Thanks to the MOD’s sales service,
we have just discovered that the Royal Navy has been robbed of yet another
precious capability, with the untimely demise of RFA Diligence, the Forward
Repair Ship. She is now
on sale, ready for further use in the hands of a new owner.
She is in good conditions despite
the many years of age, having received constant updates and adjustments over
the years, which have included an improved ballast water treatment plant
purchased in 2014. She completed her last refit in March 2015… and left
service, according to the sales brochure, in May 2015.
Congratulations, MOD! It is not the
first time that money is wasted to refit a ship which is then immediately after
removed from service. In recent times, it has been the fate of RFA Orangeleaf
as well. But this does not mean that the practice is any less demented and
offensive.
The cut of RFA Diligence is probably
the stealthiest in many years. Sthealtier still than the cut of 2 of the Point
class RoRo transports, which took place merely months after the SDSR 2010 had
specifically said that all 6 would stay in service. There have been no
messages, no ceremonies, no news, no explanations. Only silence.
Nobody knew that RFA Diligence had
gone out of service. It was known that she was in port since may 2015, but the
assumption was that the RFA had put her “in pause” due to the well known
shortage of manpower.
Even the MOD itself seems to have
missed the cutting of RFA Diligence, since they replied
to a FOI in December 2015 saying that her Out of Service Date was 2020.
The following is a very interesting article about RFA Diligence, her capabilities and her role, from Marine Maintenance Technology International, September 2015 issue.
RFA Diligence Article by Liger30 on Scribd
Yet, she is gone. And a replacement is nowhere to be seen. Considering the capability she offered, it is a big loss.
In the meanwhile, another interesting
FOI offers actual numbers to back up the coloured but un-detailed graphics
of the 10 year Equipment Programme. This, together with the annual publication
on the MOD Major Projects status, makes it possible to play a little bit of
math. Open all three documents, and follow me in this puzzle-solving game.
The FOI’s table offers a more readable
breakdown of the Equipment Budget, showing:
-
Money
reserved for the launch of new procurement (it does not break down the share
destined to support of said new equipment); separating between committed and
uncommitted funds. Uncommitted funds are not yet tied down by a contract.
-
Money
for In Service Equipment (so, basically, the cost of supporting what is already
in service), again in Committed and Uncommitted form.
-
Money
for procurement, which is the expenditure on ongoing programmes
Taken alone, these numbers are interesting
and impressive, but do not tell the story. What is this money paying for? What
margin exists for procuring new kit? Is the situation so desperate that it
requires losing a ship as cost-effective and capable as Diligence?
The MOD does not provide the
information required. Compare the “10 Year Programme” and all other sparse
documents published by the MOD or about the MOD (NAO reports, namely) to the
defence budget documentation produced by France, USA and even Italy, and you’ll
see that the MOD is as transparent as a thick plate of steel painted solid
black.
We only have indications about costs
and performance of a handful of selected programmes, and always one year after
the budget is determined. The MOD publishes an Excel spreadsheet, annually,
detailing the status of the major programmes in the previous Annual Budget Cycle.
The document published this July, in
fact, is composed of data from September 2015.
The NAO report works in similar
fashion.
Other programmes never get detailed:
we are not told what is their in-year cost, nor we are told how much kit is
ordered in a set year, and how much kit is taken in charge in the year.
France and US are particularly good
at reporting these information. Italy is a bit less detailed, but each year it
is possible to read a good document saying how much money is going to go on
programme X during the year. The MOD gives no comparable information.
Joining the FOI data with the Excel
spreadsheet, though, it is possible to compose a decent picture of the Royal Navy’s
equipment budget situation for the year 2015 / 16.
In 2015/16, the Royal Navy has been
given, for Surface Ships:
54 million for (eventually) starting
new procurement processes for new kit (money uncommitted)
529 million, committed, for
supporting equipment in service
302 million, uncommitted, for
support to equipment in service
1009 million, committed, for ongoing
procurement
310 million, uncommitted, for
ongoing procurement
The Excel spreadsheet offers information
on in-year expenditure for several programmes. Specifically:
Queen Elizabeth class procurement,
712,93 million
Carrier Enabled Power Projection
studies, 1,44 million
Tide class tankers, 194,98 million
Type 26, 222,3 million
The budget allocated in year can be
underspent or overspent, depending on how things go. The Excel document
contains also the forecasted actual expenditure, most of the time slightly
smaller than the allocation.
Adding up the budgets above,
however, the total goes well above the Committed 1009 million. The Uncommitted
money is not money available for procuring additional kit, but merely
money that isn’t yet tied to a specific contract.
If we consider Committed and
Uncommitted money together, we reach a 1319 million total. There is in theory a
187,35 million margin, but of course there are programmes we aren’t given
details about. For example, the procurement of the River Batch 2. Its cost is
348 million spread over N years, where N is pretty certainly not less than 4.
However, the spread of expenditure is not equal, so 348/4 is only a wild
estimate.
Again, the Royal Navy also committed
12,6 million (over how many years?) to the ATLAS combined sweep demonstration
programme; and a further 17 million (over how many years, again?) for the MMCM system
being developed jointly with France.
All things considered, the margin,
at the end of the day, is nonexistent. It would be very interesting, instead,
to learn what happened to the 54 million for wholly new procurement. It is a
small sum, but a non insignificant one. And this year the amount is 80 million,
yet, the Royal Navy is reportedly going to lose Scan Eagle, because there is no
money to buy the currently contractor-operated systems; nor to renew the
current deal; nor to launch the new Flexible Deployable UAS the Royal Navy had
hoped to start. This is puzzling, but we simply do not have the information
needed to paint a better picture.
The Submarines budget is another
interesting area. The FOI gives:
77 uncommitted millions for new
procurement, and 15 committed
194 uncommitted and 1663 committed
for support to existing equipment
684 uncommitted and 1628 committed
for ongoing procurement.
Detectable expenditure in-year in
the Submarines budget is given as:
638,65 million for Astute
170,5 for the Nuclear Core
Production Capability
770,41 for Successor SSBN
37 million for the Spearfish torpedo
upgrade (might actually fall in the Complex Weapons budget line, though)
1085,43 million in costs for AWE
Aldermaston, its new infrastructure developments and the Nuclear Warhead
Capability Sustainment Programme which is replacing the non-nuclear components
of the MK4 warheads to turn them into MK4A.
Again, the total go well above the
committed procurement funding, and above the total obtained adding the uncommitted
money, too. The most likely explanation is that a big share of the AWE costs
actually fall into the Support to in service equipment voice, considering that
it is expenditure connected to kit and infrastructure already in use.
It gets more complex with the other
services, as the data is even more fragmented and incomplete. The Excel sheet
does not provide info on in-year Typhoon expenditure, so Combat Air
calculations could only be incomplete.
The simple fact that it takes this
kind of research, guessing, reasoning and puzzle-solving to compose a picture
of the situation is a sign of just how badly the MOD works, and how much is
done to make cuts such as RFA Diligence’s unfortunate departure invisible, or
almost so.
The detail about requirements and
future purchases is inexistent, and even when the SDSR documents say something,
you can expect something else entirely to happen (see the Point class event, or
the fact that the “up to six OPVs” in the SDSR 2015 is already turning into “5”,
with only of the River Batch 2s replacing HMS Clyde even though the ship is
still very much young).
My first plea to the new government
is to clear up this mess, and make MOD plans less stealthy. This constant
scamming and book-cooking is unhelpful when it is not offensive. This absolute
lack of transparency is a shame that needs to be ended.
