Bollocks proven wrong by facts

DefenceManagement reports that the National Security Council has, yesterday 8 april 2012, approved a re-rething and sealed the return to the F35B, with an announcement to Parliament expected before the week is over. 

The Telegraph says that with the F35B both CVFs could be put in service, and carrier air restored earlier, already in 2018. 



On the "both carriers" bit, i hope they are right. If they are not, the military top brass, the defence minister and everyone in the National Security Council should be kicked in the ass from here to Port Stanley, because putting in service both vessels is the only reason why STOVL should be considered. Wasn't for this, it shouldn't even be allowed on the table.
So either it is 2 STOVL carriers, or 1 CATOBAR. One STOVL carrier, one mothballed hulk is just demented. DEMENTED. 

The 2018 date is bollocks proven wrong by facts. There's nothing at all to suggest that the B variant will be ready in time, and even less suggests that the UK will speed the buy up to have the planes earlier.
It's a lie, pure and simple. US Department of Defense reports say clearly that the F35B is 9% behind even the revised, curred project schedule, has more than 15.000 test points to clear and at least 1500 test flights more to go.
The C is 32% ahead of schedule, has 12.000 test points to clear, and 1200 flights to go.

The US Marines might have urgency to put the F35B in service first, but they are going to do so (eventually) with an airplane that risks being unable to do what it is meant to do (STOVL) due to an as-yet uncorrected overheating issue in the transmission clutch of the Lift Fan (1).
In addition, the airplane will enter service with the software block 2B, incomplete, which is now due to include some initial weapon-release capability (which likely includes none of the british weapons: no ASRAAM, no Paveway IV), but which will need urgent replacing with the Block 3 software. Worse, these early production airplanes will need millions of dollars of mods and structural changes for which the DoD is already putting aside hundreds of millions.
Follow the USMC in this particular path only means getting blasted (with good reasons) by a NAO report telling everyone how stupid the decision is, and how much money wasted it entails.

The F35B mean corrective maintenance time for critical failures is also twice as long as planned, while the F35C is in threshold on target.
The F35B is literally losing pieces in test flights, something that Lochkeed Martin won't tell on its website, obviously. (2)
In 19 days of trials at sea on USS Wasp, one of the involved F35B needed, twice, replacement of the upper lift fan doors.

Vertical Bring Back weight requirement (the weight of a minimum fuel quantity and other
necessary payload needed to safely recover the aircraft on the ship after an operational mission, plus a representative weapons payload) is for 5000 pounds (at least it should be, might have been reduced), of which up to 1700 are made up by fuel. This vital requirement is still at very real risk. There's just 230 to 370 pounds of margin for weight growth in the next five years before the "not to exceed value" for empty weight is reached and surpassed.
Even if the requirement is met, there is not enough bring back weight margin to return to the carrier with unexpended Storm Shadow missiles ( 2870 pounds each) and even Ship Borne Rolling Vertical Landing might not solve the problem.
Someone has already suggested that Storm Shadow will not be launched by shipborne F35Bs. If it proves true, well. Better if i do not say what i just thought, it is rude.   

Regarding Ship Borne Rolling Vertical Landing, it is a UK idea, which is to turn a vertical landing into almost a CATOBAR landing, but without cables. Trials have been made with a modified Qinetiq Harrier on Charles De Gaulle and Illustrious, and the activity, which was stopped in 2010 following the switch to F35C, has cost several tens of millions.
It will have to be resumed if the F35B returns to be the preferred solution.

The SRVL approach exploits the ability of the short take-off and vertical landing F-35B to use vectored thrust to slow the speed of the aircraft while still gaining the benefit of wing-borne lift, by landing with a deck run. This offers a significant increase in "bring-back" payload compared with a vertical recovery and is likely to reduce stress on the single-engined aircraft's propulsion system.
However, deck operations become more complex and a landing runway is needed, instead of a landing spot, so much so that SRVL might require an angled deck, just as CATOBAR technique.
Pilot and deck crew training regimes would have to change, and even F35 flight control laws might have to be adjusted.
A "Bedford Array" visual aid system had to be developed and tested to guide the pilots in this new kind of approach, particularly in rough seas. And you know who liked the idea? The US Navy, which is building on it for its CATOBAR carriers. Once more, a great british idea in the naval aviation field will be exploited in the right way not by Britain, but by the americans. Read this to see how fast the idea is catching on with the CATOBAR pilots of the USN.

Vertical Bring Back Weight is an issue so big that already in 2004/5 the USMC "adopted" the SRVL concept, and sponsored the british activity in this direction, to feed the data into the F35 programme. 

