The unmanned revolution

A very interesting study from DroneWarsUk has put together government data about UAV expenditure and projects, and so doing it has provided excellent food for thought and analysis. Considering, of course, that while they openly oppose the use of unmanned air systems, especially armed ones, i totally support their employment, simply for one reason: they work and deliver effect.

Since 2007, the UK has expended and/or committed around 2 billion pounds for purchasing, operating, researching and developing unmanned air systems.

The MQ-9 Reaper fleet accounts for 506 million pounds in approved purchase and support costs. The original order for 6 drones made in 2007 was followed by a 135 million order in 2010 for a further 5 Reapers and associated equipment and ground control section.
In the meanwhile, one of the original 6 Reapers was lost, so that the total fleet, at deliveries completed, will number 10.

So far, Reaper has been notoriously controlled by british personnel from 39 Squadron RAF based in Creech Air Force Base, Nevada, US. However, with the 5 new Reapers due to be delivered, XIII Squadron RAF, which ceased being a Tornado GR4 squadron early in 2011, is to stand up again this autumn as a Remotely Piloted Air System, based in Waddington, in the UK.
39 Squadron itself is to finally relocate to Waddington in the next future, once XIII Squadron is operational. The relocation of 39 Squadron will be phased to ensure there is no disruption to UK Reaper support to current operations.

This way, the UK will have brought home the ground control section of the Reaper force. But Reaper has not yet been given a safe and certain future: being a UOR-funded equipment, by the end of operations in Afghanistan the RAF will have to either bring it into Core Budget and find the funding to keep it going, or divest it. This situation also implies that the RAF so far has no plan at all to base Reapers in the UK, and fly them from UK air bases. The drones are obviously based in Afghanistan, and their future remains, at the moment, a question mark.
It is however widely expected that the RAF will keep Reaper, as a stopgap on the way to Scavenger if nothing else (there won't be a Scavenger before 2020 at best), which might actually end up being a development of Reaper itself: the option is far from having been ruled out.

The Reaper is currently the only armed unmanned system available to the UK. It has flown more than 38.000 hours and has employed weapons since 2008. They have employed weaponry 319 times as of early September, and have killed hundreds of talibans, including important figureheads, while tragically killing four civilians in one occasion, when in 2008 two Taliban pick-up trucks loaded with explosives were taken out with a Reaper attack.
There are of course various accusations that the number of civilian victims is actually higher, but the official figure is four. 

DroneWarsUK adds to the Reaper's costs an estimate of the impact of the armed UAV on expenditure for satellite bandwidth. I'm not sure of the validity of their estimate and reasoning, even if it is obvious that, without the bandwidth-hungry drone, the Armed Forces would need less satellite comms capability.
The Skynet satellite system costs 200 million pounds a year, and DroneWars estimates that up to 10% of the figure might be made up by the needs of the UAVs. This particular figure, however, remains uncertain.  


The Hermes 450 fleet is operated by the Royal Artillery with contractor's support. There are a dozen drones, sustaining 5 to 6 daily task lines. The UAVs are leased on a pay-by-flight basis, as a stop-gap measure on the way to the much enhanced, UK-built and owned Watchkeeper. The lease had to be renewed several times, since Watchkeeper failed to become operative by the end of 2011 as was once expected, and again was unable to deploy in 2012, with the first Watchkeeper task line now expected in theatre in Spring 2013.
The cost of the lease since 2007 is put at 181 million pounds.

The already mentioned Watchkeeper is currently the largest and most ambitious UAV program in the UK, and indeed is probably matched only by the US Army's Gray Eagle UAV project.
This complete, fully-integrated UAV system is due to be the main eye of the army for years into the future. 54 UAVs and 13 Ground Control Stations are on order, plus at least 21 Tactical terminals, mounted in specifically-configured Viking all-terrain vehicles.
Cost of the Watchkeeper is booked at 847 million pounds.

Watchkeeper is packed up for transport by a DROPS truck

The Watchkeeper is unarmed, but has a margin of payload available that would allow carriage of a couple of light guided weapons such as the Thales LMM missile (13 kg, with a warhead of just around 3 and laser guidance). The Royal Artillery is keen to gain weapons capability to turn the Watchkeeper into a hunter-killer platform better able to deal with time-critical targets, but there is no funding available at the moment. The "A-TUAS" (Armed Tactical Unmanned Air System) program, as it is called, remains "on hold", possibly to proceed sometime in the next few years.  

The Desert Hawk expenditure has been approved at 42 millions since 2007. The original order was for 144 mini-drones, but 27 have been lost during operations. There have been several successive additional orders and capability insertions, up to the currently in service Desert Hawk III.
In Afghanistan there are regularly a dozen 5-man detachments of DHIII operative, with each Detachment having several (possibly six) UAVs. The system is operated by the Royal Artillery and is, of course, totally unarmed.

Special Forces have and might still be using US RQ-11 Raven mini-drones in partnership with US forces on operations. The SAS in 2005 acquired the BUSTER mini-UAV in unknown quantities.  

