Trying to correct Army 2020 Refine

The cost of the official Army 2020 Refine

The King’s Royal Hussars lose actual tanks in favor of inexistent “Medium Armour” platforms, which are Ajax recce vehicles somehow posturing as tanks.

The number of Warrior-equipped battalions drops from 6 to 4.

There won’t be Light Mechanised Battalions on Foxhound. All six are reverting to Light Role infantry and only receive some Foxhounds on deployment. A portion of the Foxhound fleet is handed to the RAF Regiment which is building two permanent Light Armoured sqns, 1 Sqn and 34 Sqn.  

The Army intends to move from 3 Mastiff-mounted battalions to 4 MIV-mounted ones.

102 Logistic Brigade will vanish, and its units will be redistributed / robbed of manpower to rebuilt other units

32nd Regiment Royal Artillery will disband in 2021 with the withdrawal from service of Desert Hawk III. The provision of battle-group level ISTAR beyond 2021 is a floating question mark: cavalry regiments are arguing that mini-drones should be part of their role and equipment, but I’m not aware of any definitive decision in that sense, while the Joint Mini UAS programme, strongly wanted by the Royal Marines who do not consider the Black Hawk to be adequate for use in the littoral environment, is not funded and has failed to take off. As of today, after DH III there is just a black hole.

A “new” 26 Regiment Royal Artillery ceases to be a Close Support Regiment and becomes a “Divisional Fires” regiment by taking under command all of the Precision Fires batteries from 19 RA and 1 RHA as well as from the current 26 RA.

35 Engineer Regiment will become an EOD regiment, but it is not clear if any new EOD or Route Proving & Clearance (TALISMAN) squadrons will stand up as part of the move. The Army is making a U-turn on hybrid EOD regiments and will stand up a “new” 101 Regiment in which all reserve squadrons will be contained. 35 Regiment will go to supplement 33 Regiment (and 11 RLC). In the process, two of the current squadrons of 35 RE will be re-subordinated to 21 and 32 RE respectively, to bring these two regiments up to strength (under Army 2020 they were cut down to just 2 regular squadrons each) so they can support the Strike Brigades.

Headquarters 64 Works Group Royal Engineers will disband. Not clear yet if all STREs currently commanded by 64 Group will survive and resubordinate, or if they will disband as well.

2 Medical Regiment will disband,

Headquarters 4th Regiment Royal Military Police will disband

33 Field Hospital will disband

104,105 and 106 Battalions of the Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers reserve will be rationalized by “merging” them in 101, 102 and 103. In reality, it seems that their manpower margin will be used up in favor of other reserve units (including possibly the two extra infantry battalions formed with A2020R).

Overall, these cuts underline a drop from 3 + 2 deployable brigades (the two light brigades from the Adaptable Force were admittedly always quite threadbare) to 4.

The resulting Army has:

Two Armoured Infantry Brigades (20 and 12 Bde) each on one Type 56 tank regiment and 2 infantry battalions on Warrior, with no recce cavalry

Two “Strike” Brigades (1 Bde and another to be chosen later, initially know as Strike Expeditionary Group) on 2 Ajax regiments (one in recce role, one in “medium armour” role) and 2 infantry battalions on MIV.

All four brigades are in 3 Division, the only deployable division the army will have.

Strike Brigades: what for?

These half-tracked mechanized formations are a huge question mark. Nobody has yet given a credible indication of what they are for. The cost for setting them up is massive, while the gain is at best questionable. Carter wants these brigades to be highly independent and mobile, able to move “2000 kilometers” on their own, moving quickly back and forth across a vast and contested environment.

How, and for achieving what, against what kind of enemy?

Half the brigade is tracked (Ajax) and half is wheeled. It is honestly quite hard to imagine the tracked half coping well with a 2000 kilometers movement. At best, it will slow down the entire brigade because, remember, the tracked half brings the firepower, since MIV is unfortunately expected to be an APC, not an IFV with turret and heavy weaponry. Ajax is also tasked with recce, so, by definition, it will be scouting ahead of MIV.

The lack of firepower and the presence of just two battalions of infantry also make it inevitable to ask what these brigades are supposed to achieve once in place. How much maneuvering do you expect to do with 2 infantry battalions in a “vast and contested” battlefield? What kind of enemy can you face, when the biggest direct fire weapon available is a 40mm CTA gun?

The brigade will do well enough in a low intensity scenario (think Mali), but won’t fare well in any more challenging situation. Even in a “Mali-like” scenario the brigade might finds itself outgunned: the French have found out that the ubiquitous ZSU 23 mm guns and 14.5 machine guns can become pretty dangerous when you try to fight back with a .50, outranged and outweighted. They ended up hastily rolling back out the old 20mm gun and put it on the back of trucks to complement their Sagaie (90mm), AMX-10RC (105mm) and VBCI (25mm).

The French themselves do not seem to have learned their lesson very well since they are replacing both Sagaie and AMX-10RC with the EBRC with the 40mm CTA, shelving earlier plans and studies which had brought around the Nexter 120mm Low Recoil. I think the absence of something more punchy than the 40mm will be felt loud and clear going ahead. Compared to Ajax, the EBRC has the saving grace of carrying two MMP long-range anti-tank missiles for launch under armour.

The French “Strike Brigades”, clearly one of the inspirations behind the british ones, come with the same number of cavalry regiments (2, both with EBRC) but with more infantry (3 regiments, and French regiments are individually larger to start with, on 4 rifle companies rather than 3) and more firepower (120mm mortars, 155mm howitzers, and the missiles on EBRC).

The Royal Artillery does intend to acquire a wheeled 155/52 howitzer, thankfully, which might well be the French CAESAR, but funding (and consequently timelines) for that ambition to become reality is far from certain.
Another key development in the french army is the addition of 175-strong combat squadrons to logistic regiments to protect convoys and secure routes. If you want to manoeuvre in a "vast, contested, congested" environment, you can't really do without this particular capability. The British Army probably hopes to use Light Cavalry and extra infantry from the remaining infantry brigades for this (and other) roles, but this further exacerbates the problem of what happens after six months or so, when the deployed force has given what it could and there is next to nothing left for a follow-on. 

What is the Strike Brigade actually good for? I feel that this is an entirely legitimate and very key question, and the Army hasn’t given an answer.

Despite all the hype, considering that Army 2020 Refine is all about putting in the field a Division of 2 armoured and 1 strike brigades, it looks to me like the whole brigade is some sort of super-sized divisional reconnaissance cavalry formation. A mobile screen.

But even so, its composition (primarily the lack of firepower) brings to mind questions about what is the concept of employment and how the formation will face the enemy weaponry, in both "low" and "high" intensity scenarios. 

Is it worth it?

From the above comes the key question: is the Strike Brigade a revolution?

Honestly, I fear the answer is no.

Is the formation of the Strike Brigades worth the cuts elsewhere in the Army needed to (try to) fund MIV?

Again, I think the answer is no.

The army is consciously turning itself in a one-shot, short-term silver bullet. A division in the field, until it lasts, and then, maybe, but only maybe “put together something to maintain a presence at up to brigade level”. And the maybe isn’t mine, is general Carter’s. He is well aware that the Army will very much struggle to put the division effectively in the field and even more so will struggle to keep a fielded brigade after that.

Army 2020 Refine maintains “six infantry brigades”. These are what remains of the Adaptable Force of Army 2020 after robbing away all supports and converting 4 infantry battalions in Defence Engagement-roled “Specialised Infantry Battalions”. These brigades have nothing but riflemen and some Jackals for light cavalry work. There is no artillery, no logistic group, no signals, no engineer, no medical elements. A huge proportion of the Army’s manpower and several key resources will continue to be pumped into these “almost-brigades”, which can, of course, help, but cannot quite deploy anywhere as they are.

Alternative priorities

I advocate a different approach to the problem. Instead of focusing on equipment, namely on MIV, I want to focus on structures and on making the best possible use of what there is. Of all what there is.

-          The Army should not condemn itself to being a one-shot gamble by design. A two divisions structure is key.

-          The Army cannot afford to have 6 “half-brigades” of dubious deployability.

-          Communications are key to combat in contested environment. The current shortage of signal support must be corrected.

-          Combat Support and Combat Service Support cannot be cut ad infinitum because government doesn’t want to take the flak connected with shutting down an infantry battalion. The army is completely out of balance.

-          16 Air Assault and 3 Commando should not be “wasted” as brigades by being barely resourced to support a single battlegroup on rotation from within their structures.

Alternative Army 2020 Refine 

Below, I’ve provided tables detailing an alternative army structure on two Divisions, with each containing one armoured, one mechanized and one light / air assault brigade. 3 Commando brigade is restored to full combat strength as well, and the reserve force is organized in four “shadow brigades” supporting the main body of two armoured and two mechanized brigades.

The Army already has most of the pieces needed to make it happen: most of the changes are needed in CS and CSS units which have been cut back by Army 2020 Refine.

