Parliament approves

Parliament has approved the beginning of combat operations over Iraq against ISIL, and the Tornado GR4s already in Cyprus will likely fly their first mission very soon from Akrotiri. They have been flying reconnaissance sorties for a while already, along with the first (and for now only) Rivet Joint in service.
There might very well be a SSN already positioned for eventual Tomahawk launches. The RN maintains a SSN(T), with the T standing for TLAM, Tomahawk land attack missile, east of suez at all times, and it could fire its cruise weapons from the Gulf. Another could well be in the Mediterranean, too.

There will be time to talk in greater detail about the british operations and contribution to this fight, which doesn't have a clear end in sight. Tonight it is time to wish for happy hunting and for a safe return for everyone that will be involved.

The little that can be said right away is that already it looks like the most precious contribution that can be made will be tanker support, as well as ISR support, both in extremely high demand.
Combat aircraft are likely to be relatively less important, in a way. First of all, they are going to be few in number: the talk at the moment is for 6 Tornados, and it is going to be hard to do more, since the Tornado force is down to just three frontline squadrons, and of these one is ramping down ahead of disbandment next year (II (AC) Sqn), another has just returned from its last Afghan tour (IX Sqn) and one has just deployed in Afghanistan (31 Sqn). Add the Tornado deployed to Africa to support the ISR campaign to locate Boko Haram and the kidnapped girls in Nigeria, and the overstretch is evident.
Typhoon will have to be used, if the Iraq effort is to be ramped up. But Typhoon, as we know, is still years away from the much needed full air to ground capability, so there are many limitations, ifs, buts and maybes.

Another factor in limiting the reach of the air campaign is the distance of flight and the need for air refueling. France's own 6 Rafales, for example, flying from Al Dhafra, only fly one mission a day, roughly, tipically with two aircraft, even if double pairs have also been used. Each mission takes several hours and several AAR contacts. France has only one KC-135 tanker assigned to the operation, named Chammal, so it is very much dependent on coalition tankers, mainly USAF ones.
The USAF has been flying over 30 tanker sorties per day, and in the relatively short time since the beginning of the operations, CENTCOM has already registered a staggering 1289 tanker sorties.
The number of air strikes compared to the sorties flown is very low: only a few more than 200 airstrikes, with some 350 weapons expended in Iraq, and even less in Syria. The need for tanker support will only grow greater as the fixed, known and static targets are taken out and the focus shifts more and more to hitting mobile and relocatable targets. This will require aircraft to loiter and to hunt for targets, and will require endurance and lots of fuel. Plus, of course, even more ISR to locate the targets.
The RAF might be able to provide a Sentinel R1 to aid the ISR effort (difficult to say the least, since one is in Africa and Afghanistan still calls for Sentinel surveillance as well, which means a forward fleet of 3 machines is already well busy as it is) and some Voyager. There are 9 Voyager in service, but one is for air transport only and one is in the Falklands. When the QRA tanker requirement at home is added in, it is evident that there isn't much to go around in this field either. 
The options, in any way you want to look at it, are limited. 

Main air bases for the campaign. Approximate positions only. Incirlik is a NATO base, but Turkey is not granting authorization for its use for combat operations, at least for now. Not clear if RAF aircraft from Akrotiri will fly over Syria despite the risks this implies and despite the political hesitations. Curving south over Jordan or north over Turkey, on the other hand, only add more distance.

The overall responsiveness of coalition airpower to developments on the ground is, at this stage, still quite slow for obvious reasons: one major difference could be made by forward basing inside Iraq. The US intend to deploy aircraft to Irbil, and these will have much better chances to provide endurance and responsiveness over Northern Iraq. Of course, this does require boots on the ground, which the US already have in hundreds, with an Army Division HQ also on the way. Super Hornets coming from the USS George W. Bush (CVN 77) can also compensate the tiranny of distances somewhat, and some help comes from the USMC Harriers of USS Bataan and USS Makin Island as well.
The USAF has employed B-1 bombers as well, which have huge range and endurance, and they are likely to account for a big share of the USAF contribution so far in terms of strikes and ordnance dropped.

The start of RAF ops comes together with the announces that Belgium is to contribute 6 F-16, Denmark 7 F-16 and the Netherlands on Wednesday promised 6 F-16 plus two spare aircraft to the Coalition in one week's time.
To all of the men and women involved, again happy hunting, and wishes of a safe return.

Italy and the F-35: the PD document that backs the cuts - UPDATE

Current status of the program: the defence ministry has agreed to freeze the negotiations for further aircraft, while the defence white paper is produced, for publishing by December according to the current plan.
The freeze in the payments, according to italian defence analysts, actually applies only to the early long lead orders for the LRIP 10 production lot, for which negotiation began in february this year. The firm order for the production of these aircraft would come in 2016.
In the meanwhile, the acquisition of the 3 F-35A of LRIP 6, the 3 F-35A of LRIP 7 is going ahead. These are the only aircraft that Italy has signed definitive contracts for. In this summer, Italy will also sign the production contract for LRIP 8, with two F-35A, while next year there will be the order for LRIP 9. See the previous article for details of the production schedule for Italy, which was restructured in 2013.

Important news have come from Israeli officers, which, after voicing their intention to open a MRO line for their F-35s in Israel are now opening up to the idea of sending their aircraft to the single MRO facility for the European and Mediterranean area, which is supposed to eventually be located in the Cameri FACO, in Italy. The best chance for Italy to get a long term economic and technical return is to be selected as location for the single MRO facility: that would mean maintaining USAFE, Israeli, dutch, british and norwegian F-35s over the coming decades, assuming that negotiations with all these countries go ahead.
Italy has held preliminary talks with other F-35 partners, and the Cameri FACO is going to assemble the F-35s for the Netherlands. Italy, in exchange, will send its F-135 engines in the Netherlands for depot maintenance. It is widely expected that Netherlands will continue to lean on the Italian FACO for the regular depot maintenance of its jets.
United Kingdom and Norway have, in recent times, concluded preliminary collaboration agreements over the F-35: the scenario that is taking shape sees the brits standing up an Integrated Training Centre in the UK, which norwegian pilot could use to avoid the costs of sending their personnel all the way to Luke AFB, in the USA. The British would reciprocate by sending their F-135 engines to Norway for maintenance. None of the two countries will have a MRO depot, so for deep maintenance they are faced by the choice between Cameri or the US.
While Italy is currently planning to have its pilots trained in the US, it can be reasonably assumed that negotiations will be made to have italian pilots trained in the UK's ITC instead, in exchange for a depot maintenance agreement. Negotiations should also eventually resume with Norway, with which Italy had held successful preliminary talks in the early 2000s.
One of the greatest critiques moved to the F-35 program is the industrial and workshare returns aren't satisfactory: the biggest source of work, the depot maintenance, is a promise currently not guaranteed by firm contracts. Forging firm agreements in this area would be a major boost to the popularity of the F-35 program in Italy, so the Israeli opening is particularly important.

