The Maritime Electronic Warfare Programme

The Maritime Electronic Warfare Programme (MEWP) has entered the Major Projects spreadsheet for the first time in the issue published earlier this month. This project has been in existence for multiple years already, but only now that various portions of it are about to progress it has started to be covered by the annual report. 

 MEWP is actually split into two Category A (which means their value is greater than 400 million) projects: MEW System Integrated Capability and EW Countermeasures Project. MEWP is described as a project intent on modernizing the Royal Navy’s Electronic Warfare capability through the adoption of open architectures with the potential to contribute to the development of shared Situational Awareness and Automated Cooperation in responding to missile attacks. 

Increment 1 of the Maritime Electronic Warfare System Integrated Capability (MEWSIC) should go under contract in the third quarter of this year, according to the report. Increment 2 is in its Concept Phase, while a 3rd Increment has not yet seen activities begin. We don’t know much about what these Increments involve, but we can assume that Increment 1 is likely to be the open architecture command and control element of the EW suite, to enable the later integration of new sensors and of the new countermeasures to come from the parallel project. 

Back between 2017 and 2018, two different industrial teams formed up to pursue MEWSIC and the wider MEWP opportunities: BAE Systems, CGI and Thales form one team; Lockheed Martin and Elbit form the other. Elbit UK is not too subtly offering its eM-e dominate system of systems for maritime EW. This is an adaptive, open architecture system split in its Command and Control element, sensors element and countermeasures element. 

The Royal Navy is unlikely to be giving maximum priority to the sensors at this stage since it has already completed some efforts in the previous decade to modernize these elements, mainly through adoption of the Thales VIGILE D fully digital Radar ESM system. 

On the other hand, a notice has been published calling for a new Communications ESM (CESM) capability for the Type 23s, under Project ARDENT WOLF. Invitation to negotiate is expected in September 2021 with contract signature penciled in for April 2022. The new CESM will be fitted to a minimum of 7 frigates (accounting for the fact that, while it will happen over more than a decade, the Type 23 fleet is on its sundown path) and will replace the HAMMERHEAD CESM, which is around one decade old. 

It will be very interesting to see exactly what Increment 1 will cover. It is obviously intriguing to see the Royal Navy hanging on to hopes to develop a better capability for automated cooperation against missile attacks. The Navy notoriously wanted the US Cooperative Engagement Capability on the Type 45 destroyers but was never able to fund its adoption. The requirement has not gone away, however, and the Navy probably wants to acquire the means to connect into today’s Naval Integrated Fire Control-Counter Air architecture at the heart of the US Navy efforts. 

Cooperative engagement prominently features in the slides published a while ago by the Navy and highlighting its priorities on the way to 2030. 

In may and june, during exercise FORMIDABLE SHIELD in the Hebrides range, both SAMPSON and ARTISAN radars were put to the test tracking ballistic and supersonic sea skimming targets, but it was the dutch HNLMS De Zeven Provinciën that was able to share tracking data from its upgraded SMART-L MM/N radar to enable the “launch on remote” of an SM-3 missile from the USS Paul Ignatius. It is important that the ability to cooperatively deploy countermeasures and fire interceptors timely is developed as soon as possible. 

Coming to the EW Countermeasures project, we are told that Increment 1A should see the competition start in September this year ahead of a full business case in August 2022. 

This first increment involves the acquisition of a “trainable launcher” for the decoys. Currently, the Royal Navy uses fixed, six-barrel launchers bolted on deck which cannot “aim” autonomously to launch a decoy in the most convenient direction to face an incoming threat. The ship thus has to manoevre to make best use of the cloaking effect generated by the deployed countermeasures, but this wastes precious time that, in particular against supersonic, and even more so hypersonic, threats is simply not available. The trainable launcher is a key upgrade to enable a quicker and more effective deployment of countermeasures. 

This is a requirement the Navy has felt for many years now and which generated response in the industry: Chemring notoriously developed the CENTURION system and SEA developed its own take. From France, Lacroix can offer its DAGAIE / New Generation Dagaie Systems (NGDS®), while Italy employs the SCLAR, marketed today in its ODLS incarnation by Leonardo. The Chemring and SEA products might be favorite in the Royal Navy contest because they are designed around the 130 mm decoy that is the standard caliber for the RN, US and multiple other countries, while the DAGAIE goes hand in hand with SEACLAD rounds also from Lacrois, and SCLAR / ODLS is mostly about 105 to 118 mm rockets, although it wouldn’t be surprising to see both producers offering a variant compatible with the 130 mm SeaGnat format.

The CENTURION launcher delivers a beneficial impact on Radar Cross Section. It has also been demonstrated as a missile launcher, firing JAVELIN back in 2013 as an anti-FIAC option. 

Increment 1B remains “subject to the outcome of a feasibility study”. 

A november 2020 tender gives us a pretty good idea of what Increment 1B might be about because it was split in two parts: a trainable launcher and a new Radio Frequency Active Decoy. For the Trainable Launcher, Invitation to Negotiate was expected in May 2021 with Contract Award in December 2022. The Major Projects spreadsheet suggests these timelines have slipped, but hopefully not by too much. 

