Showing posts with label aircraft carrier. Show all posts
Showing posts with label aircraft carrier. Show all posts

Saturday, January 25, 2020

The cringeworthy debate pre-SDSR


I’ve already written out my thoughts about the SDSR 2020 and, despite the enduring noise about Cummings and cuts and other unpleasant news, i’m sticking to that description, for now at least. You can find my predictions here, if you haven’t yet read them and want to know what my position is.

This post, which I hope I’ll be able to keep short, is more of a comment to the circus of rumors, leaks and “suggestions” coming from experts ahead of every contemporary SDSR. It’s a cry of agony in front of the increasingly empty rhetoric of “sacred cows” and an expression of the deep incredulity and frustration with which Allies observe the painful process with which Britain, more often than not, commits self-harm.

The gut feeling is that those who profess the loudest objectivity are actually the most partisan, and that the “sacred cow” catchphrase has become an easy and good-looking way to advocate for cuts to fall on anything other than the pet project of the day. It makes it look like you are being all innovative and hard nosed about things. 

Most of those “sacred cows” are, in fact, valid capabilities than nowhere else in the world are subject to the same kind of denial. Moreover, these “sacred cows” are actually UK capabilities which work, which have cost billions to build up and which are competitive and respected worldwide.

I’ve already written about the absurdity ofclaiming that aircraft carriers are somehow obsolete, and I won’t go over that subject again. In this occasion I will only remark that no one else in the world, nowhere, would ever consider chopping the legs off from under a key national capability at the dawn of its service life, after 20 years of efforts, sacrifices and expenses to build it up.

The UK has a history of throwing away billions of pounds in exchange for absolutely nothing, and the Nimrod MRA4 fiasco is there to remind us all of how majestic the wasted sums can get. But Nimrod MRA4, according to what we are told at least, did not work and was “never going to work”. Personally, I doubt it, but we have to take it at face value. If we do, the question then becomes why it wasn’t stopped earlier, before wasting over 3 billion pounds, and who is responsible and why nobody is paying for such a disaster, but this is another story.

The carriers work. There is no excuse in the world that will justify turning them into pure waste, because it will be due only to self-harm, if it ever happens.

I will rather focus on the 16th Air Assault Brigade and 3rd Commando Brigade, which have increasingly become THE sacred cows, together with the capabilities they represent: parachuting and air assault, and amphibious capability.

This is the third SDSR in a row that begins with calls to “merge” the two brigades and / or drastically cut back on both capabilities, withdraw the amphibious ships etcetera. It is as illiterate a proposal as they can be. Merging the two brigades to achieve savings would almost certainly mean disbanding the brigade supports: either 7 RHA or 29 Commando RA; either 23 or 24 Engineer Regiments, and so along. The result would be the net loss of yet another set of Brigade enablers, which are already the true weakness of the British Army, which has already taken this path in 2010, with the result that there are 31 infantry battalions but only about a third of those sit within a brigade with any realistic chance of deploying and operating as a combined arms force.

It is true that it is increasingly dangerous to employ parachute assaults or even employ helicopters and operate in the littoral in a world of long-range SAMs and anti-ship missiles, but it is not true that either capability has ceased to be relevant. Nobody else is giving up on them: France has used small-scale parachute assaults as early as 2013 during Operation Serval; Russia and China are nowhere near considering giving up such manoeuvre capabilities, despite being the countries which are supposedly causing both capabilities to become obsolete. Russia and China are also pursuing massive strengthening of their amphibious forces.

Littoral manoevre and air manoeuvre remain as critical as they have ever been. It is true that capabilities and tactics must evolve as the sword and the shield battle it out for superiority, as it has been ever since warfare began. Just like I said for the carriers, it is not the ability to put troops ashore from the sea or from the air that becomes “obsolete”: you still need to be able to do that. What might become obsolete is your methods of doing it, and, above all else, the instruments you employ to make your way through enemy defences. It is not the amphibious ship that has become obsolete, per se: it is your ability to protect it from enemy missiles that you no longer trust. What undoubtedly needs modernization is the Ship to Shore connection. Slow and vulnerable landing craft need to be succeeded by connectors which can defend themselves and move much faster and over longer distances to restore the unpredictability of littoral manoeuvre.

