Early April news, waiting for the Planning Round

Selective Precision Effect At Range (SPEAR) is making leaps this year, with MBDA announcing that the Brimstone 2 [SPEAR Capability Block 2] will enter service with the RAF next year and also saying that SPEAR Capability Block 3 is progressing with design and development and flight tests will start next year. At the Farnborough show in July, MBDA has promised that they will showcase more about this new weapon. The last we've heard talked about a 100 kg, 180 km range mini-storm shadow, so to speak, carried on a multiple rack (SDB style) carrying 4 weapons and fitting inside the weapon bay of the F35. SPEAR Capability Block 3 is meant to be a network-enabled weapon capable to hit with extreme accuracy moving and relocatable targets as well as fixed ones.

In addition, Raytheon UK has been awarded a 60 million pounds contract for the replenishment of Paveway IV stocks after many hundred of the bombs have been expended in these years between Afghanistan and Libya. It is possible that as part of this new order a few new variants of the Paveway IV bomb will come to light and be delivered to the RAF, since Raytheon has proudly specified that they are "focused on a technological growth path which, under the UK MOD's SPEAR (Selective Precision Effects at Range) CAP 1 program, will enhance the system's capability with low collateral and penetrator warhead options, enhanced moving target capability and enhanced range."

SPEAR Capability Block 1 is meant to introduce new warhead options and new improvements to the Paveway IV guidance kit. For increasing range, a very likely solution is the adoption of the MBDA Diamond Back wingkit, which would enable the Paveway IV to glide over a distance of many tens of kilometers, giving it a stand-off range. Enhanced moving target capability is notionally expected to be achieved with the addition of a Selex Galileo Imaging Infra Red seeker which could lock on on vehicles moving as fast as 100 kph. A reduced yeld, low frammentation warhead option for urban engagements is envisaged, and a bunker buster warhead is desired, possibly as a replacement for the current capability, represented by the 2000 lbs Enhanced Paveway III with BLU-109 warhead. A bunker-buster warhead could emerge from the HARDBUT (do not laugh, not joking!) joint studies with France.

Currently Paveway IV only comes with a US 500 lbs MK82E warhead, but like all Paveway guidance kits, it could and hopefully will be adapted for use on larger warheads. Currently the Typhoon only uses, for examble, the GBU/EGBU-16 Paveway II, a laser guided (with GPS addition in the Enhanced GBU) bomb using the MK83 1000 pounds warhead (for the RAF, actually, that is the UK-built equivalent mass warhead, the MK13 or MK18 originally, and the updated MK20 or MK22 these days), which will need replacement at some point, as will the 2000 pounds Paveway III which uses the MK84 warhead [the RAF might not use this variant, though] or the BLU-109 bunker buster one [the BLU-109 is now the RAF standard warhead on the Paveway III. A modified BROACH warhead derived from that of Storm Shadow was shown bolted to a Paveway III guidance kit as far back as 1994, but it does not seem to have had great diffusion. Vanished should also be the early-days hybrids which combined a 1000 pounds MK20 warhead, Paveway II wing-kit and Paveway III guidance kit]. Paveway IV will be released for Typhoon use this June, and will be in active RAF service with the Typhoon by September next year.  

Raytheon has sled-tested a bunker buster 500 lbs warhead with Qinetiq collaboration, aiming to SPEAR contracts. While 500 lbs limits the lethality and penetration that can be obtained, the warhead would be readily available as it does have the same mass and centre of gravity of the current MK82E, with no need for any additional integration work. Same approach goes for the reduced-yeld warhead for use in built-up areas. 


The Paveway IV is also being integrated on the F35, and a first pit-drop test of the weapon from an F-35 was already performed at Eglin AFB, Florida, in late March. The bomb will be integrated for internal and external carriage both. 

A glorious unit returns as the Fleet Protection Group Royal Marines is re-christened 43 Commando Fp Gr RM. 790-strong, this unit reports to 3rd Commando Brigade and provides protection for the fleet, most importantly for the SSBN fleet and shore infrastructure connected to the nuclear deterrent. It also provides "Green" boarding teams, employed on british warships sent on maritime policing duties in dangerous areas where "warlike" activity is expected.