Army 2020 Refine alternative proposal_detailed by Liger30 on Scribd

The guiding principle is that each brigade should be able to field three battlegroups, built from within the brigade itself.

Armoured brigades employ Combined Arms Regiments replacing the separated Infantry and Tank formations.

The 3 tank existing tank regiments are each split into two “battalions” of 2 tank squadrons (14x) and 1 recce squadron. 

The six existing armoured infantry battalions all lose one rifle company. This cut is unavoidable unless more money can be found to upgrade more Warrior IFVs, as 245 are not enough for 6 complete battalions.

The resulting combined arms regiments will each have 2 armoured infantry companies, each supported by a tank company (Every company of 14 Warrior accompanied by a squadron of 14 MBTs), plus one Support Company (mortars, ATGW, snipers etc) and one large recce company (at least 8 Ajax, plus a dismounted element).

Compared to Army 2020 Refine as currently envisaged, this approach:

-          Cancels the reduction in the number of operational MBTs (168 active tanks, the same as 3x Type 56 regiments, spread on 12 squadrons of 14 rather than 9x18 plus RHQs. Wouldn't hurt to have tanks in the recce cavalry as well, if possible.) 

-          Forms 2 extra square battlegroups. The amount of rifle companies is the same as in the official Army 2020 Refine, but 2 extra support companies survive. 

Army 2020 Refine armoured infantry brigades will only be able to field 2 square battlegroups each, by task-organizing the remaining 2 tank regiments on six “demi-squadrons” of 9 tanks, allocated to each rifle coy.

I’m merely forming permanent battlegroups, with the tank regiment split becoming a daily reality, with more tanks retained.

The Mechanized Infantry Brigades will continue to employ Mastiff and Ridgeback for longer, adding a fourth battalion to the 3 that were always part of the original Army 2020 Refine.

The third battalion in each mechanized brigade will be lighter and equipped with Foxhound. This is partially because there might not be enough heavier vehicles for more battalions (some Mastiff and Ridgeback are used in CS and CSS formations, after all) and in part due to the need for six infantry battalions to rotate in and out of Cyprus. The units involved in the rotation should ideally be Light Role, at most Light Mechanized. Trying to keep six battalions in a pool to sustain the Cyprus rotation was one of the most complicated factors in working out this structure, because the Guards already have their rotation in and out of Public Duty; the Gurkhas have to cover Brunei and the PARAs are busy. Doesn't leave much room to wiggle into. The British Army is burdened by all of these lateral tasks. 

16 Air Assault brigade gets a Foxhound-mounted Gurkha battalion, and 4 Brigade is built up as a light / air assault formation with 2 Light Role and one Foxhound battalions. 16 and 4 Brigade won’t have a “shadow brigade” of the reserve in support, but will include a reserve battalion directly into their structure (4 PARA and 4 PWRR).

All Light Role and Light Mechanized battalions receive a manpower uplift towards an establishment of over 600, rebuilding the lost companies that were dismantled under Army 2020 (the 2010 one). Note that also the official Army 2020 Refine includes this correction, an implicit admission that what was always clearly bound not to work (binary companies counting on reservists being there to form the missing platoons) did not, in fact, work.

Each “shadow brigade” of the reserve gets three infantry battalions, one cavalry formation and one artillery regiment. This should ensure that there is a good and timely availability of reinforcements. Again, the official Army 2020 Refine partially does this by coupling 4 reserve battalions to the regular armoured infantry battalions; by reinforcing the Royal Wessex Yeomanry and by tipping 104 and 105 Royal Artillery for support to the Heavy, armoured artillery. I’m pushing on further with the concept.

I also encourage the formation of Combat Aviation Brigades under Joint Helicopter Command, to synchronize resources and readiness mechanisms. The deployable aviation HQs to make it happen already exist: JHC 1 is routinely generated from the Attack Helicopter Force and JHC 3 is generated from the RAF Support Helicopter Force, while JHC 2 is provided by the Commando Helicopter Force.

Ground supports would be reorganized accordingly, forming Aviation Support Groups combining elements currently spread over Joint Helicopter Support Squadron, Tactical Supply Wing and 132 Sqn RLC.

The fleets to be used already exist, but I encourage the formation of an additional Chinook squadron, to enable a more regular distribution of the tasks and the permanent allocation of one squadron to maritime ops (as done within the Attack Helicopter Force with 656 Sqn).

In general, I’d recommend 7 Sqn to use the Chinook HC5 for Special Forces support and long range operations; one squadron with up to 8 HC6 as primary actor in maritime tasks (as I understand that this mark comes with foldable rotor blades) and two large “green” squadrons using the remaining HC6 and HC6A (the HC4s’ new name once retrofitted with Digital Flight Controls).

One Combat Aviation brigade will support each deployable division while the third brigade, essentially Commando Helicopter Force expanded with 656 AAC and the new Chinook sqn, supporting operations at and from the sea.

In order to build up this structure, a number of changes have to be made, including the sacrifice of two infantry battalions: without additional manpower forthcoming, the adjustements have to be made within what is already present, and while the Combined Arms Regiments and the Specialised Infantry Battalions release a significant number of posts, the many holes in CS and CSS require a larger shift.

A particularly massive hole exists in communications, and in order to close it I recommend rationalizing deployable HQs and the attached Signal resources. The UK created a Standing Joint Task Force HQ and a Standing Joint Force Logistic HQ, and there also are two small early entry elements, supported from within 30 Signal Regiment.

22 Signal Regiment is tied down by ARRC needs, but I’m recommending a review of whether this is an appropriate use for finite and invaluable resources already in short supply. ARRC is just one of 9 deployable Land Corps HQs in the European side of NATO. A lot of HQs without deployable Divisions. The Army should not cling on to ARRC just for pure vanity. It might be sensible to seek out the help of a smaller country which might be willing to replace 30 Signal Regiment in the supporting role. A number of the other existing HQs are multi-national, and the ARRC might well take that path too. Or vanish entirely. 30 and 22 are needed elsewhere.

Joint Standing Task Force HQ should really become one with the Division HQs. Early Entry has its most obvious home as part of the deployable command elements of 16 AA and 3 Cdo. Rationalization is key.

Standing Joint Logistic HQ should not be disjointed from 101 and 102 logistic brigade, as these are the main supporting formations the UK has and would be the core of the whole logistic element in any case.

As a consequence, with the signal regiments assigned directly to the formations they support, 1^st Signal Brigade will be disbanded, leaving 11 Signal Brigade in charge of the reserve element and of the technical support for networks and infrastructure as well as specialisms such as ECM.

1^st Artillery Brigade will also vanish, replaced by strong Div Arty cells aligned with the deployable divisions.

Instead of building a Division Fires regiment, I recommend adding a fourth Precision Strike battery, so that each armoured and mechanized brigade has one. Ideally, an Exactor element should be made available to the Light brigades as well, but it will probably be impossible due to manpower and resources constraints.

The other changes, detailed in the tables, are primarily in CS and CSS. Missing squadrons must be rebuilt (as in 21 and 32 Engineer regiments, for example), REME resources expanded and better distributed, logistics assured to each formation.

The end result

The end result is a more complete and sustainable army, which makes good use of every major formation it has. The Force Generation Cycle could try to replicate the ambitious 2:2 model pursued by Army 2020 Refine, with one armoured and one strike brigade at readiness at all times, but doubts about the sustainability of such a rhythm suggest that a different approach might be favorable.

I suggest that each Division should be at readiness for 18 months; with each of its brigades generating a battlegroup at readiness for 6 months. In every moment of the year, the UK would be able to deploy a 2-star command element overseeing a brigade including, from the start, an armoured battlegroup, a mechanized battlegroup and an air mobile battlegroup including a parachute company group. 3^rd Commando adds an amphibious battlegroup.

Every single battlegroup would be at readiness for six months.

Each Division would force generate from within its formations: its three combat brigades, its logistic brigade and its aviation brigade.
The air mobile battlegroup and the amphibious one are notionally held at 5 days notice to move; while the others are at 30 days (as already happens). The balance of at least one, and possibly two brigades would follow over another 60 days. 

What could not be fixed

As all plans, my Army 2020 Refine proposal is a compromise. It prioritizes mass, sustainability and deployable formations over equipment (MIV delayed to better times), vanity (ARRC at all costs, because playing Corps without having Divisions is politically tasty) and, in part, capability. Mastiff has well known problems off road: its tactical mobility is inferior to any realistic MIV candidate. Mine is, however, a wider assessment: I do not believe the costs of the current Army 2020 Refine are in any way justified by a more tactically mobile MIV. There are too many holes elsewhere.

In an ideal world, Mastiff would still be replaced by a capable 8x8, and at least a quarter of those should be well-armed IFVs, not just APCs. Because being able to move a lot, and quickly, means nothing if you can’t fight, and win, once you are there.

In an ideal world, the “Medium Armour” element would be delivered by 8x8 with 120mm smoothbore, rather than by Ajax trying to be two very different things at once.

