ARMY 2020 in detail: Royal Signals

Previous parts:

1 - Force Troops Command and Royal Engineers


The Royal Signals have completed their planning work for the changes to the corps stemming from the Army 2020 cuts. I had written already months ago about much of the major changes, at regiment and brigade level, but much was still uncertain back then, including the fate of the many, many squadrons re-subordinating to different regiments, re-roling, disbanding etcetera. Now a far greater level of detail is available.

The structure of the Royal Signals is based on the two signal brigades, but several elements sit under different HQs

The entire Corps is on this slide, including signal troops assigned to NATO and to the EOD Group. Yellow text denotes Reserve element 

The document produced by the MOD months ago about the restructuring of the Reserves had provided a good overview of the changes to reserve sub-units, but many regular squadrons have moved and are moving around between formations.
For example, all the brigade signal squadrons are being removed from the brigades and brought into the five multirole signals regiments (MRSRs). The tables that follow show the fate of the regular squadrons.

Multi Role Signal Regiments and 216 Signal Squadron

216 Signal Squadron is the only brigade squadron which does not leave its supported unit. It continues to be a part of 16 Air Assault brigade, and it stays unders its direct OPCON. It is also the only signal formation retaining a Life Support role for a deployable HQ.
3rd Commando Brigade has its own ICS and Life Support elements, provided by 30 Commando IX, and so sits outside of this analysis. 

The Multi Role Signal Regiments are born out of the experience of the Campaign Signal Regiments deploying in support of operation Herrick. Communications and information management have grown in size and in importance in recent times, and the diverse range of needs of a brigade engaged in complex operations means that the old signal squadron is definitely insufficient to cover all requirements. The MRSRs are all taking up on systems such as FALCON, to be able to build up the necessary network of communications and information systems needed to run combat operations in theatre.
The reduction in manpower, however, has constrained the restructuring effort, and has forced a number of decisions. Most notably, the removal of the brigade HQ signals squadrons, and the dropping of the life support role for said HQs. While it makes sense to observe that ICS specialists, precious and expensively trained and much needed in their core roles should not be wasted on life support tasks, but this is nonetheless a requirement that is not going away. It will have to be met somehow with the restructuring of brigade and division level deployable HQs, and it works to demonstrate the pressure the army has to deal with.

Worth of note is that the Air Support Signal Regiment (21 Sig Regt) is definitively losing its AS role. Communications support for Joint Helicopter Command will now be delivered by the lone 244 Signal Squadron (AS), which is being transferred to 30 Sig Regt.

The key weak point in the whole construction is the complete absence of signal regiments aligned with the Adaptable Force. In the words of the Corps' Colonel:

ICS and EW support to the Adaptive Force. No dedicated ICS or EW assets reside within the Adaptive Force to support the maintenance of Institutional Resilience; however, capacity within the MRSRs should allow for some support to be made available if Collective Training to maintain Institutional Resilience is properly programmed. The force generation mechanism for an enduring operation will need to take account of the lean availability of expeditionary ICS and EW force elements. Support to the AF, in homeland roles, will be found principally from the R SIGNALS Reserve.

The Adaptable Force risks being very short on Signals elements to support training, and the key problem is that it will be short of ICS and EW support when the time comes to eventually deploy, as well. As i pointed out multiple times in the past, the ability of the Adaptable Force to provide, as planned, two brigades for two out of the five tours needed on rotational basis to support an enduring operation while respecting harmony guidelines is questionable. The supports are the key, and the supports have suffered cuts that put the target very much at risk.
The MRSRs will have to somehow squeeze out of their resources a package of ICS services for the deploying adaptable brigades, and this might prove to be a real problem. This is a huge weakeness of the whole Army 2020 construct.
I find it surprising, and yet depressingly normal, that the (most likely hopeless) calls for more defence investment following the wake up call of events in Ukraine have focused on "more brigades". Cap badges are, as always, the obsession of the day. Supports rarely, if ever, get mentioned, and yet they are the real, critical weakness of Army 2020.
The Army already has more brigades than it can support, and arguably more brigades than it needs. The problem is that most of these brigades are paper tigers, simple containers of (very small) infantry battalions.
If there's one weakness that needs fixing, is in the supporting area.


Support to ARRC and JRRF

 As said earlier, 30 Regiment is to assume responsibility for the Air Support Signal Squadron as well.


Training, EW, 3rd level Support

Other critical areas include the availability of ECM and Electronic Warfare. Both have proven invaluable and indispensable on operations, and are most definitely going to have crucial importance in the future. Even so, they can't escape cutbacks. Most notably, 14 Signal Regiment, Electronic Warfare, is to lose its fifth squadron, stood up in 2012 (better late than never...) to support the enduring deployment in Afghanistan. Again, this cut represents a serious limitation to the army's effective capability of facing a complex enduring deployment in the future.
As a little item of good news, 14 Regiment has resumed preparing airborne-capable Light EW Teams (LEWT) for the high readiness airborne task force. The Royal Marines have their own EW capability in Y Sqn, 30 Commando IX.


Special Forces 

The regiment should survive with no squadrons lost. I've added the list of squadrons as lat publicly known.


Reserve Signal Regiments and pairing arrangement

The four reserve regiments to remain after the cuts and restructuring provide support to the five regular MRSRs, and retain the Strategic Communications role in 2nd Signal Squadron.
The pairing works as follows:

37 Regiment (R) is asked to support two regular regiments at once.

As already evidenced by decisions made in other areas (es. Engineering), the key weakness of the Adaptable Force is the shortage of supporting units. It remains my belief, as i've been saying for a long time now, that if the Army high officers had been given a truly free hand, they would have taken different decisions, cutting back further on the infantry to ensure a more balanced final output.
Some of these weaknesses are the result of the somersaults that defence chiefs have had to make to obey Dave's order of seeing no more than five infantry battalions losses, and no regiment badge loss.

The result is an army which, despite claims of the contrary, is most evidently not balanced across its parts. The final capability output, to be measured in truly deployable brigades (infantry battalions are awesomely flexible and useful, but on their own they mean relatively little) is disappointing. It is probably the best that could be done given the political limits posed to the plan, but it is most likely not the best use of a given force of 82.000 regulars.
Politics and the need to have a significant number of "spare" infantry battalions to rotationally cover a huge public role liability and a large presence in Cyprus pose a significant challenge to the building up of an army that would otherwise have the chance to genuinely adapt to battlefield considerations and probably express six full deployable brigades (3 Heavy, 3 medium / light role) plus the air assault brigade at high readiness.



Sources: Royal Signals Journal - March 2014

Royal Signals "The Wire" magazine - December 2013

My alternative proposal for Army 2020

I promised quite some time ago now that i would try and take a shot at a coherent, realistic, alternative Army 2020 plan, which would not move away from the 82.000 regulars and 30.000 phase 2-trained reservists numbers. No fantasy fleet, in other words, but a serious, disciplined attempt, because of course it remains an exercise of theory, to put together an alternative structure.


My planning has been done building on a number of firm points:

Army 2020 is not just about manpower. It is about training and basing infrastructure as well. If i suggest a whole different army structure, like the original plan for five multirole brigades each comprising heavy armor, i must plan for fewer battalions, because i'll need to move money out from the personnel budget to spend it on infrastructure to prepare other bases around the country for the arrival of heavy armor. New training areas will be needed, and this will imply big expenditure.

I'm sticking to the basing plan released by the MOD as much as possible. I think the basing of the army brigades and units is one of very few things that have been done with real wisdom in these three years. Mind you, there are still challenges, but it is a very good basing layout overall.
Moreover, it reprensent a financially realistic plan. I could suggest different choices, but i could not realistically cost them and say that they would be achievable with the same budget.

I'm not going back to the multi-role brigades because they imply some real challenge in terms of training areas and infrastructure. It is a wise thing, overall, to have the "peacetime" brigades divided by role and by geographic considerations. Salisbury Plain is the right place for the heavy armour. Complementary capabilities, lighter in nature, will come from other brigades.

Source: Uploaded by user via Gabriele on Pinterest

The above points explain what i'm not changing. But there are other considerations that have made me take several choices different from the ones made by general Carter's team.

The UK's first line of defence is represented by the two high readiness brigades: 3rd Commando and 16 Air Assault. These two brigades are planned to sustain a very challenging rhythm, generating, constantly, battlegroups to keep at very high readiness: the 1800-strong Commando Lead Battlegroup and the 1300-strong Air Assault Lead Battlegroup. This is an Army 2020 / SDSR firm point, which has been, in my opinion, badly betrayed by the choices made in terms of force structure.

I'm fine with the removal of 1st RIFLES battalion from the Commando brigade, but i'm absolutely opposing the reduction of the brigade's engineer capability to the sole 59 Independent Squadron plus Reserve Squadron. It is an insufficient level of engineering support to enable the brigade to deploy whole without being reinforced by other elements scraped up from some other formation, and, worse, it is too little to ensure that the constant formation of serious battlegroups at high readiness can be formed.

A battlegroup should comprise one Commando battalion, one artillery battery, one Commando Logistic Task Group comprising the medical capability and surgical group, C4I capability from 30 Commando IX and one squadron of Engineers.
All elements can be sustained, in general, save for the Engineer component: how can a single squadron, even with a reserve capability available, sustain a constant state of high readiness? It just won't be able to do it.
And the Commando battlegroup will end up weak on combat engineer support, despite the Agile Army studies saying that combat engineering will be high in demand in future ops.

My first move is to keep 24 Commando Engineer Regiment, with HQ Sqn and three regular squadrons. 59 Independent Sqn currently holds most of the capabilities of an HQ Sqn, being alone in the role, so the manpower impact mostly comes from the need for two more field squadrons.

16 Air Assault brigade, has no combat engineer problem, but has its own issues too. First of all, the reduction to just two regular battalions plus 4 PARA (Reserve). Again, this just doesn't do the job in my opinion.
In my army structure, i resurrect an old plan, dating back several years, and assign the british-based Gurkha battalion to 16AA Brigade. The battlegroup at High Readiness will have to be a mixed battalion, formed by two Aviation Companies, good for helicopter assaults and for running out of a C130 following a tactical landing, plus a parachute-current company, capable to airdrop if and when necessary. The Gurkha battalion will be tasked to provide Aviation Companies, obviously. No parachute training, there's no money (and arguably no need for additional capability other than the enduring ability to airdrop a single Company group at any one time).

