The evolving budget situations: army programs on the (slow) move

1: Of aircraft carriers and OPVs
2: Land Forces

3: Helicopters

4: Force Structure 

5: Reversing bad decisions 

Defense News reports that the Army is about to move, handing out new requests for information for four important programs. None of these four is a new requirement: each has already an history behind, some already stretching over years. The four programs are:

Light Recovery Vehicle: a replacement for the old Bedford-based LRV. The requirement has circulated for quite a while already, but an earlier attempt to select a new platform was eventually stopped, with some 16 Navistar Husky vehicles converted into interim LRV platforms under UOR. British Forces News has a video of the Husky recovery in Afghanistan: these vehicles cover the needs of the deployed force, supporting vehicles such as Foxhound.

The MOD however aims to bring a definitive air-portable LRV vehicles into service by 2016. A number will be assigned to the amphibious brigade as well, thus introducing the necessary wading and winterization requirements. The MOD has already taken vision of some products that could meet the requirement, such as the Penman-EKA LRV, based on a DURO III 6x6 chassis. Another option is offered by MAN Truck and Bus UK Ltd which have created a LRV variant based on the MAN HX60 4x4 truck already in widespread use in the british army. This could be an excellent solution, offering logistical commonality. 

Multi Role Vehicle – Protected (MRV-P): this is the biggest program by both numbers of vehicles and variants envisaged and, of course, by cost. Unsurprisingly, it is also the one program that has been around for the most time, having spent years already languishing through studies, concept phases, trials, rethinks and rebranding.  MRV-P is in fact the child of the failed Operational Utility Vehicle System (OUVS) program, which came to light as far back as 2003.

MRV-P should replace Land Rovers, Pinzgauers and other old and unprotected vehicles currently widely used in a variety of roles within army units. The MRV-P should also introduce a gun towing variant, a new vehicle which shall replace the (already withdrawn) never loved RB-44. For the gun-towing role and for mortar platoons, 650 old Leyland 4-tonne trucks were kept into service with a decision taken in 2011, being preferred over the RB44 TUH.

There are not many new things to say about this long-running program. An article I wrote in June 2012 contains pretty much all the info available, and some analysis, so I suggest you read it. The most evident possible novelty is that there might now be another serious contender in the race, since General Dynamics Land Systems - Force Protection Europe has privately funded the development of a family of Ocelot (Foxhound in british army service) variants based on a cheaper crew citadel made of steel instead of high-end, expensive composites as in the current patrol variant. Known as Ocelot-S, the new family of vehicles offers a wide range of variants, covering multiple roles.

The steel citadel imposes a 1800 kg weight penalty affecting the payload of the vehicle, but is said to enable a significant reduction in cost. The use of steel also reduces the protection level afforded by some degree (GD promises that the protection afforded is “similar”), but the requirement for MRV-P is much more permissive than for the Light Patrol Protected Vehicle, so this would not be a problem.

As I said back in 2012, Foxhound is a very expensive vehicle, and is far from meeting the cost objective set by the MOD. The new variant might go some way in mitigating this issue.

Obviously, with 400 Foxhound in the patrol variant already on order and destined to equip six infantry battalions under Army 2020 plans, basing MRV-P on the same mechanics would simplify training and logistics.

GD is exploiting the experience collected with Foxhound to try and offer an Ocelot-S product virtually ready for british army adoption. The Ocelot-S command variant in fact comes with a General Dynamics UK's (GDUK) integrated communications and battle management system and with Thales' generic vehicle architecture (GVA) kit. Both are already in use on Foxhoud and, to varying degrees, on UOR fleets such as Mastiff, which are now being taken into core.

Other variants on offer include a logistic flatbed cargo vehicle capable to transport two NATO-standard pallets with a two-tonne payload to the rear of a protected two-door cab. Ambulance, general purpose, dog kennel, fuel bowsers, gun towing and shelter carrying variants are all being offered as possible developments by GD, which also says that there is the potential to stretch the chassis to create a long wheel base variant and, in the longer term, extend the Foxhound developing a 6x6 vehicle variant. 