The quality of the debate on both air and littoral manoeuvre has dropped to such desperately low levels that we have “experts” that sometime literally argue, at the same time, that air assault is now impossible due to the proliferation of surface to air missiles, but that the Marines should become a lighter force which gives up on surface manoeuvre in favor of long range raids enabled by helicopters.

Have you spotted the problem?

If helicopters are the future of Littoral Manoeuvre, they can’t be simultaneously obsolete. If air assault is no longer feasible, why helicopters coming from the sea are an answer? It’s absurd.

It’s what happens when your argument is actually nothing but a call for the cuts to fall on anything but what you care about.

Several of the UK defence commentators and experts have fallen in love with the nebulous STRIKE concept, for reasons that remain mysterious. There have even been repeated suggestions that STRIKE makes littoral manoeuvre unnecessary, because you can just land the STRIKE brigade in a friendly port and then drive on road to the front. This has even been offered as a solution to avoid the risks connected with facing the Anti-Access, Area Denial capability of a peer enemy, which supposedly make the Royal Navy incapable to operate in the area.

How is that a sane argument to make? 
If you are dealing with an enemy sophisticate and powerful enough to keep the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force out, how the hell are you going to create trouble for them by driving wheeled APCs up to their border?

Moreover, in a war scenario, will a country nearby to your enemy want to get involved, and let you land your forces there and then drive all the way to the border, exposing itself to all sorts of dangers? Sometimes they will. Sometimes they won’t want to get involved at all.

And ultimately, if you are landing in a safe port and then driving up to the front, why not do it with heavier, more credible armour than with expensive but nearly unarmed BOXERs? This is not a replacement for littoral manoeuvre and amphibious capability: it’s normal land warfare. Nothing at all new here.

5 years on I’m still waiting for a single rational explanation of how a mixture of BOXERs and AJAX somehow changes the reality of modern warfare. UAVs will spot and possibly attack tanks and IFVs, but not BOXERs…? They are not invisible hover-tanks, they are enormous 8x8s with very little armament on top. They are don’t have a firepower advantage. They do not solve the reality, finally admitted by the Commander Field Army himself in a recent interview with Wavell Room, that the British Army is outgunned and outranged. It faces a dramatic disadvantage in weight and reach of Fires.

The STRIKE brigade will have some degree of self-deployability, and that is good. It will require less HETs, less LETs, less of a logistic train. And that is good and desirable. But pretending that they will somehow revolutionize warfare is absurd. The British Army is purchasing an 8x8 armored vehicle 30 years after everyone else, and that is it. There are much better equipped and armed wheeled, medium brigades within NATO already today, but nobody in their sane minds pretend they can not only maneuver quickly up to the fight and along it, but split up into platoon packages and rampage deep behind enemy lines.

The British Army and some commentators insist on saying that STRIKE will do that. It is not credible. Not unless something truly new and revolutionary comes to these formations. STRIKE as of now comes with no advantages over a peer / near peer enemy capability. None at all. If there is no rational reason to expect success, all that is left is hope and dreams.

The increased strategic mobility of wheeled armor is a step forwards from what the British Army has, but is not a new thing compared to wheeled formations which have been around for decades. At the end of the day, British Army 8x8s are not going to be any more unpredictable in their road moves than the enemy’s own 8x8s.

Actually, Russian 8x8s are lighter and often amphibious, so you could actually legitimately claim that their strategic and tactical mobility is superior, as they can use more routes, more bridges (BOXER and AJAX are over 38 tons behemoths) and even, with some limitations, move across rivers without seeking a bridge at all. They are less protected than BOXER, but on the other hand are far more heavily armed.

These are all factors that routinely get ignored when STRIKE is promoted as the best thing since sliced bread.
For all its merits, STRIKE is a capability that is far more limited than its supporters want us to believe.

