Delaying Prince of Wales and closing Portsmouth's shipyard...?

The controversity about the Portsmouth shipyard is continuing. BAE, owner of the yard, is expecting to have the installation without any ship to build when work on the sections for the CVF carriers is completed by 2018, and they have no intention of keeping the yard open but idle until work starts on the Type 26 frigates.
They have signalled that, if a solution can't be found, the yard will be closed, with the potential loss of some 3000 jobs and the downgrading of Portsmouth to a sole maintenance and support hub, where RN ships would be refitted. Indeed, there have been open calls to make it the sole maintenance center, and base there all of the future Type 26 frigates, effectively a punch in the face for Devonport and the city of Plymouth.

The first question i feel i must ask is: does this "gap period" actually exist? 

If the Type 26 is not delayed again, the first new frigate should hit service in 2021, and this means starting the build process two or three years earlier, almost certainly, at least for the first in the class. Portsmouth is not suited for building the vessel, as the yard is constrained by the size of slipways and by the depth of water available, but if the Type 26 is built in modules like the Type 45 and CVF, Portsmouth could certainly build one or more blocks of it. And indeed this seems to be the idea, but BAE is worried that the work on Type 26 won't start in time for saving the yard.

This is worrisome for many reasons, since up to late last year we've been told that work could and would start even earlier than 2018. DefenseNews reported in October last year:

The schedule envisions the MoD's approval of the business case for manufacture of the Type 26, known as Main Gate, in late 2013 [or possibly in 2014, i will add, but this is the expected period], formal go-ahead the following year with the first steel cut in 2016 and launch in 2018 or 2019, Johnson said. [Brian Johnson, who directs business development at BAE Surface Ships]
The first vessel, an ASW variant, should be commissioned around 2021, about 20 years after the Royal Navy received its last new frigate, the Type 23 HMS St Albans.

 
Main Gate is still expected around 2014, and if the rest of the schedule outlined above is maintained, Portsmouth might well be busy in a constant succession of work contracts.
The suspect is that Type 26 got silently but effectively delayed and we do not yet know it. I'm sadly starting to wonder if we haven't already moved from a 2021 desidered in-service date to a first steel cut not earlier than 2020. That seems to be what BAE fears, and if theirs is not strategic scaremongering, something bad has happened to the programme in Planning Round 2012. 
But we might not know until the 10-years budget plan is released.  

If the Type 26 is not the answer, for whatever reason (delays, building strategy not on Blocks but in dock at Govan or something) there should still be yet another possibility, the MCM, Hydrographic and Patrol Capability. This cheap, 3000-ton globally deployable vessel, heir of the C3 concept of the Future Surface Combatant tribulation, is supposed to replace the current minesweeper fleet and survey ships such as Echo and Enterprise. In 2011, a minimum number of 8 hulls was envisaged and a 1.4 billion pounds budget was the expected allocation. In the SDSR document, the MHPC was specifically mentioned:

The Sandown and Hunt-class mine countermeasures vessels will remain in service [in number of 15 at least for now, 8 Hunt and 7 Sandown, reducing to 14 later] and start the transition to a future capability from 2018 as part of the Mine countermeasures, Hydrographic, Patrol Craft (MHPC) project.

The MHPC programme to replace these vessels continues.

Now, assuming that the 2018 date is maintained, if it means "entry into service of the first vessel", work will start well before CVF work is completed, and if Portsmouth is involved, the issue is easily solved.
Even if it only means "cutting the steel for the first vessel", it is still good.


But let's assume that Type 26 and MHPC, for whatever reason, can't work as saviors. Philip Hammond reportedly commissioned former Chief of Defence procurement Admiral Sir Robert Walmsley to provide his opinion on what the MOD should do.
According to the press, the report says that Portsmouth should be closed down, and the cost of closure should be met by delaying the building schedule of HMS Prince of Wales by 2 years, delivering her in 2028 instead of 2016, keeping the other yards busy and closing the gap. 
Same cost, no additional capability (indeed, less of it), jobs lost and yard closed. I mean, seriously...?

This is shaped by the obligations contained in the TOBA (Terms Of Business Agreement)  agreement signed in July 2009 by the MOD and BAE, as a way to ensure the survival of shipbuilding in the UK. According to the MOD's own explanation, the TOBA

provides MOD guarantees to BAE Systems of a minimum level of ship build and support activity of around £230 million/year. This level of work was independently verified as the minimum level of work possible to sustain a credible warship building industry in the UK. The TOBA has been designed to incentivise major reductions in the size of the industrial base on a managed basis to minimise the rationalisation cost for which MOD was already liable under historical Yellow Book rules.

The TOBA can be cancelled at anytime. Cancellation crystallises the extant rationalisation costs, leaving MOD liable for remaining industry closure costs and compensation to BAE Systems for their lost investment. During the SDSR, cancellation of the TOBA would have been expected to cost in the order of £630 million. A key element of the TOBA is that it ensures that this figure reduces year on year against an agreed formula and bounds MOD's liabilities.

According to the Agreement Terms, there is no way to come out of it without paying the cost. If shipbuilding capacity was sacrificed and no longer considered a strategic sector to protect, the MOD could opt out of the TOBA, but would incurr significant short term expenditure.
Staying in the TOBA, on the other hand, comports costs and responsibilities of its own, which already in other occasions have been met in not very intelligent ways. The main example being the Astute class SSN: as the NAO notes in its 2011 report:

As a result of the delay to Successor and to further save costs in the short-term, the Astute build programme was slowed to avoid a production gap in the submarine construction industry. The Review therefore extended the build time for the seven-boat Astute Class submarine programme by a further 96 months, including the 13-month deferral to boat four noted in paragraph 4. This has resulted in an average deferral to the Astute Class over the past three years of 28 months per boat. By extending the Astute build programme, the Department will have to use older boats beyond their out-of-service dates, work the smaller fleet of Astute submarines harder, or reduce scheduled activity for submarines. Therefore, the Department is currently reporting that the Astute Class submarines will not meet the Royal Navy’s requirement for sufficient numbers of submarines to be available for operations over part of the next decade.

