Two projects worth thinking about

Two very interesting written answers were given in Parliament yesterday, 10 July 2012, regarding Apache and the Smart Defence initiative launched by NATO. Let’s seethem:

Alison Seabeck: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what multinational projects the UK will be leading under the Smart defence umbrella following the Chicago Summit. [114421]

Mr Gerald Howarth: The UK will be leading two projects under the Smart defence umbrella. These are the Immersive Training Environments project, which seeks to enhance NATO's training and education capability through the development of synthetic systems, and the Theatre Opening Capability project which seeks to develop a multinational capability for expeditionary operations to establish a port of debarkation and conduct cargo handling and movement operations.

Mr Ellwood: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence (1) when he plans that the Apache helicopter will be upgraded to utilise the Brimstone missile system; [116028]

(2) what plans he has to marinise the Apache helicopter; [116029]

(3) what the total number of Apaches in use is; and how many are earmarked for upgrade. [116030]

Peter Luff: The Army Air Corps currently operates a fleet of 67 Apache helicopters. The number of aircraft to be upgraded through the Capability Sustainment Programme will be decided at the main investment decision, which is currently planned for 2014.

While not originally designed as a maritime helicopter, the Ministry of Defence (MOD) has modified and cleared the Apache to support operations from the maritime environment as demonstrated from HMS Ocean on Operation Ellamy. The modifications included wet-sealing the aircraft to resist corrosion and modifying the windscreen wipers to include a solution to disperse sea spray. We are also currently in an assessment phase to fit flotation equipment to increase safety when operating over water.

The Apache is currently armed with variants of the Hellfire missile which are due to go out of service in 2021-22. The MOD will look at various options as a replacement to this capability. The successor to Brimstone, the 50kg class Spear Capability 2 Block 3 missile, will be one of the options considered as a replacement.

The two Defence Initiatives that the UK will lead under the Smart Defence agreement are both very interesting. Synthetic training and simulators are something that the british armed forces have been adopting on a large and ever expanding scale. Simulators of various nature and ambition level have been introduced into service for training soldiers prior to deployment, to train Royal Marines how to escape from a sinking Viking vehicles, to train personnel in how to evacuate a vehicle overturned by a mine blast, to train in the use of parachutes and firearms, to prepare crews for the AS90 self-propelled howitzer and so along. The UK is particularly sensible to synthetic training systems, and it is a good choice to have it leading the multinational effort in this direction.

But people will pardon me for being particularly interested in the second Capability, that of Theatre Opening. The scope of this initiative is potentially very ample, depending on the level of ambition that will be set. We are looking, potentially, at a true re-edition, in modern key, of the Mulberry Harbour pre-fabricated port of D-Day memory, depending on the level of existing infrastructure envisaged as requisite for “establishing a port of debarkation”.

For the UK, this multinational capability investment might be a way to remedy to the pretty certain loss of the 3 Joint Sea Based Logistic ships which were once planned as part of the original, very ambitious Military Afloat Reach and Sustainability (MARS) project. These three vessels were intended as deployable floating support bases carrying supplies for land forces and the means to disembark and distribute said supplies in absence of port facilities to support the operations of 3^rd Commando Brigade and/or of army forces deployed abroad. The JSBL was also meant to have rather extensive workshop and support facilities, where helicopters and vehicles could be maintained and serviced, close to the frontline, even in absence of suitable equipment and installations on land, limiting the number of vehicles and items of kit that have to be returned all the way back to the UK for being serviced.

It is now expected that the JSBL vessel will not be funded. Secured the 4 Fleet Tankers with the recent contract announced with South Korean shipyards, the Royal Navy’s new main target within MARS is the Fleet Stores Replenishment requirement: 3 vessels are envisaged, to transport and distribute solid stores to the ships of the fleet, including everything from food to gun shells to replacement F35 engines and aviation weaponry for the aircraft carrier’s wing.

The FSS vessels are meant to replace Fort Victoria, Fort Austin and Fort Rosalie in the early 2020s, and the 10-years budget contains allocation of money for initial activities connected to this requirement. The ships will almost certainly be fitted with the new Rolls Royce replenishment at sea (RAS) equipment, which can transfer pallets waiting 5 tons, against the current 2 tons, solving also an emerging problem of weight connected to the F35 (an F135 engine in its transport case is currently too heavy for the existing RAS rigs and is even creating problems to the US Navy for aerial transport, as it is incompatible with the Carrier On Board delivery plane, the Greyhound).

The Royal Navy is aware that there won’t be money for a further three ships in MARS, and they are also aware that, by the late 2020s, the new urgency will be delivering a replacement for RFA Diligence and RFA Argus, effectively killing pretty much any chance of financing the JSBL.

So they are hoping to incorporate some JSBL solutions for the delivery of stores to the shore within the FSS design. Among other capabilities that arguably FSS should try to deliver I’ll add the possibility of resupplying an SSN at sea with torpedoes and Tomahawk missiles, and the capability of replenishing at sea the missile cells of Type 45 and Type 26.

Currently, the RN has no capability to reload the missile cells at sea, and Tomahawk missiles can only be embarked on a submarine within a protected bay and with very calm sea. Expanding the capabilities in these two sectors would be a major improvement, no doubt.

The RFA Diligence’s replacement could take on some other characteristics of JSBL, if economically and technically feasible, by providing some workshop space and equipment compatible not just with the support to ships and submarine, but to land vehicles and helicopters as well. The Forward Repair Ship would be particularly useful if able to provide such comprehensive service. Of course, providing maintenance on helicopters would be relatively simple, while providing vehicle workshops and “fitter section” spaces would be more challenging, as vehicles would need suitable arrangements in the design of the ship for driving in and out, and in absence of a port, this means bringing the vehicle to be serviced to the Repair ship either via helicopter or, more feasible, via landing craft: a stern ramp allowing vehicles to board the landing crafts would be a possible solution, but this adds cost and complexity to the design, and the Royal Navy will be dealing with tight budgets and competing demands. A RFA Diligence replacement must come cheap, first of all.