Ocelot S ambulance variant

A proposed Ocelot S APC variant, with stretched chassis (Long Wheel Base variant)

Ocelot S logistic support variant

The Ocelot-S might give new chances to Foxhound, to expand on many additional roles within the british army.

That is, of course, if the cost really goes down a lot, and if the program manages to get funding and progress to actual delivery. 

For the MRV-P program, Supacat offers its SPV 400 vehicle, and its proposed 6x6 variant, the SPV 600

 

The requirement for a new battlefield ambulance which Defense News quotes should be known (if it hasn’t undergone a new change of acronym already!) as Future Multi Role Battlefield Ambulance. This vehicle, which would replace the venerable Land Rover-based one, could actually end up being just another part of the MRV-P if a suitable variant on the same mechanics can be delivered.  

Defense News’s article is confused in this passage:

Starting with a lightweight recovery vehicle that the MoD’s Defence Equipment & Support organization said it wants in service by 2016, the British military is looking at adding a multi-role vehicle-protected (MRV-P), a protected battlefield ambulance and a vehicle able to carry a protectable palletized load system by 2020.

Only the MRV-P program is big enough to qualify for what is called a Category A program, with a value of £400 million (US $660 million) and above.

The fourth machine, a lightweight air-portable recovery vehicle, which will need to be able to wade ashore in support of Britain’s commando forces, is in the assessment phase and replaces the elderly Bedford-based machine.

The highlighted paragraph clearly is talking of the Bedford Light Recovery Vehicle, but erroneously suggests i("the fourth machine") that it is talking of the "vehicle able to carry a protectable palletized load system by 2020."
I'm not sure of what exactly this could be. A small vehicle to move pallets, especially around helicopter landing zones, replacing the horrendous Springer and the old Supacat "Super Cat" ATMP, or actually the long-delayed replacement for DROPS? I'm inclined to believe it is the replacement for DROPS, but we'll need confirmations going ahead.

A replacement for the DROPS truck fleet is another long running program. The last time it surfaced, it was known as Non Articulated Vehicle Programme. Previously, it had been known as Heavy Load Distribution Capability (HLDC).

The old DROPS trucks are unprotected and no longer adequate to operational scenarios. In Afghanistan, the container carrying capability has been covered by the Enhanced Palletized Load System. The EPLS was obtained converting a first batch of 90 HX77 MAN Support trucks before ordering an additional 87 newly produced, with 31 being used for the establishment of a training fleet. At least 10 EPLS trucks have been used as platforms for the carriage and employment of the Rapidly Emplaced Bridge System  (REBS) in british army service, while three more such trucks were handed over to New Zealand in late 2012, which urgently needed them for its own REBS purchase. It is unclear if the three trucks have then be replaced by new ones in the british army. Even if they have, there are at most 167 EPLS vehicles for the transport of palletized supplies, plus 10 fitted with the REBS bridgelayer system. 167 vehicles, or less, to replace a fleet which up to recent times had counted 1400 Leyland Medium Mobility Load Carriers and 375 Foden Improved Medium Mobility Load Carriers. A large reduction in the requirement is evident, but certainly it has not reduced enough to make 167 vehicles enough to cover it all. 

 

EPLS in action

EPLS will be taken into core as interim replacement for DROPS (which has seen its OSD advanced from 2021 to December 2014 in the SDSR 2010), but it is obvious that the army badly needs to either purchase more, or select a definitive replacement and procure it. Quickly. 

As for "enhancing performace" of the UOR fleets, the Defense News article probably refer to the work already announced to convert some of the vehicles into command and communications variants, as well as for restoring the vehicles to full efficiency as they come back from Afghanistan.
It might also refer to the fact that the vehicles will be stripped of the RPG cage armor and thus made narrower and lighter to be able to move on UK roads and to reduce wear and tear. It can be expected that the reduction in weight and bulk will result in improved manoeuverability. But of course, the additional armor would be fitted again right away for deployment, so this would be a rather virtual "enhancement".

