Wednesday, November 11, 2015

A last summary, two weeks from SDSR day



 

SDSR 2015 – Issues, analysis and recommendations going towards the review

Budget


Army 


Royal Air Force 
Royal Navy 





What to expect?

In general terms, it is thought that this SDSR will bring “good news”. As I wrote on Twitter back in October, its publication was pushed to the right to more closely aligned with the Spending Review (25 November), but with release “a few days before” (that was my guess, and we now know it’ll be 2 days, as the SDSR is due for release on the 23rd) to show that, “no, It is nothing like 2010”.

In broad terms, the SDSR will re-affirm the targets for Future Force 2020. No cuts are expected, and instead there should be some good news. How many, and how actually good, we don’t yet know.

I’m moderately optimistic. The fact that we can expect overall stability is a welcome change in itself, but I’m still skeptic about the good news. If the SDSR doesn’t settle satisfactorily the MPA gap, which I consider the most problematic, I cannot consider it a success.

One thing I try to keep in mind and a warning that I feel I must give is: don’t expect too much detail. The yearly Equipment Programme document shows just how well this government is using indetermination to protect its ability to cut at leisure behind the curtains. What does the Equipment Plan include, exactly? How many vehicles? For delivery when? We don’t know. The document says nothing until firm contracts have been signed, so that anything not yet firmly on contract can be stealthily cut, pushed to the right, descoped, changed.
I expect the SDSR to be just as indecisive and vague whenever it suits the Treasury’s interests. For example, I do not expect to be given details about the plans for purchasing F-35s, other than a confirmation of the 48 needed for the OCU and the first two squadrons.
Main Gate 5, the next big programme decision point, is scheduled for 2017 and I honestly can’t imagine this government telling us much before that date.

The purchase of 20 Protector RPAS to replace the current 10 Reaper will also not be detailed before Main Gate in early 2016, I’m afraid. Until then, we are unlikely to learn much about what exactly they’ll be like, or what impact they will have on manpower, infrastructure and number of squadrons (currently, there's 2 squadrons operating 10 Reapers). 

In general, I expect plenty of questions to remain unanswered.

Some programmes are however on the move, or expected to move on with the SDSR. There is even some optimism in the press about reversing some more of the 2010 madness. The following summary shows where we are, what we know, and what rumors are floating around.



Airborne troops and helicopters

16 Air Assault Brigade is re-subordinated to the Land Forces, leaving Joint Helicopter Command. In the process, it “loses” some pieces: the Apache regiments remain as Attack Helicopter Force under JHC. 7 REME battalion splits into two, with 8 Field Company (Para) re-subordinating to 13 Air Assault Support Regiment RLC to continue delivering equipment support to the paras on the field and the aviation coys (73 Av Coy now in Yeovilton to support the Wildcat fleet, the other two in Wattisham, aligned with the two Apache regiments)  staying under JHC as 7 REME battalion. All should be done by the end of this month. The Eagle symbol retires with dignity, and the beloved Pegasus returns. 



The split of 7 REME was in my list of suggested changes to 16 Air Assault Brigade, as well as the separation of the helicopters from the troops. Of course, I called for more ambitious changes, with 8 Field Company being at least doubled into a (small) battalion better suited to support the force generation cycle of 16X and with the army and RAF helicopter squadrons reorganized into real aviation brigade(s). I did not expect it to actually happen, at least not in one go, but one can hope. The restructuring of 16X is, at least in my opinion, following the right path.  

The army is taking control of the work to determine what comes after the Medium Stressed Platform to allow the parachuting of heavy equipment and vehicles. An attempt to find a stop-gap solution by adapting the MSP for use on the C-130J seems to have sadly been cancelled, leaving the present airborne forces badly handicapped. An handicap that will stay for a good few years, until a new platform and the A400 are ready for operations.
The US Type V platform remains on the list of possible solutions, but there’s reportedly a 500 kg problem still for using it with Jackal. The employment of Jackal with the airborne has been trialed during exercises in the US, and the vehicle has fared very well, delivering decisive firepower and faring better than the Humvees employed by the US. However, the impossibility of parachuting the Jackal into battle is a limit, and even when air landing from the C-130, the Jackal can’t just charge into the fight right away: the weapon on top needs to be re-installed after landing due to the dimensional limits of the C-130’s cargo door and hold.

It is also to be regretted that there are no plans to retain a small force of light, well armed, tracked armoured vehicles. Those would add immensely to the ability to react swiftly and to bring armoured fire support even in the most hostile territories. 

Right as the US Army resurrects ideas for a light tank capable even of being airdropped, with BAE showcasing a renewed M-8 Buford, the UK has no plan to retain a squadron of light combat vehicles. I think Ajax is a good replacement for CVR(T) in the armoured brigades, but i also see the enduring need for a small unit equipped to enter a distant theatre quickly and support the reaction force even on the worst terrain.