In an ideal world, the Mechanized Brigades would not use Ajax (tracked) for reconnaissance.

This is not an ideal world. The dramatic change of heart of the Army, which in 2010 prioritized tracks and heavy armour just to change its mind less than 5 years later, means that the Ajax contract is now effectively an hindrance, not a benefit. With the Strike Brigade idea, Ajax is suddenly the wrong vehicle. And this is eloquent about how confused the army is, because the damn thing isn’t even being delivered yet.

There used to be a Medium Armour variant of FRES SV in the plan. It was cancelled. Now, a few years later, the Army wants two regiments worth of medium armour, but will pretend that the Recce variant can double up as medium tank. This is rather extraordinary and extremely depressing: the Ajax contract was announced in September 2014. General Carter was there already, not yet CGS but in charge of Army 2020 and tipped to replace general Wall. Army 2020 was there. The need was for three armoured reconnaissance cavalry regiments.

A year later, the Army says it wants two wheeled brigades, and since it is now stuck with an expensive Ajax contract, it puts tracks into those wheeled brigades, and since it only has recce vehicles with 40mm guns it pretends that half of the same fleet can cover recce and the other half can somehow magically become two regiments of “medium tanks”.

This is an extraordinary mess. Extraordinary. Within one year, Ajax, which was bought to do recce for the armoured brigades, ended up hijacked so badly that it now won’t even be part of the armoured brigades (save for small numbers assigned to armoured infantry battalions and tanks regiments replacing Scimitar in the scout platoons, unless these vanish as well). Within one year. One year. It is almost impossible to believe, yet it is what is happening under our eyes.

My proposal includes two (mostly) wheeled brigades because there is merit to the greater on road autonomy of these formations. Moreover, there are not enough resources for an army with an armoured division of three (tracked) brigades and one mechanized division of three mechanized brigades. I wanted a symmetric force, because it allows for evenly spreading of the tasks, and so of the burdens.

From whichever direction you look at it, however, Ajax becomes, at least in part, the wrong vehicle.

In Army 2020 Refine as proposed by general Carter it is completely out of place; in my proposal two of the regiments are in the right place and two… not so much. You’d ideally want to halve the number of Ajax on order in favor of 8x8s with the same turret, to put tracks with tracks and wheels with wheels.

The army has completely messed up its own plans and its own internal balances. It has Warrior to upgrade, Ajax on the way, and a big number of ancient FV432 to replace with ABSV, but this last program has been in the limbo for years and it is not clear if, when and how it’ll finally move onwards. And then there is MIV.

It is almost impossible to fix the mess now, because the Ajax contract is huge and probably cannot be modified. It ties up a lot of money and does not deliver quite what is needed.

In a better world, the Army would sit down with General Dynamics and Lockheed Martin and find a reasonable arrangement to change current contracts. Basically, it would have to say “look, we messed up. Here is what we need to do to remedy”:

-          Cancel Warrior CSP (which is continuing to encounter problems with the new turrets)

-          Reduce the purchase of Ajax from 245 to 140 or so (two Cavalry regiments plus 6 scout platoons of 8 vehicles each for the six Combined Arms Regiments)

-          Cancel the Warrior FV514 upgrade for the Royal Artillery, replace with Ajax Joint Fires sub-variant, increasing the number of these

-          Introduce an IFV variant of Ajax and purchase 245 to replace Warrior instead of going with the CSP for it

-          Remove the turrets from existing Warrior and convert the hulls into ABSV variants (APC, Command Support, ATGW, Mortar Carrier…)

And then, eventually, get on with MIV, purchasing a number in IFV configuration and a number armed with 120mm for the direct fire punch.

But this is the real world, and that would probably never work out. There’s a big contract signed, and the Army can only blame itself for the mess it now is into. It cannot change its mind every five minutes. It cannot purchase a new, expensive vehicle after years of suffering to trial it, define it, get it funded, and then decide that it is not what it wants. Pretending that said vehicle can be what it clearly isn’t will only make the mess worse, and more painful.

Light Mechanised Infantry and Light Cavalry: the next orphans?

The British Army seems to have dropped the unwieldy "Light Protected Mobility Infantry" definition for the more immediate Light Mechanised Infantry title. But this is the minor of the changes that affect the 6 infantry battalions mounted on Foxhound.
A much greater change of plans regards the structure of these dramatically undersized units: they now have only two Rifle Companies each. The army apparently calls these "Strike Companies", but i'm not really ready to care for general Carter's questionable obsessions.

Notoriously, Army 2020 got around the political imperative of not cutting more than 5 infantry battalions by making all other Light Role and Light Mechanised battalions a lot smaller. The establishment of these units, all  ranks - all trades, is 561 and 581.
A big part of the cut comes from eliminating three rifle platoons: initially, the structure was on three companies of two platoons plus a GPMG Section, but in more recent times the Army has chosen instead to keep the GPMGs grouped up into a traditional Machine Gun platoon and put all 6 remaining rifle platoons in two companies.

The current structure of a Light Mechanised Infantry unit is as follows, exemplified here by 3 SCOTS, The Black Watch:

Alpha (Grenadier) Coy     

1, 2, 3 rifle platoons

Bravo Coy

4, 5, 6 rifle platoons

Charlie Coy (Manoeuvre Support Coy)

Mortar platoon

Machine Gun Platoon

Assault Pioneers / Pipes and Drums

Delta (Light) Coy – Intelligence Surveillance Reconnaissance (ISR)

Recce Platoon / Sniper Platoon (when combined, they make up the "Patrols" platoon)

Anti-Tank Platoon 

Intelligence Section

Signals Platoon 

As can be observed, the other bit of novelty is the conversion of the third Rifle Coy into an ISR Company grouping signals, the intelligence cell, snipers, recce and Javelin missiles. 

The Javelin has probably been included in the ISR company because of the value its aiming unit has when used as a battlefield surveillance sensor. 

The Husky recovery is the current interim solution

The Foxhound Logistics and WMIK variants would have an obvious role to play within the Light Mechanised Infantry

The recce platoons in Army 2020 have been slimmed down, to 24 men. The number of sniper pairs should still be 8. There was the ambition to train all recce infantrymen on the L129A1 to add long range precision firepower, but it is hard to say if this is being done for real or not. 

The reconnaissance patrols are usually composed of a 6-man team from Recce platoon plus a Sniper Pair, and four such patrols are generated. 

The Anti-Tank platoon has four detachments, led by corporals. 

Vehicles 

In terms of vehicles, the battalion is currently a mix of many different platforms: the Rifle Companies are mounted in Foxhound vehicles, while Anti-Tank, Machine Gun and Recce ride in RWIMIK +. 

The battalion probably employs some Panther too, meaning that, from a logistic point of view, the whole formation is a bit of a mess. 

The Mortar Platoon uses the Husky, which is also employed by the REME Light Aid Detachment. 

It has to be assumed that the REME are still using the few Husky Recovery vehicles that they created when still deployed in Afghanistan: the army has a requirement for an actual Light Mechanised Recovery Vehicle but so far hasn't yet selected the platform. 

Supacat is showcasing at DVD 2016 a Recovery vehicle developed on the Coyote 6x6 chassis, which could be a good solution for the needs of PARA, Marines, Light Cavalry and Light Mechanised Infantry. 

Other offers have been made, one of which based on a DURO chassis. 

Supacat's offer for the Lightweight Protected Recovery Vehicle requirement. 

The Army has a Multi Role Vehicle - Protected requirement that should move on in the near future to deliver a few hundred general purpose, protected vehicles and a new protected battlefield ambulance, and this could end up adding yet another vehicle to the roster. According to recent news reports, the Army has been seriously considering the opportunity of selecting the american Joint Light Tactical Vehicle, which, being due for a massive production run of well over 50.000, might be the only contender with a chance to fit the small budget. 

I remain personally concerned by the way the MRV-P programme seems to lack a true long-term plan, and clarity about how MRV-P fits within the other fleets and how the number of different vehicles can be cut down to achieve logistic simplification over the coming years. If MRV-P is to be successful, the Army must be prepared to build up its numbers with regular purchases over the years, and make it part of a coherent programme for replacement of old platforms. 

The first MRV-P purchases seem destined to replace shares of unprotected support vehicles (Land Rover, Pinzgauer, DURO) in a number of roles and positions across the army, but this must only be a beginning, not a one-off. The army has already started and then abandoned too many programmes, ending up with an endless list of different vehicle types. This time, it must do things differently. 

The planning gap: the Army quite clearly does not know what it wants going ahead. The confusion is made even more evident by Foxhound OSD being given as 2024: frankly, an absurd proposition. 

MRV-P variants duplicate, in a way or another, a variety of vehicles including Panther, Foxhound and Husky. It is imperative to formulate an actual long term plan to move from multiple vehicle types down to one or two. Foxhound's uniqueness is given by its high protection level, which is two NATO STANAG levels higher than what is requested out of MRV-P. The level of protection requested should determine which proportion of the fleet needs to be made up of Foxhound variants and which can be covered with MRV-P. 

