Shortage of resources require
coherence and joined up thinking at the budgeting table. Pursuing vague
“revolutionary” concepts such as Land Strike while knowing full well that there
is no chance to ever be able to afford the equipment needed to make it remotely
workable is simply suicidal, particularly while the SDSR 2015 is already under
a new review, exquisitely money-driven. Nobody in their sane minds can believe
this new review has actually anything to do with supposedly changed geopolitics
due to Brexit. It is about money, and they might as well admit it and show some
honesty for once.
It is urgently time to go back to
basics and set out a coherent way forwards that builds on the strengths the
british forces already posses, rather than continuing to disorderly knock
pieces off them in order to fit into the annual budgeting circle while pursuing
two hundred different programmes, most of which end in nothing but sunk costs
(FRES, LIMAWS, Soothsayer, FRES UV, SMART, FIST, Fire Shadow etcetera, I’m
looking at you). The modern day army, although of course not entirely for
faults of its own, has been particularly guilty of this sin.
Budget delegation is in many ways a
welcome development, but asking each service to generate “savings” from within
their budget without considering the wider implications is a recipe for further
disasters.
A general direction of travel needs
to be decided and then defended. It must be coherent and joined up: all
services need to be working according to the same strategic guidelines. At the
moment, this is not the case, as the talk of split buy for the F-35 or the
dismantling of littoral and amphibious capability demonstrate.
Aim of the UK’s defence policy
should be to preserve, as much as possible, the ability of the country to take
independent action where absolutely necessary and within a realistic scale.
Second, the equipment and force structure choices should be oriented towards
making the UK a Leader within NATO, by making it a perfect candidate framework
nation for the construction of multinational forces for more complex
operations. UK policy makers in recent times like to remind us that future
operations are likely to be coalition efforts, but the actions do not quite match the
rhetoric as cuts and corner-cutting have far too often hit areas which were of
great importance alliance-wide.
It is the case, notably, of the
maritime patrol aircraft cut, thankfully eventually corrected, but also of
Sentinel R1 (a unique capability in Europe), amphibious shipping and logistic
shipping.
What does the UK bring to the table that is unique, or particularly valuable; and how can it get the most from what it has? This should be the question at
the base of an honest review.
Excluding the nuclear deterrent and
the SSNs (by far the biggest influence buyers, as well as areas with a rather
solid plan already in place), the UK’s areas of excellence include:
Special Forces. Highly respected and valued, the british special forces are a powerful
strategic asset and an influence buyer. Repeatedly, government has promised to
boost them, but progress cannot be measured from the outside for lack of
information.
What can be seen is, however, not
actually encouraging: as will be discussed further below, the SDSR commitment
to providing long-range vertical mobility (air refuel-able) to the Special
Forces seem to have died in early stealth cuts. Another problem without an
evident solution is 657 AAC, which is part of the Joint Special Forces Support
Wing and provides support in the form of light assault helicopters (Lynx AH9A
at the moment). 657 AAC is planned to move into Yeovilton, which suggests that
it will probably convert to Wildcat when the last 8 AH9A are withdrawn from
service as soon as April 2018.
Director Special Forces was almost
saddled with 8 “Light Assault” Wildcat in 2011, of which 4 would have been additional new
buys and 4 conversions of airframes from the 34 purchased for Army and Royal Marines. That
project was announced, costed, and then killed without explanation. Reportedly,
Special Forces were not happy with the helicopter.
Now, however, 657 AAC might end up
being not an additional Wildcat LAH Sqn, but just one of 4 (?) Army sqns,
equipped with the Battlefield Reconnaissance variant, with little or no mods.
In other words, Director Special Forces is getting a far worse solution than
the one it reportedly turned down in 2011.
The UK Special Forces Support Group
(1 PARA) also recently disbanded one of its companies, removing a platoon from
all Strike Coys and redistributing the Fire Support Groups to partially
compensate.
21 and 23 SAS, the reserve
formations, underwent a change of role as well, towards Human Environment
Reconnaissance and Analysis. An important role, but the impact that this change
had on availability of personnel for more “traditionally defined” tasks is
unclear.
In addition, Special Forces are
still waiting for the full range of mods and additions to the C-130Js under
Project HERMES. Ever since the C-130Ks configured for SF work went out of
service, there has been a gap in capability.
Not a reassuring picture. We have to
hope that the "black" programmes, the ones we don't hear about, are doing better, because for the rest, facts
do not match rhetoric.
Air Mobility.