A bit of good news came from Joint Warrior 15-1, which saw the debut of RAF C-17 in tactical role, with it being employed in Rapid and Follow-On Air Landings. Finally! As I’ve said more than once, the UK has paid big money for a strategic cargo with great tactical capabilities: you paid for them, now use them. I hope we will see airdrops becoming part of the C-17’s routine as well. 

A capable replacement for the Medium Stressed Platform is key to keeping the airborne task force viable.

Meanwhile, the MOD has begun the process for upgrading 25 Gazelle helicopters with GPS, traffic avoidance system and a new VHF radio. The upgrade will be carried out by Gama Engineering Ltd, and should be completed by August 2017. It has to be assumed that the Gazelle OSD is no longer 2018, and that the thorny issue of its replacement will be pushed to the right by a good few years. The Gazelle remains in use with 667 (Development and Trials) Squadron and 671 Squadron as part of 7 (Training) Regiment at AAC Centre Middle Wallop; in 665 Squadron, part of 5 Regiment at Joint Helicopter Command Flying Station Aldergrove, Northern Ireland; and 29 (BATUS) Flight as part of the British Army Training Unit Suffield (BATUS) in Canada.

The SDSR should confirm the plan to upgrade 50 Apache helicopters to Block III standard, but details of how, where (Boeing or AW?) and when are most likely going to come out only in March 2016 when the Main Gate decision is planned.  



Army vehicles

The 10 Years Equipment Plan, 2015 edition is, as was to be expected, entirely devoid of details, dates, numbers, but it still provides some interesting pointers: both ABSV and MRV-P are included in the plan. The ABSV has been definitively separated from the Warrior CSP and will be, on achieving Main Gate, a new Category A programme in its own right. Unfortunately, we might have to wait for 2017 before Main Gate is reached. Entry into service might have to slip as well as a consequence, from 2020 to sometime into the 2020s. ABSV is a key programme, as it is needed to replace the ancient FV432 and complement the (insufficient) number of Warriors with 40mm gun. The effectiveness of the armoured infantry battalions is in no small measure connected with ABSV.

A curiosity: if the Equipment Plan is not just messing up numbers, the Warrior Section Vehicle becomes FV520 after the CSP (now is known as FV510) and the Infantry Command sub-variant becomes FV521 (was FV511).

The Equipment Plan confirms thinking that the MRV-P will require a 4x4 and a 6x6 vehicle. The requirement, albeit over many years, runs into the thousands of vehicles, but the funded MRV-p project for now is expected to cover only 500 troop carriers, 78 ambulances and 27 recovery vehicles. Main Gate is expected in 2017. The hope is that the MRV-p does not become another orphaned programme, abandoned after the first phase with the result of creating yet another “mini” fleet. Rationalization of the current holding of vehicles (from Land Rovers and Pinzgauers in “close to firing line” roles to Husky, Panther, WMIK) with successive purchases of MRV-P should be a key army aspiration in along the next decade.

The Challenger 2 LEP is confirmed as part of the plans. Main Gate has slipped to the right as the army tries to find ideas (and money, especially money) to try and address the growing list of deficiencies. The idea of possibly purchasing a “new” tank as replacement has quickly been abandoned, but the Army has now officially declared its concerns, especially about lethality. The powerpack would also need replacing. Whether the delay to the LEP brings to any increase in its scope, is beyond my guessing ability at this point: the army knows that upgrading only the fire control system, communications and sights won’t quite solve the problems, but might still be unable to do anything about it for lack of money.

The REME Conference 2015 has seen the announcement that there is a funded plan to procure an Air Portable Lightweight Recovery Vehicle that will be used by 16X and 3X Commando. A light recovery vehicle for the Light Protected Mobility Infantry battalions will also be procured. Finally, the Challenger recovery variant is due to receive unspecified survivability upgrades, perhaps in line with add-on armor elements of the Challenger 2 LEP.

Note that MRV-P and Air Portable recovery vehicle were grouped together with two more requirements to form the Operational Support Programme (OSP). The other two components were the new Future Protected Battle Field Ambulance (FPBFA) and the Non-Articulated Vehicle – Protected (NAV-P), the vital replacement for DROPS (also known as the vehicle which went out of service at the end of 2014 but remains used in numbers anyway because the army simply can’t do without it for many things). It is not known yet if these will progress as well. The NAV-P certainly should, because it really is an indispensable piece of capability. 



