Showing posts with label MCM. Show all posts
Showing posts with label MCM. Show all posts

Sunday, May 6, 2018

Towards unmanned, stand-off maritime mine counter measures



The MOD has announced that the first unmanned minesweeping system has been accepted by the Royal Navy. This welcome development comes after years of tests, experiments and also delays. It is the result of 3 years of work following a contract announced in march 2015 and is just a step, however important, within a much larger enterprise.

 
RNMB Hussar in action, towing the Combined Influence Sweep package 





UK-only development; Combined Influence Sweep replacement

12 October 2005 was an historic day for the Royal Navy, because the Hunt class minesweepers HMS Middleton and HMS Ledbury conducted the last evolution at sea involving sweep gear, both the Oropesa mechanical wire system and the combined influence sweep equipment. The Royal Navy at that point had already operated unmanned, remotely controlled sweep systems in 2003 during waterway clearance work in Iraq, notably the opening of Umm Qasr. Under a UOR, a number of Combat Support Boats with remote controls were used to tow the Mini Dyad System (MDS) produced by Australian Defence Industries (ADI) and Pipe Noise Makers. Called Shallow Water Influence Minesweeping System (SWIMS), they were sent ahead of the RN minehunters as precursor sweeps against ground influence mines. The future of MCM was taking the path of stand-off action through unmanned systems and it was felt that the more than 100 years of manned ships sweeping were at an end.

The replacement for the sweep equipment was to come through the Flexible Agile Sweeping Technology, or FAST. The idea was to put two unmanned surface vehicles on the Hunt class vessels by modifying their open, capacious stern area. FAST, however, proved anything but fast, and even though a contract was signed in 2007 by the MOD with the Atlas-QED consortium, comprising Atlas Elektronik UK, QinetiQ and EDO Corporation, the resulting Technology Readiness Demonstrator never made it on the Hunt class. FAST became a test platform that spent the following years doing all sort of trials and demonstrations. Initially intended only for towing sweep kit, it ended up testing remote deployment and recovery of Sea Fox unmanned underwater vehicles, demonstrating that stand off clearance of minefields was possible.



The above photo, from Mer et Marine.com, show FAST during tests involving the launch and recovery of Sea Fox at range. The Sea Fox UUV is visible on the launch arm to the right. 

Atlas Elektronik UK continued to work with the MOD and on its own, and eventually developed in-house the ARCIMS (ATLAS Remote Combined Influence Minesweeping System) system, which has enjoyed a first export success in an unnamed Middle East navy and has gone on to become the much delayed replacement for the Hunt’s sweeping capability within the Royal Navy.
An ARCIMS seaframe, but manned, was delivered to the Royal Navy in 2014 for trials and development purposes, and remains in service with the Maritime Autonomous System Trials Team (MASTT) of the Royal Navy as RNMB Hazard.    
On 6 march 2015, Atlas received a 12.6 million pounds order from the MOD for a first ARCIMS-derived system, in the unmanned configuration, configured to tow sweeping equipment. The system has now been accepted, and according to MASTT, which has already trialed it extensively, the new boat is called RNMB Hussar.

The RNMB Hazard, manned precursor to Hussar, is used in tests since 2014 
Redeployability directly from the shore after being transported by air, land or sea is a major advantage of the unmanned, stand-off MCM solutions. Here, Hazard is being moved.  

The 2015 contract for this system included the groundwork for two further “Blocks” of work, to be confirmed and funded later. Block 2 covers the integration with the Hunt class vessel: a refit will be necessary to clear the stern and add an A frame for launch and recovery of the 11-meters unmanned surface vehicle. A dedicate Reconnaissance Unmanned Underwater Vehicle Hangar is also envisaged. Block 2 is not yet under contract, nor is Block 3, which would consist of the acquisition of further systems. In 2015, four were envisaged.

This old image from the early phases of FAST shows the look of a modified Hunt turned into FAST mothership. The general arrangement is unlikely to change much with Hussar and MMCM, but the modifications to the Hunt class are not yet under contract, at least as far as i know

In late 2017 the First Sea Lord gave a speech in which he announced that the unmanned MCM project would be “speeded up” to deliver a workable system for “routine mine clearance” in UK waters within 2 years. The 2015 contract was always meant to last 3 years, so there is not an evident schedule change for the better; nor there is any evidence of rapid progress on Block 2 and 3. The unmanned system can be launched directly from the shore, so its use in UK waters probably does not require the modification of a Hunt. In other words, I’m not sure the 1SL speech is something to be happy about, or really a cut worded nicely.
In light of the coming of MMCM next year, Block 2 and Block 3 might never take place as originally envisaged.