When SRVL activities were ongoing, this very significant brief was given, and the awesome website Navy Matters still reports it:

Using SRVL F-35B aircraft would approach the carrier from astern at about 60 knots indicated air speed, 35 knots relative assuming 25 knots wind over deck (the maximum speed of a CVF will be 25 knots, so 25kts WOD is achievable even in dead calm) on a steep 5-6 degree glide path.  Touch down would be about 150 feet from the stern with a stopping distance of 300 to 400 feet depending on conditions (wet flight deck, pitching ships etc).  That would leave around 300 feet of flight deck for margin or even "bolters". [Note: 400 + 150 + 300 = 850 feet. THE WHOLE DECK IS COMMITTED TO THE LANDING. What about any other flying activity????]

The SRVL technique has a significant impact on ship designs and aviation operations, Commander Tony Ray told a conference in February 2008: "We expect to trade some STOVL flexibility for increased bring-back and fuel.  We have to .. check for for relevant CV criteria that apply to slower SRVL operations.  For example flightpath control will be a far more important flight criteria for SRVL than it has been for STOVL.  It is a CV trait creeping in".

So, the "training gap" between STOVL and CATOBAR further reduces, and deck operations are as affected by SRVL than by an arrested landing.
Or wait, that's actually worse than on a CATOBAR vessel.
Without an angled deck for SRVL, and having to rely only on the plane's brakes, in order to accommodate a bolter, the whole deck, from ski jump to stern, will have to be free and committed to the landing of the "heavy" F35B.

Isn't it awesome? The disadvantages of CATOBAR (and possibly some more) coupled to the inferior performance of STOVL airplanes.
Really smart. Really. I'm so impressed. 


The other problems with the F35B (and the C's ones, it is not perfect either, but at least much, much better...) i've covered already in other articles, so i won't repeat it all and annoy everyone to death. The US report i've linked contains the most complete non-classified liste of issues available, and the most up to date, so it remains the go-to document for any who wants to see the full table of the F35B propulsion issues and count the number of times the TBD (To Be Determined) sign comes up when the subject is "solution to this issue".

I will close this bitter piece with a brutal assessment of reality, and then an hope and wish.

First the brutal assessment:

- STOVL is less expensive in the short term. 

True, there are less costs connected to the ships, but the airplane will cost a lot more to acquire, and a lot more through life.

- CATOBAR would cost more for added ship crew for operating catapults and wires, and would impose a great training penalty, with associated cost. 

Questionable. The full extent of the training penalty and crewing difference is actually not well determined. SRVL, if adopted, risks reducing the gap by a lot. If it is not adopted, we risk seeing certain weapons not cleared for use from the carrier (Storm Shadow on top of the list) and/or many expensive weapons thrown into the waves over the plane's life.

As to the impact of catapults and wires on ship crew, a current Nimitz carrier employs 56 men for the 4 catapults and 47 for the MK7 wires.
EMALS is expected to require 30% less crew, so that could go down to 40. For a 4-rails system. The british one would have half the rails.
The Advanced Arrestor Wire (which differently from EMALS is to be retrofitted to all carriers) requires only 4 men for normal operations, namely a Pri-Fly Recovery Operator, an Arresting Gear Officer, an AAG Monitor and an AAG Retractor Operator. 

Pardon me if i continue to have reserves.  

- The F35B works: it went to sea on USS Wasp.  

The F35B went to sea for 19 days, lost pieces in flight and had others replaced twice in three weeks. It remains plagued by multiple issues, its airframe life is currently 3000 hours (bulkheads developed cracks by this milestone) against a requirement for 8000 (the Typhoon is certified for 6000 flying hours, but BAE is still running an airframe on stress tests in Brough that have overcome the 12.000 hours milestone and aims for proving that the airframe is going to last without troubles for 18.000, to give an idea). As it is, there's an unresolved overheating issue that prevents it from entering STOVL mode in hot weather, and production airplanes in USMC squadrons will, for an undetermined time, only fly in CTOL profile).
Supposed to serve for 30 years, the F35B has a growth margin of 370 pounds at best before it reaches the not-to exceed weight. A bit little. Hope that engine technology moves ahead a lot in 30 years and increases very significantly the power output...
In short, i've issues with the "it works" statement. Not even in service yet, and already feels like it's held together in one piece with strings and scotch tape. Not the best feelings.

- STOVL operations can better cohexist with the helicopter ops necessary for the carrier to work as Assault Ship as envisaged by Carrier Enabled Power Projection


It is a marginal advantage. US Kitty Hawk in 2001, during operations against the Talibans in Afghanistan, had 8 to 12 Super Hornets on board, which flew 600 sorties in her deployment, and simultaneously was used as afloat staging base for helicopter insertions of troops and special forces, with the 160th Regiment Special Forces Aviation on board.


Actually, if SRVL is continued and adopted, and a heavy plane returns to the STOVL carrier, all deck needs to be cleared and the impact on other operations is worse than with CATOBAR ops.