Moreover, the British Army as a whole is currently outgunned and outranged and full of capability gaps. If you want to fill those gaps and make it more competitive, you must find many more billion pounds to invest.
Is it worth it? Is it something the UK actually needs?

The Royal Navy and RAF are small, but are already globally competitive. They line ships and aircraft which are on par, or superior to peer and near peer rivals. The Army, unfortunately, is not in as good a shape. It is small and also faces severe obsolescence issues in its equipment.

In an ideal world, those deficiencies need to be corrected, but this is not an ideal world: if the corrections are only possible by robbing Peter to pay Paul, is it worth it?
In my opinion, no. Why should you cut funded, existing capabilities which are useful and globally competitive in order to pursue the new fashion of the day?

The Army says it needs STRIKE to contribute to NATO, to be able to rush to the aid of Eastern Europe in case the Russians lash out. The first question that should be asked is: is in the UK’s interest to rush to the East for a major land campaign? Does it need to be “the first” to get there (even with STRIKE, it would not be…)? Why should the UK’s contribution take that shape? Why not give priority to completing the modernization of the heavy armour, and perhaps invest on more HETs and in rebuilding railway mobility capability which was so unwisely demolished in the SDSR 2010…?
Why not focus on providing other capabilities, which the UK is better equipped to deliver without having to find extra billion pounds, simply?

I go back to 16th Air Assault Brigade: the UK owns 60 Chinook, 23 Puma HC2 and is getting an excellent, globally competitive Apache block III fleet. It owns 8 C-17, which in Europe are an unique, high value capability. In addition to those, it owns 22 A-400M and 14 C-130J. All these high value items are funded, operational, proven.

Nobody in Europe is currently as well equipped as the UK to build up a powerful air mobile force. Instead of babbling about the parachute regiment being a “sacred cow”, the UK should look at the excellent ingredients it owns, and think about how they can more effectively be exploited. Those 60 Chinooks are a treasure that other NATO countries would kill for. You can easily imagine the frustration of the French, for example, whenever they look at that fleet and think what they could do with it.
Many UK commentators apparently consider it not a treasure, but an expensive obstacle to throwing money on something new.

Wouldn’t it make far more sense to think about how to get more out of what you already have? You probably can’t launch an helicopter-borne force deep behind a peer enemy lines, but there is still enormous usefulness for a fleet of 60 Chinooks that could be used to quickly move whole battalions of infantry to hold ground and plug gaps in a modern, contested, wide-area combat zone. Especially with 50 Apache in support.
Instead, we get the “sacred cow” rhetoric.

Thankfully, in its interview with the Wavell Room, the Commander Field Army has demonstrated greater wisdom than the various “experts” and said that they are indeed rethinking the contribution of 16th Air Assault to a Divisional fight, or even a Corps operation at NATO level. It might look more like the old air mobile force of BAOR days, or take yet another shape. What matters is making good use of the very expensive ingredients that are already on the table.

Similarly, the UK has excellent maritime capabilities, including the amphibious and heavy sealift vessels needed to move a capable littoral manoeuvre force, which NATO values. Why should you cut back on something that is already there, already funded, and that can deliver plenty more usefulness well into the future?

Such a sacrifice would only make sense if it resulted in some kind of truly revolutionary leap forwards in other areas, or if it resulted in plugging a capability gap that just cannot be allowed to continue. But this is not the case.

Watching british SDSRs unfold is a cringeworthy experience. The arguments thrown around, with calls for cuts of this or that expensive, precious capability are painful to listen to.
It’s like watching a guy with only very vague notions of cooking suddenly put into a kitchen with a table covered in all sorts of expensive, precious ingredients. Some of those precious ingredients he completely disregard, others he even wants to throw away (but it’s fine, so long as he describes them as sacred cows that hold back “innovation”). Some others get mashed together into some sort of half-cooked, disappointing recipe (BOXER and AJAX, I’m looking at you). Some other recipes, he starts without having all ingredients for and without being able to afford them (STRIKE). Some other recipes are started out with great enthusiasm, then abandoned halfway in (the modernization of heavy armour, which was thrown into disarray by taking Ajax out of it and might other blows via WCSP and CR2 LEP). Some other precious ingredients get kind of forgotten and are abandoned in a plate to the side, certainly not without some usefulness for the future, but not mixed together in any kind of rational recipe ( 1st Division and its incomplete brigades without CS and CSS).

