SDSR 2015 - What does it say, what does it imply - UPDATES

As was to be expected, plenty of questions remain without an answer at this time, but what we know is:

 

This is the maximum level of detail provided. And it clearly is not much.

Royal Air Force

In manpower terms, the SDSR seems to suggest that the RAF will gain around 300 personnel. That is because the document says that Royal Navy and RAF together will grow by 700, and 400 are expected to be for the Navy.

MPA: P-8 Poseidon purchase. 9 will be acquired, to be based in RAF Lossiemouth. At least three will be delivered quickly, within the current Parliament. The official MOD release affirms the importance of having a proper, ASW- capable aircraft armed with torpedoes and missiles. No detail yet on whether US torpedoes will be acquired or if integration of Stingray will be sought.

Overland surveillance capability is openly mentioned and thought to be in direct connection with eventually replacing Sentinel R1 in providing wide area surveillance and GMTI targeting.

Sentinel R1: will be operated into the early 2020s (was 2018). Around 2022, the P-8 Poseidon should acquire the capability to employ the AAS radar for overland surveillance, and this might be the reason. 

UPDATE: Gareth Jennings of Jane's gives the new OSD as 2021. A RAF article says that 4, not 5, will be extended. Typo or correct information? 

Shadow R1: this secretive asset will be extended out to at least 2030. The graphic showing the “Joint Force 2025” reports 8 Shadow R1: at the moment there is no telling if it is a mistake or an indication of further purchases. Only 5 are in service at the moment: a sixth aircraft was purchased but not fitted with the mission kit in the end and remains in use as a training aid. An expansion of the fleet would thus be a considerable U-turn in its own right. 

UPDATE:  Gareth Jennings of Jane's reports that the MOD has confirmed that 2 extra Shadow R1 are to be procured and that the sixth will now receive the mission suite, giving a fleet of 8.

Sentry:  the AWACS fleet will be extended to 2035, the current NATO out of service date for the type. It is to be assumed that funding will be made available to adopt the same kind of Mid Life Upgrade that NATO is carrying out to achieve that date, but no detail is provided. 

UPDATE:  Gareth Jennings of Jane's reports that the MOD expects to launch the upgrade programme for Sentry in 2020. The number of crews will also be increased, from 9 to 12 in 2021.

Rivet Joint: will operate out to 2035.

Typhoon: the Tranche 1 aircraft will be retained and this will enable the formation of 2 more squadrons, for a total of 7. Basing and timeframe is not detailed yet. Since the manpower increase to the RAF is limited to around 300 men, the only possibility is that the two additional Typhoon squadrons will only come on the back of disbanding Tornado GR4 units. This passage is however complicated by the fact that Tornado remains engaged in operations and cannot be withdrawn, while Typhoon will take several more years to become ready to employ Storm Shadow (August 2018) and Brimstone (in 2019 at the earliest).

F-35: the biggest surprise is the reaffirmation of a procurement plan for a full 138 aircraft in the long term. There is no variant mentioned, keeping the door open to purchase of the F-35A later on. By 2023, 42 aircraft will have been put into service, supporting the formation of the 2 squadrons already planned, 617 RAF and 809 NAS. We also know that an OCU is planned from 2019 in Marham and 17(R) Sqn will carry on in Edwards AFB, USA, as the Operational Evaluation Unit.  

Protector: at least 20, to replace the current 10 Reaper around 2020.

C-130J: another big surprise is that more than half of the Hercules fleet is no longer expected to go out of service in 2022. They will continue out to 2030, probably in 47 Sqn and with a heavy focus on Special Forces support. Whether the increase in funding for the Special Forces also covers addition of weaponry to the Hercules (on the lines of what, for example, French special forces are planning) is not known. They will be “upgraded and extended” to support a “range of operations” out to 2030.

It is possible that the 14 Hercules retained will all be of the -30 variant, with the stretched fuselage and greater cargo space.

A400M and Voyager: numbers unchanged. One Voyager will be refitted with a VVIP compartment allowing secure transport of ministers and of the royal family over long distances.

FCAS and Complex Weapons: again, no details, but the promise is to continue working on FCAS with France and progressing collaboration on Complex Weapons as well. Important decisions are expected already in December regarding the shape of the FCAS unmanned aircraft, while there is expectation for Storm Shadow mid-life upgrade and launch of Future Cruise and Anti-Ship Weapon work during 2016.

Royal Navy

Manpower: an increase of around 400 men.

Carriers: both will enter service and both will be crewed. The document mentions that one of the two will receive enhancements specifically thought for better supporting the amphibious assault mission, since HMS Ocean will retire without a dedicate replacement.