Extending construction time of the Astute Class submarines also added a further £200 million in-year to the forecast cost to complete the Astute programme for approved boats (boats one to four). In total, these decisions have added nearly £1 billion to forecast costs to complete all seven boats in the last three years. The cost increase rises to over £1.9 billion when technical difficulties and capability changes made since the original approval for boats one to three was taken in 1997. In procurement terms, this equates to substantially more than the cost of acquiring a further boat.

The regrettable short-termism in management of the MOD programmes has cost the country and the Royal Navy dear. In absence of a reserve of money for facing in-year needs, the MOD has, in the last decade, constantly chosen to delay its programmes for saving (normally relatively small amounts of) money in-year, only to pay several times as much in the long term.
That's the case of the aircraft carriers as well, for example, which saw 405 million pounds of expenditure delayed in 2008 by the Labour Government, which have become a 1.56 billion net increase in the cost of the programme, entirely caused by political stupidity.

Had the MOD had a reserve of money to draw from, at least part of this disaster could have been avoided. Money could have been committed in-year, and effectively recovered later by costs staying stable and more capability being delivered.
Short-termism has cost the MOD money and capability: had money been committed when it was supposed to be, the carriers would cost 1.5 billion less, would be significantly closer to delivery, and there would be an 8th Astute (for which the First Sea Lord in 2007 and 2008 fought as hard as he could, knowing full well that 7 boats won't really be enough to meet the missions he's assigned by the government) on order. For less money expended.
And while it is fair to point out that more boats means sustaining more running costs, we should be under no illusion of this being in any way less desirable and/or more expensive than delaying, delaying, delaying. The Iraq and Afghanistan wars (funded from the core defence budget, pretty much entirely the first and for a significant part the second) caused the MOD budget to run hot from the early 2000s, and made it impossible to deliver the modernization and equipment promised by the SDR 1998, because the money went away from procurement and into the budget for operations, but the delays to the equipment programmes that were used as "solution" to the problem have contributed even more to the formation of the infamous budget black hole.  

Now that we are told that the next ten years of MOD budget include 4 billion pounds of reserve and 8 billion pounds yet to be committed, every effort must be made NOT TO repeat the same stupidity all over again. With all due respect for Admiral Robert, his suggestion, if the press is right, is exactly more of the same damaging, abused, god-damned delaying. Shifting chairs on the sinking Titanic's deck, once more.
If Hammond is not lying and there is uncommitted money, there are much better solutions to the problem. 

There are at least two more programmes that could help bridge the gap in work in Porsmouth shipyard between 2017/18, thus potentially ensuring to the yard many more years of life, if they were launched in the right timeframe.
I'm talking specifically of the Future Force Protection Craft and of the Fast Landing Craft. The first has lead to the well known loan of CB90 combat boats from Sweden, with the Royal Marines trialing the vessel for informing the final list of requirements for the FPC, of which the Royal Navy said last year:

A total of twelve craft are planned with the first anticipated to enter service in 2016.

The Fast Landing Craft was confirmed in the SDSR, and for it the Royal Marines extensively trialed the PACSCAT prototype during last year, demonstrating a record 19 knots speed with a Challenger 2 on board, and nearly 40 knots when empty. An In-Service Date for this capability has so far not been indicated.

While i do realize that none of these two programmes qualify as "complex warships" and certainly do not go close to working on blocks for carries, destroyers and frigates, I'd very much have Portsmouth building these small boats in the "gap period", instead of adopting our good Admiral's plan, that shreds 3000 jobs in a moment of economic downturn while making the CVF programme even more expensive by delaying it, just for BAE to get the money it is bound to get under the TOBA agreement.
Since that money is bound to be spent in a way or another, no escaping this truth, for once we could expend it on actual capability, at least, eventually delaying the go-ahead order for the Force Protection Craft (if it has not been done already, wouldn't surprise me...) and then getting something useful and substantial, instead of nothing but scorn for the "expensive" carriers being made artificially even more expensive.

If rationalization is invitable and effectively desirable, perhaps the two small programmes can bless Portsmouth with a "gentle" death, gradual and less traumatic for the town, the economy and the workforce. While delivering to the Navy what it needs, for one last time in its so-long history. Still a gain.
If, instead, these two programmes can bridge the gap and give Portsmouth a chance to be involved in the bigger items planned for later (MHPC, Type 26), there might easily be at least a decade more of life for the shipyard, gained for the same price it would cost to close it (plus the additional cost of operating the LCU MK11 Fast Landing Craft and the FCP, but since the first would essentially replace the current LCU MK10 and the second would replace part of the LCVP MK5s i don't think it would be anything substantial).

So, please, let's look at all options with honesty. The short-termism of delaying, delaying delaying needs to end. If it ended right now as i write this, it would still be late. 

   

The Australian Army Reform and the British Army

One army in the world that is adopting the british model of Multi Role Brigades and organic, deployable reserve forces if the Australian army. The analogies in the plan are (for what we know, considering that the new British Army structure is not expected to be announced before June 11 at the earliest) very relevant, and since the Australian "Beersheba" plan has been explained in good detail, it is very interesting to give it a look and try to reason on what aspects also could apply to the british army.

Plan Beersheba reorganizes the Regular and Reserve components of the australian army. The regular brigades are being reorganized as follows:

1st Brigade, Darwin - Currently Mechanized, to become Multi Role Brigade

3rd Brigade, Townsville - Currently Light Role, to become Multi Role Brigade

7th Brigade, Brisbane - Currently Motorized, to become Multi Role Brigade

Other than the fact that the australians call them Multi-role Maneuver Brigades (MMBs) and regardless of the fact that they are much smaller than the planned british formations, the concept behind the restructuring is the same.

Each MMB is to have two infantry battalions and one Armoured Cavalry regiment, for the Recce role and with an embedded Tank Squadron of 14 vehicles. Australia has just 59 tanks, M1A1 refurbished and sold by the US in 2006 for 500 millions, and all of them support a single tank regiment, which is however set to lose a further 14/15 vehicles which are going into mothball in the latest announced cuts, and there are doubts on the effective chances of the Army of keeping the 3 squadrons needed for the MMBs viable and effective. 