Logistic storage capacity

In Summer 2016, we should finally get to hear the recommendations for where to re-locate the vehicle storage capability from the current facilities: Ashchurch and its sister site in Mƶnchengladbach, Germany are the 2 major controlled humidity storage sites preserving vehicles and kit for all three the Services, but government wants to close both by 2018. Clearly, a decision on where to park the thousands of items, including armored vehicles up to the Challenger 2, is an absolute necessity.
A new site, ideally located close to the Salisbury Plain training area and well connected by rail to both Marchwood and Brize Norton, is clearly required. It will be important to see what is actually done in this key area. 

Seeking a new garage

Work has already begun on the complementary storage site, the Defence Fulfillment Centre MOD Donnington, which will store and distribute food, clothing, general and medical supplies in a 80.000 square meters, two-hangars facility.



VIRTUS

With Phase 1 vests and load carrying equipment deliveries beginning, the Equipment Plan 2015 says that activities have begun for Phase 2 and Phase 3, respectively covering the development of new, advanced and lighter ballistic plates and man-worn data and power infrastructure.



Ground Based Air Defence

An anti-UAV capability demonstration was given earlier this year by SAAB to the MOD: the focus was on an Enhanced Low, Slow, and Small (ELSS) capability for the Giraffe AMB radar in service. The development of anti-UAV capability is part of Increment 2 of the Network Enabled Airspace Defence and Surveillance programme. If the schedule continues to be followed, a kinetic C-RAM capability should be acquired by 2017.  

The MOD is procuring a C4 solution for integrated air defence of the Falklands and has procured additional Giraffe AMB radars and an upgrade to the latest standard for those already in service. The fleet should now count 10 systems between radars delivered and on order.

The Phase 1 of procurement for the FLAADS(Land) batteries that will replace the current 4 Rapier batteries has begun with a contract signed in December 2014.



A new EOD robot

A new battlefield UGV for EOD work is to be procured under Project STARTER. This is curious, since I thought the recent purchase of the much celebrated CUTLASS would be enough to completely replace the old WHEELBARROWs, Evidently it is not the case. STARTER is for 56 UGVs with a further 30 options. It is meant for fire line battlefield use, and requirements include being able to fit within existing EOD vehicles, from Pinzgauers to Mastiff III EOD.



Training of aircrews

Plans for the complete renewal of the training fleets for both fixed and rotary wing fleets are progressing, and surprisingly they are doing so in complete silence. One possible explanation is that they are keeping the announcement for the SDSR, to present it as good news.
It is not, at least entirely, good news: the training fleets will be renewed, yes, but their sizes are expected to drop enormously, and there will be little to no more capability for training foreign pilots. Moreover, RAF Linton-on-Ouse is probably going to close as Basic training is moved to RAF Valley.
The SDSR should, one would expect, spend a few words to explain what will happen to the base and to the training fleets.

A “RAF Military Flying Training School” is expected to stand up in 2017 in RAF Valley, probably replacing both No 1 FTS (basic training, RAF Linton-on-Ouse) and No 4 FTS (Advanced, RAF Valley). It can be assumed with quite some confidence that the current 72(R), 208(R) and IV(R) squadrons will drop to just 2.

No 2 FTS has been re-formed in January 2014 on RAF Syerston to oversee the gliding training programme for up to 45,000 air cadets of Cadet Flights and Air Training Corps.

No 6 Flying Training School has been re-formed in September to command and manage the 15 RAF University Air Squadrons (UAS) located across the UK.

The RAF will rebuild a pipeline for training mission specialists and “back-seaters”, after losing it in 2011. The role will be covered by the same small fleet of Phenom 100 jets which will replace the Beechcraft 200 as training platform for the multi-engine pipeline.The same squadron will cover both roles, unlike what happened up to the SDSR 2010, with 55(R) Sqn using the old Dominie to deliver rear-crew training and 45(R) delivering multi-engine training.

No 3 Flying Training School at RAF Cranwell currently has 2 squadrons (16(R) and 57(R), with 16 being actually based at RAF Wittering) for elementary flying training; 115(R) Sqn (RAF Wittering) for instructor training and refresher courses and 45(R) Sqn for Multi-Engine training. The impact of the renewal of the fleet might bring further changes and downsizing.  

A new school building, with simulators and hangars for the new rotary wing training fleet is to be built by 2017 in RAF Shawbury. The details of the re-organization, and the types of helicopters that will replace Griffin and Squirrel have yet to be decided.



MPA

The big thing everyone is on the lookout for. The Sunday Times has recently reported that, just three weeks from SDSR publication, the secretary of state for defence would have stopped what was said to be a done deal for the purchase of P-8 Poseidon aircraft, throwing RAF plans in disarray. According to the Sunday Times, the SDSR will only contain an indecisive “promise” about addressing the MPA gap, perhaps through some kind of competition.
This will inexorably delay the closure of the gap and risks creating significant difficulties: top brass have warned more than once about SEEDCORN being sustainable only for a limited amount of time. The programme has recently been given a further 3 year extension, with 22 out of 36 service personnel involved deployed in the US to work on the P-8 Poseidon.