The MOD has recently disclosed the total numbers of UOR vehicles, of various types, that will be taken into core:

71 Coyote

325 Husky

441 Jackal

439 Mastiff

169 Ridgeback

60 Warthog

It is not clear if the Wolfhound vehicles are being counted in the “Mastiff” total, or if they have been left out by the list. Up to 130 of them should be available.

Keeping track of the exact number of UOR vehicles purchased over time has been very complex, but Defense Industry Daily has tried. According to their data, the total numbers of vehicles of the various types purchased for operations are:

97 Coyote

351 Husky

462 + Jackal

506 Mastiff (Wolfhound included?)

168 (some order slipped under the radar?) Ridgeback

115 Warthog 

14 Buffalo vehicles have been purchased for the TALISMAN route clearance system of systems. I'm still waiting for an official confirmation of some kind about their future. They are being brought back from Afghanistan, but there's no certainty yet on whether or not they will go into core, or into storage. 

The Jackal totals are broken down as being:

202 Jackal 1

120 + Jackal 2

140 Jackal 2A

A variety of support equipment related to these fleets and also purchased under UOR, has been brought into core, including CHOKER and 69 Pearson Engineering Super Light Weight Rollers.

It is not mentioned in that article on Defense News, but the british army Small Arms Corps journal mentions the fact that a program has been started for a replacement Mortar Platoon carrier vehicle for Light Role infantry battalions. Unfortunately, there are no details available.

A replacement for the FV432 Mortar Carrier in use in armored infantry battalions will also be needed but is never mentioned openly: my guess is that it could perhaps figure as part of the Armored Battlegroup Support Vehicle (ABSV) conversion of surplus Warrior IFVs that is in the concept phase. 

As the US Army wrestles with the problem of replacing its M113 variants, the turretless Bradley offers a capable and relatively straightforward solution. The UK, faced with the need to replace the FV430-series vehicles, could follow the example replacing (at least a part of) them with the "turretless Warrior" under the ABSV name.

Lastly, it is worth reminding that at DVD 2013 the MOD started looking around for a light, air droppable vehicle which can fit ready to go inside a Chinook and that would be used for C-SAR missions (and special forces work, i'd suppose?), as part of an ambition to rebuild a Joint Personnel Recovery Capability from 2016.

There are a lot of requirements begging for attention, and also several programs starting, re-starting, or just trying to move ahead, out of the infinite successions of concept and assessment phases, studies of all kinds, and costly delays that keep coming.

We will see how much manages to actually go ahead and deliver.

Merry Christmas... and dig in, because a tough year is coming.

Just a quick line to wish all my readers a merry Christmas and a happy new year. My best wishes to all of you.


Now, because i'm a bastard at heart, i will share some of my depression with those who want to read further.

It will be an important and tough year for defence, this one is for sure. There are two events on the horizon that will be of absolute relevance and that will have the potential to slam the death blow on defence, already agonizing after the cuts of 2010 and 2011. These two events are the referendum for the Independence of Scotland and, obviously, the SDSR 2015.
An independent Scotland, make no mistake, would be a gigantic pain in the ass for defence, which would be faced with new, enormous and very expensive challenges, right at a time when the budget is tighter than ever. The SNP's fantasy plans for defence in an independent Scotland are as credible as unicorns gallopping over rainbows. What would be very real in case of a separation would be the cuts, the losses, the dismemberment of the Army and the further emasculation of the other two services.

The road to the next SDSR promises to be painful, as well. The MOD has been underspending since the SDSR, but much of the underspend, instead of being moved into later years to support the needs of defence, has been clawed back by the Treasury with cuts in the Autumn Statements of 2012 and 2013, and in the 2013 budget. The suspect, for a cynic like me, is that the MOD is underspending as a mean to cut even further without having to admit it plainly.