The RN crews of frigates and destroyers provide the "Blue" boarding teams, which are used on lower-danger searches.

43 Commando is immortal in the memory for its exploits in the battle of Comacchio in northern Italy, in which Cpl Thomas Peck Hunter, in a well-known act of bravery, seized a Bren gun and stormed German machine-gun positions, shooting from the hip and single-handedly capturing or driving the enemy away until he was cut down – but not before his troop reached safety.

The action saw Hunter posthumously given the nation’s highest military honour, the last (to date) of ten Victoria Crosses awarded to Royal Marines.

The Defence Reform progresses as the Joint Forces Command takes shape. 2 april 2012 saw the JFC standing up in its new headquarters in Northwood. 

The Joint Forces Command is expected to reach full operating capability next year, with a number of joint organizations having already been assigned to the Command:

• The Permanent Joint Headquarters (known as PJHQ)
• The Permanent Joint Operating Bases in Gibraltar, Cyprus, British Indian Ocean Territory and South Atlantic Islands
• The Joint Force Headquarters
• The Joint Force Logistics Component
• The Joint Counter-Terrorist Training and Advisory Team
• The Directorate of Special Forces
• The Defence Academy
• The Development Concepts and Doctrine Centre
• Defence Intelligence
• Surgeon General's Headquarters and the Joint Medical Command
• The Joint Arms Control Implementation Group
• The Defence Centre of Training Support
• The Defence Cyber Operations Group.

The Joint Forces Command has a central staff of around 150 between military and civilian personnel, but with the controlled organizations it will effectively direct over 30.000 men between military and civilians. First Joint Forces Commander is Air Chief Marshal Sir Stuart Peach, RAF.

The Joint Forces Command will:

"ensure investment in joint capabilities is appropriate and coherent, and strengthen the link between experience in operational theatres and top-level decision-making."

"ensure that a range of vital military capabilities, functions and organisations – such as medical services, training and education, intelligence, and cyber – are organised and managed effectively and efficiently to support success on operations."

This centralized approach is similar to that adopted by the German armed forces, which have a Joint Support Service counting some 36.750 men as of 2011. Around 26.000 of these come from the army and the total includes 14.620 men of the Joint Medical Service.

Interestingly, the German armed forces's signals units are considered a joint asset and are part of this command. It would be interesting to consider the application of a similar move in the UK, taking the Royal Signals and the tactical communications unit of the RAF and Navy and put them together in a single, large organization centrally managed.

Again, in Germany the military police is also a joint asset under Joint Support Service, while in the UK there's the Royal Military Police, the sizeable RAF Police, the MOD Police [which is a civilian force currently counting over 3000 men and due to be cut back to 2400 by April 2016], the MOD Guard Service and a Royal Navy Police, which provides a Troop to 3rd Commando brigade.

There seems to be scope for centralization and efficiency in this area as well in the medium term, and i'd suggest planning for it in earnest, since i'd much prefer cutting back on duplication before cutting on frontline soldiers and formations.

Since we have formed the Joint Forces Command, let's give it a meaning and use at least.

FRES SV continues to progress. General Dynamics has been assigning contract after contract in the last few months, as the suppliers of the various components for the new vehicles are selected. The latest contract covers the software and operating system to be used on the vehicles. It follows other contracts, such as those assigned to BARCO for the supplying of the displays and to ViaSat for the onboard data encryption unit.

Over 36 explosive/destructive tests have been completed in the past months to validate the protection levels of the FRES SV hull, and things are progressing well. Expect more contracts to be signed in the months to come, since the list of requirements has been shortened considerably after the various agreements reached, but still has many voices open for tender.

Towards a busy Somali summer? The European mandate for the anti-piracy "Atalanta" operation has been recently broadened in scope to authorize military attack on pirate havens ashore, by helicopter and by naval gunfire (No missiles or ground troops due to German opposition, however).  

Now command of Atalanta has been passed on to France, and the promise is to seize the initiative from the pirates by patrolling close to shore, attacking their bases, and possibly expanding the security patrols in Somali waterways.

France has deployed to the area Maritime Patrol Aircrafts (Nimrod MRA4 was expected to go by this time as well, but we know how that ended...), the frigate Georges Leygues with two Lynx helicopters aboard and the LHD Dixmunde, Mistral-class, which can act as an helicopter carrier with 16 machines.