It’s a painful spectacle of waste and indecision.

Sometimes someone manages to buy at bargain price some of what is thrown away (RFA Largs Bay, swiftly picked up by Australia; next time will it be Wave class tankers taken up by Brasil, or perhaps even some Type 23s…? Maybe Sentinel R1, too. I’m sure someone would gladly buy those). Sometimes it ends literally in the garbage bin.

We should all be very careful when labeling existing capabilities for deletion and sacrifice, for many reasons. First of all, the efforts of thousands of people and billions of taxpayer money are invested into them, for a start.

Second, deletion of existing capabilities never recoups much money at all. You are certainly not getting back the billions it cost to build them up. You lose far more than you can purchase with what little money is recouped.

Third, any deletion of capability comes with a depressive effect on the force that suffers it. How much manpower is going to bleed out, and how much is the perception of your force’s future and relevance going to be impacted?

Last but not least, you have to be very, very sure that what you are going to invest in is worth the sacrifice. We have to be rational and admit that the British Army is unlikely to ever be truly competitive again. It can be improved, certainly, but it is not going to be a main continental force, not even if several more billions a year are poured into it. Does the UK need to cut back on its existing capabilities to try and reinforce the army? Why? What influence and effect is that going to buy, at the end of the day?

The new SDSR should completely ignore the empty rhetoric of sacred cows, which are mostly just the latest evolution of inter-service bickering, and assess what the UK absolutely needs to do, first of all, and immediately after it should determine what it can do well, and specifically what it can do with what it already owns.

If there are new capabilities that absolutely must be funded – and there might well be – then the first place where to look to make room is in the long list of programmes which haven’t yet started and are not yet under contract. You might have to delay, delete, prioritize.

If I had to point my finger at some kinetic capabilities that might urgently need attention, for example, I’d have to mention anti-ballistic missile defense and air-defence in general, since this is an enormous weak spot in the whole of the UK’s forces. As ballistic anti-ship missiles and theatre ballistic missiles become more and more common in the tactics and strategies of enemies and rivals worldwide, having no BMD defence at all will soon simply become unacceptable. The ability to fire back, and thus some truly powerful and modern Fires, would be by big second. The US Army has made Fires its number one priority, and it’s no mystery that I think they have got that right.

In order to make room for investments in those areas, the UK might have to cut pieces of its future-years equipment programme, and that is why the Army is worried, since most of its programmes have yet to be put under contract. According to the official schedule, after all, in this very year alone the Army should get to decisions for Warrior CSP production, JLTV procurement, Multi Role Vehicle – Protected Group 2 selection (between Bushmaster and Eagle 6x6) and Challenger 2 LEP. It’s easy to understand why the Army is particularly nervous.

The alternative is to drastically cut back on some of the stuff that is already under contract or even in service, even if it means wasting a lot of still perfectly valid capabilities and throw in the garbage bin all the money it cost to procure them.

But I hope that the actual decision makers at the SDSR table will prove more reasonable than the voices of the informal debate we are hearing in the last while. If it is not possible to do everything, you should stick to what you are good at. If your money is not enough to purchase all you’d need, at least start by using well what you already have, and have already paid.

If the UK can do well guarding the North flank, reinforcing Norway and keeping the Atlantic supply routes open, that is a plenty valid contribution. If it can supply modern, competitive airpower, from sea and from land, that is plenty good contribution. If it can also deploy a decent heavy armor force, that is good.

If you pursue a “revolutionary approach”, you’ll better make damn sure your revolution is real and workable.

Because you know what you lose, but not what you might or might not gain.