The Gurkha battalion is chosen because it is based in an acceptable position, and because it is not a formation that has problems recruiting and staying fully manned. 
This change is roughly manpower neutral.

I'm also proposing the formation of a new unit for the air assault brigade: an HQ Troops / Information Exploitation battalion on the model of 30 Commando IX.
This formation would be built up using the RMP element, the brigade HQ, 216 Signal Sqn and Pathfinder Platoon, and it would continue to draw from other army formations for additional capabilities: an air defence troop with Starstreak LML taken out of 12 Royal Artillery, EW teams from 14 Royal Signal regiment and so along.
The manpower increase would come from the re-formation of the 1st Airborne Reconnaissance and Surveillance Squadron (which would build on the history of the WWII airborne reconnaissance sqn), which would include in its strenght the current Pathfinder platoon but would add a standing Brigade Recce Force dedicated to the particular needs of 16 AA Brigade. The Squadron would have Jackals as main vehicle.

Note that there is a possibility that this move would actually be manpower neutral: so far, the Household Cavalry regiment has had an additional squadron in its establishment in order to provide recce support to 16AA. It is not clear if this will continue, under the current planning.

These changes are meant to better and more realistically enable the High Readiness brigades to cover the roles they have been given.

Flexibility must be real, not a catchword. The current Army 2020 plan abuses, in my opinion, of virtual "centralisation" of support units under specialised brigade HQs. I think this arrangement adds no flexibility at all, especially when we consider that the regiments are configured very differently depending on wheter they are Reaction Force-oriented or Adaptable-oriented.
The basing plan has also made good, rational efforts to base regiments in the best possible locations depending on their configuration.
Why have the three Reaction Force's artillery regiments in Larkhill, near the manoeuvre brigades they are meant to support, only to subordinate them to an "Artillery Brigade" based in Tidworth which is also supposed to control regiments located as far away as Newcastle?
It just makes no sense to me. It adds nothing good to the army's capabilities. It possibly hinders them, in fact.
I can't think of another major NATO power even considering the same idea. Not the US, not France, not Germany, not Italy.

My opinion is that intimate combat support elements must remain an integral part of the manoeuvre brigade, especially when the basing plan makes it possible.
So:

1) Disband 1st Artillery Brigade, re-subordinate artillery regiments to the relevant brigades.
2) Move Close Support Engineer regiments out of 8 Engineer Brigade back to the brigades.
3) Move Medical regiments back to the brigades' control.
4) Directly assign to the brigades their Close Support REME battalions.

The same could perhaps done to Logistic (RLC) regiments as well, but in their case it might make more sense to have them in two Logistic Brigades, assigned each to one of the two main deployable brigades.
The Logistic Brigades will include the Force Support REME battalions as well.

The Adaptable Force as currently envisaged in my opinion kind of forgets one of the main points of Carter's own assumptions: an Army is for warfighting, first and foremost. The structure of the Adaptable Brigades as of now is unnecessarily complicated and confused. There are, in the plan, three "main" Adaptable Brigades, but in the facts they are paper tigers, weakened by having their establishments hindered by the need to sustain Cyprus and Woolwish (Public Role) deployments.
Since it is possible to make sure that these brigades are properly configured at all times, with 3 manoeuvre battalions in force, i can't see why we shouldn't do that.

These three "main" brigades will be, as now, the Cottersmore-centered 7th, the Catterick-centered 4th and the Edinburgh-centered 51st.
Some Infantry battalions will need to be subordinated differently from what is now planned. The three mechanised battalions for the Reaction Force will now be the ones based in Aldershot. The change basically means removing from the role 4 SCOTS, which is based as far away as Catterick.
4 SCOTS will now be part of 4th Brigade instead, alongside with 2nd LANCS, which currently would respond to 42nd Brigade.
7th Brigade will assume command of the Guards battalion posted to Pirbright, while the battalion rotating into Public Role at Woolwich will fall, for the duration of its posting there, under the command of the Guards brigade.

In this way, it is possible to keep the strenght of the manoeuvre brigades up, even as battalions rotate in and out of Cyprus and Public Duty.

In an additional effort to make these brigades genuinely deployable, i'm giving them the combat support elements as well. The current Army 2020 plan includes two regular engineer and artillery regiments for the Adaptable brigades, because it privileged the achievement of the minimum number of five enabler formation per each role, so to support the capability for enduring brigade-sized deployments in the future.

I'd like to go a little bit further, and give all three brigades an artillery and engineer capability, so that the three main Adaptable Brigades can do their own 36-month readiness cycle complete of their enablers and thus ready to tackle deployments abroad in operations of some complexity. To do so, i'd backtrack from the plan to disband 40 Regiment Royal Artillery and 28 Regiment Royal Engineer, and use integration of regulars and reserves to keep these two formations at full strenght with minimal change to regular manpower figures.
From the current plan, which calls for 2 regular and 2 reserve Light Gun artillery regiments, i'd move to a plan with three mixed regiments, each with two regular and two reserve batteries.

My assumption (and the Army's one as well, it would appear) is that, to "equal" a regular sub-unit availability with a reserve sub-unit, you need to have two reserve sub-units. This is due both to manpower and training worries regarding the reserves, both to the fact that reservists can only deploy for a 6-month tour once in a 5 years period, while the regulars would do two tours in the same timeframe.
Having two reserve sub-units is meant to make it realistic to expect that the regiment could deploy with a mixed regular/reserve manpower delivering a full three batteries / squadrons /companies without exceding harmony guidelines.

Guidelines for the employment of Reserves

In the engineer field, it would appear that the plan already is for two integrated regiments, with 2 regular and 2 reserve squadrons each.
I would add a third regiment equally configured, at the expense of one of 3 currently planned Force Support engineer regiments (Reserve).
For the regulars, this means one additional RHQ and two additional engineer squadrons. 

Two regular medical regiments are already planned. A third regiment could be provided via an adequately reinforced reserve regiment.

The REME situation is the same: 2 close support regular regiments can be completed by a reserve REME battalion, taken away from a currently planned 4 Force Support battalions for the Adaptable Force.

On the Logistics front, there are two regular Force Logistic regiments planned for the Adaptable Force. The Force Logistic regiment is described as a hybrid unit comprising Supply and Transport/Fuel capability.
While the Reaction Force brigades, logistically heavier, are each supported by a Close Support Logistic and a Thetre Logistic regiments, the lighter Adaptable Brigade are supported by a single hybrid formation.
The equivalent of a third Force Logistic regiment is already planned, under the shape of two Transport and two Supply regiments of reservists.

The above changes are roughly manpower neutral: the number of squadrons and batteries remains the same. The number of Regimental HQs reduces.
However, the barracks in Ripon, which are now home to an engineer regiment but are currently planned to close as the regiment moves to Catterick, in my plan would remain. The third reg/res engineer regiment would be housed in Ripon, in fact.

To balance the changes in manpower and basing that i've described, my alternative Army 2020 reduces the infantry by a further battalion. Difficult choice to make, but the only one possible in my opinion. My proposal would imply the disbandment of 2nd MERCIAN and the closure of barracks in Chester, instead of Ripon.

Agile Warrior studies have concluded that future deployments should see the brigade HQ helped by a Division HQ. The brigade staff must be able to focus on the tactical aspects of the operation, while the 2-star HQ covers the strategy and the theatre-wide issues including theatre logistics. Despite this, Army 2020 proposes a rather confused future of the Divions of the british army.

My plan would see the downgrading of the LONDON DISTRICT, a two-star post not really necessary, in exchange for a more readily deployable capability within 1st UK Division HQ. The division would command the three "main" Adaptable Brigades.

The currently planned 2-star HQ UK Support Command would also revert to being a more traditional Division HQ, not immediately deployable but nonetheless more outward looking.
This Division would command the remaining Adaptable Brigades plus the Guards brigade (result of the downgrading of LONDIST).

The Guards brigade, non-deployable, would act as a container for the units based in the London area for their public duty period. Nonetheless, the Falklands Roulement Companies will come out of the battalions of this brigade. For what i understand, this already happens, but not all the time. In future, i'd want it to be the rule, because the army is stretched and can't afford to lose so many resources to ceremonial roles.

Then there would be three Reserve brigades directly paired to the three "main" Adaptable Brigades.
11 Brigade, the South HQ, would be paired to 7th Brigade. 11th Brigade, for geographic reasons, would also control the reserve elements supporting the Reaction Force, namely the 100 RA regiment, which i propose as possible new GMLRS reserve formation (since the regular GMLRS are moving south, from Newcastle to the Salisbury Plain area) and the Royal Wessex Yeomanry which will continue to provide reinforcement/replacement crews for Challenger 2 MBT formations.
42 Brigade, the HQ North West, would be paired to 4th Brigade.
52 Brigade, which would be re-established, would be paired to 51st Brigade.
These brigades, as much as possible, mirror the regular formation they support and integrate, so there is a TA infantry battalion for each regular one, and a TA Cavalry regiment for each Regular one.

The shifting and re-subordination of squadrons from the Royal Mercian and Lancastrian Yeomanry regiment to reform a Scottish Yeomanry regimen is apparently already on the cards.  

Lastly, there would be two mixed regular/reserve brigades, 38th and 160th, which would be the first choice for upstream defence engagement abroad.

The Force Troops element would be much the same as currently planned. Since Agile Warrior has confirmed the absolute, capital importance of Maneouvre, it is absolutely fundamental to preserve a number of specialised capabilities that make maneouvre possible. I'm speaking of the TALISMAN route clearance capability, and of the M3 rigs for rapid river crossing. These two capabilities would be preserved each into a Squadron of the Land Support regiment, 36 Engineer.