The MMB of the Australian army will number 3685 men, an increase of 178 men compared to current formations. 56 men will be part of the Brigade HQ, 292 of its Signals element, 631 in the Armored Cavalry Regiment, 665 in each Infantry Battalion, 337 men in the Artillery regiment, 398 men in the Combat Engineer regiment and 641 men will be part of the Combat Service Support Battalion. The Cavalry Regiment includes a Tank Sqn and 3 Companies on Bushmaster protected vehicles. The Artillery Regiment was to have 3 batteries, 2 with towed M777 howitzers and 1 battery on Self Propelled Howitzers. However, this latest element is at risk due to budget cuts that might well mean no self propelled howitzers to work with. There will also be two Observation Posts / STA batteries, plus a third on armored vehicles.

Here we already have an interesting consideration to make: is the british army possibly going down this very same path as part of the cuts? With the rumors of substantial reductions to the Royal Armoured Corps and the words of the SDSR in mind ("The multi-role brigades will include: reconnaissance forces to gain information even in high-threat situations; tanks, which continue to provide a unique combination of protection, mobility and firepower; and infantry operating from a range of protected vehicles. The brigades will be self-supporting, having their own artillery, engineer, communications, intelligence, logistics and medical support.") the only observation possible is that each brigade should have either a Recce Regiment and a Tank Regiment (now considered unlikely) or a single armour regiment combining the two roles.

Add to this the rumor that many of the remaining tanks are to be given to the Reserves, and a possible explanation is the rationalization of the RAC with the reduction to five or six Regular regiments and N Reserve regiments, with the regular regiments having 2 FRES SV Squadrons, 1 squadron on a 4x4, wheeled vehicle (Jackal?) and one tank squadron.

At least one tank regiment and one Formation Recce regiments have been mentioned by the press as at risk, so the above hypothesis might well be correct, with the two trades losing a number of regiments each, with the other ones merging together in the new hybrid. However, at the moment this is, it is worth reminding it, speculation based on the incomplete information so far available.

The sixth regiment would cover the training and demonstration roles and would act as a "regular reserve" of manpower for enduring operations: exactly what 1st Royal Tank Regiment is doing already, after losing the CBRN role, given wholly to the RAF Regiment following the demise of the Fuchs vehicles.

The rationale for the move to MMBs is explained in very clear way by this statement of Major General Caligari:

"...we have been struggling for almost 10 years to rotate forces overseas. We have taken Mechanised units out of Darwin and turned them into Motorised units and we send them to Afghanistan, we have brought them back after eight months and said (to them) you haven’t done any thing (operations) mechanised for a year and you are no longer qualified in Mech and you have got to re-train. We put them back into their mechanised vehicles and we start to retrain them and them we start to re-assign them to another operation. You have got to be able to rotate like forces behind everyone else. It makes logistics easier, it makes the force preparation for mission specific training, makes a whole raft of other things far simpler. And from my perspective it makes what the Army does (to Navy and Air Force) far easier to describe, rather than trying to describe what the difference is between a Mechanised Brigade and a Motorized Brigade and a Light Brigade because they are all fundamentally different. Now we will have the same structures across the three."

"When I was a Brigade commander I trained soldiers for deployment to Afghanistan but I was drawing soldiers from all over Australia. I was calling on 7 BDE in Darwin and putting them in Townsville. They were spending 3 months in addition to their 6 or 8 month deployment just training to get there. That is not family friendly. And then we moved into let's do it by Brigades. Let's make sure that the whole Brigade, the whole effort that goes overseas comes from a single Brigade. At the same time we have got 2 DIV dealing with its own operations. Well let's put those two (elements) together.

I have got a Multi-Role Manoeuvre Brigade that will now be on reset, (that we will be the one that has just come home from operations on contingency), I have got one that is readying to go and I have got a third one that is ready to got or is actually deployed."

It is an explanation of the main reason behind the MRB concept that works perfectly well for the UK as well: the British Army has long been facing the same issues, and already in 2008 the solution had been identified in the MRB structure.

In terms of support and strategic enablers, the Australian Army fields the brigades 6, 17 and 16, with the first being responsible for Command Support and Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition, Reconnaissance and Electronic Warfare (CSISTAREW). 17th Brigade is a Combat Service Support Brigade, while the 16th Brigade is the Army Aviation formation, with a regiment on the Tiger attack helicopter and two regiments on on MRH90, Chinook and Black Hawk helicopters.

The enablers have seen changes inspired by operational experience and by the need for savings: on the plus side there are plans for 5 new Chinook helicopters, a third EOD troop to be raised, a third Shadow UAV system to be rolled into service, and the restructuring of air defence onto 6 troops in 2 batteries; on the bad side the Army is losing its water transport capability, which probably will go out to a civilian contractor, perhaps something on the lines of the British Army arrangement for Heavy Equipment Transporter trucks, and it is also seeing a heavy restructuring in Bulk supplies logistics capability.

Combat Engineer regiments are to be expanded, as are Special Forces and Intelligence Battalion.

Note that the Australian army has determined that a "1 in 4" rule for deployment would be the most desirable, but they have had to accept the impossibility of the proposition: to sustain a 1 in 4 rule would take a fourth regular brigade that the Army just won't get.

The aspiration is to have a 1 in 4 rule at least in the Enablers, by using the reserves to stand up, in the next future, a fourth unit for each crucial capability. Much will depend on funding, though, especially considering that the defence budget in Australia has just been quite dramatically cut.

The combat elements, 3 regular brigades and 6 reserve ones, are to work on a 36 months Force Generation cycle with three stages: Readying, Ready/Deployed, Reset. A brigade will be "ready" for a period of 12 months, but it is not clear if a deployment in war zone would also last so long. In the US Army, it does.