From a Light Mechanised Infantry point of view, the priorities beyond proper, protected Recovery vehicles and ambulance should arguably be the replacement of the RWIMIK +. It is hard to accept that the firepower of the battalion should ride into battle in a platform offering less protection and, probably, somewhat inferior mobility than that of the troop carrier within the rifle companies. 

The Foxhound WMIK variant should be brought in to solve the problem, and General Dynamics has been offering other variants of the base Foxhound: this year it is showcasing a SF variant and a C2 command and communications variant that could be a perfect long-term replacement for Panther and beyond. 

The Army needs to formulate a plan which, i suggest, would need to capitalize on Foxhound on one side and on MRV-P on the other. The main differences between the two will be protection and cost, with the Foxhound being much better armoured and much more expensive. Over the coming years, the Foxhound, in all its variants, should equip the light units closer to the line of fire, with MRV-P in its variants covering the rest of the requirement, leaving completely unprotected vehicles to the non-frontline jobs. 

Light Cavalry 

Light Cavalry regiments, currently 3, are 404 strong and are mounted on Jackal and Coyote. They currently suffer the lack of an adequate light recovery vehicle able to follow the formation and support it right up to the line of fire. Apart from a few Husky "Recovery" created directly by the REME in Afghanistan, they currently have nothing but the gigantic MAN wrecker trucks. 

This problem should, however, be solved relatetively soon. 

Another problem facing the Light Cavalry is a serious firepower deficit. Javelin aside, the Light Cavalry does not field anything more than Grenade Machine guns (in theory, one in each Troop of four vehicles) and .50 HMGs (on the other three vehicles in the Troop). 

This firepower is insufficient to stand up to the threats likely to be encountered, and i'm not talking necessarily about russian reconnaissance formations here, but even of the ubiquitous toyota pick-ups loaded up with heavy weaponry by terrorists and insurgents all around the world. 

As the french discovered in Mali, the .50 is at a disadvantage against enemies often armed with the russian 14.5mm gun, not to mention against pick ups armed with the ZSU-23-2 anti-aircraft gun. 

Accuracy is questionable, but this kind of combination would put a Jackal with a .50 HMG at a disadvantage in terms of range and lethality. 

The Light Cavalry needs a greater reach and greater lethality in order to be credible. The French in Mali had the Sagaie and AMX-10 to fall back on, and where these were not available they have resurrected old 20mm guns and installed them on the back of trucks, to fight fire with fire. 

The US Army, facing much the same considerations, intends to equip its lightweight recce formations with a JLTV variant armed with a 30mm gun derived from the Apache's one. 

The russian army is working on an impressive unmanned, enclosed turret with a 30mm gun, installed on top of the Tigr 4x4 protected vehicle. 

Tigr with 30mm gun turret

The M230LF trialed on top of an M-ATV of the US Army. 

The Jackal needs to follow the same path if the Light Cavalry is to be credible, otherwise it will be badly outgunned in each and every scenario. 

An orphaned capability? 

There is a big question mark floating over the british army light forces, however, due to the new Army 2025 plan. At the moment, there is little to no information available about the kind of structure that the six Infantry Brigades will assume. Moreover, there are no details regarding how these brigades will be employed and what kind of capability they will be able to generate. 

Light Mechanised Infantry and Light Cavalry were key components of Army 2020, as two "Adaptable" brigades formed around these units were part of the 5-formations cycle needed to support an enduring operation: 

Armoured Infantry Brigade x3 

Adaptable Brigade x2    (the 7 Adaptable Brigades would be used to generate two deployable force packages, to cover two successive tours in theatre) 

Under Army 2025, however, there will be a "greater focus" on one-shot, short duration, Division-level warfighting, and the SDSR 2015 document and successive (few) words offered by general Carter accurately fail to detail whether the army will still be able to support a 5-brigade cycle, making a future enduring operation possible. 

When listed: 

Armoured Brigades x2

Strike Brigades x2

Infantry Brigades x6 

the elements of Army 2025 seem impressive and more than capable to support a future enduring operation. However, this is actually far from certain, as the Army intends to keep two rather than one brigade at readiness each year (1 armoured and 1 strike). 

In addition, 5 infantry battalions will be further maimed to create "Defence Engagement" formations numbering a mere 350 men each. The re-organization of the cavalry regiments might also take away one or two Light Cavalry regiments, depending on the decisions that will be made (four rather than 3 Ajax regiments are envisaged now, and a Cavalry unit might be ordered to change role to CBRN reconnaissance as the capability is given back to the Army). 

Husky in Mortar carrier role 

The insufficient number and consistence of supporting regiments (Signal, Logistic, Artillery, Engineer) makes it unthinkable that more than 5 brigades can be adequately resourced for deployment, which means having, at best, one deployable Infantry Brigade out of the six planned. Maybe not even that. 

This risks turning the Light Cavalry and Light Mechanised Infantry into orphaned capabilities, lost somewhere within a force structure that makes little sense and that seems unable to properly, fully exploit the resources already paid for. 

SDSR 2015 - Army projects and requirements

SDSR 2015 – Issues, analysis and recommendations going towards the review

Budget

About that 2%

Army 

Army projects and requirements

Army vehicle projects – post DSEI 2015

Solving the problem of hollow army 2020

Royal Air Force 

Fast jets and squadrons number 

Air Capabilities

The mystery of Protector

 

Royal Navy 

Royal Navy and the SDSR 

Beyond Harpoon and Storm Shadow (and Tomahawk too…?

NOTE: the MOD classifies its project by value, as follows:

Category A	£400 million and above
Category A1	£250 million to £400 million
Category B1	£100 million to £250 million
Category C	£20 million to £100 million
Category D	£10 million to £20 million
Category E1	£4.5 million to £10 million
Category F1c	£869,716 to £4.5 million
Category F1d	£347,868 to £869,716
Category G1	£113,057 to £347,868
Category H1b	£10,000 to £113.057

I’ve already written a long post about the Army on the eve of the SDSR 2015, but since that was a rather radical proposal of reorganization meant to make better use (in my opinion) of the 82.000 regulars available, I’ve written this other post to make a summary of the main requirements and projects the army is grappling with. These are the main issues on the table.

Operational Support Vehicles Programme (OSVP)

Over late 2013 and into 2014, the Army has renewed efforts to define the solution to four major requirements belonging to the Operational Support Vehicle Programme (OSVP), part of the wider Operational Support Programme which is the Army’s office for Combat Service Support work, including infrastructure and vehicles.

These requirements unfortunately come from a long story of false starts, cancellations and dreaded changes of acronyms, which have, as always, meant that years have passed with the problem only getting worse and harder to ignore. There is no telling if this new try will finally bring results, or if we are just staring at yet another false start.

The four projects are:

Multi Role Vehicle – Protected (MRV-P) is a Cat A project intended to meet the requirement for a protected deployable platform employed by all Force Elements, at all scales of effort, in a wide range of environments, and on all parts of the battlefield except for the direct fire zone. The MRV-P should bring commonality to the fleet and reduce the logistic footprint for utility vehicles by 2020.

The MRV (P) programme is a new attempt which follows the failure of the operational utility vehicle system (OUVS). The vision is for one vehicle solution for many roles, using plug-and-play communications and flexible seating layouts. Variants expected include:

— Command and communications post vehicle,
— Command and liaison vehicle,
— General purpose vehicle – cargo,
— General purpose vehicle – pax,
— Light gun towing vehicle.

A crew of 2 or 3 is expected, with the back area organized depending on role. In the pax role, there is a desire for six dismounts in the back.

The programme was, according to this 2014 MOD document, expected to reach Initial Gate during 2017 and Main Gate in 2017. There are many off the shelf vehicles which could and will be offered, but cost (at one point, 250.000 pounds per vehicle was envisaged) will be an issue, since the hoped for price seems too low.

As of 2014, a first purchase of MRV(P) vehicles was envisaged in the 800 units range, but the actual requirements are much higher, with the MOD envisaging long-term purchases of some 4000 more vehicles in the various variants. The Army does not seem to dare formulating a precise plan for how to move from the current wide range of vehicles to a full MRV(P) solution or at least, more realistically, a future fleet consisting of less vehicle types. 

Fleets and OSDs. The OSD of Foxhound is absurd, there is no other way to describe it. Either it is a mistake, or it is a financial planning figure as valid as the 2030 OSD for Typhoon: no one believes in it. Dragging on Panther until 2037 is quite on the crazy side as well, since it has notoriously been pretty poorly received.

The current fleet includes some 400 Foxhound in frontline troop carrier role, with much higher protection and cost (and mobility?) than expected for MRV(P). They seem ill suited for direct replacement; as do the Jackals and, to a lesser degree, the WMIK Land Rovers. The 2014 graphic shown by the MOD has an absurd 2024 Out of Service Date for Foxhound which can’t possibly be taken seriously, especially when seen near 2030 for the RWMIK and 2037 (!) for the Panther. 
A more recent (March 2015) FOI puts the Foxhound OSD in 2030, but advances the OSD for Husky to 2024, probably on the assumption that MRV(P) will come online as replacement. 