It is evident that these industrial plans, and the international agreements already signed or hoped for will have to be considered as part of the White Paper. While workshare returns as of now appear uncertain and mostly based on the conclusion of future collaboration deals, excessive cutbacks to Italy's committment to the program could be the death blow to the hopes of making of Cameri a winning investment.
There are at least two requisites for which Italy absolutely needs the F-35, and in both the A and B variants: the F-35A, at the bare minimum, is needed to replace the Tornado IDS in the NATO tactical nuclear bomber role. At least a squadron of F-35A, eventually to receive integration with the B61-12 nuclear bomb, is planned to replace the current "nuclear" squadron on Tornado on the Ghedi air base.
Another group is needed, with F-35B this time, to equip the aircraft carrier Cavour.
Current plans include further F-35A to replace Tornado IDS in the strike role and AMX aircraft in CAS role, in up to three other squadrons.  One air force group on F-35B as CAS asset is also planned.

While a reduction from 90 aircraft is almost certain, halving the order would have a dramatic effect on the future of the air force, and defence chiefs are unsurprisingly already pushing back with their full force against the misinformed attacks.

Attacks which are misinformed for real. Let's see what the document produced by the PD members in the defence committee says.


The document that backs the cuts 

The internal document produced by Partito Democratico (PD) members that have taken part, over the past months, to multiple hearins with the armed forces chiefs and industry representatives has been revealed to the press. The document is born out of the initiative of Gian Piero Scanu, head of the PD group in the Defence Committee and a well known enemy of defence spending, which never fails to show his very lacking understanding of defence matters. As was to be expected, the document looks like the product of an hour of the attention of an 8-year old boy.

On the F-35 story, which is the one which caught the international attention the most, the document reaches its top levels. The document says it is necessary to explore other solutions for the renewal of the Navy's fighter fleet, made up of STOVL aircraft, the only ones which can take off from the relatively small aircraft carrier Cavour. It will be a short exploration, since there isn't any alternative to the F-35B in this specific area.
The document also says that the air force is wrong in saying that the Typhoon has little to no air to ground capabilities and won't have them for several more years, even with big investments on the way. The Typhoon is "fully operational", the politicians say they have discovered in the hearings.
Of course it is. In the air defence role, since 2005. Big discovery. The real discovery, and this one truly does amaze everyone, is that there is a fully multirole Typhoon in production: it is called RAPHALE and it is the "french variant of Typhoon".
Well, i'm sure Eurofighter and Dassault will both be delighted of finding this out.

A big advantage of throwing more money into Typhoon by producing this "french variant" is that the "works-shearing" arrangements are more favorable than those of the F-35 program.
Fantastic.

Il caccia multiruolo Typhoon, nella versione di attacco al suolo, non solo sarà prodotto, ma risulterà competitivo con il JSF della Lockheed. Questa versione dell'Eurofighter sarà messa a disposizione delle missioni UE, NATO e ONU da numerosi alleati europei (Austria, Spagna, Germania e Inghilterra, mentre la Francia utilizzerà la versione “Raphale”).

E' necessario quindi che il nostro Paese mantenga e rafforzi con convinzione la partecipazione delle aziende italiane a questo programma, tenendone sotto controllo i costi, ma anche avendo presente che il sistema di works-shearing, che tiene insieme tutti i programmi di cooperazione europea, garantisce ad ogni paese ritorni in nessun caso inferiori alle proprie quote di investimento.

Sorry France, we should have told you earlier: you are apparently building a Typhoon variant named RAPHALE...

Yes, the Rafale is a multi-role aircraft with air to ground capabilities much more developed than the Typhoon's, and with an AESA radar already in production.
But, sorry Scanu, it is not in any way a Typhoon variant named Raphale...

The "Raphale" is not the only priceless discovery of this document. The terrible english isn't, either. Not even the terrible italian used in some passages, even if it is rape on Dante's language.

The programs of the Navy are seen favorably by the politicians (the new defence minister Roberta Pinotti, born in Genova, has her electoral base in the area of the shipyards which would build the new ships, so for this and other reasons it is not surprising) but even here, of course, they call for some sacrifices. They say that Italy can't afford two aircraft carriers: well, they are a bit late with this discovery, since Italy already has only one aircraft carrier, the Cavour, and no plans to operate another. The older Garibaldi is tied up in port, receiving limited maintenance in the hope of being used for a few more years, but as an helicopter ship in support of amphibious operations, due to the very limited (if not non-existant) helicopter hangarage and maintenance facilities available on the tiny LPDs of the "Santi" class. Garibaldi is meant to be a gap filler on the way to the construction of a 20.000 tons LHD which would replace both her and one of the three Santi ships.
The savings from removing Garibaldi, due to her no longer having an air group and aircraft carrier ambitions, would actually be modest. The Navy has long been considering the option of doing away with the ship, and politicians would want to see Garibaldi sold.
The navy would be fine with selling her, but the problem is that the market isn't really big for ships of this kind: old, manpower-intensive and without air group (Harriers these days are rare and precious, and with the british GR9s sold as spare parts to the US Marines, there really isn't any Harrier on sale anywhere). Any buyer would only be able to put helicopters on her, and even in this role Garibaldi would have to beat the rivalry of the spanish Principe de Asturias, which Spain would also gladly sell off.

The document also makes a mess of the italian army's plans, all of them apparently collectively grouped up under the heading "Forza NEC" and under a notional, impressive and almost certainly wildly speculative pricetag of "20 billions", which obviously should be re-thought. How? Who knows. They seem to be putting in the same basket things such as the future soldier system (Soldato Futuro), the Iveco Lince 4x4 vehicle, the Orso VTMM in all its variants, the modernization of the Ariete MBT, the purchase of the Freccia 8x8 armored vehicle family for the medium weight brigades and many other programs.
The PD politicians are somehow convinced that Forza NEC is not able to operate alongside similar NATO network enabled system of systems, and want european standardization. In part, this might be true, and it would indeed be desirable to achieve better synergies in European defence programs, but sorry Scanu: France, Germany and UK and others aren't exactly going to listen to what you have to say, i fear, and readily follow your orders. 

Finally, Scanu sneaks in another big plan of his: getting rid of the army training grounds in italy, particularly the most important and strategic of them, like Capo Teulada and the weapons training range of Salto di Quirra, in his native Sardinia.
Scanu hates the army's range on the island, it is not a new thing. He has recently stated that the italian army should close all its ranges, in favor of using a "multinational training range" which should be developed in Europe. Somewhere. Anywhere but not in Italy.
Of course, mr. Scanu. I can already see nations rushing forth with money and will to build a mega training range which can fullfil your dream of allowing all european armies to train in the same place.
The document is, thankfully, not so direct as Scanu was in interviews, but it still calls for rationalization of training areas at European level to build common ranges. It also calls for standardization on a single type of rifle, tactical vest, helmet, grenade etcetera. Which, mind you, does have its sense. But, again, it is wishful thinking. Especially since, of course, the unspoken bit of thought in Scanu's mind is that the european rifle should be italian, made by Beretta, as well as probably every other bit of kit the document quotes.