Notoriously, the British Army works to a 1 in 5 rule, also on 36 months FORGEN, with 6 months in readyness/deployment. The notional phases of the british FORGEN are:

Reset/Recuperation

Mission Specific Training

Unit and Battlegroup-level hybrid training

High Readyness / pre-deployment training

Deployment   

The British Army has been expanding some of its enablers in order to meet the Rule of the 5 and make enduring deployments possible (5 Regiment RA, 39 Regiment RA, UAV batteries of the combined 32 and 47 Regiments RA) but it is to be seen if the additional batteries can be retained despite the budget and manpower cuts. 

If they cannot be maintained, it is crucial that the Territorial Army is built up and organized to provide the Army with the missing battery. While this is apparently already the case (the example being 101 Regiment (V) Royal Artillery, which has 2 batteries on GMLRS and 2 STA batteries, which should enable 39 and 5 Regiments to meet the 1 in 5 rule), the reality is that only the creation of additional regular batteries solved the problem for Herrick ops.   

The most interesting element in Beersheba is the improved use of Reserves under "Whole Force" concept. Since this is what the British Army is trying to do as well, it is helpful to look at what the Australians are doing.

Their 6 reserve brigades, under 2nd Division HQ, are being restructured and assigned in number of 2 to each regular brigade. Their role is pretty well specified, and their contribution is to provide a battlegroup-sized reinforcement to their supported regular brigade.

In practice, a regular australian brigade with 2 infantry battalions will be able to deploy as a 3-battlegroup formation, with the third being from the Reserve, with training focused on Stabilization Operations. 

A graphic of the expected shape of the 6 Reserve brigades of the australian army. They have roughly the same combined strenght, with a minimum of 3 and a maximum of 5 infantry battalions. The british Territorial Army has 14 Infantry Battalions in 10 brigades. Once regrouped, and once 2 TA brigades have been assigned to each Regular MRB, assuming that the TA gains at least one additional infantry battalion, there will be 3 TA battalions supporting each regular MRB. 

The combined force of the Army (regular and reserve) will total 50.000 men.

In order to use reserves in the most efficient way, a number of measures have been adopted: the reserve artillery regiments are being made into Mortar batteries and given to the infantry battalions, while the names and colours of the historical regiments remain. Units affected are 7 Field Regiment, 23 Field Regiment and 2/10 Field Regiment. Changes also involve 21and 22 Construction Regiments, which are being broken down into Squadrons and incorporated into Combat Engineer Regiments.

The M777 guns are going into the Regular artillery batteries instead, along with the Self Propelled Howitzers (which might actually not arrive due to cuts to the budget) are into the regular artillery formations.

Similarly, all Reserve elements of the Royal Australian Armoured Corps are being re-roled to operate as squadrons of Protected Mobility Vehicles, receiving Bushmaster vehicles.

Rumors from the UK instead seem to suggest that the Reserves will be assigned the AS90 self propelled howitzers and, possibly, most of the tanks. It is hard not to have doubts and hesitations in front of such a proposition. It is not normal to give the most complex and training-intensive equipment to the reserve: it is illogical.

It would almost certainly be better to have the reserves providing mortar batteries to the infantry, L118 batteries, and other capabilities.

On Soldier, the magazine of the british army, the Chief Land Forces announced that the plan is to have two Territorial Army brigades assigned to each regular MRB, and in fact the cut of "at least 2" regional brigade HQs, announced in the SDSR, has been abandoned and all 10 brigades are staying. It is also expected that a number of formations cut from the regular force will become TA units.

The most logical, and most likely to succeed, use of this sizeable force would be something on the lines of what Australia is doing: a deployable battlegroup centered on at least one infantry battalion, perhaps including a L118 gun battery and other elements, of logistic support, of engineers, perhaps even of armor. The Australian model, of having reserves providing crews of protected mobility vehicles, that in the British Army could well be Mastiff 3s for the Mechanized Infantry, appears the most sensible.    

The australian model is interesting, and probably the British Army has looked at it with great attention. We will see how many points of contact are confirmed when the long awaited announcement from Philip Hammond finally arrives. The utilization of reserves, the destiny of Challenger II, AS90 and Combat Engineering capabilities are all dark corners in need of a ray of light and clarity. 

In general, the utilization of the Territorial Army will be crucial to the future of the British Army, so we have to hope that the right decisions are made. 

And, to me, this implies proving the press speculation largely wrong, because what they reported so far, i'm afraid, is a solution that most likely would not work.  

Pray that it works, and wait for 2015

So, with a statement that openly contradicts the official declarations of the US Navy and of the UK government itself, which barely days ago said in Parliament that there was no reported problem with the conversion of the Queen Elizabeth class carriers for the use of EMALS, now we are told that:

Because Britain’s carriers will have all electric propulsion, and therefore do not generate steam like nuclear powered vessels, the catapult system would need to be the innovative Electromagnetic version (EMALS), being developed for the US Navy. Fitting this new system to a UK carrier has presented greater design challenges than were anticipated.

Either you were lying a week ago, or you are lying now. Somehow i think it's the second. 

Anyway, the statement also says that:

Secondly, and partly as a result of the delayed timetable, the estimated cost of fitting this equipment to the Prince of Wales has more than doubled in the last 17 months, rising from an estimated £950M to around £2Bn, with no guarantee that it will not rise further.

Again, i just cannot believe it. But i suspect that, just like a promised but never published NAO report into the economic factors of keeping Harrier over Tornado, we will never be told the truth nor we will ever hear them justify this absurd figure.
There won't be a NAO investigation on this particular claim, want to bet with me?

Another lie is a few lines down the statement:

Thirdly, at the time of the SDSR, there was judged to be a very significant technical risk around the STOVL version of JSF and some commentators were speculating that it could even be cancelled. Indeed, the STOVL programme was subsequently placed on probation by the Pentagon However, over the last year, the STOVL programme has made excellent progress and in the last few months has been removed from probation. The aircraft has completed over 900 hours of flying, including flights from the USS Wasp and the US Marine Corp has a high degree of confidence in the in-service date for the aircraft.