The T-HAWK vertical take-off, man-packable UAV was initially operated by the Royal Engineers, but was subsequently assigned to Royal Artillery personnel as the RA became the Army's UAV authority. T-HAWK is used as an integral part of the TALISMAN route clearance system.
12 UAVs were procured, for a booked cost of 3 million pounds.

The PD-100 Black Hornet is the most recent and less known addition to the force. This nano-UAV weighting only 16 grams is a tiny helicopter that fits in a hand, but can fly for up to 25 minutes, depending on wind conditions and other factors. It uses internal rechargeable batteries for power and can fly at up to 1000 meters of distance. The PD-100 Black Hornet is a complete system comprising two or three nano air vehicles (NUAV) and a ground control element fitted in a light, small box for transport with a total weight inferior to 1 kg.  
Thanks to its tiny sizes, it can fly even into buildings and provide the troops with situational awareness. An unknown number was ordered in November 2011: the value of the "initial" contract was put at 2.5 millions, but 20 millions were indicated as through-life value.
This is likely to include further expected acquisitions and successive capability-insertions: the MOD wants the nano-UAV to provide night vision too, something that, at the moment, could not be fitted. As technology progresses, it is hoped that this and other features will be added.

While there is no certainty, it would appear that the MOD has procured 100 or more nano-UAVs, so possibly between 33 and 50 complete "Personal Reconnaissance" systems. It would appear that the nano-UAV number 100 was delivered to the MOD last June.

Black Hornet in action

Cost, as explained, is indicated in 20 millions.


For research and development, Mantis and Taranis received, as of 2010, funding for 167 million pounds.
In January 2012 BAE was awarded a much publicized 40 million contract for the definition of "Future Combat Air Systems", and most recently a 30 million Joint Effort with France was announced, relative to work for the design of an UCAV for entry in service in 2030.
The UCAV (Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle) has strike missions as main role, and it is expected to be an ultra-long range, stealth, highly-survivable bomber capable to deliver precious strikes deep into enemy-held territory, even in presence of significant enemy air defences. 

The most interesting part however is the indication of a Scavenger requirement for a total fleet numbering up to 30 MALEs, with a through-life cost of 2 billion pounds over 15 years.
Normally, support and running costs account for 60% of the total expenditure, so the development and procurement of the Scavenger solution would be budgeted at less than 1 billion pounds.
Scavenger is expected to have significant Strike capability: the Mantis demonstrator from BAE, expected to be the basis for development of the production-standard aircraft, was shown fitted with 6 underwing pylons suitable for Paveway IV guided bombs and Brimstone missiles.

Aimed at the Scavenger requirement is the collaboration with France on the BAE-Dassault "TELEMOS" MALE development. Committment to Scavenger is expected to be part of the 2013 defence budget. An announcement was actually expected already this summer, but the new government of France imposed a delay as it reviews its defence strategy (and, crucially, funding). France has recently signed a deal with Germany for collaboration on a MALE drone, in practice unilaterally expanding the bi-national project Telemos to involve Germany.
It remains to be seen how the UK will react, and what kind of future Telemos will have.

It should also be reported that a 40 million pounds UOR has been launched by the Royal Navy for the procurement of a UAV for employment on RFA ships and Type 23 frigates. It is widely expected that ScanEagle, or its newer, more capable incarnation, the RQ-21 Integrator, will be selected, as the Navy already validated operations of ScanEagle from Type 23 frigates as far back as 2006. Integrator uses the same launch and recovery kit and methods as ScanEagle, so it would make sense to go for the newer, more capable system as it would only imply minimal changes from the procedures already validated with ScanEagle in the past.
There is also a program for the demonstration and, in time, for the purchase of a rotary wing UAV which might be armed, and that will form an important part of the future mission capability of ships such as the Type 26 frigate.
These marittime UAVs programs are to be welcomed, as they will finally give the Navy improved situational awareness during deployments in congested and potentially hostile waters, such as in the Persian Gulf. 

If anything, my greatest worry and complaint is that Scavenger and the new UCAV, as it stands, are not to be made aircraft carrier capable, in no small part because they would need arresting wires and very possibly catapults to be fitted to the ships.
And as we know, the very questionable decision of going STOVL was taken instead.

F35B: 48 B for the carriers, then maybe some A...

The Telegraph and some other newspapers and internet sources reported about Philip Hammond having given indication during the July 19 handover of ZM135, also known as BK-1 at Forth Worth, that the UK would acquire 48 F35B.
At the start, i did not give this figure much importance: i was unable to find any hard evidence of the minister having actually said it, and the official position indeed remained the same: the number of F35s to be procured is for SDSR2015 to decide.
And, said or not, even the eventual 2015 decision won't be definitive: cuts, of course, could arrive at any moment, as we sadly well know...

Philip Hammond speaks at the official handover of ZM135, also known as BK-1, the first of 3 pre-production F35B ordered by the UK.