Tuesday, December 24, 2019

Of Carriers, Obsolescence and Vulnerability



An aircraft carrier is a sovereign, mobile air base that ensures you can apply airpower at a point of your choosing. It ensures the fleet can have its own intimate air support, and its own timely air cover. It allows the surface fleet to launch its own quick reaction alert fighter jets and have its own CAPs to protect itself from enemy air attack.

Incidentally, allow me to say that one of the biggest mistakes the Royal Navy has made in the past was to refer to the carriers as “strike” carriers. That actually downplays the immense importance the carrier air wing plays in the survivability of a surface task group.

“Strike” is just one of the many missions of the Air Wing and is actually in some ways the least important one. Much (not all of it, but certainly much of it)  of the “strike” role could be carried out with Tomahawks or other ship and submarine-launched missiles, if you just funded enough VLS cells and missiles.

Air defence, reconnaissance, flexible close air support, anti-submarine warfare through the use of groups of helicopters, etcetera. These are the really defining roles of the carrier air wing. There are many alternative ways of putting 500 to 1000 lbs of explosive into a target, especially in the age of air to air refueling, drones and cruise missiles.
Put putting air defence patrols up above the fleet deployed far away from friendly shores? That definitely requires the carrier. You can’t sustain any sizeable air umbrella for any meaningful amount of time by trailing fighter jets thousands of miles via air to air refueling.

The aircraft carrier enables you to do that, because it is a fighter jets base that you can position as needed. As such, it can only ever become truly obsolete if A) jets themselves are obsolete and no longer needed. Already in the 50s the UK imagined a world where aircraft would become almost pointless because of missiles. It was wildly wrong at the time, and still is in many ways, but maybe a combination of drones and missiles will indeed take the place of jets one day. Not today, nor tomorrow, though.

Option B is that jets somehow grown such combat endurance and range that you can launch them from home and have them reliably and persistently overhead out at sea, or anyway at a great distance from a friendly air base. This is still technically unfeasible and it will be so for many, many more years.

Is the carrier vulnerable? Yes, it is relatively fragile. It is a ship. It has very little available estate, no matter how large it is, and that makes it difficult to work around battle damage. If the flight deck is damaged, you can’t simply fill up the crater with dirt and plate it up with AM-2 mat like you’d do on land. And if enough holes are opened in the hull, it will inexorably sunk. That’s the reality of being a ship. But that’s nothing new, and shouldn't be blown out of proportion either, because finding an aircraft carrier at sea and then assaulting it successfully, going through the various layers of its defences, remains actually a very challenging task. 

Whenever you say the aircraft carrier is “too vulnerable”, what you are actually implying is not the obsolescence of the carrier, but the fact you don't trust your AAW and ASW capabilities.
From a purely british point of view, the aircraft carrier is surrounded by Phalanx CIWS, Aster missiles from the Type 45 and Sea Ceptor from Type 23, 26 and 31.
Add the embarked jets supplying air defence, and the carrier is literally the best defended place in the whole of the UK and its armed forces.

In comparison, Land forces and land airbases have access to just a few STARSTREAK and Land Ceptor missiles (replacement from Rapier, coming into service beginning in the new year).  
If you feel you can’t protect the aircraft carrier from “drones”, it is not a carrier problem. It is a forces-wide problem, because it means other ships, the army and the RAF jets when on the ground are all even more vulnerable.
Clearly, your problem is not the carrier being “obsolete”, but your air defences.



Naturally, the carrier is exposed to submarine threats which are particularly scary. An air base on land, no. Then again, the land base is subject to a whole lot of other threats, including lack of host country authorizations and cooperation, protests, disruptions of the supply routes and potentially indirect fire at all levels (from ballistic missiles down to mortars and rockets). Airbases on land can also be assaulted by suicidal attackers with various tactics. 
There is a reason why the RAF continues to integrate the equivalent of 2 infantry battalions in the form of 6 RAF Regiment Squadrons for Force Protection. Without expanding beyond the last decade alone, we have witnessed the Taliban attack on Camp Bastion, repeated disasters in Pakistani airbases stormed by terrorists and various attacks in Syria which are all good examples of additional threats to land bases. 
A base on land cannot sink, but it remains very vulnerable to disruption and, moreover, any aircraft when parked on the ground is very fragile. 
A swarm of UAVs cannot sink an air base ashore, but it can put it out of commission all the same, and destroy the aircraft on the ground with relative ease. 
Yet nobody would argue that the airfield is "obsolete". You'd argue, correctly, that better defences are required. 