A part of the underspend has been spent on things such as additional Litening III pods (how many?) and the tiny successive orders of Foxhound vehicles that we have seen in the last while. Hammond said that some money will be used to start CROWSNEST next year instead of in 2017, and we shall see if the promise is kept. I very much hope so, because this would at least cut short the AEW gap.
But still, the last two Autumn Statements both raided away hundreds of millions of pounds each. The Autumn Statement 2012 clawed away £245 million in 2013-14 and £490 million in 2014-15.
The Autumn Statement 2013 added another 277 million cut for 2014-15 and announced a 272 million cut for 2015-16.
 
Multiple voices agree that even the Future Force 2020 structure, already depressingly incapable in several areas, is not going to be affordable unless there's an increase in the defence budget, over and above the promised 1% uplift in the sole Equipment Budget. These voices include RUSI in its overview of the coming year and the Chief of Defence Staff himself, who launched his warning in the traditional, annual lecture.

Depression rules supreme within the force, along with cynism. Scratching beneath the surface, it emerges that things are even worse than they look from the outside. Even relatively inexpensive projects are often unfunded and some did not even make it into the White Board of the "unfunded but with a hope come 2015" projects. Apparently, among these projects, there's the Force Protection Craft for the Royal Marines. This follows the killing, already in 2011, of the Fast Landing Craft project (it'll be 2020 at least before the Marines can try again at replacing the LCU MK10), and earlier still (2008) the killing of the replacement for the venerable BV-206 vehicles.

From the outside, the picture for the Royal Marines is unpleasant to say the least: all their main projects appear to have been killed; one Bay LSD has been sold off; one LPD is in mothball and HMS Ocean is to be withdrawn from service in 2019 without a replacement. 
848 NAS will disband at the end of the year, having concluded the last training course for Sea King HC4 crews on December 19. 846 NAS has been disbanded already in March, leaving the sole 845 with just 11 Sea Kings. 846 NAS will reform on Merlin HC3/3A in September 2014, with 845 NAS following in August 2015.
It is not expected to reform 848 NAS: 845 will instead include an Operational Conversion Flight. The whole force will include 37 crews and 25 helicopters, unless there are further reductions.This is a reduction from 43 crews and a force which once lined over 30 helicopters.
Actually adapting the Merlin for shipboard operations will be a slow affair. The first navalised Merlin is not expected before 2017, and the last won't be around before 2022. For several years, the amphibious force will be extraordinarily poor in dedicate helicopter support.

The fate of 24 Commando Engineer Regiment is somewhat uncertain. The Royal Marines and Navy HQ are locked in a fight against the Army for its survival, trying to reverse the plan for its disbandment. Stood up in 2008 to respond to a chronic shortage of engineer capability in the amphibious brigade, 24 Cdo Eng hasn't even had the time to stand up the planned second field squadron (56 Sqn) before being sacrificed by the Army to the reductions required by Army 2020.
The assignment of 131 Cdo Eng (Reserve) Squadron to a command within the Army, other than to the Cdo Enr Regiment itself is also source of many questions and doubts. 
The Army also wanted to axe 148 (Meiktila) Bty Royal Artillery, but this was thankfully avoided. 29 Cdo Royal Artillery, however has suffered its own reductions, and is down to just 12 Light Guns. Hopefully, it'll at least maintain its batteries.

Lastly, P Squadron, 43 Cdo, a force protection squadron made up by RN personnel, stood up in 2010 to provide "Blue" teams for the force protection of navy and RFA ships at sea, is also disbanding, and this role will fall on the shoulders of the line commando battalions. 40, 42 and 45 Commando are, as a consequence, being asked to generate, more or less constantly, 1.7 units at readiness out of 3, Jane's estimates. A new record.