I was not ready to believe that Hammond would give away such an accurate figure to the press, especially when he and the other defence ministers regularly avoid giving any solid indication on quantities to Parliament despite being asked about it at least once a month.

But spreadsheet Philip is surprising me once again, since it seems that he did say that. And Jane's says that it received further confirmations from the MOD.

I'm sure that many in Parliament won't appreciate, but i fear that i now have to believe to the figure. The source, this time, is the respected Jane's, which reports:

In remarks on 19 July in the United States, Hammond said the UK would order 48 F-35Bs to equip the UK's future carrier strike force. He added that a follow-on F-35 buy would be set out in a future Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR), with the aim of replacing the Eurofighter Typhoon in UK service.

[...] 

The UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) has confirmed his comments, telling IHS Jane's : "The defence secretary said that initially the UK would buy 48 jets for the aircraft carriers and announce at a later date what the final numbers would be. We will not finalise our decisions on the F-35 programme until SDSR in 2015."

Jane's reports that the follow-on order might be made up by cheaper, longer-range, non carrier-capable F35A.
Nothing definitive, but the Split Buy rumor is back.

The first time, it was in 2005, when Future Offensive Air System (FOAS, the intended Tornado replacement programme) was killed. That's when rumors of a split buy of 80 F35B and up to 58 F35C started to circulate. The C would be the Tornado replacement, possibly under a formal programme split: the F35B would meet the original Joint Combat Aircraft requirement, with the F35C procured under Deep and Persistent Offensive Capability (DPOC, the programme the RAF conceived to replace FOAS in the Tornado-replacement role).
Back at this time, the F35C's range and full-size weapon bays were given as main reason for the choice. In pure British style, there were some "imaginative" proposals such as removing the naval features from the C (hook, folding wings etc), something that, no doubt, would have ended just like the plan for Typhoon fighters without guns: removing such weights and components would dramatically change aspects of the plane's centre of gravity, and require software modifications and other expensive adjustements that would have no doubt made the changes a source of additional expense and not of savings.  

In 2010, the SDSR killed DPOC (nominal but unallocated 1 billion budget) and assumed that the sole JCA would replace both Harrier and Tornado. The choice was the F35C, and this time there was an added reason: facts had changed.
In 2001, when the UK entered the F35 enterprise with the B as preferred solution (but never with a really definitive selection), it was expected that the F35C would be the most expensive of the 3 variants.

By 2010 it had become absolutely clear that it was actually the F35B that would cost the most to buy and then to run through life.

The 2010 decision was soon reversed, as we know, and now we are back in the B field fully, with the reason being a still rather unconvincing estimate putting the cost of fitting catapults and arrestor wires to CVF at 2 billion for Prince of Wales (converted at build) and 3 billion for Queen Elizabeth (converted at her first major refit, eventually).
I say rather unconvincing for a number of reasons. One of the funniest ones is that, in their latest explanation, MOD officers say that they found out they'd have to modify 280 compartments instead of an earlier planned figure of 80/90 in order to fit EMALS and wires into Prince of Wales, pushing costs up dramatically.
What does not really fit into the picture is that such compartments are not being built yet, so it's the paper design that needs changing, not a physical vessel (at least in Prince of Wales's case).
Again, even if 280 compartments need redesign, one cannot possibly understand how the financial impact can be so mostrous, considering that each CVF has over 2800 compartments, that the class was designed with a 111 million pounds Assessment and 175 million pounds Demonstration phases and that the virtual total unitary cost (inclusive of a 1.56 billion cost increase purely caused by a 2008 slow-down imposed to the works by Labour government) is 2.6 billion.
Rather spectacular modifications muse be necessary to double the cost of the vessel while modifying a tiny fraction of it...

At the moment, the UK has taken ownership over ZM135, the first F35B. Its brother, BK-2, should be delivered to the UK next month.
BK-3, that at one point following the SDSR 2010 was destined to be given to the US Marines in exchange for an F35C (CK-1), will arrive next year, since it was ordered one year after the first 2.
These planes will stay in the US, as probably will the first 6 "production" F35Bs.
Calling them "production" airframes is not really correct, since they are still going to be part of Low Rate Initial Production blocks. Only from 2018 or 2019 there will be full production-standard F35s.
Anyway, the UK has placed long lead orders this year, that will be formalized in 2013 as the order for the first of the 48 (if reports are true) planes planned.

In any case, here are some observations of the two possible scenarios implied by the latest development:

Scenario 1:

Tornado and Typhoon Tranche 1 go in 2019 (leaving 5 Typhoon squadrons), 48 F35B by 2023, additional F35 A or B in the 2020s.

48 F35B for the carriers. Possibly to be ordered/received by 2023, this date being indicated in the MOD Business Plan 2012 as the "end date" for the JCA effort.
Not too bad a number, but a very tight one nonetheless.
6 of these airplanes would stay in the US, with the USMC Squadron 501 "Warlords" at the Eglin F35 Integrated Training Centre, and act as a OCU to prepare pilots.
There won't be any UK-based OCU at least until 2014, but after that part of the airplanes might need to be used for a training formation at home.

