The Royal Artillery tries again

Jane's is reporting that the Royal Artillery is considering a series of new equipment programmes to update its regiments and adapt itself to better support the "strike brigades". 

There is no shortage of good requirements. A "new" one is "Strike 155", for the purchase of a wheeled or towed 155mm howitzer for the Strike Brigades. 

It can't be defined as a truly "new" requirement, of course, because it comes after LIMAWS(Gun) was cancelled years ago. 

If there was the funding, purchasing perfectly good off the shelf guns would not be particularly problematic. Sweden will put 12 Archer on the market soon; France would be all too happy to sell CAESAR, and Royal Artillery troops have already trialed it in the field in several occasions. 

The BAE-Bofors Archer. 48 were produced, 24 each for Sweden and Norway, but the latter eventually pulled out of the programme. Sweden has announced the intention to take all 48 but put 12 up for sale. 12 are not enough for the UK's requirement of two regimental sets, but would be a beginning. 

The Royal Artillery has already trialed the french CAESAR in the field 

In the photos by Army Recognition from Eurosatory 2016, the Nexter CAESAR 8x8, a more capable development with autoloader, better protection and mobility. Another obvious candidate. 

There is Project Congreve, for introducing new capabilities and eventually looking at the replacement of GMLRS and Exactor. 

GMLRS could really do with a purchase of some Alternative Warhead rounds, to restore the area-annihillation capability that was once the pride and reason d'etrè of the system. 

The two GMLRS launchers as used by the US Army. The british variant is known as B1 rather than A1. Arguably, the british army does not really need to rush into procuring a wheeled launcher: while its strategic mobility would be better, it would not change the equation by much. The Strike Brigades will use vehicles no lighter than 30 tons and will have tracks in it (Ajax, Terrier) regardless of what happens to the artillery element. A wheeled launcher will not realize the dream of an air transportable brigade, so its procurement is arguably at the bottom of the priorities list. The actual problem is that the British Army has no more than 35 - 36 operational M270B1. Ideally, there should be 4 Precision Fires batteries in the army (one in each armoured and strike brigade). There are currently 3, with only 6 launchers each. A fourth should be formed for the second Strike Brigade, and ideally the number of launchers should grow to 8 or 9. There is also a reserve GMLRS regiment (101 RA).  

The Alternative Warhead seeks to generate area-destruction effects similar to those offered by the old submunition-laden rockets, without generating an UneXploded Ordnance (UXO) hazard on the ground. The ban on submunitions left the British Army with only the unitary warhead rocket: excellent for many things, but insufficient, alone, to cover all needs. 

GMLRS and ATACMS family tree 

Up to 2010 the Royal Artillery was also planning an ATACMS purchase. Of course, that, as well as everything else, did not progress. But now they might just be in time to buy into its successor, if there is real money for it, and not just dreams. 

Long Range Precision Fires will deliver ATACMS-like range and effect, within a thinner body allowing carriage of two missiles in each standard pod. 

Long Range Precision Fires will give the US Army a tool to fight back against the vast arsenal of Iskander missiles that would have to be faced in a clash versus Russian forces. It will complement, at lower cost, the deep strike capability of aviation. 

If they are looking for a lighter, wheeled replacement for the tracked M270B1, there is of course the US HIMARS readily available. Even this requirement would not be new: the british army years ago had attempted to get a GMLRS launcher that could be slung under a Chinook, no less, the LIMAWS (Rocket). 

LIMAWS - Rocket (LIghtweight Mobile Artillery Weapon System) was the british answer to the US HIMARS. Even lighter and easier to deploy, it could be carried under slung by a Chinook. LIMAWS R was cancelled. It employed a single, standard GMLRS 6-rocket pod, just like HIMARS. 

The M777 Portee combined a Supacat high mobility vehicle carrying the gun crew and the ammunition and an M777 howitzer. The gun could be towed or carried and deployed in the field rapidly. The gun cannot fire when mounted on the truck, but the hybrid vehicle resulting could be carried (vehicle and gun separately) under slung by Chinook. LIMAWS - Gun was cancelled.  

