Building on strengths

 In this series of short posts I pursue two key objectives:

-          Argue that the British Armed Forces, in times of severe budget difficulties, should not pursue “ham tomorrow” at all costs, but focus instead on a number of areas in which they still have the seeds of excellence.

-          Provide a more detailed background to my “Alternative Army 2020” proposal, showing the reasoning behind certain approaches.

The approach behind my reasoning is simple: building on what is available, to secure and improve a number of key capabilities that make the UK a major player in defence within NATO.

Rather than dismantling mass and capability even further to pursue new “Strike Brigades”, or seek savings by cutting back on the more “exotic” specialties, I argue that it makes more sense to move back a step and watch the picture from a slightly different angle.

It is by now constantly repeated that the British Armed forces will always operate in Coalition and that this or that gap are not worrisome because allies will help plug the hole. However, unless the “ally” is invariably Uncle Sam, certain decisions make no sense as they are not at all aligned to what the European allies could effectively provide in a joint operation. The result is that certain cuts and proposals only exacerbate weaknesses that already exist within NATO and sacrifice precious specialism.

Does it make sense to cut back on Heavy Armour when, even with all the well known obsolescence issues of Challenger 2, the british heavy contingents are the only ones with true, recent wartime mileage in Europe?

Does it make sense to cut back on the ability to project power from the sea through amphibious operations when 3^rd Commando Brigade and the shipping available for it remain a very large percentage of Europe’s capability in this specialist area?

Does it make sense to weaken the Royal Fleet Auxiliary and pretend that there is no manpower problem, when the RFA represents the vast majority of complex logistic shipping in Europe, making it a truly invaluable component not just for the UK, but for its allies as well?

Does it make sense to cut back on air-ground manoeuvre when there are 60 Chinooks, 50 Apache and 8 C-17 in service, giving the UK the best mix of tools for air manoeuvre in all of Europe?

Does it make sense to still tinker with the idea of cutting Sentinel, when the air ISTAR elements the UK can field are without rival in Europe?

Certain suggestions and, worse still, certain MOD moves appear to me to be absolutely misguided. Dismantling capability in areas in which the UK is the major European player is not going to make any favor to Her Majesty’s Government political weight. Being leaders in a number of specialist areas is more valuable than being able to field half-formed, half-tracked “Strike Brigades” able to respond “quickly” to… no one really knows what.

Not to mention that if the specialist capabilities are retained and nurtured, the potential for independent action, albeit on a small scale, remains more realistic. And the ability to take action independently is a key differentiator in the weight of a country at the table. An independent nuclear deterrent on its own will lose value if the rest of the armed forces turn into handicapped forces, plagued by capability gaps, pursuing political clout by being always the first to deploy in any new crisis. The UK still has a budget large enough and capabilities good enough to be a leader within NATO, a framework nation to which smaller players can contribute reinforcements. The UK should be, first of all, a Strategic Enabler: a military power lacking in mass, for obvious reason, but with the most complete range of capabilities possible. Even more so because it already possesses much of what it takes to do so. It is actually cheaper, or at least more cost-effective, to build upon what there already is.

Air Manoeuvre

While large-scale airborne operations are of questionable, at best, likelihood and of uncertain wisdom in this day and age, and anyway outside of the UK’s material possibilities; smaller scale parachute operations and, above all, manoeuvre by the air at battlegroup level, remain absolutely valid and useful. Air manoeuvre has been extremely effective and very widely used in Afghanistan and in Mali. In Mali, the French had some success with company-group parachute assaults as well, showing that there is still merit to having this kind of rapid insertion capability.

It is my belief that the British Army absolutely needs to maintain parachute assault as a capability, albeit at relatively small scale. Even more important is maintaining a significant ability to manoeuvre significant forces by air, both for securing key points ahead of the ground forces and for flank operations.

This is a complex, demanding and expensive proposition but, among the good reasons for insisting on this capability, is the fact that the UK is actually relatively well positioned to maintain and expand its know-how in this area. It is not my intention to produce here an history of the various SDSRs and of the procurement decisions they have generated, because it would take several pages at best, but the important thing is that the various decisions taken in the past have generated:

-          A fleet of 8 C-17 strategic cargo aircrafts, which provide a lift capability with no match elsewhere in NATO

-          A fleet of 22 A400M Atlas; not as numerous as desirable but certainly significant

-          A fleet of 14 C-130J to be retained in the long term thanks to a sudden dawn of wisdom in the SDSR 2015

-          A large and very capable helicopter fleet, composed of, crucially, 60 Chinooks providing a lift capacity that only Germany, having the CH-53, could hope to match.