Even if they are not needed and training is met by the Eglin facilities and UK force in there, the very best number of frontline squadrons that could be formed would be 3. And that would leave just 6 airframes to rotate in the force to cover maintenance needs.
The original Italian Navy assumption (now the plan has changed) was for a force of 22 F35B: 3 based in the US for training, 5 expected to be in maintenance/not available at any one time, and 14 available for embarking on the Cavour aircraft carrier.

The UK order would be a bit more than double that size, so let's make an empiric assumption and say that 6 airframes in the US do it for training. More than a quarter of the fleet would be unavailable most of the time, so that would mean 10/11 airframes. And a 6 + 32 (3 Squadrons) + 6 (attrition) airframes would struggle to make ends meet.
48 airplanes would realistically support 2 frontline Squadrons, with the third being routinely understrength to some degree.
Not unacceptable, considering that squadrons would normally rotate at different readiness levels, but this is arguably the very, very barest minimum for having an aspirational capability of filling up a CVF with a Wing of 3 squadrons in case of need.

The lack of attritional airframes would in addition mean that airframes would age faster, as there wouldn't be enough spare aircrafts to enable a rotational use, spreading the flying hours on more aircrafts.
This is, to a degree, acceptable in my view because the F35 is going to be in production for many, many years into the future, and its future price will likely drop over time, depending on how much export success it effectively reaps around the world.
With this background, it does arguably make sense to buy less airframes at the start, cutting back on the Attrition pool, in favor of buying replacement airframes in later years as and if it proves necessary.

Even so, in my opinion the eventual follow-on order should really be for the same aircraft type, to increase the number of carrier-capable aircrafts and to avoid the duplication of costs and issues that would be unavoidable if a split buy was the chosen path. F35A and F35B might have a lot in common, but they are simply not the same thing. Training and logistics would be partially different, and while the A's support and training would be less expensive per airframe, i'm not convinced that it would be an advantageous approach when all things get considered together.

The follow-on order for F35A would be, really, the third attempt of the RAF to procure a dedicate Tornado replacement. While Hammord reportedly said "that a follow-on F-35 buy would be set out in a future Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR), with the aim of replacing the Eurofighter Typhoon in UK service", i really do not think that a total replacement of Typhoon is on the cards.

The Typhoon Out of Service date is 2030, notionally, but it is unthinkable that the main industrial product of Europe, the most numerous (it'll be from around 2015, since at the moment there is technically more Tornado GR4s still) aircraft in service with the RAF, the main export offer of the UK in the defence aerospace sector, the horribly-expensive superfighter does not get a Mid-Life Upgrade like all other major defence platforms.
The idea of retiring Typhoon just 12 years after it hits Full Operating Capability (planned for 2018 at the moment) is frankly impossible to accept or conceive.
Typhoon will no doubt live much longer than 2030.

A possibility is the loss of the 52 Typhoon Tranche 1, which have for some time now been assumed to go out of service by 2019, same OSD now planned for Tornado GR4.
The Tranche 1, relatively new but hard-worked already, would cost a fortune to upgrade, and they have some structural differences compared to Tranche 2 and 3 aircrafts that would prevent them from expanding their capabilities sufficiently (or making it financially unfeasible, anyway).
The idea is to remove them early from service, and keep a 5 squadrons fleet flying with a force of 107 Tranche 2 and Tranche 3. [Note, again, that 5 frontline squadrons supported by a fleet of 107 means 21.4 airframes per each 12-aircraft frontline squadron. Applied to F35B, the same ratio supports only 2.28 frontline squadrons, as mentioned earlier. What Typhoon is not likely to have is a production line open for as long as the F35's one. In addition, there is no US centre that trains pilots for the Typhoon!]

The Tornado GR4 and Typhoon (Tranche 1) are the two machines that will need replacing in the 2020s, and a second order of F35s, plus, in good time, the hoped-for UCAV, will be the only real option available for keeping up the fast jet numbers in the UK. The hope of the RAF is probably to get around 50 more airframes: post SDSR, a long-term target figure of "around 100 F35s" continued to circulate, in fact.

For maximum efficiency, though, i'd very much prefer if the UK sticked to the sole B variant, for maximum flexibility.
The F35A, of course, costs less, has a greater range and full size weapon bays.
The B's bays are 14 inches shorter, so there is less space for fitting current and future large weapons and/or payloads. The internal hardpoint for air-ground weaponry is rated for 1500 pounds, against 2500 for A and C variants.
In addition, the second of 3 pylons under each wing of an F35B is rated for 1500 pounds payload, against 2500 for the A and C variants. The innermost underwing pylons are rated for 5000 pounds on all variants (on these pylons the UK F35 will eventually carry Storm Shadows) while the third point on each wing is for AA missiles only, and the UK F35s will carry ASRAAMs on them.

It is not just about the Weapons Bays 14 inches shorter: payload limitations extend to the pylons carrying physically less weight, and there are of course Vertical Bring Back margins which can be a problem when the aircraft is returning to the carrier or short runway with unexpended weaponry aboard.

