The Warrior Capability Sustainment Programme

The December issue of SOLDIER, magazine of the British Army, contains a brief article which reports the beginning of field trials with the prototypes of the upgraded Warrior family. This is an important and much awaited milestone, reached after a stormy programme review sparked by the difficulties encountered by Lockheed Martin UK in providing the modern turret with 40mm CTA gun. The programme accumulated a 12 months delay and an unspecified cost growth caused by the decision to fit the vehicle with a whole new turret instead of remanufactured ones.

The delay resulted in a 22% in-year saving in 2016/2017 as some activities could simply not progress and shifted to the right. The expected in-year expenditure of 87 million shrunk to 68. There is no indication yet of the extent of the long-term cost increase, however.

The first upgraded Warrior vehicles entered Factory Acceptance Tests earlier this year. In September it was reported that qualification trials were to begin in Bovington by the end of the year, and the schedule seems to have been more or less respected since then.

Lockheed Martin UK manufactures the new turret and also puts together the upgrade “kits” that turn the old Warrior into the new one.

Lockheed leads a team which includes: Ultra Electronics; the Defence Support Group; SCISYS (Electronic architecture); Rheinmetall Defence; Curtiss Wright (they supply the turret-drive servo system for the Ajax Scout turret. Their role with Warrior is the same); Thales UK (optics and Battlegroup Thermal Imaging system); Moog; Meggitt; CTA International (supplying the 40 mm CTA gun); Westwire; TKE; MTL and Caterpillar UK (support to the powerpack).

Rheinmetall is the supplier of the Ajax Scout turret structure, a derivative of their LANCE product, and for WCSP they were meant to rework the existing Warrior turret and adapt it to the new requirements. This is no longer the case, and a whole new turret is produced instead.

The difficulties encountered by the LM team vindicated BAE’s original warning and underline the validity of their offer, which was turned down: BAE had offered a whole new turret along.

DSEI 2017 

As well as manufacturing the new turret for WCSP, LMUK is also responsible for putting together the upgrade ‘kits’ that will refresh the vehicle’s protection as well as the platform’s electronic architecture.

The new turret and main gun are only the most visible of a series of modifications and upgrades. The CSP is the sum of multiple development programmes:

-          WFLIP (Warrior Fightability Lethality Improvement Programme) to improve turrets and sensors, and add firepower by changing the turret and gun;  

-          WMPS (Warrior Modular Protection System) to add a modular frame that takes note of the experience of Iraq and Afghanistan TES armor fittings and prepares the vehicle, PUMA-like, for easy and rapid installation of existing and future add-on armour packages when needed;

-          WEEA (Warrior Enhanced Electronic Architecture) to add a fully integrated set of modern, expandable electronics and communications gear;

For years, the CSP also included the Armoured Battlegroup Support Vehicle, a family of “turret-less” variants of the Warrior that should have been developed to finally replace the FV432 within armoured formations.

Warrior numbers  

The original production run of Warrior delivered:

- 489 FV510 Infantry Section Vehicle (105 of which are platforms for the mobility of ATGW teams, once with Milan, now with Javelin)
- 84 FV511 Infantry Command Vehicles
- 105 FV512 Mechanized Combat Repair Vehicles
- 39 FV513 Mechanized Recovery Vehicle (Repair)
- 52 FV514 Mechanized Artillery Observation Vehicles for the RA
- 19 FV515 Battery Command Vehicles for the RA

In the 90s, A standard armoured infantry battalion of the British Army was expected to use some 63 Warriors:

- 47 FV510 Infantry Section Vehicles (including those kitted for ATGW transport role)
- 9 Infantry Command Vehicles (these are turreted and armed but have a completely different arrangement in the back)
- 4 FV513
- 3 FV512

A number of Warrior recovery and repair are found within MBT regiments, REME battalions and AS90 artillery formations. The Battery Command Vehicles are no longer in use and some were hastily converted into ambulances in Afghanistan for the armoured company group.

In its early years, WCSP was meant to upgrade 643 of the original vehicles with WEEA electronics and WMPS modular armoring upgrades. Within that group, 449 vehicles were to get WFIP program’s new turret and weapon system as well.

The SDSR 2010, however, drastically reduced the number of armoured infantry battalions, from 9 to 6, and that number has then been further slashed to just 4 for Army 2020 Refine.

In 2014 the NAO reported that the “affordable fleet” was down to 565 Warrior vehicles, 445 of which would be picked for getting upgrades under WCSP. 65 of those 445 vehicles would have been converted in APCs and Ambulances under ABSV, while the remaining 380 would consist of around 250 Section vehicles with turret and 40mm gun, with the balance made up by Recovery and Repair and Artillery Observation vehicles.

ABSV was ultimately split from WCSP, initially to “become its own Category A (400+ million pounds in value) programme” under the main budget heading “Armoured Infantry 2026”. This happened in the 2014/15 financial year.