Add the 50 Apache E with their proven firepower and sensors; 23 Puma HC2 and the Wildcats, and the resulting pool of resources is actually very considerable. It is easy to lose heart in front of the constant downpour of cuts and capability gaps, but there are actually still areas of excellence which could and should be better exploited.  

Arguably, the UK has better resources in this area than anyone else (always excluding the US, obviously) within NATO, yet 16 Air Assault brigade hasn’t fared too well in the last decade. Its organic supports (Artillery, Logistic, Signal…) have been eroded down to such a degree that the brigade today cannot be considered a “true” brigade. It has three regular infantry battalions thanks to the recent addition of the Gurkha rifles, but for lack of supports it would not be able to convert all three into battlegroups and deploy en masse. It has also lost the little bit of semi-organic cavalry support it had, and the Patrols platoons within the PARA battalions cannot be considered an adequate replacement.

In my opinion, this amounts to wasting a fine unit and a great opportunity. Those who have read my alternative proposal for Army 2020 Refine know that I called for a reinforcement of 16 Air Assault Brigade in its supporting parts as well as, if at all possible, the expansion to a four-battalions structure. What is needed is an “air-mechanized” brigade composed of two air mobile battalions and two light mechanized battalions (on Foxhound and Jackal). The whole brigade remains relatively light and easily deployed, but comes with everything it needs to be a true Strike force, tactically as well as strategically agile and able, from within its constituent units, to replicate the kind of combined air and ground manoeuvre that the army has most recently carried out during operation Herrick.

It is worth mentioning Operation Panther’s Claw (Panchai Palang) in the summer of 2009: 3^rd SCOTS, then deployed as Aviation Assault Battlegroup, saw 350 soldiers of A and B companies (the Aviation Strike Coys in the group) airlifted in a single large wave to secure key crossing points in the Luy Mandeh wadi, north of Babaji. The reinforcements came in the form of a 64-vehicles convoy, with Mastiff, Jackal, Vikings and trucks from Camp Bastion, led by Task Force Thor, an American C-IED route clearance unit. The single-wave assault was made with 12 Chinooks, both british and American, supported by 4 Apache and 2 US Black Hawks.

2 weeks later, after holding the ground, B company carried out another aviation assault to secure another key passage ahead of the advancing Light Dragoons battlegroup. In July, during the third phase of the operation, Alpha coy was inserted using 5 Chinook and the support of 2 Apache. This operation included link-up with an armoured thrust by Charlie Company, 2 Royal Welsh in Warriors. The Fire Support Group operated on the ground, mounted in Jackals.

Air manoeuvre remains an essential capability, and the Army and RAF own the most expensive pieces already: there is no reason not to expand on them to put meat on the bones of 16 Air Assault Brigade.

As 3^rd SCOTS example proves, in addition, air mobility is not necessarily a job for PARA troops, provided that the necessary expertise and procedures are well rehersed and understood within the army. In my alternative Army 2020 proposal, 51 Brigade has the same structure: 2 Light Role Battalions replace 2 and 3 PARA, and are meant to provide the air mobile element, while two light mechanized infantry battalions provide the ground mobility element. Each brigade also has a Light Cavalry regiment on Jackal.  

Several equipment problems are immediately evident:

-          The army currently lacks the capability to parachute Jackal into battle, and this means that the first Fire Support elements are forced to enter the fight as dismounts.

-          The Jackal is a good vehicle, but it was not engineered to be a rapid air landing assault platform. As amazing as it might sound, the Jackal cannot charge out, combat-ready, from a C-130 since the machine gun on top has to be removed in order to fit. So, even as an air-landed follow on reinforcement, it needs some time to make ready before it can move into the fight.