The submarine threat is perhaps the most terrifying of all, but if you don’t think you can keep the aircraft carrier safe, the implication is that surface operations as a whole are doomed to failure, because nothing else will be as well defended.
Again, it implies you don’t trust your ASW technology, tactics and resources as a whole to be up to the task. If this is the case, the problem is not the carrier, or at least definitely not limited to it. 



Ultimately, if the carrier was not there with its jets and helicopters, both your AAW and ASW instantaneously gets even weaker. Maybe the fleet will still have access to Airborne Early Warning (the one saving grace of having helicopter-borne AEW is that it can work from pretty much any ship at all), but it will no longer enjoy intimate air support. It’ll have to restrict its movements to where land-based airpower can provide sufficient cover.



Remove the ASW helicopters embarked on the carrier, and your ASW defences are also immediately weakened.

Threats are getting more difficult to counter, that’s undeniable, but the war between the “sword” and the “shield” is as old as war itself.
It is not the carrier that you are calling into question if you believe you can’t defend against the enemy “swords”. It is your “shields”.

Wednesday, July 22, 2015

SDSR 2015 - Any chance to keep up fast jet numbers?




SDSR 2015 – Issues, analysis and recommendations going towards the review

Budget

Army 

Royal Air Force 
Fast jets and squadrons number 
Royal Navy 



It is SDSR time, and it is evident in the news. Suddenly, something that we have know since at least 2011 is making the headlines as newspapers and publications grasp the fact that the UK is running down a steep slope that could bring the total number of fast jets all the way down to a paltry 127 or so by 2020, in as few as 6 squadrons, one of which probably not even fully operational and built up by that date.
The totals are easy made: 107 Tranche 2 and 3 Typhoons in 5 frontline squadrons, plus around 20 F-35Bs in 617 Sqn (plus OCU and OEU). The exact number of F-35Bs by 2020 is not known because government has yet to detail how many british aircraft will be purchased in LRIP 11 and in the Full Rate Production Lot 1. LRIP 11 aircraft would be delivered over the year 2019, with Full Rate 1 jets following during 2020, assuming that the F-35 production ramp-up is successful and there are no delivery delays.
18 F-35Bs should be in british hands by end 2018, according to JPO documents. LRIP 11 will add a yet unknown number. By 2023, some 48 F-35s should be in british hands, which, if confirmed in these terms, would mean spreading the purchase of 30 aircraft over LRIP 11 and Full Rate Lots 1, 2, 3 and 4. An average of 6 aircraft per year.

Anyway, by 2020 the fast jet fleet will indeed count a mere 127 or 130 or 131 aircraft, whatever it might be. The difference is marginal, and would still equate to just 6 squadrons, with a seventh (809 NAS) to follow by 2023. Longer term figures entirely depend on the number of F-35s to be purchased beyond 2023, but there is every reason to be fearful that if the number of jets is allowed to fall so low, it will then be very complex to rebuild.
The fall to such a low number of jets (and squadrons) will be determined by the loss, by 2019, of the 52 surviving Tranche 1 Typhoons (one written off in 2008) and the withdrawal of the remaining Tornado GR4 fleet, planned for March 2019.
Is there any way to put a limit to this dismantling process? 

The Tranche 1 Typhoons are far from out of useful airframe life, but they are extremely limited in their multi-role capability, and increasinly less comparable to Tranche 2s and 3As. The aircraft cannot be upgraded to current standards unless they are vastly rebuilt, in a process which would cost billions.
The Typhoon Tranche 1 is effectively stuck to AMRAAM and Paveway II, and both weapons are on the way out. The latter is being replaced by the lighter, more modern and capable Paveway IV. The AMRAAM will be replaced by the Meteor.
None of the two new weapons can be employed on Tranche 1, nor can the old Typhoons be upgraded to accept them at an acceptable cost.