If it is true that the Secretary has suddenly awakened to the high cost of closing the MPA gap only now, after years of effort clearly targeted at boarding the Poseidon train, we have touched a new low in MOD history. This thing has been in the making literally for years now, and it is a bit late to throw everything back to square one.

I’ve talked about the MPA issue at length, so my comment at this time will be brief: there is the widespread belief that, due to money and manpower shortages, the MPA eventually acquired by the RAF will have to be a multi-ISTAR platform, coming, in particular, with a wide area surveillance, including GMTI capability sufficient for replacing Sentinel R1. In practice, the assumption is that the MPA and Protector will be accommodated using the manpower and money currently “occupied” by Sentinel R1, Shadow R1 and Predator (and then some more, probably).

For the overland surveillance requirement, the RAF will obviously look at USAF’s own experience, to try and keep the pace, so to speak. Most contenders in the JSTARS replacement race for the USAF are offering business jet platforms, size-wise, stepping down from the current huge size of the JSTARS and effectively following the general direction the RAF traced with Sentinel R1.
There is one exception: Boeing is still offering a larger aircraft, the 737-700, which is however a bit smaller than the 737-800 which is the P-8's base. The small business jet comes with the advantage of lower costs, higher altitude (good for radar range) and ability to operate from smaller airfields. However, they also come with constrained growth margins and with limited space available for systems and crew. The Sentinel R1 itself is an example: it reportedly has a growth margin as small as 700 kg, and the RAF had to renounce to fitting an air to air refueling probe which had once been in the requirements.

The main point of interest is, however, the sensor. The radar to be employed also hasn't been firmly selected yet, but one of the top contenders is the same AN/APS-154 AAS that the US Navy will put on part of its P-8 fleet for its own needs, or anyway a derivative product reportedly going by the “Skynet” name.

It will be interesting to see what choices the USAF makes, but unfortunately the JSTARS recap effort is struggling to get funding and might not progress for a while.
Key considerations to take away are: the AAS radar is a serious contender for the US JSTARS requirement and a 737 platform remains in the game.

The US Navy is working to integrate the AAS on P-8 for increased target mapping capability in the littoral and overland domains. The AN/APY-10 radar already comes with overland functionality and the P-8 as it is now is not any less of an ISTAR platform than other MPAs used over land.
It is actually probably better already. 

P-8 test flight with the AAS "canoe"

The UK requirement is for a MPA with good ASW capability and, eventually, a wide area SAR / ISAR / GMTI surveillance capability over land. The P-8 with AAS fits the requirement like a glove.

Would it be better to use a pure, high performace MPA and a smaller, higher-flying business jet with AAS for the overland role? Sure. But the UK can't realistically afford to purchase, man, operate and upgrade through life two such fleets and have reasonable numbers to work with. There is a very high risk that, at some point, two such fleets would end up locked in a fratricide struggle for funding and manpower, and one of the two would end up succumbing.  

No other MPA on offer in the world has a clear path to a wide area SAR / GMTI capability matching the AAS on P-8; no other MPA in the world has a civilian base of similar airframes and a military, international fleet as large as P-8 has; no other MPA in the world comes with tens of RAF personnel already trained / involved on it; no other MPA in the world has the kind of assured evolution path that the main MPA of the US Navy can expect to have.

There are several offers to create something that does MPA and overland ISTAR for the UK, but they all exist only on paper: the Sea Hercules, the Q-400, a UK evolution of the C-295 or P-1. They are all entirely or partially paper projects with varying degrees of risk and uncertainty.
It is a movie we’ve already seen: it starts with promises of "it'll be cheaper and better too" and then it ends in years of frustrations and cost overruns. Then, a few years later, when it is time for major upgrades, you look around for a partner to share the costs with... and while US and Australia go on with P-8, you end up alone in the room, with a Challenger 2 rifled gun and 2-piece CHARM 3 round at your side, cursing the heavens.

No MPA in the world comes ready for british weaponry, apart perhaps for the P-3 Orion of Norway, the only customer of Stingray ever.  I’m not sure if the planned integration was carried out, but even assuming it progressed, is P-3 an option / would the UK take any real advantage? No.
Integration of british-specific weaponry and equipment it is not a P-8 problem but a UK problem. Some integration of customer-specific kit is unavoidable whenever a country purchases an off-the-shelf product. Either that, or purchase of US torpedoes for P-8 use, whatever is cheaper. India decided to buy the torpedoes along with the aircraft, for example.

