Vikings to be overhauled

The Royal Marines ordered 108 Viking vehicles in the early 2000s, as part of the Commando 21 reorganization. The Viking All-Terrain Vehicle (Protected) was meant to provide armoured, amphibious mobility to the Commando groups, and it hit its IOC in 2005, with deliveries completed by 2006. The vehicle would supplement and replace part of the unarmored BV206 vehicle, still present in large numbers and in several variants within the Commando brigade.  

The Royal Marines took 33 of the new vehicles with them in Afghanistan during their tour in October 2006, and the all terrain mobility of the Viking proved incredibly precious during operations, so much so that the British Army asked to retain a Viking presence in theatre in the long term as Herrick 6 began. The Army obviously had no Viking-trained personnel, so the new big mission of the Royal Marines Armoured Support Group became the support of the Afghan effort, in parallel to the deployment of the vehicle at sea on amphibious operations, including a raid inland in Somalia last year.

Further orders for Viking vehicles were made during the years of service in Afghanistan: in June 2008, for example, 14 new vehicles were ordered.

Eventually, 24 Viking of the much improved MK2 type were also ordered during 2009, with deliveries completed in 2010: these were 22 troop transports and 2 command vehicles.

In 2007 a separate order was placed, for 21 Vikings which will be part of the Watchkeeper UAS system , carrying the Tactical Party that will enable ground forces and HQs to access the data from the unmanned aircrafts and assign missions to it.

In total, more than 160 Vikings have been ordered by the UK, but at least 27 were lost during operations.
 

This Viking, in action in Afghanistan, is allowing a sniper to fire from under armor cover. The MR555 protected mount for a GPMG on the front car is immediately evident.

 

Eventually, the Viking in Afghanistan began showing its limits, as the need for bar armour against RPGs, under-belly protection against IEDs and other threatre-entry standard modifications added a good two tons of weight to the vehicle, bringing it close to its limits.

Worse, as the threat of the IEDs became worse, the Viking’s adaptability to the threat came to an end when the weight growth margin was reached, and adding further protection proved simply impossible. A UOR at that point was launched, and some 100 to 115 Bronco vehicles, larger and with more room for armor but otherwise based on the same principles and architecture, were procured from Singapore, and extensively improved and modified into the “Warthog” vehicle, which then replaced the Viking in theatre.

The Warthog order was announced in December 2008 as a UOR for Afghanistan: curiously, barely months before, in June, the MOD had launched a tender for the All-Terrain Vehicle (Support), which had to be amphibious, armoured, fitted for weapons, and which was intended as a replacement for the BV206. The ATV(S) was to work alongside the Viking, and obvious candidates included the Viking itself, perhaps in the MK2 variant, and the Bronco.

In July, the tender notice was cancelled. Ever since, I’ve been thinking that the Warthog might be considered more than just a UOR: personally, I hope (and suspect) that Warthog might end up in the Royal Marines core budget as ATV(S). The need for a replacement for the BV206, after all, has not gone away.

The Viking finally came home from Afghanistan, but years of such intensive employment in a very hostile environment took their toll: earlier this year it became clear that the share of original Viking vehicles that had been overloaded with armor and TES kit would not be able to be safely operated in amphibious operations with the Royal Marines without getting an extensive refit and upgrade.

Not long ago, the Royal Marines trialed the Viking for launch and swim ashore directly from the amphibious vessel HMS Bulwark. Due to their low water speed (only around 5 km/h at best) they are normally carried close to shore, up to five at a time, via LCU MK10. But they have proven that they can swim ashore and back directly from the ship, in the fashion envisaged by the (infinitely more ambition) EFV of the US Marines.

Now, the Ministry of Defence has announced a regeneration programme worth 37.8 million pounds, with a contract awarded to BAE Systems Hagglunds. Work will be carried out at Ornskoldsvik, in Sweden, and will be completed by the end of 2014. The scope is to rebuild all but the existing MK2 Vikings to a fully amphibious, heavier, better protected MK2 standard.

The gross weight will grow to 14 tons, and new front and rear hulls will be rebuilt to integrate the latest generation V-shaped mine-resistant protection. Modifications to brakes and suspensions and to all other affected components will be part of the overhaul.

