Towards unmanned, stand-off maritime mine counter measures

The MOD has announced that the first unmanned minesweeping system has been accepted by the Royal Navy. This welcome development comes after years of tests, experiments and also delays. It is the result of 3 years of work following a contract announced in march 2015 and is just a step, however important, within a much larger enterprise.

 

RNMB Hussar in action, towing the Combined Influence Sweep package 

UK-only development; Combined Influence Sweep replacement

12 October 2005 was an historic day for the Royal Navy, because the Hunt class minesweepers HMS Middleton and HMS Ledbury conducted the last evolution at sea involving sweep gear, both the Oropesa mechanical wire system and the combined influence sweep equipment. The Royal Navy at that point had already operated unmanned, remotely controlled sweep systems in 2003 during waterway clearance work in Iraq, notably the opening of Umm Qasr. Under a UOR, a number of Combat Support Boats with remote controls were used to tow the Mini Dyad System (MDS) produced by Australian Defence Industries (ADI) and Pipe Noise Makers. Called Shallow Water Influence Minesweeping System (SWIMS), they were sent ahead of the RN minehunters as precursor sweeps against ground influence mines. The future of MCM was taking the path of stand-off action through unmanned systems and it was felt that the more than 100 years of manned ships sweeping were at an end.

The replacement for the sweep equipment was to come through the Flexible Agile Sweeping Technology, or FAST. The idea was to put two unmanned surface vehicles on the Hunt class vessels by modifying their open, capacious stern area. FAST, however, proved anything but fast, and even though a contract was signed in 2007 by the MOD with the Atlas-QED consortium, comprising Atlas Elektronik UK, QinetiQ and EDO Corporation, the resulting Technology Readiness Demonstrator never made it on the Hunt class. FAST became a test platform that spent the following years doing all sort of trials and demonstrations. Initially intended only for towing sweep kit, it ended up testing remote deployment and recovery of Sea Fox unmanned underwater vehicles, demonstrating that stand off clearance of minefields was possible.

The above photo, from Mer et Marine.com, show FAST during tests involving the launch and recovery of Sea Fox at range. The Sea Fox UUV is visible on the launch arm to the right. 

Atlas Elektronik UK continued to work with the MOD and on its own, and eventually developed in-house the ARCIMS (ATLAS Remote Combined Influence Minesweeping System) system, which has enjoyed a first export success in an unnamed Middle East navy and has gone on to become the much delayed replacement for the Hunt’s sweeping capability within the Royal Navy.

An ARCIMS seaframe, but manned, was delivered to the Royal Navy in 2014 for trials and development purposes, and remains in service with the Maritime Autonomous System Trials Team (MASTT) of the Royal Navy as RNMB Hazard.    

On 6 march 2015, Atlas received a 12.6 million pounds order from the MOD for a first ARCIMS-derived system, in the unmanned configuration, configured to tow sweeping equipment. The system has now been accepted, and according to MASTT, which has already trialed it extensively, the new boat is called RNMB Hussar.

The RNMB Hazard, manned precursor to Hussar, is used in tests since 2014 

Redeployability directly from the shore after being transported by air, land or sea is a major advantage of the unmanned, stand-off MCM solutions. Here, Hazard is being moved.  

The 2015 contract for this system included the groundwork for two further “Blocks” of work, to be confirmed and funded later. Block 2 covers the integration with the Hunt class vessel: a refit will be necessary to clear the stern and add an A frame for launch and recovery of the 11-meters unmanned surface vehicle. A dedicate Reconnaissance Unmanned Underwater Vehicle Hangar is also envisaged. Block 2 is not yet under contract, nor is Block 3, which would consist of the acquisition of further systems. In 2015, four were envisaged.

This old image from the early phases of FAST shows the look of a modified Hunt turned into FAST mothership. The general arrangement is unlikely to change much with Hussar and MMCM, but the modifications to the Hunt class are not yet under contract, at least as far as i know

In late 2017 the First Sea Lord gave a speech in which he announced that the unmanned MCM project would be “speeded up” to deliver a workable system for “routine mine clearance” in UK waters within 2 years. The 2015 contract was always meant to last 3 years, so there is not an evident schedule change for the better; nor there is any evidence of rapid progress on Block 2 and 3. The unmanned system can be launched directly from the shore, so its use in UK waters probably does not require the modification of a Hunt. In other words, I’m not sure the 1SL speech is something to be happy about, or really a cut worded nicely.

In light of the coming of MMCM next year, Block 2 and Block 3 might never take place as originally envisaged.

MMCM; working with France

The Royal Navy is working on a second and much more ambitious programme, which is the Maritime MCM (MMCM) system jointly funded and developed alongside France. The contract for the manufacture of two full prototype systems, one for each country, was signed at Euronaval in October 2016, and next year the system should be delivered for trials.

The MMCM system-of-systems consists of multiple unmanned / remotely operated elements that will enable stand-off detection and disposal of mines up to 30 miles away from the mothership. The system is centered on a 11-meters Unmanned Surface Vehicle which will be used to tow a Synthetic Aperture Sonar and to deliver a Remotely Operated Vehicle for mine disposal. A large, autonomous underwater vehicle is also included, for reconnaissance of minefields.

Thales is tasked with delivery of the integrated Portable Operations Centre (POC), which will use a command & control solution jointly developed by Thales and BAE Systems. BAE Systems will provide the Mission Management System, the virtual visualization and experimentation suite. The BAE NAUTIS command and control system is expected to be at the core of the MMCM solution. NAUTIS is already operational on the RN minesweepers and in service in several other countries, from Turkey to Australia.

The Royal Navy in the meanwhile has been repeatedly using the Autonomous Control Exploitation Realisation (ACER), a containerized command post, complete with sensors, able to receive and fuse data streams from multiple unmanned air, surface and underwater systems. The ACER was successfully demonstrated at the Unmanned Warrior 2016 event, where it integrated data from 25 different unmanned systems supplied by 12 different organizations. For the occasion, it was embarked on the SD Northern River. It has also been used from the shore at the British Underwater Test and Evaluation Centre (BUTEC) range, and it was well visible on the flight deck of RFA Tidespring during exercise Joint Warrior 2018.

Whatever command system the MMCM employs, it will be important to integrate lessons from the ACER experience to ensure that integration of new unmanned vehicles, including eventually the rotary wing UAS that the Royal Navy hopes to put in service in the 2020s, is smooth.

