The UK's F-35 situation

 

The reality of the announcement: it’s not the F-35A, it’s actually TRIDENT

At present, the F-35A announcement by the UK at the NATO Summit is easily translated and summarized:

 

Since F-35A procurement cost is somewhat lower than that of the F-35B and in theory we can more easily maintain it and have it available more of the time, we are procuring 12 of them instead, replacing as many F-35Bs assigned to 207 Squadron (Operational Conversion Unit). We will train our crews on the F-35A as far as possible, and only use F-35B for the unique parts of the syllabus. By releasing aircraft from 207 Sqn and by still procuring 15 new ones, we are still going ahead with standing up a third frontline Squadron.

Since F-35A comes Dual Capable, we are seeking integration into NATO Nuclear Sharing mission planning, carrying dual-key, US owned B61-12 bombs. We will presumably send a few of the F-35A to the relevant exercises a couple of times a year.

We are not spending a penny more than strictly needed as this is literally born as a Saving measure.  Forget about any UK tactical nuclear weapon, forget about storing the bombs in Marham (that would cost a lot in infrastructure) and forget about fixing the air to air refuelling problem.

Maria Eagle, asked during Urgent Question time in the House of Commons specifically on these points, confirmed that as “it is a NATO mission”: any UK F-35A long range mission will depend on allied tanker support. She also confirmed that "this decision is not a stepping stone" towards wider tactical nuclear plans. The UK is "not looking" at “broadening range of nuclear weapons and delivery means".

 

Scratch away the hype, dig to the facts, and while other countries announced new brigades, new SAM batteries, new jets, ships, etc, the UK really took to the stage to say: "we are saving some money off on jets for the OCU Sqn and, so long as you furnish us the bombs and air to air refueling, we can help carry a few of the warheads".

 

B61-12 launch trials. 

The only reason why Starmer wasn't laughed out of room at the NATO Summit while delivering such an announcement is that UK has a Strategic Deterrent of its own, which other double-key B61-carrying european partners don't have. In theory it puts a TRIDENT other than the US one behind the B61s.

As we know, after all, multiple NATO countries have F-35A to carry double-key B61-12s and had them before this UK stunt. They thankfully even have tankers which can actually air to air refuel said F-35A and anti-radar missiles & other weapons that give those F-35A wider capability and meaning.

Germany, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands and Turkey all have an established role in Nuclear Sharing and all but Turkey are acquiring F-35As for it, carrying American B61-12 bombs. Poland, which has 32 F-35A on order, has already expressed interest in being involved.

And of course, the US own F-35A Squadrons in Europe, and beyond, are available to carry the bombs as well. Most important for the UK perspective are of course the 2 USAF F-35A Squadrons in Lakenheath, which is where B61-12s could be stored on UK soil.

In practical terms, the 12 F-35A in theory added by the UK are almost entirely meaningless. They are few, don’t come with air to air refuelling of their own, and add to a vast fleet of potential carrying aircraft which would have no problems absorbing not only every last B61 stored in Europe but the entire stock of 200+, including the ones stored in Continental US (CONUS).

B61-12 bases. 

Inert B61-12 inside an F-35A's weapon bay. The F-35C's weapon bay has the same size but there was no B61 integration program because the US Navy has been out of the tactical nuke business since the early 2000s. 

More delivery aircraft are the very last thing needed. The one thing the UK adds here is actually TRIDENT. None of the other NATO countries depending on tactical B61-12 has a Strategic Nuclear Deterrent to loom behind the tactical warheads, apart of course from the US one.

Unlike France, the UK already declares its strategic deterrent to NATO, formally offering it to SACEUR, and by integrating in the Nuclear Sharing arrangement it is technically "supplying" a TRIDENT other than the American one to loom behind the B61s.

There is an argument to be made that the government announcement has been deliberately misleading on a political level: it's not so much the UK that is acquiring a new lever of deterrence; it is arguably supplying Trident to Europe. 

 

It’s tenuous, obviously, because the B61-12s are going nowhere without US authorizations and collaboration, and while the warheads on the UK TRIDENT are sovereign, the system as a whole does not stand without cooperation with Washington. But the political message is still valuable.

  

Value in a split fleet?

In pure money terms, the F-35A is effectively cheaper than the more complex F-35B and it’s also pretty realistic to expect its availability will be a bit higher on average.

There will be, as claimed, a short-term saving in terms of aircraft purchase, although the differences between the two aircraft and the need for a separate stock of spares etc will immediately eat away some of the savings.

The cost cutting measure will initially work, we can be reasonably sure of it.

Longer term, I’m pessimistic. Pain will inexorably pop up later whenever type-specific upgrade differences and material differences force duplications with their related costs.

It's also obvious F-35A as training jet can do most, yet not all the training of crews for the B fleet. 

 

When it comes to generating aircraft for operations, the two mini-fleets will generate their own entirely non-compatible pools of Force Elements At Readiness (the aircraft and crews actually ready to fly missions): the F-35A cannot contribute to carrier air at all; the F-35B cannot contribute to the nuclear mission.

 

The value of F-35A beyond the "training role with secondary nuclear mission" is very close to zero, if the number does not grow well above 12 over time and a number of other things aren’t funded and fixed.

 

The optimists are always quick to note that F-35A can fly a bit further on Internal Fuel and has weapon bays that are 14 inches longer than the B’s (no Lift Fan in the way) so can carry larger weapons internally. That makes them perfect for “Deep Strike”, is the usual justification offered.

However, that is only theory. In practice, the F-35A in the RAF will in fact not fly further than the F-35B. Whatever little advantage it brings in internal fuel range is completely drowned out by the RAF's inability to refuel them in flight, which Minister Maria Eagle already confirmed is not being fixed.  

As you should know, the RAF has access to up to 14 excellent A-330 MRTT tankers, the VOYAGERs, but none of them is fitted with Boom, which is what is needed to refuel USAF aircraft, including the F-35A.

The VOYAGER fleet is split in KC2 aircraft which have only the 2 drogues in pods under the wings; and KC3 aircraft which add a centreline drogue which enables the refuelling in flight of A400M.