This opens the possibility that we will see both at sea together, covering different roles. But a more realistic settlement would still appear to refit the “amphibious” bits to the other as well, at the first major refit period, to allow each ship to act in both roles and, indeed, in a mixed role. The assured availability is for only one carrier at a time, after all.

Frigates: BAE was unable to keep the Type 26’s cost down, and sure enough the axe hit home. The Type 26 building phase is being further delayed and the first ship will only enter service around 2025 now. Only 8, all in ASW configuration, will be built.

The MOD is reverting to the “C1 and C2” approach it abandoned at the beginning of the Type 26 project, and is now seeking the design for a smaller and cheaper frigate to be built in at least 5 examples, and ideally more, after the Type 26 production ends. The target remains for 13 frigates, of which 8 ASW and 5 GP, with the hope of possibly building more of the GP ones by virtue of them being cheaper.

In the old days, C1 was to deliver 10 “high-end” ASW frigates and C2 was to deliver 8 cheaper general purpose frigates.

A shipbuilding strategy detailing dates and targets will be crafted in 2016. At the moment, it is hard to express a judgment of the decision: much will depend on the shape of the “light frigate”, which is, anyway, years away into the future. The Type 26 procurement was always going to be a long-term affair, and plenty of questions will remain with us for years to come. For all we know, by the time the first series of 8 is almost complete, a decision will have been made to build more of the same to complete the replacement of the Type 23s.

Type 45 BMD: studies and "investigation" about the capability of the Type 45s to detect, track and one day counter ballistic missiles will continue. The UK remains involved in the NATO BMD projects and will "invest in a land-based BMD radar". Not clear if it refers to RAF Fylingdales, to a whole new installation or a NATO project outside of the UK entirely. 

OPVs: a further two OPVs (almost certainly other River Batch 2s) will be ordered to keep the yards busy as Type 26 is delayed.

The Royal Navy is to have “up to 6 OPVs”. Initially, we have to assume that they will be the 3 new River Batch 2s plus two of the existing River Batch 1s plus HMS Clyde in the Falklands.

In a few years time, the 2 River batch 1 would be replaced by the two new OPVs to be ordered.

HMS Clyde could continue to serve as, unlike the 3 Batch 1s in UK waters, she has a flight deck.

Depending on her fate, the Royal Navy will have 5 or 6 OPVs.

There is no detail about perhaps forward basing 2 of the OPVs abroad, as I continue to suggest, but it is a possibility. Use of the OPVs to support british interests “abroad” gets a mention.

MCM: there is no mention of cuts, but only 12 MCM vessels appear in the graphic showing “Joint Force 2025”. This suggests a reduction of 3 vessels from the current fleet, with the Sandowns being most exposed due to the Hunt having an open stern area which is more readily converted to a mothership arrangement in support of the new MHC unmanned vehicles expected to be procured over the coming years.

MARS Fleet Solid Support Ship: the SDSR promises that three new Solid Support vessels will be procured to add to the six fleet tankers (2 Waves and the 4 new Tides). Plenty of questions remain on the capabilities that these ships will have and the timeframe for their purchase as well as about where they will be built. The news is to be welcomed, but now begins the sentry duty, scanning the horizon for finding the details.

  

Army

Manpower: unchanged.

Structure: the two new “Strike Brigades” represent the upgrade of one of the Adaptable Force brigades planned so far and the downgrade of one of the three armoured infantry brigades.

Beyond the fancy “strike” title, the very few words offered by the SDSR suggest that these will be medium-weight, mechanized brigades equipped with the Ajax tracked vehicle and with the Mechanised Infantry Vehicle (MIV), an 8x8 to be procured in the coming years. Once, we called it FRES Utility Vehicle.

The time needed to procure the MIV is the most evident cause for the long time expected to be required to bring these brigades into operation: they are planned to be ready only by 2025, and even that seems ambitious.

Once again, the SDSR provides no detail about the changes connected.

One hypothesis is that one Challenger 2 regiment will be re-roled to become a fourth cavalry regiment on Ajax, so that each armoured and each mechanized brigade has its own recce formation.

The number of armoured infantry battalions could in theory remain the same, but spread on only two brigades, each comprising also a single tank regiment. The Warrior CSP remains in the plan, as is the Challenger 2 LEP and, hopefully, ABSV.

The MIV was initially about equipping 3 mechanised battalions in the armoured infantry brigades, but could now be about re-equipping a total of 6 battalions, if all the infantry units in the new medium brigades are to be mounted on 8x8.