The latter problem is possibly going to go away thanks to the A400 Atlas. The first can only be solved by procuring a strong enough parachute platform system for use on the Atlas. The British Army has decided to entirely gap Heavy and Vehicle airdrops by withdrawing from service the old Medium Stressed Platform, which was compatible with the old C-130K cargo floor but not with the J’s. After seeking a modification to integrate the platform on the C-130J, the army decided that it was too expensive and accepted the gap. In the last few years, 16 Air Assault brigade has been able to parachute its artillery and other heavy loads into action only by exploiting US help and kit.

A new platform and the A400M are supposed to fix the problem.

The light cavalry mounted on Jackal has a firepower deficit, as the .50 HMG and 40mm GMG alone can’t give the reach and the heavy punch required to stand up to more threatening adversaries. Without even needing to go all the way up to Russian or Russian-style light armoured vehicles, the Jackals could end up being severely outgunned by “technicals” such as those seen in Syria. While the accuracy of fire coming from a ZSU-23 mounted on a Toyota pick-up might be questionable at best, it is not acceptable to step into a fight knowing that the enemy already has a range and firepower advantage almost every time (14.5mm machine guns, ZSU-23s and even old BMP turrets are easily found around in every theatre of war). Syria and Iraq are also showing how dangerous hastily and crudely armoured vehicle-born IEDs are: having a 30mm gun to decisively hit and stop them at a safe distance would make the difference.

The cheapest and easiest solution is to fit a number of Jackal vehicles with a remote turret armed with the same 30mm gun employed by the Apache. It is a weapon the army already has and supports, limiting its impact on logistics, and it would help the Light Cavalry a great deal. It does not weight much and it is getting a boost thanks to US Army plans to have it on top of JLTV in the reconnaissance role.

In this photo by Army recognition, a particularly capable RWS, my Moog Inc., integrating 7.62 coax, Javelin missile and M230 30mm gun. 

A simpler, lighter M230LF installation on M-ATV. The US Army is probably going to require this weapon on top of the Joint Light Tactical Vehicles used in recce role. 

From heavily armed technicals to russian Tigr with 30mm guns. The Light Cavalry is not good for much unless it has the firepower to at least compete with this range of threats. 

Another issue, until recently, was the non exploitation of the C-17’s tactical capabilities. Thankfully, in the last couple of years the Army and RAF have begun to open up airdrops, rapid air landing and austere runways capability latent in the Globemaster fleet. Hopefully, it is only a matter of time before the C-17 can be fully exploited.

Heavy Air Drop capability needs to be rebuilt; it cannot be delegated entirely to US help

Relatively small investments can have a major impact on the British Army’s capability to manoeuvre from and through the air. Much of the required equipment exists. Central to my alternative Army 2020 proposal, air mobility is a key attribute of light brigades. Two such brigades, one of which based on 16 Air Assault; would provide the army with a sustainable and quickly deployable core of Aviation Assault battle groups supported by light mechanized formations ensuring post-landing mobility and lethality.

Parachute capability, normally at company group-level, continues to come on rotation from within the 2 PARA battalions, while air assault is more widely delivered by Light Role battalions.

A last summary, two weeks from SDSR day

 

SDSR 2015 – Issues, analysis and recommendations going towards the review

Budget

About that 2%

Army 

Army projects and requirements

Army vehicle projects – post DSEI 2015

Solving the problem of hollow army 2020

Royal Air Force 

Fast jets and squadrons number 

Air Capabilities

The mystery of Protector

Royal Navy 

Royal Navy and the SDSR 

Beyond Harpoon and Storm Shadow (and Tomahawk too…?

What to expect?

In general terms, it is thought that this SDSR will bring “good news”. As I wrote on Twitter back in October, its publication was pushed to the right to more closely aligned with the Spending Review (25 November), but with release “a few days before” (that was my guess, and we now know it’ll be 2 days, as the SDSR is due for release on the 23^rd) to show that, “no, It is nothing like 2010”.

In broad terms, the SDSR will re-affirm the targets for Future Force 2020. No cuts are expected, and instead there should be some good news. How many, and how actually good, we don’t yet know.

I’m moderately optimistic. The fact that we can expect overall stability is a welcome change in itself, but I’m still skeptic about the good news. If the SDSR doesn’t settle satisfactorily the MPA gap, which I consider the most problematic, I cannot consider it a success.