 

A VOYAGER KC3 refueling an A400M with the centreline drogue 

The F-35A has a receptable on the spine and needs a Boom-equipped tanker to take on fuel in flight. The UK fields no such equipment. 

The centreline drogue is the one used to refuel the big receivers, which would in the past have included NIMROD (MRA4 and R1) and E-3D SENTRY. Unfortunately, over the years things have evolved the way we know and now the only big receiver left is A400M. P-8 replaced NIMROD MRA4 and needs a Boom, RIVET JOINT replaced R1 and needs a Boom (a special arrangement is in place with 100^th Wing USAF at Mildenhall to access their tankers so RIVET JOINT can go places) and E-7 replaced E-3. C-17 could also be air refuelled if the RAF had a Boom tanker.

 

In practice, the RAF literally has more platform types that it CANNOT refuel than ones it can. It's 4-3 right now (E-7, P-8, Rivet Joint, C-17 versus Typhoon, F-35B and A400). 5-3 with the F-35A.

The F-35A problem could also be fixed “laterally” by adding a probe onto it. Space reservation does exist in the fuselage, but it's the second poorest decision just above the current "doing nothing at all": it would make UK F-35As heavier and more expensive and, of course, all the strategic big receivers would remain unable to get fuel in flight.

Although the option exists, nobody took it. Those who have F-35A have Boom equipped tankers, and vice versa. 

Fitting probes rather than acquiring Booms would also mean the UK would continue to be severely limited in providing air to air refuelling support to Allies, which is not great when the 14 VOYAGERs represent a large percentage of the total number of tankers available in Europe and widely known to be insufficient.

 

There are glaringly obvious strategic reasons for acquiring Booms, the most obvious of which is the 143 F-35A in the "Nordic Air Force" (Norway, Finland, Denmark) that sits right between the UK and Russia. That powerful force is short of tanker support, and one of the best joined-up things the UK could possibly do was helping out with that by putting Booms on VOYAGERs to help THEM stay in the air and hit deep into Russia, while helping its own (and allied) P-8s to guard the North Atlantic and E-7s to deliver airborne early warning.

Instead, it is purchasing 12 F-35A that exacerbate the scarcity of tankers while bringing nothing tangible to the table.

 

The optimists assume that more F-35As will follow in the future. I’m not at all sure they will and I’ll explain exactly why, but if they do, expenditure to retrofit Booms on the VOYAGERs must be part of the plan.

 

Why am I so sceptical of the possibility of more F-35A Squadrons following?

Money, timelines, infrastructure, personnel.

 

What has been done right now is taking existing Tranche 2 procurement plans for 27 new F-35, which have been in the works since 2022, and split them into 12 A and 15 B, not adding a single extra jet.

Tranche 2 plans as known to spread the purchase and deliveries all the way to 2033 and at the moment we have been given no indication whatsoever of an acceleration.

In theory, in 2035 GCAP/TEMPEST will be entering service. Even assuming F-35 assembly lines will still be happily going by that date 2035, GCAP will be absolutely bleeding the budget dry.

It is not overly difficult to imagine GCAP not being ready by 2035, but that does not change the picture much: it will still be devouring a huge share of the budget, making it extremely difficult to imagine the RAF being still busy building up F-35 Squadrons by then.

 

Tranche 1 deliveries should conclude this year, in theory. The last of the first batch of 48 F-35Bs for the UK are coming out of Production Lot 17.

In theory, Tranche 2 buys could begin right away with Production Lot 18, the definitive contract for which is expected really soon. Lot 18 and 19, in fact, were due to have a combined contract award announcement this very month, so either it comes on Monday or it has slipped slightly.

 

Long Lead orders covering most of the material (and cost) for production lots 18 and 19 have been signed at various dates from December 2022 onwards.

The US DoD doesn't break down allocation of jets by country when announcing those orders and MoD/UK Gov in their usual mud-like clarity haven't provided info about when Tranche 2 starts.

 

At present we do not know for sure whether Lots 18 and 19 include any UK jet at all or whether there is a gap before new orders are placed. Tranche 1 ends with Lot 17 but it's not clear if T2 starts right away in Lot 18 or gap was/is expected.

We can only go by hints and clues: as funding for Tranche 2 was delegated to the RAF in early 2022 and the very first Long lead Items contract for Lot 18 was eventually awarded in December the same year, the assumption is that the UK is involved.

 

We do not yet know the full composition of the Lot 18 and 19 orders. Lot 18 Long Lead contracts were awarded in 2023 for a total of 147 jets, but the latest contract modification on 20 December 2024 only had 145.

In those 145 there was a single F-35B for “partner nations” and 7 F-35Bs for Foreign Military Sale nations. The 7 FMS ones should belong to Singapore and Japan, but the lone partner B is for the UK or for Italy? Given precedents, the 2 jets partly funded through earlier awards could be Italian ones, to re-emerge as contract modification later (it’s already happened in the past that timelines diverged somewhat), but we do not know.

So 0, 1, 2 jets for the UK...? We will have to see. Even if they were 2, that’s still clearly not a quick procurement pace at all.  

The exact same uncertainty exists for Lot 19 as well.

IF there are UK jets in lot 18 and 19, they are almost certainly going to be F-35Bs.

In fact, some significant Long Lead order has already been placed for Lot 20 as well, and if the UK funded anything in that, it will have been for B aircraft, again.

In practice, there are good chances that the first UK F-35A only happens in Lot 21, which roughly equates to order in 2027 and delivery in 2029.

Maria Eagle, speaking in the House of Commons, says the government is “hopeful” the first F-35A deliveries can happen “before the end of the decade”, which sounds like a confirmation of sorts.

 

It doesn't matter one bit how many times politicians insist on talking about 138 jets. Unless the next lots show a substantial acceleration in procurement rate, it's not going to happen. 

We have already been told, including by Chief Defence Staff himself, not to expect much for circa 2 years. Virtually nothing “new” is coming before 2027 at earliest, simply because no actual new money appears before then.

The only realistic hope of a greater F-35 fleet beyond 74 jets in 3 Sqns plus OCU lays in a drastic acceleration to the purchase rate beginning in FY2027. I don’t see how you can build any other Sqn otherwise.

