Solving the Ocean problem

The LPH(R) program has been dead for several years now, and like it or not it is officially down to the carrier(s) to replace the capabilities currently brought to the table by HMS Ocean. Now alone in the LPH / Commando Carrier role, with HMS Illustrious going out of service, the newly refitted HMS Ocean is almost certainly on the last leg of her life. Her OSD is likely to be confirmed for 2018, and the carrier, hopefully but not certainly the both of them, will have to accomodate her role into their schedule as well, or the Royal Marines risk to face a grim future. 

Since 2010, years of effort to build up the most complete and credible amphibious capability in Europe have been squandered and crumbled by reductions in shipping, in supports, in vehicles and landing craft projects. Having recently re-read "3 Commando Brigade in the Falklands No PicNic", by Major General Julian Thompson RM, it is very much alarming to see how the last three years have brought back the Marines on the same dangerous edge of destruction they faced in the early 80s.
The brigade today would have much the same problems it had in 1982, which means, to my cynic mind, that 31 years have been largely wasted and no lesson has actually been learned firmly enough to avoid falling back into the same old pits. The brigade was desperately short of helicopters back then, and would have even less today: 847 NAS is going to have just four, perhaps six on deployment Wildcat helicopters, and the Sea King HC4s (which was new in 1982, and is very old today) are far less than back then. Their replacement, hopefully fully online by 2020, will be of just 25 Merlin HC4 in total.
Save for the introduction of Viking and some other kit, the brigade has less of everything: less light guns, less helicopters. The loss of HMS Ocean and the incoherent, messy plans for embarked fixed wing aviation would put the brigade back in the same position as in 1982: no air superiority, no adequate air reconnaissance, little in the ways of air support, and no appropriate helicopter support ship for amphibious operations.

The Royal Navy is probably not without its faults. Thompson in his book remembers how the Navy already in 1970, pressed by cuts and budget problems, tried to halve the number of Commandos from the then 4 down to 2. Ironically, back then it was the Army's opposition that prevented that from happening.
In 1980, the Navy tried again, because faced by the cost of the submarine-borne nuclear deterrent (see the similarities? There's the Successor SSBN on the horizon...) and by a very limited and precise sets of roles assigned in the Cold War scenarios by a MOD 100% focused on Germany and convinced that out of area operations would never happen again. Instead of directly proposing the disbandment of Commando units, the Navy focused then on axing the amphibious shipping (again, see the similarities...). Thompson was told so in December 1981 by First Sea Lord Henry Leach. Not without sadness, of course, but that was the direction the Navy was inclined to follow to preserve other parts of its "body". Argentina's hurried, foolish move came a few months early: had they let the winter pass, and acted later, the carriers and amphibious ships would have all vanished, victims of cuts, and the islands today would be named Malvinas.

The Royal Marines of today are precious to the Navy. Their involvment in Afghanistan has made the whole navy proud and has kept the admirals at the table. During 3rd Commando Brigade tours in Afghanistan, up to 40% of the total british involvement in Afghanistan was covered by the Navy. In a land locked country. This was an immense demonstration of how flexible and full-spectrum the navy is, one aspect that should very much be used to reinforce the case for maritime power investment when sitting at the budget table. Investing in the Navy does not and should not mean "just" ships. There are excellent reasons for making the Navy the centre of what is supposed to be an expeditionary armed forces structure.

Moreover, the flexibility of the RN Response Force Task Group has been proven multiple times since the SDSR came out, with the quick response to events in Libya and, to a lesser degree, to Sirya, and then the Philippines natural disaster. 

In a time in which Her Majesty's Government wishes to continue to play a big role on the international stage while avoiding to put boots on the ground in a traditional, expensive and risky way, the unique ability of the Response Force Task Group to bring enduring, self-supporting power (land, sea, air) without having to actually "go all in", is a major premium that needs to be highlighted, understood, funded and exploited.  

The Navy HQ is, this time, on the Marines's side, thankfully. The involvment of Navy HQ in the fight to save 148 Meiktila and 24 Cdo Eng is telling, in this sense, and has had some success, with both being (at least partially) saved from the chop. 1st Sea Lord Zambellas has said recently while speaking in the US that he sees a strong case for the Marines, and that he does not expect further reductions, but actually thinks there's a case for growth. 