The F35A as a standard comes fitted with USAF-style receptacle, for Boom-type air to air refuelling. The RAF uses the USN method of Probe and Drogue.
Fortunately, the F35A is "ready to take" the same kind of probe and drogue kit used by the B and C, but nonetheless, there will be additional cost to fit it.

The Boom style air refuelling is the USAF favorite method. The USN method, adopted by NATO, has the well known probes and drogues. The Voyager tankers could be fitted with a Boom, but of course, this would cost serious money. And as it stands, none of the 14 air tankers on order has the Boom. Which creates already enough problems considering that the RAF can't refuel its C17s in flight, and in future won't be able to refuel the Rivet Joint either.

The main problem is that a Split Buy without the money for making it a big split buy is only going to buy two small aircraft fleet instead of a single, decent sized one.
Instead of 100 between F35B and F35A, i'd take 80 F35B any day, if the problem is money.
If the problem is about range and payload, then stepping away from the C was not right.

And, finally, there is another fear connected to a split buy: that of the two fleets entering a competition for access to the little budget available. The kind of internal, fratricide competition that gave Harried a death from a thousand cuts (the reduction enacted in 2009 was the death blow that was used as justification for the final retirement in 2010, as the many cuts had made the fleet "too small"), that forced the First Sea Lord to announce he would resign if the RAF went ahead and sacrificed the Harrier (2008).

I really do not want to hear, in a few years time, the same old shit.

"F35A costs less..."
"We've got more range and payload than them..."
"We can't put that weapon on the B..."
"We should just cut the B..."

No. It's happened once. Strategic Thinking has been sacrified once already, and it must not happen again. 
    


The Jane's article, reportedly, talks of yet another scenario. Please be aware that i cannot check it myself, i'm reporting from other sources:

Typhoon Tranche 1 retained, giving a 7 squadrons force. 48 F35B procured by 2023, a second order of F35 in the very long term (2030) as manned part of a Typhoon replacement, probably completed by drones. 

This would see the MOD abandoning the plan of retiring Tranche 1 Typhoons by 2019.
The Typhoon force would instead grow to 7 squadrons plus OCU and OEU, probably with the Tranche 1 used for the 2 "Air Defence" Squadrons (3rd and 6th RAF) and the Tranche 2 and 3 used in 5 "Swing-Role" deployable squadrons, due to their more complete capabilities.

The F35B force would be made up by 48 airplanes, procured probably by 2023, as said in Scenario 1.

The second buy of F35 airplanes in this case is, effectively, a non-binding promise. The government might well say they will order more F35s in 2030, but effectively they don't know, they can't and won't promise.
It is a nice way to say that, really, the F35 order has been slashed from 150, then 138 all the way down to 48. Quite dramatic a cut, more than two thirds of the original planning figure.
Not even worth bothering thinking about what will happen in 2030: way too far away in time to say. Not to mention that, as i said earlier, i really do not expect the Typhoon to bow out of service that soon.

This second scenario is admittedly attractive financially speaking because retaining already available, already paid-for Typhoon Tranche 1s is undoubtedly going to be less expensive than a second F35 order in the early 2020s.

A force of 48 F35Bs, however, calls into question the sense of adopting a "60:40" split between RAF and Fleet Air Arm.
With 48 being the bare minimum number for a single carrier wing, the focus on naval operations for the force must be absolute, or it won't make much sense. 

Drone news

France and UK deals

Philip Hammond and his french counterpart Jean-Yves Le Drian announced in a Joint Statement on July 24 that, building on the collaboration agreements of the 2010 Lancaster House agreement, the UK and France will fund the first phase of the Joint UCAV development and demonstration programme.

The Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle is expected to become mature and ready for service by 2030, a very unanbitious target considering that the US Navy will trial on an aircraft carrier at sea the X47B next year, in 2014 will demonstrate its Air to Air refuelling capability and between 2018 and 2020 it plans to put the drone in active service as a long range, stealthy, long endurance strike and recce asset for the Carrier Air Wings.

Europe is lagging behind by a great margin. 

The contract announced has a value of 13 million euro, and this money will be used by the BAE Systems / Dassault joint venture to begin the joint UCAV work.

Separately, BAE and Dassault both plan to stage the first flight of their existing UCAV-representative prototypes next year: for BAE, this is the Taranis drone, while Dassault is the team leader (50% share of work and costs) in the NEURON effort, a 405 million euro Europe-wide project which includes Italy's Alenia (22%), Sweden's SAAB, Spain's EADS-CASA, Greece's EAB and Switzerland's RUAG.

Taranis born from a 143 million pounds effort first announced in the Defence Industrial Strategy 2005. Production of the drone started in September 2007, and the Taranis was finally revealed at Warton, on 12 July 2010. Ground testing followed, in particular to demonstrate the all-sides stealthness of the prototype, and this phase was extended several times, so that the first flight was delayed from an intended 2011 date first to 2012 and then to 2013.