For the Radio Frequency Active Decoy (which would effectively replace the current MK251 SIREN) the notice said 2021 would see a Feasibility study, with an Invitation To Negotiate target of April 2022 and Contract Award expected in August 2023. Overall, things match. 

Loading of a MK251 SIREN decoy in the current fixed launcher barrels. 

The Royal Navy has been working on a new active RF jammer decoy for multiple years. Under the ACCOLADE project, France and UK collaboratively designed a Manoeuvring Expendable Airborne Carrier round fitted with a Thales-developed RF ECM payload. The ACCOLADE round was test fired on Salisbury Plain, but the technology demonstrator phase ended in February 2016 and was not followed by adoption. The RF payload from ACCOLADE is still around, however, and in 2019 was actually demonstrated to the Royal Navy installed on the HALCYON Unmanned Surface Vehicle, the prototype of the USV that is the core of the MMCM counter-mines system. This was a demonstration of the concept of Recoverable Offboard Decoy System which might well bring results in the coming years, although, of course, an 11 meter USV is clearly oversized in comparison to this particular payload. The choice of boat was probably made out of sheer convenience; a much smaller one would be used in an operational system. Or, conversely, one could seek a much larger payload. 

ACCOLADE test firing on Salisbury Plain 

During 2019 the Royal Navy had also put up a notice for the replacement of the current Outfit DLF (3B) inflatable floating decoy. A Naval Passive Off-Board Decoy (N-POD) of similar concept is wanted from 2023. 

An airborne corner reflector decoy, of similar concept to the DLF (3B), has possibly entered service. A DSTL document mentions a MK217 “mini corner reflector” decoy round. In 2018 Chemring unveiled its TORERO 130 mm ammunition which, fired into the air, deploys a Fast-Inflating Airborne Corner Reflector to passively seduce missiles away from the ship. Airborne Systems and Rheinmetall offer their ADS 103 round, very similar in concept. The corner reflector begins its seduction in the air and floats on the surface of the sea after coming down.

Gaps, gaps, gaps - part 2

Part 1 of this report: Gaps, Gaps, Gaps


Next in line is the FRES SV vehicle family. Unfortunately, the NAO report covers a period that ends before the most interesting developments. Following confirmation of the enduring requirement for FRES SV at the completition of the SDSR, and indeed following the army restructuring program (Army 2020), the number of vehicles to be purchased and timings have all changed.
Entry into service will happen at least 9 months later than originally planned. The date is not disclosed, but we are possibly looking at 2018, if not later. I've read that CVR(T) vehicles will not be entirely gone before 2026.

An option that could be given the go ahead in the immediate future would however partly compensate the delay to entry in service by bringing forwards development and demonstration of the RECCE Block 2 group of vehicle variants.
The FRES SV has been broken down into multiple parts, all with their own decision Gates. So far, activity has focused on RECCE Block 1 (Scout vehicle, Armoured Personnel Carrier, Repair, Recovery and Common Base Platform) but the Block 2 could now be added to the ongoing activity, to demonstrate Ambulance, Command Post and Engineer Recce variants.
Part of the Block 2 should also be the Joint Fires direction vehicle, destined to carry a full six-man Fire Support Team of the Royal Artillery, with full equipment for the direction, under-armor or dismounted, of mortar, artillery and air attacks.

A RECCE Block 3 is also envisaged for the future, but budget uncertainty makes me be particularly careful about these future, as yet uncommitted to parts of the program. Bringing forwards demonstration of Block 2, to include the vehicle variants it covers into the Initial Operating Capability would be a very welcome move, as it would greatly increase the chances for the Army to actually get the vehicles it needs.

The Type 45 destroyers are now going strong, and the program has achieved a very positive in year net cost variation of -108 millions, which have been handed back for use elsewhere in the equipment programme. Reportedly, this year we'll see up to four Type 45 fitted with Harpoon missiles, presumably coming from the retired Type 22 frigates, but the NAO does not speak about it. Major improvements in Combat System software and communications (SATURN has been fitted) are reported.

The Typhoon Future Capability Program is, as always, a source of misery. While the Typhoon program registers a positive result, with a cost reduction of 69 millions, the Future Capability Program 1 for introduction of advanced Air-Ground features reports a 22 million cost increase (to 441 million) and, more importantly, a massive 18 months delay, to December 2013, which also affect the Meteor as we have seen before.

A combination of technical complexity, Partner Nation disagreement on a synthetic training solution and delays in agreement of an international support arrangement have caused the delay.

Anyway, the SDSR has pushed to the right the requirement for Typhoon ground-attack capability to 2015.
Future Capability Program 1 introduces Paveway IV, full functionality of the Litening III targeting pods and other improvements.
Future Capability Program 2 will follow, at some point, hopefully including integration of Storm Shadow and Brimstone.

An Active Electronic Scanned Array voice has made its appearance into the Report, with Initial Investment Decision made in July 2011, but no other detail is provided. The budgeted-for date of entry in service is currently classified.

Regarding the Warrior Capability Sustainment Programme, the NAO reports that the current plan is for the upgrade of 445 vehicles (all variants, including FV514 Artillery Observation Post, but excluding the Battery Command vehicles which appear not to be in use anymore, with a number having been converted in Ambulances by the REME for use in Afghanistan) from an affordable fleet of 565.
The FV514 vehicle is very important to the future of the Royal Artillery. As part of WCSP it is getting mechanical, electric and protection upgrades, but a separate programs will have to be funded at some point to upgrade the fire targeting and direction equipment. I plan to write an article in the near future looking in more detail into the Warrior situation, and more info will be provided there. 