ACER on the cargo deck of SD Northern River during Unmanned Warrior 2016 

ACER seen on the flight deck of RFA Tidespring during the recent Joint Warrior (thanks to RFANostalgia on twitter) 

Another ACER node seen again on SD Northern River while she plays prey to HMS Montrose's boarding team in recent exercises

ASV Ltd was selected to deliver the Unmanned Surface Vehicle, which will be a development of their Halcyon USV, an exemplar of which has already been used by the Royal Navy during various trials and experiments. The ASV will be similar in size to the ARCIMS / Hussar, and in theory a modified Hunt could carry two in tandem.

One interesting question going ahead is whether the RN buys further ARCIMS hulls in addition to the ASV Halcyon Mk2, or if it standardizes on one of the two. It is unfortunate that two virtually identical USVs are being procured, as having a single fleet would no doubt ease logistic considerations.

Halcyon is visible to the right, ahead of RNMB Hazard, during Unmanned Warrior 

Halcyon deploying a ROV 

The Halcyon USV that the Royal Navy has already employed has a displacement of over 8 tons and is capable of carrying a 2,5 tons payload at ranges in excess of 300 nautical miles. The vessel is 11.5 m long, has a beam of 3.5 m, is 2.9 m high, and can achieve a top speed of 29 kt (25 kt when fully loaded). It features a full navigation suite comprising GPS, radar, AIS, compass, and chart plotter; forward-looking EO cameras; a pan, tilt, and zoom camera; mission planning and mission management system; and a payload management system. The MMCM USV derivative will not dramatically depart from these dimensions, meaning that deployment from a Type 26’s mission bay will be another possibility.

The Hussar is similarly sized: 11 meters long, with a beam of 3.2m and a draft of 0.5m and a payload of around 3 tons. Propulsion is on two engines with water jet, giving an unladen max speed of some 40 knots and a speed of up to 15 knots while towing the sweep gear.

Atlas Electroniks and Rolls Royce have recently completed a demonstration campaign with an ARCIMS fitted with an autonomous collision avoidance system.

It will be interesting to see how the Royal Navy moves in the future in regards to the unmanned surface vehicle element.

The autonomous underwater vehicle will be a derivative of the French ECA A-27M.  With a speed of 6 knots and an endurance of 40 hours, the A-27 can dive down to 300 meters while carrying a suite of sensors which will include the Thales SAMDIS advanced syntheric aperture sonar, first demonstrated during 2014.

The SAMDIS, but in towed form, will also be streamed by the Halcyon-derivative USV, and will be the primary mine detection sensor.

A-27M AUV

The mines will be destroyed thanks to a multi-shot, reusable Remotely Operated Vehicle provided by SAAB. The Multi-Shot Mine Neutralisation System (MuMNS) could, in other words, replace the current Sea Fox, which was born as a one-shot system. There are two drones under the Sea Fox name: one, reusable, is used for reconnaissance, while the disposal system is sacrificed in the explosion that removes the mine. In more recent times, an add-on mask known as “COBRA” has made Sea Fox reusable by introducing the possibility of detaching the disposal charge and sail away, but the MuMNS is born with this concept of operation already in mind. The ROV can be operated down to 300 meters depth, and thanks to its “storm” magazine can actually carry other payloads in alternative to the mine disposal system.

SAAB MuMNS

Wood & Douglas is responsible for the communications between the elements of the MMCM system.

Currently, the main unmanned underwater vehicles employed by the survey and MCM flotilla are the REMUS 100 and 600 by Hydroid. Recently, the MOD has contracted an extension of support arrangements to ensure that these systems remain operational at least out to September this year, while a replacement contract is negotiated.

The REMUS 100 is used for Very Shallow Waters reconnaissance and its capability has been expanded in 2012 with the addition of extra sensors. A dozen systems should be in operation.

REMUS 600 can dive down to 600 meters for reconnaissance, lasting up to 70 hours. It can be reconfigured to dive down to 1500 and even 3000 meters. Additional sensor modules are added at the front. The basic payload suite consists of dual frequency Side Scan Sonar, CTD (Conductivity, Temperature and Depth) and pressure sensor.

Obviously, these systems are very important to the MCM mission and their extension in service and / or replacement will have to operate alongside the sweep and MMCM modules, and eventually possibly “become one” with said systems. The sweep payload itself would become just a component of the wider MCM system of systems.  

REMUS 100 

Deploying REMUS 600 

Both Hunt and Sandown are being life-extended and upgraded. The Hunt class is receiving new Caterpillar C32 diesel engines that replace her old Napier Deltics; and the Sandown class underwent the the Sandown Volvo Generator Programme (SVGP) that replaces the ageing Perkins CV8 diesel generators with more efficient Volvo Penta D13 Marine diesel generators. The first vessel to receive this upgrade was HMS Bangor, during a dry dock support period at Rosyth undertaken by Babcock in 2014.

Hunt class engine replacement 

Hunt class: the open stern is reconfigurable with relative ease, unlike on Sandown vessels. Note the white dome of the Satcom, added in the last few years, and the minigun positions, standard op Kipion fit 

The sonars fitted to the two classes have received significant updates: the Hunt class, with the hull-mounted Type 2193 sonar, are extremely good at detecting mines in shallow waters, down to 80 meters. The Sandown, with the multifrequency variable depth sonar system Type 2093, can hunt mines down to 200 meters depth. Both sonars have been improved with wideband pulse compression technology which allows for long-range detection and classification of low target echo strength mines by optimising performance against reverberation and noise simultaneously.

The capability of these sonars will have to be replaced though unmanned vehicles as part of the future solution going into the post-MCM ship era.

US Navy unmanned assets are often found in the Gulf on board RFA Cardigan Bay 

With the coming of MMCM, where do Block 2 and 3 of the Sweep technology contract sit?

Block 2 is arguably more necessary than ever, but the Unmanned Vehicles Hangar and launch and recovery equipment should not be just Sweep-focused, but more widely focused on the whole package.

Going ahead with a single USV type would be desirable, so the Sweep module should go on as a payload to be towed by whichever of the two USVs prove more successful.

As a consequence, Block 3 could have to include the migration effort and the delivery of more sweep modules but perhaps not more ARCIMS boats.

HMS Echo, a survey ship, has spent months as NATO MCM Squadron flagship. Here she is in La Spezia, Italy, in September 2017, embarking unmanned vehicles, training mines and other equipment. A sign of things to come. 

There is no telling what the Royal Navy is currently planning to do. Information is extremely scarce, but already in 2014, in the Naval Engineer magazine, the Sweep module was indicated as a component in the wider solution. Both Hussar and the incoming MMCM are, once more, prototypes, and it will be important to bring them together and harmonize the two programmes into one.

Motherships, not minehunters

  

The successful delivery of the whole future MCM package will transform the way mine clearance operations are carried out. If all goes well, in the new year the Royal Navy will finally be able to abandon its last reservations about the viability of stand-off mine clearance and begin crafting the course for the post-dedicate minehunter hull era.