Despite Germany's opposition and hesitations, France, UK and Netherlands are pressing for a far more active answer to the growing piracy problem. China can be expected to also support such a move: they have long made clear that they regard the only solution to the problem being going ashore and smashing the pirate havens there, indeed.

It has been reported that this year's Royal Navy Response Task Force Group, which will set sail in the summer for exercise Corsican Lion with France's Charles De Gaulle carrier strike group, will then set sail for Somali waters to take part in such "active" reaction to piracy. For the second year in a row, the Task Force might set sail for training and end up shooting very real bullets, after Libya events last year.

This time, it won't be Albion and Ocean, but HMS Illustrious and HMS Bulwark, accompanied by escorts and RFAs vessels, including tankers, Bay class LSDs and probably a Fort stores vessel.

Illustrious is widely expected to carry Apaches, that will be tasked with attacks on pirate bases. Cameron has been said to be asking for this since last February.

Busy summer ahead for the Royal Navy.

In the meanwhile, HMS Daring shines in the Gulf and HMS Dauntless is to carry out the first Type 45 south atlantic patrol, and in May the assembly work for the carrier Queen Elizabeth will make giant leaps forwards. LB02 was powered up this March, 6 months ahead of schedule. In May both LB05 (1600 tons) and LB02 (over 6000) are to be moved by barge from Portsmouth to Rosyth, with the start of Assembly Cycle B.

LB04's two halves will be joined up in the next few days, and the Combat System of Queen Elizabeth is making progress and being tested at HMS Collingwood.

Around 25 May the giant LB02 section will start its travel, and it'll be a major milestone in the build programme. And of course, around the 17 of April we should finally have some clarity about the choice of the airplane to fly from the ships.

About time, to say the very, very least.

On 30 March, HMS Liverpool decommissioned, after being in the thick of the action until her very last moments, with Libya, escorting the russian aircraft carrier and then the exercises in Norway keeping her running at full pace. A most distinguished vessel of the Royal Navy bowing out with honor.

And with the Type 22s gone and the Type 42s to be entirely gone by 2013, the shore-based Tyne gas turbine training set has been shut down, closing a long era of Royal Navy engineering. The engine of the gas revolution soon will be no more. The Spey era will last until the 2030s, however, and the WR-21 and MT-30 eras are dawning thanks to Type 45 and CVF. 

F35 updates. The US accountants and DoD have re-priced the F35 program. It was widely anticipated that it would be 15 billion dollars more expensive, turned out being 17, but the US acquisition plan remains unchanged, and there's nothing new about the rumors of the B order of the USMC being cut back down to just 65.

By 2018 USN and USMC will be getting 50 F35s per year.

I also saw a new LM promotional image with upgraded quantities of jet fighters for nations: for example, Italy is down from 131 to 90 as announced in Parliament last month, and Norway is down to 48 from 56 as just confirmed (4 LRIP to be used for training, 42 fighters main order, 6 options to be confirmed later on). The figures for all countries are, in other words, very accurate and very up to date.

For the UK the figure is 3 B (those already ordered, even if the third, BK-3, is to be given to the USMC in exchange for one of their C, probably to be named CK-1) and 135 C.

Unfortunately, this figure is unlikely to mean anything serious, compared to the other numbers, as the UK still has to finalize its plan... But one can hope! 

The US DoD has announced that they expect to produce 50 Navy Department's F35s per year from 2018 onwards, with the order equally equally split, 25 B and 25C, at least in 2018.

2018 is planned to see US orders for:

60 A (to rise to 80 per year by 2021)

25 B

25 C

They have also released updated expected recurring flyaway cost of the full-rate production airframes (in 2012 dollars):

78.8 USD million x F35A

106 USD million x F35B

87 USD million x F35C

If these prices are anywhere near reliable and representative of the cost to be paid by the MOD, 50 F35C would cost some 2718 million pounds [of course, spare engines, spares and all the rest are not included], while an equal number of F35B would come at 3312.5 million pounds. Again, spares not included, and we know that the B-variant spare engines are expensive like hell, so the total difference is likely to be greater still.