Another project is the purchase of a new weapon locating radar, to succeed to MAMBA, which has a 2026 OSD. The weapon locating radar requirement is also nothing new. In its earlier incarnation, the Common Weapon Locating Radar was once to enter service by 2012 to replace COBRA, and lately MAMBA too, with a single type covering both the High (COBRA) and Low (MAMBA) spectrum of the mission. The British Army evaluated the SAAB Arthur C for the requirement, a perfectly sensible candidate. But of course, that project fell apart too, with nothing purchased and COBRA removed from service with only MAMBA left. More luck this time...?

Then there is an equally long-running ambition to purchase guided, long range ammunition (Excalibur, Vulcano, SGP all good choices readily available) and a requirement for a course-correcting fuze to improve the accuracy of the normal shells and reduce CEP. Requirements that have all been around since before 2010 and that have a tentative delivery date of 2018. 

AS90 could really, really do with a 52 calibre barrel, putting it at least on par with other contemporary artillery systems. The longer barrel was part of the Braveheart upgrade which, you have surely guessed it already, fell apart years ago. 

The Braveheart long barrel would remove the current range disadvantage of AS90

The US Army suffers from the same weakness: 39 caliber barrels in a world of 52 calibers. A 24 km reach versus 30 and more. There can be no doubt about it being a significant disadvantage. 
The US Army is upgrading its Paladin self propelled guns but hasn't changed their barrels yet. It is, however, working on creating a long-barrel M777. The british army has done nothing about this disadvantage ever since Braveheart was cancelled. 

M777 ER in front, and standard M777 behind. 1000 pounds and 6 feet of difference. 

Eventually, the L118 Light Gun will need a replacement as well, of course, and the Royal Artillery is also aware that if MORPHEUS progresses and replaces the Bowman radio and data infrastructure it will have to develop a new artillery-specific fire control application to replace the current one. 

The Royal Artillery modernization programme used to be called "Indirect Fire Precision Attack Capability", but it produced little more than nothing. The procurement of the SMART 155 mm round carrying guided anti-tank submunitions was cancelled soon after the contract was signed, LIMAWS went nowhere, Braveheart was cancelled, Fire Shadow is lost in some unknown dimension of the universe and everything else is changing name and waiting for tomorrow. 

Let's see if under new names it goes any better...

After the SDSR - Strike brigades: a big deal?

 SDSR 2015 is published: What it says and what it does not detail

 Strike brigades: a big deal?

The Strike Brigades: a big deal?

The “Strike Brigades”, which seem actually destined to be mechanized infantry brigades, fantasy-titles aside, represent a far great change for the army than most appreciate from the SDSR document, which is completely devoid of details.

What is the extent of the change, and what are the implications?  

What is a strike brigade?

Answer: we don’t yet know exactly what shape it is supposed to have. It will include the Ajax family of tracked vehicles and the new Mechanized Infantry Vehicle (a wheeled, 8x8 armoured vehicle) to be procured in the coming years.

It is also expected to have the full range of supports, from logistic to artillery, from medical regiment to REME to combat engineers.

Where do the strike brigades come from?

One Strike Brigade will be obtained downgrading one of the current three Armoured Infantry Brigades; the other will come from the upgrading of one of the seven Adaptable Infantry Brigades.

The end result is a force with 2 armoured infantry brigades, 2 strike brigades, 6 infantry brigades.

Vehicles?

The key questions are: how will Ajax be distributed? The most likely answer is in a single Cavalry regiment for each brigade. The implication: the Ajax fleet has been ordered under the Army 2020 plan, which would have seen Ajax replace the ancient, light CVR(T) vehicles in the reconnaissance regiments and in the recce platoons within tank regiments and armoured infantry battalions.

The assumption was that the vehicles would equip 3 cavalry regiments and 9 recce platoons (in 3 tank and 6 armoured infantry units).