Good luck with getting the rest of Europe to agree.

Is this document serious, well researched, belieavable? No. It is junk. Even worse than i expected it to be.
Is it dangerous for the future of the italian armed forces and the F-35? Yes. Politicians of this kind, with this spectacular level of ignorance even after months of hearings and explanations by the defence chiefs (it is clear that lawmakers have listened to very little of what was said in the hearings), are dangerous for any and everything.
Will this document be torn apart in the next phase of studies and decision-making when it is brought before government? Yes. I very much hope and think so.

It is such a piece of garbage that it wouldn't surprise me if it was cancelled from the web to hide the stupidity of it, while a patched up variant is thrown together. Download it and preserve the memory of it: the Eurofighter RAPHALE asks you to do so! 

Download link (in italian) 


UPDATE: trade union that was reported as being happy with cuts to F-35 already starts backing off as it understands that a cut to F-35 will not mean more Typhoons. Says (with some reason) that Italy was unable to negotiate a truly advantageous deal in terms of technology and work sharing, but that it looks forwards to talking about a serious policy for defence and for investments in the defence field. Asks for a "rethink" on the F-35 program, not for cuts anymore. Better to seek better terms on the F-35 than hope in more Typhoons that were never going to come.

Trade union statement

How surprising.

Oh, and of course, nevermind that Forza NEC (Force NEC, from Network Enabled Capabilities) in the statement becomes NEK, an italian singer...

France's Defence White Paper

France has finally published its long awaited document of strategic and budgetary guidance for the next decade (2014 to 2025), setting a total budget of 364 billion Euro, with 179 of those committed over the years 2014 - 2019. 

34.000 posts within the armed forces will be lost by 2019. Of these, 10.000 posts already were earmarked for suppression since 2008. The document says that the reductions will mainly affect administration and support manpower, but reading the Defence Planning Assumptions does rise more than one doubt about this claim.

Reading the document, it is obvious that cuts and reductions in national ambition are on the way. As widely anticipated, the Navy is, overall, perhaps the service getting the best deal, but, even before we learn the details, it is clear that some sacrifices will be made: there won't be an order for a second aircraft carrier (PA2 has looked more and more unlikely in the last few years anyway, so it is not a real surprise) and there won't be a fourth Mistral-class LHD either, with the Dixmunde, third ship in the class, being the last vessel the french navy will get. 

The Fleet is set to have: 

1x Aircraft Carrier (Charles de Gaulle)
3x LHD (Mistral, Tonnere, Dixmunde) 

4x SSBNs 
6x SSNs 

15x "First Rank" frigates. This suggests that there will be an increase in the number of high-end escort ships as part of the new strategy.
The documents released do not really detail this figure, but it comprises the 2 Horizon-class air defence frigates (the french navy insists to call "frigates" these units which are destroyers by any other name) and the planned 11 FREMM frigates. This, though, gives a total of 13 hulls, which is the same number of high-end frigates currently available to the french navy. While the White Paper fails to detail this voice, perhaps the FREMM order will be incremented to 13. (NOTE: originally, the french navy was due to receive 17 FREMM ships, but the order was later reduced to 11).
The FREMM program is currently intended to deliver 9 ASW/Land Attack frigates and two FREDA air-defence configured vessels. The FREDA are needed to keep up the number of air defence ships in the fleet: originally, four Horizon units were envisaged, but costs were too high and the order was halved. The FREDA is seen as a lower-cost alternative.  

However, the "Dossier Thematiquè" suggests that the reality could be less pleasant: it says that the 15 tier-one ships include "less powerful combat units, notably the frigates type La Fayette upgraded with sonar". If all five La Fayette are similarly upgraded and counted in the total of 15 high-end warships, it would entail a reduction from 11 to just 8.



15x Offshore Patrol vessels. Again, not easy to exactly understand what this entails. Judging from a look at the current french fleet and previous plans, these 15 vessels should include the five La Fayette-class frigates, the 9 A69-class avisos and the patrol vessel L'Adroit which is, however, currently only available for french navy use for a period of three years, as a DCNS move to try and put its new OPV design in the spotlight, with the hope of gaining firm orders. The language of the White Paper is "ambiguous" enough that the number of patrol vessels could probably be dropped to 14 at the end of this three-year concession, but the Navy might also decide to buy the ship by then.   

The uncertainty on the future collocation of the La Fayette adds confusion to the whole picture. Anyway, there is plan, known as BATSIMAR (bâtiment de surveillance et d’intervention maritime), which will deliver replacements for the aging patrol vessels.

6x Surveillance Frigates. The current Floréal ships, we have to assume.   

The White Paper provides no information on the plans for the smaller coastal patrol vessels and does not give an indication of the planned future of the support vessels. The french navy has a requirement for 4 new tanker/supply ships. The relevant program is known as FLOTLOG (flotte logistique).
There is also no update on the plans for the future of the minesweepers flottilla. There will be one, and the SLAMF (Système de Lutte Anti-Mines navales Futur) program goes ahead to develop the future solution for the MCM requirement.  Drones, deployed by a new kind of mothership, are the envisaged solution.

Anyway, it does show that MOD personnel collaborated with the french for this White Paper...! 

The Fleet Air Arm will keep its nuclear role, with nuclear-tipped missiles carried on Charles De Gaulle for launch from the embarked Rafale M airplanes. The number of naval aircrafts, helicopters and maritime patrol aircrafts are not disclosed, for the moment. 
Programs ongoing include the upgrade of the Atlantique 2 maritime patrol aircrafts and the acquisition of 27 NH90 NFH helicopters.
With the total number of Air Force and Fleet Air Arm fighter jets now capped at 225, i would not be surprised to the see the french air force becoming more aggressive in a bid to get an as big share of them as possible: we'll have to see if the french navy fights its corner better than the Royal Navy did when faced with the same problem... 


This leads us straight to the Air Force.
As i just said, France now aims to a force of 225 fighter jets in total, comprising Air Force and Navy airplanes. With the imminent withdrawal from service of the navy's Super Etendard and of the Air Force's Mirage F1 CR, the fleet will be composed only by Rafale and Mirage (several variants). 
In the future, a monotype fleet of sole Rafale is in sight, but for many more years the Mirage will continue to be a precious workhorse. 
In recent times, the plan had been to procure 234 Rafale for the Air Force and 60 Rafale M for the navy, with the air force hoping to have, on its own, 225 aircraft by 2022. The drop in expected numbers is obviously very relevant, and the Air Force / Navy proportions might have to change as a consequence. 
The Navy wants 60 Rafale M because it aims to have three embarkable squadrons, each having (on paper) 18 airplanes. The squadrons are the 12F, 11F and 17F, the latter being the last unit to fly with the Super Etendard.  