- STOVL enables RAF land-based crews to embark with minimum warning and rapidly certify for all-weather ops from the deck.

Probably. But with the Harrier GR9 it didn't work very well: the number of carrier qualified RAF pilots was normally extremely low/non existant. Does not promise that well.

Again, SRVL is highly likely to make things a lot more complicated, and much more similar to CATOBAR ops.
Not adopting SRVL would be worse, though, as it would severely limit the operational viability of the F35B: the bring-back weight value is really far too low.

- We can always switch to catapults later when there will be UCAVs to launch.

Does it sound like an idiocy only to me? It reads like "ok, we are doing a stupid thing. But, eventually, we will fix the error with more money later".

After buying the most expensive, less capable fleet of airplanes.

Better if we do not reach the point in which catapults become indispensable "later". Since i can't see that much money being available for defence anytime soon, such a need would likely be a big, big issue.

- STOVL means two carriers in service.

I wish it did. But it is far from sure. We will see if there will be an announcement in this sense, eventually.
And even if there is, the destiny still passes through the SDSR 2015.



Lastly, the hope.

May both carriers enter service, and may the F35 work as intended in the end. 




NOTES:

(1): US DoD programs, F35 program testing report, page 30, 31 and 32 

"Production aircraft will be restricted from STOVL-mode flight operations until Service airworthiness authorities grant a flight clearance. A significant amountof flight test and development of system maturity of the final STOVL-mode door and propulsion system designs remains to be accomplished. A system mature enough for unmonitored STOVL-mode flight may be needed as early as late 2012 to coincide with the delivery of lot 4 F-35B aircraft to the Marine Corps at Yuma, Arizona. If testing of the changes is not complete and needed modifications are not installed by late 2012, aircraft at Yuma will fly in CTOL‑mode only.

"The interim solution to unacceptably high clutch temperatures is to add a temperature sensor and display page so that the pilot can be aware of increasing temperature inside the clutch housing. Fuel and operational conditions permitting, changing flight regimes (e.g. configuration, altitude, and airspeed) may cool the clutch so that the pilot can engage STOVL modes. Such a cooling procedure may be untenable in combat conditions."


(2): US DoD programs, F35 program testing report, page 32


"Roll control nozzle doors separated in-flight from a test aircraft twice, drawing attention to door rigging and the potential for redesign. The program plans to conduct flight test on a new door in early 2012 to support the redesign effort."

The MOD has looked into the X47B carrierborne UCAV

... But STOVL carriers will make any development in this direction impossible, since the UCAV is, you guess it, a CATOBAR one.
Wonder if politicians are aware of it... 

News of the interest of the MOD for the X47B emerged in a recent written answer of Lord Hastor:

Question

Lord Moonie (Labour)
To ask what discussions they have had with the Government of the United States or Northrop Grumman Corporation about the X-47B unmanned combat air programme.

Answer

Lord Astor of Hever (Parliamentary Under Secretary of State, Defence; Conservative)
The Ministry of Defence has held an initial scoping discussion with the United States Government on the X-47B unmanned combat air programme. Northrop Grumman Corporation has not been involved.

Let's be clear on this, it does not mean that the UK wants to buy the system (at least not anytime soon), but it might be about trying to bring some of the highly advanced american research, with related achievements, into the UK's own drone programme.
But it is worth remembering that the X47B is on track to be trialed at sea on USN carriers in 2013, the same year in which the USN hopes to start trialing the F35C on a Nimitz carrier, and the USN wants, from 2018 or 2020 at the latest, be able to have 4 to 6 UCAVs embarked in each carrier air wing.
The CATOBAR, long endurance, stealth drone for reconnaissance and strike is here now. 

As a quick list, the US has:

- Developed software that was capable to guide a Super Hornet in an arrested landing on a carrier at sea without the pilots doing a thing

- Is developing software that will enable the future embarked UCAV to recognize and understand gestures and body language of the deck control crew and officers, which will so be able to guide the drone on deck as they would guide a normal fighter with a man in the cockpit

- They are leading on the technique of air to air refuelling of drones from manned tankers and even from other drones. Tests were conduced also last January as the program progresses. 

In the UK, Philip Hammond is still expected (now next week, everything keeps sliding to the right...) to bring the issue of Carrier Strike at the national security council to abandon the CATOBAR path and return to the F35B. Hopefully with the consolation of getting both carriers in service, but note that this is an ambition and not at all a certainty. If we revert to STOVL and still get one single carrier, it is officially the worst decision ever. 

