Showing posts with label HMS Ocean. Show all posts
Showing posts with label HMS Ocean. Show all posts

Friday, August 25, 2017

Road to Carrier Enabled Power Projection


The ships

HMS Queen Elizabeth will be in port for a few more weeks before heading out for another round of trials. There is still plenty to do: the ship has not yet received its weapons (Phalanx CIWS mounts and DS30M 30mm guns), for example. While she is in port she is getting further elements of the deck visual aids installed, and there will be no doubt further touch-ups on the list. Judging from CGIs and from the metallic frame well visible, the forward island should get a large display which is still missing. When she goes out to sea again, she’ll be more complete.

Testing the Firefighting Foam Spray system 

Testing the pre-wetting system for CBRN washdown 

There is still plenty to be tested, too. So far, Queen Elizabeth has not used her Mission System. Only navigation radars have been in use, while Artisan and LRR have been kept motionless. The next phase of trials will almost certainly focus on this area, to get to the point when the Royal Navy can commission her. That should happen by the end of the year or in early 2018. As of now, the Queen Elizabeth is still contractor owned and does not fly the White Ensign.






A further period of defect rectification and capability insertion is planned for next year. That’s when the F-35 related kit, beginning with the ALIS computers and ending, probably, with the planned complement of mission simulators to be carried onboard at all times.
The Instrument Carrier Landing System (ICLS) AN/SPN-41/41A, which provides all weather instrument approach guidance from the ship to the aircraft, might also only appear onboard during this period of works. Currently, the space reserved for the AN/SPN-41 Azimuth aerial is still empty.
The AN/SPN-41 is found on all American aircraft carriers, LHDs and LHA, as well as on the Italian carrier Cavour. It has a large, flat antenna installed on the stern of the carrier, for the provision of Azimuth data, and a second element, for elevation, found normally on the back of the island.
The particularly powerful and hot downwash of an F-35B coming in for a vertical landing has however introduced the necessity for appropriate shielding of the Azimuth component. The three vessels that the US Navy has so far refitted for F-35B operations (USS Wasp, USS America and USS Essex) are a good example: their stern area has been re-arranged, moving some equipment around (Phalanx CIWS mounts, most notably) and building a protective box around other pieces, including the 41’s antenna.
On HMS Queen Elizabeth, the 41 Azimuth component is contained within a specially designed sponson which was rapidly worked into the design and into the building process after the MOD requested it in November 2013, when the F-35 had completed two periods of Development Trials at sea on USS Wasp (DT-1 in October 2011 and DT-2 in august 2013.

The AN/SPN-41 is among the systems that still have to be installed 

Other equipment yet to be filled includes the Height Indicator Hover Aid Thermometer (HIHAT) which will appear on the forward island. A good view of the main Landing Aid lights and tools is available in the brochure by AGI, which produces them and is working right now on QE in Portsmouth. 

Meanwhile, on September 8, the second ship in class will be named with a ceremony in Rosyth which will see the Royal Lancers, affiliated to the ship, proving a spear Guard.


The USS America as commissioned (top) and following F-35B modifications applied in 2015 (bottom). The shielding of the AN/SPN-41 is evident. Phalanx has moved, with RAM replacing it. This might indicate that RAM is less vulnerable to hot downwash. 

Ship boats for both carriers are in delivery or on order. Four purpose-built boats have been ordered for Queen Elizabeth, and two (named Swordfish and Buccaneer) have already been delivered.

Queen Elizabeth's boat




Ship boats and RHIBs are carried in fully enclosed bays in the sponsons


Prince of Wales, instead, will receive three boats from the recent contract for “up to 38” workboats of the SEA class. The workboat contracts includes 33 firm orders and 5 options. Included in the firm order are three boats for Prince of Wales, while the options include 3 more boats of the same kind.
For general interest, the SEA class will include 10 workboats (for delivery in Fiscal Year 2018 (5), 2019 (3) and 2020 (2)), 3 passenger transfer boats plus 3 options, 7 Dive Support Boats (3 in 2019, 3 in 2020), 6 officer training boats plus 2 options, for delivery in 2020 and 2021; 3 survey motor boats (Medium) and 3 Survey motor boats (Small).