The UK has a very valuable C-17 fleet which is unique in Europe. There is a
NATO mini-fleet of 3 C-17, but as helpful as that can be, it is clearly not
enough. The combination of 8 C-17, 22 A400M, 14 stretched C-130Js and 9 (14 as
max effort) Voyagers is a powerful one, and one of the most valuable assets
that the UK can offer to its allies. A capability valued by allies means
influence.
France and Germany will have much
greater numbers of A400M, but no C-17s, and there are things that only the
latter can do. France experienced in full the difficulties caused by lack of
strategic airlift while transferring forces into Mali for Op SERVAL. 8 C-17s
are too few to solve the problem entirely, but they certainly mean the UK is better
positioned.
The UK also is going to have a
capable, large fleet of 60 Chinook, which represent a lot of lift capability
for Air Manoeuvre of land forces. 23 Puma HC2 and 34 Wildcat also help,
although a greater number of more capable medium helicopters would be
desirable.
It also possesses a capable fleet of
50 Apache which, considering the Tiger’s constant woes, are arguably by far the
most capable attack helicopter force in Europe.
 |
| Heavy airdrop has been gapped |
 |
| 16 Air Assault has much reduced access to light armour these days |
A lot of money has been expended to
build up this air mobility fleet, yet a succession of corners have been cut,
denying the full exploitation of this sizeable investment.
In particular:
-
16
Air Assault Brigade has been cut back in capability as well as size. The
gapping of Heavy Airdrop capability and the failure to progress with the
adoption of precision airdrop mean that the brigade’s already limited parachute
capability is essentially virtual unless the Americans drop the heavy bits
(vehicles, L118 Light Guns etcetera).
-
The
acquisition of long-range vertical manoeuvre assets seem to have been quietly
cancelled once more. Although the SDSR was deliberately vague about providing
longer reach to Special Forces, it was pretty clear that two options were on
the table: MV-22 Osprey, which could refuel in flight from Voyager KC3s; or the
retrofit of air refueling probes to at least part of the Chinooks and the
fitting out of a couple of short C-130Js to serve as tankers. None of the two
options seem destined to materialize.
-
The
failure of efforts to purchase internally transportable vehicles that would
give air mobile troops far greater mobility after reaching the LZ inside
Chinooks.
-
The
Voyager’s lack of a boom as well as the choice not to invest in a
reconfigurable top-deck, which would have made it far more capable by opening
up huge cargo possibilities.
 |
| Foxhounds of 2 Gurkha Rifles are air landed in support of 16 Air Assault during ex Joint Warrior |
Air mobility, including air
manoeuvre of ground troops via Chinook and Puma lift, is a partial excellence.
The UK is an extremely good position under some points of view and in an
extremely poor one under others. At the moment, it is an unfinished work.
In recent times there have been some
welcome developments thanks to the end (op TORAL requirements aside) of the
very demanding Afghanistan air bridge. In particular, the RAF has finally
started to employ the tactical capabilities of the C-17instead of employing it
just to lift heavy / high volume cargo from A to B. Airdrops and tactical air
landing have been opened up, and 16 Air Assault brigade has experimented with
“air-mechanized” operations by inserting small “packs” of Foxhounds (apologies
for the pun) in support of the air assault task force during the last Joint
Warrior.
This is an area of excellence which:
-
Enables
UK long-range operations, not just as part of a coalition, but, at limited
scale, in substantial independence
-
Is
valuable to allies and, in its C-17 part, unique in Europe (which is a bonus in
light of the need for influence during the Brexit process)
-
Is
valuable to the main ally, the US, and can be a vector for further integration
As such, it is a battle-winning and
influence-gaining asset which deserves greater attention, instead of being
repeatedly run into the ground by small money-savings measures that add up to
huge losses of capability.
A more detailed look into the Air
Mobility area is here and here.
ISTAR. The
UK has the most complete air-breathing ISTAR force outside of the US Air Force.
This asset is highly valued by the US, as evidenced by the extremely close
relationship in operating the Rivet Joint element. The 3 UK aircraft complement
a fleet of just 17 in US service, making it an important contribution in terms
of mass as well.
Protector, if “at least 20” are
effectively put into service as promised by the SDSR, will represent the
largest MALE fleet in Europe and the most capable, at least until the European
MALE 2020 project delivers results. Something that it might or might not do.
The 9 P-8 Poseidon are a critical
asset for the safety of the UK, which remains as exposed as ever to submarine
warfare in the, perhaps unlikely but certainly catastrophic, eventuality of
conflict against Russia. The new MPA fleet will also represent a large portion
of Europe’s capability in the MPA sector, which is suffering NATO-wide and was
officially listed already a few years ago as one of the critical weaknesses to
correct.