Even assuming that workshops could be provided, and that the FSS vessels will have a decent capability for sending ashore supplies even in absence of a port, there would still not be that degree of independence from shore installations that is desirable.

In this optic, the outcome of the Theatre Opening Capability initiative will be very important, and potentially game-changing, if the ambition is that of enabling a large scale deployment in absence of suitable ports. The solution could be somewhat similar to the US Marines Mobile Landing Platform, but with a greater attention placed on the logistic aspect. The MLP itself is currently being built in a very basic configuration, but the design can be significantly enhanced by fitting ramps, already tested and validated, that allow vehicle transfer between ship and platform even in Sea State 4. Such Self-Deploying Ramps were tested in prototype form (produced by Cargotec this was named Test Article Vehicle Transfer System’ (TAVTS)) to the FLO-FLO ship MV Mighty Servant 3 in February 2010, and demonstrated at sea by the USMC with the successful transfer of personnel and vehicles from a Large Medium-Speed Roll-on/Roll-off (LMSR) vessel to the Mighty Servant in high sea state 3 and low sea state 4 over multiple days of testing in the Gulf of Mexico. Vehicles transferred included HMWVVs, HMWVVs with trailers, MTVR medium trucks, LVS wreckers, amphibious assault vehicles, M88 tank recovery vehicles, and M1A1 main battle tanks.

The capability is thus at a very high readiness level. Ideally, though, the design should be further refined, so to be able to work with different and unmodified Ro-Ro ships, without having to fit the vessels with their own part of the TAVTS ramp system. 

The TAVTS being trialed in the Gulf of Mexico, with its launch tower assembly well visible on the huge open deck of the civilian FLO-FLO ship Mighty Servant 3. The Theatre Opening vessel could be a FLO-FLO vessel, or a large barge deployed from a FLO-FLO vessel, acting as a firm "port" for dembarkation. From the barge, vehicles and supplies could drive ashore on floating causeways, or be brought onto the beach via landing craft and/or mexeflote.

A container crane can also be added, making it possible to bring huge amounts of supplies forwards using civilian or military container vessels.

Cranes of various design and capacity can of course be added, and connection to the shore can be achieved via landing crafts or via floating causeways of various design, effectively creating a port of entry: Ro-Ro ships loaded with vehicles and troops can connect to the MLP and transfer vehicles and men onto it, and from the MLP the vehicles can be driven ashore down the causeways or shipped with landing crafts. Container ships can berth alongside the platform and be unloaded by the crane, which might put the container directly down on the back of a truck ready to drive towards the shore or onto a winched sled connecting the platform to the beach and specifically thought to move containers back and forth. 

Thanks to US Marines studies and trials, many of the most complex problems have alreadybeen overcome, leaving the money aspect as perhaps the worst of all issues to be tackled. A multinational, collaborative approach might be the solution to the problem. 

I put together a proposal for such a "Theatre Opening" capability already long time ago, as my personal take on the JSBL ship, and i'm gonna put it forwards again as an example of what can realistically be achieved with the right effort.  

I am wary of such multinational plans, since results could never arrive for lack of funding and committment from this or that nation, delays could be caused by countless reasons and we might not see results for years, but at the same time i welcome the news of this Smart Defense plan, and i keep some hopes alive: i've just read the Army's Agile Warrior 2012 report (i'll write about it in the coming weeks) and they are saying that they "won't be able to avoid being dragged in battle in two particular environments being the Urban Areas and the Littoral, where most of the world's population and wealth is and will be concentrated. 

When even the Army start to admit that operations in the Littoral and amphibiosity are going to be more frequently needed, it is time for your hopes to grow at least a little.

Theatre Entry from the sea: my take on the JSBL/Mobile Landing Platform at full capability, including extensive workshops for maintenance of helicopters and land vehicles.

Regarding the Apache, it is interesting to hear that an emergency flotation device is being assessed for possible fitting onto the helicopter. The Army Air Corps had evidenced a list of improvements that the Apache needed to operate effectively and safely at sea in the future, right after the somewhat pioneer operations in Libya concluded. A flotation device was among the requirements deemed more urgent, since the crew of a current Apache which was to crash at sea during operations from a ship would have very little chances to get out in time to survive. It is good to see that some proper reflection and action is going into completing the “navalization” of the mighty Apache. Personally, I’ve long been saying that the cost of the folding blades and other “naval” features included in the UK Apaches is little thing when compared to the flexibility it offers. Purchasing “naval” Apaches was as smart a decision as it was stupid to buy Merlin helicopters deprived of their naval traits for the utility role.

The unpleasant note is the unwillingness to promise that all Apaches will be upgraded and life-extended out to 2040, but we can hope that, when the Main Gate point is reached, the right decision is taken. For sure, after all, Apache is, at the moment, a "must-stay" capability, which has been ringfenced from any hypothesis of cut. This is at least promising.

It is interesting to hear that the MOD plans to retire Hellfire by 2022. Currently, the Hellfire missile is employed by the Army on the attack helicopter and by the RAF on the Reaper drones, despite the current Brimstone missile having the capability to be employed from drones and helicopters without any issue.

The Reaper, of course, was procured for an Urgent Operational Requirement, so integration and validation of new, national and sovereign weaponry was a no-no as it would have required more money and, critically, more time, delaying the fielding of the drone in theatre.

