5 years
ago, I ran a series of articles ahead of the SDSR 2015 in which I highlighted
what, in my opinion, were the priorities to be tackled in the review.
Admittedly, it was perhaps easier back then, because some major requirements
were well evident and it didn’t take much imagination to call for the plugging
of those holes. But my predictions proved remarkably accurate, and so I want to
write a short piece ahead of the incoming SDSR 2020 as well, pointing my finger
at what I see as main issues to be tackled.
First of
all, I will expose myself and say that I am, for now at least, somewhat at
peace with the idea of the incoming review. I’m relatively confident that it
won’t bring big cuts: I’m expecting the targets of the SDSR 2015 to overall
hold steady. The Conservatives have committed to the 2% of GDP base figure, and
extended the 0.5% annual growth above inflation for the duration of the new
Parliament, which is progress, however modest, since that commitment was
otherwise going to expire by 2022.
This gives
the MOD a degree of certainty about the budget that will be available, and
means that the uncertainty mainly stems from the exact entity of the rumored
“black hole” in the future years programme. That “black hole” is not really
easy to actually define, as its effective magnitude depends on a huge variety
of factors that go from Foreign Exchange variations to cost growth in ongoing
programmes, to variations in GDP etcetera. In the 2018 estimates of the Black
Hole, it is possible, and actually pretty likely, that the 0.5% growth above
inflation was not factored in beyond 2022, and that will have contributed to
the “worst case scenario” figure. Estimates supplied in 2018, in fact, had a
pretty dramatic range, going from a modest 2,8 billion to nearly 15 or more
over the 10 years of the programme. Clearly, 15 billion would be a big problem.
3, not so much.
The MOD
secured a much needed injection of cash recently, as we know, and that helped
overcome the short term problems and avoided the old and highly ineffective
solution of delaying expenditure, which inexorably results in an even higher
cost further down the line.
The budget
pressure is indeed mostly, if not exclusively, concentrated on the next few
years since a multitude of programmes are supposed to start and, at the same
time, several others are already under contract at the same time. What is
already under contract cannot, obviously, be easily tampered with, leaving
limited flexibility to deal with money shortages.
In future
years the problem is less dramatic simply because much of the expenditure is
planned, but not contracted, and can be simply be pushed to the right. Of
course, this has an impact on capability as kit is not procured, but on the
other hand does not require the frantic cutting of what is already there, which
is what happened in 2010.
Much, if
not everything, will depend on the real width of the “black hole” and on the
flexibility available to deal with it. Obviously, the most vulnerable
programmes are the ones which haven’t yet started: Multi Role Vehicle
Protected, for example, could very easily slip further to the right despite
decisions on both Group 1 and Group 2 being currently expected in 2020. WCSP
production, Challenger 2 LEP, but also purchases of F-35s after 2025, the
Future Fleet Solid Support ships for the Royal Navy and the procurement of
Typhoon upgrades (AESA, Litening 5…) and the purchase of new build Chinook
Block 2 are all exposed to delays and variations and potentially even
cancellation. Contracts which have not been signed yet are, obviously, the
easiest ones to remove from the 10 year programme, and they make for cuts which
are quite “stealthy” and do not expose politicians to as much criticism.
In other
words, despite the noise on some newspapers about Dominic Cummings’ previous
comments about the carriers, it is not the Queen Elizabeth class which is
exposed. Both ships are now in service and the acquisition programme is nearly
entirely complete, so (thankfully) any further political meddling (like the delay
imposed by Gordon Brown which resulted in a cost growth of over 1 billion, or
the 2011 mess) is out of question.
The
carriers can of course still be hurt indirectly by, for example, stopping the
Fleet Solid Support project, but this is relatively unlikely given how
unusually high a profile shipbuilding has played in the Election. Labour had
promised to amend the shipbuilding strategy to
ensure RFA vessels are built in the UK, and while the Conservative
manifesto does not contain such a promise, the Prime Minister has promised more
shipbuilding work. While I don’t expect the optional 3rd Solid
Support Ship to ever be contracted, I’m optimistic that 2 will eventually come
and I think building them in the UK is almost a certainty at this point.
Some other
programmes are much more secure despite the lack of a contract. An easy
example: apart from the capability rationale, Type 26 Batch 2 would be
political dynamite to tamper with, due to the tensions with Scotland. SKYNET 6
satellites are also unlikely to suffer much, simply because they really are the
kind of equipment which just HAS to be procured.
Space is
expected to be a winner, in general. The Manifesto promises a Space Command,
which might or might not grow into or from 11 Group, Royal Air Force, which is
currently in charge for space activities, along with 23 Sqn, resurrected to be
the first “space squadron”.