Mr. Hammond came out with the genial assesment that converting Prince of Wales at build is expensive, and converting Queen Elizabeth in refit is even more expensive, and i have to say: how smart an observation!
Navy Matters.com, or even my Blog, have been saying this in forever. When people babbled about "converting Queen Elizabeth", i told them again and again "no way at this stage of the work. It'll have to be Prince of Wales, with QE fitted eventually during the first major refit".
I was all but insulted back then, but i was totally, utterly, damned right. Let me have this bit of a fit of rage and revenge. Prince of Wales is the one selected for (eventual, and more and more unlikely) conversion. Not one of the smart guys of the "It will be QE" party has admitted being awfully wrong, unsurprisingly, but still, they were and are.

We still get feed up with the 1.8 billion figure for conversion, which at times becomes 2 billions, which has never been confirmed by official sources. It's a rumor thrown out in the wind which all carrier haters have eagerly made theirs.
The only official statements are from the US Navy, which puts the EMALS and AAG cost at the same pricetag as in 2010, if not a bit lower, and which estimate conversion work cost at 400 million; and a recent answer in Parliament:

Question

Jim Murphy (East Renfrewshire, Labour)
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence whether Ministers in his Department have received any representations on technical difficulties associated with converting the aircraft carrier to a CATOBAR configuration; from whom any such representations were received; and when they were received.

Answer

Peter Luff (Parliamentary Under Secretary of State (Defence Equipment, Support and Technology), Defence; Mid Worcestershire, Conservative)
The Ministry of Defence has not received any representations regarding technical difficulties associated with converting the operational Queen Elizabeth Aircraft carrier to a CATOBAR configuration.

So, what are we actually talking about? If there are no difficulties and no cost increases on the American kit, how is the cost-ballooning ever justified?
My guess, as i said already once in another article, is that 1.8 billion is the cost of converting both carriers.The official cost figures add up perfectly to make up the figure, and while coincidences are always possible, they are far less likely than people might think.

Note that there's one whole hell of difference between presenting the cost of ONE conversion as 1.8 billion when said cost is that of converting both ships. If i'm right, this is misleading advice at its best, a revival of Australia moving 500 miles up on the maps to allow land based planes to cover the Royal Navy at sea East of Suez after the retirement of the big carriers.

With the difference that this time it might be the Navy who uses the trick: for the RAF, owner of the JCA program and budget, the F35C is the best choice.
For the RN, given no budget increase, finding the money in the short term for converting the carriers is a huge issue. They might well be the main source of the F35B arguing, due to the scary thought of what might have to be cut in order to find the money for CATOBAR work.
It is very likely, especially considering that the RAF has craved the long range, higher payload F35C at least since 2005, and there's no reason why they should have changed their minds now.
They pay for the planes, and the C does more and costs less. Easy choice.

The Navy has to pay for the ships, and fears that vessels and Marines would have to be cut to save money for CATOBAR, since government won't give any additional funding. I can understand the fear, but i still cannot really support the solution chosen. STOVL is not much of a good decision even if it gets both carriers in service, which, again, is anyway far from sure.
It locks the UK into the F35B box, tying the destiny of the vessels and british airpower at sea to a plane that still does not really work and still risks being a failure. It ties the long-term defence equipment programme to the most expensive and less capable aircraft of the trio. And it makes the carriers effectively outdated even before they enter service.
UCAVs on carriers?

Not on british ones.
But the RAF will no doubt love to tap into the X47B tech for its notional "2030" land-based UCAV to develop in collaboration with France.
After all, they've loved the carrier's hero, the Buccaneer. I'm sure they'll love to turn another naval system in a land machine, throwing away its best capabilities. They might in exchange content themselves with the F35B.
And in the case, you can bet that its lack of range and payload will be used to argue for more UCAV funds for a "proper replacement" for Tornado, for the deep strike missions.

The reality is that an effort should be made to shoulder the short-term cost, with extra funding made available, and later there would be the benefit of the long-term gains.
But this is what the MOD never does.

Type 26; the future of the Afghan vehicle fleet, the F35 saga

Type 26 Update: new BAE video

Once again, not very showy and not very good in quality, but there's a new Type 26 video from BAE, released at DSA 2012 in Malaysi,a and it seems to prove some of the good spotters on this blog right: there's a VLS silo in the funnel. This new video shows it well. Its sizes seem to match the main missile silo, which could mean as many as 24 cells. 

 


Congratulations to the several readers who saw it already in the first video i reported: for how much i tried, i personally struggled to see it, but this new video seems to definitely confirm that something's up there.

Hard to imagine the RN finding the money to put VLS in there when they have difficulties funding the main silo, but we at least know that the design offers this chance. Other highlights: the helicopter hangar door is single (no dog kennel as we all hoped) but, to me, it looks a bit narrow. A single, large hangar is a fundamental requisite for helicopter + UAV operations, so i'm hoping in an hangar at least as large as the Type 45's one. 