The known plan of “27 jets by 2033” implies spreading the order across a minimum of 8 Lots, 18 to 25. Lot 25 would be ordered in 2031, and deliveries would wrap up in 2033.

If 2033 was actually the year of last order, we’d be looking at a spread across 10 Lots and last deliveries in 2035, indicatively. That means an average purchase rate of 3.3 jets a year in the best case, 2.7 in the worst.

In the kindest way possible: if the procurement rate stays at those levels, forget any fantasy of more Squadrons. You will be deep into GCAP funding era by then.

 

What if more Squadrons were to happen?

I want to make one thing clear: I have nothing against the F-35A in isolation. I know about the larger bays, I know about the greater range on internal fuel. You don’t need to tell me things that, respectfully, I’m likely to know better than you do.

The problem with a split buy from a UK point of view is that the number of jets and the number of Squadrons are not large enough to make a split buy sensible. The end result is a B fleet too small for what it has to do and an A fleet also too small to make any real difference.

 

3 frontline Squadrons are the complement of a single carrier, and they would only ever all deploy in a major emergency, of course.

3 Sqns are the size the JAGUAR fleet was withdrawn from service at. 2 Sqns is the size the HARRIER GR9 fate was sealed at. It’s not wise to have these numbers at the beginning of a long service life. Those are end of life numbers.

I do not think a split of 3 and 1 Sqns is in any way smart, period. 3 and 2 is also not very good. I’d rather have a single fleet type of 5 Sqns to generate force elements from, frankly. The individual characteristics of the airframe type are little more than a distraction when all other factors are considered.

 

Moreover, we have already seen this movie multiple times in UK defence history, and the end is always sour. Two fleets locked into fratricide battles each time there’s a need for concurrent but fleet-specific upgrades or other expenditure result in disasters. We have seen it again and again and again, most recently with SEA HARRIER and HARRIER GR7 and then with the contrast HARRIER versus TORNADO. To get into that position again for no good reason is absurd.

 

Any “deep strike” advantage F-35A brings is only theory, for the UK. It is only theory because if the Air to Air refuelling situation is not cured, F-35A will actually be far shorter legged in practical terms than F-35B. Nevermind the fact you can sail F-35B thousands of miles closer to whatever you need to hit.

 

The weapon bays advantage is also pure theory. At present there is not a single weapon, in service or planned, which fits the F-35A’s weapon bays but not the B’s. It either fits both, or is too large and fits none.

The F-35B could carry 1,000 lbs stores, but the UK does not have any bomb larger than the 500 lbs Paveway IV at this point.

Does it help anyone that F-35A could potentially carry 2,000 lbs stores?

No, unless new weapons are procured. There is nothing in the UK arsenal or existing plans that can take any benefit.

 

Also, any weapon integration process will be at least partially duplicated, to account for the differences between the two aircraft types. METEOR integration, for example: the UK is leading the F-35B process, with Italy leading for the A.  

There is a very real risk that the UK F-35A will have to partially repeat integration work (and expenditure) just to “port” Paveway IV and ASRAAM across from the B.

I have a suspicion, unconfirmed for now, that as long as the whole buy is 12 aircraft for the OCU, the UK won’t even try to get ASRAAM and Paveway IV cleared on the A.

Also, of course i suspect no ammunition will be procured for the 25 mm gun, considering gunpods for the B fleet have not been procured at all so far. 

 

The external "heavy load", innermost pylons are rathed for the same loads, so the F-35B should be able to carry Future Cruise and Anti-Ship Weapon externally, just like the F-35A. Internally, it won't fit either. AARGM ER, JSM, 2,000 lbs guided bombs could give a sense to the larger bays on the A, but none of these weapons is in the RAF arsenal nor in its plans. 
There might (or might not) be a possibility for the A to carry 6 rather than 4 Meteor internally, but we don't know. 

And there is yet another issue, in terms of infrastructure: RAF Marham has "obvious" room and Hardened Aircraft Shelters sufficient, with modernization work, for taking 4 Sqns. Project ANVIL fixed the South HAS area for the needs of 207 and 617 Sqns; the much delayed Phase 2 to finally go under contract next year is going to focus on the East HAS area to finally give 809 NAS adequate infrastructure and, hopefully, to prepare the space for the 3^rd frontline Sqn, which will also be the fourth Marham sqn (207 OCU, 617, 809 and the as yet unnamed Sqn to come).

Can Marham take more? Possibly, but without HAS (there are only 24 in total, each can take 2 jets once modernized) and with the need for further, substantial and expensive infrastructure work.

The alternative, even more expensive, is to activate another F-35 base.

 

Project ANVIL was heavily focused around the South HAS area. We expect the new contract to be centered on the East HAS area. The potential for squeezing more Sqns into the base to avoid activating another is unclear. 

In short, an expanded F-35A buy, in order to make even just one lick of sense, requires:

 

-         Not only buying more jets, but buying them much faster, to avoid going into "full conflict" with GCAP’s own funding needs just as they reach their peak

-         Adding Boom to VOYAGER

-         Procuring new weapon types, otherwise the larger weapon bays will mean absolutely nothing in practice

-         Infrastructure spending potentially including activation of a second operating base

 

Unless the Defence Investment Plan in Autumn has something serious to offer in regard to these needs, the infamous “138” F-35 number will almost certainly remain fantasy.

 

And in absence of Booms and adequate weapons, the F-35A is in fact of no substantial relevance for any “Deep Strike” mission you might try to imagine.

 

And that is if we completely ignore the wider issue of substantial duplication and inefficiencies that come from running 2 small fleets, and the risk of another fratricide relationship ending in tragedy a few years into the future.

 

None of the problems are impossible to solve. But for the specific UK situation, they are very unlikely to be solved, and that’s unfortunately what matters.

The Aachen Treaty and Great Power Competition

First of all, a due premise: if it wasn’t already clear, I will warn that I am a convinced Atlanticist. I literally have a NATO star mosaic in the alleyway leading to the door of my home, designed by me and built by my ever skilled father, who has worked so much and for so long in his life to pick up an amazing breadth of abilities.