Importantly, the NAO report confirms that the Armored Battlefield Support Vehicle element is not dead, despite having been silent ever since it was made a part of Warrior CSP by the 2005 defence industrial strategy.
The ABSV is described as:

A new variant, replacing obsolescent platforms, that has equal protection and mobility to the core fighting platforms. Armoured Battlefield Support Vehicle is currently in the Concept Phase and is subject to future approval.

The ABSV, also known as "turretless Warrior" is meant to replace a number of FV430 tracked vehicles inside armored infantry battlegroups. Also known earlier as Battle Group Support Vehicle (BGSV) and earlier still as M1P1 (tracked vehicle which was accompanied by the also cancelled M2P2, the 8x8 Boxer vehicle), it has had a complex history to say the least.
At least 3 prototypes were ordered to then Alvis Vickers, and at least one was built and demonstrated. The requirement has varied anywhere between 125 and 300-plus vehicles, with Ambulance, Command Post and General Support variants envisaged.

With how things are evolved over the years, now ABSV and FRES SV Recce Block 2 are kind of in conflict for the same roles, replacing FV430 vehicle variants.
Using turretless Warriors for the roles might cost less than build a wholly new FRES SV, and of course having almost all the battalion using Warrior mechanics is good for logistics, but insertion of technology which is so important for Command and Ambulance vehicles in particular suggest that going for a new, modern FRES variant is desirable.

However, the FRES Engineer/Bridgelayer vehicle has been cancelled, while a Warrior bridgelayer prototype has been showcased in 2011. Since the requirement is still there (some 35 vehicles were envisaged), to support the FRES Scout, ABSV might end up delivering Bridgelayers instead of ambulances, command posts and APCs.
There is also another requirement that has been ignored this far, which is that for a Mortar Carrier replacing the relevant FV430 variant currently in use. As the Mortar Carrier role should not require a too complex modification to the Warrior hull, and since the requirement would be for a low number of vehicles (between 6 and 9 vehicles for each armoured infantry battalion, so around 54 at most) it might make sense to convert surplus Warrior hulls as a low-cost, big-gain program.

This way, FRES SV RECCE Block 2 would replace APCs (not overly complex, but required in significant numbers that Warrior wouldn't be able to cover) and the complex Command, Ambulance, Communications and Engineer Recce / Joint Fires variants, while surplus Warrior hulls could be used for covering the need for Bridgelayers and Mortar Carriers. The numbers are also compatible with what the NAO says, as 565 - 445 gives 120, a number of hulls more than adequate to meet the two requirements i suggest to tackle.

IOC for Warrior CSP remains defined as one Armoured Company equipped and trained collectively at Level 2. Expected in November 2018.

Among the pre-Main Gate programmes appears MARS, which will of course move up into Post-Main Gate in the 2013 report, since the contract has since been awarded for MARS FT.
The NAO report confirms what i had already reported: the procurement of the MARS Fleet Solid Support Ships currently sits on the White Board, waiting to be given the go ahead later in the decade, post SDSR 2015.
Money is planned to be provided from the core budget for assessment phase of Solid Support in the coming budget cycles.

One major, welcome programs in Pre-Main Gate phase is the Network Enabled Airspace Defence and Surveillance (NEADS), which is the Army's effort to modernize the obsolete air defence capability currently available.
A very complex program, it is considered of prioritary importance by the Army since future operations are expected to be conducted in far less permissive environments. NEADS is meant to expand the defence capability to give protection from the whole range of threats: aircrafts, helicopters, cruise missiles and, very importantly, against UAVs and Rocket-Artillery-Mortars. 

Three Increments are planned:

Increment 1 will replace Urgent Operational Requirement equipment with an enduring Counter Rocket Artillery & Mortar automated sense and warn capability from 2015.
This capability is being used in Afghanistan to protect UK bases from rocket artillery and mortar attack. This was provided under Treasury Urgent Operation Requirement Funding. Automatic Sense and Warn capabilities will be brought into the core equipment programme.

Increment 2 will deliver an initial Counter-Unmanned Air Vehicle Capability and replace the existing Counter Rocket Artillery and Mortar intercept capability from 2017 as well as sustain ground-based air defence in the Falkland Islands beyond 2020.


Increment 3 will improve protection against the remainder of the Difficult Air Targets with Full Operating Capability expected in 2027.

The Difficult Air Targets set includes cruise missiles, Unmanned Air Vehicles, Attack Helicopters and Rockets, Artillery and Mortars.

 

Automatic Sense and Warn UOR is an adaptation of the Land Environment Air Picture Provision (LEAPP) equipment program for Afghanistan needs. Another element is JAPPLE. In 2011 i wrote this description, which should still be at least partially valid, even though not much info is available on this kind of systems, for obvious reasons.