Summary of changes:

Regular 2-star HQs: -1 (LONDIST)
Regular 1-star HQs: -1 (Artillery Brigade)
Reserve brigade HQs: +2 (52 Bde, Guards Bde)

Regular regimental HQs: +3 (24 Commando Engineer, 28 Engineer, 40 Royal Artillery) NOTE: 24 Commando RHQ virtually manpower neutral change, due to HQ capabilities otherwise being part of the Independent Commando Sqn
Reserve regimental HQs: -3 (2 Light Gun artillery regiments, one Force Support Engineer regiment)

Regular Artillery Batteries: +1 TacGroup Bty (number of gun batteries unchanged, but spread over three regiments each with 2 gun batteries instead of 2 regiments of three batteries)
Reserve Artillery Batteries: Same (spread over three regiments instead of grouped up in two)

Regular Close Support Engineer Squadrons: +4 (?) (it depends on wheter the two currently planned Adaptable engineer regiments have 2 or three squadrons each, not yet clear) (2 Commando Engineer squadrons, 2 Adaptable Sqns)
Reserve Close Support Engineer Squadrons: +2
Reserve Force Support Engineer Squadrons: -2

Reserve Force Support REME battalions: -1
Hybrid Regular/Reserve Close Support REME battalion: +1

Regular Infantry Battalions: -1 (2nd Mercian)
Reserve Infantry Battalions: Same

Base closures: Ripon to stay, Chester to close


I believe my Army 2020 proposal delivers an army which is both more flexible and more realistically aligned to the Defence Planning Assumptions set by the SDSR. In addition, it makes efforts to try and adhere to the findings of the Agile Warrior studies.

In a way, my proposal returns to a concept of business that the Army has already experienced in the past, when three Armored and three Mechanised Brigades were meant to have their own 36 months cycle of force generation.
At any one time, in this way, one Armoured Infantry (Reaction Force) and one Light/Mechanised (Adaptable Force) brigades would be trained and ready for operations. The Adaptable brigade could be deployed on simpler interventions, or provide elements to be combined with regiments coming from the Reaction force to form a Multi Role Brigade with the correct mix of capabilities.

How it used to be

One problem, highlighted by Agile Warrior but harder to fix without a proper budget, is the fact that the British Army remains filled with Light Infantry, and is arguably the less mechanised army within the major forces in Europe. There is a very evident gap between Warrior and Foxhound, which FRES UV, currently planned for just 3 infantry battalions, is not going to close.
To improve the situation in this field, a complete rethink of FRES UV is in order, i think. One option would be to take a step back from the expensive, top class 8x8 AFV, and re-assess the possible "good enough" solutions. France is planning to buy hundreds (a thousand, possibly) of 6x6 VBMR vehicles for its medium weight, multirole brigades. Their requirements for the new vehicle are rather ambitious, and include excellent protection for a section of up to 9 soldiers, at a cost as little as 1 million euro per vehicle. My suggestion is to follow this interesting procurement effort with attention: it might be advantageous to go along with the french for once, with the hope to Mechanise at least a further three battalions, one for each "main" adaptable brigade.
It would be a step in the right direction, compliant with the Agile Warrior recommendation to re-mechanise the army.

Multi Role Brigades and Army 2020

Some more information has been coming to the light regarding Army 2020, thanks to a speech delivered by general Nick Carter to the International Institute for Strategic Studies that was clearer and more honest than any announcement, speech or description delivered so far to the british public.



I also found the video of another IISS conference during which part of the Army 2020 approach was explained by Mayor General K. D. Abraham, and this confirmed the identity of the brigades contained in the Force Troops command:

1st Artillery Brigade
8th Engineer Brigade
1st and 11th Signals Brigades
1st Intelligence & Surveillance Brigade
2nd Medical Brigade
104th Logistic Support Brigade
Security Assistance Group

The Reaction Division will be supported by 101 Logistic Brigade, and the Adaptable Division will have the support of 102 Logistic Brigade.

Some additional indications (not much in terms of new info, actually) came from the hearing of the Chief General Staff, general Peter Wall, with the Parliamentary Defence Committee, of which is already available the uncorrected transcription. It is also possible to watch the hearing in video here.

Moving on to the solid information that these sources provided, i'll start by saying that, in part to provide a figleaf to politicians, the Multi Role Brigade is not entirely dead.
As we know, the October 2010 SDSR promised a 95.000-strong regular army formed in five 6500-strong Multi Role Brigades, one of which would be based in Scotland, each with:

1x Tank Regiment (size unspecified, possibly as small as 38 tanks per regiment)
1x Recce Regiment (during the planning it emerged that each would have 2x FRES Scout squadrons and 1x Jackal-mounted squadron) 
1x Armoured Infantry Battalion (mounted on Warrior)(6 Battalions would have been mounted on Warrior, with the sixth having a Training and Demonstration role, filled on rotation)
1x Mechanized Infantry Battalion (mounted on Bulldog, then on FRES UV)
2x Light Role Infantry battalions 
1x Artillery Regiment (it was intended that each regiment would have 2x AS90 batteries and 1x L118 Light Gun battery)  
Full Embedded Logistic Tail

Accordingly, there were big promises of army manpower increases in Scotland, and, with heavy armor headed up north, there even were talks to open a large training area in Scotland, a "Salisbury Plain" north of the border.
Big promises that are all going to be broken, entirely or almost entirely, with Army 2020 and the Basing Plan announcement that will come early next year.

The infamous supplementary "3 months Exercise" (effectively a second, emergency Review) in July 2011 eventually ended with the Army ordered to plan for a regular force of just 82.000 men, and a much smaller budget, and that spelled the end of the Multi Role Brigades as originally intended. A team guided by general Nick Carter put together the Army 2020 plan to accommodate the savage cut to manpower and deliver a force structure still able to (somehow) meet the (unchanged) Defence Planning Assumptions that had been written for a 95.000-strong regular army of 5 Multi Role Brigades.

The key planning assumptions are:

- The Army must be able to deploy, at the same time, a 6500-strong brigade on an enduring operation, a 2000-strong battlegroup on a complex but not enduring intervention and a 1000-strong force in support of a non-complex, non-enduring operation such as a Non-Combatant Evacuation.

- The Army must be able to deploy, with suitable warning, a Division of 3 brigades, roughly 30.000 strong for a non-enduring operation. 

The Multi Role Brigade, complete with its own artillery and logistics and with the full spectrum of capabilities (from heavy armor down to light infantry) was ideally suited to ensure that the Army was realistically capable to meet the needs of a complex, enduring operation, even if this required deploying tanks and heavy artillery.
The number of 5 is not casual: the Army works with harmony guidelines that expect personnel to deploy in the warzone for a 6 month tour, followed by 24 months at home to rest, reset, train for a new tour. This means that out of 5 men, one is deployed and 4 are back in the UK. The five brigades, supported by services also organised to the "Rule of the Five", would have be able to support an enduring operation with minimal disruptions and changes to their structure, ending a long practice of "patchworking", pulling battalions and units from multiple brigades to put together a deployable force package containing all of the various capabilities needed.
A new concept that the Army had been planning out since 2008.

The 3 month review has brought the Army back, effectively, a concept of operation that is, in good measure, a return to its pre-2004 structure. Back then, the army took its force from the 3-year rotation (Low Readiness year, Collective Training year, High Readiness year) of 3 Armored and 3 Mechanized brigades: under Army 2020 it will use the same concept, but will have 3 Armoured Infantry Brigades (Reaction Force) and 3 Adaptable Infantry Brigades on the same 3 year readiness cycle, supported by a further 4 Adaptable brigades.

And here comes the figleaf: for the Army and for the Government, the 3 Reaction and 3 of the 7 Adaptable brigades are "basis for Multi Role Brigades".

On the composition of the Army 2020 brigades, we have some detail:

the 3 Armoured Infantry brigades will have each a tank regiment (Type 56, so with 56 Challenger 2s), a Cavalry/RECCE regiment, with Scimitar first and then, in the 2020s, with the FRES Scout (CVR(T) vehicles will not be fully replaced before 2026...!) in 3 large squadrons with 16 vehicles each. 9 Squadrons of 16 vehicles means more vehicles needed than with 5 regiments each with two squadrons of 12, even if, of course, there would have been also 2 more tank regiments needing their own embedded Recce component with 8 Scouts (unless the recce element in the tank regiments is removed, at this point nothing would surprise me anymore...).
Each brigade will have 2 Battalions of infantry on upgraded Warrior vehicles (6 armoured infantry battalions, as for earlier MRB plan, and indeed with all six in full frontline role, instead of 5 + training unit).
A third infantry battalion will be present, mounted on Mastiff when the vehicles are brought back from Afghanistan and, in the future, on FRES UV if it'll ever arrive for real.

The composition of the 7 Adaptable brigades is far less clear. Nonetheless, we know the regular army will have 14 Light Role infantry battalions and 6 Light Protected Infantry battalions (infantry mounted in Foxhound vehicles) to distribute in them.
The Army 2020 brochure indirectly suggested that, in the end, only 3 of the 7 Adaptable brigades would really be relevant and base for deployable maneuver formations.
The brochure provided a graphic illustration of the 3-year Readiness Cycle, and showed an indicative adaptable brigade output comprising one Light Cavalry regiment (on Jackal), one battalion of infantry on Foxhounds and one Light Role battalion, each with a paired Reserve formation.
An internal Army briefing document, initially not released to the public, shows the 3 brigades formed by:

- Cavalry regiment - with paired reserve formation
- 2x Light Protected Infantry battalions - with paired reserve formations
- 3x Light Role Infantry battalions - with paired reserve formations    

The Adaptable brigade output; general overview from the Army 2020 brochure

The Adaptable brigades as shown in the internal Army briefing package

Both general Wall and general Carter report that the 3 "main" Adaptable brigades are intended as the basis for the generation of "Multi Role Brigades" to be used to sustain a future enduring operation, and they would be responsible for the Fourth and Fifth tour in theatre.
A future enduring operation, in fact, would be met with a rotation of this kind:

Reaction Brigade, Reaction Brigade, Reaction Brigade, Adaptable Brigade, Adaptable Brigade, Reaction Brigade... 

and so along.
The 3 main brigades in the Adaptable Force are described by the two generals as "light-ish brigades", which is frankly more than a bit pathetic as they will in fact be light brigades with the addition of some Foxhounds.
It is to be expected that the 6 Protected Mobility Infantry battalions and a good number of the regular light battalions will be concentrated in these 3 brigades that, and here comes into play the figleaf again, will be based in Scotland (i can already hear the secretary of state saying "we promised a Multi Role Brigade, and here it is!"), in Edimburgh area (with units in Leuchars too, it seems, but until the Basing Plan is announced we can't be really sure), one in Catterick and one on the ex-RAF Cottersmore base, now Kendrew Barracks, already selected as home to the 2nd battalion The Royal Anglian Regiment and 7 Theatre Logistic regiment RLC.  