I absolutely agree, but despite the nice words, the many problems remain and the way ahead isn't clearly marked.

Only recently, the cuts in manpower to supporting elements of 29 Commando Royal Artillery (REME in particular) have forced the commander to decide that the planned retention of 3 gun batteries is pretty much unachievable. 7 (Alma) Battery is to leave Arbroath (save for a Fire Support Group which continues to fly the flag, possibly to avoid scottish rage!) to retreat to Plymouth, where it will join the pooled resources left to the gun batteries, to task-generate one battery to support the Response Force Task Group. 

As always, the shortage of supporting elements stemming from Army 2020 comes out in the light: and again i ask, what use 31 infantry battalions if to keep all of them they have to be small and scrawny, while also affecting disproportionately the supporting elements that make them deployable and useful in the first place...?

The Army, faced with its own painful cuts, is rowing against the Marines as it has been trying to redirect cuts away from its main formations. The cuts to 3rd Commando Brigade army supports were originally planned to be even worse, and thankfully Navy HQ stood up firm for once, and avoided the worse scenario becoming true. The parts have inverted from the 80s, but the Royal Marines still sit in the middle, in an uncomfortable position. 

The Royal Navy itself, while supportive, is stretched far too thin in manpower and budget terms, has accepting tough reductions in amphibious shipping capability despite its support for the Marines, and the senior service notoriously faces an uphill struggle in manning figures over the coming years, which put both the second carrier and the three new OPVs in danger: the first might "enter service" only partially, being tied mothballed most of the time and only pulled into activity when the other hits refit time (like with the LPDs HMS Albion and HMS Bulwark post-SDSR 2010); the seconds might end up being brought into service at the expense of early decommissioning of the three River class vessels currently in service. Despite them having entered service as early as 2003 and despite a 39 million investment in 2012 to purchase them outright, as they earlier were contractor owned and given to the Navy on lease. 

I fear this is a defining moment: the SDSR 2015, despite the optimism of some, is highly unlikely to be a happy rebirth of defence. It'll be a matter of new, painful choices. May the 350th birthday not be the last of the Royal Marines as we know them.

Under Carrier Enabled Power Projection it has been effectively written in stone that it will be down to the carriers to absob the amphibious force's aviation requirements, as the previous practice of geographically separated Amphibious Group and Carrier Group has been cancelled as unaffordable, and replaced by the all-singing all-dancing Response Force Task Group. A number of studies have been launched as a consequence, and most of them are centered on the carriers.

HMS Queen Elizabeth's commander has said in its Twitter answering event a while ago that carrying LCVP landing crafts in the boat bays is being considered for the future; a study is underway (or has finished, the wording in the reports does not make it too clear) on how to organize and paint the deck of QE to provide 10 spots for simultaneous helicopter operations (up from an initial design of 6 very large spots. There are, anyway, 12 deck positions serviced to serve as aircraft / helicopter operation positions).
The carrier has room for 250 Royal Marines and can carry more depending on how the air wing is shaped (and the related manpower figure changes consequently); using the boat embarkation area aft of QE for some Marines to boat transfers will probably be investigated as well. 

The 200-pages book let out by the Royal Navy in occasion of the naming of QE also adds that using some of the available space to increase EMF accommodation and support spaces at the first refit is being looked at. There will be a lot of work to be done to certify ships spaces and facilities for the Embarked Military Force's helicopters, stores and ammunition.
An indicative all-LPH TAG has been defined as a flight of 3 Chinook, 12 Merlin HC4, 8 Apache and 6 Wildcat; while an Hybrid air group comprising 6 - 12 F-35B plus helicopters for a Commando group is being studied. (see pages 68 and 69).

The vehicles capability of HMS Ocean is not particularly noticeable, and anyway it was relatively often out of the picture when HMS Illustrious or another of the CVSs served as Commando carriers. As was to be expected ever since her sister was not built. So in itself this will not be too much of a blow, while certainly not helpful. 

HMS Ocean's capability to carry light and medium vehicles, and deploy them to the shore, is quite limited. The vehicle deck is small, and the vehicles can only drive down to landing crafts thanks to a ramp and a floating, folding pontoon that the ship carries on deck and deploys in the water by crane.