The Apache was purchased along with its typical weapon, the Hellfire, and Brimstone, anyway, was not yet mature back then, and only entered service on Tornado in 2005, meaning that Hellfire was, if not the only choice for the Apache, surely a sensible one, in the optic of achieving IOC in 2000, even if the Apache Full Operating Capability was only declared in 2007. 

Hellfire also has the advantage of having been acquired in tens of thousands of rounds by the US, and by many export customers, so that its cost is also remarkably competitive. The US backing has also meant the timely development of upgrades, alternative warheads and other improvements that have kept Hellfire up to date and made it suitable for new roles and employment methods as time and events moved onwards.

At the same time, Apache started deploying on operations with the British Army as soon as it entered service, and is still going full strength to this day, so the appetite for devoting money, time and airframes to the integration effort required by a passage to Brimstone never developed.

But with combat operations in Afghanistan to end in 2014, with a mid-life upgrade to Apache to follow and with a new MALE drone to come into service in 2020 in place of Reaper, times are more than mature for nationalization and standardization of this particular area. By the early 2020s, it make a lot of sense to envisage the gradual retirement of Hellfire and the passage to Brimstone 2, also known as SPEAR Capability 2 (block 3?). 

For some clarity, it should be noted that SPEAR is a multi-capability programme, and each capability is divided in blocks. It does not make it very easy to keep track from the outside of exactly what is going on. Anyway, the Selective Precision Effects At Range (SPEAR) programme includes: 

SPEAR Capability 1 - Improvements to the Paveway IV bomb, new warhead options, potentially new seekers and guidance methods.  

Paveway IV is the british answer to the USAF’s JDAM, and it undoubtedly built on American experience with the Joint Direct Attack Munition: while the USAF first focused on a bomb guided on its targets by the GPS and then found out that a secondary laser-targeting mode was desirable, the Paveway IV was immediately conceived as a combined guidance weapon, using GPS and Laser, depending on the situation. The weapon is a guidance kit based on the existing Enhanced Paveway II Enhanced Computer Control Group (ECCG) added to a modified Mk 82 general-purpose bomb with increased penetration performance. The new ECCG contains a Height of Burst (HOB) sensor enabling air burst fusing options, and a SAASM (Selective Availability Anti Spoofing Module) compliant GPS receiver. It can be launched either IMU (Inertial Measurement Unit) only, given sufficiently good Transfer Alignment, or using GPS guidance. Terminal laser guidance is available in either navigation mode. The bomb displayed amazing accuracy, and can be detonated at impact, with delay to exploit penetration against protected, buried targets, or it can detonate in the air for air-burst effect. The Paveway IV guidance kits can also be modified to fit other sized warheads, but for now it is being used only for 227 kg warheads. Its stand-off range is significantly greater than any other precision guided bomb. Paveway IV's unique manoeuvrability means that, if necessary, following launch it can turn and attack a target behind the delivery aircraft. The availability of dual-mode laser/GPS guidance within a single weapon also means that air forces do not have to incur the expense of maintaining two separate (laser and GPS) weapon stockpiles.

As part of SPEAR Capability 1, a series of enhancements to the Paveway IV are to be pursued:

-          Low Yeld Warhead for reduced collateral damage in urban environment

-          Enhanced Penetrating Warhead for engagement of deeply-buried reinforced targets

-          Extended Range with wing-kit

-          Improvements to the GPS signals security

In particular, point 4 is already being undertaken by Raytheon, while point 3 should be the easier of all to fulfill, because the Paveway IV system is already compatible with the addition of wing-kits, and many such systems are already available, with an obvious leading contender in the form of the MBDA’s Diamond Back wing-kit, which would allow the bomb to glide for tens of miles to strike targets while keeping the launcher aircraft as far away as possible for enemy air defence weaponry.

Point two, perhaps the most interesting, would fill in a gap of capability of the RAF, which is currently not well equipped for the destruction of deeply-buried targets, which can range from caves where talibans hide to modern bunkers and underground facilities which have never passed out of fashion and remain common throughout the world. Most likely aimed to an upgrade of the Paveway IV and AASM respectively, the joint UK-France development programme through MBDA of the bunker-buster Hardbut warhead is the most probable answer to this requirement.

The second test firing of the Hard and Deeply Buried Target (HARDBUT) Next Generation Multiple Warhead System (NGMWS) was carried out successfully at the Biscarrosse test range of DGA Essais de Missiles on 14th September 2010. The HARDBUT Technology Demonstration Programme (TDP) is a successful warhead research programme jointly funded by the UK MoD and French Direction Générale de l’Armement (DGA) with MBDA UK as the Prime Contractor. The NGMWS is designed to defeat a wide range of targets such as command and control facilities, infrastructure and underground facilities including caves, reflecting current and potential future operations.

The recent orders for new Paveway IV (one worth 60 million pounds, and another one for less than 20 millions announced even more recently) reportedly included money to continue development of incremental improvements for the bomb under SPEAR arrangements. 

Paveway IV is on Saudi Arabia's shopping list since 2010, but the UK has been unable so far to ink the deal due to US opposition under ITAR regulations. Quite a low blow of the USA, considering that they do sell everything and more to Saudi Arabia themselves.  

SPEAR Capability 2

Capability 2 is about developing improvements / new variants of weapons in the 50 Kg class, mainly Brimstone. In fact, the "Brimstone 2" was recently unveiled by MBDA, and should enter service next year with the RAF, replacing the earlier Brimstone and the Brimstone Dual Mode which was, effectively, a UOR upgrade to the original missile. Brimstone 2 includes several improvements, including Insensitive Munition compliance for improved safety of handling and storage. It will have a multi-mission warhead and multi-mode seeker and will be launched from the typical triple rail (for fast jets and UAVs), from a readily available twin rail (UAVs) and in future from the quadruple rack currently used for Hellfire. Launch of Brimstone from the ground was tested and validated already in the late 90s, and launch from boats as small as 15 meters long has been validated literally in the last few days.