There is a very real risk that indecisiveness on MPA causes knock-over effects across wider ISTAR planning. If the RAF does not get P-8, money will probably tend to go to Sentinel R1 to life extend and upgrade it, leaving even less money available for a later MPA purchase. The result could end up being a horrible example of half-arsing which creates more problems than it solves.



Fast Jet squadrons

News reports lately have insistently mentioned the possibility that the SDSR will announce plans for a third F-35B squadron and two more Typhoon squadrons, the latter made possible by the retention of Tranche 1s into the 2020s (at least the first half of them). Under current plans, the Tranche 1s would be withdrawn from service by 2019 and only then would the new Tranche 3A be assigned to the squadrons.

I’ve already explained where the merits of the Tranche 1 solution are. Tornado GR4 would be more useful, but its retention is more complicated and expensive.
Assuming that the rumor is true and the Tranche 1s stay, the next big question is where does manpower come from?
The first (and possibly the only) answer is “from the Tornado fleet”, but settling the details will be complex: Typhoon will not be ready to take Tornado’s place in action for several years still, meaning that, if operations against ISIS drag on over the coming years, it will not be possible to draw down Tornado squadrons and train the personnel to move on to Typhoon. A transfer from Tornado to Typhoon does not happen overnight. The process of setting up two more Typhoon squadrons can only happen in concert with the drawdown of Tornado unless the RAF is not only given the funding for hiring more people, but manages to boost recruitment quickly and efficiently.

Even if the additional squadrons will be confirmed by the SDSR (and I certainly hope so), it’ll take quite some effort (and probably a few years) to find a way to make them happen. Two additional Typhoon squadrons would be fundamental to avoid falling to just 6 squadrons in 2020, and the Tranche 1 could act as a place holder ahead of further purchases of F-35s in the second half of the 2020s, when keeping Tranche 1s any further is likely to become a real problem.



Sentry

There are expectations about the SDSR bringing good news for the AWACS fleet too. The UK Sentry are lagging badly behind US and NATO , having not been included in the ongoing upgrade programmes for lack of money. If the problem is not addressed, the british Sentry will become more and more obsolescent and of less immediate integration within allied plans.
This is another area requiring urgent attention.



And the navy?

The Navy is a major question mark. It unfortunately starts to sound like it will be shafted once more, to some degree. Earlier optimism about being granted a manpower increase has been watered down, and there is still no real indication of what, if any, answers the SDSR will give about the fate of the River Batch 2, MARS FSS and other plans.
We are also still waiting to understand exactly what “in service” will mean for HMS Prince of Wales. 

The SDSR will reaffirm the objective of putting into service 13 Type 26 frigates, but in the facts we can only really expect the order for the first batch, of just 3 ships, with a contract expected in early 2016. It seems almost certain that the other two batches of 5 ships each will be left for future parliaments. With the last Type 26 due in service in 2035/36 and with the government having decided to go for a procurement in small successive batches instead of the hoped-for contract for 13, or even the earler "ASW batch" of 8 in one go, we can expect the uncertainty about the final number of frigates to be a fact of life for many years. 

No ship is expected to be axed, but probably the out of service date for HMS Ocean will be confirmed as 2018/19 (not necessarily saying it into the SDSR document, of course). 

The Navy is very likely to be asked to provide one carrier group presence in the Gulf with a certain regularity. This will be particularly welcomed by the US Navy, which probably wants the UK’s help to be free to focus its own carrier groups more on the Pacific, without leaving the Middle East uncovered.

The new british base to be built in Bahrain will help support this role as well as the enduring operation Kipion presence, with its significant MCM element.


 

Sunday, November 1, 2015

Beyond Harpoon and Storm Shadow (and Tomahawk too...?)



SDSR 2015 – Issues, analysis and recommendations going towards the review

Budget


Army 


Royal Air Force 
Royal Navy 
Beyond Harpoon and Storm Shadow (and Tomahawk too...?)








The Tomahawk problem

Not everyone has taken notice of the fact that Tomahawk was / is about to go out of production. The 2016 US Navy Budget request had a ZERO at the voice “Tomahawk”, with no new rounds to be procured. Eventually, Congress stepped in and
added funding for a new TLAM purchase to keep the production line open a bit longer.
However, the expanded defence budget crafted by Congress goes well above the amount of money that the Obama administration wants to spend, and the president has vetoed it.
Eventually, days ago a bipartisan agreement on spending limits for the next two financial years has been reached, meaning that the worst scenario will be avoided… but also meaning that the 2016 defence budget is going back to the table for corrections meant to shave 5 billion dollars off the list. The unrequested TLAM production might or might not survive the re-examination of the budget document.