Reportedly, at least, the MOD is pleased by the excellent level of stealthness achieved.

The NEURON was launched by France in 2003 and the main contract with Dassault was signed in 2006. The French ministry of defence target for NEURON was described as the validation of a UCAV design which would lead to a production-ready aircraft with an unitary price of 25 million euro.

The two demonstrators are actually quite similar, sharing the same general architecture, stealth with two internal weapon bays, and even using the same engine, the Rolls Royce Adour. The French ministry of defence anticipated that a production-ready UCAV would need a much more powerful engine, and expected it to be a development of the M88 engine used by Rafale.

Now, with Dassault and BAE teaming up, the future of NEURON becomes uncertain, and the plan of using the Rafale engine becomes even more uncertain, as it is expected that, in the next few days, Rolls Royce and Safran will announce their own joint venture for the development of engine solutions specifically targeted at drones.

For sure, Dassault from the NEURON gains significant experience and know-how, paid in no small part by other european nations which now might find that the NEURON brings, effectively, to nothing for them.

The UK on its part can build on the Taranis experience and, to an unknown degree, it'll be able to access technology and solutions developed for the X47B carrierborne UCAV of the US Navy, after receiving clearance to follow the development with the Carrier Air cooperation Memorandum of Understanding signed on January 5, 2012.

Another deal reached will see France acquire a Watchkeeper drone system from the UK in 2013. The French Army will trial the drone at least until mid-2013, and eventually adopt it for its own needs. The Watchkeeper is built by Thales UK, and selling it to France would be a significant export win. 

In addition, it would open the door for extensive cooperation between the british and french army units working with the drone.

The most anticipated, expected and important deal, though, is again missing.

A contract for starting the development of the joint BAE/Dassault Medium Altitude Long Endurance (MALE) drone, to be known as Telemos, has not been announced, with developments in this direction once more delayed and pushed to the right. 

The Telemos aims for a 2020 in-service date, and for the UK is targeted specifically at the Scavenger requirement, a particularly important one. The constant delays (the RAF had hoped for a 2018 ISD, this had to be abandoned and pushed to the right) are already becoming an issue. 

Worse, France is under a new government, and is undergoing a defence review which will bring forth a new White Paper in the coming months. As part of this effort, France is looking again into its own MALE requirement, and for a few more weeks at least we won't know about the impact that this review will have on Telemos. 

As of now, the government suspended a previous decision to acquire the Heron TP drone from the Israel Aerospace Industries as an interim solution "France-ized" at great cost by Dassault.

This decision, already contested by the french senate, was the most expensive of all solutions, but was seen by Sarkozy as a way to preserve national industrial capability thanks to the great involvment of Dassault, which would heavily modify the israeli drone. 

The Senate noted that purchesing 7 MQ-9 Reaper drones from the US would be a much less expensive interim solution, and the new government is looking again at this and other possibilities: France's Defense Ministry is reportedly in talks for an extension of the contract for the Harfang MALE UAV system, due to expire in October 2013. 

They might continue with the Harfang in the near term and speed up the MALE program with the UK, if we are lucky, or they might take more damaging decisions. 

For example, France is keen on bringing Germany into the cooperative effort, and perhaps even Italy. France's intest in including Germany is mainly tied to EADS, the french-german-spanish defence industry giant, which would otherwise be cut off, after the failure of its internal Talarion MALE project. 

The UK, after the negative experience of the Typhoon enterprise, would very much prefer to keep the program binational only, or at most multinational at industrial level but binational in management and leadership. 

The Telemos saga is already getting complicated, before actual work even starts. It is a situation that needs to be sorted out quickly. 

Royal Navy drones 

The Royal Navy is finally managing to launch the expected Rotary Unmanned Aircraft development programme. On 24 July, the MOD notified industry that a contract is due to be signed for the Capability Concept Demonstrator (CCD) programme of the planned future Rotary-Wing Unmanned Air System (RWUAS). 

The bad news is that the CCD phase will last until 2015 (!) and an In-Service Date is not expected before 2020.

The CCD is meant to inform the Navy on "whether a multi-role RWUAS can provide utility in the mine countermeasures, hydrography and meteorology, offensive surface warfare and general situational awareness capability areas." 

The CCD phase will involve physical demonstrations of a vertical take-off and landing UASs and specialist sensors, supported by simulation and synthetic environment experiments. The MAGIC ATOLS system from Thales, which is used to let Watchkeeper land autonomously without human input, might be involved as it offers a readily available ship solution as well, capable to guide an helicopter drone on the deck of a ship at sea.

Defence Equipment & Support (DE&S) wants an air vehicle, ground control station and communications link offering "a low probability of delay due to unplanned maintenance or technical issues". The CCD will also have to determine the impact of embarking and using such a drone on ships, determining how it will be used, storaged, supported. 

Decisions about the drone system will affect arrangements for the Type 26 and MHPC vessels, so the Royal Navy should move and develop a clear plan for the future.