The Joint Air Picture Provision of the Land Environment is active in Helmand since 2008. A team of eight, split between Camp Bastion and Lashkar Gah, provide the Joint Helicopter Command and to the Combined Forces HQ a 24-hours complete picture of activity going on in the air, to direct air defence efforts and de-conflict the Joint Helicopter Command routes and missions with the concurrent artillery fire or othe potential threats. In addition to this constant presence, the system also deploys small forward teams with troops where necessary. 

JAPPLE builds on the capability provided by the Automated Sense and Warn system: this was procured as UOR for Afghanistan, and is a combination of software and hardware capable to fuse together information coming from a number of sources, including MAMBA artillery locating/battlefield surveillance radars. Mainly, though, it uses two Giraffe ABM radars. The information is fused and transmitted on the LEAPP C2 network, and alarm of incoming attack is launched via the Waves towers installed in based in Afghanistan. Two Giraffe radars are in Bastion, two in Kandhar.

In the system, at some point, is likely to be integrated also the flow of informations coming from B-ISTAR sensors.

The whole system is currently manned by 5^th Regiment RA, with the support of roughly one battery deployed on each Herrick cycle by 16 RA.

LEAPP in itself (Land Environment Air Picture Provision) is a little known but invaluable programme which is going on from a few years, and that allowed the advanced JAPPLE to happen. LEAPP provides near real time correlated air picture for the land environment. It is a combination of control nodes and organic sensors, and a vital software, Bowman data radio-compatible, capable to link and connect all Royal Artillery assets (artillery batteries receive info and feed back into the system the data of their own firing trajectories, so that all things moving in the air can be mapped). LEAPP is deployed at formations Hqs, and provides its air picture to all users via NATO data link 16 and 11.

The report says that the C-RAM interception capability will be replaced in 2017, but please note that the British Army currently has not an in-service C-RAM interception capability. ASW is a detection and warning system only.
In Iraq, the Army deployed, as UOR, a number of american-made Centurion C-RAM trailers, fitted with suitably modified Phalanx CIWS guns taken from the Royal Navy's stock. However, for what i understand that was a temporary solution: Centurion was not deployed to Afghanistan, the trailers have been handed back to the US and the Phalanx guns returned to the Royal Navy.
The "existing" C-RAM capability is virtual, but a C-RAM protection system was promised in SDSR documents. Nice to see that they are sticking to that promise. 

We can assume that  connected to NEADS will also be the replacement for the now retired COBRA counter-artillery radar and for the active MAMBA: the Common Weapon Locating Radar, which should be the ARTHUR Mod C from Saab.
Entry in service should be in 2014 but an order has not yet been finalized.

Some 34 US-made Lightweight Counter Mortar Radar are in use after being procured as UOR. Most of them are in Afghanistan, but a number was also used to provide protection to the Olympic games in London. It's near certain that these precious radars are part of the solutions being brought into Core Budget.

The NAO does not go into such detail in its report, but includes this information:

Approval for the Assessment Phase 1 was given by the MOD Investment Approvals Board in February 2010, and ratified in June 2010 as part of the review by the new coalition Government.
The objective of the Assessment Phase 1 is to establish the most cost effective solution to the Increment 1 requirement and early de-risking activities for Increment 2.
The current approval covers Assessment Phase work required to reach Main Gate 1, which leads to the Demonstration and Manufacture phase for Increment 1 and effectively Increment 2 Initial Gate. The Assessment Phase has been structured into three workstreams as follows:

a. Workstream 0. Initial de-risking activities will identify and address any changes and further lessons learnt as a result of the evolving Land Environment Air Picture Provision and Urgent Operational Requirement projects and current operations. Further work will develop the architecture required to allow the incremental insertion of capability over the project lifecycle. This will also drive coherence into future Urgent Operational Requirement activity and address any scaling issues as a result of the Defence Review.

b. Workstream 1. The work stream will result in the down selection to a single affordable option to be presented at Network Enabled Airspace Defence and Surveillance Main Gate 1 to deliver the Automated Sense and Warn capability. A full option analysis will be undertaken to investigate retaining extant Urgent Operational Requirement and Core Programme components as well as alternative off the shelf solutions.

c. Workstream 2. This work stream will result in the development of a detailed system architecture and associated systems and technical requirements and initial evaluation of potential equipment options. It is planned to de-risk the overall Network Enabled Airspace Defence and Surveillance architecture, by integrating Future Local Area Air Defence Systems (Land) and High Velocity Missile models/ equipments into a representative Network Enabled Airspace Defence and Surveillance system and also undertake an initial assessment of Counter-Rocket Artillery and Mortars effectors.

In 2010, associated with the Strategic Defence and Security Review a number of options were raised to maintain alignment with wider Defence priorities. These were primarily associated with scaling and delivery timings.

An Industry Day was held in November 2010, at which a number of companies were briefed on the programme. Since then industry have been kept informed of developments via a series of newsletters. A series of one to one discussions with industry on Increment 1 is currently being conducted, following the Request for Information for Increment 1.

The NAO notes that, as of March 2012, NEADS activities were on track and making good progress towards the first Main Gate point. The Main Gate expected date, however, is classified and obscured in the report.
Surprisingly, the NAO shows FLAADS(L) as expected to hit IOC or even In-Service date in November 2016: i'm not sure how we should read this passage, however. While FLAADS(M) has long been expected to start replacing Sea Wolf on the Type 23s from 2016, Rapier replacement was expected not to be funded before 2018 at the earliest. I'd be surprised if it had been brought forwards.
Not because it is not needed, but because of budget considerations.