That is a difference of 594.5 million pounds, anyway, to start with, and it is enough to buy an EMALS/AAG set and pay for part of the installation work. It does not cover all of the conversion's cost, (458 + 400 million pounds according to the US Navy-sponsorised estimates).

At best, when spares are factored in, the conversion of ONE carrier might be covered. 

But we need two, so the C must prove economically attractive enough to ensure conversion of Queen Elizabety during refit in the 2020s. It is likely to prove very challenging, though.

The choice remains difficult, and the future of the second CVF not at all safe.

The dodgy rethink - wait a second!

Another episode in the "F35: B or C" saga has just gone on show with an article on The Telegraph reporting that the Gulf Times article which was published a few days ago and that i quoted (without much confidence in it) in my previous article might well have been correct, at least in part.

The US Navy has apparently stepped in loudly in the carrier issue, showing that they care about UK's carrier strike capability much more than even i expected.  It seems that the assistant secretary of the US Navy, Sean J Stackley, has personally written a letter to Philip Hammond to make the case for CATOBAR conversion and for F35C order, ensuring that it will be responsibility of the US Navy to make the EMALS work, and, importantly, stay within a cost of 458 million pounds.
The cost of the work required to modify the ship to fit the EMALS kit is estimated at 400 million, giving a potential total cost for one vessel of 858 million pounds, near the lowest figure of the initial conversion cost estimate (which reported that cost would vary between 800 and 1200 millions).

This cost figure would fit the allocation of 950 million pounds that MOD officers said they could make in the coming planning rounds.
The problem of converting the second carrier, however, remains. And the uncertainty about the long-term cost implications of either airplane choice remain as well, with F35C training and ship costs being higher, while the F35B is burdened by the cost of its engine, by its higher initial acquisition cost and higher maintenance cost.
The question that remains unsolved is:

Is the cheaper and more effective F35C worth the high initial cost of converting the carrier(s)? Or the costs of CATOBAR and associated higher training penalty remove the advantage in the long term when compared to the more expensive B which does however not require catapults?   

As i tried to explain in a previous article, an answer to the above question is not easy to get.

There is also another question that comes to mind, and it regards the conversion cost itself. From where did the sudden "2 billions" figure come out?
There are many possibilities. For sure, there's still a party of MOD officers and civil servants that believe that F35B, while more expensive to acquire, will cost less to run through life, due mainly to the expected training penalty associated with CATOBAR ops and to the ship's own costs inclusive of catapults and arrestor wires if a CATOBAR solution is chosen. This has been the feeling that guided the F35B selection in the 2000s.
The feeling is that the "STOVL" party, fearing future financial difficulties, might be trying to find high-effect reasons to oppose to the F35C, perhaps inflating the conversion cost figure. It wouldn't be the first time that cost estimates are played with regarding an Aircraft Carrier program: the ill-fated CVA-01 Queen Elizabeth, which lost out to the TSR2 (what a sad story that was as a whole...) at one point was given a pricetag that, it was then evealed, included 4 Type 82 destroyers as "defensive systems".
Talk about CIWS...!
It is about as fair as taking Typhoon and adding to its cost the well over 1 billion expense for Meteor, and the nearly 13 billions of FSTA, and perhaps the cost of running the Sentry AWACS fleet as well. It is clear that this kind of creative accounting is highly unfair, and deliberately misguides politicians in their decisions. 

From the outside, it is hard to tell what exactly is going on inside the MOD, obviously. But the intervention of the US Navy might prove decisive. The Telegraph suggests that, after getting the US message, the prime minister has ordered the Treasury to direct an in-depth review of the costs forecast. They say that a report on the outcome of the study is due by April 16, for examination by the National Security Council on April 17.
It is clear that the CATOBAR solution brings the most political weight to the table, as british carriers with catapults would be welcomed by both the US and France. So CATOBAR is a political winner to start with. 