And Sentinel R1 is as precious and
unique as it is unlucky and constantly targeted by cuts guided by short-termism
of the worst kind. The reduction of the fleet to just 4 aircraft and, more
importantly, the marked reduction in the number of crews have already
determined, or at least undoubtedly played a part in the gapping of this
capability in Operation SHADER.
The UK is extraordinarily weak in
terms of satellites. It has no radar, optical or SIGINT satellites of its own,
relaying on the data supplied by US constellations instead. Even a good portion
of the communications capacity comes via participation in the US AEHF
constellation.
 |
| Sentinel R1: a unique, praised capability facing a never ending struggle for funding |
The ISTAR fleet is another key
excellence. Cutting back on the number of Sentinel R1 and crews is an example
of damaging short-termism determined by lack of joined-up thinking. The RAF
budget holder had to save money somehow, and I’m willing to believe this was
the least damaging options among those at his disposal, but it remains,
overall, a disproportionately negative outcome.
It is also very worrying and
disappointing that there is still complete uncertainty about how to preserve
this unique battlefield surveillance and targeting capability post 2021. It is true that, by then, capable SAR radars with Moving Target capability will be widely available (on Protector, Watchkeeper, F-35 and on Typhoon once it is retrofitted with the CAPTOR E AESA radar), but none of these is a full Sentinel R1 replacement all the same.
ISTAR ticks all the boxes again:
-
It
enables UK operations, in coalitions and in independence
-
Is
valuable to allies and, in several ways, unique in Europe
-
Is
valuable to the main ally, the US, and can facilitate further collaborations
(with Norway and beyond, particularly thanks to P-8)
Long range strike. A multi-pronged capability made up by:
-
Tomahawk
-
Land-based
aviation with Storm Shadow
-
Carrier
based aviation
-
Stealth
The UK will be the only country in
the European side of NATO to tick all boxes at once / in significant numbers,
thanks to the F-35. This area of absolute excellence is not without its own
problems, with the main one being the tiny stock of Tomahawk and the relative
poverty of platforms able to fire it. The Type 26 will introduce the ability to
fire long-range missiles from surface vessels for the first time, but Tomahawk
by then will be out of production unless US plans change or the UK lodges in an
order before it is too late.
In the future, Tomahawk and Storm
Shadow (and Harpoon) could be replaced by the same weapon, the new SPEAR 5 /
Future Cruise and Anti-Ship Weapon to be jointly developed with France. Entry
into service is not expected until the 2030s, however, with the Storm Shadow
OSD being 2032.
Much too late to avoid a lot of
problems for the Navy, forced to lose Harpoon already next year and facing the
dilemma of how to arm the Type 26 in the meanwhile.
Long range strike capability could
be expanded by putting cruise missiles on P-8 Poseidon or even by resurrecting
the idea of ramp-dropping Storm Shadows from the back of cargo aircraft.
Future long-range strike should also
be able to relay on the FCAS unmanned aircraft in development in collaboration
with France.
This area is in relative health,
despite the cancellation of Storm Shadow integration on F-35B. Unfortunately,
the integration would only become effective much too close to the missile’s OSD
to truly make sense, so spending money on it is not, in any scenario, wise. SPEAR 5, however, should definitely find its way on F-35B
and Type 26.
The worst problem in sight is the
dramatic firepower gap on Royal Navy warships with the loss of Harpoon.
Carrier Enabled Power Projection
For a long time, the UK has talked
of the new carriers in terms of Strike, as that was the fashion of the moment.
The truth is that “Carrier Strike” understates what carriers are for, reducing
them to one mission when in reality they have many. The “Strike” capability of
the new carriers come from their size: they can carry enough fuel, stores,
weapons and aircraft to generate enough sorties to be a true power projection
tool, unlike the Invincibles, which arguably achieved all they could and then
some, but could never go past the limits imposed by their size.
Carrier Enabled Power Projection
better summarizes what the carriers really are about: they ensure the fleet has
the air support it needs to operate in the congested, cluttered, contested,
connected and constrained environment of current and future warfare. Without organic air power, a fleet
cannot venture far from the air cover coming from land. Without a fleet capable
to go into a contested environment, far from home and potentially far from
friendly land bases. there can be no power projection at any serious scale.
With the Navy planning to have one
carrier at Very High Readiness (5 days notice to move) and the other at 20 to
30 days notice to move, continuous carrier capability is a realistic aim.