The 2014 table puts MRV(P) in semi-direct relationship with a number of vehicles which, for various reasons, really shouldn’t be compared, as I think they are too different. The Wolfhound, for example, is a massive machine, very well protected: the MRV(P) aims to have a similar payload (but much less protection). It is a trade off which could well be acceptable, as having a lighter, smaller, more agile vehicle could be advantageous, and anyway acceptable.

The MRV(P) requirements leave the door open to unladen weights approaching the 14 tons, which is twice the weight of Jackal and Foxhound. The base protection level, and probably the base agility, are inferior. Turning circle performance is also going to be worse, unless a “combat” derivative of MRV(P) comes with a lot of difference from other variants, and focus placed on mobility and protection.

It looks likely that an MRV(P) platform will have to be the same base vehicle but coming in Long and Short wheelbase variants: this would preserve much of the logistical commonality, but still enable the production of variants better suited to specific roles. 

The approximate requirements for MRV(P). The MOD hopes for a cheap vehicle: one early RFI mentions a price of 250.000 pounds per unit.

 

Same vehicle, in long and short wheelbase, seem to be the only way the MRV(P) could ever achieve the single-type vehicle objective.

Even so, I suggest that Foxhound should be the very last vehicle on the list of those to replace. Replacing Foxhound and Jackal, two frontline combat machines, with an adapted MRV(P), might be stretching too far the differences with the “cheap” Combat Service Support variants which represent the bulk of the programme.

The MRV(P) should ideally replace Panther (2037, seriously…?), Husky and eventually Wolfhound. For these roles, it is reasonably well placed. Replacing Foxhound seems to me to be a long shot: I could actually see Foxhound replacing Jackal and WMIKs in its open-top, weapon carrier variant, while MRV(P)s replace the rest. Envisaging such an early end of service date for Foxhound is flat out ridiculous, with what the machine can do and with how much it cost, too.

At the moment, there is nothing in sight which delivers greater performances in the same size and weight class, so that my recommendation would be to think about Foxhound as the base for replacing Jackal and WMIKs, with MRV(P) replacing the rest. I suspect that keeping the two things separate will help in ensuring that MRV(P) doesn’t get too expensive trying to be too many and too different things at once; and also ensure that, when the time comes to replace Foxhound, a new vehicle thought for its specific combat role is sought.

Going down to two fleets (plus Land Rovers and Pinzgauers) for where protection is not strictly necessary would already be be a major, major improvement over the fragmented, multi-type fleet of today.

Non-Articulated Vehicle – Protected (NAV-P) is a Cat B project to meet the requirement for a protectable Palletised Load System (PLS). This would replace the ageing and unprotected DROPS fleet, enabling logistic support by a protected fleet to concurrent operations from 2020.

NAV-P is a major component in the renewal of the fleets of trucks which are the backbone of the British Army's logistics.

The truck fleets and the way ahead. Two main projects will be key in the next few years.

The already seen May 2014 MOD document shows how up in the air the replacement for DROPS still was:

 

The DROPS Out of Service Date is... partially false, because DROPS simply doesn't have a numerically adequate replacement at the moment, and several still remain. The road to a replacement is visibly torturous, and desired numbers are likely to never be truly reached. What is clear is that NAV-P is becoming increasingly urgent.

The DROPS hit its Out Of Service date in 2014, as planned and mentioned in the document. At the same time, not all DROPS are gone. An unknown number of DROPS continues to serve and will remain for some more time. Some DROPS can still be seen in use with the reserve, but also with other units, including Falcon squadron in the CBRN role, where the DROPS is still used to carry the decontamination system, and will stay in the role out to 2017, when EPLS should replace it. It is not known how many DROPS are being run-on: in late 2014, the running-on of up to 825 trucks beyond 2014 was envisaged, but there is no telling how the programme has evolved since.

In addition, the EPLS is used. The Enhanced Palletized Load System, based on the MAN SV 15 Ton truck, has been procured as UOR for operations in Afghanistan. Two orders were placed, for 87 new build EPLS trucks and 90 conversions from HX77 trucks already MOD owned respectively. The 2014 document shows “170 EPLS going into core”: that is 7 vehicles less than originally procured, indicating that some must have been written off due to damage. 3 or 4 EPLS were also handed over to New Zealand, which urgently needed them as platforms for the REBS bridging system.

The 2014 document shows a plan to convert a further 175 MAN SV trucks to the EPLS role. I don’t know if a contract has been signed for this, but the indication that Falcon Sqn will receive EPLS in 2017 might be related to this second batch. 

Up-armoured EPLS in Afghanistan, doing its thing

The NAV-P, according to the May 2014 plans, would begin coming online in 2017, and 350 would be procured by 2020/21, giving a combined fleet of some 1045 trucks which would still include at least 350 old DROPS, evidence of the funding difficulties stretching out the replacement process.

Note that the requirement, all-in, is estimated in as many as 1349 vehicles, a number that the Army might simply never achieve.

There once were 1612 Leyland DROPS Medium Mobility Load Carrier (MMLC) and 404 Foden DROPS Improved Medium Mobility Load Carrier (IMMLC).

Light Weight (Air Portable) Recover (LW(AP)RC) is a Cat D project to meet the requirement for a recovery capability that is air portable and that can wade ashore with Commando Forces to provide intimate support to Very High Readiness (VHR) forces by 2016.

This Light Recovery Vehicle is an interesting requirement, which I think actually extends beyond the Paras and Commando: the Light Protected Mobility infantry battalions, mounted on Foxhound, and the Light Cavalry regiments on Jackal could all use a better, lightweight recovery vehicle instead of the 32-tons MAN Wrecker monster. In Afghanistan, a number of Husky vehicles were converted by the REME into recovery vehicles better suited to operate on the line of fire and, crucially, able to follow the Foxhound and other “light” vehicles into narrow urban areas and other challenging places, but a more definitive solution is needed.

Future Protected Battle Field Ambulance (FPBFA) is a Cat C project to meet the requirement for a Protected Mobility (PM) battlefield multi role ambulance. This will enable in-theatre protected movement of casualties, whilst delivering expected clinical care by 2020.

Not mentioned as part of the RFI for the Operational Support Programme, is the nonetheless vital Common Articulated Vehicle – Protected, which is meant to eventually deliver the Future Common Articulated Bulk Capability. A CAV vehicle should begin appearing in 2018 (according to the 2014 document already seen, but not much at all has been heard since) as a much needed replacement for the 99 old Seddon Atkinson Light Equipment Transporters (LET), which have gone out of service by end 2012, without adequate replacement. 99 new 3-axle semi trailers for the LET role have been purchased between 2005 and 2006, but no coherent replacement for the tractor itself was funded. Low cost interim solutions have had to be rolled into service instead: the RAF’s 2 Mechanical Transport Squadron has procured some 20 Iveco Stralis trucks in August 2013, while the army has converted a small number of Oshkosh movers, originally procured as part of the tactical tankers fleet, to use them as Interim LET on operations.

The CAV should also help make up for the 54 Seddon Atkingson 32.000 liters General Support Tankers leaving service.

The CAV will become even more important in the first half of the 2020s, when the Heavy Equipment Transporters PFI contract will end, and the tactical tankers will hit Out of Service Date. Achieving fleet commonality, finally, would be greatly beneficial, logistically speaking.

The HET contract expiry date is 1^st July 2024, currently, while the tankers have a 2025 OSD.

The HET fleet comprises 92 Oshkosh Truck Corporation 1070F 8 x 8 tractor units, 3 Tru-Hitch recovery systems, 89 King Trailer GTS 110/7 seven-axle semi-trailers and 20 Broshuis Heavy Duty 45 tons trailers procured as UORs in late 2005.  The Private Financing Initiative sees Fasttrax Ltd supplies the trucks, provides training for drivers and REME maintainers, as well as procure spare parts and support. The company provides drivers and maintainers as Sponsored Reserves, which can be called up for service for periods as long as 9 months. When not deployed on operations or completing peacetime taskings for the MoD, the SRs, who are salaried employees of FTX Logistics Ltd (who operate the HET service on behalf of Fasttrax) are employed on third party work. This work enables them to maintain their driver/operator skills, which, together with the fact that they must pass Military Annual Training Tests (MATTs), ensure that they deploy current and fully prepared for their operational role.

The HET fleet is now assigned to a the sole 19 Tank Transporter Squadron RLC, with 16 Tank Transporter Sqn having disbanded in Germany on July 25, 2014, as part of Army 2020 reductions.

The tankers are instead MOD owned. 357 Oshkosh MTVR tractors are used to tow 200 Close Support Tankers, each with a 20.000 liters capacity; 82 Tactical Aircraft Refuellers, each capable to hold 15.000 liters of fuel and pump it into 2 Chinooks at once, the helicopters on the ground with rotors turning; and 57 18.000 liters Close Support Tankers (Water).