Next year the Royal Marines will be 350 years old. They have much to be proud off, and much to celebrate. But behind the curtain, the picture is unpleasant. Since 2010, years of effort to build up the most complete and credible amphibious capability in Europe have been squandered and crumbled by reductions in shipping, in supports, in vehicles and landing craft projects. Having recently re-read "3 Commando Brigade in the Falklands No PicNic", by Major General Julian Thompson RM, it is very much alarming to see how the last three years have brought back the Marines on the same dangerous edge of destruction they faced in the early 80s.
The brigade today would have much the same problems it had in 1982, which means, to my cynic mind, that 31 years have been largely wasted and no lesson has actually been learned firmly enough to avoid falling back into the same old pits. The brigade was desperately short of helicopters back then, and would have even less today: 847 NAS is going to have just four Wildcat helicopters, and the Sea King HC4s (which was new in 1982, and is very old today) are far less than back then.
Save for the introduction of Viking and some other kit, the brigade has less of everything: less light guns, less helicopters. The loss of HMS Ocean and the incoherent, messy plans for embarked fixed wing aviation would put the brigade back in the same position as in 1982: no air superiority, no adequate air reconnaissance, little in the ways of air support, and no appropriate helicopter support ship for amphibious operations.

The Royal Navy is probably not without its faults. Thompson in his book remembers how the Navy already in 1970, pressed by cuts and budget problems, tried to halve the number of Commandos from the then 4 down to 2. Ironically, back then it was the Army's opposition that prevented that from happening.
In 1980, the Navy tried again, because faced by the cost of the submarine-borne nuclear deterrent (see the similarities? There's the Successor SSBN on the horizon...) and by a very limited and precise sets of roles assigned in the Cold War scenarios by a MOD 100% focused on Germany and convinced that out of area operations would never happen again. Instead of directly proposing the disbandment of Commando units, the Navy focused then on axing the amphibious shipping (again, see the similarities...). Thompson was told so in December 1981 by First Sea Lord Henry Leach. Not without sadness, of course, but that was the direction the Navy was inclined to follow to preserve other parts of its "body". Argentina's hurried, foolish move came a few months early: had they let the winter pass, and acted later, the carriers and amphibious ships would have all vanished, victims of cuts, and the islands today would be named Malvinas.


The Royal Marines of today are precious to the Navy. Their involvment in Afghanistan has made the whole navy proud and has kept the admirals at the table. For not the first time, the contribution of the commandos has been much greater than their numbers suggest.
Moreover, the flexibility of the RN Response Force Task Group has been proven multiple times since the SDSR came out, with the quick response to events in Libya and, to a lesser degree, to Sirya, and then this year to the Philippines natural disaster.
The Navy HQ is, this time, on their side, i believe. The involvment of Navy HQ in the fight to save 148 Meiktila and 24 Cdo Eng is telling, in this sense.
However, the Army, faced with its own painful cuts, is rowing against them. The parts have inverted, but the Royal Marines still sit in the middle, in an uncomfortable position. Let 2014 be a year of celebration, but never let down the guard! The Royal Navy, stretched far too thin in manpower and budget terms, is accepting tough reductions in amphibious shipping capability despite its support for the Marines, and the Army will be trying to redirect cuts away from itself as well. I fear this is a defining moment: may the 350th birthday not be the last of the Royal Marines as we know them.

The problem, basically, comes down to an alarming lack of strategic cohrence. The rushed and completely financial nature of the SDSR 2010 certainly has a good part of the fault, but the way the decisions made drift completely away from the slogans and strategic narrative is too evident and too disturbing to be excused only on those grounds.
The other half of the High Readiness reaction element, the Air Assault brigade, is in a messy situation of its own. Cut down to just two para battalions (plus reserve battalion) and with supports similarly scaled down, the brigade is no longer effective as a brigade and appears just as hard pressed as the Commandos in sustaining the generation of a battalion-strong task force every year. Binary brigades have been proven ineffective again and again and again. The US Army has just reversed its own try: the Brigade Combat Teams, save for those mounted on Strykers, have two manoeuvre battalions but are now to be enlarged to three, with corresponding uplift in artillery and engineer capability.

In practice, the strategic narrative and the reality of the brigade's capabilities are on diverging paths: having assigned to these two formations key and very demanding roles, with a very tight force generation cycle, the Army has then swiftly moved to weaken both brigades, making them at once busier than ever and weaker than ever, in CS and CSS elements in particular. The battalions in the two High Readiness brigades will constantly rotate in and out of very high readiness, putting the men, the kit and the organisation under severe strain. 
Rushed SDSR or not, i simply can't understand how this is even possible, frankly. It screams wrong in your face from whatever angle you look at it.