The programme for the first two
squadrons of F-35B and for Crowsnest is now firm. The biggest risk for the
realization of the CEPP’s promises regards the formation of the F-35B squadrons
number 3 and 4. These are threatened by the “split buy” idea which could see
the RAF go for the F-35A, in what would a sublime example of single service
reasoning.
Unfortunately, to the F-35 budget
holder (the RAF), the F-35A is alluring because it is cheaper than the B, and
has (potentially) a larger internal, stealth payload and a bit more range. If
joined-up thinking doesn’t win the day, there is every possibility that CEPP
will be compromised for little to zero actual gain: the RAF does not own or
plan a weapon for which the larger weapon bays of the A are both necessary and
sufficient. SPEAR 5 will almost certainly be too large for internal carriage
regardless, while all other weapons in service or planned do not need a larger
bay.
The split buy must be avoided at all
costs, at least until the B fleet doesn’t comprise a fleet of 4 frontline
squadrons, which represent the threshold for a realistic, self-supporting
force.
A more detailed explanation of the
dangers of the split buy idea is here.
The Royal Navy’s effort should be
focused on its Joint Expeditionary Force – Maritime, centered on the carriers
and including the amphibious group. The UK has the tools needed to put to sea
an “Expeditionary Strike Group +” , more capable than those fielded by the US
Navy, which are centered on a LHA / LHD, a LPD, a LSD and some 3 escorts. The
UK group can buy substantial influence:
-
Its
global deployment is a statement of intention that is not matched by any other
short-term deployment form
-
It
is valued by the US as it helps cover all stations, enabling the progressive
shift of US attention to the Pacific
-
It
represents a capability that, in Europe, only France can, in part, replicate
Royal Fleet Auxiliary
Too often overlooked, the RFA is an
extremely valuable tool and one that truly sets the Royal Navy apart from other
European navies. The capability and capacity of the RFA is unmatched in the
European side of NATO. It is the tool that enables the Royal Navy to have blue
water and expeditionary possibilities.
Unfortunately, some of its most
valuable assets have been lost or risk being lost without replacement: RFA
Diligence had no equal in Europe, yet it was sacrificed to short-termism in the
hunt for savings. RFA Argus risks suffering the same fate in a few years time.
Two Point-class Ro-Ro sealift
vessels and one Bay-class LSD were also lost to cuts, and the loss in
capability far exceeds the savings.
 |
| A design proposed for the Solid Support Ship, including a well dock for landing craft for increased amphibious support capability |
Particularly important to the RFA’s
future is the nascent Solid Support Ship programme, which aims to build 3 ships
that will replace Fort Austin, Fort Rosalie and Fort Victoria around the middle
of the 2020s. Critical enablers for complex CEPP operations, these vessels
should represent a priority in planning and their design should include Joint
considerations, primarily through the provision of support to forces ashore, to
the greatest possible scale.
The RFA is a key enabler for
independent and coalition operations. It allows the UK to support multi-national
efforts at reach and thus represents an influence-buying asset.
Amphibious capability
Amphibious capability is a key element within Carrier Enabled Power Projection, but it deserves to be detailed further.
The future of this capability is
particularly concerning as it is being squeezed to death by lack of joined up
thinking and budgetary short-termism. With the budget holder (Navy HQ) forced
to slice the salami to somehow fit into the annual budget cycle, the Royal
Marines have taken a long series of hits, most recently the removal of 42
Commando from the traditional assault role in favor of “maritime force protection”
task.
Equipment-wise, the amphibious force
is about to lose Ocean after losing one LPD (in mothball) and 1 LSD plus 2
Ro-Ro sealift vessels.
Modernization efforts have been
almost entirely frustrated by killing off:
-
Force
Protection Craft
-
Fast
Landing Craft
-
BV206
replacement
-
Joint
Mini UAS (a proposed Royal Marines / Army replacement for Desert Hawk III)
The picture is currently very
depressing and the future is full of worries, despite the Royal Navy correctly
listing amphibious capability as one of its three defining capabilities
(together with Continuous At Sea Deterrence and Continuous Carrier availability).
The dramatic reduction in amphibious
capability extends to the Royal Logistic Corps losing its own large landing
craft without replacement.
3 Commando Brigade, just like 16 Air
Assault, has been partially dismantled and turned into a “demi-brigade” on two
battlegroups alternating yearly into readiness.
And all this has happened in open contradiction
with doctrinal studies that have reaffirmed, year after year, that the future
of global geo-demographics is Littoral. This requires UK forces that are able
to mount substantial littoral and riverine manoeuvre, as joint and Army papers,
including the Agile Warrior experiment, constantly reaffirmed.