6 infantry brigades will remain in the Adaptable Force, but “a number” of infantry battalions will be reconfigured for counter-terrorism and defence engagement and mentoring roles. What this likely means is that several battalions will become even smaller, which is a necessity if the mechanized battalions (each requiring more than 700 men) are doubled and if the combat support and combat service support units in the mechanized brigades are to be reinforced.

The Ajax order is not expected to change, but an impact is likely in Challenger 2 and AS90 numbers, potentially even GMLRS as the three heavy artillery regiments will probably become two, and we have no indication of what the “strike” brigades will have in terms of artillery support. Warrior numbers could be severely affected depending on the new shape of the remaining armoured infantry brigades.

Apache: the procurement of upgraded (Block III) capability is confirmed, as are 4 frontline squadrons. Training formations are not counted in the graphic, so there is no certainty about the OCU and the Conversion to Role squadrons, but hopefully there is no change to the plans. 

Nuclear deterrent

Four replacement SSBNs are to be procured. The number of missiles and warheads remains unchanged from the SDSR 2010. The entry in service of the four new submarines will now begin in the “early 2030s”, so a bit later than the 2028 which was the plan until it became evident that HMS Vanguard needs one last nuclear core refueling.

The cost estimate, including inflation, has been revised upwards by six billion, to 31. A large contingency fund of 10 billion is also reserved to absorb any cost growth emerging during the life of the programme. 

The programme will be delivered with staged investments, and will be overseen by a new team within the MOD, headed by an experienced commercial specialist. 

Special Forces 

Despite much noise being made about new equipment for the SF, the SDSR provides no details. Part of the “extra” money for Special Forces is most likely employed to keep the C-130js going. There is mention of investment in high altitude unmanned platforms which are expected to be the Zephyr drone. The purchase of 3 such unmanned air vehicles should soon be authorized, but they will initially be mostly for testing as the Zephyr still has to overcome a big problem: it has a tiny payload available for sensors. Flying at 70.000 feet for 3 months is great, but is only useful if the right payload can be put on the UAV.

Another interesting phrase is “we will upgrade our helicopters and transport aircraft so they can deploy further and faster”. This could mean anything. 9 C-130s have been recently fitted with under-wing fuel tanks, but on the helicopters front the way forwards is less clear.

The Special Forces need to replace the Lynx AH9A used by 657 AAC squadron and if we wanted we could speculate about adding air refueling capability for helicopters using the C-130s. It is unlikely, though. We will have to wait for actual developments.

Satellites

In August 2022, the current Skynet service provision contract will end, and Airbus will hand back to the MOD the full ownership of the ground and space infrastructure, including the constellation of communication satellites.

The way forwards from there is still uncertain. Decisions have yet to be made, but collaboration with France could prove pivotal going forwards.

As from early November news reports, the MOD seems determined to work its way out of the Private Financing Approach. A new satellite, expected to be launched in 2021 / 2022 will extend the life of the current system and begin opening up new and up-to-date capabilities, to be further increased later on with a second. 

A review about the way forwards should be completed next year, though.

Civil servants and defence estate

A major 30% reduction is announced, bringing the total down to 41.000 by the end of this parliament.

A 30% in the built defence estate is also envisioned, releasing vast areas back to civilian use.

The impact of these two cuts is difficult to evaluate at this stage.

A final comment

Until not long ago, defence was facing an abyss: had the 2% of GDP spending target not been confirmed, the armed forces today would have been hit by a dramatically different and far less pleasing review.

Today we have reasons to be quite happy: there are several good news, some expected and others which no one dared to hope for.

But, as was expected, plenty of questions remain. It is also worth remembering that projects stretching in the very long term, such as Type 26, F-35 (beyond 2023 and the first 48 and two squadrons) and indeed the running on of C-130J are promises, not certainties. Much can change in the many years that have yet to come and pass.

What matters is that the MPA hole is finally being plugged, and with the right aircraft. The carriers will enter service and a plan is in place for the initial two squadrons for them; the need to think about amphibious assault capability for the carriers is recognized; extra OPVs will be kept (and hopefully used abroad to ease the workload of actual frigates); the vital ISTAR assets of the RAF are getting air in their lungs and the MARS Solid Support Ship is finally on the radar.

This is a huge, huge improvement. The fact that we are no longer staring at a six squadrons RAF in 2020 is also to be welcomed with enormous relief.

I’m particularly worried by the Army’s position, and I am immensely curious to learn about the impact of the “strike brigades” on the force structure and on heavy, tracked armour capability.