Another program of interest is the already mentioned upgrade to the Spearfish torpedo.

Spearfish is the sole heavyweight torpedo in the UK arsenal and is carried aboard Trafalgar and Vanguard Class submarines. The weapon was introduced into service in 1994 and is the only submarine launched weapon for offensive and defensive operations against ships and other submarines. Spearfish will be deployed in the Astute Class from 2013 and an upgraded Spearfish weapon is the planning assumption for equipping the future Deterrent.

The Spearfish Upgrade project is required to deliver a mid-life upgrade to sustain a credible and safe weapon for future submarine operations. The scope of the project includes digitisation of the weapon, the provision of a new insensitive munition warhead to replace the current ageing warhead, changes to the fuel system and the introduction of a new communications link. The upgrade will address obsolescence and also enable future reductions in through life costs.

Assessment Phase began with a contract assigned to BAE in April 2010, and will be completed in April 2014 with in-water trials. So far, the effort is progressing satisfactorily and on time. The new Insensitive Munition compliant warhead achieved the required level of technological maturity in January 2012 completing successful land based and underwater scale test firings undertaken in Germany and in the UK respectively.

The fibre optic dispensing system evaluation trials in April 2011 proved that the fibre in use was too weak and required replacement with a more ruggerized one. There are no delays to report anyway.

Initial design work to define and develop the interface between the upgraded weapon and the submarine combat system was completed in February 2012. Work is ongoing.

Regarding CEC, the NAO unfortunately confirms that:

Planning Round 2012 has announced United Kingdom Cooperative Engagement Capability Project Delete Option E12AW006S has been taken and is not part of the funded Core Programme. Delete Option also identified £1m to conduct project close down activities in Financial Year12/13.

It is a big loss of capability, in particular for the Type 45 destroyers. It is not clear how this PR12 decision affects the possibility, for the Navy, to resurrect the CEC effort in the coming years.

Particularly unwelcome is this passage:

Once the Sea King leaves service there will be some consequent capability gaps until upgraded Merlin helicopters can take on the tasks of providing helicopter lift from naval vessels to the shore (a two-year gap until April 2018) and providing airborne surveillance and control capabilities for the future aircraft carriers (a potential four‑year gap until 2020). The Department is examining alternative means of closing these capability gaps.

Regarding Crowsnest, the intended replacement for the Sea King MK7 ASaC, we will know more this year, if plans do not change: assessment phase will finally be launched. Avoiding this particular gap is extremely important.
Just as unwelcome is the gap in amphibious support helicopter capability. It is not clear how this must be read: the plan so far has been that in 2016 the Commando Helicopter Force will take over the Merlin HC3/3A, but properly "navalized" HC4-standard airframes were not going to arrived before 2017.
In the disaster, we have to hope that the April 2018 is the new date for conversion to HC4 standard of the Merlins: if the delay is to be intended as total lack of helicopters for CHF for two years due to postponed Merlin transfer, the only sane option is keeping the Sea King going for a little longer. It would be totally irresponsible to do otherwise.



Finally, they have nothing to do with the NAO report, but they are relevant news:

- The british armed forces have selected their new sidearm: it's the 9mm Glock 17 Gen 4 pistol, fitted with Picatinny rail under the barrel. It is lighter than the Browning, the clip holds 17 rounds (vs 13) and it allows much shorter reaction times from draw to firing of a full sequence of 5 rounds.

25.000 pistols have been ordered, at a cost of 9 million. Afghanistan-deployed troops, of course, will get the weapon first. Firearms distributor Viking Arms Limited, of Harrogate, will deliver guns and holsters.

- An UOR has also been financed to procure a number of LSD500 laser surveillance and sniper detection systems from France's CILAS. The systems are for use in base protection in Afghanistan.
I don't question the wisdom of the purchase which i'm sure is made for good reasons, but bases have already the Boomerang III system, while soldiers have seen the UOR for a body-worn or rifle-mounted sniper detection system cancelled last year. I would have preferred to fill the capability gap in terms of wearable/rifle mounted shooter detection system first, to extend the capability to foot patrols away from FOBs and vehicles (a number of vehicles in theatre are fitted with Boomerang III). 

CEC dead, FRES SV delayed?

DefenseNews reports that the FRES SV fielding, albeit confirmed in the "balanced" MOD budget, might be delayed to 2020, compared to the dates so far hypothized (from a best case 2015 to a more realistic 2017). Numbers of vehicles to be procured (between 400 and 589) might also be reduced, depending on what kind of Army structure is announced next month (not before Parliament returns from recess, so it'll be 12 June at the earliest).

The article also confirms that the plan to fit Cooperative Engagement Capability system to the Type 45 is dead, and actually adds that CEC has been removed from the list of systems to be fitted to the Type 26 as well. This is a very nasty blow to take: the air defence capability of the vessels would have been massively enhanced by fitting the CEC.
However, this relatively small-ticket program could return at some point in the future if the Royal Navy will feel it is truly needed.
The real question that emerges is about how many other "small" programs have been silently killed off or delayed: i'm thinking about MHPC, which is particularly crucial to the future of the Navy, but also about the Fast Landing Craft and the Force Protection Craft programs, for example.