The Royal Marines are also
historically connected to Norway and are one of the formations tasked with reinforcement
of the Northern Flank in case of a “Russia scenario”. Consequently, they are
defence’s sole specialists in Arctic and Mountain warfare. Even this aspect of
their capability is under threat, with arctic training for 2018 reportedly
entirely cancelled due to Navy HQ simply not knowing how else to fit into next
year’s budget. In a triumph of bitter, humiliating irony, days before the news
emerged, UK officers were saying, at the Air Power Conference, that the next theatre of operation will be the frozen
north.
As too often happens in british
defence, words tell one story, actions paint another one entirely.
The UK’s amphibious capability is a
key asset for future independent and coalition operations; it is valued by the
US and by other allies, in particular Norway; and represents much of the
amphibious capability available to the European side of NATO.
The trend of reductions and
capability losses should be immediately reversed. Royal Marines and Army
integrations should increase, if this is what it takes to encourage more joint
thinking and a common response to correctly identified trends. The current situation
of agreeing on the key and growing importance of littoral and amphibious
manoeuvre while cutting back on all elements of said capability is ridiculous
and must end.
The UK also took the leading role in
a NATO initiative to develop solutions for the opening of sea ports for
deployment abroad. Considering that all UK operations, considering geography,
will inexorably deal with multiple seaports every time, and that entry into a
theatre of operations might well be complicated by damaged / poorly kitted out
/ contested and semi-demolished ports, this capability is a key national
requirement as well as an influence-buyer within the alliance. It also has
peacetime value as a disaster relief instrument.
Literally nothing has apparently
move since the launch of the initiative, and it would be really important to
revitalize the effort and invest in this area.
A more detailed look into the state
of the amphibious force can be found here and here.
ASW
Anti-submarine warfare is back on
the list of priorities as tensions in Europe remind NATO that the basic
scenario has never changed: if things ever go seriously wrong, the fate of the
conflict in central Europe completely depends on the ability of the navies to
escort convoys loaded with American tanks and supplies across the Atlantic.
The UK’s vulnerability to submarine
warfare is unchanged as well. There are less submarines these days, but there
are far fewer escorts as well, and today supplies and fuel travel on a
far, far smaller number of far larger tankers, container ships and other
vessels.
The loss of a few large merchant
vessels today would have catastrophic consequences comparable to the complete annihilation
of a few convoys back in the old days, a fact not always appreciated.
During expeditionary operations, the
presence of a few diesel submarines is enough to put the task force in grave
danger and tie down a lot of resources for defensive action. Undervaluing the threat is very risky: there is no certainty that the next torpedo fired at a Royal Navy
warship will fail like those fired by the argies' ARA San Luis in 1982.
The Royal Navy remains a champion
and an authority in the field of ASW operations, and its Type 23 frigates,
Merlins and, tomorrow, Type 26s and MPAs will be particularly precious. Gaps do
exist, however, including the absence of a long-range anti-submarine weapon for
warships. The Navy also has just 8 ASW escorts these days, and there is
worrying talk of Type 31 being a non-ASW vessel as well. A rethink is urgently
needed.
Survey and MCM
The Royal Navy has great survey and
MCM capabilities, and both will remain precious in the future, since mines
remain a huge danger.
The Royal Navy’s MCM capability is
particularly valuable in part for the US Navy’s relative weakness in this area.
From an European point of view, the RN’s MCM force is less valuable, only
because pretty much all countries in Europe have maintained capable flotillas of
their own.
The ability to survey the seabed and
clear it from mines remain crucial for the safety of the UK and for the conduit
of operations abroad.
The MHC programme that should
eventually define the replacement of the survey vessels Echo and Enterprise as
well as of the current MCM ships is particularly important.
The deployable Division
The ability of the UK to field a
capable Division for operations at range is a key element in determining the
country’s power and influence. Division-level deployment gives the UK a more
realistic “independent” option and keeps the country in the top tier of
contributors within the alliance. Deploying a division far from home remains a
major undertaking and one that is beyond the possibilities of many states: as
such, there can be no doubt about the influence brought by this capability.