The new structure will also require a rethink of the force generation cycle, since the burden of readiness is now shared by two couples of brigades instead of 3 plus 3-out-of-7-to deploy-2.

Now begins a new quest for details.

A last summary, two weeks from SDSR day

 

SDSR 2015 – Issues, analysis and recommendations going towards the review

Budget

About that 2%

Army 

Army projects and requirements

Army vehicle projects – post DSEI 2015

Solving the problem of hollow army 2020

Royal Air Force 

Fast jets and squadrons number 

Air Capabilities

The mystery of Protector

Royal Navy 

Royal Navy and the SDSR 

Beyond Harpoon and Storm Shadow (and Tomahawk too…?

What to expect?

In general terms, it is thought that this SDSR will bring “good news”. As I wrote on Twitter back in October, its publication was pushed to the right to more closely aligned with the Spending Review (25 November), but with release “a few days before” (that was my guess, and we now know it’ll be 2 days, as the SDSR is due for release on the 23^rd) to show that, “no, It is nothing like 2010”.

In broad terms, the SDSR will re-affirm the targets for Future Force 2020. No cuts are expected, and instead there should be some good news. How many, and how actually good, we don’t yet know.

I’m moderately optimistic. The fact that we can expect overall stability is a welcome change in itself, but I’m still skeptic about the good news. If the SDSR doesn’t settle satisfactorily the MPA gap, which I consider the most problematic, I cannot consider it a success.

One thing I try to keep in mind and a warning that I feel I must give is: don’t expect too much detail. The yearly Equipment Programme document shows just how well this government is using indetermination to protect its ability to cut at leisure behind the curtains. What does the Equipment Plan include, exactly? How many vehicles? For delivery when? We don’t know. The document says nothing until firm contracts have been signed, so that anything not yet firmly on contract can be stealthily cut, pushed to the right, descoped, changed.

I expect the SDSR to be just as indecisive and vague whenever it suits the Treasury’s interests. For example, I do not expect to be given details about the plans for purchasing F-35s, other than a confirmation of the 48 needed for the OCU and the first two squadrons.

Main Gate 5, the next big programme decision point, is scheduled for 2017 and I honestly can’t imagine this government telling us much before that date.

The purchase of 20 Protector RPAS to replace the current 10 Reaper will also not be detailed before Main Gate in early 2016, I’m afraid. Until then, we are unlikely to learn much about what exactly they’ll be like, or what impact they will have on manpower, infrastructure and number of squadrons (currently, there's 2 squadrons operating 10 Reapers). 

In general, I expect plenty of questions to remain unanswered.

Some programmes are however on the move, or expected to move on with the SDSR. There is even some optimism in the press about reversing some more of the 2010 madness. The following summary shows where we are, what we know, and what rumors are floating around.

Airborne troops and helicopters

16 Air Assault Brigade is re-subordinated to the Land Forces, leaving Joint Helicopter Command. In the process, it “loses” some pieces: the Apache regiments remain as Attack Helicopter Force under JHC. 7 REME battalion splits into two, with 8 Field Company (Para) re-subordinating to 13 Air Assault Support Regiment RLC to continue delivering equipment support to the paras on the field and the aviation coys (73 Av Coy now in Yeovilton to support the Wildcat fleet, the other two in Wattisham, aligned with the two Apache regiments)  staying under JHC as 7 REME battalion. All should be done by the end of this month. The Eagle symbol retires with dignity, and the beloved Pegasus returns. 

The split of 7 REME was in my list of suggested changes to 16 Air Assault Brigade, as well as the separation of the helicopters from the troops. Of course, I called for more ambitious changes, with 8 Field Company being at least doubled into a (small) battalion better suited to support the force generation cycle of 16X and with the army and RAF helicopter squadrons reorganized into real aviation brigade(s). I did not expect it to actually happen, at least not in one go, but one can hope. The restructuring of 16X is, at least in my opinion, following the right path.  

The army is taking control of the work to determine what comes after the Medium Stressed Platform to allow the parachuting of heavy equipment and vehicles. An attempt to find a stop-gap solution by adapting the MSP for use on the C-130J seems to have sadly been cancelled, leaving the present airborne forces badly handicapped. An handicap that will stay for a good few years, until a new platform and the A400 are ready for operations.

The US Type V platform remains on the list of possible solutions, but there’s reportedly a 500 kg problem still for using it with Jackal. The employment of Jackal with the airborne has been trialed during exercises in the US, and the vehicle has fared very well, delivering decisive firepower and faring better than the Humvees employed by the US. However, the impossibility of parachuting the Jackal into battle is a limit, and even when air landing from the C-130, the Jackal can’t just charge into the fight right away: the weapon on top needs to be re-installed after landing due to the dimensional limits of the C-130’s cargo door and hold.