DE&S has been conducting some early studies, and identified three main potential "classes" of drones that could be used, from a tiny 100 kg solution to a 3000 kg one. To provide a comparison of sort, a fully-loaded Gazelle light helicopter weights 1900 kg. 

An helicopter drone is envisaged as part of the Type 26 mission packages, and is also part of the MCM, Hydrographic and Patrol Capability (MHPC) program for the replacement of the minesweepers and survey vessels.

It has not been a mystery that the Navy would eventually launch this contract award call. A VTUAS has been wanted for some years now, and last year QinetiQ and Northrop Grumman had outlined their proposal for the conversion of a Gazelle helicopter into a drone, using the US MQ-8B Fire Scout software and operating system. They are likely to bid for the CCD with this exact solution. 

The Fire Scout itself might be offered, too, along with other drones. 

A small drone such as the Camcopter is easily integrated on any ship, but its usefulness is severely limited for obvious reasons. A larger drone, such as Gazelle, is likely to be far more useful, but using it on Type 23 frigates in concert with even just a Wildcat might prove impossible. 

The Type 45 hangar, which can take two Wildcat helicopters, could easily take a Wildcat and a naval drone and perhaps even a Merlin HM2 plus drone combination. 

The Type 26, hopefully, will offer ample spaces for carrying Merlin HM2 and drone(s). It must be noted, indeed, that a drone helicopter is not going to be a replacement for manned helicopters capable to carry Marines, do SAR and medical evacuation and carry out ASW: all roles that the drone won't be able to cover. 

2 Lynx helicopters inside a Type 45 hangar

 

While the US has been sending ships out with sole-drone complements on rare occasions (recently, a frigate with 4 FireScouts), the US Navy ships are likely to pretty much always operate in company with other vessels, while RN ships are alone most of the time. The drone must expand the capabilities of the ship, not reduce them, so i do not think it can replace the embarked helicopter, but only supplement it. 

No news, for the moment, on the planned demonstration of "a drone rail-launched from the back of a frigate", which is also apparently planned for this year, according to what Air Vice-Marshal Mark Green, Director Joint and Air Capability told the defence committee back in June. 

The drone, not identified (might be Scan Eagle, even though this drone was already validated for launch and recovery from a Royal Navy Type 23 frigate between 2005 and 2006) would "fly for 14 hours" and then return to the ship.  

Scan Eagle on its launch rail on a Type 23 frigate in 2005. Back then, the Navy was unable to finalize an acquisition, and the successful trials did not lead to an acquisition.

Connected to the MHPC is also the recently announced deal for collaboration between Thales UK and Autonomous Surface Vehicles Ltd (ASV Ltd) to develop a re-configurable Unmanned Surface Vehicle (USV) to meet the challenges of future off-board Mine Countermeasures (MCM) operations.

The vessel has been jointly designed to meet a number of key requirements and drivers:

• Deployable from military platforms, craft of opportunity and from shore/harbour 
• Air transportable 
• Payload flexibility for all MCM systems – unmanned underwater vehicles, towed sonar, disposal systems, minesweeping 
• Stable platform with excellent slow speed and towing capabilities 
• Highly reliable & cost effective

The low signature USV, which is 11.5m in length and 3.6m in beam, will have a maximum speed of around 25 knots. The vehicle is now under construction and will be undergoing acceptance trials later this year. A series of payload trials will be conducted from early 2013 onwards, drawing on experience gained in previous off-board system programmes.

They are certainly going to offer this new system to the Royal Navy for MHPC: while the Navy has been using the Atlas FAST in these roles, trialing it since 2009, there is still good chances for Thales to win the actual contract.

FAST was originally born in 2007 as a 2-year, 4.3 million pounds demonstration programme aimed at a 150 million pounds requirement for an unmanned platform capable to tow Combined Influence Sweeping kit, following the retirement of such equipment from the Hunt minesweeper fleet in 2005. It was anticipated that 4 Hunt vessels would  be modified to carry and put in the water 2 FAST drones each.

The FAST was successfully designed, trialed and validated, but to this day the adoption on the Hunt vessels has not gone ahead. Instead, FAST is being used as a demonstrator for unmanned, remote MCM operations.

In 2011, Atlas demonstrated the use of FAST as an unmanned mothership for the deployment of smaller drones, namely the SeaFox mine disposal system.

These remotely-operated assets are crucial for the future of MHPC, as the 3000 tons ship envisaged is to be built of steel and it is to stay well far away from minefields, clearing routes from stand-off distance using surface, air and subsurface drones.

The FAST, or the new Thales drone, or yet another system, is the surface element: it is meant to tow combined influence sweeping equipment or sonars, and it is intended to deploy directly into the minefield other drones, such as the REMUS underwater search drones or the SeaFox disposal system.

For this role, the unmanned surface vessel must be kitted with suitable radio links, and with an underwater communication system: signals coming from the mothership are relayed by the unmanned surface boat to the underwater drones. 