The vehicle deck, (53) is small. There is a ramp leading to the flight deck, one leading to the stern exit, and a RoRo ramp in the side for port embarkation / disembarkation

The floating pontoon can be seen on deck in this photo. The exit of the flight deck vehicle ramp can also be seen. The pontoon, folded, is carried on top of the structure of the ramp's exit.

The side RoRo ramp for embarkation

 

HMS Illustrious, serving in the Commando Carrier role, has no RoRo ramps or vehicle deck. Still, it has been seen embarking small numbers of vehicles, including BV206s as in this photo. Helicopter delivery to the shore via Chinook, though, becomes the only available option.

There is also a chance to absorb some or all of the negative impact depending on how MARS FSS shapes up to be: the Fleet Solid Support requirement has merged with the previously separated Combat Support Ship Auxiliary (earlier called the Joint Sea Based Logistics, a ship that would have been designed and built specifically to support ground forces ashore with stores, vehicles and afloat maintenance workshops) and the early designs the MOD and the industries of the Naval Design Partnership have put together include carrying a couple of LCVPs and having a RoRo deck with steel beach or even a well dock, giving some very real capability to carry and deploy ashores stores and even vehicles. Depending on if and how MARS FSS progresses post SDSR 2015, the problems might be in large part ironed out. 

The early concept for MARS Fleet Solid Support would help plug the gaps in amphibious capability, making it twice as important. Her new generation Heavy RAS equipment and vast cargo holds already make this vessel extremely important to support the logistic requirements of the carriers in high intensity ops.

The next SDSR will be a turning point of huge proportions. And the navy desperately needs to get this one right.

There is always some room for dreams, as long as you remember what reality is like.

A perfect solution would be to have HMG get serious about sanctions versus Russia, by exploiting the unique chance represented by the two Mistrals being built by France. It is painful to observe how well things could slot into place, if there was the money and political will to place such a blow. The two vessels could probably be taken up and re-fitted with RN communications, weapons and essential kit to enter in service in 2016 and in 2018: the first could replace the LPDs Albion and Bulwark. 

In 2016, Albion is expected to be re-activated from her current sorry state in HMS Tamar, Devonport, by removing the seals and controlled humidity kit that keeps her dormant and, hopefully, well preserved and by re-storing her to bring her back into active service. Bulwark, which would hit her refit point that year, would be mothballed in her place. 

The first Mistral could be used to replace the LPDs, and it would be a painful (they are still young ships) but actually pretty advantageous trade, capability-wise. The Mistrals have greater troop and vehicle cargo spaces, a well dock of equivalent capability, and, crucially, a hangar and flight deck allowing them to be a replacement for Ocean at the same time. On the other hand, Mistrals have no davits for LCVPs. 

The vehicle deck of Dixmunde, french Mistral-class LHD, used to bring armoured vehicles to Mali

The vehicles / cargo spaces are much larger than on the Albion-class LPDs

The cost would be (partially) offset by doing away with the need to refit the LPDs any further, and by a substantial reduction in the number of LCVPs. The second Mistral, in 2018, would directly replace HMS Ocean, and two ships would replace three, of different types. 

HMS Bulwark's vehicle deck. The ramp in the centre leads up to the flight deck. Beyond the ramp, there's the well dock with the LCUs. Behind the standing officer, there's the side RoRo ramp of access.

the dock of HMS Bulwark. Rolls of Trackway and BV206 vehicles can be seen in first line in the vehicle deck.

It would be a more than happy trade in terms of capability, but not financially fair enough to make the plan cost-neutral. Which is the reason why this scenario is a dream. It is a semi-serious, dreamy suggestion due to the high and sudden up-front cost of taking the ships and fit them out for RN use. 

Then again, it would be a great investment for the future. 

Early April news, waiting for the Planning Round

Selective Precision Effect At Range (SPEAR) is making leaps this year, with MBDA announcing that the Brimstone 2 [SPEAR Capability Block 2] will enter service with the RAF next year and also saying that SPEAR Capability Block 3 is progressing with design and development and flight tests will start next year. At the Farnborough show in July, MBDA has promised that they will showcase more about this new weapon. The last we've heard talked about a 100 kg, 180 km range mini-storm shadow, so to speak, carried on a multiple rack (SDB style) carrying 4 weapons and fitting inside the weapon bay of the F35. SPEAR Capability Block 3 is meant to be a network-enabled weapon capable to hit with extreme accuracy moving and relocatable targets as well as fixed ones.