The latest Major Project spreadsheet published by the MOD, however, which was released in July this year but is, as customary, current to 30 September of the previous year, shows that the “Armoured Infantry 2026” budget has reduced to 1612,72 million from 2176,45 million in the previous report. A note in the sheet says that ABSV was “removed” in the Annual Budget Cycle 2016, giving no other indication about the future of this vital requirement.

As result of all these passages, WCSP has been almost halved in scope, with 380 vehicles now expected to be upgraded, with 245 of these being in the turreted IFV configuration.

“Warrior 2” and ABSV

Once upgraded, the vehicles change denomination:

FV510 becomes FV520

FV511 becomes FV521

And so along. The Army has also assigned:

FV525 to the Warrior Ambulance variant

FV526 to the Warrior APC variant

Prototypes of such turretless variants have been seen already back in the 90s, when Alvis was still active. In more recent times BAE Systems has showcased a Mortar Carrier sub-variant of the Warrior APC, and an Engineering variant, able to serve as breaching and bridging vehicle has also been developed and trialed.

The ABSV requirement is ancient and its history is one of constant deaths and resurrections and uncertainty and delays. In 1995, the UK MoD had formalized its requirement for a new vehicle called the Multi Role Armoured Vehicle (MRAV) which was meant to replace the FV432 family; Saxon (4 × 4) armoured personnel carriers and those elements of the Combat Vehicle Reconnaissance (Tracked) family which would have not been supplanted by the then Tactical Reconnaissance Armoured Combat Equipment Requirement (TRACER). TRACER eventually died, supplanted by FRES, then FRES SV, now Ajax. MRAV is most commonly remembered because in 1999 the MOD joined the Boxer 8x8 programme and then cancelled it.

The original turretless Warrior, when Alvis Vickers was still a thing. 

Today's BAE Systems ABSV Mortar Carrier 

The Engineer Warrior, which could also fullfil the requirement for a medium weight assault engineering capability which used to be part of FRES SV but did not make it into Ajax 

MRAV, however, was not meant to result in a single vehicle family, but in two: M1P1 was tracked and also known as ABSV; M2P2 was the wheeled element, which became Boxer, then FRES UV and now is attempting to come back under the name MIV.

More than 20 years completely wasted, and the solution to the problem is still not in sight. ABSV, following the unclear ABC2016 decision, is in a particularly worrisome position while MIV might end up being Boxer all over again.

For the development trials, LM must deliver seven FV520s (section vehicle); two FV521s (infantry command vehicles); one FV522 (repair); one FV523 (recovery); and one FV524 (artillery observation vehicle).

The first company group equipped with the upgraded Warrior was expected to achieve IOC during 2020, but this might now have slipped to the right by as much as a further year.

Clear as mud

British Armed forces management is clear as mud. It is not a new discovery, but the sheer complexity and intricacy of the story of every programme never fails to amaze. It would take ages to follow all the name-changes and chair-shifting that have happened over the decades, and this is not the aim of this article.

It is however instructive to try and track the evolution of the budget allocation for the main armoured vehicles programmes in just the last few years to see how dishonest and murky the whole process is. Since the MOD refuses to reveal numbers or even detail exactly what requirements are included in the Equipment Programme, it is pretty much impossible to ensure any form of true accountability. I’ll go back just four years in this brief travel through the dishonesty of a government which wants to murk the waters so that cuts can not only be ordered, but hidden away in the countless folds of the programme.

In 2014 the Army had a massive overarching programme known as “Mounted Close Combat” which covered everything from Challenger 2 to Warrior and from Ajax to Mechanized Infantry Vehicle. That monster programme had a budget of 17.251 billion, spread out to the project end date of 31/12/2033.

Obviously, as a single programme its scope was way too vast and so it was split into four separate components going into 2015.

“Armoured Cavalry 2025” chiefly covers the acquisition and entry into service of the Ajax family of vehicles, to culminate by 30/04/2025 in a completely renewed Armoured Cavalry capability.

“Armoured Infantry 2026” includes chiefly the Warrior CSP, but not only that. There is the enduring problem of replacing FV432 as well, with the ancient vehicle having a notional OSD of 2026.

“Armour MBT 2025” covers the delivery of life-extended MBT capability to be fully operational by 2025.

“Mechanized Infantry 2029” covers the renewal of this other area, with FOC in 2029 and with the main focus being MIV.

In 2015 the MOD included only Armoured Cavalry and Armoured Infantry in the list of the major active programmes, so no detail at all was available about the other components. The Cavalry component had a budget of 6831,53 million; the armoured infantry a budget of 2176,45 million. Thanks to the NAO’s own report, the last one of its kind, unfortunately, we learn that Warrior CSP aimed for 445 vehicles in total, including 65 “Armoured Battlegroup Support Vehicles”, aka converted, turret-less hulls to replace FV432 with. The report, however, noted that the ABSV requirement is larger than 65 vehicles and the army envisaged a greater procurement effort, including more variants. A delay of two years to the ABSV element was anticipated, and once implemented it was decided that ABSV will be its own Category A (aka, worth over 400 million) project, separated from WCSP proper.