A question still to be answered is that of the Flexible Mission Deck. Is it still present? The Royal Navy's Yearbook 2011/12 reports that yes, it is still present. Then again, it still shows the old Type 26 photos. BAE's Global Combat Ship webpage is just about as up-to-date regarding images, though, so it might very well not mean that the info is out of date.

As i wrote in the recent article on the Navy's yearbook, the publication reports, about the Type 26:

The yearbook confirms that the Flex Mission Deck is present. Probably sized, according to BAE data, to take up to 11 standard containers or 4 12m boats.

The yearbook also tells us of the current preferred propulsion option, which is for a CODLOG solution on 4 diesels connected to two large electric motors, generating cruise speed as high as 18 knots, with a direct drive gas turbine for sprints of minimum 26 knots.

Other options have been/are considered, including an integrated all electric solution or a wholly diesel one.

In terms of weapons fit, the yearbook is quite clear about the RN's want to fit the Type 26 with a new medium calibre gun, capable of firing long range, precision guided ammunition. It is very much the identikit of the Oto Melara 127/64 with Vulcano ammunition, especially since the BAE 127/54 rival has been badly damaged by the US cancellation of the guided ammunition meant for it.

Fitting TLAM long range land attack missiles is "subject of further studies" (read: we are trying to get money for it, won't be easy), but regardless of the decision on TLAM it remains the RN's ambition to have the Type 26 fitted at build with a large VLS silo (24 cells) in which land attack missiles and the future anti-ship missile would be carried.  

The Type 26 frigate is to "reverse" the Type 45 situation (20% of technology carried through, 80% new kit) by de-risking most of its mission system thanks to the Type 23 mid-life upgrade program.

Type 26 will inherit from the Dukes the Type 997 radar (Artisan 3D), the Type 2087 towed sonar (8x) and its command system will be a derivation of the current DNA(2)/CMS-1.

The adoption of proven, in-service kit for almost 80% of the ship's systems is meant to keep costs and risks down, as there is no margin for error in this crucial program.

  

The future of Mastiff

On 19 April Philip Davies made a question i've been waiting for for a long time, and got an interesting answer:

Philip Davies: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what plans his Department has to bring all Mastiff, Ridgback and Foxhound vehicles back to the UK after the British role in Afghanistan has been completed. [102414]

Nick Harvey: It is intended to bring all serviceable Mastiff, Ridgback and Foxhound vehicles back from Afghanistan but the specific details, including timing and locations, are still to be determined. It is planned to return the vehicles to a number of sites across the UK and wider Ministry of Defence estate. We expect to make decisions on which vehicles will be retained as part of the core equipment programme during the course of the next year.

Philip Davies: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence whether his Department plans to keep sections of the Army fully trained in the use of Mastiff, Ridgback and Foxhound vehicles for use in future counter-insurgency operations. [102416]

Nick Harvey: It is not yet known which of these of vehicles will be retained as part of the core equipment programme. However, the Army's training programme will continue to reflect their use for as long as there is a requirement to do so.

Unfortunately Davies did not include Warthog and Jackal in his question, and Harvey accurately avoided expanding on the matter himself.

On Foxhound, we pretty much already knew: Foxhound is already considered part of the Core Budget (the second order for 100 vehicles has also been already funded from Core, and not under UOR method), while it is interesting to hear that Mastiff and Ridgback are coming back to the UK.

Somewhat sensibly, the long term future of both will be decided in Planning Round 2013, it seems, after this year's Planning Round gives (hopefully) a clear indication of the force structure that the Army has to develop.

Using a Voyager for VIP transport role?  

It is not a bad proposal. One of the 5 "on-call" Voyagers could well fill this need. And you have to admit that the press and industry do make a good point: if you go abroad to advertise the Airbus products but show up in a chartered Boeing, you don't look very smart.

The Voyager is also an obvious candidate for the UK's eventual participation in the currently tri-national Air Tanker initiative launched within NATO by France, Germany and the Netherlands in order to provide, by 2020, a greater european air tanker capability, based on the Airbus 330 platform, of which France plans a fleet of 14, with orders for the first 5/7 to come next year.

F35 saga

We are still dealing with an unjustified, unspecified inflated carrier conversion cost figure having ballooned from a NAO estimate of 800 million and a MOD allocation of 950 millions to 1.8 billion or even 2 billions, depending on the newspaper talking of it. 

According to the US Navy, the EMALS and AAG cost has not changed, and the modifications to the carrier itself and additional worktime are not worth more than 400 million pounds, meaning that the 950 million allocation is actually still more than valid and also has a margin for cost overgrowth. 

So, from where does the 1.8 billion figure come? 