SEA class workboats are modular and come in 11, 13, 15 and 18 meters lenght. 

SafeHaven Marine will deliver the largest boat, a 18-meter WILDCAT60 derivative which will be delivered in May 2018 and will replace the current HMS Gleaner, which is soon to leave service after carrying out key survey work to chart the course out of Rosyth and into Portsmouth for the carriers.

At 18 meters, the replacement will be a big bigger than the current HMS Gleaner 



Capability build up

Things will get more interesting next year. HMS Queen Elizabeth is expected to put to sea between January and March 2018 for Rotary Wing trials and first embarkation of a Special Purpose Task Group of Royal Marines. The aim is to land Merlin HC4, Apache, Chinook and Wildcat on the ship and validate the employment of a rotary wing air group and of an embarked component of Marines up to Company-group size.

By August 2018, HMS Queen Elizabeth should achieve IOC as LPH. It is the Royal Navy’s intention to always embark a Royal Marines SPTG of anything between 50 and 300 marines supported by at least a “unit of action” of up to 4 Merlin HC4 from 845 NAS. The SPTG provides the carrier with a response force that can quickly move ashore for raids, evacuations of british personnel and, crucially, for recovery of downed pilots and recovery or destruction of valuable equipment lost in enemy territory. The F-35 is highly valuable technology and cannot be allowed to fall into enemy hands other than in very small pieces. Development of a Joint Personnel Recovery Capability within 3 Commando Brigade is well underway, and the RAF Regiment is working on JPR training of its own.

This period of early LPH trials and experimentation will be followed by the already mentioned period in port for technology insertion, which is meant to prepare the ship for First of Class Flying Trials. Queen Elizabeth will set sail for the US East Coast in the autumn. HMS Montrose is currently expected to escort her there.

The Royal Navy anticipates to send QE loaded with a Royal Marines force including a composite rotary wing air component. This will move inland for exercises alongside the US Marine Corps, while QE will embark 2 instrumented F-35Bs and 4 pilots for 8 weeks of tests and evaluation. Highlight of the trials will be the experimentation of the Short Rolling Vertical Landing technique, which is of routine use ashore but that, for the shipboard side, represents an innovation and something that has so far been trialed only in simulation.
In March 2018, 617 Squadron will formally stand up in Beaufort, in the US, in time to celebrate the 75th anniversary of the Dambusters.
In June 2018 the Sqn will begin its extraction from Beaufort, with a first group of 4 aircraft flying to Marham, followed by other waves by August. By December, 617 Sqn should achieve Land IOC with 9 aircraft in Marham.
5 more aircraft and around 50 personnel will remain in Beaufort until the summer of 2019 to repay the USMC of the collaboration and literally provide back training flying hours. They’ll then move to RAF Marham in time for the stand-up of 207 Sqn, the OCU for the Lightning fleet, in July 2019.
3 Instrumented aircraft (BK-1, BK-2 and BK-4) will remain in Edwards AFB with 17(R) Sqn for test, development and evaluation purpose.

By the summer of 2019, work should be complete on the new Integrated Training Centre being built in Marham. It will have 4 networked full mission simulators, and the hope is to hook them up as soon as possible with Typhoon simulators in Coningsby and Lossiemouth as well as with USAF F-35A simulators at Lakenheath and elsewhere, to enable large-scale collaborative operations within the training simulation.
By then, Marham will also have 3 vertical landing pads; a hangar for deep maintenance, a facility for maintenance and monitoring of the health of the stealth coating and a new National Operating Centre hosting the UK ALIS infrastructure as well as the Lightning Force HQ, offices and other key supports. Drive-through sun shelters will be installed in the area destined to 617 and 207 Sqns operations, and existing Hardened Aircraft Shelters upgraded for F-35 compatibility.
The runways (one of 9500 and one of 6500 feet) will be resurfaced and the shorter one will have an area specifically configured as STOVL strip.