The announced purchase of 200 Meteor missiles and the integration of the weapon on Rafale (by 2018) seem to still be planned.

The new White Paper will undoubtedly cause a lot of big and small changes and plan rethinks in the coming months and years, but it is worth remembering that in recent times France had been planning to: 

- Retire the Mirage F1CR. The withdrawal of this reconnaissance aircraft is to be balanced by the integration of the RECO NG Aeros pod on the Rafale. 12 such pods are planned for the Air Force and 6 for the Navy, along with 3 ground control stations. 

- Mirage 2000N: to remain in service until 2018, it is compatible with the RECO NG pod but its main role is as nuclear strike aircraft, armed with the ASMPA cruise missile. 

- Mirage 2000D: the intention is to upgrade these strike fighters so they can employ the ASTAC (Analyseur de Signaleux TACTiques) pod to provide ELINT reconnaissance. Data Link 16 and ROVER image downlink also planned. The 2000D was seen likely to be in service until 2021 or even 2025. 
A new generation laser designation pod remains planned. 

- Mirage 2000-5 and 2000C: these air defence aircraft should retire by 2018. 

The White Paper signals a reduction in the number of new tanker aircrafts to purchase, from 14 to 12. The program will be launched next year, with the A330 MRRT aircraft as the choice. Differently from the RAF, which ordered the passenger variant of the A330, the french will purchase the fully multi-mission cargo/passanger variant. In exchange for this great capability, the air force will lose the 5 A310 and A340 aircrafts currently used as strategic cargo aircrafts.  
It would appear that the full order for 50 A400M tactical cargo aircrafts is confirmed without reductions, but there is some controversity still. The A400 order could still be reduced, with the air force keeping its small fleet of C130s or some of its C160s for Special Forces use instead. 

The small transport aircrafts of the CN-235 type are not mentioned in the White Paper, but they are believed not to be part of the figure of 50 tactical cargo aircrafts. They should be (relatively) safe.

Studies for a future UCAV will go ahead, so to build up options for a future program of acquisition of a novel unmanned air combat platform in the 2020s.  

In the missiles section, the document gives a welcome promise that the FASGW(H) / ANL will get the go ahead, along with the MMP missile destined to replace the MILAN. 
An upgrade program for the SCALP / Storm Shadow is also confirmed, which will keep the missile relevant out to 2030. These confirmations mean good news for RAF and Royal Navy.  
The White Paper also promises to go ahead with the ASTER 30 modernisation (Block 1 NT) which will also expand anti-ballistic capability. Italy is interested in this development, while it is not clear if the UK will join. 
A new missile to succeed to the MICA is promised. Can't quite understand if this successor to MICA is the Meteor, or if they are talking about a new missile (presumably short-range, to complement the Meteor).

The document also promises 7 aircraft for "air detection and surveillance". I immediately thought of the E3 Sentry AWACS, but France only has four of those. It is not specified in the document, but i'm assuming the total of 7 comes from adding in the 3 E2C Hawkeye owned by the Navy. 
Not better specified manned light reconnaissance and surveillance aircrafts are mentioned, along with a planned 12-strong fleet of "drones for theatre surveillance", which should be Medium Altitude, Long Endurance (MALE) machines: it has been widely reported that France is seriously considering ordering the US Reaper for this role. 
Officially, the Reaper would be "an interim solution", but in these times of extreme budget tightness, i can't see France being much willing to committ to TELEMOS after acquiring the Reaper. TELEMOS is the joint BAE-Dassault program for the development of an european MALE, which is hoped could meet both the british SCAVENGER requirement and the french needs. 
In the end, the MQ-9 Reaper might win the day in both countries. 

Lastly, the White Paper says the Air Force will have 8 batteries of medium-range air defence missiles. This means that the SAMP-T order, which was expected to deliver 10 batteries, will be cut short. 
 

As had been reported in the last while, the Army is going to be the service hit hardest by the reductions. The White Paper says that the Army will restructure on 7 brigades, two of which will be Heavy, 3 will be Medium/Multi-Role and 2 will be light. 
Studying the current structure of the french army, and the distribution of recently purchased, critical equipment such as the VBCI, it is possible to formulate an educated guess regarding the identity of the brigades to remain in the force: 

2° and 7° Armoured brigades as the two Heavy formations 

1°, 3° Mechanised brigades plus the 9° Amphibious brigade as the Medium / Multi Role formations 

11° Parachute brigade and 27° Mountain Infantry Brigade as the two light formations. 

The above is, at the state, only my guess. The White Paper seem to suggest that the brigade to be cut will be one between the 1st, 3rd and 6th Mechanised brigades, assuming that the two heavy brigades will remain the same and expecting that the amphibious, parachute and mountain capabilities will be protected.

The new army will have a core of around 66.000 deployable personnel comprising the Special Forces, the seven combined arms brigades mentioned above, Combat Support and Combat Service Support units, "prepositioned units" and the garrisons located in overseas territories.

In terms of equipment, the White Paper announces a reduction in main battle tanks (from 254 Leclerc in active service to a planned 200). There will also be around 250 "medium tanks". Quite what vehicle is indicated by this definition is not really clear, by i think it could be the AMX 10 RC rénové. This wheeled tank, armed with a 105mm gun, is the only vehicle in the french arsenal which i'd dare calling medium tank. 256 such vehicles been upgraded ("rénové", in fact) by 2010, and their out of service date is set into the 2020s, so i think this is it. 

Continuing with the generic, never detailed trend, the White Paper promises a fleet of 2700 armoured vehicles, with no real indication of what it comprises. The fate of the SCORPION modernisation and digitalisation programme for the army, as a consequence, couldn't be more confused.  
The french army hopes to replace the ERC90 Sagaie reconnaissance vehicle and the AMX 10 RC as well, with the EBCR (Engine Blinde de Reconnaissance et de Combat).
There is also a requirement for the replacement of the aging VAB (Véhicule de l'Avant Blindé) with a new vehicle known as VBMR. How the White Paper impacts all these programs, and what is counted in the "2700" figure is impossible for me to say at the moment. Among the armoured vehicles currently available and on order we can count 191 Vikings on order, well over 3000 VABs in all variants, 700 VBCI, 1610 light armored cars Véhicule Blindé Léger (VBL) and 1500 small protected vehicles Petit Véhicule Protégé and small numbers of Buffalo, Aravis and Sherpa vehicles, ordered for use in Afghanistan.
Assuming that the Vikings and VBCI orders won't be touched, even expecting the old VBL to be retired from service in the near future, it is clear that there will be reductions and changes and the hoped-for 2326 VBMR and 292 EBCR could end up coming in much lower numbers.
EBCR might become the new "medium tank", so that would mean 250 vehicles according to current plans. The VBMR, the VBCI and the lighter vehicles including Viking should make up the 2700 figure. 