An indirect help to Tranche 1 comes from the Meteor's and F-35's delays, however. It is to be assumed that the RAF will once more life-extend its (limited) stock of AMRAAM missiles to ensure that the F-35 has an air to air capability at entry in service and into the first five years of 2020. Meteor is expected to be integrated with the F-35 Block IV software (it should be confirmed later this year, hopefully), but it could take out to 2026 before it is operational. It is to be hoped that the RAF will not accept years of gap with the F-35 capable to employ only 2 external ASRAAM missiles.
Indirectly, a life-extension to the AMRAAM stock would benefit the Tranche 1 Typhoons, ensuring that they have at least one operational weapon (again, in addition to ASRAAM).

Thanks to an AMRAAM extension, it is theorically possible to talk about delaying the Tranche 1 OSD, putting the aircraft into one or two "air to air only" squadrons, with the other five employing Tranche 2 and 3 machines in a multi-role fashion, with special focus on air to ground due to Tornado GR4 leaving service in 2019 as currently planned.

The advantages of a Tranche 1 run-on, potentially, are:

- Confirmed elimination of one logistic and training line (Tornado GR4)
- Up to two extra squadrons going into the 2020s, albeit only good for air to air and at a progressively declining level of combat capability due to the rest of the Typhoon fleet moving on to Meteor
- It will be somewhat easier to argue for more F-35s if the number of squadrons is kept up. Replacing the equipment of existing squadrons is one thing. Rebuilding squadrons after losing them entirely is a different story, especially in the Treasury's eye.


The alternative is, of course, delaying the OSD of Tornado GR4. This is likely to be what the RAF actually hopes to obtain. The GR4 is useless in air to air, but has a complete air to ground capability which is in far higher demand.
It is already deployed on operations against ISIS.
And it has RAPTOR. This point is particularly relevant since the RAF is so far still refusing to seek integration of RAPTOR, or of another recce pod, on Typhoon. The RAPTOR is used constantly, and its contribution is appreciated and praised: with the Prime Minister and top brass voicing their support for ISTAR spending, surely the risk of losing RAPTOR without an immediate replacement in 2019 will add weight to the RAF's calls for a Tornado run-on.


The Tornado GR4 is more immediately useful and better responds to what the UK currently needs and is likely to continue needing in the near future: air to ground capability, including excellent tactical imagery reconnaissance with the RAPTOR system.
The Tranche 1's help would instead consist only of providing an (increasingly sub-standard, but arguably good enough) air defence capability, enabling the rest of the Typhoon fleet to be more swing-role, and to take up the job from the outgoing Tornado.
The Tornado run-on means facing all the costs of a separate fleet with its own logistic and training needs. The availability of a very large sustainment fleet can help somewhat in covering logistic costs, but the financial impact is still likely to be important.
The Tranche 1 eurofighters, albeit increasinly different from later aircraft of the same name, would still fit within the Typhoon pipeline, instead.

In other words: capability wise, the running on of Tornado is more desirable than the running on of Tranche 1. The problem is the added complexity (and cost, presumably) or running a third fleet with a different logistic and training pipeline. The Tornado GR4, unlike Typhoon and F-35, also requires a specific training pipeline for the rear crew.

The signs that the RAF hopes for a longer life for Tornado, in my opinion, are:

- The refusal, voiced by RAF officers at RIAT, to commit to a reconnaissance pod for Typhoon, saying that integrating RAPTOR for now is not on the cards and "leaving the decision for the SDSR"



- The seeking of an Helmet Mounted Cueing Display system for the Tornado GR4. Helmet mounted cueing was already introduced back in 2012 as an Op Herrick UOR, but now the RAF is asking for a fleet-wide installation of a system which must be compatible with all weapons employed by Tornado, including the ASRAAM. It is true that these devices greatly help the crews in conducting their missions, and that if deemed essential they should be made available to the crews even in the imminence of the OSD, since they are engaged in real combat. But the requirement seems a bit excessive, if the assumption is for less than three years of use before the aircraft goes out of service.