The generals also confirmed that the regular infantry battalions in the Adaptable Force will be smaller, but did not venture into details. As i've reported for a long time now, this means, apparently, that each infantry battalion will lose one platoon from each of its 3 rifle companies.
It is not casual, therefore, that the generals described the "formed unit" to be provided by the Reserves as company-sized elements: general Carter in his speech says that the regular battalions, reduced to a total establishment of 561 men (Light Role) and 581 (Light Protected Mobility) will be paired to Reserve battalions that he expects will be 400 to 450 strong.
Only working together, the regular and reserve battalions will be able to put in the field a complete battalion which, Carter hopes, will actually be larger than before, assuming the reserve element can really generate deployable formations.

The new look of the Territorial Army, or Army Reserve as it will almost certainly be renamed, is not known in detail yet, but the outline of roles for the existing reserve force has been announced: one battalion will be in the Air Assault role and will be part of 16 Air Assault brigade, in the Reaction Force. That will be 4 PARA, which has indeed been recently assigned to the brigade command.

That will leave 13 infantry battalions (The TA counts 14 infantry battalions in total), of which 6 would (in theory, since all documents show the Foxhound battalions paired with TA formations) support the Foxhound-mounted regular infantry, leaving only 7 other battalions.
This is a controversial point: the internal briefing graphic on the Adaptable brigades output alone shows 15 TA battalions, 9 Light plus 6 Light Protected.
Again, we are told that the regulars will have 14 Light Infantry battalions, and even if the 2 Gurkha battalions get no paired TA formation (despite seeing their establishment reduced to 567), up to 12 other reasonably should.
Will some TA battalions support more than one Regular formation at once? Are the Foxhound-mounted battalions really going to get a paired formation from the reserve? Will some more battalions be raised in the Reserve component? At the moment, it is impossible to say.

The generals then explain that the remaining four brigades in the Adaptable Force will be very much like the current regional brigades: non-deployable HQs tasked with administration of a variety of units (mostly Reserves, but also 1/2 regular units) based in their area. General Wall provides the example of the Welsh brigade, which he says will contain "one regular battalion, one reserve battalion, a big training area and a lot of other TA units". More interesting than this pretty vague description, is the point he makes: the brigade will mostly be about UK resilience tasks (support in the event of floodings etcetera) and upstream defence engagement abroad, with the possibility of using the brigade to build enduring relationships with a particular region of the world, as the americans hope to do by "regionally align" some of their Brigade Combat Teams.
If the graphic from the internal army briefing is correct and not just an example, 9 of the 14 regular Light Infantry battalions will be in the 3 "main" adaptable brigades, leaving 5 for the other 4 brigades. Even if not exactly 100% correct, it should be quite close to a ratio of this kind.

Gone the Multi Role Brigades, it seems that supports like Artillery, Engineers and Logistics will be removed from the single brigades, and all reunited in the Force Troops formations. But this, even if it happens, is kind of an illusion that the Army 2020 document itself destroys: we know, for example, that there will be 5 Artillery regiments, 3 of which will line AS90 and GMLRS batteries, while 2 more will only have L118 Light Guns.
Similarly, there is going to be 3 fully-regular manned engineer regiments and 2 "integrated" regiments with a strong embedded reserve component.
There are even 3 Armoured Medical Regiments and 3 Armoured Close Support REME battalions! Even if they are formally removed from the maneuver brigades and managed centrally, it is pretty clear which regiments will support who.

Indeed, the supporting elements arrangement gives away the trick, showing that the Army is indeed still planning to the rule of the five: even though the "Deployable" Adaptable brigades are 3, for them there is only going to be 2 Engineer Regiments, only 2 Artillery regiments ("paired" to two Reserve artillery regiments also on L118 Light Guns), only 2 regular Close Support Battalions REME, only 2 regular Medical Regiments... In short, there is only going to be the elements needed to support the Fourth and Fifth roulements within an enduring operation.

With a difference: compared to the original Multi Role Brigades plan, the Army loses the capability to deploy formed regiments of tanks, heavy cavalry, armoured engineers and heavy artillery enduringly. It will be realistically able to sustain such elements in the field for around 18 months only. After that, only sub-units will be sustainable in the long term if the men within the affected regiments have to see their break between tours protected.
It is not casual that both Carter and Wall have observed that the "6 months deployed, 24 months at home" rule "might not be the right solution". It is "about right", and "a good benchmark", and but not set in stone.
I have the benefit of not having to justify the cuts imposed by government, so i can say that the above expression are weak diplomacy: the reality is that the generals are entirely aware that, in the future, regular soldiers in many roles and trades will possibly be deploying for 6 months, but won't have 24 months to spend at home before going again if the operation becomes an enduring effort. The rule of the 5 is no longer sustained by the new army structure: in many trades, there are going to be only 3 men in the role.

Even in terms of infantry, light artillery and other "simpler jobs", the dependency on reserves is going to be great. The adaptable battalions will have 3 companies, but that will be "virtual": if 3 platoons are removed for real, it will be like having only 2 companies. The battalions will depend on reserves to achieve their intended trinary structure, and there is no telling if the "war time" establishment on 4 companies (1 for Maneuver, 1 for Support, 1 as Reserve and 1 Echelon) will ever be obtainable again.

A slide from an Army briefing helps in better understanding the impact of the changes:

The expected minimum amount of reserves deployed is 14.4% in a Reaction Brigade deployment, rising to a 39.2% of reservists in the 5th tour.
In support of the Reaction Brigade tours, most of the reservists will be Individual Augmentees, with some formed sub-unit or unit at logistic and medical level. But when the 4th tour comes around and the first Adaptable Brigade deploys, the number of formed Reserve units required to support the operation grows dramatically.

It is also evident, that Army 2020 maximized the use of "patchworking" to form deployable force packages by picking units up from all over the army: a concept that is not wrong in itself, but that will impact the lives of serving personnel and the efficiency of basing, training and of the brigades themselves, which will end up missing pieces more often than not. 

In addition, it must be kept in mind that reservists are intended to be at readiness for a year in five, which means six months of deployment followed by five years at home. Eventually, the harmony guidelines will collapse: the british army is now severely limiting the meaning of "enduring", because the manpower will simply be insufficient to sustain operations abroad beyond a certain amount of time.

The generals also noted that, to deliver the "Best Effort" and deploy a 30.000-strong division in the field, the new army will need 12 months of notice. The Army's feeling is that, given less warning, it will only be able to deploy a couple of brigades.

Earlier figures released tell us that the composition of the Reaction Force will be 20.000 regulars and 2000 reserves, while the Adaptable Force will have 12.500 regulars and 8000 reserves, with the rest of the personnel part of the other units and of Force Troops.


Another interesting change is the committment to develop a collaboration with industry, to exploit the training period of the Reaction Brigades to test and innovate: the armoured infantry brigade in its training year will spend part of the time working in an experimentation role, to define new tactics, approaches and, of course, requirements that industry can work upon.

The generals provide evidence that Gurkha battalions will continue to rotate in and out of Brunei, and the Falklands will continue to be garrisoned. Two infantry battalions will continue to be based in Cyprus, as well, and here comes the big surprise, when general Carter drops in the mention of one of the two battalions being expanded into a battlegroup. How and why, this is not at all clear at the moment.


Equipment

General Carter also interestingly notes that, in the long term, the Royal Artillery is likely to adopt one single calibre for its guns, kind of confirming that the long delayed program to replace the 105 mm L118 Light Gun will look at acquiring a 155mm weapon. The M777 lightweight howitzer has always been considered the perfect solution, and this is unlikely to have changed, but there won't be a budget to replace the Light Gun until well into the 2020s, so for now this is philosophy.

39 Regiment Royal Artillery will disband, as we know. It has been expanded to 5 batteries to support the constant deployment of one in support of operations in Afghanistan (well over 800 rockets have been fired, with great success) and it is also supporting the entry in service of the Fire Shadow loitering ammunition, but it will nonetheless be lost in the cuts in coming years.
3 Batteries of GMLRS will move into the 3 "heavy" artillery regiments: these will have 2 batteries of AS90 guns and 1 battery of GMLRS each. A further battery contains the Fire Support Teams.
A Reserve GMLRS regiment will also be maintained: currently, 2 batteries are found in the 101 (Volunteers) regiment of the TA: it is not clear if there will be changes to this arrangement or if it will stay exactly the same. 

89 AS90 self-propelled guns will be retained (down from an earlier figure of 95), while 48 will be stripped of all valuable parts and scrapped. The six batteries planned, i hope, will at least grow back to an 8-gun establishment.

The "Heavy" artillery regiments are expected to be 1 Royal Horse Artillery, 19 Royal Artillery and 26 Royal Artillery.
3 Royal Horse Artillery and 4 Royal Artillery will be "adaptable" artillery regiments, with just two batteries of L118 Light Guns and a battery of Fire Support Teams.
There will be 2 reserve regiments using the Light Gun in support.

There are also been no known developments regarding the promise of a "force protection system to protect against indirect fire such as artillery and mortars". Some C-RAM artillery would surely be a welcome capability. 

Carter also says that the Army has considered improving and expanding communications and data-sharing (C4ISR) down to Company level if not further down the scale, but that the Army is now looking at expanding communications capability at battlegroup level: the budget won't allow much more than that. On the issue of communications in the Army, i had already written, noting this very problem and very urgent requirement, here and here.
Talking about communications, the changes in the Royal Signals have been explained in great detail and can be read here. 
In terms of communications, efforts have also been announced in trying to make brigade and even more so division HQs better able to "talk" to HQs from other NATO nations, with which the UK obviously expects to work frequently.