News coming
out on some newspapers ahead of the Election suggest there will soon be
announcements about a national Global Positioning System, aligned with the 5
Eyes organization (Australia, in particular, is expected to be involved in the
project), which will give the UK a sovereign alternative to GPS and Galileo. If
confirmed, this would be an exciting development, even if, with the pricetag
being given at around 5 billions, I’m not sure should have been granted such a
great priority. Much will depend on exactly how
alternative it is to the existing GPS and “clones”. To be truly worth it, it
should come with different technical approaches, hopefully obviating to some of
the known vulnerabilities of the existing systems. With the UK’s (but
Airbus-owned) Surrey having build the navigation system payload of the Galileo
satellites themselves, know-how definitely exists.
What I
truly hope to see is a bold and meaningful commitment to projects ARTEMIS and
OBERON, in connection with the spaceports in Scotland and Cornwall. Both
programmes have received some initial funding but are currently experimental: I
hope there will be a solid commitment towards growing up both constellations to
give the UK a sovereign space-based imagery intelligence capability (ARTEMIS)
and a sovereign Radar and Electronic Surveillance capability (OBERON), so to
drastically reduce what is currently pretty much a 100% dependency on Allies
(mostly the US) in both areas.
ARTEMIS and
OBERON are bold because they want to pack high definition imagery and Inverted
SAR radar capability in small satellites. Since Britain is among the biggest
producers of small satellites in the world, this makes sense in more ways than
one. And since the UK will soon have two spaceports able to put small
satellites into space from UK soil, this is even more exciting. ARTEMIS, in
particular, includes provisions to demonstrate the ability to put satellites
into space with short notice, exploiting the air-launched rocket and the
modified Boeing 747 “Cosmic Girl” taking off from Newquay in Cornwall.
 |
| The UK-developed "origami antenna" which should allow OBERON small satellites to have a powerful Inverted SAR radar sensor, with a resolution normally associated to much larger and heavier satellites |
This is
extremely promising and potentially very, very significant, because
(relatively) cheap ARTEMIS satellites could be launched at short notice to improve
coverage in the future and, crucially, timely replace space-based sensors
destroyed or denied by enemy action, kinetic or otherwise.
Britain-made,
Britain-owned satellites, launched from UK soil, potentially with the Orbex’s
british made rocket. That would be a great capability to have, and it would go
quite some way towards healing the disastrous decisions of the past which put
UK space on a dramatic capability holiday just after the UK had become one of
the few nations in the world to put a sovereign satellite into space with a
sovereign rocket (PROSPERO satellite and BLACK ARROW rocket, in 1971).
The RAF
putting one first pilot into Virgin’s space programme is also a welcome step
going in this very direction.
 |
| UK built satellites, launched from the UK, potentially with a RAF pilot at the controls. As early as 2021 |
Obviously,
further support for the SABRE engine is to be auspicated. The recent RAF
contract for studies into the potential benefits coming from integrating the
pre-cooling technology of SABRE into the EuroJet engine of the Typhoon is a
very welcome development and hopefully it’ll be just the first of many
applications. SABRE is a true potential revolution in the making, so I’d like
to see support to this exciting project being front and centre.
In general,
Space should be a winner in the coming review and beyond. Space investment is
in no way a Defence exclusive, and the UK has already confirmed a substantial
uplift of investment into ESA projects, in exchange securing lead roles in a
number of key initiatives. Further investment into space tech for the military
sector is likely to be guided in large part by the Space Strategy document
which was announced back when Gavin Williamson was still Secretary of State for
Defence. The document has not been published yet, but we can expect much of its
content to migrate into the new SDSR.
Much the
same can most likely be said for the Arctic Strategy as well, which saw the UK
committing to a 10 year programme of support, primarily to and in Norway, which
will become very apparent with the large scale 3rd Commando Winter
Deployment 2020 (WD2020) which is in preparation. The Northern Flank of NATO
should, for obvious reasons, be confirmed as an absolute priority engagement
area for the UK. The North Sea is the UK’s exposed flank in any Russia
scenario, and this is enough of a reason to ensure appropriate attention is
pinned on this sector and on key capabilities such as Anti Submarine Warfare.
A welcome
step was the revitalization, back in November, of the NATO Channel Committee to
oversee plans for the protection of vital shipping routes across the North Sea
and the English Channel. A document was signed on November 7 between the Navies
of UK, Germany, France, Belgium and Netherlands to breathe new life into the NATO
Advisory Body - Channel Committee (CHANCOM), and it is in the UK’s best
interest, for reasons I hope are obvious to everyone, to play a key role in
this organization.
With the
Type 31 under contract and the Type 26 being a top priority as well as
politically red-hot things no one will want to mess with, I’m expecting the
Royal Navy to fare well in the review, despite whatever grievance Dominic
Cummings might have against the carriers.
The First
Sea Lord will go to the SDSR table with the Future Commando Force as one of its
top priorities this time, and hopefully that will help the amphibious flotilla
and the Royal Marines survive another round of political meddling. This
remains, however, the most exposed area for the Senior Service, so it is where
the hardest battles will be fought.