The Hardened Aircraft Shelters for 617 Sqn, to the left, and the 207 Sqn OCU area, including the Integrated Training Centre, to the right

The OCU facilities are entirely new builds, developed on brown land 

The ITC 

Maintenance facility, being built in place of the old No3 hangar. Another engineering facility replaces the old No1 as well. 

From the journal of RAF Marham, the progress in the build 


Project ANVIL is a massive infrastructure improvement


In the summer / autumn of 2019, the intention is to embark 617 Sqn and sail in UK waters for squadron-level trials and certifications.
In 2020 this will be followed by a larger exercise combining 617 Sqn with the other elements of the air wing (Merlin from 820 NAS; CROWSNEST from 849 NAS and so along) and of the surface task group, in order to reach IOC Carrier.




Finally, in 2021, Queen Elizabeth and her task group are expected to set sail for the first major operational deployment away from home.

The UK has received 11 F-35B so far, and by the end of the year they will be 14. 3 more aircraft will be delivered next year (BK-15, 16, 17), while BK-18 will follow in 2019, alone, as the MOD ordered a single aircraft within LRIP 11.
3 will follow within LRIP 13, for delivery in 2020. 6 more in 2021, 8 in 2022 and 7 in 2023. By the end of 2023 the UK will have 42 F-35B, of which 24 will be in frontline units as 809 NAS stands-up.
6 more aircraft will follow in 2024, so that by January 2025 the UK will have taken delivery of 48 F-35B.
The number of aircraft effectively embarked will depend on the Routine Operating Model that will be written down.

The profile of orders beyond Lot 16 (deliveries in 2024) is not yet known. The latest Major Projects Report released by the MOD has the F-35 programme end date as 31 March 2035. To receive all of the promised total of 138 aircraft by then, the MOD should place the last order in 2033, as two years pass between order and delivery.
Beginning in 2023 and ending in 2033, the MOD would have to order 8 - 9 aircraft per year. Not a particularly ambitious target, yet a non insignificant one for a ministry in perennial budget crisis.
The greatest threat for the future of embarked fixed wing aviation is the Split Buy idea that continues to float around as very real threat. More on the split buy danger here.
Within the Joint Force, the manpower split is currently expected to hover at around 58 to 42% in favor of the RAF, but with the Squadron’s commanders alternating by Service.
There is every intention to have a permanent exchange programme in place with the USMC, as used to happen with the Harrier, with one UK instructor in Beaufort within the USMC OCU, and a USMC instructor in the UK within 207(R) Sqn.

For expeditionary operations, the UK has the same kind of ambitions as the USMC. AM-2 matting stocks are expected to be rebuilt, and Royal Engineers should already be involved in USMC expeditionary airfield training at 29 Palms as this is being written. Next year, a landing strip and pad should appear in Kinloss, home of the Air Support engineers.

Training of deck handlers is carried out at the School of Flight Deck Operations at Culdrose, on the “HMS Siskin”, the dummy carrier deck modified for the new QEC age. 4 training mock-ups of the F-35B have been procured, and thanks to water tanks inside their structure they can replicate the various weights of different load-outs. They are also equipped with cockpits suitable for training of emergency extraction of injured pilots. Old Sea Harriers, which do not fly but which have working engines, are used to prepare personnel to the noise and hazards typical of flight deck operations. The School includes a special simulator, an enclosed space where personnel can train safely for fire emergencies.


4 Ground Training Aids, Sea Harriers and real helicopters are used for deck training

Since late 2015 the School also includes a new Flight Deck Training Simulator which allows flight deck crews to simulate every aspect of deck operations. Fire fighting & engineering emergencies, aircraft refuelling, marshalling and multi-spot landings can be simulated as well as changing sea states and day and night conditions.