The report published this year, and which actually details the year 2016, has the Armoured Cavalry pricetag reduced to 6248 million thanks to vaguely described “cost saving measures” including an extended Initial In-Service Support Contract for Ajax. Good news, in theory. In practice, we don’t know what elements of capability were traded out to make it happen.

Armoured Infantry also drops, all the way down to 1612,72 million, to be expended out to 31/12/2026. In this case, the budget has shrunk because ABSV was “removed as a direct cost-saving measure in the Annual Budget Cycle (ABC) 2016”. There is no way to tell whether the removal is permanent or not, and if, when and how we can expect ABSV to reappear. Is the 2015 plan of making it its own programme later on still on the cards? The FV432 still definitely needs replacement, but we are given no clue of what’s happening.

Together, these two changes amount to almost 1150 million which have shifted around / vanished. With no fanfare, no real way to assess how bad the damage is.

Armour MBT 2025 gets finally reported, with a budget line of 744,79 million to be expended between 04/12/2014, start date, and 01/06/2026, current end date.

Mechanized Infantry 2029 remains unreported as it is still in very early stages, with little to no money allocated to it yet. A Written Answer to Parliament has since disclosed that MIV is now in the assessment phase, with a budget of 9 million, for “confirming the optimum fleet mix and delivery sequence”.

I’m tempted to offer a comment about the need for 9 million to determine what should be, really, the very basis of the requirement, but it wouldn’t be kindly worded.

There is still a lot of money left to get to the over 17 billion originally attached to the MCC, but tracking all movements is difficult if not impossible. It is not even possible to determine whether the Multi Role Vehicle – Protected budget is included within this macro budget area or whether it sits under another heading. We might get some information about it, but probably not before July 2018, when a new spreadsheet will make it possible to track the changes enacted during the year that is now ending.

Active Protection Systems

APS technologies can include ‘soft-kill’ defences that jam or decoy the seeker of incoming missiles; and ‘hard-kill’ solutions that intercept an incoming projective with an effector fired from the vehicle itself.

The Army has two ongoing programmes that aim to have pan-fleet applicability: one is MEDUSA, and is looking at how Soft Kill defences could be adopted on british armoured vehicles. The other is ICARUS, which is examining Hard Kill defences.

The studies will run out to 2019, and include equipment trials, some of them already ongoing on Challenger 2. ICARUS should eventually lead to a UK sovereign Modular, Integrated Protection System (MIPS) electronic architecture (EA) that will enable the installation of sensors and effectors (both soft and hard) as required.

MEDUSA trials have already seen Rheinmetall’s ROSY rapid obscurant system tested on a Challenger 2, while a wider test campaign revolves around the integration of the soft-kill Multifunction Self-Protection System (MUSS), manufactured by Hensoldt and already installed on the german PUMA IFVs.

In November this year the Israeli IMI company revealed that a Challenger 2 has also been fitted with the Iron Fist Heavy: this APS is a hard-kill system that destroys incoming missiles before they can hit the tank. It uses "mini-missiles" that are fired against the incoming threat and that should be safer for accompanying allied infantry than the well know Trophy, which uses blasts of pellets. 

Obviously, both programmes could have a major impact on the future of Warrior’s survivability.

The new armoured infantry capability

As of August 2016 the Army was still expecting to get an ABSV to support the “new” Warrior. The importance of this supporting vehicle cannot be overstated. In particular, the Army hopes that ABSV will finally remedy to a capability gap which is rarely mentioned yet is particularly damaging: the complete absence at present of a mobile, fire-under-armour anti-tank missile capability. An ATGW sub-variant of the ABSV APC is a desire the Army has had for years. The last time it dared mentioning it in public was in 2014 when, with remarkable and sadly misplaced optimism, the colonel in charge for armoured vehicles procurement envisaged a 2019/20 entry in service for ABSV. This now seems very unrealistic, and we don’t even know whether ABSV is still alive at all.

Capability-wise, WCSP will deliver a vehicle which is far more lethal and far more aware of its surroundings.

A new Main Engine Generator will provide 1200 amps for the various on-board systems and all variants will be fitted with Auxiliary Power Units to enable silent running. A new battery management system is meant to prevent increased demand from draining batteries dry while a Health and Usage monitoring System (HUMS) should make maintenance easier.

Renewed environmental control makes the vehicle more suited to extreme climates, and the adoption of mine-blast resistant seats improves survivability for the occupants.

Local situational awareness will be provided by six Local Situational Awareness Cameras (LSAS) distributed around the vehicle.

The driver will receive improved vision hatches, forward day & Thermal Imaging camera (SELEX ES Driver’s Night Vision System 4 (DNVS4)) and rear day & low light feed to aid manoeuvre.