In terms of Engineer support, as we said, there will be 3 regiments fully manned by regulars. These will probably be heavy, armored engineer units which will have the majority (or very possibly all) of the Trojan and Titan vehicles.
The other two regiments will be "integrated", sporting a smaller regular component supplemented by embedded reserve sub-units. My guess is that there will be only 2 regular squadrons in each of these two regiments, supplemented by 2 reserve squadrons.
Encouraging my guess is the recently released breakdown of roles planned for reserve units, where 4 Close Support Engineer squadrons appear. Details here.

There will also be 3 Reserve regiments in the Force Support role, helping 36 and 39 Regiments delivering the wide range of engineer capabilities needed to enable land and air operations. In this field, apparently it is not yet fully decided how the wide river crossing capability will fit in the force structure: currently, the M3 rigs are based in Germany with 23 Amphibious Squadron, 28 Engineer Regiment, but 28 Regiment is to be disbanded, and the unique capability of the amphibious squadron will have to be retained somehow.
I suspect 36 Regiment will, in good time, inherit the M3 rigs and have a Squadron in the amphibious role, assuming that 39 Regiment maintains its airfield and air support focus. I think it is less likely that the M3s will be made a wholly-Reserve managed capability, although it must be noted that, already now, one of the 3 Troops composing 23 Squadron is 412(V), the only unit of reservists based outside the UK. 

It is also not clear what will happen to TALISMAN, the family of systems and vehicles procured to give the Royal Engineers an invaluable Route Clearance capability, for which an impressive training simulator solution has been just acquired. My hope is that at least a Squadron in the Force Support engineer regiments will have a Route Clearance role and will continue using this precious kit: too many times in the past the British Army has developed this kind of capability only to throw it away at the end of the operation at hand, regreting it just a few years later. 


The British Army is retaining 227 Challenger 2 tanks, plus 16 more than will be converted in Driver Training Vehicles. The army already had 22 Driver Training Vehicles: the 16 new ones might replace some of the old ones, or be a partial compensation for the loss of A Squadron, 1st Royal Tank Regiment, which used to have 12 to 16 Challengers for training and demonstration role.
102 Challenger 2s will be harvested for spares and then sold for scrap. As we said, there will be 3 regular Type 56 tank regiments, established for 587 men, all ranks, all trades, and a Reserve regiment tasked with providing replacement crews.

Challenger 2 Driver Training Vehicle

The Army hopes to upgrade "at least" 381 Warrior vehicles. The Capability Sustainment Programme is progressing, and 11 prototypes will be prepared: 6 in the Infantry Section Vehicle configuration, 2 in the Infantry Command variant and one each in the Recovery, Repair and Artillery Observation.
It must be noted that the Artillery Observation variant will need a separate upgrade, which the Royal Artillery is trying to determine and secure at least since 2010, to modernize its artillery-specific sensors and electronics.
The Battery Command Post variant of the Warrior is probably destined to vanish: it used to be a command post for AS90 gun batteries, but some or perhaps all of them had been turned into ambulances by the REME. So far, i've heard nothing about the future of these Warriors.
In 2005 it was also decided that many Warriors, removed from disbanded Armoured Infantry battalions, would be converted into Armoured Battlegroup Support Vehicles, with an APC, Ambulance and Mortar variants planned: it was to be part of the wider Warrior Capability Sustainment Programme, but i never heard anything about it ever since, unfortunately.
Lastly, in 2011 a Warrior Bridgelayer was showcased, fitted with a multipurpose front mount point which allowed swapping the bridgelaying arm for other engineering devices including mine ploughs: such a bridgelayer Warrior could at some time be chosen as solution for a requirement for up to 35 medium weight engineer support vehicles for the FRES-equipped Cavalry regiments.
Prototypes should be demonstrated from 2014 onwards, with production starting in 2016 and with dDeliveries of the first upgraded Warriors for service in 2018. The first armored infantry company on the upgraded Warriors should be ready in 2020 and full capability should be reached by 2022.
Armored infantry battalions will number 729 men. 

The new Scout vehicles will replace Scimitar and will be fielded in 3 Heavy Cavalry regiments, each with 3 squadrons of 16 vehicles. The regiments are established for 528 men.

The 3 main Adaptable Brigades will each have a Light Cavalry regiment, on 3 squadrons of 16 Jackal vehicles each. Establishment is for 404 men, and each Light Cavalry regiment will be paired to a reserve cavalry regiment.  

The Army Air Corps will suffer a significant downsizing with the retirement of the Lynx AH7 by 2015, but will retain the 22 AH9A helicopters out to 2018. The number of Wildcat helicopters to be delivered to the Army are unclear: everywhere you can read of a plan for 34 machines (6 of which will actually go to the Royal Marines in 847 Naval Air Squadron, however), but in Planning Round 2011 a decision was made to convert 4 Wildcats into "Light Assault Helicopter", and procure a further 4 new LAH, bringing the total to 38 machines in two variants instead of 34 in one.
The 8 Light Assault Helicopters were expected to go to 657 AAC Squadron, supporting the Special Forces, but there has been no update on this plan ever since, and i'm waiting for the NAO Major Projects report 2012 to discover what happened.
The Army is planning to have 4 Squadrons equipped with Wildcat helicopters within 1st Regiment AAC: this is down from 5 Lynx squadrons today (2 in 1st Regiment and 3 in 9th Regiment) and includes the announced merging which will see 9th Regiment vanish.

1st Regiment AAC will return from Germany and find home at Yeovilton, where the Navy's own Wildcats will be based. This is likely to mean closure for Dishfort, current home of 9th Regiment AAC. 

The Army Air Corps is also fearing reductions in its Apache force, despite SDSR promises to retain the whole Attack Helicopter fleet. From a six squadrons force plus Conversion to Type training squadron, the apache force could go down to just four squadrons plus training formation. Details here.
In the meanwhile, one airframe was written off after a very hard landing in Afghanistan in 2008, reducing the fleet to 66 from 67.

In terms of base-ISTAR, the RAF Regiment and the Army are collaborating under Project Outpost to determine the best way to retain in the long term the valuable network of sensors built up under Project Cortez to protect bases in Afghanistan.
Watchkeeper's future is certain, while more of a question mark hovers on the Desert Hawk III: for all the talk of focusing on ISTAR and on providing the soldiers with enhanced surveillance, there is at the moment no certainty about this UOR's future. The Treasury will stop funding it when operations in Afghanistan end, and the Army will need to bring it into the core budget somehow, if it has to stay.
The RAF will have to make the same kind of decision for the Reaper fleet itself. 

I believe that the two Royal Artillery regiments using drones will be moved into the Military Intelligence & Surveillance Brigade although i have no evidence for it at the moment, while it has already been officially announced that 14 (Electronic Warfare) Signal Regiment is definitely moving in. Unfortunately, a (highly questionable at best) decision was made to size the EW regiment at 4 Field plus Support Sqn. Even this vital capability, when Afghanistan operations end, won't meet the Rule of the 5.

5 Regiment Royal Artillery will probably remain in 1st Artillery Brigade, and i can only hope that at least this regiment, which has been keeping at least a battery on the field for over 10 years, constantly, is allowed to retain the five deployable batteries that have been raised in these years: in 2003, 5th Regiment had the 4/73 Sphinx special ops observation battery, K and P batteries and Q (HQ and Support) Battery.
53 Battery was added in 2004, Z battery followed in 2009 and 93 Battery was added over the course of last year. In a decade, this rarely celebrated regiment provided constant Surveillance and Target Acquisition to over 100 different battlegroups and introduced into service more than 30 different UORs. 4/73 Bty provided a 'behind enemy lines' observation patrol which kept the men totally isolated in hostile territory for 56 days, the longest patrol since World War II.
This regiment now needs to receive new Battlefield Surveillance and Artillery Locating radars, since the COBRA has been prematurely dismissed, and i hope the formation is properly resourced and supported in its current form, to be ready for the next operations. 
  
  
Training Areas

A review into the future training areas for the new Army is ongoing, but decisions might not be taken before 2014 or 2015.
Salisbury Plain is the only true certainty, with the 3 Reaction brigades headed there. BATUS, in Canada, should also be retained, while the british army base in Kenya is being expanded to accommodate greater use.
The "Salisbury of Scotland" is, i think, definitely a dead idea. 

There is also an option for retaining a presence in Germany, and the army is, in particular, evaluating the possibility of using much more frequently the US training areas in Hohenfels and Grafenwoehr in South-Eastern Germany, which make up the largest US training area outside of the USA and have received huge investment in the last years. These two areas offer a much more complex environment, more challenging than that offered by BATUS, and thanks to american investment the targetry and infrastructure is top class. There is also another advantage, which is the possibility to train alongside very relevant contingents from the US and from other european allies, while in the BATUS area the US and Canadian presence is not constant and normally numbers in tens or a hundred men at most.
However, the areas are much, much smaller than BATUS, possibly too much to accommodate all of the heavy armor maneuvering training.
Anyway, the 5th Rifles battlegroup will train there next year, instead of going to BATUS and last October the 3rd Mercian also trained there, participating in the massive Saber Junction NATO exercise. And the soldiers liked it.
Are we in for a major surprise regarding BATUS in the coming years...?

General Carter mentions expanding the presence in Cyprus by transforming one of the two resident infantry battalions in a full battlegroup, and i suspect this is connected to training plans.
And lastly, Brunei is willing to engage more widely with the british forces on its territory.

For an army that is shrinking rather dramatically, there sure seems to be abundance of training areas. 



Earlier Articles explaining Army 2020 

Strenght of the Army after the cuts http://ukarmedforcescommentary.blogspot.it/2012/09/the-force-of-army-2020.html 

An in depth analysis of the british infantry's weapons and capabilities http://ukarmedforcescommentary.blogspot.it/2012/07/the-infantry-of-army-2020.html

Beyond the announcement: an in depth analysis of Army 2020 http://ukarmedforcescommentary.blogspot.it/2012/07/army-2020-in-detail.html

Future Land Operating Concept and MOD Business Plan 2012/15

Two very important documents released recently by the MOD deserve a look and analysis: the Future Land Operating Concept (available here) is effectively the reasoning behind the new Army Structures, and sets out a bit of a (very generic) map of the investments to be made, and (in theory) sets the record on the priorities for the force.

The Business Plan 2012 (here) tells us a bit more of what is being done by the MOD, what is to happen, and when. 