The Telegraph goes farther, by saying that the carrier cooperation agreement in place with the US would see Prince of Wales built with additional and separated accommodations and communications fits, in order to allow a US Navy squadron to work from the carrier. They go, i suspect, way overboard by suggesting that there might be a "US carrier into a british one", with "US eyes only" communications. I believe it will be nowhere near as invasive.
But it is very likely, i believe, that an US squadron or mini airwing could exploit the british deck quite frequently. This would suggest that the british carrier, and to a degree Charles de Gaulle, are seen by the US as stopgaps, as helping hands available to fill all the deployment slots on the map. While the US are committed to maintain 11 carriers and 10 airwings, they do not quite deem them to be enough, and they expect to have to focus their attention on the Pacific and on the Indian Ocean in the future, but they do not want to gap presence in other areas such as the Gulf and the Middle East area in general, or the Mediterranean.
And in these two areas, the UK and France carriers would fill the gaps.

The situation is actually not totally new.
As it is, the US Navy is being required to have 2 carrier strike groups operative at all times in the Indian Ocean to support operations in land-locked Afghanistan, but sustaining a two-carriers enduring commitment while sending flat tops to all the other areas as well is proving immensely challenging, leaving the fleet and its men no time to pull their breath.
France has been helping in the Indian Ocean with Charles de Gaulle replacing a US carrier for some periods of time. When CdG joined the air operations over Libya last year, she was back from the Indian Ocean by less than one month, in fact, factor that had a big relevance in limiting to 132 days the time that the carrier spent on station for Unified Protector: after months and months at sea, for the carrier the maintenance time was by now approaching.

Going further back in time, the US had already experienced the carrier shortage issue at the time of the Vietnam war. Back then, the requirement was not for 2, but for 3 aircraft carrier groups in the area for 365 days a year, year after year, with no pauses.
And back then it was the british fleet that provided an helping hand: throughout the sixties, the big british flat tops Eagle, Ark Royal, Victorious, Centaur and Hermes deployed again and again as far as south west asia to plug the holes left open by the USN's huge commitment to Vietnam. They helped all the way until they were abruptly retired from service with the disgraceful "East of Suez" defence review.
Ark Royal, the last survivor, continued to help the US Navy by taking up the role of strike carrier as part of the NATO Atlantic Strike Fleet, which was intended to always field two flat tops. Ark Royal's presence left one US carrier free to head to the Gulf of Tonkin as part of the rotation of vessels to the Vietnam theatre.

Back then, the british carriers all had their own wholly british airwing, tomorrow they might carry a mixed airwing and sail in the Gulf of Aden, to allow one more US aircraft carrier to take position in the Pacific.

Will US pressure and assistance win the Royal Navy's case for converting Queen Elizabeth as well in the 2020s, during her first major refit? I certainly hope so, if the EMALS and F35C plan is confirmed, as i continue to envisage a two-carriers capability as vital.

Regarding the F35B, the Telegraph joins Gulf Times in shoving the B variant under a wrap of darkness, reporting that the americans might be really considering a massive downsizing of the USMC order for the STOVL plane.
I continue to doubt of this, also because the US Marines have massive political weight to help them make their case heard, but we will have to see.   

Another thing that is not clear is wheter the Planning Round 2012 announcement, so far planned for Monday 26 March, will go ahead without the Carrier Strike bit to be added later, or if it all will be postponed further, past April 17. 



Meanwhile, the European Union has extended the Atalanta Operation mandate, and now the ships involved in anti-piracy operations in the Somali area will be authorized to pursue pirates on land with air attacks or gunfire.
Due to the opposition of Germany and Spain, though, missile attack and insertion of ground troops are still no-no.

Will we see HMS Illustrious or HMS Ocean loaded with Apache sent to Somalia to strike at pirate havens...? Dave apparently was calling for it even before the Atalanta decision, after all.

For a country left without aircraft carriers, the demand for sea-delivered airpower is damn high...

HMS Ocean and HMS Illustrious, both in LPH role, are going to be very busy in the next months and years. For Ocean there's her last refit in sight, but she will first have a role in the Olympics. Illustrious will be on exercise in Norway with Royal Marines and Apache helicopters to ensure that 3rd Commando retains its important arctic skills. Then one of the two (probably Illustrious again) will be part of the yearly deployment of the Royal Navy Response Group, which will be involved in the massive exercise Corsican Lion with France's own aircraft carrier and Marines later this year.