My personl opinion is that the press got it wrong and it is reporting the figure in an absolutely misleading way. The conversion cost of the single carrier has not increased 8not that much at least!), with 1.8 / 2 billion being the cost of conversion for both hulls. Which would more than fit the only official cost estimations we have, coming from the NAO, the MOD and the US Navy, 3 sources that, in my book, matter a lot more than the Daily Mail. 

This is of course still a cost increase because, as we know, the original 2010 plan was to convert only Prince of Wales and rely on carrier sharing with the french to put the british planes on Charles De Gaulle when the carrier was not available. 

The key point is that Charles de Gaulle is unsuitable for operations with the heavy F35C, as its deck is not adequate. This was first reported in a Parliamentary Defence Committee report, and when i first signaled it, i was ridiculed by many. I stand vindicated now, as the CdG unsuitability is confirmed. 
However, you will agree with me that a lot of things change between being fed with the story that fitting two catapults and 3 wires costs almost as much as building the vessel whole and having that pricetag covering two conversions.  
It would be very important to have clarity on this point.

In absence of an adequate second deck provided by France, converting the second CVF becomes indispensable, and there appears the 1.8 / 2 billion cost figure, with the new, magic question being: is it still worth the price? 

Question which is followed by an even less comfortable: "if it is still worth the price, where the hell do we find all that money in the short term?"

Answering these two questions is the key. 

According to US DoD figures, the F35B will cost 25% more than the C through-life to support.

In terms of acquisition costs, the 2012 figures for the expected Recurring Flyaway Unit Cost (the pricetag of a complete F35 airframe ready to go, but excluding spares, training and support) are: 

F35C - 87 USD million

F35B - 106.5 USD million 

From these figures comes the "600 million pounds" saving that has been reported by the Press several times when the subject is the F35C. The 600 million pounds savings is calculated on an  initial order for 50 airframes.

A Telegraph article reporting of a leaked "top secret" OPEVAL exercise internal at the MOD reports, however, that the F35B limitations in terms of range, payload and availability would require an order of 135 to match the same requirements met by 97 F35C.

The interesting bit is that the "about 100 airframes" target reported by RAF sources would convert to a rather accurate (and very interesting) planned number of 97 F35C. That would be a very excellent number to work with, because it could sustain a good 5 frontline squadrons plus OCU, or Fleet Replacement Squadron in US terms. In economic terms:

cost of 97 F35C = 8439 US million [5241 million pounds, roughly, in today's pounds, so it would fit within the rumored "5 billion budget"]
cost of 97 F35B = 10330.5 US million [6415.2 million pounds]

Difference: 1174.2 million pounds.

Number of F35B theorically achievable with 8439 US million [the budget is more than likely to stay the same, after all] = 79 vs 97 F35C

Difference in million pounds if 135 F35B were to be ordered (will never happen, but if we are to believe the Telegraph this is the number of B it takes to meet the requirements covered by 97 C)

8929 million pounds [135 F35B]
6415.2 million pounds [97 F35C]

2513.2 million pounds of difference.

[135 F35C would cost 7293,6 million pounds, again over 1.6 billion saved]

There is who has already suggested that this report is a "Navy trick" aiming to provide the government with a cost figure that justifies spending for the conversion of the carriers. What can i say, perhaps. Or maybe no. 
The first who argued for the F35C, and we know thanks to Lockheed Martin sources, was the RAF, who's been wanting the C as a Tornado replacement since at least 2005. They might have changed their mind and now want the B very badly, but i do not exactly think so.

Launching accuses of "Navy tricks", though, stinks. And it clashes against a reality which from many years now sees the Navy quite regularly screwed and outplayed, and which is all but denounced by Liam Fox himself, who after the SDSR period at a conference had to bitterly note: 

“Sometimes I get the impression that the Navy is less successful, even less willing, at selling itself than the other services.”

and

“I was accused by some of being the only dark blue suit in the SDSR apart from the First Sea Lord.”

The Navy playing tricks within the MOD? Would be kind of about time they started, but it is unlikely that they have gained any real foothold in the right positions in order to do so, since the still recent past.

I want the best decision to be made. I want two carriers available, and the planes to fly off them also available. My preference goes to the C, for a number of reasons, from its better and smoother progress in the testing and development to the much better weight growth margin which gives it much more helpful breath space to evolve, fix eventual issues yet to be discovered, and reach entry in service as an effective airplane, to the fact that the only "hard" cost figures we have all point to it being a much cheaper and cost-effective choice. 
I also value the flexibility and future-proof nature of a big CATOBAR carrier: future UCAV? It can go aboard. CATOBAR plane? It can go aboard. STOVL plane? It can go aboard. US Navy, USMC, French, Italian airplane? They all can use a big CATOBAR CVF.
Name it, and the big CATOBAR ship almost certainly can do it. 