One thing I try to keep in mind and a warning that I feel I must give is: don’t expect too much detail. The yearly Equipment Programme document shows just how well this government is using indetermination to protect its ability to cut at leisure behind the curtains. What does the Equipment Plan include, exactly? How many vehicles? For delivery when? We don’t know. The document says nothing until firm contracts have been signed, so that anything not yet firmly on contract can be stealthily cut, pushed to the right, descoped, changed.

I expect the SDSR to be just as indecisive and vague whenever it suits the Treasury’s interests. For example, I do not expect to be given details about the plans for purchasing F-35s, other than a confirmation of the 48 needed for the OCU and the first two squadrons.

Main Gate 5, the next big programme decision point, is scheduled for 2017 and I honestly can’t imagine this government telling us much before that date.

The purchase of 20 Protector RPAS to replace the current 10 Reaper will also not be detailed before Main Gate in early 2016, I’m afraid. Until then, we are unlikely to learn much about what exactly they’ll be like, or what impact they will have on manpower, infrastructure and number of squadrons (currently, there's 2 squadrons operating 10 Reapers). 

In general, I expect plenty of questions to remain unanswered.

Some programmes are however on the move, or expected to move on with the SDSR. There is even some optimism in the press about reversing some more of the 2010 madness. The following summary shows where we are, what we know, and what rumors are floating around.

Airborne troops and helicopters

16 Air Assault Brigade is re-subordinated to the Land Forces, leaving Joint Helicopter Command. In the process, it “loses” some pieces: the Apache regiments remain as Attack Helicopter Force under JHC. 7 REME battalion splits into two, with 8 Field Company (Para) re-subordinating to 13 Air Assault Support Regiment RLC to continue delivering equipment support to the paras on the field and the aviation coys (73 Av Coy now in Yeovilton to support the Wildcat fleet, the other two in Wattisham, aligned with the two Apache regiments)  staying under JHC as 7 REME battalion. All should be done by the end of this month. The Eagle symbol retires with dignity, and the beloved Pegasus returns. 

The split of 7 REME was in my list of suggested changes to 16 Air Assault Brigade, as well as the separation of the helicopters from the troops. Of course, I called for more ambitious changes, with 8 Field Company being at least doubled into a (small) battalion better suited to support the force generation cycle of 16X and with the army and RAF helicopter squadrons reorganized into real aviation brigade(s). I did not expect it to actually happen, at least not in one go, but one can hope. The restructuring of 16X is, at least in my opinion, following the right path.  

The army is taking control of the work to determine what comes after the Medium Stressed Platform to allow the parachuting of heavy equipment and vehicles. An attempt to find a stop-gap solution by adapting the MSP for use on the C-130J seems to have sadly been cancelled, leaving the present airborne forces badly handicapped. An handicap that will stay for a good few years, until a new platform and the A400 are ready for operations.

The US Type V platform remains on the list of possible solutions, but there’s reportedly a 500 kg problem still for using it with Jackal. The employment of Jackal with the airborne has been trialed during exercises in the US, and the vehicle has fared very well, delivering decisive firepower and faring better than the Humvees employed by the US. However, the impossibility of parachuting the Jackal into battle is a limit, and even when air landing from the C-130, the Jackal can’t just charge into the fight right away: the weapon on top needs to be re-installed after landing due to the dimensional limits of the C-130’s cargo door and hold.

It is also to be regretted that there are no plans to retain a small force of light, well armed, tracked armoured vehicles. Those would add immensely to the ability to react swiftly and to bring armoured fire support even in the most hostile territories. 

Right as the US Army resurrects ideas for a light tank capable even of being airdropped, with BAE showcasing a renewed M-8 Buford, the UK has no plan to retain a squadron of light combat vehicles. I think Ajax is a good replacement for CVR(T) in the armoured brigades, but i also see the enduring need for a small unit equipped to enter a distant theatre quickly and support the reaction force even on the worst terrain.

A bit of good news came from Joint Warrior 15-1, which saw the debut of RAF C-17 in tactical role, with it being employed in Rapid and Follow-On Air Landings. Finally! As I’ve said more than once, the UK has paid big money for a strategic cargo with great tactical capabilities: you paid for them, now use them. I hope we will see airdrops becoming part of the C-17’s routine as well. 

A capable replacement for the Medium Stressed Platform is key to keeping the airborne task force viable.