An Elbit Instro CRONUS Thermal Imager Gunner Sight is provided for the gunner, with an automatic “cue to slew” function for improved target acquisition. The commander has a Thales Catherine BGTI REO/IR system. The new turret for the Warrior is now LM UK’s baseline Export Turret which is being offered for export. Inside it is more spacious and rationally organized and it offers greater survivability thanks to the under-armour storage of ammunition of the CTA gun.

Local Situational Awareness information, from navigation to imagery feed from the CRONUS and LSAS cameras, will be accessible to both the crew and dismounts in the back thanks to new displays.

Lethality sees the most dramatic uplift of all, as the Warrior goes from the non-stabilized RARDEN 30mm to the new 40mm CTA gun in a fully stabilized installation capable of accurate fire on the move.

The existing L94 chain gun remains as coaxial weapon. The cannon fires two ammunition natures; Armour Piercing Fin Stabilised Discarding Sabot (APFSDS) and a dual function General Purpose Round (GPR), with Air Burst (AB) and Point Detonation (PD) settings. The APFSDS round provides penetration of well armoured targets: the most optimist say that the CTA can take out anything less protected than a T-72. The RHA penetration value is given at 140 – 150 mm at 1500 meters.

GPR-AB will provide suppression and neutralisation out to 2000m.

For training purpose there is a Target Practice Tracer Round (TP-T) that does not have terminal explosive effect and associated hazards.

2012 images by LM. They should still be representative of the design, but probably not up to date

There are 70 rounds ready to fire in the ammunition handling system.

Made by Meggitt, it is composed by a translator, which holds 15 rds, and the magazine holding 55. At least 30 more rounds can be loaded internally through the turret, and the AHS identifies the type of round using colour bands on the case. It can cycle up to 400 rounds per minute, so selection of effects is not an issue. The AHS sits outside of the manned spaces of the turret, along the right side, so the crew is protected by a layer of armor and spall liner.

The power train remains the same with an option to upgrade, and this is the one weakness of an otherwise ambitious programme. The upgraded Warrior, at nearly 28 tons in combat order, once fitted with the roughly 10 tons of the WRAP 2 add-on armour package will max out its existing powerpack and will rapidly begin to grow limited in speed and agility.

The armoured infantry section is going down from 10 to 9 men, which actually means from 7 to 6 dismounts, since the others are the Warrior IFV’s crew. The Warrior loses a dismount seat in the upgrade, as new blast-protected seating and situational awareness troop compartment screen take away precious space.

FV524

Another enduring mystery is what exactly will happen with the Artillery Observation Post variant (FV514, to become FV524). The WCSP does not include mission-specific upgrades for this variant, which is by now obsolescent and which has to literally be transformed from an old school vehicle for the observation of the fall of artillery shots into a Joint Fires Control platform capable to direct precision air strikes as well as artillery and mortar fire. The FV514 has a turret, but the 30 mm gun is a dummy. It is not clear if under WCSP it will get the new turret, but without gun, or at least a "make up" to make its existing turret indistinguishable from that of upgraded Warriors IFVs. It is obvious that if it keeps the dummy Rarden gun and the current turret shape, it will stick out like a sore thumb among the upgraded and much different Warriors amongst which it is supposed to hide from enemy attention.

The Royal Artillery is responsible for developing and funding a new, up to date mission package of sensors and communications that will enable the direction of artillery fire and air support from under armour.

The RA has been experimenting possible solutions since 2010 / 11 if not from earlier, but it is not at all clear if it has the money to fund the upgrade.

The Royal Artillery has been working to define the mission equipment for the FV524, but the status of this particular upgrade remains uncertain 

If the upgrade can’t be embodied into the WCSP production phase, it will have to follow it, and this means, at best, that it would happen in the 2020s, and it would come into service near 2030, way too late.

Worse, if the RA package of upgrades can’t be funded at all, the FV514 risks being close to useless.

Moreover, since one of the Ajax sub-variants is equipped for Joint Fires Control (we don’t yet know exactly how, however), the opportunity of pushing on with the FV524 is questionable. Maybe purchasing more Ajax Joint Fires would provide an easier, more straightforward solution to the problem.

Battlefield implications

Armoured Infantry units are contemplating the possibility of more frequently operating without MBT support. Fire on the move capability, greater range and increased armour penetration coupled with better sensors will enable Warrior to hide less and fight more.

This could become more feasible if ABSV progressed and delivered that much-desired ATGW under-armour variant that would enable Warriors to take a much more aggressive approach in the field.  

The enhanced thermal imaging capability of the vehicle, in addition to local situational awareness and to the infantry’s own improved Night Vision capability (through visors and FIST weapon sights), is likely to also increase the focus on night manoeuvres.