The bit about UCAV is likely to be particularly important in future. I've talked with B supporters who say that we'll just fit EMCATs from Converteam or, guess it, EMALS, in future, when the drones make up more and more of the UK's airpower (the RAF itself expects that one third of its force will be made up by UAVs in 20 years time!), but to me this sounds absolutely ridiculous. If we are expecting to need catapults in a few years time, then it is absolutely clear that we should get them now, not buy the most expensive and less capable airplane, be constrained by it for 30 years or more will also paying for catapults and wires soon after. 

I recognize, however, that it is not a decision to be taken in isolation. 
The F35B should come with a lower requirement in terms of training for carrier qualification, which is very important to ensure that the RAF can embark with minimum notice. If a genuine assessment of the pros and cons suggests going with the B, i'll be the first wishing the F35B well, for it to work and work well.

However, i want it to be a genuine assessment of all pros and cons. And ideally, since carrier strike is what we want to achieve, we should finally detach the requirement from the RAF desire of spending the most of the time on land, in a comfortable airfield such as Marham, and only bother to go at sea when it really can't be avoided, unless they can provide genuine financial and operational justifications for the arrangement, for example explaining what is a second land-based jet fleet going to add to the defence capability of the UK other than numeric consistency.   
This is the original sin of the whole matter, to me. This (wrong) way of approaching carrier strike, by trying to present CVF as a floating, mobile RAF airport over which the Navy has just 40% of the say.

Sorry, this is just the wrong way of doing things. We are trying to put a land force on a ship, meeting the inexorable issues that this implies, and potentially choosing the "wrong" aircraft in order to make it possible, instead of having a naval force, which can with zero issues (other than, possibly, losing carrier currency is the ops go on and on and on for years, but this is another matter and the Harrier GR9 is there to demonstrate that, in this particular case, the B would not do any better) go on land when necessary.

And we are having to deal with this as a consequence of a dubiously wise maneuver in the SDSR 1998. Time to look into it again, and make an honest analysis of what is really needed and what must be achieved. 

The benefits of re-established naval aviation are clear: 

- Air Cover for the Fleet 
- Independent capability of deploying airpower in a place and time of UK's choosing
- More effective use of available resources thanks to the possibility of going closer to the target

etcetera. 
Given that the airplane and weaponry employed would be the same, primarily-focus the fleet on land negates and reduces the benefits, if anything.

As to the (not very relevant, but very annoying on the other hand) war of words about who-is-lobbying for what, it is worth remembering that in 2006 Tom Burbage, LM director of the F35 program, said that the UK planned a buy of 138 F35, of which 80 would be B, forming 4 Squadrons and an OCU as a replacement for the Joint Force Harrier and to provide the airwing of CVF, with the remaining airplanes forming two more (smaller) squadrons plus an OCU as Tornado replacement for land based deep strike.

It was reported that this entailed a split buy, with the F35B for the carriers and the long-range, higher-payload F35C for the RAF deep strike.

Later on, in 2007, talk for a single type order of 80/85 F35C started to emerge, and it is evident that things evolved from there up to the surprise decision in the SDSR 2010.

Better to be careful when you accuse the "evil" Navy of plotting to support the F35C: for what we know, it appears more likely that the Navy is now scared of having to shoulder a much greater expense than hoped for CVF conversion due to the clear need for two hulls as CdG won't do, and is thus arguing for the B, with at least part of the RAF pressing for the C.

Which makes far more sense when you think that:

A - The Navy pays for CVF - so converting both hulls means, for them, finding more money

B - The RAF pays for the F35 - so C for them means paying a lot less and getting more

Do you really think that the RAF is arguing for a plane that would cost them more and do less, while the Navy eagerly calls for a greater cost to face in the build program?

You might be seeing this upside-down.

It is a very complex and very embarrassing story, in any case, caused first of all by the lack of a clear strategy, by the never-successful mixture of RAF and RN on the naval aviation front, and especially by a lack of understanding of the need for and of the workings of carrier aviation.

I hope the decision which eventually is taken proves to be the correct one, but so far the premises are far from reassuring.

USMC and USN TACAIR agreement and F35 plans

Up to 2011, the USMC was still planning a buy of 420 F35B, for a sole STOVL force. This was, in part, son of the 2001-old prediction (later proved false by a good margin) that the C variant would be the most expensive of the 3.

By 14 March 2011, things had changed, and time was mature for a new Tactical Airpower integration agreement between the US Navy and the USMC, which brought forwards, along with other adjustments, the well-known change from a 420 B order to a 340 B, 80 C USMC order.

The future US Navy air component is to line 35 Strike squadrons, of which 20, out to at least 2030, will fly on the Super Hornet (half on the two-seat F/A-18F and half on the single seat E), with 15 squadrons flying the F35C thanks to an order for 260 airplanes.