Meanwhile, the MOD has begun the process for upgrading 25 Gazelle helicopters with GPS, traffic avoidance system and a new VHF radio. The upgrade will be carried out by Gama Engineering Ltd, and should be completed by August 2017. It has to be assumed that the Gazelle OSD is no longer 2018, and that the thorny issue of its replacement will be pushed to the right by a good few years. The Gazelle remains in use with 667 (Development and Trials) Squadron and 671 Squadron as part of 7 (Training) Regiment at AAC Centre Middle Wallop; in 665 Squadron, part of 5 Regiment at Joint Helicopter Command Flying Station Aldergrove, Northern Ireland; and 29 (BATUS) Flight as part of the British Army Training Unit Suffield (BATUS) in Canada.

The SDSR should confirm the plan to upgrade 50 Apache helicopters to Block III standard, but details of how, where (Boeing or AW?) and when are most likely going to come out only in March 2016 when the Main Gate decision is planned.  

Army vehicles

The 10 Years Equipment Plan, 2015 edition is, as was to be expected, entirely devoid of details, dates, numbers, but it still provides some interesting pointers: both ABSV and MRV-P are included in the plan. The ABSV has been definitively separated from the Warrior CSP and will be, on achieving Main Gate, a new Category A programme in its own right. Unfortunately, we might have to wait for 2017 before Main Gate is reached. Entry into service might have to slip as well as a consequence, from 2020 to sometime into the 2020s. ABSV is a key programme, as it is needed to replace the ancient FV432 and complement the (insufficient) number of Warriors with 40mm gun. The effectiveness of the armoured infantry battalions is in no small measure connected with ABSV.

A curiosity: if the Equipment Plan is not just messing up numbers, the Warrior Section Vehicle becomes FV520 after the CSP (now is known as FV510) and the Infantry Command sub-variant becomes FV521 (was FV511).

The Equipment Plan confirms thinking that the MRV-P will require a 4x4 and a 6x6 vehicle. The requirement, albeit over many years, runs into the thousands of vehicles, but the funded MRV-p project for now is expected to cover only 500 troop carriers, 78 ambulances and 27 recovery vehicles. Main Gate is expected in 2017. The hope is that the MRV-p does not become another orphaned programme, abandoned after the first phase with the result of creating yet another “mini” fleet. Rationalization of the current holding of vehicles (from Land Rovers and Pinzgauers in “close to firing line” roles to Husky, Panther, WMIK) with successive purchases of MRV-P should be a key army aspiration in along the next decade.

The Challenger 2 LEP is confirmed as part of the plans. Main Gate has slipped to the right as the army tries to find ideas (and money, especially money) to try and address the growing list of deficiencies. The idea of possibly purchasing a “new” tank as replacement has quickly been abandoned, but the Army has now officially declared its concerns, especially about lethality. The powerpack would also need replacing. Whether the delay to the LEP brings to any increase in its scope, is beyond my guessing ability at this point: the army knows that upgrading only the fire control system, communications and sights won’t quite solve the problems, but might still be unable to do anything about it for lack of money.

The REME Conference 2015 has seen the announcement that there is a funded plan to procure an Air Portable Lightweight Recovery Vehicle that will be used by 16X and 3X Commando. A light recovery vehicle for the Light Protected Mobility Infantry battalions will also be procured. Finally, the Challenger recovery variant is due to receive unspecified survivability upgrades, perhaps in line with add-on armor elements of the Challenger 2 LEP.

Note that MRV-P and Air Portable recovery vehicle were grouped together with two more requirements to form the Operational Support Programme (OSP). The other two components were the new Future Protected Battle Field Ambulance (FPBFA) and the Non-Articulated Vehicle – Protected (NAV-P), the vital replacement for DROPS (also known as the vehicle which went out of service at the end of 2014 but remains used in numbers anyway because the army simply can’t do without it for many things). It is not known yet if these will progress as well. The NAV-P certainly should, because it really is an indispensable piece of capability. 



Logistic storage capacity

In Summer 2016, we should finally get to hear the recommendations for where to re-locate the vehicle storage capability from the current facilities: Ashchurch and its sister site in Mönchengladbach, Germany are the 2 major controlled humidity storage sites preserving vehicles and kit for all three the Services, but government wants to close both by 2018. Clearly, a decision on where to park the thousands of items, including armored vehicles up to the Challenger 2, is an absolute necessity.

