A few more force structure updates

In the last few days some more force structure plans have been announced. Firstly, RAF Odiham has now officially said that the Chinook OCU Flight will migrate to RAF Benson next year. This is the "minimum" assured measure, with the possibility of further Chinook elements going to Benson during 2016 as the HC6 comes fully online.
There is not yet a formalized plan to form an additional squadron, though. The Chinook OCU Flight could be put into a new OCU squadron comprising the Puma HC2's own OCU Flight. The use of a new standard, or the standard from one of the disbanding RAF Merlin HC3 squadrons are both possibilities. For now, absorbing the Chinook OCU Flight into one of the two Puma squadrons is another possibility.

My hope (and ultimately my belief) is that one of the standards from the disbanding Merlin force will go to a new 2-type OCU squadron. Of course, this, like everything else, also depends on the next SDSR: if the reports of new huge cuts to come are proven right, there's no telling what will be left after the slaughter.

Meanwhile, the last Chinook HC2 has gone into factory for the upgrade to HC4 back in September 2014. The HC3s are to follow, to be upgraded into HC5s to complete the JULIUS fleet-wide upgrade programme.



Elsewhere, we have finally a clue about the future of the Reserve special forces regiments. Rumors have been circulating for a long while, and now it has been officially announced that both 21 and 23 SAS have re-subordinated to the new Intelligence and Surveilllance brigade. The effect of this move on their status as special forces elements is unclear, but the units are being assigned the new specialized role known as HERA, for Human Environment Reconnaissance and Analysis. The reserve special forces patrols will be required to observe and understand the human dimension of the battlefield.

The same role will in part fall on the Honourable Artillery Company as well. The HAC will still be paired to 5 Regiment Royal Artillery and will keep its Ground Based ISTAR role, operating sensors and counter-artillery radars and providing covert observation patrols.
The covert observation patrols, used to reinforce the capability provided by the regulars of 473 Sphinx Battery, 5 Regiment RA, come from 1 (Special OP) Sqn. These patrols will have a HERA focus as well.

2 Squadron and 3 Squadron are in GB ISTAR role, and are paired with P and 93 Batteries in 5 Regiment RA.
The HAC is also getting back the gun role that it lost a few years ago: a Gun Troop has been reformed, with some 35 men and three L118 Light Guns, to provide a reserve capability to 7 Royal Horse Artillery in the air assault role. 7 RHA has lost its reserve gun battery as part of Army 2020, and is now getting back a small depth thanks to a reserve troop coming from the HAC.

29 Commando Royal Artillery is looking to stand up its own Reserve Artillery Troop, as it suffers the same problem.



Meanwhile, in 104 Logistic Brigade, the 2 Operational Support Group has been formed. Based in Prince William of Gloucester Barracks, Grantham, this reserve unit is composed of:

498 Labour Support Unit; which brings specific competencies to manage contractors and locally employed civilians during operations abroad

497 Operational Support Unit; which brings high level logistic planning expertise.

499 Contract Management Unit

Communications Troop; supports deployable field hospitals with a communications capability



Elsewhere in the Reserve, 295 (Hampshire Battery), 106 Regiment RA has formed to operate the Stormer HVM anti-air missile system.
In Germany, as 28 Regiment Royal Engineers is disbanded and the wide wet gap crossing capability moves to the reserves of 75 RE, the 23 Amphibious Engineer Troop is temporarily moving to Minden, in Germany, alongside the german regiment equipped with the same M3 rigs.
Reservists from 75 Regiment will regularly visit the Troop in Germany to train on the M3 on the river Weser, until 23 Amphibious Engineer Troop can move back to the UK, to Halton training camp. The move is planned to take place by November 2016.

Solving the Ocean problem

The LPH(R) program has been dead for several years now, and like it or not it is officially down to the carrier(s) to replace the capabilities currently brought to the table by HMS Ocean. Now alone in the LPH / Commando Carrier role, with HMS Illustrious going out of service, the newly refitted HMS Ocean is almost certainly on the last leg of her life. Her OSD is likely to be confirmed for 2018, and the carrier, hopefully but not certainly the both of them, will have to accomodate her role into their schedule as well, or the Royal Marines risk to face a grim future. 