SPEAR Capability 3  

Development of a new 100 kg-class weapon, specifically for use on the F35 first of all, and on other platforms later. This new weapon system has been presented in these days. It is a multi-mission stand-off missile with a range of over 100 km, network-enabled, subsonic in speed and fitted with multi-role warhead. Its multi-mode seeker makes it suitable for engagement of mobile targets, even if they are maneuvering at high speed. 

The missile is effective as anti-ship weapon as well, and will be carried on a quadruple rack that will fit into the F35's weapon bays, alongside with a Meteor air-air missile. 

SPEAR 3 as shown by MBDA: the Typhoon is carrying 16 such missiles, a formidable firepower. The F35 can carry 8 internally, and could carry at least as many externally if integration went ahead.

 

SPEAR Capability 4  

MBDA-Led, joint anglo-french upgrade and sustainment programme for the Storm Shadow missile. Italy, being the third major user of the missile, could likely participate to the upgrade programme, while Saudi Arabia is unlikely to collaborate, save probably having its missiles later updated by BAE.

Not much is really known and firm about these future upgrades, but a two-way datalink is almost certainly going to figure, to allow re-targeting and increasing the control over the missile post-launch, just as with the latest Tomahawk IV. Other improvements are likely to include an increase of the range of the missile, particularly since the upgrade will build upon experience matured with the SCALP Navale with its 1000+ km range.

It is to be noted that the 250 km range figure for Storm Shadow is the range for a low-flight profile engagement from launch to hit. If the missile could do at least part of the cruise at altitude, efficiency of the propulsion would be much higher, allowing for a much longer range. 

The Lancaster House agreements signed in 2010 for collaboration between France and UK include a committment to joint Storm Shadow upgrades for the 2020s. 

Indeed, joint work is ongoing from long time in this area: an upgrade considered for Storm Shadow was the DUMAS, for which development started in 2006 in a collaborative programme with France. 

DUMAS technology combines an active infrared scanning laser and a passive infrared detector which, used in conjunction with sophisticated algorithms, detects, images and identifies targets. 

DUMAS improves existing and new missile systems by increasing target search areas and by providing powerful automated target identification capabilities. It was meant to  demonstrate a new seeker capable to guide the missile on moving, difficult targets, while also providing before-strike enhanced imagery, valid also to conduct a first mission-effect estimate.

The DUMAS is believed to have informed subsequent developments and researches tied not just to the Storm Shadow but also other elements of SPEAR.  

SPEAR Capability Block 5

Rumours about this last touted development went as far as to suggest a 600+ km supersonic cruise missile, possibly a replacement for Storm Shadow in the long term.

Blocks internal to the various Capabilities probably denote the various stages of improvement. The Capability 2 Block 3 might be a further enhancement of the Brimstone 2 entering service next year, since anyway the answer is relative to the 2020s period. 

By then, with some determination and investment, the Brimstone might finally fully mature, and meet its intended mission: become the common, multi-platform weapon of choice of the british Armed Forces, used on drones, attack helicopters, fast jets and, perhaps one day, on ships and land platforms as well. 

Already years ago, Brimstone was envisaged as Swingfire AT missile replacement in the missile Overwatch vehicle variant of the Tracer reconnaissance vehicle, which was then cancelled as we know. 

The army would still like to have an overwatch capability back in the future as part of FRES, though... who knows what might happen. 

 

The 313 ships plan of the US Navy: a rapid summary and a thought

Most of the people with an interest in defence will have heard at least once about the "313 ships plan" of the US Navy, but few will be aware of the intended composition of this total. The current US fleet hovers at around 284 ships, with the 313 ships plan having been formuled in 2006. Now it is practically certain that said plan will be rewritten and scaled down in several areas, but it remains indicative of the general direction that the USN is following.

As of now, the US Navy strength includes:

- 11 Aircraft Carriers

CVN-65 Enterprise - Her last tour of duty has begun.

CVN-68 Nimitz

CVN-69 Dwight D. Eisenhower1977 1

 CVN-70 Carl Vinson

CVN-71 Theodore Roosevelt

CVN-72 Abraham Lincoln

CVN-73 George Washington

CVN-74 John C. Stennis 19951

CVN-75 Harry S. Truman

CVN-76 Ronald Reagan

CVN-77 George H. Bush

Being built are:

CVN-78 Gerald R. Ford - due to commission in september 2015

CVN-79John F. Kennedy - first steel cut in february 2011, for delivery in 2020

- AAW cruisers; Ticonderoga class

CG-52 Bunker Hill  19865679

CG-53 Mobile Bay

CG-54 Antietam

CG-55 Leyte Gulf

CG-56 San Jacinto

CG-57 Lake Champlain

CG-58 Philippine Sea

CG-59 Princeton

CG-60 Normandy

CG-61 Monterey

CG-62 Chancellorsville

CG-63 Cowpens - to be retired as part of FY2013 cuts

CG-64 Gettysburg - to be retired in FY2014 as part of cuts

CG-65 Chosin - to be retired in FY2014 as part of cuts

CG-66 Hue City - to be retired in FY2014 as part of cuts

CG-67 Shiloh

CG-68 Anzio - to be retired as part of FY2013 cuts

CG-69 Vicksburg - to be retired as part of FY2013 cuts

CG-70 Lake Erie

CG-71 Cape St. George

CG-72 Vella Gulf

CG-73 Port Royal - to be retired as part of FY2013 cuts

7 of these powerful and impressive, but not without defects, ships will be retired as part of cuts outlined in the 2013 budget, as indicated in the above list. The intended Ticonderoga replacement, the CG-(X) was cancelled, and it is now anticipated that destroyers of the Arleigh Burke Flight III will be bought as replacement in the long term.