HMS Ocean was sent out to Libya to fill the gap in carrier air, and Illustrious was being prepared to relieve her when the conflict eventually ended.
Now, most interestingly, with the international community more and more worried by developments in Somalia, the UK is said to be considering plans for airstrikes over the country, presumably to support the Kenyan forces which entered Somalia from the south late last year. The troops of the African Union in Mogadishio are also being increased in number, with Etyopia getting involved. The british airstrikes would be delivered by the "aircraft carrier" HMS Ocean, embarking once more Apache helicopters. After all, at the moment there's nothing more performant available... so Ocean apparently officially get "promoted" from LPH to Aircraft Carrier. Magic of defence cuts.

Deploying Marines ashore is also envisioned.
Late last year, indeed, it emerged that Royal Marines already went ashore in Somalia for a raid from HMS Albion, pushing deep into the mainland with Viking vehicles and taking back to the ship a local tribal leader for interrogations. 

Just like last year, the Royal Navy Response Force Task Group could set sail for an exercise, and end up fighting a war.

And just like other Prime Ministers in the UK's history, and like any american president, Dave is now finally learning that a question he'll ask pretty often while in charge is "where is the aircraft carrier?". 

Maggie Tatcher preceeded him...

Piracy, Terrorism, Somalia, Drones and Marines

Towards a fighting resolution of the Somalia problem?

Piracy: more and more of a problem

The IMB's Piracy Reporting Centre in Kuala Lumpur published figures for the first quarter of 2011 regarding pirate attacks off Somalia: 97 attacks have been counted, an increase of 32 on the same period last year, and 18 vessels were hijack with another 90 either fired upon or boarded. These have resulted in the murders of seven crew members, 34 injuries and the capture of 344 people who are now being held hostage, bringing the total number of those being held by Somali pirates by the end of March 2011 to 596.

The data about kidnapping, injures and murders is particularly worrisome, as It reveals a disturbing, growing trend in the use of violence in these assaults, which initially wasn’t present: only two injuries were reported in 2006.

It is estimated that, every year, some 23,000 ships come down the Suez Canal and Red Sea into the Gulf of Aden, and about 40,000 transit the Straits of Hormuz. With the movements of thousands of dhows, ocean-going fishing vessels and other smaller craft, it means that piracy affects only about 0.1% of vessels transiting in the area. But this detail is deceitful.

Geographically, piracy is localized in what is simply the most strategically relevant corner of Earth, crossed by good part of the most important commercial sealanes. In particular, every year 40% of the world's energy resources go through the Straits of Hormuz, and 11% through the Suez Canal. The area at risk spans about 2.2 million square miles of ocean, encompassing the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, most of the Indian Ocean, the North Arabian Sea, the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Gulf, while in the Indian Ocean alone, the borders of the “danger area” extend all the way south to the border between Tanzania and Mozambique, eastwards past the Seychelles towards the Maldives and north to the coasts of India, Pakistan and Oman.

To cover this immense area (twice as big as the whole Europe, Uk included), 25 nations have teamed up to create the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF), headquartered with the US Fifth Fleet in Bahrain. CMF is composed by three Combined Task Forces:

CTF-150, with Maritime security and Counter Terrorism role

CTF-151, with Counter Piracy role

CTF-152, Arabian Gulf Security and Cooperation. CTF 152 is generally commanded by one of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, on 6 month rotation. The GCC comprises Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, UAE, Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman.    

CMF is commanded by a U.S. Navy Vice Admiral, who also serves as Commander US Navy Central Command and US Navy Fifth Fleet. All three commands are co-located at US Naval Support Activity Bahrain. Deputy commander is a UK Royal Navy Commodore, with other senior staff roles at CMF headquarters filled by personnel from member nations, including Australia, France, Italy and Denmark. Participation is purely voluntary and the contribution from each country varies depending on its ability to contribute assets and the availability of those assets at any given time.

Command of the three task forces is taken over, for 6 months at a time, by one of the contributing nations. CTF-151 is currently under Italian command, with the destroyer Andrea Doria deployed in the area.