It is also to be regretted that there are no plans to retain a small force of light, well armed, tracked armoured vehicles. Those would add immensely to the ability to react swiftly and to bring armoured fire support even in the most hostile territories. 

Right as the US Army resurrects ideas for a light tank capable even of being airdropped, with BAE showcasing a renewed M-8 Buford, the UK has no plan to retain a squadron of light combat vehicles. I think Ajax is a good replacement for CVR(T) in the armoured brigades, but i also see the enduring need for a small unit equipped to enter a distant theatre quickly and support the reaction force even on the worst terrain.

A bit of good news came from Joint Warrior 15-1, which saw the debut of RAF C-17 in tactical role, with it being employed in Rapid and Follow-On Air Landings. Finally! As I’ve said more than once, the UK has paid big money for a strategic cargo with great tactical capabilities: you paid for them, now use them. I hope we will see airdrops becoming part of the C-17’s routine as well. 

A capable replacement for the Medium Stressed Platform is key to keeping the airborne task force viable.

Meanwhile, the MOD has begun the process for upgrading 25 Gazelle helicopters with GPS, traffic avoidance system and a new VHF radio. The upgrade will be carried out by Gama Engineering Ltd, and should be completed by August 2017. It has to be assumed that the Gazelle OSD is no longer 2018, and that the thorny issue of its replacement will be pushed to the right by a good few years. The Gazelle remains in use with 667 (Development and Trials) Squadron and 671 Squadron as part of 7 (Training) Regiment at AAC Centre Middle Wallop; in 665 Squadron, part of 5 Regiment at Joint Helicopter Command Flying Station Aldergrove, Northern Ireland; and 29 (BATUS) Flight as part of the British Army Training Unit Suffield (BATUS) in Canada.

The SDSR should confirm the plan to upgrade 50 Apache helicopters to Block III standard, but details of how, where (Boeing or AW?) and when are most likely going to come out only in March 2016 when the Main Gate decision is planned.  

Army vehicles

The 10 Years Equipment Plan, 2015 edition is, as was to be expected, entirely devoid of details, dates, numbers, but it still provides some interesting pointers: both ABSV and MRV-P are included in the plan. The ABSV has been definitively separated from the Warrior CSP and will be, on achieving Main Gate, a new Category A programme in its own right. Unfortunately, we might have to wait for 2017 before Main Gate is reached. Entry into service might have to slip as well as a consequence, from 2020 to sometime into the 2020s. ABSV is a key programme, as it is needed to replace the ancient FV432 and complement the (insufficient) number of Warriors with 40mm gun. The effectiveness of the armoured infantry battalions is in no small measure connected with ABSV.

A curiosity: if the Equipment Plan is not just messing up numbers, the Warrior Section Vehicle becomes FV520 after the CSP (now is known as FV510) and the Infantry Command sub-variant becomes FV521 (was FV511).

The Equipment Plan confirms thinking that the MRV-P will require a 4x4 and a 6x6 vehicle. The requirement, albeit over many years, runs into the thousands of vehicles, but the funded MRV-p project for now is expected to cover only 500 troop carriers, 78 ambulances and 27 recovery vehicles. Main Gate is expected in 2017. The hope is that the MRV-p does not become another orphaned programme, abandoned after the first phase with the result of creating yet another “mini” fleet. Rationalization of the current holding of vehicles (from Land Rovers and Pinzgauers in “close to firing line” roles to Husky, Panther, WMIK) with successive purchases of MRV-P should be a key army aspiration in along the next decade.

The Challenger 2 LEP is confirmed as part of the plans. Main Gate has slipped to the right as the army tries to find ideas (and money, especially money) to try and address the growing list of deficiencies. The idea of possibly purchasing a “new” tank as replacement has quickly been abandoned, but the Army has now officially declared its concerns, especially about lethality. The powerpack would also need replacing. Whether the delay to the LEP brings to any increase in its scope, is beyond my guessing ability at this point: the army knows that upgrading only the fire control system, communications and sights won’t quite solve the problems, but might still be unable to do anything about it for lack of money.

The REME Conference 2015 has seen the announcement that there is a funded plan to procure an Air Portable Lightweight Recovery Vehicle that will be used by 16X and 3X Commando. A light recovery vehicle for the Light Protected Mobility Infantry battalions will also be procured. Finally, the Challenger recovery variant is due to receive unspecified survivability upgrades, perhaps in line with add-on armor elements of the Challenger 2 LEP.