While the USMC aims for a 2015 IOC, the reality is that production F35B are restricted from doing what they are meant to, going STOVL, as a clutch overheating problem preventing the engagement of STOVL mode in hot weather is still without a solution. 
Additionally, the USMC will declare IOC with the software Block 2 and Block 3I, which are to include basic weapon release capability [it is very likely that none of the british weapons will be cleared in Block 2 and 3I], but be otherwise largely incomplete and in need for upgrade ASAP.
The USAF and US Navy are willing to wait until 2018, in order to declare IOC with the Block 3F software.
The UK can aim for IOC whenever it wants, provided that it pays for it: early IOC means placing orders early, getting early production planes, paying more for them, and then paying more money to retrofit them with the missing pieces.
And oh, we should anticipate integration of ASRAAM and Paveway IV, too, which is planned for Block 3F, otherwise the F35B entering service "early" with the RAF will only be able to use AMRAAM, since the other weapons which will be cleared (JDAM and GBU-12) are not in UK use.

But we are used to this practice, aren't we? The last Typhoon Tranche 1 of the RAF went to Warton this month to begin its R2 retrofit which will bring it to Block 5 standard.
Years after the plane entered service and dragged on with mutilated capabilities that have arguably badly affected the Typhoon's export potential as well.

The early in service date is a lie. It entirely depends on force buildup, and it is not at all as dependent on the US's own IOC as they want to have us believe.
At most, it is in theory possible to achieve earlier at-sea IOC since Queen Elizabeth is (expected to be) compatible with STOVL ops, so that air operations at sea could begin in 2018 instead of 2020. There's no certainty that this will be possible, however, especially since the airplanes and crews available in 2018 are likely to be very few unless orders are speeded up, and it is, to say the least, unlikely.
It will also depend on decisions yet to be taken. So far, Queen Elizabeth was planned to go in mothball in 2018/19 as Prince of Wales comes online. This is likely to change in SDSR 2015, or indeed much earlier than that.
Prince of Wales might enter service, or go from shipyard to mothball immediately, without making a day of service.
It's all to be seen still.

If Hammond is not lying and the UK gets its first production F35B in 2016, the order will be placed no later than 2014, with long-lead contracts signed next year. That would mean LRIP 8 and, barring further delays, Block 3F software. In the case, it would work well. All would depend, at that point, on the number of airplanes ordered.

This simplified graphic is the result of my research into the often confusing blurry of documents available on the F35. It should be up to date, but changes are always possible. Block 3F software should start being available with LRIP 8, and will be used for the first full-rate production orders, before Block IV is developed and rolled out. It was originally planned that Block IV would include Storm Shadow and Brimstone for the UK, but the requirement was cancelled as saving measure, and at the moment there's not a plan anymore. The general rule is that the airplanes are delivered two years after the firm order is placed, with Long Lead orders placed at least a further year earlier.

A now outdated but always interesting production plan for the F35. We can guess a revised schedule with the UK ordering 0 airplanes in 2013 (but placing long lead orders for them), with firm order for 7(?) F35B in 2014, plus others in the following years. The airplanes available in 2018 for obtaining the mythical early IOC will have to be ordered between 2014 and 2016. It'll likely be 2019 at the earlier before a squadron of F35 gains full strenght in the UK.

Next in line, ladies and gentlemen:

The balance of risk has changed and there is now judged to be no greater risk in STOVL than in other variants of JSF.

The highlighted affirmation are patently, utterly untrue. It clashes with reality and with any and every document and statement you'll ever get from the US DoD.
As always, the US DoD real words are: 

[...] significant work and flight tests remain to verify and incorporate modifications to STOVL aircraft required to correct known STOVL deficiencies and prepare the system for operational use.

By the end of November 2011, overall test point progress against planned
baseline productivity was slightly behind (9 percent).    [F35A 11% behind schedule, F35C is 32% ahead of schedule]

The endless list of unresolved issues and risks tied to the F35B completes the picture. 

Then, the next pill of awesome:

So, I can announce today that the National Security Council has agreed not to proceed with the “cats and traps” conversion, but to complete both carriers in STOVL configuration. This will give us the ability to use both carriers to provide continuous carrier availability - at a net additional operating cost averaging about £60M per year. As we set out in the SDSR, a final decision on the use of the second carrier will be taken as part of SDSR 2015.

So, hold on tight: both carriers will be capable to work with the fixed wing jets to be bought, but we could still only get one.
The only interesting / reassuring bit of info is the 60 million average annual cost for running a carrier. Adjusted for inflation, i think it matches the 2003 value of 44 millions per year, so the ship's running cost is stable and - relatively - low. An Albion class LPD costs between 20 and 30 millions a year, a Bay costs 12 million a year.
A CVF at 60 millions is more than fair.


Lies aside, the lesson of the day is: pray that the F35B works. And wait for 2015. 

Type 26; the future of the Afghan vehicle fleet, the F35 saga

Type 26 Update: new BAE video

Once again, not very showy and not very good in quality, but there's a new Type 26 video from BAE, released at DSA 2012 in Malaysi,a and it seems to prove some of the good spotters on this blog right: there's a VLS silo in the funnel. This new video shows it well. Its sizes seem to match the main missile silo, which could mean as many as 24 cells. 

 


Congratulations to the several readers who saw it already in the first video i reported: for how much i tried, i personally struggled to see it, but this new video seems to definitely confirm that something's up there.

Hard to imagine the RN finding the money to put VLS in there when they have difficulties funding the main silo, but we at least know that the design offers this chance. Other highlights: the helicopter hangar door is single (no dog kennel as we all hoped) but, to me, it looks a bit narrow. A single, large hangar is a fundamental requisite for helicopter + UAV operations, so i'm hoping in an hangar at least as large as the Type 45's one. 

A question still to be answered is that of the Flexible Mission Deck. Is it still present? The Royal Navy's Yearbook 2011/12 reports that yes, it is still present. Then again, it still shows the old Type 26 photos. BAE's Global Combat Ship webpage is just about as up-to-date regarding images, though, so it might very well not mean that the info is out of date.

As i wrote in the recent article on the Navy's yearbook, the publication reports, about the Type 26:

The yearbook confirms that the Flex Mission Deck is present. Probably sized, according to BAE data, to take up to 11 standard containers or 4 12m boats.