This week, at my new job at Rivista Italiana Difesa (Italian Defence Magazine, if you want a tentative translation), arguably the best defence-themed periodic in Italy and one with a long tradition, I’ve been reviewing an important geopolitics article titled “The return of Charles the Great?”, authored by an Italian defence commentator with decades of experience. He is most clearly not an Atlanticist, so we cooperate but also regularly disagree, even quite vehemently, since his opinion of the United States is about as moderate of that of Vladimir Putin himself.

For once, though, we are in complete agreement on what is the current direction of travel in Europe. The title of his article should already have given you a clue, and I’ll give you another by telling you that the recent Aachen Treaty is the key element at the center of the reasoning.

Of course, while we read the implications of the event almost in the exact same way, we do completely disagree on whether it is a good or a bad development. He thinks it is a good thing in an anti-american optic; I am horrified.

Another thing we do essentially agree upon, however, is the fact that there has been way too little talk about the Aachen Treaty, what it says and moreover on what it implies without saying it aloud.

While at first glance the Aachen Treaty provisions might sound just like “more of the same”, reaffirming things that have been already said in the past, there is every reason to take it very seriously.

Germany and France are aligning their policies, with defence front and centre, in new and far more ambitious ways. The closeness envisaged by the Treaty in economics and defence and foreign policy matters approaches the terms of a Confederation, and effectively impresses a whole new dynamic and speed to the maturation of an European project. Note that I use “an” European project and not “the” European project because the direction of travel taken by France and Germany actually goes so far past the current EU integration that it might end up finding resistance coming exactly through current EU organizations.

If you have followed the political debate in the last while you will not have missed the repeated claims that an European army is coming. Claims that now come from the like of Merkel and Macron themselves, although some Remain-inspired media continues to approach the issue as if it was fantasy and conspiracy theorism from this or that association. It can no longer be denied that things are moving, and that they are indeed accellerating. 
It might not be EU-wide for many years still, but the Aachen Treaty sure goes a long way towards forming one military force composed of France and Germany. Joint decision-making, joint meetings of ministries, a new joint council, and joint deployments are all part of the Treaty.

You should moreover not have missed the part about France “loaning” its seat at the UN Security Council to Germany. The issue has been reported almost as badly as the “EU Army” one, which is caught between the two extremes of the “absorption by stealth” and “it’s not true at all!”.

France might or might not let Germany sit in its seat for a while, but what France has promised to do is to campaign within the Security Council to obtain the addition of a new and permanent seat specifically for Germany.

While this is unlikely to succeed, it is an unequivocal signal that Germany thinks that its period of repentance for the past is over, and France agrees. It is actually pretty easy to imagine the current hopelessly confused political class in Britain giving support to the initiative just as a way to show that they really still side with Europe. 

You might not have heard about the musings coming from the Munich Security Conference about the role that France’s nuclear deterrent “should” play in “Europe”. Or at least, I’ll correct, in the context of the Aachen Treaty. This aspect gained even less air time on the media, and most of the comments were quick attempts to once more hide the evidence. 
France already tried to get Germany to pay some of the costs of its 'Force de Frappe', but in 2007 there weren’t the conditions for such a move. Not yet.

Now, however, Aachen goes a long way towards opening the door for such a development.

While the European Union is a superpower on paper but not in fact due to its inner divisions, a combination of Germany’s economic might and France’s nuclear deterrent is a major world power from the day one. When you hear all the speeches and comments about the new age of inter-state competition, you’ll better start counting in the France-Germany combination. 

You might not have heard in the generalist news about the renewed and stronger than ever push in Germany against NATO Nuclear Sharing, and against the presence of dual-key American B61-12 nuclear bombs in the country. But it is highly likely that you will hear about this more and more frequently in the future.

Germany has already started landing blows on Nuclear Sharing by arbitrarily excluding the F-35 from the race for the replacement of its remaining Tornado bombers. The F-35A is the intended carrier (together with the F-15E, but that is relevant only to the US) of the B61-12 bomb, with an integration programme already ongoing and other NATO Nuclear Sharing partners already on board.

Germany, on the other hand, is restricting its choices for the replacement of the Tornado to the Typhoon and Super Hornet, both aircraft with no nuclear strike capability and no defined path towards ever acquiring it.

Keeping the Super Hornet as candidate effectively means, with 99.9% certainty, that the “race” is a complete farce, and Typhoon it is. Germany has literally forced the head of its Air Force and a few other high officers to leave post over their publicly stated preference for the F-35, and this tells you something. Considerable political pressure was applied on Belgium as well NOT to chose the F-35, although in this case Germany and France were eventually rebuffed.

The Tornado was European-built and carries the B61, so there is no definitive reason why Germany couldn’t simply add B61-12 integration to the cost of its new Typhoons, but I’d be very, very surprised if the attempt to do this didn’t lead to protests over the cost and, right afterwards, to accusations against the US of making it “more complex and more expensive” than it should be, as a punishment for not purchasing the F-35. It’s really, really easy to see coming.

Ghedi air base: american nuclear bomb, Italian Tornado bomber. NATO Nuclear Sharing is a key component of Europe's security. 

And while Germany has formally sided with the US on the withdrawal from the INF treaty, it has also made clear that new American missile systems in Europe are not welcome, which is kind of a contradictory position to take. 

The disagreements on B61 and on the way ahead post INF are a perfect excuse for Germany and France to press on with their greater alignment. Germany might soon decide to pull out of Nuclear Sharing altogether, and that would be a huge blow to NATO and the obvious first step towards seeking refuge under France’s own nuclear umbrella. Which, naturally, the two countries will then try to present as Europe’s nuclear umbrella, seeking financial contributions from the other European countries as well.

It might take time, but this is the direction of travel. Whoever thinks that France has committed to giving Germany a seat at the UN Security Council virtually for free is either willfully blind or a complete fool.

The bilateral nature of Aachen means that it does not technically affect EU members, which on the other hand have no effective way to counter or influence it in any way. It is immediately clear, however, that this level of integration between Paris and Berlin is going to have immense consequences for the whole European Union. 

Italy, through Prime Minister Conte, has remarked that the new UN seat should, if ever created, go to the European Union as a whole and not to Germany, which is an eminently sensible observation to make, albeit complex to turn into reality. Naturally, his remark was played down, despite being arguably very pro-EU, because he is, of course, “the puppet of Salvini” and thus just another sovranist enemy.