TLAM might soon be out of production, and this consideration might have helped the Royal Navy in getting some funding to procure "additional Tomahawks", as mentioned in passing in the 10 Year Equipment Plan, 2015 edition. 65 TLAM rounds were requested in July 2014 and authorized by the US government, but there is news of only 20 having been effectively purchased, in september the same year.
If production ends, the Royal Navy will then have to depend on its stock, which is unfortunately pretty limited (it once consisted of 65 missiles, might be a few more now) and all composed of encapsulated missiles meant for submarine, torpedo-tube launch.
No Vertical Launch rounds in stock mean that, if production closes, the TLAM will NOT be an option for Type 26, unless the RN is able to convince the US Navy to sell some of its stock (far larger, numbering possibly up to 4000 rounds).

A major US (and UK participated) upgrade and refurbishment programme for TLAM is indeed about to start, but production of new rounds might be over soon. It will be, unless plans change in the next 2 financial years or so.
Under the current US Navy planning, recertification of existing TLAM rounds (and technology insertion) begins in 2019, using already existing TLAM stocks, with no new acquisitions.

Meanwhile, the Tomahawk successor, the Next Generation Land Attack Weapon (NGLAW) received a first 5 million funding line in 2015 with this motivation: 


Funding is provided for a Next Generation Land Attack Weapon (NGLAW), a weapons system that is long range, survivable and can be launched from multiple surface and submarine platforms. NGLAW will incorporate evaluated existing and emergent technologies to support an improved strike capability with an Initial Operational Capability (IOC) no later than 2024.

This effort will enter the Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) phase of the acquisition cycle in FY15. Upon completion, the Department of the Navy will assess the results of the AoA and make a determination on a preferred material approach, the phase of the acquisition cycle the program will enter, and when the NGLAW weapon will achieve IOC.


"Amusingly" enough, by the time the Royal Navy chooses what to do with the MK41 on Type 26, the TLAM production line might be closed already, making Tomahawk actually a non viable solution.

There is the possibility that Congress will impede the US Navy’s attempt to terminate Tomahawk purchases exactly as it impedes the USAF from grounding the A-10 fleet. But it might also not happen. 
There is the possibility that TLAM will evolve and change face to become NGLAW and succeed to itself with a new, advanced variant and with production restarting within a few years. But it might also not happen.

The Royal Navy is involved in the Tomahawk enterprise and in the recertification and upgrade programme, but is unlikely to have much of a say in what happens with US Navy purchases and successor plans.
The Royal Navy itself could keep the TLAM production line open for an additional year if it purchased a significant number of rounds (above 100), either in the submarine variant or VL variant, or both. But this will require quick thinking and available money.
If indecision continues to win the day, the Royal Navy risks to fall in the gap between the end of TLAM production and the start of the production of the new US land attack missile, whatever it ends up being.


A sizeable extension to the Royal Navy’s stock of Tomahawk missiles is arguably a strategic priority regardless of the Type 26’s armament decision. In fact, the TLAM is going to be in use for at least 15 more years after the recertification. But while the US Navy can live off a vast stock, consuming it over time and filling the holes with the new Land Attack weapon when it enters in production, the Royal Navy can’t live long on the current stock. 60 – 100 missiles can be fired very, very quickly if a major operation, or several small ones, take place in the next few years.
Basic prudence suggests that a significant expansion of the stock is indispensable to make sure that the RN doesn’t run out of one of its most important and most often used weapons years before a replacement is available.

A decision will also be needed for shaping the post-Tomahawk era.



Tomahawk developments

One major capability development for TLAM Is the cooperatively funded US Navy/United Kingdom Joint Multi-Effects Warhead System (JMEWS) / Joint Capability Technology Demonstration (JCTD). The JMEWS introduces much greater capability against Hard and Buried targets, while retaining the same blast-fragmentation effects already available. This new multi-effect warhead, first demonstrated in 2010 with perforation of a target protected by reinforced concrete, would greatly expand the range of targets that TLAM can effectively destroy.

Other enhancements in development include multiple or multi-band antennas, an integrated single box solution radio and Third-Party In-Flight Targeting (3PT). These changes enable the Tomahawk to fly attack profiles that increase its chances of surviving against complex air defence systems; allow the missile to send imagery back to base and permit the missile to loiter and be re-targeted in flight.
Experiments stateside have included TLAM retargeting from an F-22 Raptor in flight, providing a glimpse of the possibilities that would be opened by F-35s working with TLAMs as “wingmen”.
JMEWS and these enhancements are almost certainly going to be part of TLAM’s future, ensuring it remains relevant for another 15 years after 2019.