The ability to deploy a Division
should not, however, come at the cost of a force structure adequately thought
out to sustain brigade-sized enduring operations, which are more frequent and
just as important. Army 2020 Refine pursues a vague concept of “Joint Land
Strike” at the cost of making the Army a one-shot only organization, with
little to no staying power. It is a completely illusory target, built upon
shaky, vague doctrine. The myth of merry, quick land wars is well and truly
debunked, yet the British Army is effectively pursuing a structure that
embodies that myth. General Carter made mentions of Operation SERVAL, the French
operation in Mali in early 2013, as being an example of rapid, decisive action
as that envisaged for the Strike brigades. However quick and decisive the
combat ops of January 2013 were, SERVAL eventually lasted 1 year and 6 months,
between January 2013 and July 2014, equating to 3 successive tours if the 6
months deployments are to stay true. And its conclusion became nothing other
than the beginning of operation BARKHANE, which endures to this day. I will
also remark that the particularities of Operation SERVAL make it hardly useful
as an inspiration for British Army future operations: in particular, the French
were able to move so rapidly because much of the troops employed in the first
phase were already forward based in Africa. Again, the rapid movement overland
of wheeled formations was enabled by the presence of allied forces that secured
the rear (not just Mali forces, but allied contingents from Niger and Chad
which were more numerous than the French contingent itself). I hope to write a
more in depth analysis of what Mali can and cannot say about the utility of “Medium
Weight” forces in the context of the STRIKE infatuation in the British Army.
As I’ve already done several times, I
suggest the British Army abandons the current, suicidal course and thinks about
using its resources, beginning with manpower and existing equipment, in smarter
ways. Joint Land Strike is a wobbly concept, based on dreams more than on
realistic assessment of historical operations. Its implementation is
essentially limited, due to budget and manpower shortages, to four battalions
worth of wheeled APCs and, maybe, a wheeled 155mm howitzer in the future, all
paid for by severe mutilation of other areas of the force structure. It is not
just a flawed concept, it is a flawed concept that the Army will attempt to
pursue while knowing from the start that it does not have the necessary
equipment pieces.
The Army should rethink its force
structure and make good use of what it has, instead, ensuring that the current “fake”
brigades are used to deliver true deployable formations instead, grouped in two
deployable divisions, albeit lighter. That will give the army a more realistic
and sustainable balance of forces. Army 2020 Refine reportedly aims to be able
to deliver a “best effort” division of 2 armoured and 1 strike brigade.
There is every reason to be
skeptical about the feasibility of such a deployment in the first place, which
would require 100% of the Army’s heavy armour and 50% of its medium armour,
right from the get go. Who was in the army at the time remembers what a
struggle it was, for a much larger army than today’s, to deliver 1st
UK Division in Iraq in 2003. That division had only one armoured brigade, 7th
Bde, plus 3 Commando and 16 Air Assault Brigades plus divisional assets.
In terms of equipment, Army 2020
Refine’s stated ambition matches or exceeds the Operation TELIC numbers: a
division of 2 armoured and 1 strike brigade would deploy, in theory, with 112
Challenger 2 (vs 116 at the time); more than 200 Warriors in all sub-variants
(versus 140 IFVs plus sub-variants), 36 AS90 (same) and 12 to 18 L118 or their
future replacement (vs 39), plus one hundred or more Ajax and probably one
hundred MIVs.
Talk about doing more with less. 1st
Division’s deployment had a long-lasting ripple effect that dragged on for
years in the daily running of the army and in the allocation of spares, and one
can only imagine what kind of impact would come from trying to deploy 3rd
Division today, from a much smaller army.
Modernization should continue in the
heavy armour sector, which is actually the one, together with light infantry,
where the British Army has the best spread of experience. Substantial armoured
forces were deployed in two Iraqi wars, and heavy armour is now once more in
high demand with defence of East Europe now at the forefront of NATO tasks.
Going back to the Air Mobility
point, seen earlier in this article, air-mechanized manoeuvre can and arguably
should be the true “Land Strike” focus for the British Army.
While there are undoubtedly merits
and attractions in wheeled armour, the British Army should not pursue them at
all costs by turning itself in a “make it or break it” silver bullet that would
leave behind little more than a smoldering empty case once fired. It has a
number of ongoing programmes already competing for shares of an ever tight
budget and a longer list still of capability gaps, weaknesses and new
requirements coming up in the next few years. There is no real urgency to pursue
the STRIKE myth: in Europe it would be of limited and questionable utility
against far more capable Russian formations, hybrid or not; while in Africa and
the Middle East it would be helpful but far from decisive. As currently
envisioned, a Strike Brigade with MIV would not be too much of a step up from a
deployment of infantry mounted in Mastiff. The MIV comes with far better
off-road mobility, but with same (or indeed less, as the new 8x8 will
definitely be in the 30+ tons region) strategic mobility and same
(insufficient) firepower.