I’m
relatively optimistic about the Littoral Strike Ships eventually materializing
since I expect that this requirement will be put in close relationship to well
known ambitions for “disaster relief / hospital ships” which will be at least
partially funded with Foreign Aid money. According to the latest reports, Boris
Johnson is much more open towards the idea of using Foreign Aid to fund
programmes which more directly benefit UK interests. The Department for
International Aid is said to be heading for incorporation within the Foreign
Office, in fact, and in general I expect that Defence will be aided with some
of this very budget, where possible.
 |
| Littoral Strike Ships will hopefully still happen. Their flexibility will be key, in particular when it comes to their large flight deck and hangar. With the loss of HMS Ocean, UK amphibious capabilities suffer badly from a shortage of helicopter capability, unless a carrier is deployed. |
According
to the Press, Ben Wallace might soon lose his role of Secretary for Defence,
but until then we have to take due consideration of the priorities he has given
in debates ahead of the Election. For the Royal Navy, the absolute priority is
making better use of what is already available, and it’s impossible not to
agree.
Ships that
have been tied up in harbor should be returned to full operational status as
soon as possible, and every effort should be made to put a brake on the delays
to refits and maintenance periods which are keeping too high a proportion of
the existing fleet tied up. The gains will take time, however, and not
everything can be affected at all: Type 23 Life Extension refits are demanding
and time consuming, and the Type 45s are going to have to circle one by one
through Birkenhead to have their Diesel gensets replaced under Project NAPIER.
Every effort should be made to ensure that the refits stick to the schedule,
however, and even more effort should go into ensuring that all ships in the
fleet are used as much as possible. This, of course, means also putting further
effort (and money, if necessary) into filling up the manpower deficit.
If
sacrifices cannot be avoided, I feel that the first “victims” should be the
WAVE and FORT classes. Fort Austin and Fort Rosalie have a dismal record for
sea days in the last several years, and 6 tankers are probably too many for the
fleet that remains in Royal Navy service. At any one time, several RFA vessels
are actually tied up into Birkenhead, inactive and effectively mothballed, and
the cause of this should be finally identified and cured. If the RFA cannot
actually crew and use the WAVEs, I think they should be sold while they have
still value. As for the two oldest FORTs, they have not received the
modifications given to Fort Victoria to make them compatible with the new
aircraft carriers and thus their usefulness is limited. If there is no way to
put them back at sea quickly, it might be better to just sacrifice them. It
would not save much money at all, but neither it would hurt the Service that
much, since they are mostly only ever parked up in port anyway.
Going back
to the Future Commando Force, instead, one priority I’d set if it depended on
me would be to bring back into full service the mothballed LPD.
It would be
a major win for the Navy and it would reflect the priority of using to the max
everything that the Navy already has. Moreover, it would greatly help in
achieving one of the key targets of the Future Commando Force, which is to have
more Marines forward deployed at sea.
Forward
basing in general is likely to be a key theme for the Navy in the new Review.
Two 1st Sea Lords in a row have, correctly in my opinion, identified
it as the only option to increase presence abroad without an increase in the
number of ships. HMS Montrose in the Gulf for 3 years is the first of,
hopefully, a few more long-term forward basing arrangements, with the Royal
Navy looking in particular at the Caribbean and at South East Asia. The 1st
Sea Lord would like to “initially” put a couple of OPVs in Asia, and while this
might seem low key, it would be a very significant first step, which Type 31
might in future make more meaty.
It will be
important, however, to secure a further extension to the operational life of
the 3 River Batch 1 ships to cover home water needs and let the more capable
Batch 2s free to show the flag abroad and complement actual frigates.
It would be
easy to ask for more frigates, but I won’t even waste the time it would take me
to write about it, because there are no real chances of it happening any time
soon, I’m afraid. Apart from increasing the readiness rate of the existing
fleet and expanding its footprint with Forward Basing and Littoral Strike Ships
and accompanying groups, my priorities for the naval sector would be:
-
Unmanned
vehicles. Some good experimentation is ongoing thanks to 700X NAS and the Royal
Marines respectively, but every effort should be made to finally move beyond
the experimentation phase. The Royal Navy and Marines both need UAVs to
increase their ISTAR collection capability. I’d like to see more work going
towards unmanned surface and sub-surface vehicles configured for ASW tasks as
well.
Among known projects, the Royal Navy is seeking a few PAC-24 RHIBS
converted into USVs, and project MINERVA is working on a large quad-copter
which will be able to locate a man at sea and drop a SAR raft and smoke
markings to aid rescue efforts. MINERVA, if successful, could greatly reduce
the need to tie up an helicopter as plane guard during every launch and
recovery evolution on the aircraft carriers, for example, resulting in significant
efficiencies in the use of precious and finite assets. The PAC-24 USV could be
a precursor to more ambitious surface combat assets for inspection and force
protection and, eventually, for ASW.