I'll start from the FLOC, highlighting some of the most relevant passages and making some observations on them.

The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction amongst states and non-state actors will escalate the risk of conflict. It is likely, therefore, that the UK and its forces will fight enemies who use chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons. This means that the UK must have the capability, with its allies, to deter and defend against (or indeed counter) such attacks.

Overall i can agree with the assesment: the risk is very real, and it featured strongly inside the SDSR as well. What does not fit into the picture is the retirement of the Fuchs CBRN recce armored vehicles, without any replacement in sight. Where is the coherence in stating A and doing B? 

As we develop better ISTAR capabilities, so will our adversaries. They will actively seek ways to defeat our ISTAR system of systems, denying commanders the information and intelligence they need. We must safeguard our own ISTAR capabilities through resilience and redundancy. Equally, we must develop our own counter-unmanned aerial system capabilities.

The focus on the need for ISTAR is a constant in the document, and rightfully so. It is recognized that the Brigade will need to gather and exploit information from UAVs, direct engagement with the local people, and by traditional scouting, by stealth and by strenght, depending on the situation.
We will see if this focus on ISTAR will remain only in the words or if it will bring to some concrete investment: for example, i'm very curious to see the structure of the famous 7 infantry brigades part of the new force structure.
According to the Army's very own doctrinal studies and documents and exercises (such as Agile Warrior 2011), a Brigade Recce Force and a strong information-exploitation capability are absolutely necessary: we will see if the 7 brigades get their own dedicate ISTAR/Exploitation capability.
A model in this sense is the very succesful 30 Commando IEX Group, 3rd Commando Brigade. This 450-strong unit groups together the scouting element of the brigade and the necessary Exploitation capability.
Conversion of current TA and some of the regular Cavalry regiments into lighter Scout/ISTAR formations would seem to be the way to go.

Avoiding collateral damage will continue to be a constraint and the need for a balance between precision and suppression (including non-precision fires) will be required as an essential firepower ingredient of manoeuvre. Our requirements for suppressive fires (non-precision) will reduce, though not wholly disappear. The development of further precision weaponry, including from unmanned aerial systems, will be another important force design principle, augmenting the precision of our traditional direct fire weapons and our currently limited indirect fire precision weapons.

Suppressive and Area Fires (conventional, unguided artillery barrages, for example) might not be as frequent as in the past, but it'll still be required. Artillery is cheap, it is always available, pretty much unaffected by weather (differently from air support) and it is effective.
At the same time, expanding the accuracy of the Royal Artillery is a priority. But it has been at least since 2001, and, save for GMLRS and hopefully Watchkeeper and Fire Shadow, none of the programs the RA pursued were spared the axe. The SMART anti-tank intelligent shell was ordered, and soon after that cancelled. The Braveheart upgrade to 52 calibers barrels for the AS90 never went ahead. The effort for procuring the ATACMS missile for use from the GMLRS launchers seems to have run agroud for good. Longer range GMLRS rockets (over 100 km) have been demonstrated, but never were acquired. The much needed upgrade for the Warrior FV514 vehicle used by Fire Support Teams to direct artillery fire is struggling to progress.
The RA has been told that arming Watchkeeper is a project which can expect to wait at least 4 years before being seriously considered, and despite validation in 2010, it might be 2018 before the Royal Artillery can finally put in service the Excalibur GPS-guided 155mm shell.
A program to pursue Course Correction Fuzes for "all" tubed artillery apparently exists, but its status is uncertain: the MOD was shown such a fuze for the existing 81 mm HE round, by BAE Systems, and US's ATK and others can provide such fuzes, able to change standard shells into highly-accurate rounds, with solutions available for the 105 mm as well as for the 155, giving artillery a circular probable error as little as 20 meters at a fraction of the cost of the much more accurate, "silver bullet" Excalibur.

We are also kept in the dark for now about the future shape of the Royal Artillery: massive reductions are rumored, and it is highly likely that the future brigades won't even have their organic artillery regiment. This is another evident contradiction, if it'll be confirmed.   

Emphasis should be placed on improving precision, integration and interoperability. Our focus should be on: secure communications; sense, warn and engage systems; detection, location, identification and tracking systems; countering indirect fires; countering aerial threats; and the rapid clearance of joint, land and multinational fires.

Manoeuvre in the lower airspace will have implications for the assets allocated at brigade level. Air defence (particularly anti-unmanned aerial systems), as well as battlespace and air space management capabilities, are likely to be required. An enhanced find capability is also likely to be needed in this dimension.

So i take it that the Army will go ahead on the Common Artillery Locating Radar program (especially since the existing COBRA is being prematurely pensioned), a C-RAM capability and CAMM(Land) missiles, plus a reorganization of SHORAD air defence with decisions on the future of Starstreak and Stormer-mounted Starstreak, which at one point seemed set to vanish completely from 2009...?
I hope so.  

Decentralisation of forces will place significantly greater demands on commanders and soldiers to understand the character of the conflict they confront.

The reduced density of forces and increased lethality of weapon systems will place a greater responsibility and capability in the hands of smaller combat teams and more junior commanders.

Armoured infantry will be a core capability around which manoeuvre will be built. The complexity of the environment will require small and robust combined-arms teams able to fight dispersed. Mobility support will be critical in the complex battlespace; assault engineers will be required in greater numbers than at present to fight within complex environments, such as urban terrain. Armour, drawing on its protection and ability to provide precision fire, will be required primarily to provide intimate support to dismounted infantry, although armour should continue to be capable of defeating an adversary by shock action and ground manoeuvre. Control and integration of joint and organic precision fires, both physical and virtual, will have to be co-ordinated and synchronised as far down as sub-unit level.

Decentralization and dispersion of the force is another big point in the document. It is also a reality well experimented in Afghanistan, where battalions can easily end up broken down with each Company sent to a different FOB.
From the lines of the British Army Journal 2012, an hint of change can be seen: there is consideration going into retaining in the long term the Afghan "Fire Support Groups" embedded into the Companies.
There's a real possibility of a restructuring of infantry battalions on a new structure which does away with the Maneuever Support Company and the three Rifle Companies in exchange for 4 "Combined Arms" companies on 2 Rifle Platoons and a Fire Support Group each, possibly with one company being from TA.
I think it is an arrangement that makes perfect sense, and it will be particularly interesting to see if it does actually happen. 

Armor and protected mobility are identified as absolute priorities, with the upgraded Warrior equipping the heavy, high-end reaction force; while UOR vehicles, Foxhound and hopefully the to-be-chosen Multi Role Vehicle - Protected (MRV-P) and the FRES UV will provide protection and mobility to good part of the rest of the force. The 7 Infantry Brigades should be mechanized, at least to a degree, with FRES UV, to build a genuine “medium weight” force which will prove invaluable by combining some of the advantages of Light and Armored forces. In most situations, a proper “medium weight” brigade is likely to be the best solution, so I deem it very important that FRES UV and mechanization of the infantry are given a real priority.
The FLOC expects the MBT to mainly work in direct support of the Infantry, with a "shock" role as a distant second: i can't help but notice that a FRES Direct Fire variant, smaller and more suited to urban mazes and embedded into Infantry battalions would make for a better solution. Of course, money is not there for pursuing the best solution.

The above passages also highlight two other crucial future requirements: Engineers and Fire Support Teams capable to plan, direct and control the whole range of Joint Fires available in support of land maneuver. 
Fire Support Teams should be spared by the cuts, unless we get a nasty surprise. However, the platforms from which they should work (upgraded Warrior FV514 and FRES SV Joint Fires, planned as part of Recce Block 2) are still in the air: the FV514 will only get basic mechanical and electronic upgrades as part of the Warrior CSP, but won't get the desperately needed refresh of its specialized under-armor fire direction kit until the RA can secure funding for it, something that it has been trying to do at least since 2010. This requirement should be prioritized, in my opinion.
The FRES SV Joint Fires will, hopefully, arrive in a not too distant future, but as of now, it is simply not here, nor a certainty.

As to Engineers, the RE is expected to be hit rather heavily by the incoming cuts, and if it happens, there will be yet another evident contradiction between an assesed, recognized need and the action implemented.

Air manoeuvre has the ability to transition between roles and operate across the range of operational environments, most notably from the sea (via the littoral) to the land and back again. Air manoeuvre should be closely integrated with the air and maritime components, and the actions of a ground manoeuvre force if also employed. Air manoeuvre employs the agility, reach and flexibility demanded by the future operating environment and its ability to operate at range, geographically distant from main ground forces or bases, represents a key operational capability to shape, sustain or provide decisive action. The addition of the third dimension in the conduct of combined-arms operations can be enhanced by the teaming of manned and unmanned platforms for reconnaissance, strike and lift sorties.
Air manoeuvre provides a capability that can achieve speed of deployment and redeployment, independent of terrain, and deliver personnel and equipment or supplies rapidly, over distance and onto objectives that would normally be considered inaccessible by vehicle. It can also be used to seek advantage over very short distances in complex terrain where movement in vehicles is constrained. Aviation can, therefore, protect and sustain both a deployed air manoeuvre or ground manoeuvre force with intimate support from the air. Control of the air cannot be taken for granted and counter-air missions may be required in the future operating environment. Furthermore, some nonstate adversaries are also able to challenge control of the air, particularly at lower altitudes. Rotary and slow fixed-wing aircraft are vulnerable, particularly during take-off and landing, and their use may be constrained by the threat of ground-fire.

As part of the air manoeuvre capability, air assault provides a capacity to concentrate, disperse or redeploy rapidly by day or night and attack or approach from any direction across hostile terrain. It has tremendous use in irregular warfare and dispersed operations, acting as a force multiplier by enabling combat power to be massed at high tempo. A tactical battle group air assault mission can provide the massed combat power required on the ground in one wave. Air manoeuvre, air assault and air mobility capabilities will be instrumental in the seizure of the initiative and exploitation of the developing situation on the ground. Air manoeuvre will have important effects in the information domain and against many of the opponents that we may face; air manoeuvre is likely to constitute one of our asymmetric edges.