The whole thing costs too much for
what it actually adds. The “8x8 revolution” has been announced many times but
has never really materialized. While wheeled armour does work, undoubtedly, it
has not and will not change warfare anytime soon.
The US are still trying to make
their Stryker brigades work, and their latest attempt to make them more useful
is the addition of 30mm guns and Javelin under-armour launch capability; both
things that MIV is almost certainly not going to enjoy. France is building on
its experience of wheeled armour by investing on vehicles substantially lighter
and simpler than the 8x8 and Ajax envisaged for the Strike Brigades: the
Griffon 6x6 APC and the Jaguar 6x6 armoured car. French brigades enjoy more
firepower, more and far larger infantry regiments than the two battalions of
the british strike brigades, and self-escorting logistic formations.
Italy is (slowly) building up the
most complete 8x8 force in NATO, thanks to the combination of Freccia and
Centauro, with Centauro 2 on the way. None of the 8x8 available have made any
kind of game-changing difference to the operations we have seen in modern
times.
In terms of availability of the
capability, it should be noted that 8x8s have been chosen by smaller European armies
which have had to renounce to their tanks for budgetary considerations. Denmark
is investing in them, Belgium has them (and will in future stay wheeled but
downgrade even further by going Griffon 6x6 after announcing recently the
purchase of the new French vehicle) and Spain wants a large number to replace
the wheeled vehicles already in use.
There is no shortage of 8x8s in
NATO. There is, instead, a shortage of heavy armour and artillery, which is
becoming more evident by the day as Russian forces modernization progresses.
France is rebuilding a fourth tank regiment; Germany is bringing back more than
100 MBTs, the US are rebuilding at least two armoured brigades over the next
three years.
The UK, conversely, is looking at
dismantling one of its three tank regiments and cut back on what is a proven,
battle-hardened capability, albeit weakened by the obsolescence of Challenger
2, delays in Warrior CSP and weakness in artillery.
Instead of fixing well known issues,
the army is looking at making them worse, just to mount four infantry
battalions on 8x8 APCs. It remains, in my opinion, the dumbest possible course
of action. There really isn’t a gentle way to put it: it is just a suicidal
direction.
Heavy armour is still the measure of
an army’s combat power as well as the main asset for high intensity warfare,
the only one which has existential implications and thus should be the
priority.
That is not to say that the Strike
Brigade could or would not be deployed in Europe for reassurance initiatives. I’m
sure the british army would gladly copy the US 2 ACR’s road march with Strykers
across Europe if it already had MIV. It would be certainly impressive and
appreciated in East Europe, but if push ever came to shove, the MIV as
currently envisaged (without turret and cannon) would be maybe able to race to the
front but it would be crushed once there.
Peacetime shows do not strictly require
MIV. The British Army attached Jackals to the 2 ACR’s road show, and as a
political statement, it suffices. For operations, MIV is not enough.
The Strike Brigade, as of now, is
just not a wise use of money, manpower and kit.
An in-depth examination of all the
gaps in the British Army force structure and a proposal to close them is here.
Combat engineering
You don’t often read this, but the
British Army has excellent combat engineering regiments, well equipped and
capable. They have a great spread of bridging capability, which is not easily
found elsewhere, and they have great breaching equipment in the form of Trojan.
They are extremely valuable assets,
which remain fundamental to any operation and which are likely to be more
important than ever in future, heavily urbanized scenarios.
There are weaknesses too, though:
the demise of SHIELDER exemplifies a dramatic decay of Counter-Mobility
capability, which absolutely needs to be reversed as it would be key in any European
war scenario, however unlikely.
Urban battlefields arguably suggest
that re-introduction of a short-barrel, high-calibre demolition cannon such as
the old 165mm is also highly desirable.
Project TYRO is (slowly) working on
life-extending and upgrading or replacing the bridging equipment.
The M3 rigs are still operational
and, in one of few good news contained in Army 2020 Refine, the regiment
utilizing them. 75 RE; is due for considerable expansion as a renewed focus
goes into wide wet gap crossing.
At the same time, Army 2020 Refine
would remove 35 RE from the Close Support role, if not from the ORBAT
altogether. This is part of the reductions that compromise the ability of the
army to keep a brigade in the field for enduring operations, and should be reversed.
Battlefield recovery and repair
Despite the cuts suffered by REME in
2010 and an unfortunate and substantially failed re-organization of REME
resources into battalions, the british army still enjoys a considerable
richness of Recovery and Repair assets and expertise. A look at the equipment
available in other European armies will rapidly show that the other countries
tend to cut this corner a lot.