A new site, ideally located close to the Salisbury Plain training area and well connected by rail to both Marchwood and Brize Norton, is clearly required. It will be important to see what is actually done in this key area. 

Seeking a new garage

Work has already begun on the complementary storage site, the Defence Fulfillment Centre MOD Donnington, which will store and distribute food, clothing, general and medical supplies in a 80.000 square meters, two-hangars facility.

VIRTUS

With Phase 1 vests and load carrying equipment deliveries beginning, the Equipment Plan 2015 says that activities have begun for Phase 2 and Phase 3, respectively covering the development of new, advanced and lighter ballistic plates and man-worn data and power infrastructure.

Ground Based Air Defence

An anti-UAV capability demonstration was given earlier this year by SAAB to the MOD: the focus was on an Enhanced Low, Slow, and Small (ELSS) capability for the Giraffe AMB radar in service. The development of anti-UAV capability is part of Increment 2 of the Network Enabled Airspace Defence and Surveillance programme. If the schedule continues to be followed, a kinetic C-RAM capability should be acquired by 2017.  

The MOD is procuring a C4 solution for integrated air defence of the Falklands and has procured additional Giraffe AMB radars and an upgrade to the latest standard for those already in service. The fleet should now count 10 systems between radars delivered and on order.

The Phase 1 of procurement for the FLAADS(Land) batteries that will replace the current 4 Rapier batteries has begun with a contract signed in December 2014.

A new EOD robot

A new battlefield UGV for EOD work is to be procured under Project STARTER. This is curious, since I thought the recent purchase of the much celebrated CUTLASS would be enough to completely replace the old WHEELBARROWs, Evidently it is not the case. STARTER is for 56 UGVs with a further 30 options. It is meant for fire line battlefield use, and requirements include being able to fit within existing EOD vehicles, from Pinzgauers to Mastiff III EOD.

Training of aircrews

Plans for the complete renewal of the training fleets for both fixed and rotary wing fleets are progressing, and surprisingly they are doing so in complete silence. One possible explanation is that they are keeping the announcement for the SDSR, to present it as good news.

It is not, at least entirely, good news: the training fleets will be renewed, yes, but their sizes are expected to drop enormously, and there will be little to no more capability for training foreign pilots. Moreover, RAF Linton-on-Ouse is probably going to close as Basic training is moved to RAF Valley.

The SDSR should, one would expect, spend a few words to explain what will happen to the base and to the training fleets.

A “RAF Military Flying Training School” is expected to stand up in 2017 in RAF Valley, probably replacing both No 1 FTS (basic training, RAF Linton-on-Ouse) and No 4 FTS (Advanced, RAF Valley). It can be assumed with quite some confidence that the current 72(R), 208(R) and IV(R) squadrons will drop to just 2.

No 2 FTS has been re-formed in January 2014 on RAF Syerston to oversee the gliding training programme for up to 45,000 air cadets of Cadet Flights and Air Training Corps.

No 6 Flying Training School has been re-formed in September to command and manage the 15 RAF University Air Squadrons (UAS) located across the UK.

The RAF will rebuild a pipeline for training mission specialists and “back-seaters”, after losing it in 2011. The role will be covered by the same small fleet of Phenom 100 jets which will replace the Beechcraft 200 as training platform for the multi-engine pipeline.The same squadron will cover both roles, unlike what happened up to the SDSR 2010, with 55(R) Sqn using the old Dominie to deliver rear-crew training and 45(R) delivering multi-engine training.

No 3 Flying Training School at RAF Cranwell currently has 2 squadrons (16(R) and 57(R), with 16 being actually based at RAF Wittering) for elementary flying training; 115(R) Sqn (RAF Wittering) for instructor training and refresher courses and 45(R) Sqn for Multi-Engine training. The impact of the renewal of the fleet might bring further changes and downsizing.  

A new school building, with simulators and hangars for the new rotary wing training fleet is to be built by 2017 in RAF Shawbury. The details of the re-organization, and the types of helicopters that will replace Griffin and Squirrel have yet to be decided.