In terms of capability of the F-35B, the UK is looking ahead to Block IV software and hardware updates, for integration in four successive incremenets (4.1 to 4.4) between 2021 and 2025/26. The full list of upgrades and additions is still being finalized by the Pentagon, but for the UK Block IV is defined by integration of the latest mark of ASRAAM (New Build, or Block 6 if you prefer); of the bunker-buster warhead variant for Paveway IV; of Meteor and SPEAR 3.
Block IV should give the F-35 full video downlink capability as well as swap the current EOTS targeting / FLIR assembly with the Advanced EOTS which offer a greater resolution, a new TV camera, an IR pointer and a lead-in laser for improved moving target engagement capability with laser-guided bombs.
A new processor (Technology Refresh 3, TR3, as opposed to current in-production aircraft which use the TR2, which supplanted the earlier TR1) a new cockpit display by Elbit are expected in Block 4.2.
Significant improvements to the engine, which would make it more powerful and reduce consumption of fuel by a good 5%, have been proposed but it is not yet known if there will be room to actually take such mods aboard in the Block IV programme, which is already quite extensive especially due to the long list of weapons to be added.

The IOC will be attained with Block 3F instead, which will begin to roll out in the coming months, and which brings integration of 2 ASRAAM for external carriage as well as up to 6 Paveway IV (2 internal, 4 external), plus of course 2 internal AMRAAM (or 4 if no bombs are carried internally).
The UK chose to wait out on the gun pods and only bring them aboard with Block IV, even though they will be cleared with 3F.

Phase 2 Ski Jump trials are underway at Patuxent River. Here a F-35B launches with a heavy ASRAAM and Paveway IV external load for the first time. Asymmetric loads and high wind launches are also being validated. 

On the amphibious side of things, the Royal Navy is working to embody some unspecified modifications and enhancements on Prince of Wales with the aim of getting it to a “LPH FOC” status in 2023.
This is a larger scale capability than the SPTG embarked on QE. Prince of Wales will embark two company groups of Royal Marines with stores and some vehicles / light guns as well as a large composite wing of helicopters for their insertion and support. It will be the de-facto replacement of HMS Ocean (which bows out early next year) and will be at the heart of the amphibious task group. With Prince of Wales, 1 LPD and at least 2 of the Bay-class LSDs the Navy intends to deliver the same 1800-strong Lead Commando Battlegroup envisaged today, with a greater rotary wing support.
The Lead Commando Battlegroup is meant to insert simultaneously a Company group by air assault and a mechanized company group mounted on Viking vehicles by landing craft from the LPD and LSDs.




The other companies and supporting elements would follow in subsequent waves.
Prince of Wales will be able to simultaneously launch 10 to 14 helicopters per wave thanks to her vast deck.
The modifications introduced on Prince of Wales should then be applied to Queen Elizabeth during her first refit around 2026.

The Navy intends to hold the aircraft carrier at Very High Readiness (5 days notice to move) with the “LPH” at High Readiness (20 to 30 days notice to move). For major deployments / operations, the two carriers would deploy together.
There will be, however, periods in which only one ship is available as the other enters refit. During those periods it will be more frequent to see mixed air wings including a smaller number of F-35Bs and a greater number of Marines and helicopters.


In conclusion 

The current plan is good. There is a lot of work to do, but the project looks solid and it is particularly reassuring to see the planned development of the amphibious capability, since the loss of HMS Ocean would otherwise have catastrophic consequences for the UK’s capabilities in this area. Now we have to hope that no new budget cuts come to knock pieces off this plan, and that the split buy idea is killed off, at least until after 4 squadrons of F-35B have been formed. 4 squadrons plus OCU are the current long-term plan and already it represents arguably a bare minimum target for a capable, sustainable fleet which must be able to generate a substantial deployable force. A split buy would greatly harm the entire project and dramatically reduce the UK’s ability to actually put jets on the deck.

An important element coming up is the MARS Solid Support Ship which must replace the old Fort Austin, Fort Rosalie and Fort Victoria around the middle of the 2020s. 
Next month might provide some clues about this programme as well as Type 31 since the Shipbuilding strategy should (finally!) be released. The MOD plans to brief industry about Type 31 at DSEI, on September 7. 
Contract award for MARS Solid Support is expected in 2020. These large ships, fitted with Heavy Replenishment At Sea rigs, will carry the stores, ammunition and spare parts needed to keep the carrier group going. Their role in support of amphibious operations will also be important, so details of their design and of the acquisition schedule are eagerly awaited. 