It would be very beneficial, logistically, if these three fleets were replaced with a high commonality solution, if not with the very same tractor unit for all three roles.

As there does not seem to be any revolution in sight in the trucks world, it would probably make perfect sense to carry on with Oshkosh products. In 2009, the MOD almost concluded a deal for additional Oshkosh MTVR tractors for the LET role: that would have been a brilliant solution for the problem, but unfortunately did not obtain funding.

MAN offers heavy tractors which could take on the HET, tanker and LET roles as well. The MAN products are expensive, but would offer even greater commonality by being closely related to the SV fleet already in service. There is the possibility to use MAN trucks for the NAV-P as well, drastically reducing the number of logistic lines that need to be kept going.

The general Support Vehicle truck fleet is not expected to need replacement at least out to 2034, and will probably last beyond that. The MAN SV fleet, as already seen in older posts, consists of:

HX60 4x4, 6-ton payload of which:

107 FALCON communication system prime movers (not originally part of SV requirement, added later)

3934 General Service Cargo Truck

958 Flatbed

84 General Service with Crane

28 General Service with Tail Lift (for RAF use)

New or existing HX60 will be used for the FLAADS(L) air defence missile batteries. 

HX58 6x6, 9-ton payload, Medium Mobility Vehicles, of which:

264 General Service

63 Flatbed

8 General Service, Crane

46 Flatbed, Crane

Unit Support Tanker 230 

SX44 9-tonne 6x6 Improved Medium Mobility, of which:

41 General Service

54 Flatbed

5 Flatbed, crane

81 Unit Support Tanker

The Unit Support Tanker is a field refueling system that replaces the previous Unit Bulk Refueling Equipment. Each UST carries 7000 liters of fuel.

HX77, 8x8, 15-tonne Medium Mobility

464 General Service

328 Flatbed

12 General Service, Crane

119 Flatbed, crane

87 EPLS (UOR, new build not originally part of SV but added later)

NOTE: 90 of the original 923 HX77 trucks have since been converted to Enhanced Palletized Load Systems, to complement and then replace the similar but older DROPS trucks, which cannot be fitted with armor for use in theatre. I don’t know if the trucks were taken from the General Service pot or from the Flatbed pot or a bit from both, but I personally suspect they might have converted some of the Flatbeds: I think it would be the easiest to change.

HX77 trucks are used to carry large, specialized shelters such as the Giraffe ABM radar; the Tactical Map Dissemination Point shelters of the GEOINT system of 42 (Geographic) Regiment Royal Engineers and the Tactical Aerial Reconnaissance Deployable Intelligence System (TARDIS) shelters.
As a UOR connected to EPLS, the MOD also procured 25 Fuel Tank Container systems from WEW of Germany. These are 20 foot container-footprint tanks fitted with the KPA400B autarkic diesel-driven pump: thanks to it, after unloading the container the system can be operated completely independent of the DROPS/EPLS vehicle.

Finally, the Support Vehicle Fleet includes 288 SX45 8x8 Recovery trucks (“Wreckers”) plus 69 Recovery trailers: they replaced the Foden Heavy Recovery vehicle.

The original contract also included 1098 appliquè armor kits, which can readily be fitted to all trucks but the 161 employed in the Training Fleet. 

For operations in Afghanistan, such armor kits have been improved with further additions on some 324 vehicles, in two different initiatives, the first known as Project Fortress.

The MAN SV trucks can be fitted with the Roush's ROPS (Roll-Over Protection System): this is a system that comes with two frames (one with 8 seats, the other with 6 seats) accommodating a series of two-part vacuum formed ABS seats, plus a 4-point quick release harness. Clearances have been designed in to accommodate a soldier in body armour, a webbing kit and battle helmet. Stowage is provided for a standard Bergen and a clamping arrangement is fitted to secure a weapon.

At least 1100 sets were ordered in August 2008 in a 5 million pounds contract and delivered by 2009 as "Enhanced Seating Kit". The system provides full protection in case of Roll Over of the truck, improving safety. The system apparently receive some kind of modification because the variant now in service is named MK2.

Project TYRO

The increased weight of the army’s vehicles means that the BR90 bridging kit needs an upgrade. Since 2014 the Army is working to define the way forwards for upgrading, or potentially replacing, the BR90 bridging equipment. The main aim of the programme is to put in service new bridging elements in 2022, which will have to last out to 2040 thanks to a greater Military Load Class (Tracked) capability. The minimum MLC(T) required is 100.

The Army wants 33 new sets of Close Support Bridging equipment for the Titan bridgelayer. Each Titan is currently supported by a BR90 Tank Brigde Transporter truck, which means that each system comes with 2x 13.5 meters bridges and 1x 26 m scissor bridge. Trestles enable the combination of bridge sets to overcome gaps of over 60 meters.

The Army also wants 16 General Support Bridge sets. Each GSB is currently composed by a single Automotive Bridge Launch Equipment (ABLE) vehicle capable to lay 32 meters single span bridges. The ABLE is supported by two BR90 Bridging Vehicles carrying bridge elements. With span reinforcements, the bridge can grow to 44 meters, while and span doubling over piers or pontoons enables the bridging of 62-meter gaps. 

Project TYRO recognizes the obsolescente of the carrier vehicles, as well as the by now insufficient MLC class of the bridging elements themselves. It is hoped that the old Alvis Unipower 8x8 Improved Medium Mobility Trucks will be replaced, and if this happens, there might be room to pursue commonality with other truck fleets.

33 CSB sets would confirm the current number of systems. 16 GSB sets are instead quite a few less than the 29 ABLE systems once available.

 

Wide Area Reconnaissance and Surveillance for CBRN 

As we know, the army has temporarily resurrected the small fleet of Fuchs vehicles for CBRN wide area recce and surveillance, but the idea within the army is not to depend from Fuchs for too many more years. 

A programme to determine new means of providing wide area CBRN surveillance is on the cards, with a UAV among the options considered. The Fuchs OSD provvisionally is given as 2020 because of it, but it'll all depend on how this particular workstream progresses.

Warrior Capability Sustainment Programme

Uncertainty continues regarding the exact numbers planned for the Warrior capability sustainment programme. It seems that we are now talking about a total of 380 vehicles, of which only 245 will be IFVs armed with the new turret and the 40mm gun. The other 135 vehicles seem destined to be recovery and repair vehicles, plus artillery observation post vehicles. 

135 supporting vehicles sound like a lot, but Warrior Recovery and Repair variants appear not jut in the Armoured Infantry battalions, but in REME Close Support battalions and a few can be found in the REME dets in tank and AS90 artillery regiments as well. 

The 245 guns figure is indirectly obtained thanks to the recently announced contract for the purchase of 515 CTA 40 guns: we know that 245 are destined to the SCOUT SV, and Jane’s reports that 25 more guns are for trials, tests and development. That leaves only 245 for the Warrior CSP.

This number is highly disappointing, I find, because it appears insufficient for properly equipping and sustaining the 6 armoured infantry battalions which are the core of Army 2020.

Even with the army hoping to mount battalion HQ and Anti-Tank platoon into ABSV vehicles instead of Warrior proper, the number remains insufficient. 14 Warrior IFVs per rifle company, alone, sum up to a requirement for 252 vehicles.

We are already beyond the expected number of upgraded vehicles, and we haven’t even considered the need for a training fleet in BATUS, and a margin of reserve machines to cover for unavailability. Talk about whole fleet management: if these are the numbers, a couple of the six battalions will be “virtual”, because even come the third world war there will not be Warrior vehicles to assign to them.

All battalions will have access to small training fleets, and there will be enough vehicles in storage to fully equip perhaps 4 battalions, in case the army ever needs to deploy two armoured infantry brigades as part of its one-shot, three-brigade, Divisional effort. 

The Warrior upgraded with the CSP will be a powerful and excellent IFV, but the number of vehicles to be up-gunned is a source of concerns, as is the ABSV programme, the other key element of the modernization of armoured infantry battalions.

 

If it is a case of "extreme whole fleet management", it makes little sense, however, to have purchased the right number of FRES Scout vehicles to fully equip the units mounted on them: if the armoured infantry, which is the core of the brigade, is without vehicles, what use can the recce vehicles on their own have?

If it must be a Whole Fleet Management exercise which enables the fielding of a maximum of two brigades at once, then Scout numbers should have followed the same philosophy, and the saved money used to fund a proper missile-launching Overwatch vehicle variant. Or ABSV. Because things about ABSV remain far from clear, as we’ll see later.

Another mystery yet to be cleared is that of the Artillery Observation Post variant (FV-514). The WCSP does not include mission-specific upgrades for this variant, which is by now obsolescent and which has to literally be transformed from an old school vehicle for the observation of the fall of artillery shots into a Joint Fires Control platform capable to direct precision air strikes as well as artillery and mortar fire. The FV-514 has a turret, but the 30 mm gun is a dummy. It is not clear if under WCSP it will get the new turret, but without gun, or at least a "make up" to make its existing turret indistinguishable from that of upgraded Warriors IFVs. It is obvious that if it keeps the dummy Rarden gun and the current turret shape, it will stick out like a sore thumb among the upgraded and much different Warriors.  