Another option immediately available is insisting with either ARCIMS or
Halcyon from the unmanned MCM solutions: those are already able to tow sonars,
and could complement the scarce frigates.
It’s also time to look again at plans for a rotary wing tactical UAS,
which would also be very important for the future of the Yeovil factory.
Leonardo was given 8 millions for studies back in 2017, but only ominous
silence has followed.
-
Force
Protection / Combat Boats. These would be essential not just for the Future
Commando Force’s needs, but for the wider Navy. Well armed, enclosed, all
weather combat boats with a good operational range could truly open up raiding
opportunities along great lengths of enemy coast and even up rivers. Moreover,
said boats, deployed from a Bay, a LPD or a Littoral Strike Ship or even a Type
26 or 31 could extend the influence radius of those units by hundreds of miles.
Imagine, for example, well armed force protection crafts supporting the few
frigates in the Gulf in the challenging task of escorting merchant shipping in
and out.
 |
| Combat Boats such as the Mark VI, or the swedish CB90, would hugely boast the capabilities of the Navy and Royal Marines in the littoral |
-
Ship
to Shore Connectors. Much as “raiding” seems to be the sexy word of the week,
the future of the Royal Marines still lies with their ability to put an enemy
coast at serious risk, forcing enemy units to mount guard along hundreds or
thousands of miles of littoral. Moreover, the amphibious capability of the
Royal Navy is only truly valid until it is dimensioned in such a way to enable
the landing of heavy, mechanized force elements. New Ship to Shore Connectors,
much faster and thus more survivable, are a key component of the future
Commando Force, which means that resurrecting the LCU Mk 10 replacement
programme as soon as possible should be high up on the list of priorities.
-
Investment
in helicopters. Data links for WILDCAT and the addition of LMM missiles and radar
on the Army variant of the AW-159.
The Commando Helicopter Force would also like to more heavily arm the
Merlin HC4 (miniguns fit) and introduce the ability to refuel in flight.
Finally, in an ideal world the number of Merlin helicopters would be increased
by repairing and updating as many of the remaining, stored HM1s as possible.
This would be expensive, but everybody knows that 30 Merlin HM2 doing ASW and
AEW at once are too few. The pressure on the fleet is very intense.
For the Air
Force, with the deliveries of Typhoon now completed, the only combat aircraft
still being acquired is the F-35, and this review will have to look at what
happens after the first 48 jets have all been acquired. With the Block Buy
contract for lots 12 to 14 having been signed, focus now shifts to reaching a
deal for Block Buy II, covering lots 15 to 17. These lots will complete the
purchase of the first 48 jets and include an unknown number beyond those.
The
questions still without answer are many. We don’t know over how many years the
MOD proposes to acquire the famous 138 jets. We also do not know whether the
RAF can, and if yes how, absorb that many jets and form additional squadrons
from the manpower it has. Officially, the Typhoon Tranche 1 is now going to stay
all the way to 2035, but that continues to sound pretty suspect to me, and I
wouldn’t be surprised to see those 2 squadrons eventually becoming F-35 units
with the very limited Tranche 1 heading out of service. By 2023 there should be
7 Typhoon and 2 F-35B Squadrons, and this is about as many fast jet units as
the RAF has had in recent times. Where is the manpower margin to form
additional units?
How many
F-35 will the UK be able to purchase, year on year? The largest yearly order
currently planned is for 8 jets in Lot 14; if the UK purchased 8 aircraft per
year after 2023 it would still take more than eleven years to procure the other
90 jets, meaning that the last british F-35 could be delivered in 2035.
In that
same year, rather optimistically, Project TEMPEST should deliver the first jets
to RAF service.
I believe
the UK will never acquire 138 F-35. The actual number will be lower than that,
because expenditure on Project TEMPEST will have to ramp up over the same years
and something will have to give.
This is not
necessarily a “bad” thing, however, simply because there does not seem to be
the manpower to form additional squadrons anyway. With today’s manpower
figures, I don’t think the RAF can actually use 160 Typhoons and 138
F-35s.
Another
question yet to be answered is, of course, the make up of the F-35 fleet. The
RAF would love to switch the purchase to the A model, but if that happened
immediately after the first 48 jets, it would make it impossible to ever fill up even just one of the two aircraft
carriers. Moreover, it would make it very challenging to embark, with any sort
of regularity, the objective airwing of 24 jets. It would mean embarking 100%
of the frontline fleet, and that is unlikely to be feasible for obvious
reasons.
The Review
should determine how many fast jet squadrons can realistically be formed,
manned and supported. Until recently, the target was to eventually field 4 F-35
squadrons. If this number is confirmed, splitting them 50/50, B model and A
model, would be pretty horribly ineffective, leaving two small fleets, none of
which truly able to meet all needs, which will inexorably be at each other’s
throats all the time over finite budgets for updates, maintenance and support.