Since 2010, years of effort to build up the most complete and credible amphibious capability in Europe have been squandered and crumbled by reductions in shipping, in supports, in vehicles and landing craft projects. Having recently re-read "3 Commando Brigade in the Falklands No PicNic", by Major General Julian Thompson RM, it is very much alarming to see how the last three years have brought back the Marines on the same dangerous edge of destruction they faced in the early 80s.
The brigade today would have much the same problems it had in 1982, which means, to my cynic mind, that 31 years have been largely wasted and no lesson has actually been learned firmly enough to avoid falling back into the same old pits. The brigade was desperately short of helicopters back then, and would have even less today: 847 NAS is going to have just four, perhaps six on deployment Wildcat helicopters, and the Sea King HC4s (which was new in 1982, and is very old today) are far less than back then. Their replacement, hopefully fully online by 2020, will be of just 25 Merlin HC4 in total.
Save for the introduction of Viking and some other kit, the brigade has less of everything: less light guns, less helicopters. The loss of HMS Ocean and the incoherent, messy plans for embarked fixed wing aviation would put the brigade back in the same position as in 1982: no air superiority, no adequate air reconnaissance, little in the ways of air support, and no appropriate helicopter support ship for amphibious operations.

The Royal Navy is probably not without its faults. Thompson in his book remembers how the Navy already in 1970, pressed by cuts and budget problems, tried to halve the number of Commandos from the then 4 down to 2. Ironically, back then it was the Army's opposition that prevented that from happening.
In 1980, the Navy tried again, because faced by the cost of the submarine-borne nuclear deterrent (see the similarities? There's the Successor SSBN on the horizon...) and by a very limited and precise sets of roles assigned in the Cold War scenarios by a MOD 100% focused on Germany and convinced that out of area operations would never happen again. Instead of directly proposing the disbandment of Commando units, the Navy focused then on axing the amphibious shipping (again, see the similarities...). Thompson was told so in December 1981 by First Sea Lord Henry Leach. Not without sadness, of course, but that was the direction the Navy was inclined to follow to preserve other parts of its "body". Argentina's hurried, foolish move came a few months early: had they let the winter pass, and acted later, the carriers and amphibious ships would have all vanished, victims of cuts, and the islands today would be named Malvinas.

The Royal Marines of today are precious to the Navy. Their involvment in Afghanistan has made the whole navy proud and has kept the admirals at the table. During 3rd Commando Brigade tours in Afghanistan, up to 40% of the total british involvement in Afghanistan was covered by the Navy. In a land locked country. This was an immense demonstration of how flexible and full-spectrum the navy is, one aspect that should very much be used to reinforce the case for maritime power investment when sitting at the budget table. Investing in the Navy does not and should not mean "just" ships. There are excellent reasons for making the Navy the centre of what is supposed to be an expeditionary armed forces structure.

Moreover, the flexibility of the RN Response Force Task Group has been proven multiple times since the SDSR came out, with the quick response to events in Libya and, to a lesser degree, to Sirya, and then the Philippines natural disaster. 

In a time in which Her Majesty's Government wishes to continue to play a big role on the international stage while avoiding to put boots on the ground in a traditional, expensive and risky way, the unique ability of the Response Force Task Group to bring enduring, self-supporting power (land, sea, air) without having to actually "go all in", is a major premium that needs to be highlighted, understood, funded and exploited.  

The Navy HQ is, this time, on the Marines's side, thankfully. The involvment of Navy HQ in the fight to save 148 Meiktila and 24 Cdo Eng is telling, in this sense, and has had some success, with both being (at least partially) saved from the chop. 1st Sea Lord Zambellas has said recently while speaking in the US that he sees a strong case for the Marines, and that he does not expect further reductions, but actually thinks there's a case for growth. 