The Army will have 30 "tactical" UAVs. The french are currently trialing the british Watchkeeper, which, if selected, would fullfill this requirement. 

The Army will have 140 attack and reconnaissance helicopters, which should include the full planned 80 Tiger helicopters on order. Of these, 40 are in the HAP variant (armed only with gun, rockets and Mistral air to air missiles) while the remaining 40 are in the much improved HAD variant, which can also armed with Hellfire II missiles.
115 utility helicopters will also be available. Of these, a significant proportion should be made up by NH90 TTH helicopters (known as Caïman in the french army), but as of this month France is hesitating in placing an expected order for 34 such machines. The publication of the White Paper should be a step forwards in the right direction.
34 machines are already on order and an initial capability for the type was reached in February this year. The NH90 is mainly meant to replace over 90 PUMA helicopters used by the ALAT, the french army aviation.


Revised downwards are also the Defence Planning assumptions. France is planning to be able to deploy abroad significantly smaller force packages.
A package of 5000 men will be kept at High Readiness, in order to enable the constant availability of 
a very high readiness Joint Reaction Force numbering 2300 men. This force will be able to deploy "up to 3000 km away from the homeland" within 7 days and will comprise a 1500-strong battlegroup, Special Forces contributions, helicopters, 10 fighter jets and other supports. It will be able to deploy with the support of a small naval task group centered on one LHD. 

There is an assumption that the Army will be required to carry out multiple (up to two or three simultaneously) "crisis management operations", comparable to the british army "non-enduring operations".
To make this possible, the armed forces will be able to draw from a combined force of 6000 to 7000 army soldiers and SF operators with armored vehicles up to the mysterious "medium tank" and helicopter support. The Navy will be able to provide a frigate, and/or an LHD task group, eventually with the presence of an SSN "depending on the circumstances".
The air force would provide "a dozen fighters spread on the different theatres", and the wider forces of Air force and Navy could provide long range strikes with cruise missiles (SCALP and SCALP Navale).   

Like the british armed forces, the French are also keeping their options open for the delivery, with suitable warning (6 months notice, according to the Paper) of a non enduring "divisional effort", while retaining "some of the responsibilities already assumed in other open fronts".
This "best effort", to say it with the words that the british SDSR used, would mean deploying a Division HQ (if needed) to lead the force (which would be multinational, it is specified). The combat power would come from two brigades, representing a force of roughly 15.000 men.
These would get the support of up to 45 fighter jets (provided by Navy and Air Force together) and of a naval task group comprising the aircraft carrier, escorts, two LHDs, one SSN and support including maritime patrol aircraft. The White Paper document goes as far to suggest that it will only be possible to sustain such a level of naval support only if the british collaborate and bring to the party their own assets, as decided with the Lancaster House Agreement.
Following such "best effort", the french armed forces would be able to provide a smaller force to participate in post-war stabilisation operations.

There is also a capacity to provide up to 10.000 men in support of internal security.


Regarding the nuclear deterrence, the White Paper confirms an arsenal of "less than 300 nuclear warheads". The ASMPA air-launched cruise missile will receive a mid-life upgrade and the submarine-based ballistic deterrent will be fully supported, with work continuing on the M51 missile, which will replace the older M45 on the first three SSBNs (the fourth already had the M51 at its entry in service).  


Finally, there are relevant Satellite plans ahead.
The MUSIS Earth Observation constellation is confirmed, with France planning to put into orbit two optical satellites.
The CERES programme is also confirmed: it will deliver a space-based ELINT capability. 
There is also a New Generation COMSAT programme that will have to deliver, from 2020, a successor satellite communications system to replace the current SYRACUSE. UK-France collaboration on this requirement is a possibility, as the UK will need to think about the future of SKYNET roughly in the same period.


I'm sure we will talking again about this document and its consequences in the coming months. There are some really important developments, and some promising, much awaited news.
It is, however, rather worrisome to see that, after the UK, France is following in significantly reducing its arsenal and military capability.
Surprisingly, France is reducing its conventional force even more than the UK (in certain areas): the difference is not so much in the 200 main battle tanks against 227, obviously, but in the maximum effort that France is capable to make: 2 brigades and 15.000 men, against 3 brigades and 30.000 men.

The numbers, which are the most relevant for Europe, are starting to get truly worrisome. Capability is reducing dramatically. The numbers are truly low.

Observing the french effort, i will just add, once more, two considerations that i've made many times already:

The Royal Navy is damaged by the total absence of a "second line" of warships. The direct comparison between RN and Marine Nationale makes it very evident: while the RN leads, by quality and quantity, in terms of SSNs and high-end escorts (assuming that all 13 planned Type 26 are effectively put into service), the RN, while having just as many far and dispersed standing tasks all over the world as the french navy, totally lacks a second-tier flottilla of light frigates and large patrol ships.
The french have 21 such vessels, of various classes. The RN desperately needs to find a solution to this problem: it needs its own flottilla of "standing task" ships.

The second point i want to rise, once more, is that the UK is, in my opinion, not doing enough to exploit Space. Access to US satellites is fantastic, but are we really sure that the lack of a national capability for earth observation and space-based intelligence is a good thing?

I think it is not.

CVF and JCA: why i'd go CATOBAR

 

F35B and F35C: the airplane situation

Of immense interest is the 2011 Department of Defence Annual Report for the Office of the Director, Operational Test & Evaluation which gives us an up to date major picture of the current F35 development and testing situation. In the detail, it tells of everything that still does not work with the F35, and details the progress of the program in 2011. 

It is very useful to draw some well-informed conclusions, and contains some interesting data. For example, it emerges that: 

- F35A is 11% behind schedule with its test and validation campaign

- F35B is 9% behind schedule

- F35C is 32% ahead of schedule

We must, of course, look at the 32% ahead of schedule data with the awareness that the C is the variant who entered trials last. The other two variants are ahead of the F35C with their programs of development, testing and validation as they are closer to entering active service. For example the B already went at sea, while the C won't go on an aircraft carrier until next year.
However, A and B are lagging considerably in terms of test points cleared, while the F35C has cleared 32% more test points than planned, which is very reassuring. Having started later also means that more corrections have been incorporated into the C at build, thanks to discoveries made on the other two variants.

The planning, updated to December 2011, is for the three variants to complete their development and testing with many more flights. In each flight, a number of tests are run, in order to validate long lists of requirements. Each airframe requirement makes for 1 or several "test points". As of December 2011, maturity of the F35C was 1002 test flights away, with 12.442 test points yet to clear.
 

The A still has 827 flights and 10.257 test points to go.
 

The B 1,437 flights and 15.045 points.

These values of course change rather frequently when a change proves necessary and needs to be flown and trialed, adding new flights and points to clear to the count, but they are indicative of the current plan. 