Who's been following this blog for a while knows that my position on air manoeuvre is very clear, and that i all but proposed to modify rather extensively the way 16 Air Assault Brigade is structured and the way in which it generates force packages, so to make it sure that any deploying brigade, even in the long timeframe of an enduring operation, would be given a coherent, pretty much self-sufficient "air battlegroup", centered around a strong airmobile battalion with (indicatively) an artillery battery from 7 RHA regiment and support of a large Chinook squadron, a Wildcat squadron for recce/escort/light utility, an Apache squadron for support and a Puma flight for Medium Utility, CASEVAC and MEDEVAC and other roles.
The air battlegroup would be attached to the Land Brigade and both would operate under the wider control of a 2-star Divisional HQ, in compliance to the Army's own assesment and following the general lines of what happens in Afghanistan, where there is an higher, 2-stars level controlling the deployed brigade and all other assets.   

The above passage of FLOC summarizes very well my thoughts on the matter, but despite the convergence and despite General Wall's announcing that 16 Air Assault brigade's structure will be "modified", i doubt that they will try anything as ambitious as i imagined and proposed.
The pessimist in me fears that the above words will remain, as often happens, a bit of screams in the wind, without a real impact on how things are structured and done in day to day life. The fear is that 16AA's restructuring has more to do with the expected loss of 5th SCOTS battalion than with anything else, but this is another area to keep under watch: who knows, we might be surprised.
What’s important, in my opinion, is accepting that Air Manoeuvre, at least at Battalion level, is more important than ever. Parachute insertion is likely to be an “extrema ratio” solution, for very rare, very particular situations. But the ability to combine vertical air manoeuvre with the Brigade’s land manoeuvre involving armored/mechanized formations is going to prove absolutely invaluable pretty much in any operational context.
As such, I deem it important that the way in which 16AA is employed is changed and expanded. The brigade should not only deliver the Airborne Task Force for reaction role, it should be able to provide complete “air manoeuvre” packages to a brigade on the field.  

There is, correctly, a similar passage about Littoral / Amphibious manoeuvre too:

Littoral manoeuvre is the exploitation of the sea as an operational manoeuvre space by which a sea-based or amphibious force can influence situations, decisions and events in the littoral regions of the world. This will be achieved through an integrated and scalable joint expeditionary capability optimised to conduct deterrent and coercive activities against hostile shores posing light opposition. There is an increased likelihood that the joint force will be engaged in littoral operations given the predicted future operating environment. The denial or unavailability of ports, land routes, airfields or airspace may necessitate littoral manoeuvre. If so, future littoral operations in the joint operational area are likely to be founded on joint (or integrated) action. Amphibious forces will seek to realise simultaneous effects directly against objectives through ship to objective manoeuvre using unexpected penetration points and landing zones to avoid established defences. The seizure or denial of key terrain to the enemy may be required to facilitate the introduction of follow-on forces. If projection of greater combat mass is necessary, a full commando brigade as part of a multinational coalition could be deployed or, heavier land forces can be projected.

In any littoral scenario, a necessary pre-condition for successful joint action will be an accurate, detailed awareness or, preferably, understanding of the operational area. Defining activities will need to persist throughout all phases of an operation or campaign. Shaping activities will follow this defining activity to set the conditions for successful land manoeuvre, decisive action and exploitation. Sufficient air, surface and sub-surface capability will be required for decisive acts. Decisive activities may be necessary to influence the wider littoral or induce a favourable situation on land. In these cases, it will be necessary to project amphibious forces or land assets, to achieve objectives. Decisive activities may include the simultaneous, or sequential, projection or introduction of land forces, systematic destruction of the enemy or neutralisation of opposition through a combination of organic and joint fires, leading to further manoeuvre and consolidation.

The reasoning is correct and it is pretty much impossible not to agree with it, but the question that it causes is related to, for example, the loss of RFA Largs Bay. How does the significant reduction in amphibious capability fit into a situational assessment that calls for more littoral manoeuvre, i truly can't understand.
Especially if i'll have confirmation of the rumor about the Army losing its Ramped Craft Logistics (RCLs) along with a good share of its other boats and assets. What's the use of these studies and documents if the actual decisions in the end go straight against them?
In a Joint Force approach, this doctrinal vision also suggest that the Fast Landing Craft project and the Future Force Protection Craft should be protected, as they are two important projects to enable littoral manoeuvre. The Force Protection craft will also be invaluable against the threat of swarm attacks and other asymmetric menaces, and it will also likely offer the chance of much expanded and enhanced operational capability in Riverine environment, which, while not specifically mentioned in the FLOC, is likely to be part of the future conflicts. And indeed prominently featured in Iraq and even Afghanistan as well (Kajaki dam and operations with boats on related waterways).   

There is an operational requirement to design and test the optimal integrated headquarters in preparation for future deployments. We must design multinationality into our established formation headquarters from the start, particularly those at high readiness.

The scale, multi-dimensional nature of manoeuvre, and the complexity of the environment, require an essential level of command above brigade, or task force, where the political dialogue takes place, and judgements are made about where to concentrate force and apply economy of effort. This enables the tactical actions of the brigades, or task forces, to be sequenced in time and space. Conversely, joint and inter-agency capabilities need to be integrated at lower levels of command.

The demands of the future operating environment are such that small and mobile formation headquarters are likely to be unable to collate, process and disseminate the level of information and understanding required to generate the mixture of comprehension and agility that is needed to retain the initiative in complex modern conflict. Land forces are likely to be geographically dispersed and decentralisation is likely to be the operating principle through networked command and control. There will be a need for flat information structures and rich information services available at the tactical level. Decentralised operations demand the ability to re-group and concentrate forces when the situation demands. In order to maximise the potential of mission command to create and exploit opportunities, command and control architecture which is able to network top-down and bottom-up is required to exploit advantages in information management and information exploitation. Recognising that command is a capability in its own right, empowerment will be critical to the success in the decentralised future battlespace.

Larger, more static, main headquarters require the structures and resources to deal with the requirements of an integrated and multinational approach. The span of decentralised command, and dealing with the  demands from governments and higher headquarters, will need to be supplemented by more mobile, tactical and deployable elements. This suggests a need for a robust deployable headquarters at the divisional level and more mobile brigade headquarters. This allows commanders to remain engaged closely with the conduct of operations, when and where, the situation demands.

Headquarters and command and control are the subject of a great focus. They were considered with great attention in Exercise AGILE WARRIOR 2011, and the position of the Army is that the Brigade HQ should be mainly Tactical, Fight-oriented, and Mobile. On operations, the brigade is expected to operate under the wider strategical control of a 2-star divisional HQ. 
The contradiction here is in the fact that we seem to be losing all but 1 deployable divisional HQ under the new Army 2020 concept soon to be announced, with the other brigades being all under the newly created UK Support Command.
The target is to operate simultaneously on up to three sizeable, non-enduring operations, as announced by the SDSR, and the FLOC reminds us that, since 1945, the british army has been almost constantly deployed abroad in a manner or another. It is clear to me that one deployable Divisional HQ would soon be overwhelmed by the tasks it would have to face. The personnel and resources assigned to it would never be enough. One deployed HQ requires, in my opinion, at the very least another deployable  HQ at a decent readiness level back at home.
A minimum of 2 Deployable divisional HQs are indispensable to have a chance to meet the army's targets as they are formulated, and the "Division HQ restructuring process", which is ongoing according to the business plan, should take this in consideration. I hope some serious thought goes into solving this rather evident contradiction.  

Future land forces should be designed to train, deploy at short notice with minimal mission-specific training, and fight as a division at best effort. This responsive, intervention force should be robust in design and composed of resilient establishments to prevent the need for backfilling. It needs to be capable of combined-arms manoeuvre, land-air in design, and be able to operate in the CJIIM environment. The integration of capabilities will be key. The force should be equipped to manoeuvre, and operate in, potentially high threat, complex, or intense environments and to provide endurance to a stabilisation operation. Combat power should be concentrated in the force to
match high threats from the outset, as opposed to reliance upon a modular approach that dilutes the combat power across the force. Rapid deployment of a robustly configured force to seize and hold the initiative from an initial position of disadvantage will be critical.

[...] Brigades should be optimised to fight at the tactical level and be fully capable of manoeuvre in all environments including ground, lower air and in some cases, cyber. The structure required to achieve manoeuvre, and the training it requires, will provide the most appropriate baseline from which to adapt to other tasks.
There will be a requirement to mass scalable joint precision effect organically at an increasingly lower level than hitherto; concentration of force requires balance with economy of effort.

The above passage, lifted from the FLOC document, is the justification we get for the very recent change of heart that saw the abandon of the 5 multi-role brigades and gave us the 3 Heavy, Armored "Reaction" brigades, plus 16AA, plus the 7 infantry brigades.
My guess about the structure of the 3 Reaction brigades is for a structure on a single large tank regiment (Type 44 or 58), a Recce regiment on FRES SV (but still possibly with a squadron on Jackal jeeps as well) and, if we are lucky, 2 battalions of armoured infantry on Warrior, ideally with as many as other 2 battalions of infantry in Light Role configuration, which would, i guess, be moved by helicopter to achieve the "manoeuvre in the lower air environment".
Hopefully, at least these Reaction brigades will have their organic artillery regiments (mainly on AS90, but possibly with a L118 battery as well, assuming that double-qualification of crews on both systems continues).  
All three of these brigades might be located around Salisbury Plain. This, at least, is what General Wall hinted at RUSI, while noting how advantageous it would be to have contractors helping to keep up the 3 heavy brigades running. No "scottish Salisbury", so, and considerably less heavy stuff (if any) heading north in the case: prepare to deal with a very angry Salmond when he understands it...!
However, it undoubtedly would make practical sense, to base such formations near the port of embarkation, near their support providers and near their training area.

As a force preparing for contingency operations, it is not possible to train the whole force to be ready to fight anywhere. Force elements will need to specialise in regional and terrain specific environments where activities will enable enduring relationships and provide a much deeper level of understanding of culture, language, relationships, potential rifts between populations, and the nuances of terrain and climate. Regional specialization will require a new emphasis on language skills.The future force will need interpreters, cultural experts, intelligence officers, civil military co-operation personnel and others to understand the subtleties and nuances of the modern battlefield. Soldier-diplomats who have a progressive understanding of the ideas and technology will allow us to take the fight to the enemy, both among the people, but also in cyberspace.