The Warrior coming out of CSP will be a “real” fighting vehicle and can expect an increase in tempo and pace of operations. It will be asked to contribute more.

WCSP modular mounting frame for WRAP 2 side elements is tested 

The full WRAP 2 and Theatre Entry package 

A lot depends on FV524 and on ABSV. The ability to call in and accurately direct supporting Fires from under-armour is obviously of utmost relevance, while the availability of supporting vehicles, from ambulances to mortar carrier and ATGW, will determine the true capabilities of the AI formations.

Training implications

The CTA 40mm gun hits harder and further away. This will complicate training and require upgrades to the current AFV ranges. The new gun has a shorter shelf life, and that is true for ammunition as well. The latter is also considerably more expensive.

When added to the greater complexity of scenarios for which Warrior crews will need to prepare (see “battlefield implications”) means that training will have to change and adapt. The use of simulation will increase even further, both to save money and to give the crews the chance to face complex battle scenarios.

Wild proposals and “MIV for everything”

A proposal that sometimes surfaces in discussions about the future of the British Army is that of using Ajax as an IFV, binning WCSP. This is a rather wild idea, that does not seem to have any root in official thinking, and for good reasons: it is pretty much impossible to convert the existing Ajax into an IFV. The space in the back is more or less nonexistent. Obviously it would be possible to develop an IFV variant with logistical commonality to the Ajax, but that would not save anything. The easiest way to do it would be to adopt an unmanned, remotely operated, non-hull penetrating turret, which would free up all the space needed. That is what the germans did with their PUMA, or the Americans did with the new 30mm gun turret for Stryker.

It is not impossible per se, but would require a new contract, a new development phase, and new vehicles, or at least a complex renegotiation of the contracts for both the hulls and the turrets.

Another proposal revolves around MIV. What if ABSV was cancelled in favor of more MIVs? This one is a far more realistic proposal, and in theory it could well happen. In general I would not recommend mixing wheels and tracks: the Army itself reaffirmed this basic truth in its Agile Warrior studies. On the other hand, though, it seems pacific that modern 8x8 retain excellent off road mobility and it can be assumed that MIV-based variants could support Warrior well enough. It would be a compromise, obviously, but everything tend to be. The closest thing worldwide to a MIV-Warrior combination is seen in the Netherlands, where Boxer was procured specifically (and only) to replace supporting vehicles, including the tracked M577. The Netherlands never acquired the Boxer as APC for their infantry.

The advantage would be that the various sub-variants would only need to be developed once.

Obviously, a Warrior-based ABSV would share the exact same logistic tail and the exact same mobility as Warrior. It is also hard to imagine that converted Warrior hulls, which will be available in the hundreds, could ever cost the same as, or more than, new MIVs. In theory, converting “surplus” Warrior hulls remains the logical and cheap approach.

There is also another option, which is “MIV for everything”, with the Warrior CSP cancelled and MIV used as replacement, with the turrets ordered for Warrior being installed on MIV hulls instead.

 The examples of wheeled IFVs employed within armoured brigades alongside tracked MBTs are much more numerous: Russia and France spring to mind.

It would be embarrassing to end the WCSP now, after spending more than 200 millions and entering deals with multiple companies, but until the Manufacture contract isn’t agreed there is, in theory at least, the chance to go with this radical approach.

Can the existing contracts be renegotiated without huge negative impacts on the budget and on timelines?

Does the money suffice to purchase enough MIVs, and in all the sub-variants that are required?

If the answer to both questions was to be “yes”, the idea would not be insane. As always it would be a compromise, but not a bad one.

When Warrior was proposed for everything

Note that no one knows for sure how many MIVs the Army expects to procure. Four battalions are expected to be equipped with MIV, exactly the same number of units that will be getting Warrior CSP. Unsurprisingly, one estimate of the number of MIVs to be ordered is around 350.

However, much higher numbers have made the news: when the press reported that the army wanted to fast-track a 3 billion pounds deal for Boxer, for example, the number given was 800. That number is far higher than what is required for 4 battalions. It must be said that the expectation is that MIV will include more sub-variants, which in Warrior’s case are covered by FV432 now and by ABSV, assuming it materializes, in the future. MIV could probably include an ambulance for the medical regiments and a mortar carrier used to be part of the requirement.

It is also true, however, that 800 continues to sound too high a number. In addition, the Army 2020 Refine papers suggest that Mastiff will remain in the longer term as a supporting vehicle to MIV, and the variants of the Multi Role Vehicle – Protected might also help in some areas.

The Army still doesn’t seem able to decide where these closely related programmes meet, where they overlap, and where one could replace the other.

But maybe there is a part of the Army that already thinks that MIV should take the place of Warrior. So long as it didn’t result in further battalions being left mounted in nothing but boots, it could be a solution. It is very much time to take decisions and then stick to them, however. 20 years of expensive doubts and rethinks and U-turns have caused more than enough damage already.  