The flexibility of CMF is, however, an issue: the organization works without an overarching political or military mandate, unlike NATO and EUNAVFOR, so that no member of CMF will ever be asked to do anything that is outside its national mandate. The legal implications of this, mean that any suspected pirates have to be dealt with by the jurisdiction of the country whose navy catches them, making each case unique. The recent case of the raid of british Marines from RFA Fort Victoria, which freed the hijacked Italian ship ‘Montecristo’ and lead to the capture of 11 pirates, for example, saw the arrested men being handed over by the UK to Italy for prosecution under Italian law. This method has had some success, but there have been consistent calls for adopting an international rule: Jack Lang, UN's Special Advisor on piracy, argued for the establishment of an international legal process, aiming for an international court providing appropriate legal instruments to deal with suspected pirates in a consistent and clear way.  

The area and challenges are both vast, and even 25 nations working together are not managing to put enough warships in the area. In 2008, CMF, NATO and EUNAVFOR agreed to establish the Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor with the agreement of the merchant community, and to patrol it with a concentration of warships. This initiative, was initially very successful, resembling the concept of convoys in the two world war, when the issue was that of submarines. Ships are directed in mass into a safe “corridor” which the warships of the various navies are better able to constantly guard and protect.

However, the pirates refused to stop and moved their activities further out into the Indian Ocean, using the infamous 'motherships', larger merchant ships and previously pirated dhows or ocean-going vessels used as bases for launching assaults out at sea. This change in tactic expanded the pirates' areas of operation massively, pushing their range of action up to 1,000 miles away from the Somali coast.

The escalation

Piracy is often played down, but it is a very real concern. With the number of attacks raising constantly, and with their cost to the shipping and insurance companies growing more and more, there’s been an escalation in the gravity of the situation.

London’s Lloyd’s all but raised the project for financing a private fleet of escorts and security vessels for protecting shipping in the area.  

Dutch-Norwegian listed ocean transport company Dockwise, world leader in the market of super-heavy sea transports and known for its fleet (the largest in the world) of Float-On, Float-Off vessels often used to carry whole oil rigs and other massive and incredibly expensive payloads, warned the Netherlands’ government that it would sail its vessels under a different flag unless the country changed its laws to allow private guards to stay on ships in order to fend off pirate attacks.

The impact of Dockwise’s warning was pretty serious. The government, well aware of how much money comes from the fleet being flagged in the country, so much so that the Dutch soon after announced that they would allow their warships to strike pirates even ashore. An official Danish government anti-piracy strategy, published in June, suggested tougher measures, including the use of special forces and even bombing of pirate bases, with raids ashore to be made without warning the Somali “government” at all.

Even so, they are still hesitating on allowing armed guards aboard vessels, but the pressure is increasing, and they will probably decide in this sense sometime soon.

After the Montecristo crisis, Italy announced that the Marina Militare (the Italian Navy) would make available for hire a first group of ten 6-men teams of Marines from the “San Marco” Regiment. These government-trained guards can now be hired by Italian shipping companies to provide security to their vessels.

The UK itself in 2010 expanded the Fleet Protection Group Royal Marines, raising P Squadron, to provide embarked teams for RFA ships and government-chartered vessels transiting in dangerous areas. One day, a further expansion might allow the creation of teams on the Italian model, which british shipping companies could hire and put aboard their own vessels.

Hired guards aboard british-flagged merchant vessels are to be legalized, and companies of sea guards on hire are already working hard – and well paid -, often giving work to ex-Marines or men from the armed forces.  

Jihad, terrorism, pirates, a failed state and Kenya

But that is not as bad as it gets, because it gets worse. According to the US, Somali pirates are in league with the terror group al-Shabaab, which has spoken of a "sea jihad" and has opened a marine office to co-ordinate with pirates. The Kenyan government estimates 30 per cent of the ransoms are channelled to al-Shabaab.

And in these days, Kenya started military operations against Al-Shabaab, sending its troops into Somalia to clean up the border area. Kenyan land forces are operating in southern Somalia, in an effort to route Al-Shabaab militants bases in townships near the Somali South-East border with Kenya. Like the Libyan rebels in the recent campaign, the kenyan forces are assisted by foreign air and naval support: in particular, US drones flying out of Ethyopia and the gun of a French warship. Air attacks by fast jets have been signaled over the al-Shabaab forces, and it has been speculated that they might have been American planes, but the US denied the assumption.

Kenya started the operation as a retaliation for a series of raids by Somali gunmen who have attacked and abducted foreigners from Kenyan territory. Kenya is concerned about the prospect of al-Shabab attacking Nairobi, and westerners which are fundamental to its economy. Recently, al-Shabab threatened to bring the ”flames of war” to Kenya.