Wednesday, August 13, 2014

Solving the Ocean problem



The LPH(R) program has been dead for several years now, and like it or not it is officially down to the carrier(s) to replace the capabilities currently brought to the table by HMS Ocean. Now alone in the LPH / Commando Carrier role, with HMS Illustrious going out of service, the newly refitted HMS Ocean is almost certainly on the last leg of her life. Her OSD is likely to be confirmed for 2018, and the carrier, hopefully but not certainly the both of them, will have to accomodate her role into their schedule as well, or the Royal Marines risk to face a grim future. 

Since 2010, years of effort to build up the most complete and credible amphibious capability in Europe have been squandered and crumbled by reductions in shipping, in supports, in vehicles and landing craft projects. Having recently re-read "3 Commando Brigade in the Falklands No PicNic", by Major General Julian Thompson RM, it is very much alarming to see how the last three years have brought back the Marines on the same dangerous edge of destruction they faced in the early 80s.
The brigade today would have much the same problems it had in 1982, which means, to my cynic mind, that 31 years have been largely wasted and no lesson has actually been learned firmly enough to avoid falling back into the same old pits. The brigade was desperately short of helicopters back then, and would have even less today: 847 NAS is going to have just four, perhaps six on deployment Wildcat helicopters, and the Sea King HC4s (which was new in 1982, and is very old today) are far less than back then. Their replacement, hopefully fully online by 2020, will be of just 25 Merlin HC4 in total.
Save for the introduction of Viking and some other kit, the brigade has less of everything: less light guns, less helicopters. The loss of HMS Ocean and the incoherent, messy plans for embarked fixed wing aviation would put the brigade back in the same position as in 1982: no air superiority, no adequate air reconnaissance, little in the ways of air support, and no appropriate helicopter support ship for amphibious operations.

The Royal Navy is probably not without its faults. Thompson in his book remembers how the Navy already in 1970, pressed by cuts and budget problems, tried to halve the number of Commandos from the then 4 down to 2. Ironically, back then it was the Army's opposition that prevented that from happening.
In 1980, the Navy tried again, because faced by the cost of the submarine-borne nuclear deterrent (see the similarities? There's the Successor SSBN on the horizon...) and by a very limited and precise sets of roles assigned in the Cold War scenarios by a MOD 100% focused on Germany and convinced that out of area operations would never happen again. Instead of directly proposing the disbandment of Commando units, the Navy focused then on axing the amphibious shipping (again, see the similarities...). Thompson was told so in December 1981 by First Sea Lord Henry Leach. Not without sadness, of course, but that was the direction the Navy was inclined to follow to preserve other parts of its "body". Argentina's hurried, foolish move came a few months early: had they let the winter pass, and acted later, the carriers and amphibious ships would have all vanished, victims of cuts, and the islands today would be named Malvinas.

The Royal Marines of today are precious to the Navy. Their involvment in Afghanistan has made the whole navy proud and has kept the admirals at the table. During 3rd Commando Brigade tours in Afghanistan, up to 40% of the total british involvement in Afghanistan was covered by the Navy. In a land locked country. This was an immense demonstration of how flexible and full-spectrum the navy is, one aspect that should very much be used to reinforce the case for maritime power investment when sitting at the budget table. Investing in the Navy does not and should not mean "just" ships. There are excellent reasons for making the Navy the centre of what is supposed to be an expeditionary armed forces structure.

Moreover, the flexibility of the RN Response Force Task Group has been proven multiple times since the SDSR came out, with the quick response to events in Libya and, to a lesser degree, to Sirya, and then the Philippines natural disaster. 
In a time in which Her Majesty's Government wishes to continue to play a big role on the international stage while avoiding to put boots on the ground in a traditional, expensive and risky way, the unique ability of the Response Force Task Group to bring enduring, self-supporting power (land, sea, air) without having to actually "go all in", is a major premium that needs to be highlighted, understood, funded and exploited.  