Army vehicle projects post-DSEI 2015

SDSR 2015 – Issues, analysis and recommendations going towards the review

Budget

About that 2%

Army 

Army projects and requirements

Army vehicle projects - Post DSEI 2015 

Solving the problem of hollow army 2020

Royal Air Force 

Fast jets and squadrons number 

Air Capabilities

The mystery of Protector

 

Royal Navy 

Royal Navy and the SDSR 

Beyond Harpoon and Storm Shadow (and Tomahawk too…?

The following is a small update to the Army's situation, with the addition of the latest updated (and non updates) coming out of DSEI. It is hightly recommended to read the previous chapter, "Army Projects and Requirements", if you aren't up to date. 

The Challenger 2 problem

DSEI brings confirmation that the British Army is increasinly aware of the big obsolescence problems of Challenger 2. The biggest issue at hand is the decreasing efficacy of the L30 rifled cannon, particularly in the anti-armour role. The problem is well known: the Challenger 2 uses 2-piece ammunition, which makes it impossible to employ an APFSDS penetrator with the length and mass required to ensure lethality. The CHARM 3 penetrator is incredibly small compared to the latest, long darts which have been developed for the smoothbore 120 mm guns. A small dart inexorably means low lethality, and there is little that can be done to improve the CHARM 3’s effect.

In addition, the rifled gun is now unique in NATO, and its HESH round, which used to add useful flexibility not matched by the rounds available on smoothbore cannons, is now more than balanced by a whole range of novel generation multi-mission shells developed for smoothbores.

It is increasingly evident that the L30 is the biggest problem at hand, and at DSEI, british army officials have, for the first time, admitted that it simply does not meet the requirement anymore.

Already back in 2006, a Challenger 2 was experimentally retrofitted with a smoothbore L55 cannon by Rheinmetall. Changing the gun proved to be pretty easy, but the enormous issue is the storage of ammunition. Pretty much none of the spaces currently available can be readily adapted to carry the longer one-piece ammunition. Especially not in a safe way: if currently the launch charges and HESH can be stored below the turret ring, where they are somewhat less vulnerable, one piece ammunition does not afford that luxury. One piece ammunition need specific storage spaces, protected with armored bulkheads and with solutions for “venting” an explosion away from the crew, like on the American Abrams.

In practice, retrofitting the Challenger 2 with a smoothbore cannon requires a “new” turret. That’s why the Challenger Lethality Improvement Programme was dropped. Subsequently, plans to adopt a more powerful and fuel efficient engine also had to be shelved. As of last year, the LEP was heading towards a mere obsolescence-removal exercise involving, primarily, electronics.

At DSEI, the British Army has kicked the ball back to square one, recognizing that such a LEP would not solve the issues. What can be done? Hard to say. It is no longer taboo to say that the Challenger 2 might be replaced. The options, however, are limited: there is talk of a possible new-generation MBT project to be launched by France and Germany, and it would be great if the UK could be involved, but we don’t even know yet if the project will effectively start. We don’t know if the UK can get into it, and we don’t know when such a new tank would be available, and at which cost.

So, what? 

The Challenger 2 experimentally fitted with a smoothbore L55 gun. Storage of the ammunition is a huge issue that requires vast redesigning of the turret spaces.

 

There is a very real risk that complexity and costs will end up giving us a LEP which does not solve the big issues. This would be a bad outcome, but it remains likely. The sad truth is that Challenger 2 can’t do with a simple “Life Extension Programme”, but needs a big Capability Sustainment Programme, like Warrior.

The biggest obsolescence Challenger 2 is grappling with is its main armament, and ignoring this defeats the whole purpose of having MBTs. Add to this the obsolescence of sensors and electronics, and the turret really could be replaced entirely, pretty much. A new engine would also help, since Challenger 2 is a dead last in terms of speed if not of mobility in the wider sense, especially in the “mobile fortress” configuration which has been used in Iraq, with the installation of big add-on armor kits.

And all the issues be solved?

Money as always will be the chief factor. We don’t know exactly how much money Challenger 2 will get. Last year Jane’s reported that the LEP budget had gone down from 1.2 billion to 700 million pounds. Which is a huge amount of money under certain points of view (certainly for an electronics-only LEP!) and not quite enough under others.

One option is doing away with the Challenger 2 entirely. There are still Leopard 2 tanks being sold on the cheap: Poland has paid just 180 million euro for 119 Leopard 2 tanks with all accompanying equipment. Of course, these were not at the latest standard, but they bring the L55 smoothbore, which is the key to solving the lethality problem.

The latest standard Leopard 2s, the A7, obviously cost quite a lot more. Saudi Arabia was about to procure 200 such tanks back in 2011, and the pricetag was indicated in 1.7 billion euro.

The UK needs a workable plan to put in service at least 200 MBTs armed with the L55 smoothbore, if its heavy armor is to remain credible. 