Now we must assume that the cavalry regiments will be four, one for each armoured and strike brigade. In addition, Ajax will continue to be required for the recce platoons in the Tank and Armoured Infantry regiments and battalions.

The Ajax fleet on order is not expected to be expanded: it should be possible to squeeze four cavalry regiments out of the fleet, but it might take some Whole Fleet Management magic: the number of the specialized variants is carefully thought out for 3 regiments. Adding a fourth might mean that there are not enough vehicles for everyone, and regiments are only given access to all the vehicles on the ORBAT only when deploying.

Next, how many MIV? Until yesterday, the Army required the MIV as a replacement for the Mastiff and Ridgback MRAPs employed by 3 battalions of “Heavy Protected Mobility Infantry”.

One such battalion is present in each armoured infantry brigade.

Now the MIV could be required to equip as many as 6 battalions of infantry, or as few as 2, or 4. We have no real idea what the plan is. A Strike Brigade will have, one would expect, the canonical 3 infantry battalions. But how will these battalions be configured? They could be all mounted on MIV, or 2 or even just 1 on MIV and the rest on Foxhound, or some battalions might even be of the Light Role type, with no section vehicle at all and soldiers on foot.

What will the Engineer regiment of the brigade use? The description of the brigade’s concept would appear to rule out the massive Titan bridgelayer and Trojan AVRE vehicles, so the 30 tons Terrier will be the main item, with the truck-mounted ABLE and REBS bridging systems as likely complement, plus wheeled excavators, trucks and all the rest.

REME? We can expect no Challenger recovery vehicle for the same reason. Ajax recovery variants, MIV recovery variants, MAN Wrecker are the most likely tools.

Medical regiment: a MIV ambulance variant is a most likely fit.

Artillery: AS90 is excluded by its weight and logistic tail. The Light Gun is the most likely initial solution, although it really is an underwhelming weapon for use in a mechanized formation: a 155 mm system such as the French CAESAR would be ideal later on.

Direct Fire: armoured infantry brigades enjoy the firepower of main battle tanks. Traditional Mechanized Infantry Brigades also have tanks, but the “strike brigade”, as described, seems destined not to have tanks as they are too heavy and difficult to deploy.

If money wasn’t a problem, a MIV Direct Fire variant, sporting an MBT-class main gun but on wheels, would be procured, but it takes quite a bit of optimism to imagine the british army being able to afford this.

Italian Medium Brigades, which are mounted on Freccia 8x8 vehicles, enjoy the presence of the Centauro 8x8 tank destroyer with a 105mm gun, and its eventual replacement, the Centauro 2 with the 120 mm. The Centauro is used in the reconnaissance cavalry role.

Being the result of endless change of plans, the british Strike Brigades, despite being almost entirely wheeled, will instead end up using the tracked Ajax for reconnaissance and combat screening. Not exactly the best of solutions.

Logistic: the RLC element for the Strike Brigade will not be as large as that associated with an armoured infantry brigade, but nonetheless will have to be much larger than that found in an Adaptable Infantry Brigade. 


For the Full Size image click here

The transition from Army 2020 to Joint Force 2025 and its implications. Note: the 2025 structure of both the Strike and of the Armoured Infantry brigades can, at this stage, only be a guess. For all we know, the armoured brigades could have 2 smaller tank regiments each and 2 or 3 infantry battalions on Warrior. The Strike brigades might have to complement MIV with Foxhound battalions. We literally have no idea for now. Hope the army has a more consistent plan...

Manpower

Mechanized Infantry Battalions are only slightly smaller than armoured infantry ones in manpower terms (709 versus 729, in Army 2020). They are however some 150 men larger than a Light Role infantry battalion (709 versus 561). Since the Army’s overall manpower is not increasing, the larger units needed to transform an Adaptable Brigade into a Strike Brigade will require other infantry battalions to get even smaller. 

Supporting elements will become smaller as they move from armoured to mechanized, but again we must assume that current "light" supports will have to grow to account for the other strike brigade, and this will require even more manpower. 