The only "good news" in the article is that the MOD is continuing to plan for the Challenger II Capability Sustainment Programme (entry in service around 2018, so it should start not later than 2016) and for an "utility vehicle", presumably FRES UV, for entry in service in 2022, with assesment phase to begin likely in 2016.
In 2001, when the solution to the current FRES UV problem was the MRAV Boxer used by the Germans today in Afghanistan, the UV requirement included a baseline 8x8 vehicle with mission modules. One had to be the APC (2 crew, 10 soldiers, 48 hours of supplies), then there were to be an Ambulance/Casualty Evacuation module, and a Medical Treatment module.
The requirement was completed by the Anti-Tank Platoon Vehicle, a modified APC module giving mobility to two Javelin teams (2 missile launchers, 6 men) and carrying 16 missiles.
Today's requirements are unlikely to be different in these general lines. 

Over the next 10 years, these 3 programs, of which the Challenger CSP is the smallest and cheapest (particularly if even less tanks are retained in the new army structure...) have to squeeze into a 5.5 billion budget. It is obvious that some real challenges remain, since the FRES SV demonstration, testing and long-lead orders pre-production contract were expected to cost up to 1.4 billion in total, as reported by the NAO in 2011. And that's for FRES SV Block 1: a Block 2 is needed and envisioned, to deliver ambulances, command posts, engineer recce vehicles and Fire Support Teams carriers (replacement for Samaritan, Sultan and Spartan/Bulldog vehicles currently in use. NOTE: the Fire Support Team vehicle is NOT a firing platform. The Fire Support Team is a tactical team of 6 men of the Royal Artillery field regiments. Each team can direct air attacks, mortar and artillery fire. The FRES SV FSTV is meant to provide them with under-armour mobility and under-armour target designation capability). 

FRES as it was. Now Block 1 is more likely to number around 400 vehicles, and not nearly 600. Block 2 seems to have been expanded to include the Ambulance (and Medical Treatment?) variants, once planned for Block 3. Block 3 is unheard of, and the shifting of the Ambulance variant to Block 2 might be an unofficial death sentence for Block 3. This was to include a missile overwatch vehicle to replace Striker, a CounterMobility vehicle to replace Shielder, an higher-echelon command post and possibly a wide-area ground surveillance vehicle. Confirmed as DEAD are the Medium Armour section, and ipso-facto the Maneuver Support section as well, even though the Army apparently still hopes to procure medium bridgelayers (Warrior-based as shown at DSEI , or REBS bridges on tactical trucks, possibly).

But challenges or not, one has to wonder if it makes any kind of sense to conclude testing and development of the FRES SV Block 1 vehicles by 2013, then freeze the program instead of going into production, and jumping to FRES UV assesment instead, or perhaps continuing development to prepare for production the ambulance, command post and engineer recce variants of the SV.
Can't the Army start one armor program and complete it, for once? FRES UV was prioritary, by 2008 it had been trialed, the preferred bidder selected, then all was frozen and FRES SV was prioritized. Now it looks like we'll see the SV frozen, and the UV brought back into focus... holy hell, make up your goddamn minds! In a decade, save for UORs and specialized vehicles such as Titan and Trojan, all what over a billion pounds of armor budget expended has only bought the army trials, demonstrations, selections of preferred bidders that went nowhere, delays, hopes, hesitations, cancellations, and 7 FRES SV prototypes.

Now FRES SV is delivering, is ahead of schedule, is working, is confirmed as "vital", and yet you are thinking abount messing up the schedule. Again. 

Are you f*****g kidding me...?
 

News. And not very good ones.

Mid-June should finally bring answers.
And it will be about time, since with the often contraddictory rumors continuing to come out on the press, the future of the Army is by now as murky as it can be. A true mystery, with the reports coming out on the press so far calling in question the sanity of the Defence Chiefs and MoD and throwing a lot of question marks over to the "5 MRBs" plan. The rumors appear to go against the logic and promises of the homogeneous brigades concept, namely where they announce cuts to Cavalry (Formation Reconnaissance Regiments) and Tank regiments: with the brigades expected to have a recce regiment each and "tanks", there is theorically no room for any regiment disbanding from the RAC, as 5 Recce and 5 Tank regiments are needed, and that's the current number of formations as it is. 

Now the latest suggestion is that just 5 Infantry battalions will be lost, with the thick of the cuts being enforced on the Royal Engineers, Royal Artillery and, above all, the Royal Logistics Corps.
This second scenario might overall be the most desirable, depending on the effect it has on the Royal Engineers and Royal Artillery, mostly. I have very serious doubts on the viability of a plan that, presumably, gives the almost totality of AS90 guns over to Territorial Army formations, also considering that the TA currently does not work with the AS90 at all, but has the L118 Light Gun instead.
Again, i don't think that much can be cut from the Royal Engineers without the consequences being very serious and very undesirable. 
In October 2011, despite the second tranche of cuts having been announced in August, with the Army of 82.000 regulars being put as new target, the head of the Royal Engineers was still saying that the corp was planning for supporting 5 MRBs, 16AA and 3rd Commando, with the long-term retention of both General Support regiments as well. A very desirable outcome. The Telegraph article calls that in cause, however, suggesting that reality will be very, very different. And that would be a big problem.   