Extra money, of course, is highly unlikely. Some room for manoeuvre could be obtained, but only by shifting money away from other armoured vehicle programmes. The budget for Challenger 2 is to come from within what was, until 2014, the Mounted Close Combat Capability Change Programme, which is now broken down into four main areas: Armoured Cavalry 2025; Armoured Infantry 2026; Armoured Main Battle Tank 2025 and Mechanized Infantry 2029.

The budget for the MCC super-programme, was last indicated in 17.251,83 million, but spread over many years, towards 2030. The budget covers the whole life costs, not just procurement, and also includes simulators and initial support packages. It is very hard to guess how this figure breaks down, and thus nearly impossible to tell how much money could be shifted to Challenger 2.

In addition to Challenger 2, this pot of money must provide for the FRES SV / Ajax programme, the Warrior CSP, the ABSV if it finally kicks off and the Mechanized Infantry Vehicle (MIV) which is the new name of what once was FRES UV, so we should not be fooled into thinking that there is any real abundance.

Fixing the Challenger 2 programme, however, is a big priority, in my opinion. An MBT which is no longer lethal is no longer credible, especially not out to 2035 or 2040, which are the dates towards which the Out of Service moment should be pushed thanks to the LEP.

Armoured Battlegroup Support Vehicle, WCSP, Ajax.  

I hoped DSEI would bring news about this key programme, which represents the way out from the ancient FV432, which currently has a 2030 OSD which would give it a good 70 years service life. It is ridiculous that the Army is still stuck with this old workhorse, which was once supposed to be replaced by Warrior, and which to this day is still seeking a successor. Unfortunately, little to no news came out of the show.

The ABSV might have to wait until 2017 to hit Main Gate, with deliveries of an unknown number of vehicles in an unknown number of variants due to be completed, in the Army’s “aspiration”, by 2026.

Armoured Infantry 2026, the name of the programme, is also, in one short phrase, the objective the Army has: renewing the armoured infantry by 2026, rolling into service the Warrior CSP and the ABSV.

My frustration with the Armoured Vehicles strategy of the Army are well known. To this day, the degree of uncertainty surrounding not just ABSV but WCSP is astonishing, and throws ridicule on the notion that “armoured infantry is the core of Army 2020”.

For now, the WCSP plans to upgrade a mere 380 Warrior, of which only 245 are Section vehicles with the new turret and gun. These numbers are flat-out insufficient for the six battalions planned, and Lockheed Martin UK, which assembles the turrets, says it is “hopeful” that more will eventually be ordered.

It is also not clear what the variant split is regarding the remaining 135 vehicles. Several news releases mention a “command” variant which has never existed in the Warrior fleet. There are Infantry Command vehicles, which are minor variations of the Section vehicle, and thus part of the 245.

There used to be a Battery Command variant used by Royal Artillery AS90 batteries, but only 19 were produced and I understand they have ceased to be used already years ago, with a number converted in ambulances for use in Afghanistan.

What’s left is the FV514 variant, the Artillery Observation vehicle. Not clear what, if anything, will happen to these. Until at least 2011, the plan was to have a FRES SV Joint Fires variant AND upgraded FV514, made into Joint Fire direction platforms as well.

Whether this is still the case, is an unknown. The FV514 was going to receive only the basic mechanic and protection upgrades under WCSP, with the RA supposed to fund a separate upgrade to the mission equipment, to turn the FV514 into a platform capable to direct mortar, artillery and air attacks from under armour. The Royal Artillery experimented possible configurations at least into 2011, but what happened afterwards is a mystery. 23 Ajax in Joint Fires configuration are on order, but the number is pretty tiny, considering that each AS90 battery, alone, used to employ 3 FV514.

If it depended from me, I would NOT bother with a FV514 upgrade. The FV514 has a dummy gun, so it won’t get the new turret. Even if it was “dressed up” so that it continues to resemble other Warriors, the additional sensors needed for the Joint Strike role would make it recognizable all the same. Another problem is that, unless the Royal Artillery manages to get the Joint Strike upgrade incorporated into WCSP, the FV514 would have to go to factory a first time for WCSP, then again for the separate upgrade. How many years would it take, and how long would the units be left without their vehicles?

Moreover, is it worth it in any way to try and jam so much modern equipment into an old horse like Warrior, even after it gets a modernized architecture under WCSP?

If I was the one making the decision, I would forget about FV514 and purchase a few more Ajax Joint Fire variants. More modern, less cramped, and with a working gun.

The FV514 hulls would be very useful for ABSV, which should convert “surplus” Warriors into mortar carriers, APCs, ambulances, maybe command-support vehicles (“true” Command posts should come via FRES SV / Ajax, in the form of the ATHENA C2 variant) and Anti-Tank Guided Weapon carriers.