Sure enough, the SDSR says that “a number” of infantry battalions will be “reconfigured for mentoring and defence engagement”: another way to say that they will shrink further as manpower goes in other directions.

Mind you, it is not necessarily a bad thing: in earlier posts I’ve argued for this kind of approach (I actually suggested closing down entire battalions rather than keeping a lot of tiny, understrenght units, but I knew all too well that the government wouldn’t have the guts to face a “disappearing capbadge” outrage scenario), but the SDSR uses nice words to announce the change without making it explicit.

Heavy metal

The armoured infantry brigades remaining will have to change in some way. How, we don’t yet know.

Everything is possible, in theory. Two fairly safe assumptions are that the brigades will continue to have their own cavalry regiment on Ajax but will lose their Heavy Protected Mobility Infantry battalion in favor of the Strike Brigades.

The six armoured infantry battalions could all stay and be spread 3 and 3 into each brigade. Logical, but expensive, especially if another six battalions get mounted on MIVs. 

Similarly, what happens to tank regiments? Now 3 (+1 reserve): tomorrow? Will they become two, but larger? Two, same size? Four, smaller?

GMLRS: difficult to even guess. Its precision and long range is key, and its weight class isn't far from Ajax or what we can expect for the MIV itself. It could go both ways: we could see a fourth precision fires battery formed, or we could see a reduction to two. Hard to say.

AS90: how many will be cut? It seems an unlikely fit for the Strike Brigades, and, as of march 2015, the OSD of AS90 is 2030. The Army is already thinking about replacing it, perhaps with the french CAESAR (which 1st Royal Horse Artillery has extensively trialed). GMLRS OSD is also 2030, but this will probably not hold true, while it might for AS90.

Titan & Trojan: how many will be cut? 

Assuming each armoured and each strike brigade gets a Cavalry regiment on Ajax, a fourth such regiment has to be created. It could be obtained by re-roling one Tank regiment, or by re-roling a Light Cavalry regiment, in theory. It seems far more likely that a tank regiment will be re-roled, sadly, because this would free up some manpower (although not terribly much: a Challenger 2 regiment has an establishment of 587 versus 528 for an Ajax cavalry regiment, in army 2020) and money.

Infantry brigades and enduring deployments

The British Army currently works according to the Rule of the 5: it takes 5 man to keep one constantly deployed, as this allows said man to enjoy a 24 months interval between one 6-months operational deployment and another.

Army 2020 delivers the ability to sustain a brigade-size enduring deployment by means of 3 armoured brigades and 7 infantry brigades. The latter, which are really “containers” of deployable regiments and battalions, can deliver two deployable brigades to deliver the fourth and fifth deployment in an enduring operation. The rhythm works out as: armoured, armoured, armoured, adaptable, adaptable, and again armoured and so on.

The air assault battlegroup and the amphibious battlegroup are in addition.

Will Joint Force 2025 deliver the same kind of capability? If the answer is yes, how?

We can assume that, from the six remaining infantry brigades, a third 2-brigade, 2-year force generation cycle could be sustained, delivering each year an infantry brigade at readiness. Supports elements would be available for a single deployment, assuming that the current “5 of everything” approach is maintained.

There currently are 5 artillery regiments, 5 signal regiments, 5 engineer, 5 REME, 5 logistic elements and so along. Will Joint Force 2025 cut back from 5 to 4?

Or perhaps will Harmony Guidelines be changed to account for a 1 in 4 rule, meaning 6 months deployed at intervals of just 18 months?

We don’t yet have an answer to any of these questions.

Conclusions

The Strike Brigades have profound implications for the Army. They are extremely likely to cause further losses in heavy armour assets and in heavy, self propelled artillery, despite the relevance of these systems having been dramatically reaffirmed in Ukraine.

The formation of the Strike Brigades will send ripples across the entire army and its procurement plans. Depending on the structure of the brigades, the numbers of the MIV programme can change dramatically. The requirement for ABSV will become smaller as one brigade moves from tracks to wheels.  