99 complete vehicles will be overhauled. As I said, possibly 24 or more Vikings are already available in MK2 configuration, and won’t be modified. The 21 Vikings owned by the Army for Watchkeeper are also almost certainly out of the count, too. A further 12 rear cabs only have been given on loan to the Swedish army, which required them as a UOR to give protection to its forces in Afghanistan. The British were in condition to give them the rear cars due to the arrival of Warthog in theatre. The front cars were given by the Dutch instead.

As part of the loan agreement, Sweden will return 12 cars remanufactured at full MK2 standard.    

“All but the existing Mk2 Vikings will be rebuilt around completely new front and rear car hulls featuring the latest mine-protected v-shaped underbodies of the Mk2”

BAE Systems statement

Of the 99 vehicles going into overhaul, 9 will have their rear car modified into a Mortar Carrier wagon. This assembly, showcased at DSEI 2011 by BAE Systems, includes a turntable for mounting the 81mm L16 mortar and space for the stowage of 140 rounds.

A further 19 vehicles will have their rear carrier fitted with a crew-served weapon turret, adding to the shielded machine gun ring already present on most of the front cars. Due to the Afghan conflict, at least 69 MR555 weapon mounts were procured and installed. These shielded mounts can take any weapon, from a 5.56 Minimi to the HMG .50 and the GMG. The mount weights some 380 kg complete with the .50 HMG and offers STANAG Level 2 ballistic protection to the gunner.

The Viking Crew Served Weapon variant was showcased by BAE Systems as a very impressive, all-inclusive mobile fortress meant to provide fire support and ISTAR to the forces on the ground: it was in fact shown fitted with a Remote Weapon Station with a .50 HMG mounted over the front car, a shielded ring mount mounted on top of the rear car, Boomerang III acoustical shooter detection system and retractable, mast-mounted EO/IR sensor payload. It is not clear if the 19 CSW vehicles for the Royal Marines will include all of these features.  

The Crew Served Weapon carrier as shown by BAE at DSEI in 2011: Boomerang III shooter detection system, Selex Enforcer RWS with .50 machine gun, mast-mounted sensor and rear protected mount for another machine gun.

The British Viking vehicles originally came only in Troop Carrier, Command and Recovery variants, but in 2008 field conversion of some troop carriers into ambulances were carried out. I don’t know how this approach progressed: it is possible that a small number of ambulances are available.

The Warthog order included the ambulance variant specifically, from the very start.

Inside the MK2's rear car

 

The MK2 Viking is fitted with a shallow V-shaped shield in both cars, and has a steel body fully protected against 7.62 armor piercing rounds and 152 mm artillery slivers at 10 meters of range. The MK2 has greater engine power and electrical power output increased to 260 amperes. It is also equipped with blast-protected seats, hung on rails, and comes with four-point seat belts.

It also has weight growth margin to take additional armor to gain 2a/2b NATO STANAG resistance against mines and IEDs, and can be fitted with a cage armor to resist to RPGs, but with these additions it is no longer amphibious. 

Viking mortar carrier

The news of the overhaul is to be welcomed, naturally. The 19 CSW vehicles and the 9 Mortar Carriers will add a lot to the Battlegroup at Readiness, but more would be necessary for a complete replacement of the BV206 in the many roles it still covers, mortar carrier included. It is likely that, at least for the time being, BV206s will continue to be used in training and in low-readiness Commando groups within the brigade, with the more capable Viking mortar reserved to the battlegroup at readiness within the Response Force Task Group. 

BV206 Mortar Carriers of 42 Commando in Norway during exercises. They carry 100 ready rounds.

 

Perhaps, in good time, Warthog will help the Royal Marines solve the problem of a successor for the BV206. In the meanwhile, the overhaul will keep the Viking in service out to 2031, with a wider upgrade expected around the end of this decade: perhaps the heavier Warthog will become the main troop carrier variant, while the Viking will, in time, become the actual Support vehicle by taking over the specialized tasks...? 

It's worth remembering that BV206s give mobility also to Royal Marines' communications and EW systems. 

The unmanned revolution

A very interesting study from DroneWarsUk has put together government data about UAV expenditure and projects, and so doing it has provided excellent food for thought and analysis. Considering, of course, that while they openly oppose the use of unmanned air systems, especially armed ones, i totally support their employment, simply for one reason: they work and deliver effect.

Since 2007, the UK has expended and/or committed around 2 billion pounds for purchasing, operating, researching and developing unmanned air systems.