MMCM; working with France

The Royal Navy is working on a second and much more ambitious programme, which is the Maritime MCM (MMCM) system jointly funded and developed alongside France. The contract for the manufacture of two full prototype systems, one for each country, was signed at Euronaval in October 2016, and next year the system should be delivered for trials.
The MMCM system-of-systems consists of multiple unmanned / remotely operated elements that will enable stand-off detection and disposal of mines up to 30 miles away from the mothership. The system is centered on a 11-meters Unmanned Surface Vehicle which will be used to tow a Synthetic Aperture Sonar and to deliver a Remotely Operated Vehicle for mine disposal. A large, autonomous underwater vehicle is also included, for reconnaissance of minefields.

Thales is tasked with delivery of the integrated Portable Operations Centre (POC), which will use a command & control solution jointly developed by Thales and BAE Systems. BAE Systems will provide the Mission Management System, the virtual visualization and experimentation suite. The BAE NAUTIS command and control system is expected to be at the core of the MMCM solution. NAUTIS is already operational on the RN minesweepers and in service in several other countries, from Turkey to Australia.

The Royal Navy in the meanwhile has been repeatedly using the Autonomous Control Exploitation Realisation (ACER), a containerized command post, complete with sensors, able to receive and fuse data streams from multiple unmanned air, surface and underwater systems. The ACER was successfully demonstrated at the Unmanned Warrior 2016 event, where it integrated data from 25 different unmanned systems supplied by 12 different organizations. For the occasion, it was embarked on the SD Northern River. It has also been used from the shore at the British Underwater Test and Evaluation Centre (BUTEC) range, and it was well visible on the flight deck of RFA Tidespring during exercise Joint Warrior 2018.
Whatever command system the MMCM employs, it will be important to integrate lessons from the ACER experience to ensure that integration of new unmanned vehicles, including eventually the rotary wing UAS that the Royal Navy hopes to put in service in the 2020s, is smooth.


ACER on the cargo deck of SD Northern River during Unmanned Warrior 2016 
ACER seen on the flight deck of RFA Tidespring during the recent Joint Warrior (thanks to RFANostalgia on twitter) 
Another ACER node seen again on SD Northern River while she plays prey to HMS Montrose's boarding team in recent exercises

ASV Ltd was selected to deliver the Unmanned Surface Vehicle, which will be a development of their Halcyon USV, an exemplar of which has already been used by the Royal Navy during various trials and experiments. The ASV will be similar in size to the ARCIMS / Hussar, and in theory a modified Hunt could carry two in tandem.
One interesting question going ahead is whether the RN buys further ARCIMS hulls in addition to the ASV Halcyon Mk2, or if it standardizes on one of the two. It is unfortunate that two virtually identical USVs are being procured, as having a single fleet would no doubt ease logistic considerations.


Halcyon is visible to the right, ahead of RNMB Hazard, during Unmanned Warrior 
Halcyon deploying a ROV 


The Halcyon USV that the Royal Navy has already employed has a displacement of over 8 tons and is capable of carrying a 2,5 tons payload at ranges in excess of 300 nautical miles. The vessel is 11.5 m long, has a beam of 3.5 m, is 2.9 m high, and can achieve a top speed of 29 kt (25 kt when fully loaded). It features a full navigation suite comprising GPS, radar, AIS, compass, and chart plotter; forward-looking EO cameras; a pan, tilt, and zoom camera; mission planning and mission management system; and a payload management system. The MMCM USV derivative will not dramatically depart from these dimensions, meaning that deployment from a Type 26’s mission bay will be another possibility.

The Hussar is similarly sized: 11 meters long, with a beam of 3.2m and a draft of 0.5m and a payload of around 3 tons. Propulsion is on two engines with water jet, giving an unladen max speed of some 40 knots and a speed of up to 15 knots while towing the sweep gear.
Atlas Electroniks and Rolls Royce have recently completed a demonstration campaign with an ARCIMS fitted with an autonomous collision avoidance system.
It will be interesting to see how the Royal Navy moves in the future in regards to the unmanned surface vehicle element.