- Destroyers; DDG-51 Arleigh Burke class  

Flight I - no helicopter hangar, 2 Phalanx CIWS

DDG-51 Arleigh Burke

DDG-52 Barry

DDG-53 John Paul Jones

DDG-54 Curtis Wilbur

DDG-55 Stout

DDG-56 John S. McCain

DDG-57 Mitscher

DDG-58 Laboon

DDG-59 Russell

DDG-60 Paul Hamilton

DDG-61 Ramage

DDG-62 Fitzgerald

DDG-63 Stethem

DDG-64 Carney

DDG-65 Benfold

DDG-66 Gonzalez

DDG-67 Cole

DDG-68 The Sullivans

DDG-69 Milius

DDG-70 Hopper

DDG-71 Ross

Flight II - improved radar and electronics

DDG-72 Mahan

DDG-73 Decatur

DDG-74 McFaul

DDG-75 Donald Cook

DDG-76 Higgins

DDG-77 O'Kane

DDG-78 Porter

Flight 2A - introduces double helicopter hangar, but ships were not fitted with Harpoon missiles

Fitted with 5''/54 main gun

DDG-79 Oscar Austin

DDG-80 Roosevelt

Fitted with 5''/62 MK4 main gun, but development of long range ammunition for which they were intended was cancelled

DDG-81 Winston Churchill -  this ship, symbol of the special relationship, carries the name of the british prime minister, has a RN man on board on exchange at all times, and quite often flies the White Ensign on the mast

DDG-82 Lassen

DDG-83 Howard

DDG-84 Bulkeley

From DDG-85 onwards the vessels were not fitted with Phalanx CIWS systems, or given only one instead of two

DDG-85 McCampbell

DDG-86 Shoup

DDG-87 Mason 

DDG-88 Preble

DDG-89 Mustin

DDG-90 Chafee

DDG-91 Pinckney

DDG-92 Momson

DDG-93 Chung-Hoon

DDG-94 Nitze

DDG-95 James E Williams

DDG-96 Bainbridge

DDG-97 Halsey

DDG-98 Forrest Sherman

DDG-99 Farragut

DDG-100 Kidd

DDG-101 Gridley

DDG-102 Sampson

DDG-103 Truxtun

DDG-104 Sterett

DDG-105 Dewey

DDG-106 Stockdale

DDG-107 Gravely

DDG-108 Wayne E. Meyer

DDG-109 Jason Dunham

DDG-110 William P Lawrence

DDG-111 Spruance

DDG-112 Michael Murphy

The production of DDG-51 has restarted in 2009 due to the cost overruns of the Zumwalt class, which was subsequently cut from a planned 32 to just 3, and three more Flight 2A destroyers are on order. These will include features that are being rolled in service on existing ships as part of a BAE-led modernization programme.

DDG-113 John Finn

DDG-114 Ralph Johnson

DDG-115 Rafael Peralta

A further 6 destroyers are planned to be built as "Technology Insertion ships", incorporating design changes and improvements and kit of the in-design phase Flight III

DDG-116

DDG-117

DDG-118

DDG-119

DDG-120

DDG-121

From DDG-122 onwards, it is expected that the destroyers will be built in Flight III configuration. Flight III will introduce the new Air and Missile Defense Radars AMDR. The US Navy is thinking to keep buying Arleigh Burkes, fixing their design and kit as time passes. They anticipate a Flight IV by around 2032.

DDG-1000 Zumwalt class

DDG-1000 Zumwalt

DDG-1001 Michael Monsoor

DDG-1002 (budgeted)

Probably the most innovative ships being built anywhere in the world, they are also probably going to be the most expensive destroyers ever. Their 14.000 tons +, anyway, suggest that cruiser would be a more fair designation.

FFG Oliver H. Perry class - 20 active, 8 in reserve. Decommissioning as LCS vessels enter service.

MCM vessels - 14 Avenger class ships; destined to be replaced by LCS

Coastal patrol vessels - 10 Cyclone class ships

All 12 Osprey class coastal minehunters retired by 2007; intended replacement is LCS

Submarine Fleet

Seawolf class SSN

SSN- 21 Seawolf

SSN- 22 Connecticut

SSN- 23 Jimmy Carter

Los Angeles class SSN

SSN-698 Bremerton

SSN-699 Jacksonville

SSN-700 Dallas

SSN-701 La Jolla

SSN-705 City of Corpus Christi 

SSN-706 Albuquerque

SSN-711 San Francisco 

SSN-713 Houston

SSN-714 Norfolk

SSN-715 Buffalo

SSN-717 Olympia

SSN-719 Providence

SSN-720 Pittsburgh

SSN 721 Chicago

SSN 722 Key West

SSN 723 Oklahoma City

SSN 724 Louisville

SSN 725 Helena

SSN 750 Newport News

SSN 751 San Juan

SSN 752 Pasadena

SSN 753 Albany

SSN 754 Topeka

SSN 755 Miami

SSN 756 Scranton

SSN 757 Alexandria

SSN 758 Asheville

SSN 759 Jefferson City

SSN 760 Annapolis

SSN 761 Springfield

SSN 762 Columbus

SSN 763 Santa Fe

SSN 764 Boise

SSN 765 Montpelier

SSN 766 Charlotte

SSN 767 Hampton

SSN 768 Hartford

SSN 769 Toledo

SSN-770 Tucson

SSN-771 Columbia

SSN-772 Greenville

SSN-773 Cheyenne

Virginia class SSN

Block I

SSN-774 Virginia

SSN-775 Texas

SSN 776 Hawaii

SSN 777 North Carolina

Block II - reduced number of sections, making building easier and less expensive

SSN 778 New Hampshire

SSN 779 New Mexico

SSN 780 Missouri

SSN 781 California

Being built:

SSN 782 Mississippi - to commission by June 2012

SSN 783 Minnesota - for delivery in 2013

Block III - revised bow design replaces the 12 single VLS cells with two large tubes each containing a 6-cells module, as on the Ohio SSGNs

SSN 784 North Dakota

SSN 785 John Warner

SSN 786 yet to be named

SSN 787 yet to be named

At least 8 Block III submarines will be built. A Block IV tranche is planned, and Block V should follow, introducing an additional hull section aft of the conning tower, containing 4 large Common Weapon Launcher tubes for the Prompt Global Strike missile (if it effectively developed and introduced into service), UAVs, UUVs, or the 6-cells Tomahawk launchers. In practice, the Common Weapon Launcher is a huge, 3-meter in diameter tube that is part of the Common Missile Compartment being developed for the US and UK replacement SSBNs.

The Block V Virginia is currently envisioned as replacement for the current SSGNs, to be retired between 2026 and 2028.

As in the UK there's been some thought given to fitting a missile compartment section in an Astute design to create a "low cost" future SSBN, in the US there have been studies about using the Virginia.

In both countries, the approach is kept around as a possibility, but is not seen as the way to go.

SSGN Fleet - Modified Ohio, 4 ex-SSBN hulls

SSGN-726 Ohio

SSGN-727 Michigan

SSGN-728 Florida

SSGN-729 Georgia

SSBN Fleet - 14 Ohio class boats

SSBN 730 Henry M. Jackson

SSBN 731 Alabama

SSBN 732 Alaska

SSBN 733 Nevada

SSBN-734 Tennessee 

SSBN 735 Pennsylvania

SSBN-736 West Virginia

SSBN 737 Kentucky

SSBN 738 Maryland

SSBN 739 Nebraska

SSBN 740 Rhode Island

SSBN 741 Maine

SSBN 742 Wyoming

SSBN 743 Louisiana

Amphibious Fleet

Command Ships

LCC-19 Blue Ridge - based in Yokosuka, Japan

LCC-20 Mount Whitney - based in Gaeta, Italy

Both command ships are to be life-extended to 2029.

LHD; 8 Wasp class

LHD-1 Wasp

LHD-2 Essex

LHD-3 Kearsarge

LHD-4 Boxer  

LHD-5 Bataan

LHD-6 Bonhomme Richard

LHD-7 Iwo Jima

LHD-8 Makin Island

LHA fleet

LHA-5 Peleliu - last of the Tarawa class, will be retired when USS America is ready  

Being built:

LHA-6 America - should hit service in 2014, will replace Peleliu 

LHA-7 - initial contract placed

LHA-8 - planned, with initial funding to be provided by 2015

LPD fleet, San Antonio class (LPD 17)

LPD-17 San Antonio

LPD-18 New Orleans  

LPD-19 Mesa Verde

LPD-20 Green Bay

LPD-21 New York 

Being built/delivered

LPD-22 San Diego - to commission in May 2012

LPD-23 Anchorage - to commission in September 2012

LPD-24 Arlington

LPD-25 Somerset

LPD-26 John P. Murtha

LPD-27 - long lead orders

LPD-28 - planned

LSD fleet

LSD-41 Whidbey Island - to be retired in FY2013 as part of cuts

LSD-42 Germantown

LSD-43 Fort McHenry

LSD-44 Gunston Hall

LSD-45 Comstock

LSD-46 Tortuga - to be retired in FY2013 as part of cuts

LSD-47 Rushmore

LSD-48 Ashland

LSD-49 Harpers Ferry

LSD-50 Carter Hall

LSD-51 Oak Hill

LSD-52 Pearl Harbor

By 2020, a replacement program, LSD(X), should be shaped to buy up to 11 replacement LSD vessels. For the moment, nothing is known about the characteristics envisaged by the Navy.

Joint High Speed Vessel

JHSV 1 Spearhead

JHSV 2 Vigilant

JHSV 3 Fortitude

JHSV 4 Fall River

JHSV 5 Resolute

JHSV 6 Choctaw County

JHSV 7 Courageous

JHSV 8 - yet to be named

JHSV 9 Sacrifice

JHSV 10 - yet to be named

Plans for 8 more vessels are apparently cancelled as part of cuts in FY2013.

January 2012 saw the US Navy receiving 2 "superferries", Huakai and Alakai, ex-civilian ferries which served in the Hawaii before the company MARAD, defaulted. The two ferries will replace an equal number of civilian ferries that the Marines had leased in the last years.

Sea Base

USS Ponce, LPD-15, is to be converted into an interim sea base.

Mobile Landing Platform

Montford Point - to hit service in 2015

John Glenn

Lewis B. Puller - should be in service by 2018

The 313 ships plan: blueprint for the future

A revised plan, with numbers tweaked downwards, is likely to emerge at some point in the future. The cuts of FY2013, after all, go against the indications of the 313 ships plan, and would require additional ships to be built to keep the originally envisaged pace, something that is almost certainly not happening, with emphasis on the 'certain'.