It is expected that the above specialization will mainly affect the other 7 brigades, which make for the (possibly) biggest floating question mark at the moment. They will emerge from the merging of the remaining two regular brigades with the current 10 Reserve brigades, but on their structure there are no real indications, other than they will vary in size, and, i add, probably in composition.
From these brigades the Army will deliver force packages for a wide variety of roles, from Public Role in London to engagement abroad.

Engagement activity incorporates security co-operation, defence diplomacy, forward presence, reassurance, deterrence, containment and coercion. Uniquely amongst the UK’s soft power tools, defence engagement can also deliver ‘hard’ influence by being able to deter, contain and coerce, and thus provides important political levers. Given the profound strategic changes and a more networked, interconnected world, land forces must continue to invest in defence engagement as a means of preventing, in certain situations, the need to use the more expensive hard power option. This should be complementary to our diplomatic, development, intelligence and trade-promotion tools in order to contribute to our security and prosperity objectives more widely. Specifically for the land environment, engagement assists understanding to shape strategy and builds trust and co-operation amongst partners.

Defence engagement, specific to the land environment, falls into four broad categories:

a. Non-combatant Operations. Non-combatant operations and security operations will continue to be an integral part of defence engagement. This includes activities such as conventional deterrence, coercion, containment and reassurance. Special Forces will continue to be used overseas, in conjunction with partners, to counter terrorist threats. Information and cyber operations will be conducted alongside our allies to protect our national interests, and contingency operations will take place to provide reassurance and security in volatile regions.

b. Defence Diplomacy. Defence diplomacy covers activities ranging from basing and access issues, to support to current and contingent operations. The Defence Attaché network provides a frontline defence presence and face-to-face interaction with host nations. This ‘soft power’ will continue to be instrumental in building alliances, coalitions, and partnerships to ensure co-operation, burden-sharing, interoperability and capacity building. The network of loan service, exchange and liaison officers provides critical situational awareness, information and influence within multinational and multilateral organisations (such as the UN and NATO), and foreign governments on a national or regional basis.

c. Defence and Security Exports and Sales. Specialist personnel, working in concert with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, will continue to support UK Trade and Industry for the sale and export of defence and security training, advice and materiel manufactured in the UK or by UK companies.

d. Conflict Prevention, Post-conflict Reconstruction and Stabilisation. Conflict prevention, post-conflict reconstruction and stabilisation are all activities in support of the Building Stability Overseas Strategy which places an emphasis on upstream conflict prevention. Security sector reform is likely to remain a key policy instrument based on the recognition that security is essential to conflict prevention, stabilising fragile and conflict-affected environments and aiding development efforts. Capacity building will be central to conflict prevention and stabilisation tasks.

[...] An expeditionary military advisory capability should be created with specific units earmarked to provide specialist training teams. This will empower partners to operate by themselves, or alongside the UK and her allies. Foreign area officers must become ‘diagnosticians’ in designing and managing indirect and direct security assistance programmes.

Another role of these brigades will be in UK engagement and in national resilience.
On the effective deployability and fightability of these 7 brigades, we have only doubts.

Also,

UK land forces are likely to increase their contribution to UN humanitarian operations.

Really? I would not bet on it.

Experimentation should identify what level of combat and enabling capability (including the critical mass of force) represents the credibility threshold that has to be maintained, or surpassed, to provide the moral authority and ability to lead multinational forces in combat.

This is, i believe, an empty hope. No government will ever authorize a (serious) assessment of what is the minimum force level under which the UK should not go. Both because an honest assessment would probably conclude that we are already significantly under such minimum level in at least 2 services out of 3, and because once numbers and capabilities were recognized as indispensable, future cuts would become much harder to sell to the public.
And already writing certain statements and announcements and doctrinal documents filled of jargon and promises of "preserving capabilities", having the "capability to regenerate", "efficiency", "uncertainty", and all that must be really complex and awkward as it is.
70% of the documents by now are about lifting a smokescreen over the water, using always the same empty words.

There is then a list of capabilities to be prioritized:

In capability terms, dispersed sub-units may need to become more robust and resilient. Mobility support will be an essential capability and, in particular, they are likely to need organic, or attached, assault engineers able to operate in the urban terrain.

There will be a greater imperative for sub-units to have access to human intelligence assets and products in order to develop the situation in contact as a core competency.

The ability to operate and analyse organic surveillance and precision fires using small tactical armed unmanned air systems is likely to become a mainstream task for sub-units.

The land force must re-discover and re-invest in the art of manned reconnaissance, closely linking it to the confidence to exploit the situation, both in and out of contact. These forces need to be capable of operating against an enemy expert at reconnoitring.

We must seek structural and technological solutions which do not remove the strategic mobility and agility of light forces, nor detract from the tactical protected mobility of heavy forces.

There is an enduring requirement for logistic support regiments to plan and conduct deliberate logistic movement through contested battlespace.
These regiments must be resourced with an organic self-protection capability that includes suitable platforms, weapons and training.

The establishment of an information exchange group should be resourced as a priority, along with greater investment to develop scalable, flexible and mobile communication information systems architectures.
 
Lethal effects will increasingly have to be built around strategic communications and, in some cases, cyber.
 
The exploitation of the third dimension [air manoeuvre] will be critical to deliver rapid deployment, reach and flexibility in the future operating environment and will form a critical element of our high readiness contingency capability.

Although elements of the force can be held at lower readiness, it is important that the Army ‘trains as it fights’ and its Reserves are fully integrated.

The use of contractors for Logistics is welcome and possible, but contractors should take over in-base jobs and other supporting tasks at home or in the rear echelons. The "last mile" will still require military specialist regiments, and with organic force elements for escort and self protection.
Similarly, some of the work done by REME can be handed over to contractors, but battlefield support and recovery of damaged vehicles is still very much a work for the military.
Manned reconnaissance points to Brigade Recce Forces inside the brigades, too, quite unquestionably: keep it in mind when the Army structure is announced, and let's see if there's coherence with the doctrine and assumptions.


Now, on to the Business Plan. Highlights include:


Carrier Strike regeneration to be completed by December 2020

HMS Queen Elizabeth in service in December 2016

HMS Prince of Wales in service in December 2020 (depending on the choices of SDSR 2015)

Switch to the Short Take-Off and Vertical Landing (STOVL) variant of Joint Combat Aircraft (LIGHTNING II) to be complete by April 2023 (does it mean that all airplanes will have been ordered and delivered by that date?) 

IOC of the F35B for Land Based operations in March 2019 [it appears there has been a one-year delay] 

IOC of the F35B for Maritime Based operations in March 2021 [how does this fit into a Carrier Strike regeneration complete by December 2020...? If the plane is not ready, how can Carrier Strike be???]

Put in service the Merlin MK4 (fully navalized?) with the Commando Helicopter Force by January 2017

Merlin HM2 in service in September 2013

RN reserve expanded and restructured according to Future Reserves 2020 plan by December 2018

Achieve 4th Typhoon squadron [it will be 1st Squadron RAF] Initial Operating Capability (IOC) to accelerate Typhoon Force growth and increase multi-role capability by March 2013 [NOTE: increase multi-role capability means everything and nothing at the same time. Is integration of additional AG weaponry going ahead, or not?]

Achieve 5th Typhoon squadron [identity to be announced] Initial Operating Capability (IOC) to accelerate Typhoon Force growth and increase multi-role capability, to be completed by March 2015

Achieve Typhoon Force Full Operating Capability (FOC) in March 2018 [holy hell is it taking a long time. Will the FOC include capabilities such as Storm Shadow, Brimstone, Conformal Fuel Tank and AESA radar, the latter two only on Tranche 3 planes? We don't know]

Deliver the Army 2020 Study in June 2012 [Hammond say's he's absolutely confident they will deliver the announcement before Parliament's Summer Recess, we'll see]
Restructure deployable divisional headquarters, to be completed by April 2015

Restructure to deliver the new brigade structures identified by Army 2020, to be completed by April 2015



Deliver Warrior Capability Sustainment Programme (CSP), FOC by December 2020, first battlegroup should be ready in 2018

Take forward work to deliver a new range of medium weight armoured vehicles, to be concluded by December 2022 [This should be about FRES UV, but it is not clear]

Take forward work to replace unprotected support vehicles with protected ones, to be completed by December 2021 [Probably involves retaining UOR vehicles such as Husky, Coyote and Foxhound as well as hopefully introducing into service the adequate variants of the new Multi Role Vehicle - Protected]

Take forward work to deliver a range of Land Environment Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) capabilities, to be completed by January 2020 [FRES SV might be comprised under this very general voice]

Take forward work to deliver a range of capabilities to counter explosive ordinance and improvised explosive devices (IEDs), by January 2020 [retention of Talisman?] 


By December 2020 the Army is expected back from Germany.

By March 2014, the TriStar airplane will be retired from service. [term seem to have been extended, was to be 2013]

No mention of the C130K going out of service by year's end as originally expected. Indeed, the C130K is not mentioned at all; the remaining units (8) might have been given an indefinite retrieve, as anticipated also on this blog some time ago, due to delays with project HERMES (upgrade of the C130J to enable it to take over the Special Forces missions now covered by the K) and due to the airlift needs of the withdrawal from Afghanistan, which might also have a part in the delay to the TriStar retirement.

The reduction from 40 to 18 Force Elements at Readiness in the Tornado fleet will only be completed in March 2015, due to the need for constant deployments to Afghanistan.  

By March 2016 the MOD will be out of the Search and Rescue job and the SAR Sea Kings will be retired.


Interestingly, there is an ongoing review in the Force Generation rules, including Harmony Guidelines and Tour Lenght. Work is ongoing, and changes will be implemented by 2015, presumably due to the new force structure adopted. Are we going to see the end of the "rule of the five"?

There is also an interesting financial table: Typhoon is, once more, the most expensive in-year big project (and the most expensive of all in general): 0.74 billion expenditure in-year and an expected 18.2 billion whole-life cost over 30 years.
This compares to 0.59 and 5.7 for Astute, 0.17 and 5.7 for Type 45 and 0.60 and 5.1 for CVF.