In addition, Raytheon UK has been awarded a 60 million pounds contract for the replenishment of Paveway IV stocks after many hundred of the bombs have been expended in these years between Afghanistan and Libya. It is possible that as part of this new order a few new variants of the Paveway IV bomb will come to light and be delivered to the RAF, since Raytheon has proudly specified that they are "focused on a technological growth path which, under the UK MOD's SPEAR (Selective Precision Effects at Range) CAP 1 program, will enhance the system's capability with low collateral and penetrator warhead options, enhanced moving target capability and enhanced range."

SPEAR Capability Block 1 is meant to introduce new warhead options and new improvements to the Paveway IV guidance kit. For increasing range, a very likely solution is the adoption of the MBDA Diamond Back wingkit, which would enable the Paveway IV to glide over a distance of many tens of kilometers, giving it a stand-off range. Enhanced moving target capability is notionally expected to be achieved with the addition of a Selex Galileo Imaging Infra Red seeker which could lock on on vehicles moving as fast as 100 kph. A reduced yeld, low frammentation warhead option for urban engagements is envisaged, and a bunker buster warhead is desired, possibly as a replacement for the current capability, represented by the 2000 lbs Enhanced Paveway III with BLU-109 warhead. A bunker-buster warhead could emerge from the HARDBUT (do not laugh, not joking!) joint studies with France.

Currently Paveway IV only comes with a US 500 lbs MK82E warhead, but like all Paveway guidance kits, it could and hopefully will be adapted for use on larger warheads. Currently the Typhoon only uses, for examble, the GBU/EGBU-16 Paveway II, a laser guided (with GPS addition in the Enhanced GBU) bomb using the MK83 1000 pounds warhead (for the RAF, actually, that is the UK-built equivalent mass warhead, the MK13 or MK18 originally, and the updated MK20 or MK22 these days), which will need replacement at some point, as will the 2000 pounds Paveway III which uses the MK84 warhead [the RAF might not use this variant, though] or the BLU-109 bunker buster one [the BLU-109 is now the RAF standard warhead on the Paveway III. A modified BROACH warhead derived from that of Storm Shadow was shown bolted to a Paveway III guidance kit as far back as 1994, but it does not seem to have had great diffusion. Vanished should also be the early-days hybrids which combined a 1000 pounds MK20 warhead, Paveway II wing-kit and Paveway III guidance kit]. Paveway IV will be released for Typhoon use this June, and will be in active RAF service with the Typhoon by September next year.  

Raytheon has sled-tested a bunker buster 500 lbs warhead with Qinetiq collaboration, aiming to SPEAR contracts. While 500 lbs limits the lethality and penetration that can be obtained, the warhead would be readily available as it does have the same mass and centre of gravity of the current MK82E, with no need for any additional integration work. Same approach goes for the reduced-yeld warhead for use in built-up areas. 


The Paveway IV is also being integrated on the F35, and a first pit-drop test of the weapon from an F-35 was already performed at Eglin AFB, Florida, in late March. The bomb will be integrated for internal and external carriage both. 

A glorious unit returns as the Fleet Protection Group Royal Marines is re-christened 43 Commando Fp Gr RM. 790-strong, this unit reports to 3rd Commando Brigade and provides protection for the fleet, most importantly for the SSBN fleet and shore infrastructure connected to the nuclear deterrent. It also provides "Green" boarding teams, employed on british warships sent on maritime policing duties in dangerous areas where "warlike" activity is expected.

The RN crews of frigates and destroyers provide the "Blue" boarding teams, which are used on lower-danger searches.

43 Commando is immortal in the memory for its exploits in the battle of Comacchio in northern Italy, in which Cpl Thomas Peck Hunter, in a well-known act of bravery, seized a Bren gun and stormed German machine-gun positions, shooting from the hip and single-handedly capturing or driving the enemy away until he was cut down – but not before his troop reached safety.

The action saw Hunter posthumously given the nation’s highest military honour, the last (to date) of ten Victoria Crosses awarded to Royal Marines.

