, supported by a handful of APCs carrying small teams of max four
dismounts. There should be an “Overwatch” sub-variant of the Ares to give the
formation some anti-tank punch, but it is not clear if it will offer any more
capability than just carrying a Javelin dismounted team. In this sector, in
many ways, the Army took a backward leap when it retired Striker and its
Swingfire missiles back in 2005. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">As it stands, the Ajax family does
not have the firepower, nor the full range of sensors to be a truly capable ISR
system. As for its attempt to be a Medium Tank, that is just insane. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The Army needs to approach the MDP as a chance to urgently reassess
how Ajax will be used and distributed. A decision on WCSP is needed, and ABSV must absolutely be taken into account as well. If all the parts aren't considered within a much needed long term plan, the Army will end up in trouble again very soon.</span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">And i will add that the Army also needs to organize the cavalry
into a force that delivers the kind of ISR and punch that a modern brigade
needs. And / or procure a "true" Medium Armour variant of Ajax, which would at least possess a more credible firepower. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br />Gabrielehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/01623558391676151582noreply@blogger.com26