- Recent, consistent investment in upgrades for the Radar Frequency self-protection capability, by means of rebuilt Skyshadow pods which also introduce modern Towed Radar Decoys.

- Rumors of a renewed RAF focus on rear-crew training, via exploitation of the Royal Navy's Observers training pipeline at 750 NAS (althouth the entry in service of Rivet Joint, the running-on of Sentinel and the expected purchase of an MPA might be enough of an explanation, admittedly)

It seems pretty certain that the Tornado force will get another temporary boost, with the further extension of the service life of the third squadron, originally planned to disband this year but then extended out to 2016. But another one-year extension will not be enough to alter the long term figures. More will be needed.

As always, the outcome depends on money, and despite some (way excessive, i fear) optimism shown by service chiefs themselves, the 2% of GDP committment has been officially exposed as being made up at least in part by financial gimmicks and inclusion of voices of expenditure which used to be separated.

As with other NATO allies, from time to time we update our approach to ensure we are categorising defence spending fully in accordance with NATO guidelines, seeking to capture all spending contributing to delivering the defence of the United Kingdom. Our 2011-12 NATO return was £36.6 billion. This included the Ministry of Defence budget, the cost of operations, and the Armed Forces Pension Scheme but did not reflect all UK defence spending. Our 2015-16 NATO return of £39 billion also included Ministry of Defence-generated income which directly funds defence activity, elements of the Government's cyber security spending, parts of the Conflict, Stability and Security Fund relating to peacekeeping, war pensions and pension payments to retired MOD civil servants.
House of Lords written answer, 20 July 2015, exposes the new expenditure voices included to secure the 2% target is formally met. 


Lets be clear once more: to even achieve 2% without gimmicks, it would still mean decline in percentual terms. We are forced to take the 2% as a good news only because the alternative was even worse, and by far.
The pressure on the forces' budget is not going away, and expecting miracles will only result in disappointment and tears. However, if we believe to the words of Howard Wheeldon, FRAeS

We had entered into the intense bargaining that surrounded SDSR 2010 with a request for twelve squadron. It was believed that we would in the end get nine and yet that belief ended up being just seven on an accepted basis that this would grow to nine.

Nine squadrons would cohincide with the up to 96 aicraft, 4-squadron F-35 force which was aired as long term target at the time of the switch to the F-35C.
Around 80 F-35Bs in four squadrons would be a good force, and they would be numbers which would give value to the investment made in the aircraft carriers. A fast jet count of some 187 would be nothing extraordinary: keep in mind that France is aiming for 225 in the long run, with quite a few more than that in service in 2020 (247, according to the documents). Even the Italian air force is planning for some 165 aircraft in the long term (with some 75 Typhoons after much of the Tranche 1s are withdrawn, and 90 F-35s). 127 is quite dramatically low.

Nine squadrons should be the magic number to aim to. But there are currently only 8 squadrons, so that adding one would already count as "neat growth", hard to fit into the budget, into the manpower, into the Treasury's vision.
If the number of squadrons is allowed to fall even further, arguining for additional F-35 squadrons will become harder and harder. Don't destroy with the hope of rebuilding later: "ham tomorrow" too often ends in tears.
It is important, for many reasons, that the number of fast jets is kept at decent levels. 127 is not a decent level. And assuming that there will be a recovery after such a sharp fall risks being terribly naive.

Immediate operational needs and long term considerations both impose that the number of aircraft and squadrons is kept up. Temporary running on of Typhoon Tranche 1, or better still of Tornado GR4, as a ramp leading to an acceptable number of F-35s, is something that should feature prominently in the SDSR.
The news we see in these days, even the (rather obscene, if you ask me) comparisons of the current anti-ISIS efforts to the battle of Britain, are hopefully part of the RAF's attempts to obtain a better settlement.