The last
time the RAF had a 2-squadrons fast jet type, it ended up cutting the whole
fleet because it was “not efficient”, remember? I would very much like to avoid
going there again.
While the A
does have some kinetic and range advantages over the B, I would very much
recommend going for 4 squadrons of a single type rather than 2+2.
The
reasons, I’ve already explained in detail in other occasions in the past.
To complete
the Combat Air section of the review, I would of course like to see continued
support for capability insertions into Typhoon. The adoption of STRIKER 2
helmets, LITENING 5 pods (with some reconnaissance capability making up at
least in part the loss of RAPTOR) and SPEAR would definitely add a lot of
capability to the fleet and I hope to see all of those confirmed.
The other
and biggest capability enhancement is the AESA radar, with the UK busy
developing a “R2 variant” which is expected to have a significantly greater EW
capability than the R1 and R1+ chosen by Germany, Spain and Qatar. The timeline
for the retrofit is still a question mark and, while Germany has now
officialized its intention to retrofit all its Tranche 2s as well as the
Tranche 3s, the UK’s plan remains obscure. Extending the Retrofit to the
Tranche 2s is incredibly important, longer term, since that is the standard of
most of the aircraft in the fleet. There are just 40 Tranche 3s.
Beyond
Combat Air, one question which needs answering is what happens in 2021 to the
wide area radar ground surveillance capability. A further extension to the
Sentinel R1’s service life? A capability gap with their withdrawal going ahead?
Or a replacement through the purchase of AAS radar pods for the P-8 Poseidon fleet,
ideally along with a few extra airframes?
My favorite
option would be withdrawing Sentinel but adding to the P-8 numbers and adopting
the air to surface radar gondola.
For the
unmanned portion of the ISTAR fleet, the Review will have to consider how many
PROTECTOR to purchase. 16 are currently on order, with the stated aim of going
beyond 20 with follow-on orders. Will those be confirmed?
Apart from
purely financial considerations, manpower margins will play a part in the
decision. It should also be noted that the recent spate of UAVs shot down (over
Libya and Yemen, but also the Global Hawk shot down by Iran over the Gulf) has
reminded everyone that these systems are currently completely (or in some case
almost completely) defenceless. Even against enemies which are in no way peers,
such as the militias in Libya, the UAVs are quite vulnerable.
I think a
pause in the orders would definitely not be a tragedy. Indeed, it might be
better to put some money into defences for the PROTECTORs already on order. In
particular, I wonder if the defensive pods that came off Tornado GR4 and which
saw considerable investment right up to the end of their service life, couldn’t
be adapted for PROTECTOR.
Eventually,
I would also like to see investment in the proposed ASW capability for
PROTECTOR, with SEASPRAY radars and sonobuoys pods eventually becoming part of
the fleet’s equipment to give the type a maritime role in support of the
precious few P-8 Poseidons.
One
expensive programme which has made very little noise so far but which will
undoubtedly be reviewed is the Chinook Capability Sustainment Programme. The UK
basically intends to procure new build Chinooks, ideally at the latest Block II
standard, to progressively replace the oldest airframes. It has already secured
in 2017 the authorization to purchase up to 16 such machines and according to
Boeing a contract for 14 could come soon. Review permitting, obviously. This
would be an expensive endeavour and it might well be postponed in a hurry to
ease the pressure on the budget.
If it does
instead proceed, the authorization document suggests the UK has requested
helicopters at the MH-47G standard, so the full-optional Special Forces one,
with just one very evident item missing: the air refueling probe. In the
meanwhile, however, the US have offered the probe for export to Israel and
Germany both, so the UK should have no problem obtaining them.
Ideally, it
should.
Putting
probes on Merlin HC4 and Chinook, however, is only half the job. The UK would
then have to procure either C-130J tanker kits, or A400M pods. The A400M is
basically “tanker-ready” and recent tests with the reworked pods, carried out
in France, suggest that the capability will indeed become available, so
procuring a few pods should not be overly complex or expensive.
The C-130
tanker kit is an alternative, but the KC-130s are all short fuselage models,
and the RAF is retaining only one short C-130. Converting just one aircraft
wouldn’t be great. Had more short fuselage been retained, the ideal solution
would have been to procure some HARVEST HAWK kits from the USMC, adding not
just air refueling capability, but weaponry.
This would
have fit into the spirit of the “VENOM” project announced by Gavin Williamson
but never detailed. Assuming VENOM is not quietly cancelled, this should see
the integration of a non better specified “kinetic strike” capability on some
of the RAF ISTAR / support aircraft. HARVEST HAWK kits would be the absolute
best fit among what is already out on the market, and the Special Forces would
no doubt appreciate.
This whole
initiative, however, is one of the easiest to cancel and will undoubtedly
quietly vanish away if saving money fast is imperative.