The autonomous underwater vehicle will be a derivative of the French ECA A-27M.  With a speed of 6 knots and an endurance of 40 hours, the A-27 can dive down to 300 meters while carrying a suite of sensors which will include the Thales SAMDIS advanced syntheric aperture sonar, first demonstrated during 2014.
The SAMDIS, but in towed form, will also be streamed by the Halcyon-derivative USV, and will be the primary mine detection sensor.

A-27M AUV

The mines will be destroyed thanks to a multi-shot, reusable Remotely Operated Vehicle provided by SAAB. The Multi-Shot Mine Neutralisation System (MuMNS) could, in other words, replace the current Sea Fox, which was born as a one-shot system. There are two drones under the Sea Fox name: one, reusable, is used for reconnaissance, while the disposal system is sacrificed in the explosion that removes the mine. In more recent times, an add-on mask known as “COBRA” has made Sea Fox reusable by introducing the possibility of detaching the disposal charge and sail away, but the MuMNS is born with this concept of operation already in mind. The ROV can be operated down to 300 meters depth, and thanks to its “storm” magazine can actually carry other payloads in alternative to the mine disposal system.

SAAB MuMNS

Wood & Douglas is responsible for the communications between the elements of the MMCM system.

Currently, the main unmanned underwater vehicles employed by the survey and MCM flotilla are the REMUS 100 and 600 by Hydroid. Recently, the MOD has contracted an extension of support arrangements to ensure that these systems remain operational at least out to September this year, while a replacement contract is negotiated.
The REMUS 100 is used for Very Shallow Waters reconnaissance and its capability has been expanded in 2012 with the addition of extra sensors. A dozen systems should be in operation.
REMUS 600 can dive down to 600 meters for reconnaissance, lasting up to 70 hours. It can be reconfigured to dive down to 1500 and even 3000 meters. Additional sensor modules are added at the front. The basic payload suite consists of dual frequency Side Scan Sonar, CTD (Conductivity, Temperature and Depth) and pressure sensor.
Obviously, these systems are very important to the MCM mission and their extension in service and / or replacement will have to operate alongside the sweep and MMCM modules, and eventually possibly “become one” with said systems. The sweep payload itself would become just a component of the wider MCM system of systems.  

REMUS 100 
Deploying REMUS 600 

Both Hunt and Sandown are being life-extended and upgraded. The Hunt class is receiving new Caterpillar C32 diesel engines that replace her old Napier Deltics; and the Sandown class underwent the the Sandown Volvo Generator Programme (SVGP) that replaces the ageing Perkins CV8 diesel generators with more efficient Volvo Penta D13 Marine diesel generators. The first vessel to receive this upgrade was HMS Bangor, during a dry dock support period at Rosyth undertaken by Babcock in 2014.

Hunt class engine replacement 

Hunt class: the open stern is reconfigurable with relative ease, unlike on Sandown vessels. Note the white dome of the Satcom, added in the last few years, and the minigun positions, standard op Kipion fit 

The sonars fitted to the two classes have received significant updates: the Hunt class, with the hull-mounted Type 2193 sonar, are extremely good at detecting mines in shallow waters, down to 80 meters. The Sandown, with the multifrequency variable depth sonar system Type 2093, can hunt mines down to 200 meters depth. Both sonars have been improved with wideband pulse compression technology which allows for long-range detection and classification of low target echo strength mines by optimising performance against reverberation and noise simultaneously.
The capability of these sonars will have to be replaced though unmanned vehicles as part of the future solution going into the post-MCM ship era.



US Navy unmanned assets are often found in the Gulf on board RFA Cardigan Bay 

With the coming of MMCM, where do Block 2 and 3 of the Sweep technology contract sit?
Block 2 is arguably more necessary than ever, but the Unmanned Vehicles Hangar and launch and recovery equipment should not be just Sweep-focused, but more widely focused on the whole package.




Going ahead with a single USV type would be desirable, so the Sweep module should go on as a payload to be towed by whichever of the two USVs prove more successful.
As a consequence, Block 3 could have to include the migration effort and the delivery of more sweep modules but perhaps not more ARCIMS boats.