Each Corp of the army will be touched in some way. And there are enormous implications in terms of force generation cycles and potentially of harmony guidelines.

The army might finally get its long dreamed Medium Brigades and new 8x8 armoured vehicles, but how much it will have to sacrifice to get to them is not yet clear.

Army 2020 is no more: a new plan needs to take shape, and we can only hope the Army knows more than we do. The SDSR provides no answers: let’s hope the Army has an actual plan about the way forwards. 

Army 2020 in detail: Royal Artillery

Previous parts:

1 - Force Troops Command and Royal Engineers

2 – Royal Signals

3 - Royal Artillery

The following tables show the intended restructuring that the regular regiments of the Royal Artillery are to undergo as part of Army 2020. The information dates back to December 2012, and reports on the shape of the force as decided in September 2012. A number of changes had already taken place by that point, with some of the batteries of the disbanded 40th Regiment RA having been re-subordinated to other regiments. The changes outlined in the tables give the final intended Army 2020 structure of the Royal Artillery.

Despite the time that has passed, the information should still be valid in its entirety. Several of the changes outlined in the tables have already happened, others are underway. The fate of 29 Commando Royal Artillery should include the survival of all its batteries, but with a rather savage cutback in manpower: the three gun batteries seem to only line 12 guns in total, or four guns each, down from a normal figure of six. The regiment, according to a note from the commander, had been asked to modify its ORBAT to account for a reduction in manpower going as far up as 20%. The effect of the cut, however, was somehow softened by the uncomfortable truth that the regiment already was understrenght, so the number of redundancies was kept to a minimum.

For a long while, 148 Battery sat on the edge, about to be removed from the ORBAT, but it was eventually saved, thanks to the resistance put up by Royal Marines command and Navy HQ.

Possible further changes beyond those outlined here might come in the training regiment and in the various batteries employed in the training role as the Royal Artillery plans out the future.

The restructuring of 12 Royal Artillery regiment appears confirmed by the Force Troops Command document, which confirms that there will be three Stormer HVM batteries, one aligned with each of the armoured infantry brigades. The third battery on Stormer will be obtained by the re-roling of the current HQ Bty. A new battery identity, coming out of suspended animation, goes to the new HQ for the regiment.

16 Regiment Royal Artillery restructures on four Rapier batteries, and the two regiments share 42 Battery as an air defence support element.

49 Battery remains independent, as the user of the LEAPP system.

The Reserve will no longer supply Rapier formations, but 106 RA will instead deliver two reserve Stormer HVM (295 and 457 Bty) batteries and one LML battery (265 Bty).

Of particular interest is the evolution of the UAS force, which is already switching away from its current campaign posture, meant to support the enduring operations in Afghanistan, to a new structure aligned to the Army’s new shape.

This probably means that at least one battery will lose its “full spectrum” capability to focus only on mini-UAVs. Currently, the batteries are structured to include T-Hawk detachments for the support to EOD work in the Talisman convoys; Desert Hawk III detachments in support of both bases and mobile forces; and Hermes 450 task lines.

The force continues to support operation Herrick, and is also working towards consolidating in Larkhill, with 47 Regiment transferring from its current home in Thorney Island. 47 Regiment RA will move from Thorney Island to Larkhill in the summer, between June and July. 43 Battery is indeed already based in Roberts Barracks, Larkhill, and the rest is to gradually follow.

10 Bty, 47 Regiment also is about to deploy to Afghanistan for Herrick 20, and it seems that they will bring with them one Watchkeeper task line, for the first ever operational use of the new tactical UAS. In the meanwhile, the UAS personnel have seen their tours sized at four months, which means that personnel from the two regiments is rotated in and out of theatre regardless of the battery that is deployed in that specific moment. Personnel rotate under directions coming from the central management, and it is thus pretty normal to end up de-linked from the parent battery for periods of time.

It is very reassuring to see that the UAV force made up by 47 and 32 Regiments will express a powerful capability, spread over six “flying” batteries of unmanned air systems, plus two HQ batteries and a shared support battery.