My list of
priorities for the RAF would include:
-
Expanding
216 Squadron activities and capabilities (the unit is standing up to work with
Swarming UAVs)
-
Investing
in the LANCA “loyal wingman” development, including the requirement for “runway
independence” to ensure they can readily be embarked in support to the F-35Bs
of the carriers as well. Maturation of the LANCA capability should be pursued
with decision, because this is probably the only truly feasible way to expand
the number of aircraft in service
-
A
plan to get to a total of 4 F-35B squadrons. Avoid a fleet split, especially if
no more than 4 Sqns can be expected to stand up in total. A reduction in total
number of airframes is not only acceptable, but borders on the advisable, in
order to free up funding for Project TEMPEST
-
Project
TEMPEST should be supported and nurtured and every effort should be made to try
and involve more countries, beginning with Japan in particular. Speaking of
Japan, continued support to joint development of the Joint New Air to Air
Missile (evolved Meteor with AESA seeker) should be a priority.
-
AESA
retrofit extended to cover Tranche 2 Typhoons as well; STRIKER 2, SPEAR and
Litening 5 to be adopted as soon as practicable
-
Investigate
adding some self-defences on PROTECTOR; ASW capability if financially
possible.
-
Acquiring
2 to 4 sets of AAR pods for the A400M fleet once they have been proven workable
i
Ideally,
go ahead with the Chinook CSP, including AAR capability for at least a portion
of the fleet
If money
could be secured, I would recommend investing further in capability aiming at
the suppression and destruction of enemy air defences. In particular, an
anti-radar missile derived from Meteor (MBDA has already proposed such a
development) and eventual adoption of Escort Jammer pods for use on Typhoon
would be my favored investments. An anti-radar weapon derived from Meteor would
come with the key advantage of being compatible with internal carry into the
F-35, while escort jammers would give better chances to the Typhoons to stay
relevant well into the future.
Finally,
the Army.
While for
the other Services I auspicate a continuation of current programmes and
approaches, I would recommend a wide ranging rethink of the Army plans. As I’ve
written many times, in multiple articles, the Army plans for the future are by
far the messiest and less convincing.
To this
day, few seem to have awakened to the fact that more than half of the Army’s
infantry battalions are “parked” within 4 “brigades” which have no artillery,
no signals, no logistic, no engineering units of their own. The whole 1st
Division is a container for “spare” infantry and some Light Cavalry. For me,
this is an unacceptable waste of finite resources. I can accept some “spare”
battalions (the UK needs a few just to cover rotating, standing tasks including
Public Duty, Brunei and Cyprus), but maintaining a ghost division and parking
in it around two thirds of the available Infantry is in no way acceptable.
Fixing 1st
Division, and indeed the wider imbalance within the Army, should be priority
number one perhaps of the entire Review. The plans that Carter left behind
himself are in large part unworkable and should definitely be rewritten.
Re-balancing
the Army will require the courage to tackle head on the one and only true
Sacred Cow in Defence: the british fetish for the infantry battalions and their
capbadges. Courage will be needed to merge and / or disband a few more
battalions in favor of beefing up what remains and in favor of standing up more
supporting units, to ensure that the brigades that remain are actually able to
deploy into the field with their own communications, logistic, engineering and
artillery support.
In
particular, I would recommend adopting an army structure similar to the one adopted
by France with the recent “Au Contact” restructuring. In practice, instead of
having all deployable brigades in 3rd Division and “everything
that’s left” into 1st Division, I’d encourage the formation of two
more equally resourced Divisions, each one comprising an Armoured Infantry
brigade, a Medium brigade (STRIKE, if you truly must insist with that rather
empty title) and a Light brigade. In the past I had attempted a detailed look
at such a possibility, and while today I’d go a slightly different way about
it, that article remains interesting to see, in detail, what
would be needed and what is instead already available.
One of said
Light Brigades might have to be 16 Air Assault. This would cut down to a
minimum the need to raise new Artillery, Logistic, Engineer and Medical
formations, since 16AA already has these formations (albeit with just a couple
of sub-units each).
On the
other hand, ideally I’d want 16 Air Assault and 3rd Commando and the
Specialized Infantry Group (which could well be given a Brigade identity, since
it is a 1-star command anyway) sitting together under a Joint Divisional
Command specializing in unconventional warfare and theatre opening. The
reasoning behind such a grouping is simple: Specialised Infantry is meant to be
constantly deployed abroad, building security but also local knowledge of
various reasons which might one day be theatres of action. 16 AA and 3rd
Commando are early entry forces and, in particular with 3rd
Commando, a raiding / unconventional warfare force which could be used to
create the conditions for a subsequent deployment of a larger Army force.
I’d alter
the (too) ambitious Carter target of being able to deploy a Division of 2
Armoured and 1 Strike brigade, which does not appear realistic, in favor of
being able to deploy either one of the two “identical” divisions instead. They
would be individually lighter, but they could rotate in and out of operations
and ensure the Army is not just a single use silver bullet which, if ever
expended, is then out of the picture nearly completely for years.