HMS Echo, a survey ship, has spent months as NATO MCM Squadron flagship. Here she is in La Spezia, Italy, in September 2017, embarking unmanned vehicles, training mines and other equipment. A sign of things to come. 

There is no telling what the Royal Navy is currently planning to do. Information is extremely scarce, but already in 2014, in the Naval Engineer magazine, the Sweep module was indicated as a component in the wider solution. Both Hussar and the incoming MMCM are, once more, prototypes, and it will be important to bring them together and harmonize the two programmes into one.


Motherships, not minehunters
  
The successful delivery of the whole future MCM package will transform the way mine clearance operations are carried out. If all goes well, in the new year the Royal Navy will finally be able to abandon its last reservations about the viability of stand-off mine clearance and begin crafting the course for the post-dedicate minehunter hull era.

France has already decided that it will no longer build dedicate, expensive, amagnetic hulls for the MCM mission. The latest Military Planning Law included funding to procure the first twonew-generation motherships by 2025, with two more to follow. The mothership will be large, steel-hulled, and flexible enough to cover other roles as well as MCM. Two designs are being considered: the NS 04 is a SWATH (Small Waterplane Area Twin Hull) complete of flight deck and hangar for medium helicopters as well as a large cargo / mission space in the stern for storage, launch and recovery of the unmanned vehicles.
The second design is a catamaran, with the same base characteristics. Other vessel designs, including more traditional monohulls, have been proposed. BMT in the UK has recently put forward the Venari, and years ago had proposed the Venator. These vessels all bring capabilities commonly found in OPVs, making them suitable for constabulary tasks as well as specialized MCM and hydrographic missions.
France’s future MCM programme (SLAMF, in French) intends to replace the current flotilla of Tripartite MCM vessels with 4 motherships, with another four vessels for Divers support, replacing four existing ships. Numerically, the contraction from 11 Eridan-class minehunters to four motherships is quite impressive, but the new vessels will be multi-role, and more easily deployable. Further units could be built if the same hull is selected for the new survey vessels to be ordered in the early 2020s.

NS04

The designs being considered for the french mothership 
BMT Venator 90 proposal 

Above, the BMT Venari proposal for a future mothership

Their pre-MMCM demonstration project, the ESPADON, launched in 2009, delivered an impressive optionally manned catamaran, the Sterenn-Du, displacing 25 tons, 17 meters long and 7.5 meters wide. Launched in 2010 and then employed in a vast range of tests, the Sterenn-Du is equipped with a launch and recovery “cage” between its two hulls. When the unmanned underwater vehicles return to the cage, they plug into connections that enable to downloading of the data collected. The Sterenn-Du was remotely operated in sea state up to 4, successfully carrying out launches and recoveries at range. The French navy does not exclude the possibility of using such large USVs again in the future, even if for the MMCM programme they have adopted the british approach of using a smaller platform.
For France, the ESPADON project removed all hesitations about the future of MCM being unmanned and stand-off.


The impressive Sterenn-Du, head on (above) and from the stern (bottom), seen with the launch and recovery cage lowered in the water, in this photo by mer et marine.com 

Despite years of work with FAST, the Royal Navy has instead not formally closed the door to the possibility of building a novel class of MCM-specific hulls, but this is looking more and more unlikely. According to current timelines, in any case, there will be plenty of time not just to evaluate MMCM and put it into service, but also to see the first French motherships enter service. The Royal Navy does not expect new vessels for the MCM mission before 2028, although a decision on the design will have to happen quite a lot earlier than that, considering how horrendously slow the british procurement and shipbuilding efforts can be. If ten years for delivering a Type 26 are any indication, the 2028 date for the first next generation mothership might actually end up proving to be hopelessly optimistic.