France has already decided that it will no longer build dedicate, expensive, amagnetic hulls for the MCM mission. The latest Military Planning Law included funding to procure the first twonew-generation motherships by 2025, with two more to follow. The mothership will be large, steel-hulled, and flexible enough to cover other roles as well as MCM. Two designs are being considered: the NS 04 is a SWATH (Small Waterplane Area Twin Hull) complete of flight deck and hangar for medium helicopters as well as a large cargo / mission space in the stern for storage, launch and recovery of the unmanned vehicles.

The second design is a catamaran, with the same base characteristics. Other vessel designs, including more traditional monohulls, have been proposed. BMT in the UK has recently put forward the Venari, and years ago had proposed the Venator. These vessels all bring capabilities commonly found in OPVs, making them suitable for constabulary tasks as well as specialized MCM and hydrographic missions.

France’s future MCM programme (SLAMF, in French) intends to replace the current flotilla of Tripartite MCM vessels with 4 motherships, with another four vessels for Divers support, replacing four existing ships. Numerically, the contraction from 11 Eridan-class minehunters to four motherships is quite impressive, but the new vessels will be multi-role, and more easily deployable. Further units could be built if the same hull is selected for the new survey vessels to be ordered in the early 2020s.

NS04

The designs being considered for the french mothership 

BMT Venator 90 proposal 

Above, the BMT Venari proposal for a future mothership

Their pre-MMCM demonstration project, the ESPADON, launched in 2009, delivered an impressive optionally manned catamaran, the Sterenn-Du, displacing 25 tons, 17 meters long and 7.5 meters wide. Launched in 2010 and then employed in a vast range of tests, the Sterenn-Du is equipped with a launch and recovery “cage” between its two hulls. When the unmanned underwater vehicles return to the cage, they plug into connections that enable to downloading of the data collected. The Sterenn-Du was remotely operated in sea state up to 4, successfully carrying out launches and recoveries at range. The French navy does not exclude the possibility of using such large USVs again in the future, even if for the MMCM programme they have adopted the british approach of using a smaller platform.

For France, the ESPADON project removed all hesitations about the future of MCM being unmanned and stand-off.

The impressive Sterenn-Du, head on (above) and from the stern (bottom), seen with the launch and recovery cage lowered in the water, in this photo by mer et marine.com 

Despite years of work with FAST, the Royal Navy has instead not formally closed the door to the possibility of building a novel class of MCM-specific hulls, but this is looking more and more unlikely. According to current timelines, in any case, there will be plenty of time not just to evaluate MMCM and put it into service, but also to see the first French motherships enter service. The Royal Navy does not expect new vessels for the MCM mission before 2028, although a decision on the design will have to happen quite a lot earlier than that, considering how horrendously slow the british procurement and shipbuilding efforts can be. If ten years for delivering a Type 26 are any indication, the 2028 date for the first next generation mothership might actually end up proving to be hopelessly optimistic.

The programme that will deliver the future capability is known as MHC, MCM & Hydrographic Capability and deliberately envisages the replacement of not just Hunt and Sandown but of the survey ships Echo and Enterprise as well. Until late 2013 it was MHPC, with the P standing for “patrol”, but this was dropped after the order for the River Batch 2 vessels had been signed.

It would be extremely shortsighted to not take note of the multi-role capability of these new motherships and make sure they can adequately cover the “patrol” function as well. The removal of the P from the programme acronym is a most unwelcome development which is to be hoped will be reversed, because to not grasp the full range of advantages of having a new class of deployable ships would be criminal.

The unpleasant sensation, common to many other areas across the MOD, is that planning is so constrained by short-termism that the relationship between programmes is regularly misunderstood or deliberately ignored. From the small to the huge things, it seems like project offices are unable to talk to each other and ensure that the overlap, where it exists, is of the good rather than of the bad kind. Was it truly impossible to avoid developing two USVs for the same role? Was it intentional as a form of “parachute” in case of issues with one of them?

At a far greater scale, why is the relationship between River Batch 2, Type 31 and MHC so confused? The Royal Navy risks to move from a fleet of virtually only “ships of the line” escorts to a fleet with no less than 3 low-end, constabulary capable classes more or less overlapping each other. Worse, it might deliberately handicap the MHC mothership to artificially eliminate the overlap with River B2.

The Royal Navy needs to put order in its ideas, and ensure that the three programmes work together, not one against the other.

Earlier french designs for the mothership as shown by Mer et Marine

Until the new motherships arrive, the unmanned systems (both the Sweep and the MMCM kits) will be used initially in home waters, probably directly from the shore. Deployment at sea can happen from a multitude of different vessels, and we can reasonably expect to see SD Northern River’s capacious deck filled up with these systems in a future Joint Warrior.  

The interim mothership, however, should still eventually be the Hunt. It will be extremely interesting now to see if, when and how the first Hunt vessel is modified for the new era. The Hunt class, unlike the Sandown, has an essentially open stern where the sweep equipment used to be carried and operated from. For over a decade the RN has planned to modify this open space, but the project has been constantly delayed and, in a surprise move, in December last year two Hunt vessels had their refit and life extension cut short by early decommissioning as part of budget cuts.

The SDSR 2015 mandates that a third vessel will eventually bow out before 2025, leaving 12 between Hunt and Sandowns, and further cuts could reduce this number even further.

From the outside, the early decommissioning of HMS Quorn and HMS Atherstone looks symptomatic of the gravity of the crisis the MOD is constantly drowning into. The loss of two of the “reconfigurable” ships is in antithesis with over 10 years of work, plans and experimentations. I can’t know what the exact reasoning was behind the closed curtains of the MOD, but their hasty cut smells of pure desperation.

Is the unmanned future of MCM “speeded up” as the MOD claims? It doesn’t look like it at all. The delivery of the first sweep system is a major step in the right direction, but Hussar alone is just a beginning, 13 years after the legacy sweep capability was lost.

The modification of the first Hunt isn’t yet in sight; the procurement of other sweep systems might or might not happen. More information is needed on what the plan is, and we all know how helpful the MOD is when it comes to explaining itself.

It is really a bittersweet picture. A step has been moved, but it is extremely hard to share the triumphalism of the MOD press release.

DMP: even though funding does not match ambitions, a global stance is still needed

The current “review that is not a review”, now called Defence Modernisation Programme, is an abomination and an abject failure. There is no other honest way to describe the current farcical situation, with a government in denial scrambling for new cuts scarcely two years into a 5-years strategic plan crafted with the last SDSR, dated November 2015. The handling of the whole “National Security Strategy” is farcical, and the months spent denying the problem now look like nothing but concentrated dishonesty. Michael Fallon’s late change of heart is the coronation of the whole disaster: now that he is no longer in charge he is not just admitting that there is a serious cash problem, but pontificating on areas where to seek further “efficiencies”.