The MQ-9 Reaper fleet accounts for 506 million pounds in approved purchase and support costs. The original order for 6 drones made in 2007 was followed by a 135 million order in 2010 for a further 5 Reapers and associated equipment and ground control section.
In the meanwhile, one of the original 6 Reapers was lost, so that the total fleet, at deliveries completed, will number 10.

So far, Reaper has been notoriously controlled by british personnel from 39 Squadron RAF based in Creech Air Force Base, Nevada, US. However, with the 5 new Reapers due to be delivered, XIII Squadron RAF, which ceased being a Tornado GR4 squadron early in 2011, is to stand up again this autumn as a Remotely Piloted Air System, based in Waddington, in the UK.
39 Squadron itself is to finally relocate to Waddington in the next future, once XIII Squadron is operational. The relocation of 39 Squadron will be phased to ensure there is no disruption to UK Reaper support to current operations.

This way, the UK will have brought home the ground control section of the Reaper force. But Reaper has not yet been given a safe and certain future: being a UOR-funded equipment, by the end of operations in Afghanistan the RAF will have to either bring it into Core Budget and find the funding to keep it going, or divest it. This situation also implies that the RAF so far has no plan at all to base Reapers in the UK, and fly them from UK air bases. The drones are obviously based in Afghanistan, and their future remains, at the moment, a question mark.
It is however widely expected that the RAF will keep Reaper, as a stopgap on the way to Scavenger if nothing else (there won't be a Scavenger before 2020 at best), which might actually end up being a development of Reaper itself: the option is far from having been ruled out.

The Reaper is currently the only armed unmanned system available to the UK. It has flown more than 38.000 hours and has employed weapons since 2008. They have employed weaponry 319 times as of early September, and have killed hundreds of talibans, including important figureheads, while tragically killing four civilians in one occasion, when in 2008 two Taliban pick-up trucks loaded with explosives were taken out with a Reaper attack.
There are of course various accusations that the number of civilian victims is actually higher, but the official figure is four. 

DroneWarsUK adds to the Reaper's costs an estimate of the impact of the armed UAV on expenditure for satellite bandwidth. I'm not sure of the validity of their estimate and reasoning, even if it is obvious that, without the bandwidth-hungry drone, the Armed Forces would need less satellite comms capability.
The Skynet satellite system costs 200 million pounds a year, and DroneWars estimates that up to 10% of the figure might be made up by the needs of the UAVs. This particular figure, however, remains uncertain.  


The Hermes 450 fleet is operated by the Royal Artillery with contractor's support. There are a dozen drones, sustaining 5 to 6 daily task lines. The UAVs are leased on a pay-by-flight basis, as a stop-gap measure on the way to the much enhanced, UK-built and owned Watchkeeper. The lease had to be renewed several times, since Watchkeeper failed to become operative by the end of 2011 as was once expected, and again was unable to deploy in 2012, with the first Watchkeeper task line now expected in theatre in Spring 2013.
The cost of the lease since 2007 is put at 181 million pounds.

The already mentioned Watchkeeper is currently the largest and most ambitious UAV program in the UK, and indeed is probably matched only by the US Army's Gray Eagle UAV project.
This complete, fully-integrated UAV system is due to be the main eye of the army for years into the future. 54 UAVs and 13 Ground Control Stations are on order, plus at least 21 Tactical terminals, mounted in specifically-configured Viking all-terrain vehicles.
Cost of the Watchkeeper is booked at 847 million pounds.

Watchkeeper is packed up for transport by a DROPS truck

The Watchkeeper is unarmed, but has a margin of payload available that would allow carriage of a couple of light guided weapons such as the Thales LMM missile (13 kg, with a warhead of just around 3 and laser guidance). The Royal Artillery is keen to gain weapons capability to turn the Watchkeeper into a hunter-killer platform better able to deal with time-critical targets, but there is no funding available at the moment. The "A-TUAS" (Armed Tactical Unmanned Air System) program, as it is called, remains "on hold", possibly to proceed sometime in the next few years.  

The Desert Hawk expenditure has been approved at 42 millions since 2007. The original order was for 144 mini-drones, but 27 have been lost during operations. There have been several successive additional orders and capability insertions, up to the currently in service Desert Hawk III.
In Afghanistan there are regularly a dozen 5-man detachments of DHIII operative, with each Detachment having several (possibly six) UAVs. The system is operated by the Royal Artillery and is, of course, totally unarmed.