MPA

The big thing everyone is on the lookout for. The Sunday Times has recently reported that, just three weeks from SDSR publication, the secretary of state for defence would have stopped what was said to be a done deal for the purchase of P-8 Poseidon aircraft, throwing RAF plans in disarray. According to the Sunday Times, the SDSR will only contain an indecisive “promise” about addressing the MPA gap, perhaps through some kind of competition.

This will inexorably delay the closure of the gap and risks creating significant difficulties: top brass have warned more than once about SEEDCORN being sustainable only for a limited amount of time. The programme has recently been given a further 3 year extension, with 22 out of 36 service personnel involved deployed in the US to work on the P-8 Poseidon.

If it is true that the Secretary has suddenly awakened to the high cost of closing the MPA gap only now, after years of effort clearly targeted at boarding the Poseidon train, we have touched a new low in MOD history. This thing has been in the making literally for years now, and it is a bit late to throw everything back to square one.

I’ve talked about the MPA issue at length, so my comment at this time will be brief: there is the widespread belief that, due to money and manpower shortages, the MPA eventually acquired by the RAF will have to be a multi-ISTAR platform, coming, in particular, with a wide area surveillance, including GMTI capability sufficient for replacing Sentinel R1. In practice, the assumption is that the MPA and Protector will be accommodated using the manpower and money currently “occupied” by Sentinel R1, Shadow R1 and Predator (and then some more, probably).

For the overland surveillance requirement, the RAF will obviously look at USAF’s own experience, to try and keep the pace, so to speak. Most contenders in the JSTARS replacement race for the USAF are offering business jet platforms, size-wise, stepping down from the current huge size of the JSTARS and effectively following the general direction the RAF traced with Sentinel R1.

There is one exception: Boeing is still offering a larger aircraft, the 737-700, which is however a bit smaller than the 737-800 which is the P-8's base. The small business jet comes with the advantage of lower costs, higher altitude (good for radar range) and ability to operate from smaller airfields. However, they also come with constrained growth margins and with limited space available for systems and crew. The Sentinel R1 itself is an example: it reportedly has a growth margin as small as 700 kg, and the RAF had to renounce to fitting an air to air refueling probe which had once been in the requirements.

The main point of interest is, however, the sensor. The radar to be employed also hasn't been firmly selected yet, but one of the top contenders is the same AN/APS-154 AAS that the US Navy will put on part of its P-8 fleet for its own needs, or anyway a derivative product reportedly going by the “Skynet” name.

It will be interesting to see what choices the USAF makes, but unfortunately the JSTARS recap effort is struggling to get funding and might not progress for a while.
Key considerations to take away are: the AAS radar is a serious contender for the US JSTARS requirement and a 737 platform remains in the game.

The US Navy is working to integrate the AAS on P-8 for increased target mapping capability in the littoral and overland domains. The AN/APY-10 radar already comes with overland functionality and the P-8 as it is now is not any less of an ISTAR platform than other MPAs used over land.
It is actually probably better already. 

P-8 test flight with the AAS "canoe"

The UK requirement is for a MPA with good ASW capability and, eventually, a wide area SAR / ISAR / GMTI surveillance capability over land. The P-8 with AAS fits the requirement like a glove.

Would it be better to use a pure, high performace MPA and a smaller, higher-flying business jet with AAS for the overland role? Sure. But the UK can't realistically afford to purchase, man, operate and upgrade through life two such fleets and have reasonable numbers to work with. There is a very high risk that, at some point, two such fleets would end up locked in a fratricide struggle for funding and manpower, and one of the two would end up succumbing.  

No other MPA on offer in the world has a clear path to a wide area SAR / GMTI capability matching the AAS on P-8; no other MPA in the world has a civilian base of similar airframes and a military, international fleet as large as P-8 has; no other MPA in the world comes with tens of RAF personnel already trained / involved on it; no other MPA in the world has the kind of assured evolution path that the main MPA of the US Navy can expect to have.

There are several offers to create something that does MPA and overland ISTAR for the UK, but they all exist only on paper: the Sea Hercules, the Q-400, a UK evolution of the C-295 or P-1. They are all entirely or partially paper projects with varying degrees of risk and uncertainty.
It is a movie we’ve already seen: it starts with promises of "it'll be cheaper and better too" and then it ends in years of frustrations and cost overruns. Then, a few years later, when it is time for major upgrades, you look around for a partner to share the costs with... and while US and Australia go on with P-8, you end up alone in the room, with a Challenger 2 rifled gun and 2-piece CHARM 3 round at your side, cursing the heavens.