Separately, Raytheon is continuing to work on the Multi Mission Tomahawk concept, which introduces an active radar seeker (in addition to the existing guidance system) to enable much expanded moving target (and anti-ship) capability. The RF seeker is another element that could be included in the 2019 refurbishment and recertification programme. Raytheon hopes to win the US Navy’s interest (and funding), and is effectively pitching the Tomahawk MMT against LRASM and JSM for the US Navy’s Offensive Anti-Surface Warfare (OASuW) Increment 2 requirement. Lockheed Martin's LRASM for now has only been selected for OASuW Increment 1, which is an urgent programme for adding improved, modern anti-ship capability on U.S. Navy F/A-18E/F Super Hornets and U.S. Air Force B-1B Lancer bombers.

Increment 2 will address the requirements for an advanced, autonomous, anti-ship missile capable of being launched from the air, surface and sub-surface, and the solution for the requirement has yet to be selected.



The Future Cruise & Anti-Ship Weapon

The FCASW has been on the list of potential joint UK-FR projects since the Lancaster House agreement. It is a programme name that has been around for a while, but that has made virtually no progress since. Its long-term aim is to replace Harpoon, Exocet and Storm Shadow / Scalp.  

Replacing Tomahawk and Scalp Navale is going to be more a problem, because of the strike range: the 2000 + kilometers range of TLAM is what makes it truly a strategic weapon, and any downgrade to that reach reduces the number of targets that can be reached far inland from launch zones out at sea. FCASW might or might not attempt to generate the same kind of strike radius: it will most likely depend on early decisions that hinge on how to sustain and then replace the TLAM capability. If the UK decides to follow the US efforts in that area, then Tomahawk replacement will not figure among FCASW requirements.

Jane's is reporting that there should be a first phase of joint concept studies starting next year, and a technology demonstrator in 2019 if we are lucky. Assuming that the british SDSR goes the go ahead and confirms the funding, things should start moving.

When FCASW is mentioned, the temptation is to think of the MBDA Perseus concept weapon, but while the Perseus is pretty likely to be considered as part of the exercise, the concept coming out of the study could actually end up being much, much different.
The CvS401 Perseus was MBDA’s Concept Weapon for the year 2011, and it clearly was inspired by the FCASW requirement: it was presented as a cruise missile capable of extremely high speed (up to Mach 3) and a range of 250 – 300 km. It was shown with a “triple” warhead consisting of a main explosive charge (around 200 kg) within the missile and two small (40 – 50 kg) inertial-guided, droppable “effectors” that could be used to strike a ship in multiple places with the same weapon; to hit multiple targets in the same area or simply to act as a large unitary warhead when necessary.
The missile would be able to cruise and attack from high altitude or to sea skim for maximum effect against enemy warships, and it would come with a multi-sensor seeker combining AESA radar, LIDAR and semi-active laser guidance.
It would be a multi-platform weapon, compatible with ships (MK41 and Sylver A70); submarines (standard 533mm torpedo tubes); aircraft and land-based launchers. 
The Perseus was clearly aimed at the UK-Fr requirement, but it remains a concept which has not left the CGIs yet, and calling the Future Cruise and Anti Ship Missile "Perseus" and expecting it to have the same kind of characteristics is a wild guess. Perseus promises a lot from an 800 kg weapon, and it looks like a complex and expensive system. Some of its features might not be part of the actual weapon emerging from the joint programme (assuming it does eventually emerge).
Perseus’s 300 km range also makes it way too short legged to ever be considered a fitting replacement of Tomahawk and Scalp Navale. 

Perseus shown while ejecting its two sub-munitions.

The FCASW concept phase will have to answer to a number of questions about range, warhead, seeker and intended strategy for penetrating inside highly defended bubbles of airspace. The Mach 3 speed of Perseus is particularly suited for anti-ship attack, as a sea-skimming, highly supersonic weapon leaves the targeted ship with a tiny timeframe available for attempting to shoot down or decoy the missile off target.
On the other hand, a high supersonic missile inexorably loses out part of its stealthness, as speed means heat (and higher IR signature) and also requires an optimization of the aerodynamics design that precludes obtaining the lowest radar cross section.
More speed and less stealth, or the other way around? LRASM settled for stealthness. FCASW might go in another direction.
But if speed is chosen, Mach 3 might be a rather modest target: while in the West supersonic anti-ship missiles haven’t had much space so far, in Russia and in Asia several supersonic weapons already exist. The Mach 3 Russia-India BramHos missile is already operational, and research is already moving on towards the hypersonic real, with speeds of Mach 5 and higher.
FCASW would risk to achieve high supersonic speed when the rest of the world achieves hypersonic speed, perpetuating the missile disadvantage.  

Another problem with Perseus /FCASW is that the date being suggested for ISD back in 2011 was 2030.
2030 might be acceptable for the RAF and Armee de l’Air and even for the Marine Nationale, since the first two can life-extend Storm Shadow / Scalp and the second is just now putting into service the latest block evolution of the Exocet and the new Scalp Navale cruise missile.
The Royal Navy has more urgent needs, considering that it still uses the ancient Harpoon Block 1C (with a 2018 OSD and an uncertain future); is faced by the possibility that TLAM production will end within two years and is planning to put in service a new frigate type beginning in 2022 that comes with 24 MK41 cells but not with a clear plan to achieve an anti-ship and land attack capability.