Note that MRV-P and Air Portable recovery vehicle were grouped together with two more requirements to form the Operational Support Programme (OSP). The other two components were the new Future Protected Battle Field Ambulance (FPBFA) and the Non-Articulated Vehicle – Protected (NAV-P), the vital replacement for DROPS (also known as the vehicle which went out of service at the end of 2014 but remains used in numbers anyway because the army simply can’t do without it for many things). It is not known yet if these will progress as well. The NAV-P certainly should, because it really is an indispensable piece of capability. 



Logistic storage capacity

In Summer 2016, we should finally get to hear the recommendations for where to re-locate the vehicle storage capability from the current facilities: Ashchurch and its sister site in Mönchengladbach, Germany are the 2 major controlled humidity storage sites preserving vehicles and kit for all three the Services, but government wants to close both by 2018. Clearly, a decision on where to park the thousands of items, including armored vehicles up to the Challenger 2, is an absolute necessity.

A new site, ideally located close to the Salisbury Plain training area and well connected by rail to both Marchwood and Brize Norton, is clearly required. It will be important to see what is actually done in this key area. 

Seeking a new garage

Work has already begun on the complementary storage site, the Defence Fulfillment Centre MOD Donnington, which will store and distribute food, clothing, general and medical supplies in a 80.000 square meters, two-hangars facility.

VIRTUS

With Phase 1 vests and load carrying equipment deliveries beginning, the Equipment Plan 2015 says that activities have begun for Phase 2 and Phase 3, respectively covering the development of new, advanced and lighter ballistic plates and man-worn data and power infrastructure.

Ground Based Air Defence

An anti-UAV capability demonstration was given earlier this year by SAAB to the MOD: the focus was on an Enhanced Low, Slow, and Small (ELSS) capability for the Giraffe AMB radar in service. The development of anti-UAV capability is part of Increment 2 of the Network Enabled Airspace Defence and Surveillance programme. If the schedule continues to be followed, a kinetic C-RAM capability should be acquired by 2017.  

The MOD is procuring a C4 solution for integrated air defence of the Falklands and has procured additional Giraffe AMB radars and an upgrade to the latest standard for those already in service. The fleet should now count 10 systems between radars delivered and on order.

The Phase 1 of procurement for the FLAADS(Land) batteries that will replace the current 4 Rapier batteries has begun with a contract signed in December 2014.

A new EOD robot

A new battlefield UGV for EOD work is to be procured under Project STARTER. This is curious, since I thought the recent purchase of the much celebrated CUTLASS would be enough to completely replace the old WHEELBARROWs, Evidently it is not the case. STARTER is for 56 UGVs with a further 30 options. It is meant for fire line battlefield use, and requirements include being able to fit within existing EOD vehicles, from Pinzgauers to Mastiff III EOD.

Training of aircrews

Plans for the complete renewal of the training fleets for both fixed and rotary wing fleets are progressing, and surprisingly they are doing so in complete silence. One possible explanation is that they are keeping the announcement for the SDSR, to present it as good news.

It is not, at least entirely, good news: the training fleets will be renewed, yes, but their sizes are expected to drop enormously, and there will be little to no more capability for training foreign pilots. Moreover, RAF Linton-on-Ouse is probably going to close as Basic training is moved to RAF Valley.

The SDSR should, one would expect, spend a few words to explain what will happen to the base and to the training fleets.

A “RAF Military Flying Training School” is expected to stand up in 2017 in RAF Valley, probably replacing both No 1 FTS (basic training, RAF Linton-on-Ouse) and No 4 FTS (Advanced, RAF Valley). It can be assumed with quite some confidence that the current 72(R), 208(R) and IV(R) squadrons will drop to just 2.

No 2 FTS has been re-formed in January 2014 on RAF Syerston to oversee the gliding training programme for up to 45,000 air cadets of Cadet Flights and Air Training Corps.

No 6 Flying Training School has been re-formed in September to command and manage the 15 RAF University Air Squadrons (UAS) located across the UK.

The RAF will rebuild a pipeline for training mission specialists and “back-seaters”, after losing it in 2011. The role will be covered by the same small fleet of Phenom 100 jets which will replace the Beechcraft 200 as training platform for the multi-engine pipeline.The same squadron will cover both roles, unlike what happened up to the SDSR 2010, with 55(R) Sqn using the old Dominie to deliver rear-crew training and 45(R) delivering multi-engine training.