The programme that will deliver the future capability is known as MHC, MCM & Hydrographic Capability and deliberately envisages the replacement of not just Hunt and Sandown but of the survey ships Echo and Enterprise as well. Until late 2013 it was MHPC, with the P standing for “patrol”, but this was dropped after the order for the River Batch 2 vessels had been signed.
It would be extremely shortsighted to not take note of the multi-role capability of these new motherships and make sure they can adequately cover the “patrol” function as well. The removal of the P from the programme acronym is a most unwelcome development which is to be hoped will be reversed, because to not grasp the full range of advantages of having a new class of deployable ships would be criminal.
The unpleasant sensation, common to many other areas across the MOD, is that planning is so constrained by short-termism that the relationship between programmes is regularly misunderstood or deliberately ignored. From the small to the huge things, it seems like project offices are unable to talk to each other and ensure that the overlap, where it exists, is of the good rather than of the bad kind. Was it truly impossible to avoid developing two USVs for the same role? Was it intentional as a form of “parachute” in case of issues with one of them?
At a far greater scale, why is the relationship between River Batch 2, Type 31 and MHC so confused? The Royal Navy risks to move from a fleet of virtually only “ships of the line” escorts to a fleet with no less than 3 low-end, constabulary capable classes more or less overlapping each other. Worse, it might deliberately handicap the MHC mothership to artificially eliminate the overlap with River B2.
The Royal Navy needs to put order in its ideas, and ensure that the three programmes work together, not one against the other.


Earlier french designs for the mothership as shown by Mer et Marine

Until the new motherships arrive, the unmanned systems (both the Sweep and the MMCM kits) will be used initially in home waters, probably directly from the shore. Deployment at sea can happen from a multitude of different vessels, and we can reasonably expect to see SD Northern River’s capacious deck filled up with these systems in a future Joint Warrior.  
The interim mothership, however, should still eventually be the Hunt. It will be extremely interesting now to see if, when and how the first Hunt vessel is modified for the new era. The Hunt class, unlike the Sandown, has an essentially open stern where the sweep equipment used to be carried and operated from. For over a decade the RN has planned to modify this open space, but the project has been constantly delayed and, in a surprise move, in December last year two Hunt vessels had their refit and life extension cut short by early decommissioning as part of budget cuts.
The SDSR 2015 mandates that a third vessel will eventually bow out before 2025, leaving 12 between Hunt and Sandowns, and further cuts could reduce this number even further.
From the outside, the early decommissioning of HMS Quorn and HMS Atherstone looks symptomatic of the gravity of the crisis the MOD is constantly drowning into. The loss of two of the “reconfigurable” ships is in antithesis with over 10 years of work, plans and experimentations. I can’t know what the exact reasoning was behind the closed curtains of the MOD, but their hasty cut smells of pure desperation.

Is the unmanned future of MCM “speeded up” as the MOD claims? It doesn’t look like it at all. The delivery of the first sweep system is a major step in the right direction, but Hussar alone is just a beginning, 13 years after the legacy sweep capability was lost.
The modification of the first Hunt isn’t yet in sight; the procurement of other sweep systems might or might not happen. More information is needed on what the plan is, and we all know how helpful the MOD is when it comes to explaining itself.
It is really a bittersweet picture. A step has been moved, but it is extremely hard to share the triumphalism of the MOD press release.



Friday, September 6, 2013

Towards the future of minesweeping: an introduction




Deploying today’s minesweepers and keeping them in action for long periods of time out at sea is not easy. The current vessels have glass-reinforced plastic hulls, excellent not to detonate magnetic mines but not so good for ocean travel. They aren’t fast vessels, and they are very small, with a logistical endurance that ranges on the 14 days mark. Minesweepers also happen to be complex warships, very expensive to build and maintain: in proportion to its size, the Hunt-class minesweeper is the most expensive ship in the Royal Navy’s arsenal. It is a very capable minesweeper, but has serious limitations, and although formally all minesweepers have a secondary “patrol vessel” capability, this is very marginal, considering their limited endurance, low speed, lack of helicopter facilities etcetera.

The RN minesweepers can be deployed over long distances, of course: it takes time, but both Hunt and Sandown vessels regularly make their way to the Gulf to replace their sister ships involved in Operation Kipion. Once every three years, there is a ship rotation. The force based in the Gulf (newly grouped under the badge of 9th MCM Squadron) is normally composed by two Hunt and two Sandown, so that the complementary capabilities of the two boats are both readily available in the area (the Hunts are fitted with the hull-mounted sonar Type 2193, while the Sandowns have the variable-depth Type 2093). To counter the weakness of the minesweepers, the RN keeps a Bay-class ship as mother vessel in the area: she carries communications, weapons for the defence of the force, an hangar for a Lynx helicopter flight, a command and control staff, Diver teams, aerial and underwater unmanned vehicle teams and stores and fuel that she can pass on to the minesweepers to extend their endurance. 