Yes, the sovranists. The new enemy of the EU is Sovranism. Populism was an earlier phase, now the threat is sovranism. Because sovranism means that other countries will try to resist the de-facto instauration of an economic and military hegemony of France and Germany, united politically and economically and shielded by a credible, non-american nuclear umbrella. Sovranism is a reaction against external control and globalisation, and as such it is an obstacle. 

America, and not Russia, is the untrustworthy side for many in Europe. European and American media alike will tell you that it is because of president Trump, but this is, in good measure, a lie or, at best, an half-truth.

Trump is not the beginning of anti-american feelings in Europe, nor is he the end of them. He is a convenient figleaf, a perfect excuse to press on with the new global ambitions of Germany and France while throwing the blame on the Atlantic side.

It is not Trump that is abandoning Europe. He has actually reversed, at least partially, years of American drawdown in Europe, which Obama happily accelerated. He has been extremely tough on the INF breach. He has committed to more American troops in Europe and he keeps asking for a stronger NATO through investment from the European partners (he's been more vocal, but he is not the first to do so). He opposes the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, too, which is in the interests of Russia and damages those of Ukraine.

And that is exactly the problem. He is doing too much. The truth, I fear, is that there are very strong currents of thought in Europe which were far happier when American troops were traveling towards CONUS, rather than coming from CONUS to Europe.

We know which side is co-funding Nord Stream 2 and holding hands with Putin. And it is not Trump.

And then there is Brexit. Brexit is the "mother of all sovranisms", the greatest-ever form of resistance against the constant expansion of centralised european powers. This makes it the supreme evil. And yet, on the other hand, Brexit brings the UK away from Veto powers in Europe, which are now one of the greatest problems that Germany and France face. The truth? Brexit is a blessing for France and Germany. 
Their hegemonic project in Europe is now free from a heavy anchor which was holding it back. And they have pretty much said as much, haven’t they? The UK’s constant prudence on European initiatives, especially in the field of defence, has been remarked more than once, in most rude form in the last few weeks. The "british friends" rethoric is incredibly hollow, and one of the most amazing things about Brexit is how many britons helplessly drink from that poisoned spring. 
There have actually been remarkably unfriendly accusations coming from Europe, and the side which has tried to put up walls is not led by London. The amazingly long time it took for Europe to begin reciprocating the promise of rights for british citizens on EU soil is plenty noticeable, yet the Remain side is strangely willing to let it all pass. For some, the EU seems to have turned into some sort of divinity. 

I get the feeling that many in the UK and the US, including most if not all the media, do not realize how much hostility there is in some quarters against America’s perceived control over Europe. And against the UK, historically seen as America’s agent within the European Union. I am amazed to see the naivety with which the issue is debated in the USA and in the UK.

You would be shocked to see the ferocity of the arguments and words used by my illustrious colleague in the article I’ve mentioned. But what you especially don’t seem to realize is that his thoughts are shared by many. Too many, perhaps. Sadly, for many the UK is still the "Perfidius Albion" of fascist memory.  

The UK and US have not yet awakened to the truth. This is NOT a reaction to Trump and Brexit. Trump and Brexit are welcome excuses that are being used to camouflage a sharp acceleration in plans to truly make Europe, or at least the Paris-Berlin core, an increasingly antagonist side to the US. Alignment is over. Disagreements are going to be far more frequent in the future.

When I see American media and commentators wondering if the alliance with Europe “can survive Trump”, I bitterly remark that the alliance has been changing and dying from well before Trump.

Going back to my colleague, he openly talks of NATO as a novel  Delian League, with the US playing the part of Athens and exploiting the alliance to control the other cities / European countries. Do you remember how the Delian League ended?

It is a sorry state of affairs, years in the making. And it is not going to heal easily. If at all. 

Regardless of whoever will be elected after Trump, it is indeed unlikely that things will ever go back to the way they were, simply because it is not an issue of Trump or no-Trump to start with.

The same is true of Brexit. Regardless of who is prime minister, regardless of Customs Union or not and regardless of how much London promises to do against Russia in the Baltic and in Norway, relationships with the new center of Europe will stay tense.

Nothing is ever universal, of course, but let me remark that there is a political current, Europe-wide, which is all too happy to have London’s veto out of the way. The feeling is that America’s “undercover agent” is now out of the room.

The use of inflammatory language over Gibraltar and many other controversies will remain in the long term, regardless of what the UK might do or say. The US and UK should both stop being so penitent about Trump and Brexit and realize that a new phase has begun. Great power competition it is, but China is not the only rival to be worried about. 

Germany-France are a rival. And the EU as a whole will be, if the new center can win over the resistences of the periphery.

The EU is a Superpower, economically. It isn’t a great power politically and militarily because it is still divided. But the new France – Germany alignment, on its own, and particularly if the nuclear deterrent situation goes as we imagine it, will generate a voice that will more often than not become the de-facto “european” position. Exactly as is happening with the new FCAS fighter jet, France and Germany are trying to “define the project” and then have “partners” tag along. In front of an essential "fait accompli", the Union will follow the hegemons. 

And as a major power with a major voice, it will increasingly speak against America and the UK. The sooner the anglosphere realizes this, the better.

If you can’t see what is happening, you are pretty blind. You can either be happy with it, like my colleague, or be worried by it, like me. But please, don’t pretend it isn’t happening! 

The next phase of the struggle internal to Europe is now officially between Germany-France and the periphery of Europe.

The periphery means Poland and in lesser measure the rest of East Europe, which are great NATO supporters as they do not trust (for very good reasons, if you ask me) France and Germany to be able and willing to defend them from Russia.

Poland has already said that it will gladly take those US troops, missiles and nukes that Germany would really like to be gone. Poland has even dared voicing support for the UK, too. Poland is sovranist. Poland is an obstacle.

The next few years might end up seeing Germany and France increasingly in disagreement with the US, increasingly hostile on the economic front, increasingly calling for European “autonomy” from the US, while still effectively defended by US troops, based in Poland. While still blaming the US for the fracture, in fact. Regardless of  what the president’s name will be. Just like now: shame Trump, but demand he does not leave Syria. Protest his every plan and request, but do not contemplate the option of using European soldiers to secure what is, in words at least, seen as a key security crisis right on Europe’s threshold.