Cuts to the RLC are more realistically manageable with the use of reserves and contractors. In the latter case, it would be an expansion of a practice that already exists, anyway: one of the best examples is the Heavy Equipment Transporter (HET) truck management. The HET is made available to the MOD under a 20 years PFI contract signed in 2001 (with a 2.5 years "start up" period) with Fasttrax Ltd, which provides the vehicles, the training for regular army personnel (REME and others) involved in the HET business, the spare parts, and the drivers to the Army. 
The operators and maintainers employed by Fasttrax Ltd are all Sponsored Reserves (SR) that can be mobilised for up to nine months at a time and when 'called up' for an operational deployment, come under army command.  

The press reports curiously paint a situation in which the Army is faced by two extremes: 

- One reports a cut of 11 Infantry Battalions, 5 RAC regiments, and other heavy cuts in combat formations 

- The other talks of a loss of just 5 battalions of infantry and heavy cuts to supporting arms instead

One would hope that, in the middle, an "happy" medium is being built. The first scenario is probably way too harsh on the combat elements, but the second risks creating an army incapable to sustain the battles it picks. 
Surely there can be a more balanced mix of decisions in the restructuring? My position is very clear: i prefer to have 3 instead of 4 Infantry battalions in a brigade, but have the brigade adequately served by a regiment of Engineers and a regiment of Artillery, than have lots of infantry, unsupported. 


The suspect (and in a way the hope) is that the press is drinking from leaks that paint the picture of the two "worst case" scenarios considered in the restructuring project, with the Army probably trying to sit in the middle, to find a smarter solution.

The Army Reform is however, in any case, going to be painful, and it seems, from whichever angle you look at it, that it might well be daring too much. I am impatient to hear the announcement, to see how things are worked out. 



Victim of the book-balancing?
Until Planning Round 2011, the MoD has expended small amounts of money to follow and influence the US Navy work on CEC, Cooperative Engagement Capability, the well known force-multiplier system capable to dramatically enhance the effectiveness of air defence networks by enabling ships to cooperatively detect, track and engage targets.

The little money committed was meant to keep the soup warm, with the Royal Navy desperately trying to secure the adoption of the precious system for its ships. CEC was delayed countless times, with the Type 45 destroyers once expected to get it at build.
More recently, the plan was for the Type 45s to get CEC around 2014, with the Type 26 fitted at build in the 2020s. Now, according to a Jane's headline, CEC seems to have fallen victim to the book-balancing exercise just concluded at the MOD. If confirmed, it would be a nasty blow to the quest of the Royal Navy for improved situational awareness and better interoperability with the US.

The enhancement for a future RN with CEC-fitted Crowsnest AEW platforms, Type 45s and Type 26s ships would have been simply dramatic. If the CEC is not adopted, it makes for a very severe setback.

The worst part is that this is likely to be only the first victim to be named. More programs are likely to have been shelved or delayed to dates to be determined.


Naval Aviation: the training aspect of F35B and F35C
When the Sea Harrier fleet was around, pre-embarkation requirements were described as follows:

- First experience pilot, daytime embarkation
before going on the carrier he had to complete a minimum of 10 training sorties of which 5 from ski-jump/dummy deck for launch and recovery practice.

- For a pilot with previous experience 
the requirements were to fly the monthly minimum Sea Harrier flying hours with sorties from dummy deck “whenever possible”.

The Sea Harrier community was however notoriously small and elitary. All Sea Harrier pilots used to be at sea or on training very often, they were very much active, and went to sea in a constant rotation, so had plenty of practice since they were, basically, always the same ones rotating in and out of deployment. And they were committed full time to carrier skills.

It would be far more interesting to see later requirements for carrier currency when the Joint Force Harrier changed the way things are done and introduced a much greater "on land" time. 

For a comparison, good for some reflection, US Marines, who like RAF squadrons spend quite a lot of time on land, end up doing a lot more training with their Harriers before going at sea. Initial at-sea qualification for day ops, Cat-I weather conditions takes a minimum of 35 vertical landings according to a 2004 USMC manual for AV8B training. In 2008 the minimum was slightly lowered, to 30, but it is still amazingly high. That's more landing cycles than CATOBAR certification requires. 

A pilot of a USMC squadron needs a minimum of 8 vertical landings on a land based dummy deck before being deployed to the ship. Field Carrier Landing Practice is done on a schedule, and re-qualification training can be required after just 30 days.

For training with the F35B and for Field Carrier Landing Practice two land-based dummy LHA decks are being built at Yuma and another at the Eglin F35 Training center. The second is the most interesting since it will almost certainly be now used by british pilots training with the USMC at Eglin. According to the plans, 6 F35B will be based there with the USMC training squadron.  

The above requirements, in addition, relate to embarkation on the carrier at Cat I weather conditions, and in daylight. Then there’s the issue of weather (what about operations in Category II and III?) and night ops, which are more complex and clearly require more experience and training.
The problem of the "RAF goes on ships" approach has been in night and bad weather ops. Just landing their STOVL planes on the deck every now and then won't mean much if the pilots aren't cleared for actual war operations from the aircraft carrier, unless the UK is going to fight only in day hours and with excellent weather...