The Defence Reform progresses as the Joint Forces Command takes shape. 2 april 2012 saw the JFC standing up in its new headquarters in Northwood. 

The Joint Forces Command is expected to reach full operating capability next year, with a number of joint organizations having already been assigned to the Command:

• The Permanent Joint Headquarters (known as PJHQ)
• The Permanent Joint Operating Bases in Gibraltar, Cyprus, British Indian Ocean Territory and South Atlantic Islands
• The Joint Force Headquarters
• The Joint Force Logistics Component
• The Joint Counter-Terrorist Training and Advisory Team
• The Directorate of Special Forces
• The Defence Academy
• The Development Concepts and Doctrine Centre
• Defence Intelligence
• Surgeon General's Headquarters and the Joint Medical Command
• The Joint Arms Control Implementation Group
• The Defence Centre of Training Support
• The Defence Cyber Operations Group.

The Joint Forces Command has a central staff of around 150 between military and civilian personnel, but with the controlled organizations it will effectively direct over 30.000 men between military and civilians. First Joint Forces Commander is Air Chief Marshal Sir Stuart Peach, RAF.

The Joint Forces Command will:

"ensure investment in joint capabilities is appropriate and coherent, and strengthen the link between experience in operational theatres and top-level decision-making."

"ensure that a range of vital military capabilities, functions and organisations – such as medical services, training and education, intelligence, and cyber – are organised and managed effectively and efficiently to support success on operations."

This centralized approach is similar to that adopted by the German armed forces, which have a Joint Support Service counting some 36.750 men as of 2011. Around 26.000 of these come from the army and the total includes 14.620 men of the Joint Medical Service.

Interestingly, the German armed forces's signals units are considered a joint asset and are part of this command. It would be interesting to consider the application of a similar move in the UK, taking the Royal Signals and the tactical communications unit of the RAF and Navy and put them together in a single, large organization centrally managed.

Again, in Germany the military police is also a joint asset under Joint Support Service, while in the UK there's the Royal Military Police, the sizeable RAF Police, the MOD Police [which is a civilian force currently counting over 3000 men and due to be cut back to 2400 by April 2016], the MOD Guard Service and a Royal Navy Police, which provides a Troop to 3rd Commando brigade.

There seems to be scope for centralization and efficiency in this area as well in the medium term, and i'd suggest planning for it in earnest, since i'd much prefer cutting back on duplication before cutting on frontline soldiers and formations.

Since we have formed the Joint Forces Command, let's give it a meaning and use at least.

FRES SV continues to progress. General Dynamics has been assigning contract after contract in the last few months, as the suppliers of the various components for the new vehicles are selected. The latest contract covers the software and operating system to be used on the vehicles. It follows other contracts, such as those assigned to BARCO for the supplying of the displays and to ViaSat for the onboard data encryption unit.

Over 36 explosive/destructive tests have been completed in the past months to validate the protection levels of the FRES SV hull, and things are progressing well. Expect more contracts to be signed in the months to come, since the list of requirements has been shortened considerably after the various agreements reached, but still has many voices open for tender.

Towards a busy Somali summer? The European mandate for the anti-piracy "Atalanta" operation has been recently broadened in scope to authorize military attack on pirate havens ashore, by helicopter and by naval gunfire (No missiles or ground troops due to German opposition, however).  

Now command of Atalanta has been passed on to France, and the promise is to seize the initiative from the pirates by patrolling close to shore, attacking their bases, and possibly expanding the security patrols in Somali waterways.

France has deployed to the area Maritime Patrol Aircrafts (Nimrod MRA4 was expected to go by this time as well, but we know how that ended...), the frigate Georges Leygues with two Lynx helicopters aboard and the LHD Dixmunde, Mistral-class, which can act as an helicopter carrier with 16 machines.

Despite Germany's opposition and hesitations, France, UK and Netherlands are pressing for a far more active answer to the growing piracy problem. China can be expected to also support such a move: they have long made clear that they regard the only solution to the problem being going ashore and smashing the pirate havens there, indeed.