Operation Kipion is the constant presence in the Gulf of powerful RN assets, centered on the MCM force of four minesweepers.

The expanded MCM force in the Gulf has now been given the collective identity of 9th MCM Squadron. The badge has already been worn by MCM forces of the Royal Navy in the Gulf in the past

The US Navy does more or less the same using the USS Ponce, an old LPD that instead of being withdrawn from service was refitted and transformed into a capable Afloat Forward Staging Base. The US Navy, which has had to deploy its minesweepers over a greater distance, all the way across the Atlantic, used Float On, Float Off vessels to carry the warships to the Gulf, in a demonstration of how difficult it can be to deploy the current generation of minehunting vessels over long distances. The minesweepers on their own would have needed at least 60 days to reach Bahrain, against 40 days of travel on the back of the FLO-FLO vessels Blue Marlin or Tern (both ships used for the super-transport), and on their arrival they would have needed a drydocking period to have the wear and tear of the travel fixed and remedied to.  

MCM global deployment, US Navy style
 
This is part of the reason why all major western Navies are trying to develop a working, stand-off suite of unmanned boats, underwater and air vehicles that can sweep a wide area of sea to remove enemy mines, without requiring the mothership to actually get close to the minefield. This would allow the removal of the single-purpose, wooden or glass reinforced plastic hulled minesweepers from the fleet, making space for larger, steel-built, ocean-capable vessels which would offer far greater deployability and flexibility.
It is the concept behind the american LCS with its MCM module. France has its SLAM-F project, the UK has the MHPC programme and Italy is planning to eventually replace the minesweepers of the Lerici and Gaeta classes with a OPV/mothership carrying an equal modular suite of unmanned vehicles. In this brief introductory piece to what I hope will be a series of posts I’ll be writing over time, I want to recall a major case of wartime difficulties with minesweeping, going back to the Royal Navy’s experience in the Falklands war. This also gives me the chance to talk about an act of bravery that does not really get recognized enough, and that I’m sure many do ignore completely.

In the task force that sailed south to retake the Falklands in 1982, there initially were no minesweepers, although it was fully expected that sweeping of mines, underwater EOD and other tasks were likely to be required, and a small MCM team sailed aboard the LPD HMS Fearless.
The absence of minesweepers was due to the elderly Ton class’s incapacity to safety face the long transfer from the UK and the heavy seas expected in the South Atlantic. The Hunt class was at the time yet to come, with the first two vessels yet to be delivered, and anyway it would have been a tough call for the newer hulls as well.

Unfortunately, the Argies were soon observed planting mines at sea. Admiral Woodward writes in his memories (“One hundred days”, book written with the help of Patrick Robinson):


One of our submarines had already watched the Args laying mines to the east of Port Stanley harbor entrance (called Port William, incidentally), which was after all the most obvious place for us to land. So we knew well enough that they were perfectly capable of laying mines across the northern end of Falklands Sound as well. For that matter they might even go for the Southern end too, depending on how many they had, how much time they had and whether they thought it necessary. And since it now seemed fairly certain that our General Directive would change in a way that which would render Carlos Water our automatic choice for the landings, I wanted to do my best to ensure that we did not lose half a dozen ships and a couple of thousand men four miles short of the landing area.


[…]


If I had been an Argentinian and had suspected even for one moment that the british were coming in to land in Carlos Bay, I would have laid as many mines in the north and south entrances to Falkland Sound as I could. That would have eliminated all worry about the Brits landing anywhere along either side of the Sound. It would have been a considerable weight off my mind. We did not, of course, know whether they had done just that… or something very like it.  

For my part, however, mine-sweepers and their special equipment I did not have, which meant that I would have to use something else – and the hull of a ship was the only suitable hardware available. The only steel which would go deep enough. Now, plainly I could not use the two indispensable Type 22 frigates Broadsword or Brilliant with their close-range Sea Wolf systems. I also clearly could not send in my remaining Type 42s Coventry and Glasgow with their invaluable long-range Sea Dart systems. And equally surely, it really wasn’t on to send a merchant ship or RFA. It had to be a ship though – and it would have to be a Royal Navy warship. But it would also have to be something cheap and cheerful which I could replace, like a 3000-ton Type 21 frigate. Like Alacrity. Like expendable Alacrity.