Army 2020 strategic narrative, shaped by the Agile Warrior trials and exercises and by doctrinal studies, says that the future will require more littoral manoeuvre capability and more riverine capability. Decisions made: scrap the RLC's landing crafts without replacement, move wide wet gap crossing entirely into the Reserve, reduce amphibious shipping, scrap the Force Protection Craft project which would have given the armed forces an excellent riverine capability, in conformity to the lessons learned in Iraq using LCPV MK5s up rivers.
Again, say one thing, do exactly the opposite.

The aircraft carriers, which should be the cornerstone of the defence strategy which is, in the words, shaped around "small but powerful expeditionary forces", remain bogged down in uncertainty and alarming trial-and-error. It all seems to slowly move ahead, entirely shaped by funding considerations, without a clear cut role and case made for them, when the impending loss of HMS Ocean without a dedicate replacement and the need for air power at sea make the case perfectly clear.

In the air force, the Sentinel R1 hasn't yet a certain future despite proving itself again and again. The Shadow R1 will stay, and it is widely anticipated that the Reaper will eventually be brought into core budget, although there's no certainty yet. The Rivet Joint force will slowly build up to achieve FOC in 2017, while the purchase of a 9th C-17 aircraft is a persistent rumour which for now fails to become a solid reality.
The fast jet combat fleet, in the meanwhile, falls down to alarmingly low numbers. The Tornado GR4 is on its path to retirement: 12(B) Squadron disbands on March 31, 2014, followed the day after by 617 Squadron.
31 March 2015 will see II(AC) Squadron disbanding as well, to reform the day after in Lossiemouth, on Typhoon. In the same month, XV(R) Squadron, the Tornado GR4 OCU, will move from Lossiemouth to Marham, along with the Tornado Engineering Flight. Lossiemouth will bid its final farewell to Tornado GR4, which will only survive for a few more years in Marham, with a mere 2 squadrons. The OCU itself, at some point, will disband and go down to a mere Operational Conversion Flight as the Tornado force approaches its end.
And this is before the SDSR 2015: the pessimist expect the OSD for Tornado to be moved even closer than the currently planned 2019.
Even if the 2019 OSD stands, the RAF will be down to as few as 6 frontline fast jet squadrons by then, hopefully growing back to seven when the second F-35B squadron stands up. That's a tiny airforce, which compares badly to others in the same theorical league: see France, or even Italy.

The hope to see the Typhoon tranche 1 retained and used for something in the long term is all but dead, making the Typhoon program a fearsome waste of money, with 160 expensive aircraft purchased to never employ, effectively, more than around 100 in just five squadrons. A waste of colossal proportions.
Only two squadrons are planned for the F-35B force, and the second (809 NAS) will probably only stand up in the early 2020s. In 2020 the RAF is likely to have only 6 frontline squadrons, five on Typhoon and one on F-35B.
And this is before anything new and nasty happens.

According to Lochkeed Martin, as of October 2013, the F-35B plan for the UK sees 617 Sqn moving to Marham in 2018 with 9 aircraft to work up to Land-based IOC and to begin carrier trials. Five more will be based in the US for training, in the US Marines base Beaufort. 3 more aircraft will be with XVII Sqn, the OEU, on the Edwards AFB.
Of these 18 airplanes, only 4 have been delivered/are on order so far, but the MOD is said to be approving the plan for the purchase of some 14 more. If they are to be delivered by 2018, however, the time is very tight, as roughly two years pass from order to delivery. With just one lone F-35B in LRIP 7 and 4 anticipated in the LRIP 8, we are a long way away from the target. Either the MOD revises these orders upwards, or there will not be 18 aircraft in 2018. Even if there are, the UK, only Level 1 partner in the JSF program, will actually have less airplanes than most other partecipants. Not entirely bad, since the later aircraft will of course be more technically mature and also hopefully less expensive, but this is due to a reduction to just 48 planned purchases, and this is no good.
In any case, this is nonetheless telling of what downsizing the british armed forces actually are going through.