The new turret and gun are completely different from the originals. In this image, the modular add-on armour package (or at least part of it) can also be seen.

The Royal Artillery is responsible for developing and funding a new, up to date mission package of sensors and communications that will enable the direction of artillery fire and air support from under armour.

The RA has been experimenting at least since 2010 / 11, but it is not at all clear if it has the money to fund the upgrade.

If the upgrade can’t be embodied into the WCSP production phase, it will have to follow it, and this means, at best, that it would happen in the 2020s, and it would come into service near 2030, way too late.

Worse, if the RA package of upgrades can’t be funded at all, the FV-514 risks being close to useless.

Moreover, since one of the FRES Scout variants is equipped for Joint Fires Control, I’m left to wonder on the whole sense of trying to develop a Joint Fires variant of Warrior, too. Why not just purchase more Scout Joint Fires? 

The WCSP is not the end, for the Artillery Observation variant. The CSP will add the electronics changes and the modular armor package common to all variants, but the key to getting any value out of FV514 will be a further role-specific upgrade. The Royal Artillery has long been working on it, but its current status is not clear.

The organization of the Armoured Infantry Battalion of Army 2020 is a bit of a mystery, due to the shortage of Warriors-with-gun. It seems that the Army hopes to compensate using ABSV, but until that becomes available (if it does become available, I sadly have to remark) the battalions are making do with the old FV432 Bulldog. 

We also know that the armoured infantry section is going down from 10 to 9 men, which actually means from 7 to 6 dismounts, since the others are the Warrior IFV’s crew.

The Warrior loses a dismount seat in the upgrade, as new blast-protected seating and situational awareness troop compartment screen take away precious space.

Armoured Infantry Battalions apparently won’t employ the L129A1 sharpshooter, either: it seems that the Army will assign the L86 LSW as sharpshooter weapon instead. The justification is that 7.62x51 hit power is less needed in Armoured Infantry role due to the Warrior’s own cannon and 7.62mm coax.

Armoured Battlegroup Support Vehicle

Much needed, desperately sought by the army, still in search of security. We don’t yet know if and when the ABSV programme will actually start. The army hoped to hit Initial Gate this year, but the latest MOD major projects summary, up to date to around middle 2014, talks of ABSV as “an aspiration”.

Awful word which does not provide any kind of certainty.

The ABSV, most likely to be obtained by removing the turret from surplus Warriors and rebuilding them into support variants, is a key programme, but one which struggles horribly in getting out of the mud. It is meant to provide new C2, ambulance, APC, Mortar and ATGW variants. BAE has showcased a Warrior configured as 81 mm mortar carrier as an example of what ABSV could and should be, but the way forwards is uncertain.

The Army’s hope for a proper ATGW vehicle might also be frustrated once more, even if the ABSV programme goes ahead. There are high chances of it being just an APC with internal arrangements for the carriage of dismounted Javelin missile teams. 

BAE showcased a mortar carrier Warrior variant as a demonstrator for ABSV

 

The army has been working on ABSV for years, trying to getting it funded. Alvis, when it still existed produced a few prototypes under an earlier contract. We were in the early 2000. ABSV eventually became a part of Warrior CSP under the Labour government, and now has been split away from it once more, to become its own programme. What matters, however, is that it finally progresses into acquisition.

The army at one point hoped to start introducing ABSV in 2018. It is desperately needed to replace ancient FV432s which, despite the MK3 upgrade in the early 2000s, really do need to retire.

The insufficient number of Warriors receiving the IFV fit adds urgency to the development of ABSV to better complement them, and fill the holes in the ranks.

Challenger 2 Life Extension Programme

The CR2 LEP appears to be another victim of stealth cuts. At one point expected to hit Initial Gate this year, it has more recently been described as “in concept phase”. This suggests that initial gate has been quietly pushed to the right by at least another year.

Complete uncertainty reigns about whether the 227 tanks remaining in active service will all be upgraded or if there will be further reductions. The extent of the upgrades is also not clear, but they will be mostly about electronic, sights and communications. Unfortunately, replacement of the rifled gun is absolutely out of the question, and a new engine also seems out of reach. 

Up to 75 Challenger Armoured Repair and Recovery Vehicles remain active. These are employed not just within tank regiments, but in REME Armoured Close Support battalions and in the AS90 artillery regiments as well as in the armoured engineers regiments. 

Even so, i think that the British Army might want to consider spending a bit less on supporting vehicles and a bit more on combat vehicles: 75 CHARRV, several dozens of Warrior repair and Warrior recovery and some 38 Recovery and 50 Repair FRES SV units sound like a lot, especially as the frontline fleets themselves keep shrinking. Recovery and Repair vehicles are true force multipliers within armoured formations, it is true, but to effectively have 1 recovery/repair vehicle for every 5-some combat vehicles sounds a bit excessive: 

75 CHARRV for 227 Challenger 2, 33 Trojan, 33 Titan, 89 AS90 = 5.09 combat vehicles per recovery vehicle 

88 Recovery and Repair FRES SV against 501 "combat" FRES SV = 5.69 combat vehicles per support vehicle

Possibly some 80 Recovery / Repair Warrior variants against 300 IFVs and Joint Fires Control vehicles = 3.75 combat vehicles per each support vehicle. This rate is particularly ridiculous but is likely connected to the Army's hope of replacing FV432 (which has its own repair variant, at the moment!) with ABSV on Warrior hull. The final rate of support vehicles to combat Warriors + ABSVs will be different. 

As we have seen before, besides, the abundance of Repair and Recovery vehicles in the Heavy fleets is somewhat countered by the current absence of a numerically and technically adequate fleet of Light Recovery vehicles thought for the fleets of Jackal, Foxhound, Husky. The MAN Wrecker is a huge 8x8 truck, at one time oversized and under protected for the job of recovering damaged Jackals or Foxhound in tight and dangerous places. 

 

Apache Capability Sustainment Programme

The Apache CSP is intended to deliver a fleet of 50 helicopters, renewed and uplifted to the latest equipment standard, the Block III, known by the US Army as AH-64E “Guardian”.

The Army’s favored option for obtaining the final result is to have its existing Apaches torn apart and rebuilt into brand new airframes, complete with new and updated systems where applicable. This is the same thing that is happening to hundreds of US Army Apache helicopters, which get dismantled and reassembled into new airframes built in South Korea and shipped to the US for assembly.

The remanufacturing approach allows the re-use of components still valid, considerably reducing costs.

The Army is said to have recommended going with Boeing as it can offer the lowest price, but the MOD and government are not going to take a final decision before March 2016, as AgustaWestland is lobbying to obtain a contract which allows it to do the work in Yeovilton.

The US Army is remanufacturing 634 of its Apaches, and will also purchase 56 wholly new helicopters, but not before 2019/2020. The production line, was the UK to decide to buy wholly new machines, will be open at least out to 2026.

An area for uncertainty is represented by the unique british bits in the Apache AH1, and how some of those might or might not find their way into remanufactured or new helicopters assembled by Boeing. Communications, such as the Bowman radio, will certainly be required, but the MOD might also want to carry on with the british HIDAS self-protection system, and this would already pose a greater challenge.

All Apache helicopters are now manufactured with folding rotors, which were unique to the british AH1, years ago. But the british army would like to include a series of naval features which, despite the US Army’s increasingly frequent deployments shipboard in the Pacific, aren’t at all standard on the Apache.

At the end of 2013, the UK MOD signed a contract with AgustaWestland to develop and fit an emergency floatation gear to the AH1, which also received a degree of corrosion protection and wet-sealing to better resist the aggression of the marine environment.

These features, as well as others which are very desirable but not yet available, such as a naval-rate rotor brake and an I-band transponder, might not be easy to incorporate.

Uk and US are at least working together on a new cockpit escape system which, unlike the original one, will work safely even in the event of a crash into the water.

Another question mark is the engine: the british Apache AH1 uses the RTM 322, but its original power advantage over the American engines is no more, and Rolls Royce has also now sold its participation in this specific engine, which is now effectively French owned. On the other hand, the RTM 322 is still used on the Merlins.

An AW deal would cost more, but would keep the work in the UK. In itself, it is not an undesirable proposition, but it depends on what the higher price means: if it means having less helicopters, or having to cut something else, then the contract should definitely go to Boeing.

Special Forces Light Helicopter, and others  

The little known 657 Sqn AAC operates Lynx AH9A in support of the Special Forces. The Lynx AH9A is expected to remain in service out to 2018, but the future of the unit beyond that date is far from clear. At one point, the MOD almost signed a contract modification deal with AgustaWestland which would have converted 4 of the army helicopters already on order into SF Light Assault Helicopters, and added 4 more on the production line. The deal, however, eventually silently died and failed to materialize. 