The yearbook also tells us of the current preferred propulsion option, which is for a CODLOG solution on 4 diesels connected to two large electric motors, generating cruise speed as high as 18 knots, with a direct drive gas turbine for sprints of minimum 26 knots.

Other options have been/are considered, including an integrated all electric solution or a wholly diesel one.

In terms of weapons fit, the yearbook is quite clear about the RN's want to fit the Type 26 with a new medium calibre gun, capable of firing long range, precision guided ammunition. It is very much the identikit of the Oto Melara 127/64 with Vulcano ammunition, especially since the BAE 127/54 rival has been badly damaged by the US cancellation of the guided ammunition meant for it.

Fitting TLAM long range land attack missiles is "subject of further studies" (read: we are trying to get money for it, won't be easy), but regardless of the decision on TLAM it remains the RN's ambition to have the Type 26 fitted at build with a large VLS silo (24 cells) in which land attack missiles and the future anti-ship missile would be carried.  

The Type 26 frigate is to "reverse" the Type 45 situation (20% of technology carried through, 80% new kit) by de-risking most of its mission system thanks to the Type 23 mid-life upgrade program.

Type 26 will inherit from the Dukes the Type 997 radar (Artisan 3D), the Type 2087 towed sonar (8x) and its command system will be a derivation of the current DNA(2)/CMS-1.

The adoption of proven, in-service kit for almost 80% of the ship's systems is meant to keep costs and risks down, as there is no margin for error in this crucial program.

  

The future of Mastiff

On 19 April Philip Davies made a question i've been waiting for for a long time, and got an interesting answer:

Philip Davies: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what plans his Department has to bring all Mastiff, Ridgback and Foxhound vehicles back to the UK after the British role in Afghanistan has been completed. [102414]

Nick Harvey: It is intended to bring all serviceable Mastiff, Ridgback and Foxhound vehicles back from Afghanistan but the specific details, including timing and locations, are still to be determined. It is planned to return the vehicles to a number of sites across the UK and wider Ministry of Defence estate. We expect to make decisions on which vehicles will be retained as part of the core equipment programme during the course of the next year.

Philip Davies: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence whether his Department plans to keep sections of the Army fully trained in the use of Mastiff, Ridgback and Foxhound vehicles for use in future counter-insurgency operations. [102416]

Nick Harvey: It is not yet known which of these of vehicles will be retained as part of the core equipment programme. However, the Army's training programme will continue to reflect their use for as long as there is a requirement to do so.

Unfortunately Davies did not include Warthog and Jackal in his question, and Harvey accurately avoided expanding on the matter himself.

On Foxhound, we pretty much already knew: Foxhound is already considered part of the Core Budget (the second order for 100 vehicles has also been already funded from Core, and not under UOR method), while it is interesting to hear that Mastiff and Ridgback are coming back to the UK.

Somewhat sensibly, the long term future of both will be decided in Planning Round 2013, it seems, after this year's Planning Round gives (hopefully) a clear indication of the force structure that the Army has to develop.

Using a Voyager for VIP transport role?  

It is not a bad proposal. One of the 5 "on-call" Voyagers could well fill this need. And you have to admit that the press and industry do make a good point: if you go abroad to advertise the Airbus products but show up in a chartered Boeing, you don't look very smart.

The Voyager is also an obvious candidate for the UK's eventual participation in the currently tri-national Air Tanker initiative launched within NATO by France, Germany and the Netherlands in order to provide, by 2020, a greater european air tanker capability, based on the Airbus 330 platform, of which France plans a fleet of 14, with orders for the first 5/7 to come next year.

F35 saga

We are still dealing with an unjustified, unspecified inflated carrier conversion cost figure having ballooned from a NAO estimate of 800 million and a MOD allocation of 950 millions to 1.8 billion or even 2 billions, depending on the newspaper talking of it. 

According to the US Navy, the EMALS and AAG cost has not changed, and the modifications to the carrier itself and additional worktime are not worth more than 400 million pounds, meaning that the 950 million allocation is actually still more than valid and also has a margin for cost overgrowth. 

So, from where does the 1.8 billion figure come? 

My personl opinion is that the press got it wrong and it is reporting the figure in an absolutely misleading way. The conversion cost of the single carrier has not increased 8not that much at least!), with 1.8 / 2 billion being the cost of conversion for both hulls. Which would more than fit the only official cost estimations we have, coming from the NAO, the MOD and the US Navy, 3 sources that, in my book, matter a lot more than the Daily Mail. 

This is of course still a cost increase because, as we know, the original 2010 plan was to convert only Prince of Wales and rely on carrier sharing with the french to put the british planes on Charles De Gaulle when the carrier was not available. 

The key point is that Charles de Gaulle is unsuitable for operations with the heavy F35C, as its deck is not adequate. This was first reported in a Parliamentary Defence Committee report, and when i first signaled it, i was ridiculed by many. I stand vindicated now, as the CdG unsuitability is confirmed. 
However, you will agree with me that a lot of things change between being fed with the story that fitting two catapults and 3 wires costs almost as much as building the vessel whole and having that pricetag covering two conversions.  
It would be very important to have clarity on this point.

In absence of an adequate second deck provided by France, converting the second CVF becomes indispensable, and there appears the 1.8 / 2 billion cost figure, with the new, magic question being: is it still worth the price? 

Question which is followed by an even less comfortable: "if it is still worth the price, where the hell do we find all that money in the short term?"

Answering these two questions is the key. 

According to US DoD figures, the F35B will cost 25% more than the C through-life to support.

In terms of acquisition costs, the 2012 figures for the expected Recurring Flyaway Unit Cost (the pricetag of a complete F35 airframe ready to go, but excluding spares, training and support) are: 

F35C - 87 USD million

F35B - 106.5 USD million 

From these figures comes the "600 million pounds" saving that has been reported by the Press several times when the subject is the F35C. The 600 million pounds savings is calculated on an  initial order for 50 airframes.

A Telegraph article reporting of a leaked "top secret" OPEVAL exercise internal at the MOD reports, however, that the F35B limitations in terms of range, payload and availability would require an order of 135 to match the same requirements met by 97 F35C.