9 aircraft in the UK, 3 in Edwards and 5 in Beaufort. That's all.

The SDSR 2015 is also supposed to fill the bleeding gap in Maritime Aircraft Patrol capability, starting a new programme, but keeping in mind how many other problems there are at hand, it is quite hard to be upbeat.
One little, tiny ray of hope comes from the CBRN real, where the demented decision to withdraw the Fuchs is apparently being reversed, with 8 such vehicles, modernized, being assigned to FALCON Squadron, Royal Tank Regiment, to form a Wide Area CBRN recce and surveillance asset which will be part of the division-level supports (probably will come under Force Troops HQ). FALCON Sqn will be based in Harman Lines in Warminster. FALCON squadron will be a sixth sub-unit, independent from the main role of the regiment as Type 56 tank formation. There isn't yet an official confirmation i can quote, but it seems to be a done deal. In 1982, the Royal Navy saw stupid decisions reversed by the strategic shock of the argentine invasion. In 2011, Libya exposed the stupidity of losing capabilities such as Nimrod (both the maritime patrol and ELINT/SIGINT variants) and the aircraft carriers. But the shock wasn't big enough, and the UK got away with it, sending a few Apaches on HMS Ocean (just five in the moment of greatest effort!) and adding a little bit of extra life on Type 22 frigates and Nimrod R1.
In 2013, the Army was given back its CBRN capability following another strategic shock, the use of gas in Syria.

Royal Tank Regiment post-merger will have: 



Armd Sqn (AJAX): SHQ (2 x CR2); 4 x Armd Tps (each of 4 x CR2).
Armd Sqn (BADGER).
Armd Sqn (CYCLOPS).
Comd & Recce Sqn (DREADNAUGHT). 2 x CR2; and 8 x CVR(T) SCIMITAR.
HQ Sqn (EGYPT).

  


The question is: what happens when, finally, a big strategic shock comes too late, instead of just in time to cause a hasty reversion of the worst mistakes?
Soon or later, it is bound to happen.

In conclusion, the Armed Forces are far from being healthy. They are, in many ways, exhausted and squeezed to death by immense pressure coming from all sides. In the way ahead, the SDSR 2015 marks a no-return point. And the Scottish issue, coming before that, can represent another such crisis point. Don't believe what SNP says: it would be foolish to expect anything other than sweat and tears in the armed forces if Independence happens.



Merry Christmas, and good luck for the new year, proud warriors. It seems good luck will be very much needed. May some kind of wisdom spirit descend in the minds of those who will write the fate of the armed forces in the coming year.



Gabriele
 

The evolving budget situation: reversing bad decisions

1: Of aircraft carriers and OPVs
2: Land Forces

3: Helicopters

4: Force Structure 

 

 

In the previous article, about Force Structure, i've noticed the apparent change in the plan for the formationg of Hybrid Engineer Regiments, and documented the ongoing war for the survival of 24 Commando Engineer Regiment.  

Another bad decision of the rounds of cuts of the year 2011 might be reversed soon, according to what Colonel Commandant Royal Tank Regiment has written to the RTR community: the wide area, under-armor CBRN reconnaissance capability of the Army, sacrificed with the early withdrawal of the FUCHS vehicle and the net loss of 319 Army posts in the CBRN specialisation, as all residual capability in this area was moved out of the green army and into the RAF Regiment. In total, the loss of the 9 armored vehicles and of all the army personnel in the role was only estimate to save £129 million over a period of 10 years.

 

The Fuchs was hurried into service for Operation Granby in 1991

 

As often happened in the modern history of the british armed forces, a strategic shock came soon afterwards, reminding everyone of just how stupid the decision just took was. The crisis in Syria, with the use of chemical weapons, accelerated the rethink already going on within the MOD, and added new urgency to the restoration of the wide area CBRN surveillance capability. I talked about it at lenght in June.   