Regarding the F35B trials at sea on USS Wasp, which were presented by the STOVL prophets as having proven that the B has "no issues" and that the jet blast hazard claims were "nonsense" and that everything actually works perfectly well, well, the reality is actually a bit different. The F35B jet blast does not hole the deck as someone had (rather extremely) prophetized, no, but a jet blast issues exists and the trials at sea only confirmed it. A 75 feet danger radius is reported. 

Jet blast from the F-35Bs is expected to produce unsafe forces on flight deck personnel up to 75 feet from the short take-off line.

This is going to make another serious dent, along with Ship  Borne Rolling Vertical Landing, in the flaunted advantages of STOVL when conducting simultaneous jet and helicopter operations on deck, which some describe as indispansable for the success of Carrier Enabled Power Projection. 

With jet blast hazard and landing runs on the deck, the differences between F35B and F35C in deck usage during ops are getting smaller and smaller.  

Among the F35B issues, is the cracking of a wing carry-through bulkhead cracked before 2,000 hours of airframe life. The required airframe lifetime is 8,000 hours. Repair of the bulkhead on the test article was completed in November 2011, and F-35B durability testing should have restarted in January 2012.

Following the bulkhead crack in the F-35B test article, analysis verified the existence of numerous other life‑limited parts on all three variants. The program began developing plans to correct these deficiencies in existing aircraft by repair/modifications, and designing changes to the production process. The most significant of these in terms of complexity, aircraft downtime, and difficulty of the modification required for existing aircraft is the forward wing root rib on the F-35A [which failed after some 3000 hours] and F-35B aircraft.

The F35C's own durability testing are due to start in the next while, if it hasn't already. By August last year the C had completed all of its structural test points, including drop tests to simulate rough carrier landing stress on the airframe. 

The F35B has had  a large number of parts re-designed and replaced and corrected, and the reports notes that, so far, there's no plan in place for rolling in the modifications in production airplanes. The report acknowledges: 

The program has not completed the final re-designs and plans to correct deficiencies through modifications of F-35B production aircraft intended for the fleet, which cannot be monitored in-flight because these aircraft are not instrumented. Production aircraft will be restricted from STOVL-mode flight operations until Service airworthiness authorities grant a flight clearance. A significant amount of flight test and development of system maturity of the final STOVL-mode door and propulsion system designs remains to be accomplished. A system mature enough for unmonitored STOVL-mode flight may be needed as early as late 2012 to coincide with the delivery of lot 4 F-35B aircraft to the Marine Corps at Yuma, Arizona. If testing of the changes is not complete and needed modifications are not installed by late 2012, aircraft at Yuma will fly in CTOL‑mode only.

The full extent of issues so far detected in the airframe doors and STOVL propulsion assembly is reported in a table, and makes for rather depressing reading, with some of the solutions in development already planned not to be ready before LRIP 7 while other solutions have yet to be determined, tested, and planned for adoption on production standard airplanes. 

The table of the F35B propulsion and door issues, as presented in the report.

There is also serious problems with overheating of the clutch that can prevent the STOVL mode to be angaged (how do you land at that point if your only runway is the carrier, or is just too short for a CTOL landing???) for which a real solution does not yet exists, and the driveshaft has to be redesigned. 

Besides, the F35B has a margin for growth of sole 230 pounds before it breaks its not-to-exceed weight planned for 2015. An additional 142 pounds might be secured by a greater descent rate to touchdown, but it is far from certain, and even so that means just 372 pounds of weight growth margin available, before the deadly line is crossed, with several years of testing and development yet to go, and no military service at all done. 

Talk about constrained airframes... 

The report notes: 

This additional weight [the 142 additional pounds of margin, to 372 total] increases the margin to 1.2 percent of current weight and allows for 0.36 percent weight growth
per year. Managing weight growth with such tight margins for the balance of SDD will be a significant challenge, especially with over 70 percent of the scheduled F-35B flight sciences test flights remaining to be accomplished in the next 60 months. For comparison, weight growth on the F/A-18 E/F was approximately 0.69 percent per year for  the first 42 months following first flight.

Again, undesirable wing roll-off, airframe buffet, and sideslip occurred in transonic flight regimes, and handling characteristics as a consequence do not meet requirements. It is likely that no more changes will be made to the plane, and it will be the requirements that are reviewed and reduced, in order for the plane to "meet" them!

The final word on the F35B can be identified in this passage: 

In October 2011, the program successfully conducted initial amphibious ship trials with STOVL aircraft in accordance with the new, restructured plan for 2011; however, significant work and flight tests remain to verify and incorporate modifications to STOVL aircraft required to correct known STOVL deficiencies and prepare the system for operational use.

Regarding the F35C, the report says: 

F-35C Flight Sciences
• As F-35C flight sciences focused on preparation for and execution of carrier launch and landing testing at Lakehurst, a limited amount of other envelope expansion occurred in 2011.
The F-35C flight sciences test points accomplished thus far are approximately 15 percent of the total expected in SDD.

• The lack of available flight envelope in the transonic regime currently constrains testing of F-35C aircraft handling qualities. In limited testing using flight control software that
benefitted from F-35A and F-35B testing, the F-35C aircraft performance in the transonic flight regime demonstrated the predicted intensity of uncommanded rolls but higher buffet
levels. The F-35C aircraft was expected to have the greatest challenge of the three variants in the transonic flight regime, which led to the decision to incorporate structural provisions for the installation of external spoilers in one test aircraft.

(Buffet is a problem of all three variants, it seems, and indeed a common problem in american naval jets, since the F-18 notoriously had this kind of issues too!) 

• The carrier launch and landing testing at Lakehurst provided valuable lessons regarding the impacts of these dynamic environments on the aircraft early in the testing.
Corrections and regression testing are needed as a result of the discoveries listed below. The program is also working to correct other performance problems such as excessive
nose gear oscillations during taxi, excessive landing gear retraction times, and overheating of the electro-hydrostatic actuator systems that power the flight controls. The program will subsequently evaluate the need for modifications of production aircraft for these items.
• Discoveries included:
-- Flight test aircraft could not engage the arrestment cable
during tests at the Lakehurst, New Jersey, test facility. The
tail-hook point is undergoing a redesign and the hold-down
damper mechanism requires modifications to enable
successful arrestments on the carrier. Resolution of these
deficiencies is needed for testing to support F-35C ship
trials in late 2013.
-- Hold-back bar and torque arm components, which keep the
F-35C aircraft from moving forward when tensioned on the
catapult at full power, require a redesign due to the use of
incorrect design load factors. Actual loads are greater than
predicted. The impact of these greater‑than‑predicted loads
on strength and fatigue characteristics is under analysis by
the program.
-- Loss of inertial navigation and GPS inputs to pilot displays
occurred during a catapult launch. Root cause analysis was
in progress at the time of this report.
-- The test team conducted initial testing in the transonic
flight regimes with one version of air vehicle software on
aircraft CF-2. Problems similar to the other variants were
observed, such as excessive buffeting and roll-off, at times
making the helmet-mounted displays unreadable.
-- Higher than predicted temperatures exist in the
electro‑hydrostatic actuator system during flight testing
of the aircraft in a landing configuration. This component
provides the force to move control surfaces.