We are now officially into a new review, but the government is still trying to tell us that it is not a purely financial exercise. They insist on turning “cuts” into “modernisation”. 

The effective gravity of the problem is hard to gauge. The MOD is now saying that they have “line of sight” on about 90% of the efficiency target set by the SDSR 2015 (more than 7.4 billions) and they also say that the earlier target set by the SDSR 2010 is more or less achieved. A variety of other initiatives requiring other efficiencies added up to an official target of some 20 billion. In theory, if the MOD statements are to be trusted, most of that money has been found, but press reports continue to suggest that a minimum of 15 and a maximum of 30 billions are missing over the next ten years timeframe. This is nothing short of astonishing because, in the worst case, it pretty much means that the MOD is missing a whole financial year of budget. It is hard to even imagine how this can be, especially since the Equipment Budget, one of the biggest expenditure voices, is entering into years in which most of the expenditure is planned but not contractually committed. According to the Equipment Programme 2016, 48% of the Equipment Budget is not yet tied to contracts as of financial year 2017/18, which in theory means that there is a lot that could simply shift to the right or be cancelled before cuts to existing assets and manpower numbers need to be considered. Of course, a large proportion of money not yet contractually locked is nonetheless tied to programmes which the MOD absolutely does not want to drop, but even then there should be (and there is) a degree of flexibility that is hardly reconciled with stories of imminent collapse.

Not to mention that all Army programmes are late on start, so the MOD has been spending less than originally planned, and all three services are undermanned compared to requirement, which also should mean personnel costs are lower than expected. Unless the MOD is completely unable to calculate a budget, it is extremely hard, if not impossible, to reconcile the MOD’s affirmations on Efficiencies and on the state of the EP and the financial crisis as reported by the press: either said crisis is far smaller than the media estimate, or the MOD must be lying about having found the efficiencies requested. Alternatively, the Treasury has not respected its promise to let the MOD carry forward its underspend and has taken back the money or is trying to take it back now. 

For sure the MOD is very distant from meeting its civilian headcount reduction target; this is known. 

The terrifying cut options that Fallon was about to approve, according to the Times. Option 2 would seem to be the most "acceptable", but it still makes for horrifying reading. The new secretary reportedly refused to seriously consider any of these. 

Meanwhile, Fallon has written in the Telegraph to say that efficiencies can still be found by removing “duplication” in medical services, helicopters and other functions.

While medical services could perhaps be an area where to look for savings, finding genuine “efficiencies” in helicopters will be very complicated: there no longer are “duplicate fleets”. Puma is no duplication of Merlin. Puma is smaller, can quickly deploy via C-17. Merlin is for shipboard ops and ASW. Chinook has no duplicate. Wildcat neither. Apache neither. That leaves the Gazelle fleet, still used in a number of supporting roles at home and in BATUS. Gazelle could be replaced with H-135 or 145 to achieve commonality with the new training fleet, but this is a typical “spend now to save later” solution. Similarly, the armed forces could perhaps put under contract a more coherent and logistically common solution for training support and Brunei (currently done with a handful of Bell 212) and for Cyprus (4 Griffin helicopters for SAR and training support). But, again, it would take cash to do so.

Reducing the number of Army Air Corps bases is also something that is being looked at, long and hard. A specific strand of Defence Estate review dealing with this topic has been in the works for months and is (very) late on publishing. There is some appetite for closing down Wattisham, moving the Apache south to Middle Wallop or Boscombe Down. This might generate significant savings in the long run, but the upfront cost is massive. Efficiencies, when they aren’t just cuts under a different name, often require upfront expenditure, and that makes them hard to pursue when lack of cash in-year is the problem.

The “serious debate on defence” dream

I remain convinced that the current handling of Defence policy in the UK is simply indefensible and needs to be dramatically reformed. British defence plans are largely unaccountable. The lack of details and the endless contradictions make it impossible to keep track of the department’s work. The EP document is a manifestation of this extreme vagueness: the graphics show us, more or less accurately, the consistence of the budgets for each equipment area but there is next to nothing in terms of detail about what programmes are included. We get told how much money is expended, but we only ever get extremely limited detail about what it buys.

The NAO Major Projects report is no longer produced, so even that source of information is gone, leaving behind only the Excel spreadsheets that the MOD publishes in July, showing the expenditure connected to the largest ongoing programmes. Some of the figures remain undisclosed; smaller but important programmes get no mention at all; acquisition profiles are not included and the entire spreadsheet only gives a vision of the financial year that has ended. In other words: in July this year (assuming there are no delays or changes) we’ll get a picture that will be current only to September 2017. What little we get to know is always a picture of a far gone past.

Written Answers are just as vague: MOD ministers regularly refuse to disclose dates and numbers. The latest written answers about WCSP and MRV-P, for example, deliberately do not include any indication of a target date for contract award. The Warrior CSP production contract; a Challenger 2 LEP candidate downselection; the order for JLTV for the Multi Role Vehicle Protected Group 1 and a choice between Eagle 6x6 and Bushmaster for the Group 2 requirement are (were?) all expected this year, but uncertainty rules supreme. Speaking at RUSI, Carter mentioned that the Army will have WCSP and CR2 LEP “sometimes in the next five years”. Is he talking of contract award? Delivery of first vehicle? IOC? FOC? He could have hardly been any more confusing. There is no way to keep track of the MOD’s actions.

The Defence Committee is powerless and the Defence chiefs are subject to such limitations when they speak to it that they are effectively forbidden from voicing any discomfort with government policy. This effectively means that the hearings are almost completely pointless.

There have been complaints recently about leaks to the newspapers being “damaging to morale”, and that is certainly true. But the sad truth is that leaks are currently the only instrument in the hands of the MOD to initiate a public debate. Chiefs aren’t allowed to voice their concerns openly in front of the committee and Parliament doesn’t get a vote on the defence plan. In France, in the US, and even in Italy Parliament does get a say and each financial year sees the publication of detailed documents that show how much money will be allocated to each programme and what said money will buy. France publishes a list of everything it plans to order in year, and another of everything it receives.

In the UK there is absolutely nothing remotely comparable.