The interesting bit is that the "about 100 airframes" target reported by RAF sources would convert to a rather accurate (and very interesting) planned number of 97 F35C. That would be a very excellent number to work with, because it could sustain a good 5 frontline squadrons plus OCU, or Fleet Replacement Squadron in US terms. In economic terms:

cost of 97 F35C = 8439 US million [5241 million pounds, roughly, in today's pounds, so it would fit within the rumored "5 billion budget"]
cost of 97 F35B = 10330.5 US million [6415.2 million pounds]

Difference: 1174.2 million pounds.

Number of F35B theorically achievable with 8439 US million [the budget is more than likely to stay the same, after all] = 79 vs 97 F35C

Difference in million pounds if 135 F35B were to be ordered (will never happen, but if we are to believe the Telegraph this is the number of B it takes to meet the requirements covered by 97 C)

8929 million pounds [135 F35B]
6415.2 million pounds [97 F35C]

2513.2 million pounds of difference.

[135 F35C would cost 7293,6 million pounds, again over 1.6 billion saved]

There is who has already suggested that this report is a "Navy trick" aiming to provide the government with a cost figure that justifies spending for the conversion of the carriers. What can i say, perhaps. Or maybe no. 
The first who argued for the F35C, and we know thanks to Lockheed Martin sources, was the RAF, who's been wanting the C as a Tornado replacement since at least 2005. They might have changed their mind and now want the B very badly, but i do not exactly think so.

Launching accuses of "Navy tricks", though, stinks. And it clashes against a reality which from many years now sees the Navy quite regularly screwed and outplayed, and which is all but denounced by Liam Fox himself, who after the SDSR period at a conference had to bitterly note: 

“Sometimes I get the impression that the Navy is less successful, even less willing, at selling itself than the other services.”

and

“I was accused by some of being the only dark blue suit in the SDSR apart from the First Sea Lord.”

The Navy playing tricks within the MOD? Would be kind of about time they started, but it is unlikely that they have gained any real foothold in the right positions in order to do so, since the still recent past.

I want the best decision to be made. I want two carriers available, and the planes to fly off them also available. My preference goes to the C, for a number of reasons, from its better and smoother progress in the testing and development to the much better weight growth margin which gives it much more helpful breath space to evolve, fix eventual issues yet to be discovered, and reach entry in service as an effective airplane, to the fact that the only "hard" cost figures we have all point to it being a much cheaper and cost-effective choice. 
I also value the flexibility and future-proof nature of a big CATOBAR carrier: future UCAV? It can go aboard. CATOBAR plane? It can go aboard. STOVL plane? It can go aboard. US Navy, USMC, French, Italian airplane? They all can use a big CATOBAR CVF.
Name it, and the big CATOBAR ship almost certainly can do it. 

The bit about UCAV is likely to be particularly important in future. I've talked with B supporters who say that we'll just fit EMCATs from Converteam or, guess it, EMALS, in future, when the drones make up more and more of the UK's airpower (the RAF itself expects that one third of its force will be made up by UAVs in 20 years time!), but to me this sounds absolutely ridiculous. If we are expecting to need catapults in a few years time, then it is absolutely clear that we should get them now, not buy the most expensive and less capable airplane, be constrained by it for 30 years or more will also paying for catapults and wires soon after. 

I recognize, however, that it is not a decision to be taken in isolation. 
The F35B should come with a lower requirement in terms of training for carrier qualification, which is very important to ensure that the RAF can embark with minimum notice. If a genuine assessment of the pros and cons suggests going with the B, i'll be the first wishing the F35B well, for it to work and work well.

However, i want it to be a genuine assessment of all pros and cons. And ideally, since carrier strike is what we want to achieve, we should finally detach the requirement from the RAF desire of spending the most of the time on land, in a comfortable airfield such as Marham, and only bother to go at sea when it really can't be avoided, unless they can provide genuine financial and operational justifications for the arrangement, for example explaining what is a second land-based jet fleet going to add to the defence capability of the UK other than numeric consistency.   
This is the original sin of the whole matter, to me. This (wrong) way of approaching carrier strike, by trying to present CVF as a floating, mobile RAF airport over which the Navy has just 40% of the say.

Sorry, this is just the wrong way of doing things. We are trying to put a land force on a ship, meeting the inexorable issues that this implies, and potentially choosing the "wrong" aircraft in order to make it possible, instead of having a naval force, which can with zero issues (other than, possibly, losing carrier currency is the ops go on and on and on for years, but this is another matter and the Harrier GR9 is there to demonstrate that, in this particular case, the B would not do any better) go on land when necessary.

And we are having to deal with this as a consequence of a dubiously wise maneuver in the SDSR 1998. Time to look into it again, and make an honest analysis of what is really needed and what must be achieved. 

The benefits of re-established naval aviation are clear: 

- Air Cover for the Fleet 
- Independent capability of deploying airpower in a place and time of UK's choosing
- More effective use of available resources thanks to the possibility of going closer to the target

etcetera. 
Given that the airplane and weaponry employed would be the same, primarily-focus the fleet on land negates and reduces the benefits, if anything.

As to the (not very relevant, but very annoying on the other hand) war of words about who-is-lobbying for what, it is worth remembering that in 2006 Tom Burbage, LM director of the F35 program, said that the UK planned a buy of 138 F35, of which 80 would be B, forming 4 Squadrons and an OCU as a replacement for the Joint Force Harrier and to provide the airwing of CVF, with the remaining airplanes forming two more (smaller) squadrons plus an OCU as Tornado replacement for land based deep strike.

It was reported that this entailed a split buy, with the F35B for the carriers and the long-range, higher-payload F35C for the RAF deep strike.

Later on, in 2007, talk for a single type order of 80/85 F35C started to emerge, and it is evident that things evolved from there up to the surprise decision in the SDSR 2010.

Better to be careful when you accuse the "evil" Navy of plotting to support the F35C: for what we know, it appears more likely that the Navy is now scared of having to shoulder a much greater expense than hoped for CVF conversion due to the clear need for two hulls as CdG won't do, and is thus arguing for the B, with at least part of the RAF pressing for the C.