Hegemony is an addicting thing: it is not likely that we will see a climbdown from Aachen. There will be disagreements and difficulties between Paris and Berlin (defence export is just one of many potential thorns on this rose), but the axis will hold because it is clearly advantageous for both countries.

The periphery also means Italy. It is not a case that the new “public enemy number 1” is now Sovranism. The greatest danger, specifically, is represented by sovranists with veto powers within the EU. Sovranists which might soon fill a great number of seats in the EU parliament after the elections of May. Sovranists that might turn the EU into a brake, rather than a tool in the hands of Paris and Berlin. 

Salvini is a sovranist: he does not quite advocate leaving the EU (not anymore, or perhaps not yet depending on how you look at it…), but he is certainly a source of resistance and opposition. And he is popular. He, and Italy, are the next big obstacle. Italy either has to be won over (and already years ago Paris tried by proposing a treaty to Italy which would have looked a bit like Aachen) or silenced in some ways. And make no mistake: the international media campaign against Salvini will keep getting more virulent. And Spread attacks against Italy will continue, too. They worked in 2011, after all, when the last Berlusconi government was effectively forced to resign and was replaced by unelected, appointed Mario Monti and the semi-elected leftist, europeist governments that followed.

The same left that went into the 2018 elections under “+ Europa” and “United States of Europe” banners, only to be savagely punished by the electorate.
Italy is in the Eurozone. It has joined the currency that was custom-tailored over Germany's needs. And because of it is greatly vulnerable. 
In the political battle for Italy, even Berlusconi has now resumed usefulness in the eyes of the EU: babysitted by Antonio Tajani, president of the EU Parliament, he is (so far unsuccessfully) trying to simultaneously ride on Salvini’s wake by formally siding with him in regional elections, while savagely opposing the government and sticking to an Europeist agenda. Berlusconi and the candidates of the Left all aspire to being the Italian Macron, defeating the evil sovranism / populism and climbing on a stage with blue flags waving and Europe's anthem blaring in place of the national anthem.

Don’t undervalue the role that Italy has to play, even unknowingly, in the next chapter of Europe’s history.

Regardless of what your misguided media like to tell you, Salvini is probably your most important ally in the next few years.

But you have to awaken from your self-defeatist, absurdly repentant “it’s all our fault” slumber.

A good alternative to SSBNs...?

A new proposal has been put forwards as an alternative to the Successor SSBN programme which is due to produce 3 to 4 new submarines as replacement for the current Vanguard class, with entry in service beginning in 2028. The effort is known to the general public as "Trident replacement", but it is a very misleading name for the project, as what needs replacement is the submarine, not the Trident missile.


Successor - a quick summary 

The same Trident 2 D5 missiles currently in service will continue to be used at least out to 2042, so it is most definitely not a matter of replacing Trident. The warheads are also good out to 2032 at least, as they are subject to a life extension programme which brings them to MK4A standard. A decision on an eventual replacement is not expected to be required before the late 2030s, and it is to be assumed that, if possible at all, efforts to eventually replace the warhead and the Trident missiles themselves will be coordinated in the 2040s.

The four Vanguard submarines, on the other hand, can no longer be life extended safely and effectively. Their useful life has already been stretched and the first of the class is now due to soldier on until 2028, but it is assessed that extending further is not desirable.
Main Gate for the Successor programme, which will finally place a formal contract in place for the acquisition of 3 or four new generation submarines, is planned for early 2016, but design activities and procurement of key long lead items (included the new PWR3 reactor core and the special steel for the hulls) are already underway, with a spend ceiling of 3.3 billion pounds by 2016. As of december 2014, 1243 million pounds have already been committed. Notably, 206 million are for the upgrading and restructuring of the Barrow shipyard facilities which are key to the UK's ability to build submarines, and the usefulness of this investment goes beyond the Successor itself.
The new PWR3 reactor, more advanced than the current PWR2, builds on very significant amounts of technology shared by the United States. Its features include a far longer unrefueled service life (the american equivalent reactor project for their own new SSBNs aims for a 40 years unrefueled service life, versus a target of 25 years for the PWR2) in order to minimize in-service costs during the life of the vessel; and enhanced safety.

In October 2014, a notable long lead contract has been placed, with a 59 million dollar contract signed with General Dynamics Electric Boat for the production of the 12 Trident launch tubes for the first SSBN. The US Department of Defense, in the same contract, has ordered a first batch of 5 tubes for its own SSBN.
This unprecedented level of collaboration is part of the Common Missile Compartment initiative. The CMC is being designed in 4-tube modules which are then integrated into the submarine at build: 3 sections will form the british CMC compartment (12 tubes in total, down from 16 in the current Vanguard class), while the US SSBN will have four sections (16 tubes, down from 24 in the current Ohio class).
The first 4-tubes module should be assembled beginning in August 2016; the first launch tube is expected to be delivered for installation in the module during November the same year. The 1st Quad Pack module should be completed in April 2018, with deliveries of all the 17 tubes currently on order completed by November 2017.
Initially, it had been thought to "future proof" the tubes by producing them with a 97 inches diameter, but this idea was shelved to save money, and the diameter will stay at 87 inches: whatever missile eventually replaces Trident 2 D5 will have to share the same diameter.

Other design features of the british SSBNs aren't yet known in detail. A CGI image released by the MOD suggests that an X configuration for stern control surfaces is being planned, like in the US for the SSBN(X). Despite having less launch tubes, the new SSBN is expected to be as large as the Vanguard, and possibly slightly heavier. Growth is being contained, however, with the aim of reducing to a minimum the need for infrastructure changes in Faslane and Coulport. What is good for the Vanguards must be good for the Successor as well.
In a similarly pragmatic decision, according to 2013 data reports, the Successor will draw largely from the Astute class SSN, sharing the same sonar and combat system, the same torpedo tubes arrangement and the same mast sensors. A Common External Communications System is also being acquired, which will use the same launcher and Comms buoys for both Astute and Successor.
It has been suggested that much of the crew will be able to seamlessly transition from SSBN to Astute SSN at any time, due to the great commonality.