It is my opinion that this absolutely needs to change. It is impossible to have a “serious debate” on Defence when no information is ever allowed to circulate. The Chief General Staff ended his much hyped RUSI speech urging experts to debate about defence. This is a very welcome call to arms, but the debate cannot be restricted to “give defence more money because Russia is a threat”. The debate cannot be restricted only to extremely general concepts: how can anyone comment on the validity of STRIKE, for example, when the Army tells us nothing about the concept? How do we make a case for “Information Manoeuvre” when we have been barely told that it will involve “77 Brigade, 1^st ISR Brigade and the two signal brigades” working together. Back in June last year, Fallon spoke to RUSI and said that Royal Signals and Intelligence Corps would “merge” as part of the Information Manoeuvre Strategy and that a second EW regiment (who knows with what kind of capability remit) would be formed. We were never given a further word about it.

One only needs to compare the british army SOLDIER magazine with Corps or Army-wide publications in the US or Australian or French armies. SOLDIER is gossip (no offence intended to those who produce the magazine, just stating facts), while journals elsewhere include very interesting discussions about tactics, force structure, proposals, critiques coming from inside the army. 

If the armed forces want a proper debate, they must start it themselves and provide us with some degrees of information. Security concerns are always and rightfully prominent, but it is just not credible to say that the British forces can never discuss anything in the open while other allied armies feel free to share their thinking. Surely there is something that is both releasable and meaningful. In absence of any relevant information, any debate ends up being a fantasy fleet exercise. Personally, I find it frustrating enough that I’ve largely ceased trying, because every discourse ultimately feels pointless and I’m finding it harder  and harder to take any statement or plan with any degree of confidence. There are only so many defence reviews that can be torn to bits within a year or two before all confidence in their worth is lost.

“Tough choices”

As cuts draw nearer, the usual rhetoric about tough choices and sacred cows resurfaces. From my somewhat privileged observation point outside of the UK I can say that:

1) The UK is extremely “good” at making tough choices when it comes to cutting defence. They are often extremely tough and they have dramatic and long-lasting effects. They tend to only make some kind of sense from a short-term perspective, however. Few other countries are able to demolish entire capabilities and spit in the face of years of efforts and investment as the UK does, and arguably none in the whole world ends up doing it so frequently.

2) The sacred cows rhetoric is too often used in the context of inter-service rivalry rather than in a rational assessment of capability. “Amphibious capability” and “airborne capability” are not sacred cows. The fetish for a disproportionate number of tiny infantry battalions is.

Ahead of this new review several commentators are calling for tough choices matching the severity of those contained in the infamous 1981 review chaired by John Nott. The Guardian in particular seems to have jumped on this train of thought advocating, for the most part in extremely vague and weak ways, for a UK that “focuses on Europe” and that “cannot afford to rule the waves anymore”.

There was some outrage when the new secretary of state for defence listed his priorities for defence and put developing a global strike capability based on the new aircraft carriers right behind Continuous At Sea Deterrence and ahead of the “capability to defend Europe”. I found that quite ridiculous, first of all because I'm not sure the order in which he told them has any real meaning. Also, they are concepts so vaguely defined that they can mean pretty much anything and its contrary, save for CASD which is (or should be, at least) unambiguous. The very fact that amphibious capability and LPDs are very much in danger of being cut means that "global carrier strike" means little. The two components are closely connected and removing one damages the whole irreparably.

Moreover, "Defence of Europe" can take several different directions.

There is a dangerous narrative doing the rounds about the navy being responsible for the Budget problem and for the army’s woes. The carriers are regularly described as the problem, regardless of how patently and demonstrably false this affirmation is.

First of all, before examining the strategic implications, let’s take note of this fact: the carriers by now are paid for. Soon enough the second ship will be delivered, and the 6 billions are gone at this point. If you want a programme costing over six billions and with most of the expenditure yet to take place you have to look at the voice “Armoured Cavalry 2025 - Ajax”.

The 6 billions for the carriers have been expended between 2008 and today, and there never was a year in which they were the biggest voice of expenditure in the budget. The acquisition of the 48 F-35B planned will cost some 9.1 billion spread on the financial years 2001 to 2026. Simple math confirms that no, the carriers did not break the budget, even if the ships cost and the F-35 costs are summed together. Note that the F-35 would still be there regardless of the carriers, as the RAF would have wanted it all the same to replace its older attack aircraft.

The carriers have contributed to forcing the Navy to accept a number of cuts to its escorts, that is definite, but the simple truth is that a navy of sole escorts is very different from a navy complete of carriers. The carriers fundamentally shape the role and capability of the Royal Navy. Having a few frigates more would not have the same effect.

It is also false that the Army is not getting money because of the Navy and of the F-35. The Land Equipment budget for 2016 – 2026 is 19.1 billion, versus 19 for Ships and 18 for Combat Air. It is true that the Air Force also gets money under “Air Support” and “Helicopters” budget, but that is valid for the Army as well (Apache and Wildcat for the Army Air Corps). Arguably, the Army is the primary user for many of the air support platforms as well (C-130, A400, C-17, Voyager). When it is said that the army is suffering the consequences of inflated Navy and Air Force programmes, fundamentally a lie is uttered.

The real elephant in the room is clearly the nuclear deterrent, which enormously inflates the “Submarines” budget, but as long as CASD remains the primary national defence tool there is little that can be done about its cost. The Navy has little to no actual control on it, and said control will become even more loose as the Top Budget Areas are restructured and  divided up differently. Effective from 1 april 2016 the MOD has established the Director General Nuclear Organisation. The effect of this further division of responsibility should become visible in the soon to be published Equipment Programme document (which details the financial year 16/17). DG Nuclear is a Front Line Command (FLC) equivalent post. Since April 2013 the equipment budget management has been delegated to the FLCs: RN, Army, RAF, Joint Forces Command, Strategic Programmes Directorate and now DG Nuclear. 

Strategic considerations; Europe and the unpleasant truth

The UK cannot and should not "defend Europe" from Russia. It can contribute to the defence of Europe, and the difference between the two affirmations is enormous.

Whether the “defend Europe” priority truly needs to be a major force structure driver is actually debatable. If we seriously expect major, non-geographically limited russian action, arguably we should not be contemplating cuts at all.

If the Russian threat is geographically limited, presumably to the Baltic countries, the UK cannot afford to have its defence policy dragged too much towards an overland posture by something it might still not be able to prevent and that, sorry if it sounds cynical, is of little actual impact to the UK. We need to ask what is the actual danger to the UK from Russia's actions in Ukraine and, potentially, the Baltics? Cynical as it sounds, UK committment must be commensurate to threat and returns. What is the UK's substantial committment to the Baltics buying? What would an even greater focus gain?

The direct impact on the UK from Russian actions in either area is actually minimal. Obviously, the one enormous difference is that the Baltic countries are part of NATO, so an aggression against them would trigger Article 5 and require NATO action. If NATO failed to react appropriately, the credibility of Article 5 would be shattered forever. This indirect impact is the real concern, as it would put the whole of NATO, and all the defence assumptions it underpins, into question.