I absolutely agree, but despite the nice words, the many problems remain and the way ahead isn't clearly marked.

Only recently, the cuts in manpower to supporting elements of 29 Commando Royal Artillery (REME in particular) have forced the commander to decide that the planned retention of 3 gun batteries is pretty much unachievable. 7 (Alma) Battery is to leave Arbroath (save for a Fire Support Group which continues to fly the flag, possibly to avoid scottish rage!) to retreat to Plymouth, where it will join the pooled resources left to the gun batteries, to task-generate one battery to support the Response Force Task Group. 

As always, the shortage of supporting elements stemming from Army 2020 comes out in the light: and again i ask, what use 31 infantry battalions if to keep all of them they have to be small and scrawny, while also affecting disproportionately the supporting elements that make them deployable and useful in the first place...?

The Army, faced with its own painful cuts, is rowing against the Marines as it has been trying to redirect cuts away from its main formations. The cuts to 3rd Commando Brigade army supports were originally planned to be even worse, and thankfully Navy HQ stood up firm for once, and avoided the worse scenario becoming true. The parts have inverted from the 80s, but the Royal Marines still sit in the middle, in an uncomfortable position. 

The Royal Navy itself, while supportive, is stretched far too thin in manpower and budget terms, has accepting tough reductions in amphibious shipping capability despite its support for the Marines, and the senior service notoriously faces an uphill struggle in manning figures over the coming years, which put both the second carrier and the three new OPVs in danger: the first might "enter service" only partially, being tied mothballed most of the time and only pulled into activity when the other hits refit time (like with the LPDs HMS Albion and HMS Bulwark post-SDSR 2010); the seconds might end up being brought into service at the expense of early decommissioning of the three River class vessels currently in service. Despite them having entered service as early as 2003 and despite a 39 million investment in 2012 to purchase them outright, as they earlier were contractor owned and given to the Navy on lease. 

I fear this is a defining moment: the SDSR 2015, despite the optimism of some, is highly unlikely to be a happy rebirth of defence. It'll be a matter of new, painful choices. May the 350th birthday not be the last of the Royal Marines as we know them.

Under Carrier Enabled Power Projection it has been effectively written in stone that it will be down to the carriers to absob the amphibious force's aviation requirements, as the previous practice of geographically separated Amphibious Group and Carrier Group has been cancelled as unaffordable, and replaced by the all-singing all-dancing Response Force Task Group. A number of studies have been launched as a consequence, and most of them are centered on the carriers.

HMS Queen Elizabeth's commander has said in its Twitter answering event a while ago that carrying LCVP landing crafts in the boat bays is being considered for the future; a study is underway (or has finished, the wording in the reports does not make it too clear) on how to organize and paint the deck of QE to provide 10 spots for simultaneous helicopter operations (up from an initial design of 6 very large spots. There are, anyway, 12 deck positions serviced to serve as aircraft / helicopter operation positions).
The carrier has room for 250 Royal Marines and can carry more depending on how the air wing is shaped (and the related manpower figure changes consequently); using the boat embarkation area aft of QE for some Marines to boat transfers will probably be investigated as well. 

The 200-pages book let out by the Royal Navy in occasion of the naming of QE also adds that using some of the available space to increase EMF accommodation and support spaces at the first refit is being looked at. There will be a lot of work to be done to certify ships spaces and facilities for the Embarked Military Force's helicopters, stores and ammunition.
An indicative all-LPH TAG has been defined as a flight of 3 Chinook, 12 Merlin HC4, 8 Apache and 6 Wildcat; while an Hybrid air group comprising 6 - 12 F-35B plus helicopters for a Commando group is being studied. (see pages 68 and 69).

The vehicles capability of HMS Ocean is not particularly noticeable, and anyway it was relatively often out of the picture when HMS Illustrious or another of the CVSs served as Commando carriers. As was to be expected ever since her sister was not built. So in itself this will not be too much of a blow, while certainly not helpful. 