The urgent needs of the navy and the uncertainties of UK-Fr cooperation (Telemos is still fresh in the memory) bring forth painful questions about what to do. The FCASW concept of a single weapon able to do it all is fascinating and comes with the plus of keeping british industrial capabilities alive.
On the other hand, the US solution to both the Tomahawk and anti-ship problems will likely be ready earlier and, due to the large US purchases, might come cheaper and with a production line open for many years.

Two programmes might be needed: a collaboration with the US on the post-Tomahawk; and the FCASW for the post-Harpoon and post-Storm Shadow.



The Harpoon problem

Aside from money, one problem with replacing Harpoon is the different design philosophies followed by the vessels of the fleet. The Type 23 cannot be equipped with a vertical-launch anti-ship missile, but is not going to be completely out of service before 2036.

The Type 45 could move on from Harpoon to a VL system, but only if the space reservation was used and two MK41 Strike Length modules (with a total of 16 cells) were slotted in. This might at some point happen when Ballistic Missile Defense becomes not a “nice to have” but a “must have”. As detailed in the previous article, the Royal Navy has already been putting work into BMD software for the Type 45 and has also funded a study into the addition of the MK41 modules and the integration of the SM-3 anti-ballistic missile.
In the meanwhile, four of the Type 45s are (slowly) being retrofitted with Harpoon, using the launchers and missiles taken from the decommissioned Type 22 Batch 3 ships. As of today, HMS Duncan and HMS Diamond have received their fit.
It is possible, but not certain) that all six Type 45s will receive the computers and wiring back-end that make Harpoon work, allowing the rapid transfer of the launcher blocks from one to the other.

The incoming Type 26, on the other hand, does not seem to have provisions to ever embark a missile unless it is vertically launched from the 24 MK41 cells. 
Today, there are many western anti-ship missiles that are fired from above-deck tubes, but there is very little choice in terms of vertical launch ASMs. This is going to change, at least in part, due to the renewed US Navy interest for anti-ship missiles.
The US LRASM is thus taking shape, and Norway intends to have a go at the US opportunity by developing its Joint Strike Missile for vertical and torpedo tube launch. The JSM will also be integrated for internal and external carriage on the F-35A and, if selected by the US Navy, could go on the F-35C as well. On the F-35B, internal carriage is not possible as the bays are 14 inches shorter, but external carry is an option. The FCASW will also be required to be compatible with vertical launch.

It is reasonable to assume that over the next decade or so, the availability of VL missiles will increase, while over-deck tubes will fall progressively out of fashion.
The problem, however, remains: it is hard to imagine the Royal Navy funding two anti-ship missiles at once (it is already hard enough to see it finding the money for one), so the option is arming the Type 26 and disarming Type 23s and, at least for a while, the 45s; or leaving the Type 26 itself without an anti-ship missile.

Given the obsolescence of the Harpoon and its single-mission nature, it would seem logic to procure a more capable and dual-role missile for use on the Type 26 and, subsequently, Type 45, even if it means accepting the loss of ASMs on the Type 23 while they have still more than a decade of service ahead of them.

But if FCASW continues to aim for the distant 2030, the Royal Navy will have to consider a big Harpoon life-extension, or an interim ASM solution with an off-the-shelf missile, or deal with well over a decade of nothing.



Storm Shadow Mid Life Upgrade

France has confirmed in its Financial Law for 2016 that the defence budget will include money to start the Scalp mid life upgrade. Originally, this was to be another joint programme, with the RAF interested in life-extending its Storm Shadow missiles, close “relatives” of the French Scalp. It is possible to find news of joint studies and technology developments dating back to 2004 if not earlier. Finally, for France at least, the actual upgrade might be about to start.
Requirements and aspirations voiced in the past years included a two-way data link for in-flight retargeting and a different seeker. At one point, the DUMAS (Dual Mode Active IR and Imaging IR Seeker), result of a joint UK – FR technology demonstration programme, was expected to be part of the MLU. DUMAS combined an active infrared scanning laser and a passive infrared detector which, used in conjunction with sophisticated algorithms, provided detection, imaging and accurate identification. 


No information is coming out from the MOD at the moment, but it is pretty likely that the RAF will still want to exploit the chance to share the costs involved in life-extending Storm Shadow. 
Despite writing off more than 200 million in Storm Shadow holdings after the 2010 review, reportedly. Which might mean having reduced the stock by 200 missiles or so...