Now, I did not particularly relish the prospect of ringing up Commander Christophere Craig and saying, “Tonight I would like you to go and see if you can get yourself sunk by a mine in the Falkland Sound. By the way, I will put Arrow up at the northern end to observe events and in case she’s needed to pick up survivors.” Nor, when it came to sending the amphibians in, could I possibly follow the instincts of the fabled American Civil War admiral, David Farragut, who roared at the entrance to Mobile Bay in 1869, “Damn the torpedoes. Full speed ahead!”

I did neither. Instead I phoned Commander Craig on the voice-encrypted network and said, “Er,… Christopher, I would like you to do a circumnavigation of East Falkland tonight, all the way around to the south, then north up Falkland Sound and out past Fanning Head to rendezvous with Arrow.” I also told him to come up the Sound very noisily, exploding a few star-shells and generally frightening the life out of the Args. I added, “If you see anything move, sink it, but be out of there and home by dawn, so you are clear of the land before they can fly.”
He was silent for a few moments and then he said, “Umm, I expect you would like me to go in and out of the north entrance a few times, Admiral. Do a bit of zig-zagging.”
“Oh,” I said, feigning surprise and feeling about two inches high. “Why do you ask that?”
“I expect you would like me to find out whether there are any mines there,” he said quietly.
I cannot remember what I said. But I remember how I felt. I think I just mentioned that I thought that would be quite useful.
He replied, with immense dignity, “Very well, Sir.” Then he went off to prepare for the possible loss of his ship and people the best way he could. I shall remember him as one of the bravest men I ever met. This was Victoria Cross material but, strangely, only if it went wrong.

I personally felt awful not to have had the guts to be honest with him and wondered what the devil he was going to tell his ship’s company about their task tonight and about my pitiful performance, which, for a sea-going admiral to one of his commanders, beggared description.



Fortunately, there were no mines. Alacrity did her dangerous job that night, taking to occasion to sink the argentine tanker Isla de Los Estados, caught in the Sound in the light of a star-shell and pounded with the 4.5 inch gun.



Thus ended quietly, and no doubt gratefully so, an extraordinary story of courage, which will go, I’m afraid, largely unnoticed in the annals of maritime history. COMAW (Commodore, Amphibious Warfare, Michael Clapp) certainly was completely unimpressed by Alacrity’s efforts. But had it ended in tragedy it would have joined the sagas of Jervis Bay or Glowworm being presented to young naval officers of the future as a supreme example of selflessness and devotion to duty. If they had hit a mine, Commander Craig would have been most strongly recommended for the award of a VC – but, thank goodness, he didn’t.


Commander Craig lived on and continued his career with distinction. No VC for him, but he became Commodore and was the frontline commander of the british task force in the Gulf War, the conflict in which, showing that many lessons from the Falklands had been learned, a much improved Type 42, HMS Gloucester, with much improved Sea Dart missiles, shot down an iraqi Silkworm anti-ship missile in a worldwide first that has yet to be repeated.  

On 12 May, Carlos Bay became the definite objective for the beach head. Alacrity had done her job and allowed the campaign to proceed. On May 21st, the troops landed on the beaches of San Carlos bay.

It was only on May 26 that the 11th Mine Counter-Measure Squadron, a formation purposefully stood up for the South Atlantic campaign, reached South Georgia. The Squadron was formed requisitioning five deep sea trawlers from Hull and fitting them with rudimentary MCM equipment. The crews for the five ships came from the Ton-class minesweepers based in Rosyth.
The vessels so obtained (HMS FARNELLA, HMS CORDELLA, HMS JUNELLA, HMS NORTHELLA and HMS PICT) initially worked to transfer stores across the task force and towards the beach heads, before serving in their intended role, finally clearing Port William waters between 23 June and July 4. It was only in early July that two new Hunt-class minesweepers could arrive in the area to complete the job.
I strongly encourage everyone who reads this piece to go read this brief but detailed account of the activities of the “forgotten few of the Falklands”: the men of the Minewarfare, Diving and Explosive Ordnance Disposal units.