HMS Ocean's capability to carry light and medium vehicles, and deploy them to the shore, is quite limited. The vehicle deck is small, and the vehicles can only drive down to landing crafts thanks to a ramp and a floating, folding pontoon that the ship carries on deck and deploys in the water by crane.

The vehicle deck, (53) is small. There is a ramp leading to the flight deck, one leading to the stern exit, and a RoRo ramp in the side for port embarkation / disembarkation

The floating pontoon can be seen on deck in this photo. The exit of the flight deck vehicle ramp can also be seen. The pontoon, folded, is carried on top of the structure of the ramp's exit.

The side RoRo ramp for embarkation

 

HMS Illustrious, serving in the Commando Carrier role, has no RoRo ramps or vehicle deck. Still, it has been seen embarking small numbers of vehicles, including BV206s as in this photo. Helicopter delivery to the shore via Chinook, though, becomes the only available option.

There is also a chance to absorb some or all of the negative impact depending on how MARS FSS shapes up to be: the Fleet Solid Support requirement has merged with the previously separated Combat Support Ship Auxiliary (earlier called the Joint Sea Based Logistics, a ship that would have been designed and built specifically to support ground forces ashore with stores, vehicles and afloat maintenance workshops) and the early designs the MOD and the industries of the Naval Design Partnership have put together include carrying a couple of LCVPs and having a RoRo deck with steel beach or even a well dock, giving some very real capability to carry and deploy ashores stores and even vehicles. Depending on if and how MARS FSS progresses post SDSR 2015, the problems might be in large part ironed out. 

The early concept for MARS Fleet Solid Support would help plug the gaps in amphibious capability, making it twice as important. Her new generation Heavy RAS equipment and vast cargo holds already make this vessel extremely important to support the logistic requirements of the carriers in high intensity ops.

The next SDSR will be a turning point of huge proportions. And the navy desperately needs to get this one right.

There is always some room for dreams, as long as you remember what reality is like.

A perfect solution would be to have HMG get serious about sanctions versus Russia, by exploiting the unique chance represented by the two Mistrals being built by France. It is painful to observe how well things could slot into place, if there was the money and political will to place such a blow. The two vessels could probably be taken up and re-fitted with RN communications, weapons and essential kit to enter in service in 2016 and in 2018: the first could replace the LPDs Albion and Bulwark. 

In 2016, Albion is expected to be re-activated from her current sorry state in HMS Tamar, Devonport, by removing the seals and controlled humidity kit that keeps her dormant and, hopefully, well preserved and by re-storing her to bring her back into active service. Bulwark, which would hit her refit point that year, would be mothballed in her place. 

The first Mistral could be used to replace the LPDs, and it would be a painful (they are still young ships) but actually pretty advantageous trade, capability-wise. The Mistrals have greater troop and vehicle cargo spaces, a well dock of equivalent capability, and, crucially, a hangar and flight deck allowing them to be a replacement for Ocean at the same time. On the other hand, Mistrals have no davits for LCVPs. 

The vehicle deck of Dixmunde, french Mistral-class LHD, used to bring armoured vehicles to Mali

The vehicles / cargo spaces are much larger than on the Albion-class LPDs

The cost would be (partially) offset by doing away with the need to refit the LPDs any further, and by a substantial reduction in the number of LCVPs. The second Mistral, in 2018, would directly replace HMS Ocean, and two ships would replace three, of different types. 

HMS Bulwark's vehicle deck. The ramp in the centre leads up to the flight deck. Beyond the ramp, there's the well dock with the LCUs. Behind the standing officer, there's the side RoRo ramp of access.

the dock of HMS Bulwark. Rolls of Trackway and BV206 vehicles can be seen in first line in the vehicle deck.

It would be a more than happy trade in terms of capability, but not financially fair enough to make the plan cost-neutral. Which is the reason why this scenario is a dream. It is a semi-serious, dreamy suggestion due to the high and sudden up-front cost of taking the ships and fit them out for RN use. 

Then again, it would be a great investment for the future.