The 313 ships plan envisages a fleet composed of:

11 Aircraft Carrier, Nuclear CVN

88 Major Escorts (DDG-51, Ticonderoga until retired, DDG-1000 Zumwalt)

55 LCS

48 SSN

4 SSGN (with the Virginia block 5 currently planned as replacement, the US navy might well have no real SSGN submarine, but more SSNs enhanced with a large number of VLS tubes for TLAM and/or whatever comes out of the Prompt Global Strike missile)

12 SSBN (down from 14)

33 amphibious vessels [8 LHD, 3 LHA, 12 LPD 17, 10 (?) LSD(X)]

30 Combat Logistics Force ships [11 T-AKE auxiliary dry cargo ships, 4 T-AOE fast CSS ships, 15 T-AO oilers, to be replaced by an equal number of T-AO(X) tankers introducing the double hull)

12 Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future)

20 Support Vessels

The effective numbers of vessels is of course given by the balance of new hulls built and launched and old ones being retired, so 313 is an aspirational number calculated on the need of maintaining a date quantity of vessels of each type. For example, the requirement for 11 active carriers has been confirmed even after the latest budget cuts, even though, for 33 months, the total will go down to 10 as Enterprise is retired before her replacement hits service. 

LCS

Over the years, it is envisaged that some 66 LCS will be built, but some will be replacements for the early units, so that the US Navy plans a force of 55 LCS in service as a standard, with the 55 hulls having to ensure that at least 23 vessels will be at sea at any one time. The LCS is getting double crews, which are swapped at sea to maximise ship availability.

The 55 LCS are seen as a direct replacement to 30 Oliver Hazard Perry frigates, 14 Avenger class minesweepers and 12 Osprey coastal minesweepers. Some of the frigates are gone, several are in reserve, and all the Ospreys have been retired already.

The LCS program includes the acquisition of 24 Mine Counter Measure modular kits, 16 ASW kits, and 24 ASuW kits. The MCM modular payload is the most urgently needed, and it is the one making the most progress. Both of the other two role payloads are suffering delays and problems. In particular, the Anti Surface Warfare (ASuW) module has been badly hurt by the US Army cancellation of the NLOS missile system: the LCS ASuW was meant to employ 3 NLOS launch boxes, for 45 missiles, plus 2 30 mm light guns.

As of early 2012, the US Navy is thinking to employ the Griffin mini-missile, but this has an even shorter range and lethality, and the ASuW module risks being unable to hit anything 'over the horizon' before 2017, when a "Griffin Increment 2" should expand the missile's capability.

To give you an idea of how bad it is, a surface launched Griffin will only go 3.5 / 4 miles, which is no bad when fired at an Afghan compound from the back of an Humvee, but sucks considerably if it is your warship's best weapon.

The Support Vessels include:

4 T-ARS rescue and salvage ships

5 T-AGOS ocean survey ships

4 T-AFT oceanic fleet tugs

2 LCC Command Ships

2 AS Submarine Tender ships

2 T-AH hospital ships [Mercy and Comfort]

Marine Prepositioning Force (Future)

The Marine Prepositioning Force future envisages three squadrons, one based in the Mediterranean Sea, one in Diego Garcia, Indian Ocean, and one in the West Pacific, based in Guam.

Note that the Marine Prepositioning Force is that dedicated solely to the US Marines Corp. Further prepositioning vessels, for a total of over 30, exist but are not part of the 313 ship count: they are operated by the US Military Sealift Command, crewed by civilians, and assigned to support the Army and the USAF.

For now i will only focus on the specific Marine fleet.

Each squadron carries vehicles and stores to support a 17.000-strong Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) for a minimum of 30 days of high intensity combat operations. Alternatively, the squadron can support several 2200-strong Marine Expeditionary Units MEU.

Each squadron will have:

1 Mobile Landing Platform

1 Large Medium Speed Ro-Ro vessel. The USMC variant of the LMSR has several improvements, such as a modified stern RoRo ramp that can be lowered in the water for launching amphibious assault vehicles, a full Day/Night flight deck (opposed to a day-only landing pad on Army LMSRs) and accommodation for 50 Marines.  

1 T-AKE dry cargo ship

1 of the current T-AK series of civilian cargo vessels of the Maritime Prepositioning Force.   

Each Marine Prepositioning Squadron (MPS) carries, in addition to stores and vehicles, material for a Seabees maritime engineer battalion, a 200-beds Role 3 hospital and material for the construction of a Forward Operating Base with runways for STOVL aircraft, today Harrier, tomorrow F35B.

The current MPS squadrons have limited self-supporting attributes. They have powerful cranes for unloading, but they still need a port. The Mobile Landing Platform, meant to constitute a "pier at sea" will enable the RoRo ships, including JHSV, to disembark the vehicles, which will then go ashore on LCU or LCAC crafts or, where possible, driving down a floating causeway connecting the Mobile Landing Platform directly to the shore.

A plan in this sense has yet to take shape, but with the introduction of the Sea Base vessel type with FY2013 planning, the Marine Prepositioning Squadrons might gain an additional vessel type, with three Seabases built on the same hull of the Mobile Landing Platform.

Alternatively, the Seabase will be built by enhancing the Landing Platform, using the immense open deck to add platforms for accommodations and other services, including container handling crane and also extensive helicopter support facilities. The order for the first definitive seabase (the USS Ponce conversion is an interim solution) is expected in 2014, as a new build ship. Converting the third Mobile Landing Platform is also being evaluated.

A previous variant, very different, of the MPF(F) foresaw an high end squadron replacing one of the current three "civvie" squadrons, lining 2 LHDs, 1 LHA, 1 Mobile Landing Platform and other vessels. This plan was abandoned in 2010, an a proposal of having an LHA built for each Prepositioning Squadron was also abandoned. LHDs and LHAs will stay back in the US as part of the assault fleet, while MPF(F) has become a far less ambitious, but in my view far more balanced and reasonable enhancement to the current three squadrons, in which the LMSR, T-AKE and MLP fit perfectly well.

A quick mumble

With a force of 88 escorts planned, but pretty much never to be reached (the actual force will hover around 70-some most of the time, and that's before other and worst reductions in shipbuilding eventually come), the US Navy is rather hard pressed.