Special Forces have and might still be using US RQ-11 Raven mini-drones in partnership with US forces on operations. The SAS in 2005 acquired the BUSTER mini-UAV in unknown quantities.  

The T-HAWK vertical take-off, man-packable UAV was initially operated by the Royal Engineers, but was subsequently assigned to Royal Artillery personnel as the RA became the Army's UAV authority. T-HAWK is used as an integral part of the TALISMAN route clearance system.
12 UAVs were procured, for a booked cost of 3 million pounds.

The PD-100 Black Hornet is the most recent and less known addition to the force. This nano-UAV weighting only 16 grams is a tiny helicopter that fits in a hand, but can fly for up to 25 minutes, depending on wind conditions and other factors. It uses internal rechargeable batteries for power and can fly at up to 1000 meters of distance. The PD-100 Black Hornet is a complete system comprising two or three nano air vehicles (NUAV) and a ground control element fitted in a light, small box for transport with a total weight inferior to 1 kg.  
Thanks to its tiny sizes, it can fly even into buildings and provide the troops with situational awareness. An unknown number was ordered in November 2011: the value of the "initial" contract was put at 2.5 millions, but 20 millions were indicated as through-life value.
This is likely to include further expected acquisitions and successive capability-insertions: the MOD wants the nano-UAV to provide night vision too, something that, at the moment, could not be fitted. As technology progresses, it is hoped that this and other features will be added.

While there is no certainty, it would appear that the MOD has procured 100 or more nano-UAVs, so possibly between 33 and 50 complete "Personal Reconnaissance" systems. It would appear that the nano-UAV number 100 was delivered to the MOD last June.

Black Hornet in action

Cost, as explained, is indicated in 20 millions.


For research and development, Mantis and Taranis received, as of 2010, funding for 167 million pounds.
In January 2012 BAE was awarded a much publicized 40 million contract for the definition of "Future Combat Air Systems", and most recently a 30 million Joint Effort with France was announced, relative to work for the design of an UCAV for entry in service in 2030.
The UCAV (Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle) has strike missions as main role, and it is expected to be an ultra-long range, stealth, highly-survivable bomber capable to deliver precious strikes deep into enemy-held territory, even in presence of significant enemy air defences. 

The most interesting part however is the indication of a Scavenger requirement for a total fleet numbering up to 30 MALEs, with a through-life cost of 2 billion pounds over 15 years.
Normally, support and running costs account for 60% of the total expenditure, so the development and procurement of the Scavenger solution would be budgeted at less than 1 billion pounds.
Scavenger is expected to have significant Strike capability: the Mantis demonstrator from BAE, expected to be the basis for development of the production-standard aircraft, was shown fitted with 6 underwing pylons suitable for Paveway IV guided bombs and Brimstone missiles.

Aimed at the Scavenger requirement is the collaboration with France on the BAE-Dassault "TELEMOS" MALE development. Committment to Scavenger is expected to be part of the 2013 defence budget. An announcement was actually expected already this summer, but the new government of France imposed a delay as it reviews its defence strategy (and, crucially, funding). France has recently signed a deal with Germany for collaboration on a MALE drone, in practice unilaterally expanding the bi-national project Telemos to involve Germany.
It remains to be seen how the UK will react, and what kind of future Telemos will have.

It should also be reported that a 40 million pounds UOR has been launched by the Royal Navy for the procurement of a UAV for employment on RFA ships and Type 23 frigates. It is widely expected that ScanEagle, or its newer, more capable incarnation, the RQ-21 Integrator, will be selected, as the Navy already validated operations of ScanEagle from Type 23 frigates as far back as 2006. Integrator uses the same launch and recovery kit and methods as ScanEagle, so it would make sense to go for the newer, more capable system as it would only imply minimal changes from the procedures already validated with ScanEagle in the past.
There is also a program for the demonstration and, in time, for the purchase of a rotary wing UAV which might be armed, and that will form an important part of the future mission capability of ships such as the Type 26 frigate.
These marittime UAVs programs are to be welcomed, as they will finally give the Navy improved situational awareness during deployments in congested and potentially hostile waters, such as in the Persian Gulf. 