Waiting so long to have minesweepers, even rudimentary, was a non-starter, during the Falklands campaign, which was dramatically constrained and absolutely had to be closed in short time, before the ships were worn out and the winter could set in.
It is worth remembering that the Falklands Campaign was planned with the awareness that the task group would, in Woodward’s effective words “fall apart” by mid to late june, due to the ships receiving no adequate maintenance and spending all their time out in the hostile South Atlantic. The arrival of winter would have made pretty much impossible to sustain the tempo of the operation, and the ships would have had to turn back and head to a port.
Already in the planning phases it was evident that the land battle had to be won by the end of June at the latest, and preferably a good two weeks before that. As a consequence, to make sure that land forces would have a reasonable time to reach Port Stanley, the soldiers had to go ashore by about May 25, not later. To sustain the campaign, the sky and sea had to be sufficiently clear to allow operations and, crucially, to enable the transfer of stores, men, vehicles, fuel and ammunition from the ships to the shore, by both boat and helicopter.
The margins were incredibly tight, also considering that the LPD HMS Intrepid had been destored in March and put in reserve as part of the disastetrous cuts of the John Nott’s defence review, and she had to be re-stored and brought back to operational status before she could sail south.
Weather and strategic considerations, plus the availability of HMS Intrepid constrained the definition of the “window” of time in which the amphibious landing could take place: it had to happen between 16 April (earlier date at which HMS Intrepid could be available) and 25 May.

It is a good thing that the Args did not have the capability to establish larger minefields. They would have posed a tremendous challenge, and potentially derailed the whole campaign, in consideration of the unavailability of proper minesweeping equipment and, crucially, the pathologic lack of available time. 
Time is always a crucial factor, in any war. But the Falklands campaign is probably the one war that has been shaped the most by choices of timing. It is worth reminding, and admiral Woodward himself never made a mystery of it, that had the Args waited six months more, the islands would now be called Malvinas for real. Six months would have seen the Argies in a stronger position (with the Etendards carrier-qualified, so able to deploy their Exocet missiles far further out at sea) while the cuts mandated by the John Nott's defence review would have had removed Britain's capability to react by removing from the ORBAT the carriers and the LPDs. 

On Sunday 13 June, the Task Group was, as was to be expected, effectively falling apart. Only three vessels in the force had no major OPDEF (Operational Defect) to report, and these were Hermes, Yarmouth and Exeter.
Fortunately, the war was over, with the surrender of the argentine garrison in Port Stanley on Monday 14, in the times that had been anticipated. HMS Invincible, that had had to deal with big trouble almost immediately after setting sail, dealing with a gearbox which wouldn’t work, had now to sail well clear to the north, escorted by the frigate Andromeda, to undergo an engine change.
As expected, by then the weather was changing, and the ships had to endure a monstrous tempest with force 10 gale winds, confirming that, for very good reasons, there was no time to waste.



Conclusions
There are many examples of how much of an impact mines can have on impeding operations. They are very effective at slowing down the pace of the opposition’s ops, and this at times can, in itself, bring to victory. Unfortunately, the current minesweeping vessels are slow, not genuinely globally deployable and limited in terms of usefulness outside of their very specific role. They are as incredibly precious, in other words, as they are frustrating.  

I’m firmly convinced that the times are now mature for motherships much less specialized and much more multirole and flexible, equipped with modular mission payloads. The emerging unmanned stand-off MCM capabilities have the potential to make sure that the unfortunate HMS Alacrity of the future will be able to reconnoiter a waterway not with their own hull, but with the help of unmanned boats and sensors they will be able to deploy from cargo decks. We can think, specifically, to the future Type 26 frigates, with their mission deck capable to take 11 containers of equipment and/or boats, manned or unmanned.

The modular payloads will extend the capabilities of warships in many roles, not just in the MCM field. Unmanned vehicles will most likely grow more and more important in ASW missions as well, for example. And while the minesweeper as we currently intend it will possibly disappear, there will be a new, exciting chance to build multirole vessels with far greater logistical endurance and deployability and with utility across a much wider range of roles.

In the coming posts, it is my intention to talk about the ongoing development programs, from MHPC to SLAM-F to the LCS, tracing a story of this important turning point in the history of naval warfare.