Indeed, just last January the US Navy admiral Jonathan W. Greenert, chief of naval operations, announced that Department of Defense has asked the Navy to take another look at implementing more “Sea Swap,” the rotation of ship crews to keep warships forward-deployed longer. The aim is to avoiding the wear and tear of long transits, and increase ship availability by keeping the vessels on patrol and forward deployed for longer periods.

The US Navy tried doing it in 200, but by 2003 it had discontinued the method because it was assessed to cause a drop in the efficiency of crews, something that the RN discovered in 2007, when it too tried the sea swapping.

Nonetheless, both US and UK crews of the respective minesweeper fleets in Bahrain are swapped regularly (UK minesweepers do tours of 4 years in Bahrain, with crews rotated in and out every six months), the RN sea-swaps happily the crews of its survey ships, which often stay a good two years in cruise around the world without ever touching the UK's coast, some sea swapping is done on HMS Protector, and crews are regularly rotated aboard RFA tankers, such as the Wave class vessels which can easily spend 2 and a half years away before heading back to the UK.

The US Navy uses double crews (Blue and Gold) on its SSGN subs and has adopted the practice for the LCS as well.

Want it or not, both the US Navy and the Royal Navy are likely to have to try harder, and make Sea Swap work, because ship numbers are going down but tasks are not.

The experiments of both navies in the 2000s were probably too ambitious: the idea of the time was that the crews would no longer be assigned to a ship and build a long lasting tie with it, but they would be flown to any vessel of the type that needed them.

This was assessed to impact morale badly, and the crews were unable to get emotionally attached to the vessels they briefly touched, which meant that they normally did the least indispensable and left behind themselves a mess the following crew would have to deal with. Also, the swap was done too quickly, without giving the crews the time to exchange info on the state of the ship.

Germany, with its F125 frigates, is adopting a different approach, with 2 crews per ship and with a 48 hours swap time, in which the new crew is introduced to the vessel by the crew that's about to leave.

This does not erase all problems and challenges, but greatly downsizes them. 2 crews assigned to a ship will still very much feel the ship as their own, and while 48 hours aren't a long time, they should be enough for the crews to exchange the most needed information.

If it could be made to work, Sea Swap could well represent an advantage for crews as well as from the Navy. In the RN, as of now, personnel can be asked to be away from home for 660 days in a 36 months period, including deployments, pre-deployment training and other activities resulting in the personnel sleeping away from his usual accommodation. In terms of deployments, the RN personnel can be asked to spend 60% of a 36 months period deployed away from home, which to me seems  to contradict the Separated Service Guidelines exposed earlier: 60% of 36 months in itself is around 660 days. Adding pre-deployment training, that means spending well more than 660 days away from home.

Swapping every six months could be made to enhance significantly the permanence of a ship in area of operations, while also improving the life of personnel by reducing at least a little the time spent away.

For the Royal Navy it could be advantageous to have double crews for a number of Type 26s and 45s, in order to sustain enduring commitments such as Atlantic Patrol South and operations in the Gulf. Instead of having a minimum of two ships committed to the Falklands over a 12 months period, you'd have one, for example, while cutting at least two 13.000 miles transits over the period, with savings in fuel and wear and tear.

Time to be imaginative, and seriously think again about it, i believe.

Second part of my mumble is that the Royal Navy, bashed for "having sacrificed escorts" for major warships, has a better ratio of escorts/capital ships than the US Navy has.

US Capital ships: 11 Carriers and 33 amphibious vessels

Escorts: 88

Ratio: 2 to 1

UK Capital ships: 2 LPH (tomorrow hopefully 2 carriers), 2 LPD and, let's be generous, 3 Bay class LSD

Escorts: 19

Ratio: 2,71 to 1

The difference is that the US is constituting a dedicate fleet for minor tasks and forward presence, the LCS force, with flottillas in Singapore and Yokosuka, Japan, and perhaps in Bahrain too.

The UK has long lost a second-rate fleet for minor tasks, and is forced to use escorts for roles that do not require major warships.

The answer is not building more escorts (although that would be a beautiful and effective answer), because that is financially unfeasible, but building a second rate fleet. It is what the Navy is trying to do with the C3, now MHPC, requirement.

It is far more than a minesweeper replacement: at 3000 tons and 7000 naval miles range, it is a presence ship which has to relieve the escorts of much of their current jobs.

As i will explain in much greater detail in my Future Force 2020: Royal Navy and Marines post to follow sometime in the future, i envisage only two "Warlike" standing commitments, as of now: the Falklands and the Gulf. For pirates and drug smugglers, a Lynx helicopter and a 30 mm gun are already enough.

Frigates and destroyers should be primarily assigned to these two locations, with the rest kept back to train, participate in multinational exercises, to escort the RN Response Force Task Group and to be ready for the unexpected, essentially: as a Fleet in Being ready to sail towards a crisis. Anti-Piracy patrol in Somalia, Caribbean counter-smuggling, and other minor tasks should all be covered by the MHPC, not by major warships which are effectively wasted in the role and consequently unavailable to respond to real crisis, or by tankers or amphibs that are best used in their true roles. 

Some double crews and MHPCs are my financially affordable solution to the shortage of escorts. It might be unglamorous, but at least it is possible, and not a wet dream.

In fact, just think about basing a single frigate in the Falklands and another in the Gulf, each keeping the position for a couple of years, with the two crews exchanging every six months.

Only 2 ships are committed in the two years, instead of, at best, 4 (2 per each task). From the same number of ships, i've gained two vessels that are now available for other tasks, like escorting the Response Force and being available when a crisis pops up and well armed ships are needed.