No MPA in the world comes ready for british weaponry, apart perhaps for the P-3 Orion of Norway, the only customer of Stingray ever.  I’m not sure if the planned integration was carried out, but even assuming it progressed, is P-3 an option / would the UK take any real advantage? No.

Integration of british-specific weaponry and equipment it is not a P-8 problem but a UK problem. Some integration of customer-specific kit is unavoidable whenever a country purchases an off-the-shelf product. Either that, or purchase of US torpedoes for P-8 use, whatever is cheaper. India decided to buy the torpedoes along with the aircraft, for example.

There is a very real risk that indecisiveness on MPA causes knock-over effects across wider ISTAR planning. If the RAF does not get P-8, money will probably tend to go to Sentinel R1 to life extend and upgrade it, leaving even less money available for a later MPA purchase. The result could end up being a horrible example of half-arsing which creates more problems than it solves.

Fast Jet squadrons

News reports lately have insistently mentioned the possibility that the SDSR will announce plans for a third F-35B squadron and two more Typhoon squadrons, the latter made possible by the retention of Tranche 1s into the 2020s (at least the first half of them). Under current plans, the Tranche 1s would be withdrawn from service by 2019 and only then would the new Tranche 3A be assigned to the squadrons.

I’ve already explained where the merits of the Tranche 1 solution are. Tornado GR4 would be more useful, but its retention is more complicated and expensive.

Assuming that the rumor is true and the Tranche 1s stay, the next big question is where does manpower come from?

The first (and possibly the only) answer is “from the Tornado fleet”, but settling the details will be complex: Typhoon will not be ready to take Tornado’s place in action for several years still, meaning that, if operations against ISIS drag on over the coming years, it will not be possible to draw down Tornado squadrons and train the personnel to move on to Typhoon. A transfer from Tornado to Typhoon does not happen overnight. The process of setting up two more Typhoon squadrons can only happen in concert with the drawdown of Tornado unless the RAF is not only given the funding for hiring more people, but manages to boost recruitment quickly and efficiently.

Even if the additional squadrons will be confirmed by the SDSR (and I certainly hope so), it’ll take quite some effort (and probably a few years) to find a way to make them happen. Two additional Typhoon squadrons would be fundamental to avoid falling to just 6 squadrons in 2020, and the Tranche 1 could act as a place holder ahead of further purchases of F-35s in the second half of the 2020s, when keeping Tranche 1s any further is likely to become a real problem.

Sentry

There are expectations about the SDSR bringing good news for the AWACS fleet too. The UK Sentry are lagging badly behind US and NATO , having not been included in the ongoing upgrade programmes for lack of money. If the problem is not addressed, the british Sentry will become more and more obsolescent and of less immediate integration within allied plans.

This is another area requiring urgent attention.

And the navy?

The Navy is a major question mark. It unfortunately starts to sound like it will be shafted once more, to some degree. Earlier optimism about being granted a manpower increase has been watered down, and there is still no real indication of what, if any, answers the SDSR will give about the fate of the River Batch 2, MARS FSS and other plans.

We are also still waiting to understand exactly what “in service” will mean for HMS Prince of Wales. 

The SDSR will reaffirm the objective of putting into service 13 Type 26 frigates, but in the facts we can only really expect the order for the first batch, of just 3 ships, with a contract expected in early 2016. It seems almost certain that the other two batches of 5 ships each will be left for future parliaments. With the last Type 26 due in service in 2035/36 and with the government having decided to go for a procurement in small successive batches instead of the hoped-for contract for 13, or even the earler "ASW batch" of 8 in one go, we can expect the uncertainty about the final number of frigates to be a fact of life for many years. 

No ship is expected to be axed, but probably the out of service date for HMS Ocean will be confirmed as 2018/19 (not necessarily saying it into the SDSR document, of course). 

The Navy is very likely to be asked to provide one carrier group presence in the Gulf with a certain regularity. This will be particularly welcomed by the US Navy, which probably wants the UK’s help to be free to focus its own carrier groups more on the Pacific, without leaving the Middle East uncovered.

The new british base to be built in Bahrain will help support this role as well as the enduring operation Kipion presence, with its significant MCM element.