If anything, my greatest worry and complaint is that Scavenger and the new UCAV, as it stands, are not to be made aircraft carrier capable, in no small part because they would need arresting wires and very possibly catapults to be fitted to the ships.
And as we know, the very questionable decision of going STOVL was taken instead.

SDSR: the words it didn't say

Time and obsessive attention on my part continue to bring forth more and more unpleasant and obscure elements of the SDSR and of the successive "restructuring" in programs and timelines.

DefenseNews.com today confirms a fear that i've reported more than once on this blog, that the Royal Navy will have a gap of at least four years in Airborne Early Warning capability when the Sea King ASaC MK7 is retired in 2016.
Crowsnest, which is confirmed as part of the Core Budget at least, is not expected to deliver before 2020. Indeed, some documents suggest that it could be 2021 or even 2022 before it can enter service.

The recent damning report of the Defence Committee on Marittime Surveillance after Nimrod contains the hint, where it notes that:

There is the potential for other capability gaps to occur, such as when the Sea King airborne surveillance and control helicopter is withdrawn in 2016 to be replaced by the Project Crowsnest operating from the Merlin Mk2.

This is another blow to the operational effectiveness of the Royal Navy, that is close to being zeroed. It is also spitting in the face of hard-gained direct and bloody experience: the Falklands evidently have not seen enough ships sunk to learn the goddamn lesson.

There is also apparently no hope left to see the AEW package going on the (at this point wasted) remaining Merlin HM1 airframes, as the MOD's description of Crowsnest is:

Project CROWSNEST will satisfy the requirement for an assured Airborne Surveillance and Control (ASaC) capability to provide long range surveillance and battlespace management to Carrier Strike and Littoral Manoeuvre task groups. Project CROWSNEST is to replace SKASaC. The mission system solution will be hosted on the existing Merlin Mk2 aircraft, affording that platform a true multi-role capability across the air, maritime, land, surface and sub-surface environments. This will exploit the flexibility inherent in having a bolt-on sensor package that could allow either Anti-Submarine Warfare or ASaC role to be discharged dependent on the Commander's requirements (although to note the two roles may be mutually exclusive for concurrent or simultaneous operations). 

Another sizeable reduction in the strenght of the Fleet Air Arm is ahead, with the loss of the current AEW squadrons, and the passage of yet another mission on the shoulders of a shrinking Merlin community, with the predictable result that there will be no longer enough ASW, nor enough AEW. A disaster on the whole line.
It's worth remembering that the Merlin is also supposed to "close the gap" left by the loss of Nimrod.
Someone in the MOD really believes that Merlin is a wizard, and not an helicopter present in a fleet that will only number 30 and supposed to deliver 6 to 8 Small Ship Flights, carrier-wing flight (up to 6 helicopters) and presence in Bahrain for maritime security, and presence on RFA vessels.
Asking for miracles.  


Also, the SDSR said that the Hunt and Sandown classess of minesweepers would continue service (in number of 14, so one is due to retire soon...?) and start the transition to a "new capability" from 2018.
This was widely read as implying the start of their replacement with the MCM, Hydrographic and Patrol Capability ship (MHPC), but it now appears that this was very wide off the mark.
A DSTL call for papers on technological innovation in marittime applications contains a little bit of detail on the shape of MHPC, described as a "phased approach".
Ultimately, it is revealed that in 2018, at most, there will be a capability insertion into the current vessels, but new ships are not due until a decade later, in 2028 at the earliest. 

In 2018, if the plan survives the next planning rounds, the Hunt class of minesweepers (or, more likely, a selected number of ships in the class) will finally get the first new Unmanned Underwater Vehicles and Unmanned Surface Vehicles designed to provide a flexible stand-off MCM capability.
In particular, Thales and ASV Ltd have recently teamed up to develop a novel USV which will conduct payload trials in 2013 and is targeted at the Royal Navy needs, specifically for adoption on the Hunt. This new unmanned vehicle will have full payload flexibility, with the capability to tow sonars and sweep equipment and/or the capability to remotely deploy other drones, such as underwater mine-clearing devices such as the in-service SeaFox.