It has been reported that this year's Royal Navy Response Task Force Group, which will set sail in the summer for exercise Corsican Lion with France's Charles De Gaulle carrier strike group, will then set sail for Somali waters to take part in such "active" reaction to piracy. For the second year in a row, the Task Force might set sail for training and end up shooting very real bullets, after Libya events last year.

This time, it won't be Albion and Ocean, but HMS Illustrious and HMS Bulwark, accompanied by escorts and RFAs vessels, including tankers, Bay class LSDs and probably a Fort stores vessel.

Illustrious is widely expected to carry Apaches, that will be tasked with attacks on pirate bases. Cameron has been said to be asking for this since last February.

Busy summer ahead for the Royal Navy.

In the meanwhile, HMS Daring shines in the Gulf and HMS Dauntless is to carry out the first Type 45 south atlantic patrol, and in May the assembly work for the carrier Queen Elizabeth will make giant leaps forwards. LB02 was powered up this March, 6 months ahead of schedule. In May both LB05 (1600 tons) and LB02 (over 6000) are to be moved by barge from Portsmouth to Rosyth, with the start of Assembly Cycle B.

LB04's two halves will be joined up in the next few days, and the Combat System of Queen Elizabeth is making progress and being tested at HMS Collingwood.

Around 25 May the giant LB02 section will start its travel, and it'll be a major milestone in the build programme. And of course, around the 17 of April we should finally have some clarity about the choice of the airplane to fly from the ships.

About time, to say the very, very least.

On 30 March, HMS Liverpool decommissioned, after being in the thick of the action until her very last moments, with Libya, escorting the russian aircraft carrier and then the exercises in Norway keeping her running at full pace. A most distinguished vessel of the Royal Navy bowing out with honor.

And with the Type 22s gone and the Type 42s to be entirely gone by 2013, the shore-based Tyne gas turbine training set has been shut down, closing a long era of Royal Navy engineering. The engine of the gas revolution soon will be no more. The Spey era will last until the 2030s, however, and the WR-21 and MT-30 eras are dawning thanks to Type 45 and CVF. 

F35 updates. The US accountants and DoD have re-priced the F35 program. It was widely anticipated that it would be 15 billion dollars more expensive, turned out being 17, but the US acquisition plan remains unchanged, and there's nothing new about the rumors of the B order of the USMC being cut back down to just 65.

By 2018 USN and USMC will be getting 50 F35s per year.

I also saw a new LM promotional image with upgraded quantities of jet fighters for nations: for example, Italy is down from 131 to 90 as announced in Parliament last month, and Norway is down to 48 from 56 as just confirmed (4 LRIP to be used for training, 42 fighters main order, 6 options to be confirmed later on). The figures for all countries are, in other words, very accurate and very up to date.

For the UK the figure is 3 B (those already ordered, even if the third, BK-3, is to be given to the USMC in exchange for one of their C, probably to be named CK-1) and 135 C.

Unfortunately, this figure is unlikely to mean anything serious, compared to the other numbers, as the UK still has to finalize its plan... But one can hope! 

The US DoD has announced that they expect to produce 50 Navy Department's F35s per year from 2018 onwards, with the order equally equally split, 25 B and 25C, at least in 2018.

2018 is planned to see US orders for:

60 A (to rise to 80 per year by 2021)

25 B

25 C

They have also released updated expected recurring flyaway cost of the full-rate production airframes (in 2012 dollars):

78.8 USD million x F35A

106 USD million x F35B

87 USD million x F35C

If these prices are anywhere near reliable and representative of the cost to be paid by the MOD, 50 F35C would cost some 2718 million pounds [of course, spare engines, spares and all the rest are not included], while an equal number of F35B would come at 3312.5 million pounds. Again, spares not included, and we know that the B-variant spare engines are expensive like hell, so the total difference is likely to be greater still.

That is a difference of 594.5 million pounds, anyway, to start with, and it is enough to buy an EMALS/AAG set and pay for part of the installation work. It does not cover all of the conversion's cost, (458 + 400 million pounds according to the US Navy-sponsorised estimates).

At best, when spares are factored in, the conversion of ONE carrier might be covered. 

But we need two, so the C must prove economically attractive enough to ensure conversion of Queen Elizabety during refit in the 2020s. It is likely to prove very challenging, though.

The choice remains difficult, and the future of the second CVF not at all safe.