The insufficient number of Warrior getting the new turret and gun is a major concern. One way to reduce the need for Warriors is via ABSV: if the ATGW variant materializes, the Anti-Tank Platoon will not need Warriors (unlike now). An ATGW variant allowing the launch of missiles from under armour, as well as the carriage of dismount Javelin teams, would be a massive improvement in the Army’s capability. 

 

The FRES SV / Ajax family is supposed to include an Overwatch variant providing long-range, guided weapon firepower. Unfortunately, it seems most likely that this will end up being just an APC carrying dismount Javelin teams: this should be corrected by adding a vehicle-launched weapon too, ideally with greater range.

The use of dismounted, 2.5 km Javelin in the Overwatch role is a downgrade from Striker, which until 2005 provided vehicle launched Swingfire missiles with a 4 km reach.

Much curiosity remains about the Ground Based Surveillance sub-variant of Ajax, too. In a world in which armies are modernizing and adopting mast-mounted sensor heads combining radar and EO, the Ajax does not look much innovative at all.

There is the risk that the GBS sub-variant ends up being just an APC carrying 3-4 dismounts and their sensors, and this would be very underwhelming.

Mechanized Infantry Vehicle

The Army really wants a 8x8 APC. Indeed, it wants more than 300, so it is preparing to a new attempt at procuring them after the utter failure of FRES UV. The vehicle, coming in different variants, is meant to replace Mastiff and Ridgback, which are the current interim solution equipping the 3 “Heavy Protected Mobility Battalions” spread across the 3 heavy brigades.

A 8x8 combat vehicle is going to bring better capabilities than Mastiff, particularly in terms of mobility, but I have to sincerely say that I’d very much encourage the army to get the armoured infantry right, before getting bogged down in another major, expensive procurement programme.

While I’m not blind to the advantages offered by an 8x8 solution, I believe that replacing Mastiff is not quite so high on the list of the urgencies. I say this especially considering that the army is most likely to procure only APCs armed with nothing more than a .50. These vehicles are going to be an upgrade over Mastiff in a low-complexity scenario, but not much of an upgrade in a more complex scenario. Ultimately, since there are so many issues left to be solved in the heavy armour area, I would focus my efforts there.

Non-Articulated Vehicle – Protected (NAV-P)

Not an armour programme, but a key one. Any vehicle the army might field will mean little if there are holes in the logistic area, and the missing replacement of DROPS is potentially a huge hole. DROPS is fundamental: it carries a vast variety of key payloads which include the ammunition for the artillery. The army is in the absurd situation of having declared DROPS out of service last year, while still using hundreds, alongside with a small fleet of EPLS, exactly because it cannot do without them.

NAV-P cannot be delayed forever. It should sit high on the list of priorities. Despite the obvious urgency, no noise from DSEI.

Multi Role Vehicle – Protected

The first purchase of MRV-P vehicles might be drawing nearer, with Main Gate expected in 2017. Industry is preparing to compete, and General Dynamics will put forwards both the Eagle and the Foxhound, the latter probably in the form of its cheaper steel-hull variation.

The first purchase is reportedly expected to include 500 or more “general service” troop transports plus 78 ambulances and 27 recovery vehicles.

Obviously, if the Foxhound can be made cheap enough to be affordable (at the current pricetag, it has no real chance) it is an obvious favorite, due to fleet commonality considerations.

Much has yet to be seen and decided regarding MRV-P. As discussed earlier, the requirements suggest that 2 variants, one “short” and one “long” might be necessary, so much so that both a 4x4 and a 6x6 variant might be procured.

The high level of uncertainty, however, suggests that MRV-P remains at risk of further delays. Anyone of the other vehicle programmes could be given higher priority and push MRV-P further to the right.

Going into the SDSR, the Army’s top priorities on the vehicular front, in my assessment, should be:

-          Upgrade Challenger 2 seriously, or replace it early. If the upgrade can’t fix the lethality problem, go for replacement. A L55 Leopard 2 is to preferred to Challenger 2, at this point in time.

-          Increase the number of Warrior Section Vehicles towards 300, the bare minimum needed for six battalions. Consider that a training fleet would also be necessary, ideally, especially due to BATUS swallowing up a battlegroup’s worth of vehicles.

-          Proceed with haste with ABSV, including the ATGW variant.

-          Ajax, WCSP and ABSV are deeply interconnected: make sure they are run with coherence! Do not duplicate where there is no need to. Complex roles like C2 and Joint Fires should be left to the newer vehicle. Adjust the numbers to ensure that the three fleets complete each other.

-          Do not waste the big investment made on Ajax by cutting corners on Overwatch and Ground Based Surveillance: provide adequate tools for the job. Mast mounted sensors and a longer-range, under-armour precision weapon capability are both necessary.

-          Procure a NAV-P solution. More EPLS, or anyway a solution using the MAN SV truck as base would have obvious logistical benefits.

-          MIV and MRV-P are both needed and welcome, but they look lower priority to me, and I’d accept a hit in these areas in order to achieve better results elsewhere.