The Flexible Agile Sweeping Technology (FAST) has much expanded its range of roles from when it was conceived in 2007 as a towing boat for combined influence sweep kit. Here it is shown with the launch arm loaded with a SeaFox mine disposal underwater drone.

As I said, FAST did not originally born with all these roles in mind, but adapted over time. The Thales realization, larger and more powerful, will be specifically configured from the start for the wide range of applications envisaged.

In future, drones such as this might also be used for Anti Submarine Warfare (ASW) by towing active sonars in swarms sailing ahead and around of the frigate/mothership, which would keep its sonar in Passive mode, receiving the sonar echoes from multiple directions and so managing to put together a much more accurate picture of the underwater situation, locating submarines much more easily, even if they are particularly silent and hard to detect.

Putting the active sonar away from the frigate is necessary, since the submarine in the depths will immediately locate the source of an active sonar signal, and might attack it if possible. That’s why frigates will almost always use the passive sonar mode (undetectable) and listen for catching the noise made by the submarine moving.

Like bistatic radars have better chances to detect stealth airplanes, a swarm of sonars transmitting active signals from different directions are going to massively increase the chances of successful detection.

From Afghanistan to the future

The US Marines are delighted by the performance of the K-MAX unmanned load carrying helicopter in Afghanistan. This 2300 kg empty weight helo, converted in unmanned configuration, is used to hail under slung loads of supplies (4000 pounds at 15.000 feet altitude, 6000 lbs at sea level) and carry them to Forward Bases, flying back and forth several times each night (for safety reasons, in Afghanistan the K-MAX is only flown at night) and reducing the need for road transfers which put personnel at IED and ambush risk. It also removes some tasks from the long list of missions assigned to manned utility helos, that can so be used for other roles, such as carrying soldiers around the battlefield.

The USMC deployed the "Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Squadron (VMU) 1 Cargo Detachment" with two K-MAX to Afghanistan in December 2011. It was an experimental deployment under a 43 million dollars contract, but the success was immediate. By early May 2012, the two drones had already moved over a million pounds of cargo, and their deployment was extended out to September 2012. Now it is flown by VMU 2. 

During the VMU 1 five months deployment, the two KMAX systems flew 485 combat mission flights, for a total of 525 flight hours. As DefenseUpdate reports:

Most missions lasted about 1 hour and included a 20-minute turnaround time during which a pilot climbed into the helicopter to shut it down, refuel it, hook up the cargo and then start it back up. “That was a pretty short turnaround time, and allowed us to conduct six sorties per night. We could have done more,” Joiner [Cargo UAS mission commander] noted. By the end of the deployment — and after receiving permission to hover — turnaround times with cargo hook-ups took 6 or 7 minutes to complete. Overall, the KMAX was very responsive, especially when compared to a convoy, a C-130 [Hercules] or an H-53 mission.

According to Joiner, “Towing the KMAX out of the hangar to wheels-up, could take as little as 15 minutes.”

“Since it was an unmanned system, we were able to conduct flights during inclement weather when other helicopters couldn’t fly,” O’Connor [Major in the VMU 1 unit] said. “We flew during the night, in the rain, dust and some wind.” The KMAX handled up to 4,500 pounds of cargo per mission, he said. “The reliability of the KMAX was impressive, It was fully mission capable 90 percent of the time.” O’Connor said. Inclement weather accounted for 5 percent of the downtime and maintenance and scheduling issues accounted for the other 5 percent, he said. The KMAX required less than two hours of maintenance per flight hour, which equates to a low cost, O’Connor added.

Kmax is an unmanned adaptation of an existing manned helicopter.

 

The US Army is looking ahead to field its own cargo carrying drone helicopters, and it anticipates putting a squadron of such systems in the Sustainment Brigades and/or in the Support Battalion of the Brigade Combat Teams. 

The USMC and USN, in the meanwhile, are looking ahead, beyond K-MAX, towards a common and multi-mission system. 

Using the same airframe, with the same training, logistic and support tail, and giving it a series of modular payloads enabling it to tackle different kinds of mission is the most effective way to go, they recognize. Such modular payloads could include a EO/IR camera payload that would be added for an intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) mission; the hook and long line added for cargo pick-up; fuel pods for long-range missions and even missiles and/or rockets for strike missions.

It is an unassailable concept, and my hope and dream is for the Royal Navy and British Army to join forces to work together on the Rotary-Wing Unmanned Air System (RWUAS), to follow the same concept. 

A 2000 / 3000 kg drone, of sizes and design suitable for embarkation in ship's hangars, capable to carry a significant payload under slung, and/or sensors and weaponry would cover a lot of roles and be of immense usefulness in all sorts of situations and scenarios.

Such Army/Navy collaboration would be further eased by the arrangements already in place for the joint running of the Wildcat fleet, including use of the same Main Operating Base, Yeonvilton, where the RN Squadrons and the Army Air Corps’ 1^st Regiment will be based.

In an age of restricted financial possibilities, this kind of cooperation is more important than ever, and where there is so clear potential for collaboration, the chance should not be missed.