The Navy HQ is, this time, on the Marines's side, thankfully. The involvment of Navy HQ in the fight to save 148 Meiktila and 24 Cdo Eng is telling, in this sense, and has had some success, with both being (at least partially) saved from the chop. 1st Sea Lord Zambellas has said recently while speaking in the US that he sees a strong case for the Marines, and that he does not expect further reductions, but actually thinks there's a case for growth. 
I absolutely agree, but despite the nice words, the many problems remain and the way ahead isn't clearly marked.
Only recently, the cuts in manpower to supporting elements of 29 Commando Royal Artillery (REME in particular) have forced the commander to decide that the planned retention of 3 gun batteries is pretty much unachievable. 7 (Alma) Battery is to leave Arbroath (save for a Fire Support Group which continues to fly the flag, possibly to avoid scottish rage!) to retreat to Plymouth, where it will join the pooled resources left to the gun batteries, to task-generate one battery to support the Response Force Task Group. 
As always, the shortage of supporting elements stemming from Army 2020 comes out in the light: and again i ask, what use 31 infantry battalions if to keep all of them they have to be small and scrawny, while also affecting disproportionately the supporting elements that make them deployable and useful in the first place...?

The Army, faced with its own painful cuts, is rowing against the Marines as it has been trying to redirect cuts away from its main formations. The cuts to 3rd Commando Brigade army supports were originally planned to be even worse, and thankfully Navy HQ stood up firm for once, and avoided the worse scenario becoming true. The parts have inverted from the 80s, but the Royal Marines still sit in the middle, in an uncomfortable position. 
The Royal Navy itself, while supportive, is stretched far too thin in manpower and budget terms, has accepting tough reductions in amphibious shipping capability despite its support for the Marines, and the senior service notoriously faces an uphill struggle in manning figures over the coming years, which put both the second carrier and the three new OPVs in danger: the first might "enter service" only partially, being tied mothballed most of the time and only pulled into activity when the other hits refit time (like with the LPDs HMS Albion and HMS Bulwark post-SDSR 2010); the seconds might end up being brought into service at the expense of early decommissioning of the three River class vessels currently in service. Despite them having entered service as early as 2003 and despite a 39 million investment in 2012 to purchase them outright, as they earlier were contractor owned and given to the Navy on lease. 
I fear this is a defining moment: the SDSR 2015, despite the optimism of some, is highly unlikely to be a happy rebirth of defence. It'll be a matter of new, painful choices. May the 350th birthday not be the last of the Royal Marines as we know them.

Under Carrier Enabled Power Projection it has been effectively written in stone that it will be down to the carriers to absob the amphibious force's aviation requirements, as the previous practice of geographically separated Amphibious Group and Carrier Group has been cancelled as unaffordable, and replaced by the all-singing all-dancing Response Force Task Group. A number of studies have been launched as a consequence, and most of them are centered on the carriers.
HMS Queen Elizabeth's commander has said in its Twitter answering event a while ago that carrying LCVP landing crafts in the boat bays is being considered for the future; a study is underway (or has finished, the wording in the reports does not make it too clear) on how to organize and paint the deck of QE to provide 10 spots for simultaneous helicopter operations (up from an initial design of 6 very large spots. There are, anyway, 12 deck positions serviced to serve as aircraft / helicopter operation positions).
The carrier has room for 250 Royal Marines and can carry more depending on how the air wing is shaped (and the related manpower figure changes consequently); using the boat embarkation area aft of QE for some Marines to boat transfers will probably be investigated as well. 


The 200-pages book let out by the Royal Navy in occasion of the naming of QE also adds that using some of the available space to increase EMF accommodation and support spaces at the first refit is being looked at. There will be a lot of work to be done to certify ships spaces and facilities for the Embarked Military Force's helicopters, stores and ammunition.
An indicative all-LPH TAG has been defined as a flight of 3 Chinook, 12 Merlin HC4, 8 Apache and 6 Wildcat; while an Hybrid air group comprising 6 - 12 F-35B plus helicopters for a Commando group is being studied.
(see pages 68 and 69).

The vehicles capability of HMS Ocean is not particularly noticeable, and anyway it was relatively often out of the picture when HMS Illustrious or another of the CVSs served as Commando carriers. As was to be expected ever since her sister was not built. So in itself this will not be too much of a blow, while certainly not helpful. 