As part of budget cuts, the SDSR 2010 has mandated a new round of reductions in the number of warheads and operational, embarked missiles. Currently, the Vanguard class SSBNs deploy at sea with no more than 8 Trident missiles equipped, in total, with 40 warheads. Each Trident missile can be fitted with up to 12 warheads, so the current totals are far, far reduced from the original 16 missile / 192 warheads load envisaged for the Vanguard. The number of operational, availlable warheads has also been reduced, to a maximum of 120 (was 160 before the SDSR), our of a total of 160 (was 225 before SDSR). 

The Trident 2 D5 missiles are exactly the same used by the US Navy. Indeed, the UK has access to up to 58 such missiles (not clear if the few expended in trials over the years have been replaced or not), which are maintained as part of the US Navy's total. To safeguard the independence of employment of the deterrent, the nuclear payload is british.

For comparison purposes, France maintains a total of 300 nuclear warheads; three sets of 16 submarine-launched ballistic missiles for it's four SSBNs and 54 air-launched ASMP-A missiles.

Even with all these measures to contain costs and achieve maximum efficiency, the Successor programme remains expensive. The December 2014 update to Parliament assures that the programme for now promises to respect the original 11 to 14 billion pounds pricetag set in 2006. Adjusted for inflation, that means 14.21 to 18.09 billion pounds in 2014 money (Bank of England calculation). We will assume a price range between 15 and 20 billion pounds for four submarines as a measure of prudence. A price which, of course, many charge of being still too optimistic.


Centre Forum steps in

Toby Fenwick, former Treasury and DfiD civil servant as well as RAF Intelligence reservist between 1995 and 2009, has written a paper, published a few days ago by Centre Forum, to argue for the abandonement of the plan for a continuation of Trident and a cancellation of the SSBNs, in favor of an air-dropped nuclear deterrent which would cost less and deliver much greater conventional capabilities in exchange for a diminished nuclear arsenal.

The list of recommendations made by the document are the following:

It is evident at first read that the nuclear arsenal resulting would be much weaker than the currently planned one, but at the same time it is evident that the proposal would bring much enhanced conventional military capability in the air and at sea.

The proposal is to adopt the free-fall B61 nuclear bomb, which is deployed in Europe as part of the NATO Nuclear Sharing deterrence concept. The B61s are tactical, free fall bombs meant for supersonic carriage, and a part of the arsenal is made available to allies for employment on their own aircraft: for example, Germany and Italy have Tornado IDS squadrons with a nuclear strike role, and the F-16 is also used. Other B61s forward stored in Europe are available for use by USAFE aircraft.

The B61 exists in several different variants, but the US has launched a costly refurbishment programme which will leave only one type of weapon in operation, the B61-12. This is obtained employing the B61-4 variable yeld warhead and introducing a new tail kit which, while not adding actual precision guidance, dramatically improves accuracy on the target and gives a modest "stand-off" range in a high speed toss towards the target. Some 480 bombs in total will be refurbished, at a cost estimated between 10 and 12 billion dollars.
The B61-12 is to be integrated for internal carriage on the F-35A.

A B61-12 being tested in the wind tunnel

The proposal is to seek integration of the B61-12 on the F-35C as well, which is physically feasible since the weapon bays have the same size (not so with the shorter bays of the F-35B), so that RAF and Royal Navy can procure 138 F-35C, to be used as dual capable aircraft.

The document also contains indications on the expected price of the proposal, which to be workable requires considerable investment in conventional capabilities surrounding and enabling the deterrent.

It is to be appreciated that the document keeps track of the need for aircraft carrier embarkation and delivery in order to make the deterrent capable to strike back against any enemy, and that it consequently makes provvisions for enhancing the surface fleet to provide more appropriate escort, adding more Type 26 frigates and Hawkeye radar aircraft.

It is also good to see that the author did not ignore the need to provide Barrow with more SSNs to buy in order to keep the yard active and it's key skills alive: one of the roles of the Successor programme is also to bridge the gap between the construction of the Astutes and the future project for their replacement. Years and years of inactivity destroy the workforce and squander the precious skills required for building submarines. It is a lesson re-learned at the cost of much money and great delays to the Astute project: after years of inactivity, the design team ended up having to ask the americans for help in order to finalize the Astute's design. So, if SSBNs aren't built, SSNs must take their place, or the cost could well be the loss of the nation's ability to build any at a later date.

The passage to catapults for the carriers brings an evident boost to capability and is required since only the F-35C can hope to carry the B61-12 internally. The purchase of Hawkeye is key to giving the air wing  and the carrier itself the survivability they need.


The problem

A nuclear deterrent based on the B61-12 would be much less capable than Trident, this is definite. The key issue is not the power of the warhead, but the certainty that an enemy anywhere in the world can be reliably hit. Any possible existential enemy of the UK must be keenly aware that there is a credible deterrent which is unquestionably able to strike back and make him pay a price which cannot be possibly accepted.

The reach of the B61-12 is the main problem. The document says that F-35C launched from UK bases could strike 2500 nautical miles away with Voyager tankers support, and goes some way in explaining how, using british bases overseas and the carrier's air wing the reach can be made sufficient to strike virtually anywhere. There are obvious difficulties with such a scenario, and there is pretty much the admission that any delivery flight would be more or less a suicide.
Then again, if it ever came to flying a real nuclear bombing mission, coming back to base might not be an option anyway.
The key, as always, is not doing it for real, but showing in a convincing way that it could and would be done. The deterrent must be credible in the sense that an enemy must be convinced that cornering the UK would result in a devastating nuclear revenge which would make any conquest ultimately futile. The deterrent must represent an implied, unacceptable price to pay that forces an enemy to drop the idea of acting in the first place. If we get to the actual use of nuclear weapons, it means the deterrent has failed, even if it later succeeds in delivering nukes on enemy towns.