Three UAS batteries will be aligned with the reaction force armoured infantry brigades, and are likely to retain the full spectrum structure. They will get Warthog vehicles modified to act as carriers for the Desert Hawk III detachments, and they will also have Viking vehicles carrying the ground tactical node of the Watchkeeper system.

Two more support the Adaptable Force, and hopefully will maintain the full-sprectrum structure as well. 21 (Gibraltar 1779-83) Battery, in the Very High Readiness air assault role appears likely to shift to a mini-UAV only role, more realistic to deploy in earnest, possibly from the air and with as little logistical footprint as possible, although I can’t confirm this at present. The battery so continues to be directly aligned with 16 Air Assault brigade, for which it once provided air defence with the Starstreak LML missile system. The air assault, very high readiness air defence role has now moved out to 12 (Minden) Battery in 12 Regiment, instead. 

The Integrated UAS Batteries as shaped by the Afghanistan experience. Note to the equipment detail: Desert Hawk III and T-Hawk are both being brought into core budget. It is almost certain that Black Hornet will also be retained. Black Hornet is the only army UAS that is employed by infantry instead of RA specialists.

 

Another interesting element is the STA force, 5 Regiment RA. The regiment is to have its batteries changed to align them to the Reaction Force. One battery looks set to be “lighter” than the others, as 53 Bty is to be configured to provide STA support to 16 Air Assault Brigade in the very high readiness air assault role. It is probable that the battery will bear greater similitude with the Surveillance and Reconnaissance Squadron of 30 Commando IX than to the other three STA batteries of 5 RA, which will be heavier and include a full range of capabilities to support the three armoured infantry brigades.

These batteries will employ MAMBA, as well as the lightweight counter mortar radar, and the plan appears to include the retention of some of the CORTEZ base-ISTAR equipment, including the large surveillance aerostats. I read time ago that Royal Artillery and RAF Regiment were collaborating on base-ISTAR equipment, including the aerostats, and it makes a lot of sense: it would be very interesting to get fresher and more detailed information about this.

Unfortunately, there won’t be five “ready-to-go” STA batteries with the same, complete range of capabilities, which puts another problem on the planning schedule for a possible future enduring operation, and unfortunately the Adaptable Force misses out completely on having a STA formation aligned with its brigades. Support for training and for future deployments will thus present some serious challenges, in a repeat of the problem already evidenced in ICS support.

There used to be two reserve batteries in the STA role, but it appears that there will be none under Army 2020, as the existing batteries are converting to GMLRS.

The Honourable Artillery Company remains, however, on three squadrons providing additional covert special observation patrols for the reinforcement of 4/73 Sphinx battery.

It is also finally confirmed that the intended structure of the Adaptable Force Artillery Regiments, 3^rd RHA and 4^th RA, includes only two Light Gun batteries, and a doubled complement of Fire Support Teams, in two (three, even, in 4^th Regiment) TAC batteries instead of the canonic one. It seems clear that the idea is that regulars are better employed in the demanding FST role, while reserves from the paired regiment can provide additional guns. 3^rd RHA is paired with 105 RA, while 4^th RA is paired with 103 RA. It seems to remain the plan that, for reasons of geographical convenience, 3^rd RHA will also support 101 RA, the Reserve GMLRS regiment, despite the different roles and equipment of the two units. 

Each of the two Reserve light gun regiments has four gun batteries. 

The Royal Artillery reserve regiments under Army 2020

 

The changes to the Air Assault artillery regiment, 7^th Royal Horse Artillery, have taken place as planned, and the remaining gun batteries have taken up the equipment and role of the gone Aviation TAC Gp Battery, bringing it into smaller but full-capability packages that can rotate in support of the airborne task force at high readiness.

The structure of the Reaction Force artillery regiments is also confirmed, with three AS-90 batteries supported by a GMLRS (and Exactor) precision fire battery.

The future will tell if the Fire Shadow loitering ammunition will find a long-term place in the Army beyond the 39 Regiment’s Troop which has taken it for evaluation and trials.