In addition, the F35C acceleration is inferior to the hoped value.

The F35B is still far from its maturity, with several thousand test points more than the other variants to clear and with a huge variety of very serious issues to fix and with a significant amount of changes and redesigning already having taken place.

The F35C has its problems too, but is in a remarkably better shape and, save for the arrestor hook issue, which is said to be due for fixing in the next few months, has not revealed problems potentially show-stopping. The B's extremely low growth margin, with associated Bring Back weight issues, is instead a very serious menace to its viability as embarked plane for CVF. 

CATOBAR reasons and issues 

Reasons:  

- Maximum interoperability. Rafale, F-18, F-35C but also STOVL F35B can work from a big CATOBAR deck. The opposite is not true. 

- Future proof. Any kind of naval drone which will be developed in the coming years will be able to operate from the carrier. We will also be able to benefit from research and development done by the US Navy, and benefit of their support and investments into EMALS, AAG, and compatible platforms. 

- Compatible with future adoptions of better COD, AEW and tanker platforms. 

- Maximum military performances. It makes it possible to use the most capable embarked airplanes, and it fits into the operations of the two main allies of the UK. 

Issues:  

- Cost. EMALS and AAG add up-front cost to the carriers, and come with a personnel and training penalty. 

I've tried to quantify the extent of the training penalty connected to CATOBAR ops, but it is not easy at all.

I've discovered that a Sea Harrier FA2 pilot was a Naval All Weather Fighter Pilot after 100 day and 80 night landings on deck, but i've been unable to find a figure for the number of day and night landings necessary to re-certify for ops when the pilots are assigned to active service on the carrier.

On the other side of the barricade, i don't have a figure for the number of landings required for initial pilot certification, but i know that France's carrier pilots re-certify for carrier ops currency by making 6 daytime arrested landings and 4 night time arrested landings. A direct comparison in this latest value would be invaluable in assessing the feasibility of having RAF pilots, initially certified to CATOBAR ops, getting current again quickly to reiforce the naval strike wing embarked on the carrier.

The STOVL prophets say that re-certification with the Harrier required far fewer landings, and was much more readily achievable. They say that with CATOBAR, it wouldn't be possible to have one naval squadron plus 2/3 land squadrons able to reinforce the embarked complement in case of crisis, but we'd need a CATOBAR cadre of at least 3 naval squadrons.

Assuming they are right and it is true,  my reply is: that's how things should have always been.

While there's several clear and rationale reasons for having a naval fixed wing element [provide air defence for the fleet and independent, full spectrum air power even when airbases are not available], which brings to the table some very unique capabilities, i believe the rationale for a separate land based fleet of "deep penetrating" strike planes to replace Tornado has never been weaker. And in many ways it is a duplicate of the carrier strike fleet.

The RAF's JCA plan so far has been to get a land fleet of planes, capable to, at a stretch, migrate on the carrier when necessary. But considered the difficulties of getting land pilots to operate from ships, it will always make more operational sense to have naval pilots instead, who can readily work from land bases if the situation calls for it.

It is much easier to put a naval squadron ashore than a land squadron at sea, it is undeniable.

If CATOBAR requires a greater focus on naval operations, so be it, i say. France does not do bad at all with its own naval aviation, considering that they deployed a sizeable and capable force at sea for Libya ops, even though Charles De Gaulle was back from four months of ops over Afghanistan by less than one month.

They did especially well considering that their naval air force at the time had a single Rafale squadron, 12F, with an establishment of 15 airplanes, plus two Super Etendard squadrons, 11F and 17F.

Now, finally, 11F is converting to Rafale as part of the progressive retirement of the Super Etendard. The naval fixed wing complement is of course completed by 4F squadron, with the 3 E2C Hawkeye. Numerically, if the UK is really to order 50 F35s, the numbers are similar, as France has so far ordered 48 Rafale M, and has lost 3 to accidents, giving them a fleet of potentially just 45 airframes, even if once they were hoping for 60.

Looking at France's small but efficient CATOBAR naval aviation, i say that Britain could no doubt at least match it, standing up three naval-focused, if not naval-owned, squadrons of 14 F35C each (as 2 would normally be roled as Buddy-Buddy tankers).

France trains its naval pilots in the US, where they fly and "trap" on the T-45 Goshawk. When they come back, as few as 12 hours on the Rafale simulator are sufficient to achieve conversion to type. Much like with the F35, there is not a (naval) two-seat Rafale trainer. Differently from the F35, which pretty much never envisaged it, the Rafale N was planned (naval two-seat) and the airforce has the two-seat B variant. From late 2010, the Armee de l'Air has formed a large Rafale training squadron (2/92 Aquitanie) which offers some 4 slots a year for naval pilots to exploit some hours on the two-seat Rafale for combat system advanced training.

The RAF and RN hope to cover this requirement for the F35 with the Hawk T2 and with the simulators.  

On land, carrier landing practice is done by french pilots without a carrier-shaped runway with wires: a standard runway, with a marked "square" area the same size of the one that on a carrier would sport the wires is sufficient for good practice prior to embarkation on the aircraft carrier.

Keep in mind that the F35 promises to come with the best and most realistic simulators ever developed, and much of the training is to be done on sims, so matching what France does with the Rafales is the minimum i expect.

I do not think CATOBAR represents such an insurmontable challenge, if the decision is eventually taken to go ahead with it.

The problem is financing the conversion of the two carriers, essentially. And accepting that naval aviation is a serious trade, that should not be half-assed with part-time solutions.    

Ooops! As expected, indian fighter jet buy saga not over yet

Indian defence minister has ordered an enquiry into allegations of irregularities and manipulation of the selection process for the MMRCA fighter jet which saw Rafale being chosen over Typhoon as preferred bidder. 
The enquiry follows a letter written by MP M.V. Mysoora Reddy, who voiced his suspects and noted, as many others have done in India and elsewhere, that the choice of the Rafale is weird, considering that the performance of the french airplane in Libya has not been entirely shiny, and that the plane has never fared really well in comparisons and evaluations made in India and elsewhere (possibly with the exception of Switzerland, where the air force evaluation of Rafale, Typhoon and Gripen saw the Rafale victorious in all mission types, with Typhoon a close second and Gripen a distant follower).

The hope of the UK is that this process will help making the case for a new review into the selection, with the UK government confirming to Parliament no later than March 7 that Cassidian, representing the Eurofighter consortium, is ready to bid a new, revised price as soon as India wishes for it.

Keep your eyes open and wait for the next episode...! 

An "oh shit!" moment

So, after the great hopes and the long waiting, we get the big surprise: Dassault is India's preferred bidder for the mammoth 126 fighters order. The Rafale bid was the less expensive, and India will now begin negotiations with Dassault over the details of the deal. Contract signature is probably still months away, and there might be still a chance for a big change to happen if negotiations were to fail...