On the
equipment front, I’m recommending that the MoD does not proceed with a production contract for the Warrior Capability
Sustainment Programme. If the decision was in my hands, that budget would be
immediately moved across to the MIV programme to purchase further BOXERs, which
would then be equipped with the WCSP turret (the only part of the program which
is already under contract). The turreted BOXERs would then be mixed with the
APC variants to form 8 battalions: 2 for each Armoured and Medium brigade. There
are many reasons for me to formulate this recommendation, but they all more or
less stem from the following main considerations: the Warrior hull is old and tired and the
CSP does not quite solve that, nor does replace the old powerpack; an all MIV
fleet helps standardization; having the infantry on wheels helps the Army be
more self-deployable and means the precious few Heavy and Light Equipment
Transports (89 and 77 respectively) are free to focus on moving the MBTs and
other tracked platforms, such as AJAX and TERRIER; having at least a portion of
the BOXERs well armed with a 40mm gun means that, apart from being able to get
to the fight, they will also be able to fight. The current MIV, armed like a SAXON, can get there but can’t get into a fight, only drop its infantry a safe distance back.
Finally, plans for a new tracked support vehicle to replace FV432 seem to have died entirely, and it would border on ridiculous to field a 28 tons tracked Warrior supported by wheeled 8x8s weighting close to 40. Boxer is a modern and well protected hull, and if the Army cannot afford a proper split of tracks and wheels, on balance of merits and defects, wheels should probably take precedence. This is what France has done, by the way, with the VBCI replacing the last tracked IFVs of the Armee de Terre.
Again, a
priority for me would also be to re-evaluate the variants of MIV to be
procured, reducing to the bare minimum the number of ambulances and command
posts in favor of pursuing instead a 120mm mortar and an ATGW variants as well
as, potentially, more APCs / IFVs to increase, if at all possible, the number
of mechanized battalions in the Army. With over 500 vehicles already on order,
it should be feasible. I’ve written about this in greater detail in a previous article.
The
Ambulance role and, wherever possible, the C2 role would be instead “offloaded”
onto much cheaper Multi Role Vehicle Protected variants. Regarding MRV-P, I’d
personally urge the Army to finally proceed with the programme with the aim of
rationalizing the current dog’s breakfast of multiple “mini” fleets, getting
rid progressively of Husky, Panther, DURO, Pinzgauer and part of the Land Rovers.
My favorite
for Group 2 would be the Thales Bushmaster, to be assembled in their Glasgow
plant as promised by the company and by the Australian government.
Unfortunately,
the near totality of the Royal Artillery modernization attempts are not under
contract yet and are thus exposed to silent cancellation. It would be a repeat
of the “lost decade+” that saw the previous programme of evolution nearly
entirely killed off by budget cuts. The Royal Artillery’s main priorities for
the new decade are pretty much the same as the previous decade:
-
Land
Precision Strike. Initially delivered by EXACTOR MK2, it is meant to evolve
towards a weapon system with a much greater range (at least 60 km, eventually).
EXACTOR has a provisional OSD of 2023, but might be the successor of itself
through a Mid-Life Upgrade. The Land Precision Strike system should be mounted
on a vehicle, and EXACTOR itself (currently launched from a small trailer)
might end up retrofitted onto a vehicle base in the next few years if the MLU
happens.
-
Deep
Fires Rocket System. This modernization / eventual replacement of MLRS should
expand the striking range and introduce a greater variety of ammunition and
effects. The Royal Artillery hopes to procure the GMLRS Extended Range rockets
being developed, which would double the current range (to above 150 km) and it
should also pursue the Alternative Warhead developed by the US as replacement
to the old submunitions to restore an area suppression capability. Procurement
of the new Land Precision Strike missile developed in the US or of a national
alternative would enable strikes to 500 km or potentially beyond, reducing the
gap against Russian systems, primarily ISKANDER.
-
SERPENS.
This key programme is about procuring replacements for the handful (literally)
of MAMBA artillery locating radars and the sound ranging equipment. High
priority should be attached to this programme and to the Army’s Surveillance
and Target Acquisition capability in general. Ideally, “basic” STA should be
pushed down into the Close Support Artillery regiments, while 5 Royal Artillery
Regiment should focus on Theatre-wide / Divisional level STA. More and better
radars are a key upgrade the Army cannot do without if it has to be taken
seriously in a peer scenario.