With the F35B we’ll also have to see what impact Shipborne Rolling Vertical Landing eventually has on the training requirements.
The SRVL might prove indispensable to enable operations since even at 5000 lbs, the best case value, the Vertical Bring Back margin of the F35B is way too small. With as much as 1700 lbs being fuel, 3300 pounds of unexpended ordnance aren't much.
It is worth remembering how SRVL was described during the tests: 

Using SRVL F-35B aircraft would approach the carrier from astern at about 60 knots indicated air speed, 35 knots relative assuming 25 knots wind over deck (the maximum speed of a CVF will be 25 knots, so 25kts WOD is achievable even in dead calm) on a steep 5-6 degree glide path. Touch down would be about 150 feet from the stern with a stopping distance of 300 to 400 feet depending on conditions (wet flight deck, pitching ships etc). That would leave around 300 feet of flight deck for margin or even “bolters”. 

The SRVL technique has a significant impact on ship designs and aviation operations, Commander Tony Ray told a conference in February 2008: “We expect to trade some STOVL flexibility for increased bring-back and fuel. We have to .. check for for relevant CV criteria that apply to slower SRVL operations. For example flightpath control will be a far more important flight criteria for SRVL than it has been for STOVL. It is a CV trait creeping in”.

In other words SRVL is a CATOBAR-style approach, just slower and without cables to catch. Its good features are:

- Much less stress on the engine and lift system, allowing it to live longer
- Much improved bring back weight margin

Problem is that SRVL is going to require skills and training. If it is not adopted, the F35B’s combat capabilities will be severely hampered and the life of its engine plant dramatically shortened, with all the costs this implies.
And in addition to the effect on training requirements, please note that 150 feet + 400 feet + plus deck free for bolters means that when a F35B lands with SRVL approach the WHOLE deck, from end to end, has to be clear and any other aviation operation on deck is likely to be stopped entirely, making SRVL effectively more invasive than even arrested CATOBAR landings are.

Of course, CATOBAR skills are expensive, and take training to be acquired and maintained: the point of discussion is the extent of the effective gap between CATOBAR and STOVL training needs.
A good reference document about the US CATOBAR certifications and currency requirements is the US Navy Landing Signal Officer's manual. 

The CATOBAR "training penalty" is here broken down in good detail. For the US pilots, Initial Carrier Qualification comes with 12 Day landings (10 of which arrested) and 8 Night landings (6 arrested). The first night flight should last a minimum of 20 minutes. Carrier Qualification is to be achieved during a period of no longer than 30 days.
After achieving currency, the pilot is ready for service, and needs to keep current by refreshing his qualification by, of course, operating from a carrier.

Depending on the time that passes since he's last been qualified, he has to carry on some training to renew his currency.
If 12 months or more pass from he's last been current, he has to face once more the whole 20 landings ICQ, while if he's last been current 60 days to 6 months earlier, the pilot needs facing a Field Landing Carrier Practice (in this video you can see French naval pilots doing their FLCP - needs a runway, one carrier landing lights aid system, the Landing Signal Officer and, for night FLCP with more than two airplanes in the air, one LSO assistant ), followed by 4 day landings (2 to 3 of them arrested) and 2 night landings. No longer than 5 days should pass between FLCP and the first landing on the aircraft carrier.

A whole table of the time periods and associated training needs is available in the manual in chapter 6.2.

It is to be seen how much of the training advantage of STOVL is real and how much of it is virtual, especially with the F35B.
And with SRVL the assumption “STOVL = better simultaneous helicopter and fast jet ops on deck” goes to hell immediately. 

Ultimately, to say that a RAF land-based squadron will just move out, land on the carrier and be ready to operate from it in conditions other than “light load, perfect weather”, just like that, is a full-out lie and is deliberately misleading. When you hear the gurus of the F35B telling you that is as easy and merry as that, know that you are being fed lies, with reality being, as always, a bit more complex and articulated.



What comes back from Afghanistan?
According to a Daily Mail article, up to 1200 out of around 1900 protected mobility vehicles will be handed over to Afghan security forces or anyway disposed off when the UK withdraws from Helmand.

The vehicles listed for return are Mastiffs, Ridgebacks and "a number" of Jackals (presumably the Jackal 2 will be returned, while the remaining Jackal 1s won't.) Foxhounds will also be all returned to the UK, but there's no telling how many since Foxhound is a bit late and still has not made it to afghanistan in the first place. The article says that "a small number" of Warthogs will be left behind, and this affirmation puzzles me. Some 115 Warthog have been acquired, and most of these are likely in Helmand, so what is the correct interpretation of "small number" is up for debate. Will all Warthogs be disposed off? Will damaged ones be left in situ and handed to the Afghans? Will the Army bring back only a share of its Warthogs, having chosen a niche role for them in the long term plans?
It would be a waste to get rid of the Warthog so soon and after all the money expended, especially since it has proven a good and effective vehicle which, i believe, could certainly find long term roles to fulfill.

No one will miss the Vector and Snatch Land Rovers instead: their age in the British Army is, thankfully, over.