Which makes far more sense when you think that:

A - The Navy pays for CVF - so converting both hulls means, for them, finding more money

B - The RAF pays for the F35 - so C for them means paying a lot less and getting more

Do you really think that the RAF is arguing for a plane that would cost them more and do less, while the Navy eagerly calls for a greater cost to face in the build program?

You might be seeing this upside-down.

It is a very complex and very embarrassing story, in any case, caused first of all by the lack of a clear strategy, by the never-successful mixture of RAF and RN on the naval aviation front, and especially by a lack of understanding of the need for and of the workings of carrier aviation.

I hope the decision which eventually is taken proves to be the correct one, but so far the premises are far from reassuring.

USMC and USN TACAIR agreement and F35 plans

Up to 2011, the USMC was still planning a buy of 420 F35B, for a sole STOVL force. This was, in part, son of the 2001-old prediction (later proved false by a good margin) that the C variant would be the most expensive of the 3.

By 14 March 2011, things had changed, and time was mature for a new Tactical Airpower integration agreement between the US Navy and the USMC, which brought forwards, along with other adjustments, the well-known change from a 420 B order to a 340 B, 80 C USMC order.

The future US Navy air component is to line 35 Strike squadrons, of which 20, out to at least 2030, will fly on the Super Hornet (half on the two-seat F/A-18F and half on the single seat E), with 15 squadrons flying the F35C thanks to an order for 260 airplanes.

The US Navy is standing up a first Fleet Replacement Squadron, with 15 F35C, based on the F35 Integrated Training Center on Eglin air force base, and is finalizing the program for the transition of the legacy F/A-18C fleet to the F35C.

In particular, the transition will start on the West Coast, where, from 2015, the active squadrons on the 18C will start changing airplane. A total of 7 active squadrons will convert to the C on the West Coast, and each squadron will have 10 F35C.

In 2017 they will be joined by the Fleet Replacement Squadron responsible for the West Coast, which will have 30 airplanes.

109 F/A-18C are thus being replaced by 100 F35C, to be all based, almost certainly, on the Leemore air base.

The East Cost squadrons will begin transition to the C in 2019. There should be 8 more active squadrons and another large Fleet Replacement Squadron, even if the plan has yet to be announced. There should also be at least one Reserve Component squadron on the F35C.

A possible utilization of the Navy F35C would thus be:

160 assigned to frontline squadrons (16 squadrons including one reserve sqn - plan still evolving)

75 in Fleet Replacement Squadrons [15 on the ITC, 30 in the West Coast FRS and probably 30 in an East Coast FRS]

25 OEU/Attrition

The USMC will have 21 Active and 3 Reserve squadrons: 5 squadrons (10 airplanes each) will be on the F35C.

The 420 USMC F35s will be used in the following way:

282 airplanes assigned to Active and Reserve squadrons

64 airplanes committed to Training

6 in OEU

68 attrition reserve

The 80 F35C of the Marines will form squadrons on "10 plus" airplanes each, leaving up to 30 for training and attrition.

The 340 F35B are to be assigned to 9 Expeditionary Squadrons, each with 10 airplanes, with the task of supplying airplanes to the 7 Marine Expeditionary Units, for employment on the LHDs and LHA ships.

A normal LHA/LHD detachment will have 6 F35B and 9 pilots. There is thus plenty of airplanes to put machines on each deck.

A further 7 Squadrons, larger, will stand up for land deployment, each with 16 airplanes. Four of these squadrons will be based on Yuma AB.

These squadrons will rotate and one will at all times be located in Japan, on Iwakuni AB: prior to the 2011 TACAIR agreement with the US Navy, this task was covered by F/A-18 squadrons of the Navy on behalf of the Marines.

Last, there will be 3 Reserve Squadrons, all on F35B.

Prior to the 2011 TACAIR deal, the Marines planned, as said earlier, for an all B fleet, which would have lined 3 Fleet Replacement Squadrons, each with at least 20 airplanes.

There is not yet a detailed plan for the FRSs now that the F35C is part of the picture, but a share of the 64 airframes assigned to training will no doubt be made up by the C.

A 20-airplanes Fleet Replacement Squadron on the F35B is part of the Eglin ITC, and two more F35B FRS were planned: i guess that there might still be, but line, perhaps, 15 F35B each instead of 20, with another FRS having the F35C.

The FY2012 Marines Aviation Plan, once published, should explain this: normally, their documents are wonderfully detailed. FY2011 Plan sure is, and it is immensely interesting even though the F35 part is clearly outdated as it is still an all-B plan.

The Naval Aviation Vision 2012, released in January, describes the future of the 10 Carrier Air Wings of the US Navy:

44 Strike Fighers [2x Super Hornet sqn, 12 airplanes each, one two-seat and one single seat]

                            [2x F35C sqn, 10 airplanes each]

5 AEW&C            [1x E2D Hawkeye sqn with 4/5 airplanes]

11 helicopters      [+8 distributed within the battlegroup, all of the MH60R type]

2/3 Carrier On-board Delivery [Greyhound and then future replacement]

4/6 UCAVs           [from 2018 or, more likely, 2020]

5 Electronic Warfare [1x EA-18G Growler squadron with 5 airplanes]

556 Super Hornet are available/on order so to sustain a 20 Squadron force up to 2030.

75 E2D Hawkeye are being purchased for 10 squadrons plus Fleet Replacement Squadron, 1 Reserve Squadron (will continue to use the E2C).

114 EA-18G Growler on order, to sustain 14 Squadrons [10 for the Carrier Air Wings, 4 "Expeditionary", needed also to fill a big hole in EW capability since the termination of the USAF B52 Standoff Jammer Capability], one Fleet Replacement Squadron with 12 airplanes.

The USMC is not getting any Growler: they will use to exhaustion the remaining Prowler, [22 in 4 Squadrons] decommissioning one squadron per year from 2016 onwards. The replacement will be the stealthy Next Generation Jammer, mounted on the F35B (the Navy will use it on the Growler and possibly on the C), and a UAV with an Electronic Warfare payload.