What is in short supply elsewhere
becomes automatically valuable when the time to mount an operation comes.
Training
The level of training and expertise
that can be found in the british armed forces remains considerable. Training
delivered by british forces is respected and valued, and the UK can buy
security and influence through provision of training and assistance to friendly
countries all over the world. Training deals also play a substantial role in
supporting british defence industry in the export market: Typhoon jets can
result a lot more attractive, for example, if british training comes along with
them.
While there are good reasons to be
skeptical about the “Defence Engagement Battalions” being created within the
army, the general idea of having units permanently tasked with defence
cooperation abroad is good under many points of view. Substantial uncertainty
remains about the nature of these battalions, their effective capabilities and
their employment. Several press reports have suggested that these battalions
will be similar to American Green Berets, acting as Special Operations Forces
where necessary, supplying covert or overt assistance directly on the
battlefield. If true, this would make them particularly valuable but also
particularly expensive to set up, man and maintain.
The area of foreign engagement,
albeit unglamorous in many ways, does deserve attention and further work.
Delivery of naval and air training
can be just as valuable. One problem in the Air domain is the puny size of the
new training fleets. These are modern and capable, but truly minuscule. The
SDSR 2015, by reverting some of the cuts of 2010, massively increased the
requirement for trained aircrew, but did not adequately expand the training
fleets to account for it. The number of instructors was expanded considerably
compared to pre-2015 expectations, but the number of training aircraft was not
corrected. There
is already talk of adding an extra 2 Phenom and of doubling the T-6C Texan
II line, from 10 to 20 or more aircraft, but well known budget issues have to
be overcome for this to happen.
The reduced size of the training
fleet means that there is little to no room for foreign pilots training, but
cutting back on this kind of engagement is damaging.
Another important aspect of UK capability
is the availability of a capable Red Air element to train against. Hawk
aggressor squadrons, backed by EW and in-flight simulation deliver high-value preparation for warships and aircrew. In the
post-2020 era, the fate of this capability rests on the ASDOT (Air
Support to Defence Operational Training) programme.
Further to the training aspect, the
UK is investing a lot of money into building an Integrated Training Center for
F-35 training at RAF Marham. So far, this ITC is the only one planned in
Europe, with the other countries planning to have their personnel trained in
the US.
Substantial opportunities for
collaboration exist due to the Marham ITC, and every effort should be made to
valorize it.
In conclusion
The above list of considerations is
a “back to basics” assessment of what elements of the armed forces have a clear,
special value and a defined role in current and future operations. All of them
are backed by the two true game-changing attributes that the UK has:
-
The
nuclear deterrent, with the freedom of action and the political clout it buys.
-
The
willingness to engage and use force where required.
Other countries have impressive armies
but never really employ them for their unwillingness to engage in unpleasant,
dangerous business.
The capabilities listed in this
article have particular relevance and the range of possibilities they open up
should drive the UK’s strategic thinking. These areas of excellence should be
developed and valorized with the aim of buying influence in peacetime and
delivering decisive effect in wartime.
The measure of their usefulness
comes from evaluating their importance to the UK’s conduit of war operations as
well as their relevance within NATO.
Is it a capability matched by other
allies? Is it unique? If other allies have it, is it important enough to
deserve investment all the same? Can I afford to disinvest in it, with the
reasonable certainty that I will still have access to it through allies?
Even with the UK determined to stay
out of any future “European army” (arguably even more so because of it, in
fact), the UK must be very careful in assessing its capabilities and that of
its allies, including a realistic assessment of how easy it would be to obtain
access to said allied capabilities in times of need. Just saying that future
operations will be a coalition affair is not enough: if the UK had been
counting on France’s equipment to retake the Falklands, today the islands would
be the Malvinas.
A capability that adds something to
the overall roster is particularly valuable, and should be accorded priority. Overall,
the most complete and balanced spectrum of capabilities possible should be pursued,
to preserve the UK’s ability to act alone when truly necessary.
The UK retains many areas of
excellence, but has badly damaged all of them in repeated salami slicing exercises
that have fixed the short-term budget while opening large capability gaps all
over the place. Coherent, joint thinking is required to preserve those
excellences and build on them to deliver a capable force. It might well mean
not having medium, pardon “Strike” brigades, but that is someone else’s area of
excellence. 4 MIV battalions will not improve the UK’s world stance; this still
impressive roster of military capabilities, if maintained and well resourced,
will.