Near the border, in Kenya’s own territory, the Kenyan security forces are launching a crackdown on Kenyan residents suspected to be helping al Shabab. Inside Somalia, Kenyan forces captured six towns in six days, including the pirates’ havens of Ras Kamboni, Dhobley, Tabda, Beles Qooqani, Oddo and Kolbio.

The main objective of the current campaign is the town of Kismayu, and nearby ports of Marka and Baraawe, providing the main source of revenue for al Shabaab, from port fees, business taxes and smuggling. Kenya has refused to put any timelines to its mission, announcing that it will withdraw only when it feels that Al-Shabaab is no longer a threat. Negotiation with the terrorist group is currently ruled out, and it is expected that the African union will be reinforcing the currently heavily-understrenght military presence in Mogadishu. Authorized by the UN in 2007 and set at 12.000 men, the force present at the moment counts only around 9000, from Burundi and Uganda. On November 15, the Intergovernmental Development Authority, that groups together Uganda, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Kenya, Sudan and Somalia will organize a conference, and it is expected that Uganda and Burundi will then confirm their willingness to provide a further 4,000 men, with Djibouti deploying 1,000 more. This force, known as AMISOM, is currently holding its positions in Mogadishu, with the spokesman Paddy Akunda saying there are currently no plans to provide support for Kenya's mission, although, asked if AMISOM had any plans to join the Kenyan operation at a later point, Akunda said they would "cross that bridge when we get there."

The US recently confirmed that they are flying drones from Ethiopia all the way over Somalia. It is also well known that US Special Forces have made raids into Somalia in several occasions to fight terrorist groups linked to Al-Qaeda. At the moment, any link to the Kenyan operations is denied, but it is hard to believe it, and in any case no one, in Europe or in the US, can possibly oppose the current stance of Nairobi. They are doing the dirty job for us.

Commandos raid

And in the list of “events” relating to Somalia, it has today been confirmed that the Royal Marines made, last July, an amphibious raid into Somalia. Viking armoured vehicles were involved, inserted with landing crafts by 539 Assault Squadron. The vehicles then pushed “well inland” in the lawless Somalia to seize an influential local clan chief, which was taken back to the amphibious ship. 

Viking vehicles of 539 Assault Squadron during exercises in Cyprus as part of Cougar 11 deployment. Between Libya war and raids in Somalia, the amphibious ready group has had an eventful deployment!

The clan chieft was then questioned by MI6 and Foreign Offfice officials, centering on issues such as terrror training camps and the seizing of hostages. A very “Commando-style” operation, one which was not done in quite some time. Details are still minimal, and it is unlikely that much more will be told.

More worrisome than piracy, is the fact that UK and US-born terrorists are believed to be increasingly travelling to Somalia for training rather than Pakistan and Afghanistan, making of the lawless country the “new” (not really) hot spot.

Very little is known about the raid. Not even the name of the ship involved, or which Commando unit. However, it is quite easy to restrict the options: it was probably HMS Albion since she headed ‘East of Suez’ in June, after exercises in the Mediterranean sea. The Marines were from 40 Commando, embarked on board.

The ship had been part of the maxi-deployment “Cougar 2011”, first deployment of the Response Force Task Group (RFTG) - the UK's maritime quick reaction force, centered for the occasion on 40 Commando. The deployment saw HMS Albion, HMS Ocean, HMS Sutherland, RFA Cardigan Bay, RFA Mounts Bay, RFA Wave Knight and RFA Fort Rosalie involved, leaving the UK in early April in two main groups. Trafalgar-class submarine HMS Triumph and Type 42 destroyer HMS Liverpool were also to be part of Cougar, but they almost immediately were diverted to Libya, where they took part in the war.

The exercise set sail two weeks earlier than planned due to the war in Libya, and a significant number of vessels from the Task Group (mainly HMS Ocean and Fort Rosalie) were then assigned to operation Unified Protector. HMS Albion moved on with the exercise, and passed Suez, so she is almost certainly the source of the Somalia raid.   

For sure, even with incomplete information, summing it all together, we have the picture of quite a dangerous situation developing in Somalia, with some potential for further developments.