But the fact remains. Typhoon as of now is out of the game. A true "oh shit!" moment.

France looked into HMS Queen Elizabeth

It has been officially confirmed that France, following publication of the british SDSR10, containing the statement that the first CVF vessel would have been mothballed and potentially sold in 2020, launched a study in the cost effectiveness of eventually purchasing HMS Queen Elizabeth as solution for their PA2 requirement. 

The bond between CVF and PA2 is antique. During the design and development phase of the CVF class, France, until 2008, contributed money and expertise. Some 100 million euro were poured by France into studies for ensuring that CVF was catapult capable; studies that ensured that the design could be converted during life (option initially chosen by the UK, prior to 2010 switch to Cats and Traps) and that, on the french side, generated the CVF-FR design, to be built under the name Richelieu. 

In 2008, France quit the CVF programme and delayed decision about the building of PA2 up to 2012. Problems in the joint programme had emerged, with France pressing for a more powerful propulsion plant, which would have besides used LM2500 gas turbines instead of the british, mandated Rolls Royce MT30. France probably was also irked by the refusal of the UK to have blocks for the CVF built in French shipyards.

It is not surprising, then, that a study was launched into the possible selection of QE as PA2 solution. 

Hypothesis of a "fair" deal

It is interesting to read into the French concept of "fair deal" about the eventual acquisition of QE. According to the respected publication 'Mer et Marine', France expected that, in exchange for their purchase of the QE, the UK would have commissioned french shipyards to build the new Fleet Tankers to be purchased (according to the latest plans heard, by 2016) to replace the remaining, ancient RFA oil replenishers. And of course, why not: they want to sell the UK Rafales as well! 

Talk about "fair" deals!

The Fleet Tanker programme, once envisioned as a 6-ship buy (with a first order of 4 vessels, with space for subsequent order of another and then a last one), is now seen as a "4 ships at most" contract that the Navy is trying hard to resuscitate (indeed, the RN tried to get it to advance in EVERY Planning Round in the last few years, but without great luck). The order, expected to eventually come in the shape of a "2 + 1 + 1", would fill the first requirement of the 3-classes MARS programme for the modernization of the RFA. 

MARS is part of the wider "Carrier Enabled Power Projection" main programme, which comprises CVF and JCA-F35, even though MARS is needed for the fleet as a whole, and not at all as a mere CVF-support tool. 

Indeed, the ancient, single-hulled tankers still in use, such as Black and Gold Rover, were planned to leave the service by 2010! 

The MARS FT (Fleet Tanker) is indeed planned to use hulls built abroad, so France might well be a possibility anyway. The ships would be built abroad, and only brought in the UK for final kit to be installed. 

On 10 December 2007 the MOD issued an "Invitation to Participate in Dialogue" to industry to for up to six fleet tankers at an expected cost of £800 million.

On 21 May 2008 the MOD announced the results of the invitation, indicating that four companies had been shortlisted:  Fincantieri (Italy); Hyundai (Republic of Korea); Navantia (Spain) and BAE Systems with BMT DSL and DSME (Republic of Korea). 

No french yards had been selected for the final competition.

Ever since, these selected possible builders have remained in the race, but someone else appears to have entered the frame. According to an answer of Parliamentary Under Secretary of State Gerald Howarth, dating back to last March, the bidders have increased to 6 during the latest attempts of resurrecting MARS and getting the long awaited go-ahead for it. 

The Military Afloat Reach and Sustainability (MARS) programme is in its assessment phase, and the Ministry of Defence issued an advertisement for an international competition in October 2009 for the MARS tankers. Following expressions of interest from industry, six bidders were invited to submit outline solutions. In October 2010, the bidders were invited to submit more detailed solutions and the resulting bids are currently the subject of discussions between the MOD and the bidders. On current plans, final bids are expected to be requested later this year.

I've been unable to find out what new builders have entered the frame, but it is very possible that France's DCNS is one of them. 

As a matter of fact, the Fleet Tanker element might well be built in France anyway, regardless of QE's situation, if France's offer is valued as the best one. 

A whole different story is buying Rafale...!

So, is it happening?

Hard to give a definitive answer. A possibility remains. 

But the UK government has lately been very clear that selling QE off is considered a very remote hypothesis. The aspiration is to keep her in service even past 2020, and retrofit her with Cats and Traps during her first major refit, around 2022. 

To make such a selling option further improbable, besides, France itself is expressing big doubts about the feasibility of such an acquisition. Even before considering emotional and political implications of such an agreement (and we are talking of a very big implication, you can bet), the french have assessed the cost of the option, and judged them far too high. 

The Admiral Guillard, head of the french Navy, reported the results of the study on QE to the Defence Committee of the National Assembly of the french republic on 5 October, just a few days ago.

His assessment is that QE would be expensive to purchase, judging its cost to be 30 to 40% higher of the cost it would have to build an identical vessel in french shipyards. And to this, there's to add an estimate of 1 billion / 1.5 billion euro of expense for converting the vessel to Cats and Traps, making for an expense of over 4 billion euro for France, which he compared to an expected (but probably optimistic, i'd say) price tag of 3.5 billions for a PA2 built in french shipyards. 

And it is not enough. 

While in 2004 France had chosen to pursue a conventional-propelled PA2, in 2008 they changed their mind, and nuclear propulsion came back for a revenge, apparently returning to be their favorite solution. 

Add to this the fact that french shipyards are definitely not going to accept to lose the massive workshare and revenues that the building of a new carrier implies, and you have a big, big obstacle on the way of any possible QE acquisition. 

But moreover, this years the budget crisis killed any attempt of looking again into PA2. Next year, the situation is unlikely to change, and the Presidential elections will represent another big issue to contend with. 

And finally, the chef d'état-major des armées français (CEMA), the supreme organization that controls the French armed forces on behalf of the President and of the government, have been very clear and definitive: 

PA2 remains an aspiration, a requirement, and a need. But simply, currently, it is not financially feasible.

But...

But, i will add. 

3.5 or 4 billions might be out of reach, as the bill for retrofitting QE could be a real problem for cash-strapped Britain, even come-2022, as the Successor SSBN programme by then will be sucking up money like a vacuum cleaner, particularly when you listen to its detractors. 

But if the UK and France collaborated to share the cost of retrofitting cats and traps to QE, the expense for each country could be in the region of "just" some 5 hundred millions, a whole different story. 

And it would give the two fleets the "second carrier" that both countries need but can't afford. 

After all, as HMS Bulwark trains in Scotland landing French Marines ashore, tomorrow QE could operate a mixed air group of Rafales and F35Cs, filling in the gaps left by PoW and CdG going into refit or being unavailable for any reason.

Admiral Guillard had already put forward this proposal in an interview a few months ago. And i think that, while not entirely optimal, it makes for the best solution by far. 

After all, we do not live in an optimal world.