HMS Ocean's capability to carry light and medium vehicles, and deploy them to the shore, is quite limited. The vehicle deck is small, and the vehicles can only drive down to landing crafts thanks to a ramp and a floating, folding pontoon that the ship carries on deck and deploys in the water by crane.
The vehicle deck, (53) is small. There is a ramp leading to the flight deck, one leading to the stern exit, and a RoRo ramp in the side for port embarkation / disembarkation
The floating pontoon can be seen on deck in this photo. The exit of the flight deck vehicle ramp can also be seen. The pontoon, folded, is carried on top of the structure of the ramp's exit.
The side RoRo ramp for embarkation
 
HMS Illustrious, serving in the Commando Carrier role, has no RoRo ramps or vehicle deck. Still, it has been seen embarking small numbers of vehicles, including BV206s as in this photo. Helicopter delivery to the shore via Chinook, though, becomes the only available option.

There is also a chance to absorb some or all of the negative impact depending on how MARS FSS shapes up to be: the Fleet Solid Support requirement has merged with the previously separated Combat Support Ship Auxiliary (earlier called the Joint Sea Based Logistics, a ship that would have been designed and built specifically to support ground forces ashore with stores, vehicles and afloat maintenance workshops) and the early designs the MOD and the industries of the Naval Design Partnership have put together include carrying a couple of LCVPs and having a RoRo deck with steel beach or even a well dock, giving some very real capability to carry and deploy ashores stores and even vehicles. Depending on if and how MARS FSS progresses post SDSR 2015, the problems might be in large part ironed out. 


The early concept for MARS Fleet Solid Support would help plug the gaps in amphibious capability, making it twice as important. Her new generation Heavy RAS equipment and vast cargo holds already make this vessel extremely important to support the logistic requirements of the carriers in high intensity ops.

The next SDSR will be a turning point of huge proportions. And the navy desperately needs to get this one right.



There is always some room for dreams, as long as you remember what reality is like.

A perfect solution would be to have HMG get serious about sanctions versus Russia, by exploiting the unique chance represented by the two Mistrals being built by France. It is painful to observe how well things could slot into place, if there was the money and political will to place such a blow. The two vessels could probably be taken up and re-fitted with RN communications, weapons and essential kit to enter in service in 2016 and in 2018: the first could replace the LPDs Albion and Bulwark. 
In 2016, Albion is expected to be re-activated from her current sorry state in HMS Tamar, Devonport, by removing the seals and controlled humidity kit that keeps her dormant and, hopefully, well preserved and by re-storing her to bring her back into active service. Bulwark, which would hit her refit point that year, would be mothballed in her place. 
The first Mistral could be used to replace the LPDs, and it would be a painful (they are still young ships) but actually pretty advantageous trade, capability-wise. The Mistrals have greater troop and vehicle cargo spaces, a well dock of equivalent capability, and, crucially, a hangar and flight deck allowing them to be a replacement for Ocean at the same time. On the other hand, Mistrals have no davits for LCVPs. 

The vehicle deck of Dixmunde, french Mistral-class LHD, used to bring armoured vehicles to Mali

The vehicles / cargo spaces are much larger than on the Albion-class LPDs

The cost would be (partially) offset by doing away with the need to refit the LPDs any further, and by a substantial reduction in the number of LCVPs. The second Mistral, in 2018, would directly replace HMS Ocean, and two ships would replace three, of different types. 

HMS Bulwark's vehicle deck. The ramp in the centre leads up to the flight deck. Beyond the ramp, there's the well dock with the LCUs. Behind the standing officer, there's the side RoRo ramp of access.
the dock of HMS Bulwark. Rolls of Trackway and BV206 vehicles can be seen in first line in the vehicle deck.

It would be a more than happy trade in terms of capability, but not financially fair enough to make the plan cost-neutral. Which is the reason why this scenario is a dream. It is a semi-serious, dreamy suggestion due to the high and sudden up-front cost of taking the ships and fit them out for RN use. 

Then again, it would be a great investment for the future.