-
Mobile
Fires Platform. The replacement for AS90 and for the L118 Light Gun in the
“STRIKE” regiments. Around 98 systems for equipping 4 regiments, with initial
capability expected in 2026. This programme is also very vulnerable to stealth
cancellation, but it should be accorded high priority because the British
Army’s artillery is truly in bad shape. In this very early phase of the
programme, the Army has essentially looked at autocannons (CAESAR and ARCHER
above all) but I’d recommend a more careful evaluation of the options. The US
are about to move on to a 58 caliber 155mm gun system, while in Germany
Rheinmetall is now working on a 60 caliber retrofit option. It would be very
unwise for the Army to procure (with so great delay) a 52 caliber system only
to still lag well behind both Allies and Enemies in terms of range.
-
Precision
/ Near precision 155 mm ammunition and, ideally, a smart shell with top-attack
capability for use against enemy armour on the move. The Army had selected
SMART shells for this requirement but the procurement was just one of the many
programmes to be cancelled in the lost decade.
Other
priorities, Army-wide, include finally pressing home the reorganization of the
Army Air Corps and Joint Helicopter Command. Plans have been ongoing since at
least 2015, including a seemingly endless review into the possibility /
opportunity of moving the Apache helicopters out of Wattisham to rationalize
the AAC bases.
Plans were
well advanced, but implementation has largely been put on hold. It is now likely
that the plan will be brought into the SDSR 2020 and the formation of a Combat
Aviation Brigade on the American model will be part of the final document. Next
year, a UK combat aviation battlegroup will deploy in Europe together with a US
CAB during the mega exercise DEFENDER EUROPE 2020, and this is likely to be a
key test for the new structures and methods. The implementation of the Combat
Aviation Brigade plan should be a priority and it should, obviously, involve
the RAF Chinook and Puma squadrons.
Finally,
I’d urge the Army to proceed with the Challenger 2 LEP, because the
obsolescence of the type can no longer be denied. The new turret put forwards
by Rheinmetall BAE Land Systems will cure the problems and turn Challenger into
one of the very best tanks within NATO, ensuring its validity for the next
couple of decades. Ideally, a powerpack change should also be funded, however,
since the current engine has too little power for such a heavy machine, and is
getting increasingly unreliable.
Rather than
cutting the number of tank regiments from 3 to 2, I’d encourage the Army to set
up 4 tank regiments, albeit individually smaller (Type 44 instead of Type 56,
for example), to ensure that the two Armoured Infantry brigades can have a
solid “square” base and assign a tank formation in support of each infantry
battalion.
Ideally, in
a more courageous Army, I’d urge the reorganization of the Tank and Armoured
Infantry regiments / battalions into Combined Arms Battalions, similar to the
American ones, permanently combining tank squadrons and IFV companies. With
Armour now being all concentrated in the Salisbury Plain area, this should not
prove overly complex.
In terms of
Commands, I remain unconvinced by the restructuring last August which saw Force
Troops Command dismembered and renamed. While I recognize that the “spare infantry”
of 1st Division would be used to secure the rear in a Divisional
deployment and would provide security to theatre opening activities, I still
don’t think 104 Logistic Brigade, 2nd Medical Brigade and 8 Engineer
Brigade belong there.
As I said,
in my “ideal” army, a Joint Rapid Reaction divisional HQ would group together
16 AA, 3 Cdo and Specialised Infantry, while 1st and 3rd
Division would be nearly identical in structure and would alternate into
readiness (and deployment, when necessary).
Force
Support units would probably sit under a command focusing on logistics. However
close the liaison would have to be with the “fighting” divisions, I don’t think
the current arrangement is a good idea.
Conclusion
This piece
is a summary of my expectations and opinions ahead of the SDSR 2020. As such,
it might well be proven wrong in multiple areas. Things might end up being a
lot rougher. I would lie if I said I was relaxed and solely confident in the
outcome of the review.
I am,
however, moderately optimistic. I’m expecting something upbeat, more similar to
2015 than 2010. There will be less big programmes launched, compared with 2015,
and much of the focus will be on Cyber (thus on area where progress is hard to
visualize and even harder to measure, allowing loud and cheap claims) and on
Space. In general, I think the 2015 targets will be maintained as much as
possible, and I hope there will be room for a few welcome adjustements and
boosts in key areas.
As I’ve
made clear in the article, pain is likely to be felt mostly in the less
glamorous programmes which are part of the 10 years plan but are not really
known by the public and are not yet under contract. Stealth cuts are a constant
at the MOD, and this review will not be an exception. I don’t think Boris
Johnson will want to associate himself and his government with draconian cuts
to what is left of the Forces, so I’m trying to focus on the positive. The one
area in which I think a revolution is necessary is the Army. Unfortunately, it
is the one area which is most resistant to change. There is often much talk
about “sacred cows” in defence, but as often happens, what is talked about the
most is the smokescreen, not the problem.
Sacred cows
are not the Paras, or the Marines. The one Sacred Cow is the Army’s insistence
in clinging on to its regiments and infantry battalions, even at the cost of
maintaining a ghost Division with very low actual combat capability.
This is the
one sacred cow I’d want to slay right at the start of the Review.