The 9A uses the same engines as the Wildcat. It is lighter and somewhat roomier, which makes it more effective in light utility role. It is fitted with an MX-10 EO turret, and an M3M heavy machine gun.

 

There is a clear requirement for 8 – 10 light or medium machines for Special Forces support. Already before the publication of the SDSR 2010 there were rumors of 10 special forces helicopters being included: I think a Telegraph article at one point said that 10 NH-90 helicopters would be ordered.

That was not to be, but the problem remains to be solved. At a minimum, a last minute addition of 8 Wildcat in LAH configuration will be needed.

Some 21 Lynx AH9A remain, also used by 9 AAC Regiment. The Lynx AH7 will be entirely gone by the end of July, truly closing an era: only six remain in use, for assistance in Wildcat training.

The last few Gazelles are also planned to bow out of service by 2018, and a replacement is not in sight. Homeland work in Northern Ireland, though, might require a little investment. In May 2014, the army has added an MX-10 EO/IR turret to a Squirrel helicopter, currently used for training but destined to be replaced by the new Rotary Wing UKMFTS solution in 2018: this might provide a hint of what could be used in home security role after Gazelle.

Joint Helicopter Command has also voiced its interest in “surrogate training helicopters”, cheap-to-fly machines that, if procured, would be equipped with cockpits able to “simulate” Apache (and maybe Wildcat too), to enable low-cost, effective training of crews. This is intended to generate savings by reducing actual flying hours of the very expensive Apache.

It is not clear if and how this idea will be funded, however.

Watchkeeper

Full Operational Capability is expected in 2017, when de-icing and operations from austere, unpaved airstrips are to become available, with the release of Equipment Standard 2 (ES 2). Further development of the type is not yet mapped out, but already in 2011 there was interest in the Royal Artillery about the possibility of making Watchkeeper a shooter, adding a couple of pylons capable to employ weapons such as the LMM Martlet missile. This might be one of the future additions.

It will be interesting to see if the British Army and Royal Navy will ever get around to try and put Watchkeeper onto the Queen Elizabeth aircraft carrier. The launch should not be a problem: Watchkeeper is not overly heavy and can be launched from a trailer-mounted catapult which wouldn’t be much more challenging to embark than a Scan Eagle catapult. The problem is the landing, but there might be ways around the issue.

Air Defence

A contract for the CAMM missile batteries in Future Local Area Air Defence System – Land (FLAADS(L)) configuration was reportedly signed in December 2014, but there are no details about what exactly it funds. Replacement of Rapier remains expected “by the end of the decade”. 4 to 5 batteries are expected, one of which is effectively permanently based in the Falklands islands.

The Falklands should see a contract signed next year for the installation of a complete battle management and C4I system which will provide a full, detailed radar air picture to enhance the efficiency of the air defence system.

The british army, for the same task, has the deployable Land Environment Air Picture Provision (LEAPP) system, which achieved full operational capability in December 2014. 

The LEAPP Skykeeper system includes 5 Giraffe ABM radars especially purchased to serve as powerful eyes for the system, and shelter-based elements, deployable also under slung by Chinook. LEAPP however fuses together data coming from other radars and systems, from AWACS in the air to ships at sea. 

The LEAPP shelter, produced by Marshal, mounted on HX60 truck

Inside LEAPP

LEAPP is employed by 49 (Inkerman) independent Royal Artillery battery, as part of Joing Ground Based Air Defence. LEAPP networks together various external sources, receiving data in real time with Link 16. A Link 11 access node is also available, operated by Royal Marines of 29 Commando Royal Artillery: it enables LEAPP to receive the air picture coming from the sensors of RN warships. 

4 control nodes and 3 "air picture" trailers have been purchased. Networked with radars on the ground, in the air and on ships, LEAPP can control virtually everything moving in the air. Integrated with MAMBA and other radar and sensors, it provides a Sense and Warn capability against C-RAM threats as well.

In 2012, the MOD launched the Network Enabled Airspace Defence and Surveillance (NEADS) project, funding the first Workstream, which should eventually fully integrate LEAPP, FLAADS(L) and Starstreak vShorad systems, as well as starting the evaluation of C-RAM effectors. This later requirement might be related to the MOD’s research on laser.

The SDSR should give the go ahead to NEADS Increment 2, which is expected to include “sustainment of the Falklands air defence beyond 2020”, and as we saw, this is progressing. Specific anti-UAV capability is to be assessed (and the MOD is funding some research in this field), and a new C-RAM system was expected to be selected and procured for 2017. It will be interesting to see if NEADS goes ahead, and how, with specific attention to be paid on anti-UAV and C-RAM capability.

Fire Shadow

Who knows if the SDSR can provide an answer about what is going on with the Royal Artillery’s loitering ammunition programme. Silent and unadvertised death, it would look like.

Protected Mobility, UORs and the Utility Vehicle

The Protected Mobility needs of the Army, at the very least out to the middle 2020s, will be covered with the vehicles procured as UOR for Afghanistan and now brought into Core.

These include:

305 Mastiff Troop Carrier vehicles;

127 Mastiff specialist variants (Enhanced Communications, Interim ECM, Interim EOD, Ambulance and Protected Eyes with mast-mounted ROTAS EO/IR sensor, with its Praetorian variant for the RAF Regiment.

An unknown number of Troop Carrier variants of the Mastiff is being converted into additional Enhanced Communications variant as the army adjusts the fleet to its long-term needs. 

118 Ridgback Troop Carrier Vehicles;

51 Ridgback Specialist variants (Command and Ambulance)

Some Troop Carriers are being converted into additional command vehicles.

116 - 125 Wolfhound, including EOD and Military Working Dog variants. Somewhat surprisingly, a number of EOD Wolfhounds are being converted with the Military Working Dog pod.

441 Jackal 1/2/2A

71 Coyote

325 Husky (in Utility, Command, Heavy Weapon and Light Recovery variants)

45 to 60 Warthog will remain in use. They were originally procured in Troop Carrier, Command, Ambulance and Recovery variants, but are now expected to be used as carriers for Desert Hawk III UAV detachments and for the MAMBA artillery locating radar. 

The Army continues to crave a 8x8 armoured “Utility Vehicle” as a replacement for Mastiff and Ridgback in Heavy Protected Mobility infantry battalions by the middle of the 2020s. The programme is expected to formally restart in 2018, and between September 2014 and may 2015, a whole rifle coy from 4 RIFLES has been in France to train on and experience the French VBCI.

The VBCI was dropped from the original FRES UV competition in 2008 because back then it was not certified for above 30 tons weight and had not a quick-change, battlefield removable powerpack. The latest development of VBCI, however, has corrected both defects, and is now seen as a very serious candidate.

I remain quite skeptic on money being available for such a programme, however, and if I were in the Army I would first focus on ABSV and Warrior CSP, to fix armoured infantry before getting caught into another major project.

Virtus and other soldier systems  

Deliveries of the new helmet, vest and load carrying equipment have now begun, but greater purchases will be necessary to re-equip the army. Crucially, in order for VIRTUS to truly be beneficial, it is important that the MOD goes ahead with Pulse 2, which is the development and adoption of new, lighter and more effective armour plates to replace the ones now in use, which are strong but also very heavy. 

The new VIRTUS equipment. The mask is especially meant for use by crews of open-top vehicles such as Jackal.

Even greater potential lays in Pulse 3, with the development of a centralized power infrastructure for the soldier, which will be fundamental to allow adoption of new weapon sights and Situational Awareness computer systems for the soldier.

New Tactical Hearing Protection devices are entering service.

Replacement of the L85A2 weapon is now not expected before 2025 at the earliest. New upgrades and additions are however possible: the army has been experimenting suppressors, for example. The most welcome recent addition has been the Laser Light Module MK3, however, which is very light yet very capable.

Contrary to earlier reports, the 60 mm handheld light mortal is still observed on exercise, so it seems that, at least for now, it remains part of the infantry battalions. It delivers a key array of long-range capabilities to the infantry platoon.

Sharpshooter rifles are a combination of L129A1 in 7.62 mm and L86A2 LSW in 5.56. The latter seem destined, in particular, to armoured infantry units. The LSW is an accurate and effective weapon, but of course employs the lighter round. L129A1 with 12x optics are employed as Sniper No 2 Weapons.

The biggest revolution is anyway expected to eventually come via communications and Dismounted Situational Awareness developments. Key to this will be the sustainment / further evolution / replacement of the Bowman data radio, via Project MORPHEUS, part of the LaTacCis (Land Environment Tactical Communications and Information Systems) effort to renew and develop communication solutions. For now, there is not much to be said, other than the latest iteration of the Bowman system is in use, alongside UOR radio sets which have been brought into core to provide a more complete capability. MORPHEUS is a potentially huge programme, with a potential value of 3 billions or more, and with profound implications for all three services, as the Bowman data radio is employed by troops, vehicles, aircraft, helicopters and ships.