The collapse of Article 5 is to be avoided by preventing the start of hostilities. I think that, if we are realistic, we will all admit that if Russia ever attacked for real, rushing into war would be very, very complicated. Would the NATO countries  be willing and able to declare war on Russia over the Baltics? Especially if Russia managed to make the invasion start off as a “local uprising” as in Crimea and Ukraine? I very much struggle to imagine much enthusiasm in the public opinion, including a UK in which an alarmingly large share of the population seem to share Corbyn’s feeling that even the Falklands and Gibraltar should be given up. If they have so little care for fellow Britons, do we expect them to support a far more dangerous war in the Baltics? We are “lucky” that Georgia and Ukraine are not part of NATO. And we cannot be surprised that Russia attacked them before they could join. As much as US and NATO protested and deprecated Russia’s actions and regardless of how good and deep the relations with either country are, nobody was willing to enter an actual war for them. Within Europe there are those who think the EU is responsible for the Ukraine disaster because it “intruded into Russia’s backyard”. There was and is political opposition even to the economic sanctions against Russia, with some parties valuing trade with Russia more than Ukraine. As Italian, unfortunately, I know this all too well, as we have had some loud voices speaking exactly in these terms. If push came to shove there would be some serious thinking about how to react to a Baltic scenario as well. Realism hurts, but is desperately necessary.

The NATO forward presence in the Baltics is intended to prevent such a scenario by hopefully making it impossible for Russia to build up an “uprising scenario” or any other form of modern maskirovka while also putting NATO troops directly on the frontline. Any invasion would put British, American, German, French and other troops immediately at risk, and public opinion in the respective countries would find it much harder not to react. In the most brutal and direct terms possible: if the Russians advance, NATO soldiers will die and that will provide motivation for the fight to continue. And in turn, this awareness discourages Russia from trying in the first place.

It is a game of deterrence, and I hope no one believes that the forward-deployed battlegroups, with their handful of mix and match armored vehicles from multiple countries, could actually defend the Baltics through combat. They are nowhere near large and capable enough to do that. Their presence is meant to dissuade Russia from opening fire in the first place, not to provide effective defence against a serious attack. They are there to ensure that others would come after them.

Should NATO’s forward presence be reinforced? Should a much greater permanent presence of troops be a priority? No. An excessively cumbersome NATO presence would risk alienating local support in the long run, while worsening relations with Russia even further. It would also be difficult, if not impossible, to accumulate enough forces to make the Baltics “unassailable”. Russia is advantaged by geography and by good internal communications that would allow it to rapidly concentrate overwhelming force in the area, while the small Baltics states physically do not have territory to give up to gain time. 

“Defending Europe” does not require the UK switching its focus back to continental warfare. It would be extremely unwise to do so. Skewering any further the whole UK's defence posture towards a new British Army of the Rhine, or even of Poland or of the Baltics would be nothing short of stupid.

Half-tracked STRIKE brigades, even if their vehicles were stored in Germany, where the army intends to maintain its Controlled Humidity Storage facility, would not change the equation. Even assuming they could truly drive all the way to the Baltics along European roads, they still wouldn’t shift the balance. 
I'd rather invest further in the ability to move heavy armour by road and train. The British Army's fleet of Heavy Equipment Transporters is a precious asset, but with just 89 transporters and 3 recovery vehicles there are obvious limits to what can be moved around. British HETs have been transporting allied armoured vehicles and loads as well. Notably, some 30 HETs have been loaned to the US Army as the american HET does not comply with european regulations. 

The supporters of the mythical “tough decision”, however, seem to advocate for a repeat of the retreat from East of Suez to preserve the army and focus on the European theatre. Supposedly this is not just the wise choice but also the cheap one.

The actual harsh truth is that it is neither wise nor cheap.

The British Army is not in good shape. It is very small; it is short of supports; it is incredibly weak in terms of air defence and most of its brigades are not deployable but are mere bags containing a variable number of small, light role, non-mechanized infantry battalions plus three small cavalry regiments mounted on Jackal. The British Army is nowhere near ready for an actual fight with Russia and, size-wise especially, it will never truly be. The Guardian can happily subscribe to the Russia-produced story that what the heavily mechanized, artillery rich Russian army is very afraid of the tiny light role infantry battalions on foot that make up most of the british army, but I hope that most people can recognize deliberate trolling for what it is.

Fortunately, the British Army does not need to take on Russian forces on its own.

Obsolescence of major equipment, weakness in Fires, ground based air defence in need of rebuilding and a dog’s breakfast mix of countless small vehicle fleets procured under UOR all add up to a gigantic capability gap that it would take many billions to close. The 19 billion ten-year equipment budget would merely begin to improve the outlook, even assuming everything (finally) worked out. And keep in mind that it is, de-facto, not known exactly what is included in those 19 billions, what is partially included and what is left for later. Even before new programmes begin to appear (new artillery, land precision strike, long range rockets for GMLRS, air and missile defence, new ground based sensors, a Desert Hawk III replacement etcetera) we don’t know when WCSP will deliver, or when CR2 LEP will go ahead and whether it will be enough to make Challenger 2 competitive again.

The UK is not equipped to be a continental power. The British Army in many ways compares horribly poorly to Poland’s army. And this is, to a degree, normal. It is not the UK’s task to be a continental power and the guardian of East Europe. It should continue to contribute, certainly, but trying to buy influence in Europe with the land forces the UK has is, if not impossible, a job that will take many years and many more billion pounds than the UK can expend.

Cutting back capabilities such as the (existing and paid for) amphibious force with its shipping; or the carriers; or the F-35 purchase, would merely mean turning billions of pounds and years of efforts and investment into nothing but waste. New weaknesses will be created where there are not, for little to no effective gain at all.

What the UK has always added to Europe's military capability and to the “European side of NATO” is the willingness and ability to intervene far from home. An Europe-centric garrison, even if it was to revolve around a new "british army of the Baltic" would not be in the UK nor EU's interest if it came at the expense of other capabilities.

The UK was never primarily defined in Europe by its MBTs apart perhaps when Chieftain's 120mm appeared in a 105mm NATO. BAOR was of course a valued contribution, and there was a period in which it made sense to focus on it and GIUK gap above all else, but those times are over.