No 3 Flying Training School at RAF Cranwell currently has 2 squadrons (16(R) and 57(R), with 16 being actually based at RAF Wittering) for elementary flying training; 115(R) Sqn (RAF Wittering) for instructor training and refresher courses and 45(R) Sqn for Multi-Engine training. The impact of the renewal of the fleet might bring further changes and downsizing.  

A new school building, with simulators and hangars for the new rotary wing training fleet is to be built by 2017 in RAF Shawbury. The details of the re-organization, and the types of helicopters that will replace Griffin and Squirrel have yet to be decided.

MPA

The big thing everyone is on the lookout for. The Sunday Times has recently reported that, just three weeks from SDSR publication, the secretary of state for defence would have stopped what was said to be a done deal for the purchase of P-8 Poseidon aircraft, throwing RAF plans in disarray. According to the Sunday Times, the SDSR will only contain an indecisive “promise” about addressing the MPA gap, perhaps through some kind of competition.

This will inexorably delay the closure of the gap and risks creating significant difficulties: top brass have warned more than once about SEEDCORN being sustainable only for a limited amount of time. The programme has recently been given a further 3 year extension, with 22 out of 36 service personnel involved deployed in the US to work on the P-8 Poseidon.

If it is true that the Secretary has suddenly awakened to the high cost of closing the MPA gap only now, after years of effort clearly targeted at boarding the Poseidon train, we have touched a new low in MOD history. This thing has been in the making literally for years now, and it is a bit late to throw everything back to square one.

I’ve talked about the MPA issue at length, so my comment at this time will be brief: there is the widespread belief that, due to money and manpower shortages, the MPA eventually acquired by the RAF will have to be a multi-ISTAR platform, coming, in particular, with a wide area surveillance, including GMTI capability sufficient for replacing Sentinel R1. In practice, the assumption is that the MPA and Protector will be accommodated using the manpower and money currently “occupied” by Sentinel R1, Shadow R1 and Predator (and then some more, probably).

For the overland surveillance requirement, the RAF will obviously look at USAF’s own experience, to try and keep the pace, so to speak. Most contenders in the JSTARS replacement race for the USAF are offering business jet platforms, size-wise, stepping down from the current huge size of the JSTARS and effectively following the general direction the RAF traced with Sentinel R1.

There is one exception: Boeing is still offering a larger aircraft, the 737-700, which is however a bit smaller than the 737-800 which is the P-8's base. The small business jet comes with the advantage of lower costs, higher altitude (good for radar range) and ability to operate from smaller airfields. However, they also come with constrained growth margins and with limited space available for systems and crew. The Sentinel R1 itself is an example: it reportedly has a growth margin as small as 700 kg, and the RAF had to renounce to fitting an air to air refueling probe which had once been in the requirements.

The main point of interest is, however, the sensor. The radar to be employed also hasn't been firmly selected yet, but one of the top contenders is the same AN/APS-154 AAS that the US Navy will put on part of its P-8 fleet for its own needs, or anyway a derivative product reportedly going by the “Skynet” name.

It will be interesting to see what choices the USAF makes, but unfortunately the JSTARS recap effort is struggling to get funding and might not progress for a while.
Key considerations to take away are: the AAS radar is a serious contender for the US JSTARS requirement and a 737 platform remains in the game.

The US Navy is working to integrate the AAS on P-8 for increased target mapping capability in the littoral and overland domains. The AN/APY-10 radar already comes with overland functionality and the P-8 as it is now is not any less of an ISTAR platform than other MPAs used over land.
It is actually probably better already. 

P-8 test flight with the AAS "canoe"

The UK requirement is for a MPA with good ASW capability and, eventually, a wide area SAR / ISAR / GMTI surveillance capability over land. The P-8 with AAS fits the requirement like a glove.

Would it be better to use a pure, high performace MPA and a smaller, higher-flying business jet with AAS for the overland role? Sure. But the UK can't realistically afford to purchase, man, operate and upgrade through life two such fleets and have reasonable numbers to work with. There is a very high risk that, at some point, two such fleets would end up locked in a fratricide struggle for funding and manpower, and one of the two would end up succumbing.  

No other MPA on offer in the world has a clear path to a wide area SAR / GMTI capability matching the AAS on P-8; no other MPA in the world has a civilian base of similar airframes and a military, international fleet as large as P-8 has; no other MPA in the world comes with tens of RAF personnel already trained / involved on it; no other MPA in the world has the kind of assured evolution path that the main MPA of the US Navy can expect to have.