Lieutenant-General Christopher Michael Deverell MBE wrote last month about the ongoing planning for the resurrection of such capability, while providing an update on the plans for the merging of 1st and 2nd Royal Tank Regiments into a single Type 56 tank formation as part of the Army 2020 restructuring: 

 

 

A message from the Colonel Commandant Royal Tank Regiment 

 

My main purpose in writing this message is to cover a number of issues that arise as a result of the amalgamation of our two Regiments. The RTR Council has been looking at these issues, significantly assisted by members of all ranks from both Regiments.   

The amalgamation issue that will affect serving members of the Regiment in the most immediate way is dress. So I am pleased to be able to say that the Commanding Officers and Regimental Colonel have agreed on the key aspects of the new Dress Regulations to be adopted on amalgamation, the details of which will be promulgated separately. Suffice to say that black will continue to feature highly.     

The Council has determined that there are a number of amalgamation issues on which it is not yet possible to reach decisions, in which the status quo will therefore continue for the time being. For example, we have not yet been engaged by the Army or the RAC in substantive discussions about Recruiting Areas – so for the time being we would expect to continue to recruit from the same areas of the country that 1 and 2 RTR recruited from. In similar vein, we have not yet formed a view on the distribution of tasks between Regimental Headquarters in Bovington, and the new Regiment in Tidworth. I will report back on these, and other important issues such as the future of the Tank magazine, and of the Association, when I am in a position so to do. But I am now able to let you know what the Council has decided on Squadron names, and on the degree of Scottishness we should seek to maintain, topics that I know will mean a good deal to many of you.

The Council accepts that some of our antecedent Regiments have a tradition of using letters, rather than names, to describe sub-units. However, with the benefit of our considerable experience, and time served in both Regiments, we believe that Squadron names strengthen sub-unit identity in a positive way and that the ability to name our Squadrons offers the Regiment a significant brand advantage over others. We conclude that the advantages of using names, rather than letters, for all our sub-units outweigh the loss of some historical precedent. 

We have therefore decided that, upon amalgamation, the three armoured squadrons in the Royal Tank Regiment will be known as AJAX, BADGER, and CYCLOPS. Command and Reconnaissance Squadron will be known as DREADNAUGHT, and Headquarters Squadron will be known as EGYPT. Should there be a future CBRN Area Surveillance and Reconnaissance (AS&R) Squadron, it will be known as FALCON. These particular names have been chosen because they represent a connection all the way back to the Heavy Branch of the Machine Gun Corps in World War 1, as well as to more recent regimental history.  As far as our Scottish heritage is concerned, the Council is proud of this tradition and recognises the benefit it confers in helping us to differentiate ourselves from others. We would not wish it to dominate, but we see it as a net contributor to recruitment. For so long as it is practicable so to do, we would wish to maintain this historical association. We will achieve this by retaining the Pipes and Drums, by painting ‘Chinese Eyes’ on our tanks, and by applying whatever other aspects of Scottishness that the Commanding Officer of the day so authorises. The practicality of this approach will next be reviewed after the referendum on Scottish independence.   

Finally, I should take this opportunity to say something about the formation of the CBRN AS&R squadron. As I write this message, there is a strong possibility that the RTR will be invited to generate an additional squadron to meet this task, over and above our Type 56 Armoured Regiment role. But the Defence Board has not yet made a final decision, so the task may yet fail to materialise, or (less likely) could be given to some other unit to perform. I have been involved in a host of high levels discussions about this task, both as your Colonel Commandant and as a member of the Army Command Group. My position throughout has been that the Army and Defence need an AS&R capability, that the RTR has demonstrated the ability to provide it, and that we stand ready to do so again. My one proviso has been to say that it would not be sensible to double-hat this capability with that of an armoured sub-unit: it needs to be a squadron in its own right. Hopefully, we will know the outcome on this issue within the next few months. 

 

Fear Naught.  

Lt Gen C M Deverell MBE                                                                       15 November 2013

 

 

 

Restoring the AS&R capability of the armed forces would be a massively welcome move, which would remedy to one of many very questionable, hurried decisions that were taken in 2010 and 2011. Let's hope in good news, for once.