The US Navy is standing up a first Fleet Replacement Squadron, with 15 F35C, based on the F35 Integrated Training Center on Eglin air force base, and is finalizing the program for the transition of the legacy F/A-18C fleet to the F35C.

In particular, the transition will start on the West Coast, where, from 2015, the active squadrons on the 18C will start changing airplane. A total of 7 active squadrons will convert to the C on the West Coast, and each squadron will have 10 F35C.

In 2017 they will be joined by the Fleet Replacement Squadron responsible for the West Coast, which will have 30 airplanes.

109 F/A-18C are thus being replaced by 100 F35C, to be all based, almost certainly, on the Leemore air base.

The East Cost squadrons will begin transition to the C in 2019. There should be 8 more active squadrons and another large Fleet Replacement Squadron, even if the plan has yet to be announced. There should also be at least one Reserve Component squadron on the F35C.

A possible utilization of the Navy F35C would thus be:

160 assigned to frontline squadrons (16 squadrons including one reserve sqn - plan still evolving)

75 in Fleet Replacement Squadrons [15 on the ITC, 30 in the West Coast FRS and probably 30 in an East Coast FRS]

25 OEU/Attrition

The USMC will have 21 Active and 3 Reserve squadrons: 5 squadrons (10 airplanes each) will be on the F35C.

The 420 USMC F35s will be used in the following way:

282 airplanes assigned to Active and Reserve squadrons

64 airplanes committed to Training

6 in OEU

68 attrition reserve

The 80 F35C of the Marines will form squadrons on "10 plus" airplanes each, leaving up to 30 for training and attrition.

The 340 F35B are to be assigned to 9 Expeditionary Squadrons, each with 10 airplanes, with the task of supplying airplanes to the 7 Marine Expeditionary Units, for employment on the LHDs and LHA ships.

A normal LHA/LHD detachment will have 6 F35B and 9 pilots. There is thus plenty of airplanes to put machines on each deck.

A further 7 Squadrons, larger, will stand up for land deployment, each with 16 airplanes. Four of these squadrons will be based on Yuma AB.

These squadrons will rotate and one will at all times be located in Japan, on Iwakuni AB: prior to the 2011 TACAIR agreement with the US Navy, this task was covered by F/A-18 squadrons of the Navy on behalf of the Marines.

Last, there will be 3 Reserve Squadrons, all on F35B.

Prior to the 2011 TACAIR deal, the Marines planned, as said earlier, for an all B fleet, which would have lined 3 Fleet Replacement Squadrons, each with at least 20 airplanes.

There is not yet a detailed plan for the FRSs now that the F35C is part of the picture, but a share of the 64 airframes assigned to training will no doubt be made up by the C.

A 20-airplanes Fleet Replacement Squadron on the F35B is part of the Eglin ITC, and two more F35B FRS were planned: i guess that there might still be, but line, perhaps, 15 F35B each instead of 20, with another FRS having the F35C.

The FY2012 Marines Aviation Plan, once published, should explain this: normally, their documents are wonderfully detailed. FY2011 Plan sure is, and it is immensely interesting even though the F35 part is clearly outdated as it is still an all-B plan.

The Naval Aviation Vision 2012, released in January, describes the future of the 10 Carrier Air Wings of the US Navy:

44 Strike Fighers [2x Super Hornet sqn, 12 airplanes each, one two-seat and one single seat]

                            [2x F35C sqn, 10 airplanes each]

5 AEW&C            [1x E2D Hawkeye sqn with 4/5 airplanes]

11 helicopters      [+8 distributed within the battlegroup, all of the MH60R type]

2/3 Carrier On-board Delivery [Greyhound and then future replacement]

4/6 UCAVs           [from 2018 or, more likely, 2020]

5 Electronic Warfare [1x EA-18G Growler squadron with 5 airplanes]

556 Super Hornet are available/on order so to sustain a 20 Squadron force up to 2030.

75 E2D Hawkeye are being purchased for 10 squadrons plus Fleet Replacement Squadron, 1 Reserve Squadron (will continue to use the E2C).

114 EA-18G Growler on order, to sustain 14 Squadrons [10 for the Carrier Air Wings, 4 "Expeditionary", needed also to fill a big hole in EW capability since the termination of the USAF B52 Standoff Jammer Capability], one Fleet Replacement Squadron with 12 airplanes.

The USMC is not getting any Growler: they will use to exhaustion the remaining Prowler, [22 in 4 Squadrons] decommissioning one squadron per year from 2016 onwards. The replacement will be the stealthy Next Generation Jammer, mounted on the F35B (the Navy will use it on the Growler and possibly on the C), and a UAV with an Electronic Warfare payload.