Today’s unique UK strengths include strategic air mobility; air breathing ISTAR which is second only to the US’s; the Royal Fleet Auxiliary which has more capability on its own than the support vessels of the other major European navies put together; SSNs and their expert and excellently trained crews; Tomahawk which only has a European paragon in France’s Scalp Navale; amphibious capability which in Europe few players have; a vast Chinook fleet; Apache; and combat engineering. P-8 Poseidon and Carrier Strike will soon enough be part of this list. In good part, the strength’s of today’s UK have come out of the never realized review of 1998, but this does not make them any less relevant. Whether by design or by incident, many of those capabilities remain unique in Europe or make up a huge percentage of Europe’s entire potential capability in the sector.

It would be absurd to throw away existing strengths to try and become a continental power on the cheap. Also because, quite simply, the budget would never suffice anyway.

Years ago, before starting this blog; before Russia invaded Georgia, I was a commentator on blogs owned by others. More than once I warned that the Cold War had never ended from a russian prospective but only from a western one. Back then, any remark of this kind was invariably met with the typical 90s and early 00s story that Soviet equipment was never good anyway and Russia would never be a threat again.

Even after the events in Georgia the situation did not change. It took Ukraine to truly generate a reaction.

Now I see a real risk that the UK will go from one extreme to the other. Russia must not become an hysteria that bends the UK’s defences and foreign policy entirely out of shape.  

Russia's threat, while absolutely significant, does not require nor suggest the UK should be throwing away every bit of effort expended since at least 1998 to become a country engaged globally in a globalized world in favor of garrisoning an hostile Europe seeking gains from Brexit.

The UK has chosen to leave the European Union. It will not leave Europe, for obvious reasons. But Global Britain needs to be a concept which is actively pursued, not an empty slogan. With the capabilities it possesses, the UK is better positioned to be an expeditionary player than a garrison entrenched in East Europe. This does not make the UK’s forces any less valuable to NATO or the EU. If the UK sacrifices its expeditionary capabilities to revert to an “European garrison” ala review of 1981, France’s military weight within the EU will massively increase as they will be the only major player with worldwide reach. There is no guarantee that the UK would even be able to conserve its current “rank” (let alone improve it) if it cut back on expeditionary capabilities to keep the army at 82k personnel. Sending a squadron of open-topped Jackals in the frozen north-east Europe so the crews can get frostbite is hardly going to impress anyone. I say this with the utmost respect for the crews out there riding Jackals and Coyotes, let me make this clear. I just can’t take the idea seriously, though.

Remainers should not be under the illusion that cutting back on the navy in favor of the army will gain the UK any advantage in Brexit negotiations. The government, moreover, should not be under the impression that they can cut defence at will and still expect Europe to be awed by the british armed forces and overtly attach to them a great value. General Camporini had tough comments to offer about the UK’s armed forces and their role in Europe pre and post Brexit and he is unlikely to be the only one thinking in those terms. In fact, the the last thing the UK should do is to offer even further unilateral promises and reassurances and commitments before securing any kind of return. Unilaterally and unconditionally committing to “manning trenches” in the East Europa is the perfect way to enable the EU to snub the british armed forces value and still get them to pay the cost of defending the union. 

Ultimately, in this day and age, the UK cannot and should not pretend that the world begins at Gibraltar and ends near Kaliningrad. The UK spent a good twenty years rebuilding its forces to an expeditionary model and is now on the verge of having the second most powerful naval task force in the world.

The “tough choice” it needs to make is arguably to stop salami-slicing capability from all three services and accept that its efforts have to be prioritized on some sectors rather than others. The strengths are at sea and in the air? Build on them. They are paid for. They are valuable.

Middle East commitments build security, buy the UK a market (including for its defence industry) and play into Europe’s security no less than a battlegroup in the Baltic. The “defence of Europe” does not encompass only the continent: it stretches out to Africa and Middle East.

The UK also needs to continue its return East of Suez, not because it can more realistically take on China than it can on Russia, but because it needs to be seen as a player in the Indian Ocean and beyond. France and even Italy, which is basing its new defence strategy on the concept of “enlarged Mediterranean” and on the acquisition of expeditionary capabilities such as AEW and new, larger ships, have understood that they need to buy relevance beyond Suez. The UK’s powerful naval group and its air force cannot defeat China, obviously, but are more than valuable enough to contribute to build security and can buy the UK influence in the area.

The UK’s natural role in Europe is as guardian of the GIUK gap and ASW expert. The new NATO command for the Atlantic should see the UK in very first line for obvious reasons of geography, direct interest (nobody else has as much to lose from a potential Russian break out into the Atlantic as the UK), expertise and equipment (P-8 incoming, Merlin, SSNs, Type 23 and, in the future, Type 26). The Type 31 frigate is the odd one out: the ship would be much more useful if it was ASW capable. “GP frigates”, as I’ve said more than once, are a terribly poor investment as far as I’m concerned.

The Arctic?

MOD officials recently went on record saying that the next fight will be in the frozen north, but does the UK have any sort of strategy, or even clear ambitions in the arctic?

China has now published a programmatic document outlining its approach to the Arctic, including the stated intention of beginning to exploit the natural resources to be found in the area, as well as the new navigable routes that are increasingly becoming viable with the retreat of the ice.

The Arctic Shipping Routes, if they became truly viable, would significantly shorten the travel times to China, Korea and Japan, reducing shipping costs. The UK is in a good position to benefit from such a development. 

The UK needs to think about what it wants to get in the Arctic and how it might get it. What is the position of the UK on the exploitation of the untapped natural resources to be found in the frozen north? There are well known concerns about the preservation of the natural environment, but does the UK think said concerns should entirely prevent future exploitation? China clearly expects to tap into those natural resources and so does Russia, which has been working for years on turning its arctic coast into a massive military base and defensive bastion. Obviously they are not doing that to protect polar bears from hunters. What is the UK's position on the matter? 

The UK has no direct way to directly claim territory in the Arctic, and whatever it wants to obtain from the frozen north must reflect this. Clearly any UK access to the area and its resources depends on cooperation with allies which have a legitimate claim to arctic territory. Norway, which is a historic and natural partner, including for GIUK gap defense, is an obvious candidate.
Bilateral agreements and common strategies and goals are needed. 

China’s plan for a “polar silk road” is potentially enormously significant for the UK’s economy. The arctic routes to Asia are much shorter, and quicker, cheaper navigations could, in the future, encourage a massive growth in traffic. The UK is excellently positioned to benefit from such a development .

Russia, advantaged by geography, is already putting up a true Anti Access Area Denial bubble extending over much of the Arctic, to ensure it starts from a dominant position.

The UK needs to engage with its allies, beginning with Norway and Canada, to shape a common policy for the Arctic, to ensure that it can benefit from future developments in the area and avoid strategic shocks.

Where does that leave the Army?