A number of B61-12s hitting major enemy towns and installations would represent a cost too high to be accepted, by anyone and in any circumstance, even if the target hit wasn't the enemy capital itself. On this i can agree.
Where the credibility gets shaky is in the delivery. A Voyager tanker can trail 4 fighter jets for 2800 miles in a transfer flight, but an actual stike mission, especially if a return to base is at least envisaged, is a whole different matter. Even bringing all 14 tankers in service (instead of just 8 + 1 transport only and 5 tankers "on demand" at 90 days notice) and fitting them with booms and receptacles so they can juggle fuel between themselves and work cooperatively, it remains dubious that it would be possible to trail a real strike package over the great distances likely to be involved. Particularly because, in order to deliver the strike with gravity-fall bombs with a stand-off reach of 40 kilometers in the very, very best case, you need a large attack squadron, knowing that many aircraft are likely not to make it to the target, even with the F-35's stealth.

Would it ever be possible to make this construct credible enough to serve its purpose? 

At one point the document talks about a snap launch of 72 aircraft in the space of little more than 2 minutes in answer to a detected nuclear attack. But it is clear to me that there could never be 72 aircraft at readiness, never mind at a 2 minutes readiness, not even if there was a significant "warning" period of worsening international situation beforehand. And moreover there would never be enough tankers to trail them to a distant target anyway.
Besides, if the vast majority of the improved tanker fleet and of the larger fighter jet fleet are tied into nuclear readiness, the potential advantage they bring in terms of conventional capabilities is lost because they aren't available for other missions. If the end result is having less tankers and less aircraft readily available for conventional operations, the whole idea is self-defeating.


Costs

The idea falls apart further when costing is examined with greater attention. The procurement of 100 "anglicized" B61-12 weapons might be simply impossible, at least in the terms envisaged in the document. The B61-12 is built by refurbishing existing bombs, and there is only a finite number of them.
It would of course be possible to purchase the new Tail Kit, which is a new production element, but all the rest, and not just the warhead, would likely have to be new. This calls into question the timings and costs estimated.

Moreover, the document assumes a 30% cost increase for the Successor programme based on the Astute's earlier mentioned troublesome birth. The assumption that costs will grow is admittedly pretty realistic, unfortunately, but i cannot help but question the method. It seems a bit unfair to inflate the cost by 30% right away, and base the comparison on this figure. A 15 to 20 billion programme cost is assumed in the document and then brought up to a 24.8 - 33.1 billion affair. Sincerely, i find this skews the discussion. Expecting cost growth and doubting of estimates is one thing, but this seems way excessive.

Again, the document assumes that building 5 more Astute SSNs will cost 5 billion pounds or less, while also enabling the adoption of the PWR3 reactor, or at least of part of its technological improvements. It seems to me like a shot in the dark. You can't assume unchanged or indeed diminished pricetags for an SSN if you also assume that you will change its very heart, the nuclear reactor. It would seem only fair and prudent to me to assume that trying to take in PWR3 tech would require quite some design work, and consequently costs.

The purchase of 138 F-35C is also described as a saving of over one billion. But this is sadly unjustified, simply because the UK does not have a budget for 138 F-35B as of now. Not even close. So, even assuming the F-35C as effectively cheaper to purchase and to operate, several billion pounds are missing from the count.

The purchase of 8 P-8 Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft for 700 million pounds also look like a miracle to me, considering that Australia is going to pay 3.6 billion USD (around 4 billion AUSD) for the same amount of the same aircraft (and the supporting elements and infrastructure, but it is not like you can leave those out of the picture). It is a mistake i've already seen in other occasions: you can't just take the unitary price tag from a US multi-year mega contract and expect your purchase to come at that same price. What about spare parts, training, support, infrastructure, and everything else?
I wait to see how much Japan will pay for the 4 E-2D Hawkeye it has ordered, but i sincerely believe 900 million pounds might well prove insufficient. 

Modifying the Voyager tankers with booms is something that could indeed be done in a few months per airframe, and probably with a modest investment. But adding in the receptacle might not be as simple, and the cost suggested, i fear, is likely again overoptimistic.

The C-2 Greyhound is no longer in production, and the surviving examples are high in demand in the US Navy. Moreover, even if some could be acquired, the US Navy has estimated that their useful life will expire by 2028. A refurbishment programme which would replace the wings, the engines and the avionics and make them more common to the E-2D has been proposed, but the US Navy has not been convinced and has instead decided to procure 44 MV-22 Osprey for the role.
The document also suggests converting the Greyhound to serve also as tankers to extend the range of the F-35C embarked squadrons, but this has never been done before. I would suggest that the US Navy would have already done it, if it was that straightforward.
The MV-22 will have a tanker kit by 2017, and the navy variant, HV-22, is likely to be fitted with external, conformal fuel tanks which would also increase available fuel to give away... but this is another story, and would have a whole different cost from what the document proposes with the C-2.

I think there is too much optimism regarding infrastructure as well, since counting on old 1969-era structures dating back to the V force seems a bit risky to me, but i'm not able to make an estimate myself.
What looks clear to me is that there is no real consideration given to the greater manpower and annual budgets which would be required by having far more squadrons of jets than planned, more tankers in continous service, more SSNs and more frigates. Even assuming that current SSBN-related personnel can cover completely or almost completely the crewing needs of 5 new SSNs, i think a lot is missing from the picture.


Conclusion

The boost to the conventional forces that an air deterrent would bring is certainly tempting. If the costing was realistic and actually feasible, i would sincerely be tempted to support a proposal like this. The credibility of the deterrent would be menaced, but i think it could be made to stay at a reasonable and thus acceptable level: i would like to think, after all, that no country in the world would consider "a few nuked cities" as an acceptable price to pay in any scenario. My way of thinking suggests to me that the demonstrated ability to deliver nuclear strikes at range, even with difficulties and limitations (it would never be the same as a 10.000 miles Trident missile launched literally out of the blue, where you can't touch it beforehand) would be enough, if balanced by such a healthy increase of conventional firepower as a byproduct.

The problem is that to stay credible, the air deterrent would tie down almost entirely those additional F-35C squadrons and, critically, the Voyager tankers. To deploy them on conventional operations will dramatically reduce the capability of the deterrent, and to keep them at nuclear QRA means badly hurting conventional capabilities. 
And moreover, the cost estimates seem to be wide off the mark, making the whole thing unachievable in the shape and budget proposed.

In the end, the SSBN once more remains as the most cost-effective and most credible deterrent solution.