There are several offers to create something that does MPA and overland ISTAR for the UK, but they all exist only on paper: the Sea Hercules, the Q-400, a UK evolution of the C-295 or P-1. They are all entirely or partially paper projects with varying degrees of risk and uncertainty.
It is a movie we’ve already seen: it starts with promises of "it'll be cheaper and better too" and then it ends in years of frustrations and cost overruns. Then, a few years later, when it is time for major upgrades, you look around for a partner to share the costs with... and while US and Australia go on with P-8, you end up alone in the room, with a Challenger 2 rifled gun and 2-piece CHARM 3 round at your side, cursing the heavens.

No MPA in the world comes ready for british weaponry, apart perhaps for the P-3 Orion of Norway, the only customer of Stingray ever.  I’m not sure if the planned integration was carried out, but even assuming it progressed, is P-3 an option / would the UK take any real advantage? No.

Integration of british-specific weaponry and equipment it is not a P-8 problem but a UK problem. Some integration of customer-specific kit is unavoidable whenever a country purchases an off-the-shelf product. Either that, or purchase of US torpedoes for P-8 use, whatever is cheaper. India decided to buy the torpedoes along with the aircraft, for example.

There is a very real risk that indecisiveness on MPA causes knock-over effects across wider ISTAR planning. If the RAF does not get P-8, money will probably tend to go to Sentinel R1 to life extend and upgrade it, leaving even less money available for a later MPA purchase. The result could end up being a horrible example of half-arsing which creates more problems than it solves.

Fast Jet squadrons

News reports lately have insistently mentioned the possibility that the SDSR will announce plans for a third F-35B squadron and two more Typhoon squadrons, the latter made possible by the retention of Tranche 1s into the 2020s (at least the first half of them). Under current plans, the Tranche 1s would be withdrawn from service by 2019 and only then would the new Tranche 3A be assigned to the squadrons.

I’ve already explained where the merits of the Tranche 1 solution are. Tornado GR4 would be more useful, but its retention is more complicated and expensive.

Assuming that the rumor is true and the Tranche 1s stay, the next big question is where does manpower come from?

The first (and possibly the only) answer is “from the Tornado fleet”, but settling the details will be complex: Typhoon will not be ready to take Tornado’s place in action for several years still, meaning that, if operations against ISIS drag on over the coming years, it will not be possible to draw down Tornado squadrons and train the personnel to move on to Typhoon. A transfer from Tornado to Typhoon does not happen overnight. The process of setting up two more Typhoon squadrons can only happen in concert with the drawdown of Tornado unless the RAF is not only given the funding for hiring more people, but manages to boost recruitment quickly and efficiently.

Even if the additional squadrons will be confirmed by the SDSR (and I certainly hope so), it’ll take quite some effort (and probably a few years) to find a way to make them happen. Two additional Typhoon squadrons would be fundamental to avoid falling to just 6 squadrons in 2020, and the Tranche 1 could act as a place holder ahead of further purchases of F-35s in the second half of the 2020s, when keeping Tranche 1s any further is likely to become a real problem.

Sentry

There are expectations about the SDSR bringing good news for the AWACS fleet too. The UK Sentry are lagging badly behind US and NATO , having not been included in the ongoing upgrade programmes for lack of money. If the problem is not addressed, the british Sentry will become more and more obsolescent and of less immediate integration within allied plans.

This is another area requiring urgent attention.

And the navy?

The Navy is a major question mark. It unfortunately starts to sound like it will be shafted once more, to some degree. Earlier optimism about being granted a manpower increase has been watered down, and there is still no real indication of what, if any, answers the SDSR will give about the fate of the River Batch 2, MARS FSS and other plans.

We are also still waiting to understand exactly what “in service” will mean for HMS Prince of Wales. 

The SDSR will reaffirm the objective of putting into service 13 Type 26 frigates, but in the facts we can only really expect the order for the first batch, of just 3 ships, with a contract expected in early 2016. It seems almost certain that the other two batches of 5 ships each will be left for future parliaments. With the last Type 26 due in service in 2035/36 and with the government having decided to go for a procurement in small successive batches instead of the hoped-for contract for 13, or even the earler "ASW batch" of 8 in one go, we can expect the uncertainty about the final number of frigates to be a fact of life for many years. 

No ship is expected to be axed, but probably the out of service date for HMS Ocean will be confirmed as 2018/19 (not necessarily saying it into the SDSR document, of course). 

The Navy is very likely to be asked to provide one carrier group presence in the Gulf with a certain regularity. This will be particularly welcomed by the US Navy, which probably wants the UK’s help to be free to focus its own carrier groups more on the Pacific, without leaving the Middle East uncovered.

The new british base to be built in Bahrain will help support this role as well as the enduring operation Kipion presence, with its significant MCM element.