The UK should continue to aim for Division-sized effects, because that is the ambition level appropriate for a regional power with worldwide reach. It should be well within the UK’s possibilities. The Division should be the ambition, but not at all costs. If it can’t be done because the government is not prepared to fund defence in line with ambitions, then strong brigades must be the alternative.

The Army should not try at all costs to be a continental power that can take on Russia. What the UK needs from its army is a capable land element that can deploy effectively within a larger allied force and complement other tools of british policy and power projection. It is more important to field a flexible, capable force, than a larger but obsolescent force tormented by the current plethora of capability gaps and vulnerabilities.

Like in the Air and Sea domains, the UK should strive to field an enablers-rich land force that can act as leader and take aboard the contributions of other countries.

In order to modernize, the Army needs to become a lot more rational in its approaches. In twenty years of constant rethinks, cancellations, delays and mistakes it has gone around in circles, returning to the starting point again and again, losing something along the way with each lap. With the exception of Royal Engineers vehicles, the British Army’s last “combat” vehicle purchase that didn’t happen through UOR was the Panther. And after purchasing it, it tried to use it as a patrol vehicle, which was not what it had been procured for, and ended up hating it.

Then, only partially excused by the urgency imposed by ongoing combat operations, it only ever managed to procure vehicles through UORs. Now it has a multitude of small fleets requiring multiple different logistic lines.

Its main acquisition programmes have literally gone in circles: again Boxer (or at least a heavy 8x8) is on the list of wishes, as it was in the 90s (in the Boxer case we are literally talking of the same vehicle). The Warrior capability sustainment programme is years late. Challenger 2 CSP, eventually downgraded to a simpler Life Extension Programme, has long been in the same limbo. Artillery modernization programmes are more or less motionless by as much as a decade plus.

Still, the Army continues to start more programmes than it can manage and fund. In the SDSR 2010 the focus was put on modernizing the armoured brigades: a noble target that was the one bit of common sense in the whole of Army 2020. WCSP finally began; the huge Ajax contract was signed in September 2014.

In November 2015 the priorities were turned on their heads and wheels returned to the front of the queue, with MIV being the new must-have. Results so far: WCSP downsized by two battalions; one armoured brigade to be converted to Strike; ABSV removed from the programme in 2016; CR2 numbers slashed once more. 3 years later, WCSP production contract is still not coming, the FV432 replacement remains a question mark, CR2 LEP does not truly satisfy anyone and marches to an unknown timeframes and Ajax is being tentatively squeezed into a new role for which many, beginning with me, do not think it is adequate.

Is it too much to ask the Army to at least focus on one thing at once? Can it start one modernization process and, just this once, bring it to conclusion? The armoured brigades were the focus. Serious money was assigned to the projects needed to modernize them. Bring the job to conclusion.

If STRIKE is unaffordable; if MIV cannot be procured at the moment, then it should be shelved. In the meanwhile perhaps the Army can explain what it wants to do, for real, and we can have that “serious debate” about it. Because as of now STRIKE seems just a solution in search of a problem. 

Through stubbornness of its own and political meddling the army has also never properly restructured its regiments and when faced with cuts to the budget has ended up disproportionately damaging the supporting elements, so much that now it is heading for just 4 “complete” brigades out of 11. 16 Air Assault is a two-battlegroups force; two armoured and two strike brigades will be the only other units for which there will be Signals, Artillery, Engineer and Logistic units. And even then, the armoured brigades will miss an important piece: a cavalry formation for reconnaissance and screening.

The army needs to modernize and re-balance its structure even more than it needs to modernize its equipment.

Real elephant in the room for me remains 1st Division and its load of "fake brigades" without CS and CSS. As useful as it still can be in a variety of roles (infantry is never useless), in its current form it cannot possibly be considered a wise and rational use of manpower and resources.

Rationalizing structures and inventory also brings efficiencies. Some big, some small, some neutral. CBRN mission, currently split between FALCON Sqn RTR and 27 Sqn RAF Regiment after the complete disaster that was the disbandment of the Joint CBRN regiment in the SDSR 2010 needs sorting out with a new joint solution.

Medical services across the three services and field hospitals should be reconsidered in a joint way: most of the field hospitals are reserve ones and jointery is already noticeable, so there probably aren’t big savings to be found, but with how much everything else has sized down there still seems to be a disproportion. The field hospitals do a sterling job, but if I was the one looking for efficiencies I would want to look into the medical services. On this one, I side with Fallon.

DFID might want to make greater use of them, and should help pay for them to help pull defence out of trouble.

I also suggest looking into a unified, single Police service. Again, jointery is already well developed in the police domain already but it still seems absurd to me that there is a RAF Police, Royal Navy Police, RMP, MOD Police. Again, probably small savings to be found, but then again RFA Largs Bay was sold to Australia to save a paltry 12 million per year and Albion could be lost to save 20 million or so per year, regardless of the completely disproportionate consequences. Any small saving that can be obtained in less damaging ways is a saving that must be harvested first.

A big "spend-to-save" measure could be pursued in the Army if the large JLTV purchase was made in one go rather than parcelled over uncountable years. The FMS request calls for over 2700 vehicles but the expectation is that the army would initially order 750 at best. I’d recommend going with the big order from the start instead, with the aim of replacing Panther and Husky right away, as well as replacing out-of-the-wire unprotected Land Rovers as currently planned. I’d also withdraw from service the RWMIK, replacing them with Jackals which would cease to play “cavalry” in favor of working as fire support and mobility platforms in the infantry, until they can be replaced as well.

JLTV assessment is ongoing, as are track trials for MRV-P Group 2 with Eagle and Bushmaster 

The fragmented multitude of fleets the army has to support. MRV-P must bring about a massive inventory rationalisation if it has to be a success. 

Instead of suggesting improbable and unwise mergers of PARAs and Marines the MOD could take note of the fact that they possess a precious C-17 fleet plus Puma, plus 50 Apache plus the largest Chinook fleet outside of the US. Seriously, if the British Army doesn’t invest on its air assault force while having all these paid-for resources, who else should?

What if STRIKE, at least initially, was delivered, accepting the limitations of the case, of course, with a combination of Mastiff-mounted infantry plus Marines, with the capability to go in from the sea, and of Mastiff-mounted infantry and PARAs on Chinooks and aircraft? Mastiff has defects and limitations, but is it really so indispensable to replace it with MIV? I think there are far more pressing urgencies. And instead of pushing the rhetoric of the “sacred cows” for Marines and PARAs, I think every effort should be made to beef up both 16 AA and 3 Cdo to expand their capabilities.

The really radical thing to do in this review is squeezing the maximum value out of what is already available. If you can’t afford to be a hero in every sector, do at least try to be one where you can.