This is, however, only the latest reincarnation of a requirement that has been agonizing since 2005, when the Hunt minesweepers lost forever their on-board towed influence sweeping equipment.
This was due to be swiftly replaced with unmanned systems which would be fitted to 4 of the Hunt vessels under a 150 million contract. The unmanned vehicle, developed by ATLAS under the acronym FAST (Flexible Agile Sweeping Technology) didn't actually enter service, however: instead, it is to this day being used to research and demonstrate the use of unmanned vehicles in off-board MCM operations.
In 2011, FAST deployed at sea, controlled via radio, and launched a SeaFox mine-disposal drone, acting as a communications relay platform keeping the Mission Command center (installed in a container on the shore) in contact with the SeaFox in action underwater, in a world's first.

The Thales USV (which is actually apparently required to be Optionally Manned) is expected to deliver a more complete, all-round capability, which will finally enter service. Hopefully.
The numbers have reduced, and from 4 Hunt vessels fitted now the ambition is to fit only one. 
The MOD expects to buy two complete USV systems, one of which will be integrated on a Hunt vessel, while the other will be "deployable" and configured so to be operated from the shore or from a vessel of opportunity.
The USV will have to operate remotely at 12 miles from the mothership and will have to offer a wide variety of capabilities: electric, magnetic and acoustic influence sweep systems, but it will also demonstrate deployment of other, smaller Unmanned Vehicles and deployment and employment of sonars and sensors meant to detect the mines.
This will be a demonstrator to the future MHPC full capability, while delivering (with many years of delay) a replacement for the influence sweep capability once offered by the Hunt.

The USV project is part of an Unmanned Vehicle demonstrator program that was kick-started this year, to define a full equipment set comprising Medium and Small Underwater vehicles, Remotely Operated Vehicles (ROVs), Delayed Disposal Charges (as opposed to the current One-Shot SeaFox disposal vehicle, that is sacrificial, the DDC is placed on the mine and detonated when the unmanned vehicle has gotten back to safety - one off the shelf option being the COBRA system intended for use on SeaFox itself) and a surface craft capable to deploy the unmanned vehicles at stand-off range.
The package, once fully defined, will be globally deployable and able to operate from shore and from ships.

At least, the MCM package is taking the right shape, and much of the necessary systems and capabilities already exist and are, to a degree, proven.
The 2011 demonstration with FAST, SeaFox and deployable command post ashore was particularly precious and illuminating. With the USV hopefully demonstrated next year, the system will get considerably more mature.
The bad news is, of course, that MHPC vessels are far, far away in time.


In the early 2020s we should see the entry in service of the 3 vessels of the MARS Solid Support Ship type. There is still little in the way of detail about these vessels, meant to replace Fort Victoria, Fort Rosalie and Fort Austin. Fort Rosalie had a "first" last year when it became the first RFA vessel taking aboard an Apache helicopter, which it delivered to HMS Ocean for operations.
Fort Austin, which had been in reserve from 2009, has been re-activated and is about to re-enter service following an extensive refit.
Unless their lives are further extended, however, the Forts will retire in the first years of the new decade (Rosalie in 2022, Austin in 2021), and for this reason "additional work on MARS" is part of the funded Core Budget for the next 10 years. Their replacements will be needed not far into the future (in defence planning terms).

The MARS SSS requirement was once only for 2 vessels, because the support to amphibious and army forces ashore from the sea would be provided by 3 "Joint Sea Based Logistic" vessels. Unsurprisingly, the JSBL was soon enough killed in budget cuts, and currently the assumption is to have their intended role "added" to the SSS, with a boost from 2 to 3 ships.

The SSS will employ the new "Heavy-RAS" kit from Rolls Royce, which can move 5-ton pallets instead of the current 2, a dramatic improvement. The H-RAS kit is already being installed in a shore training facility at HMS Raleigh.
The ships are also expected to have, much like the current Forts, a great Aviation-Support capability, with large hangars for multiple helicopters. 

Other than this, though, we do not know much about the ship's design yet. However, an interesting concept drawing has appeared, which shows a two-spot flight deck, a triple hangar for Merlin-sized helicopters and, most interestingly, a RoRo ramp for vehicles and a LPD-style well deck. This feature, which has appeared on several designs of "Joint" Solid Support vessels around the world, might be inherited, along with the role of support to troops ashore, from the defunct JSBL. It is too early to say if this project will be the definitive one, but it seems safe to assume that some real consideration is going into giving the SSS a vehicle deck and the possibility to operate with large LCU crafts for the delivery of supplies, vehicles and logistic services to troops ashore. This is important, since the JSBL ship might well have been cancelled, but the requirements that brought to her in the first place are still very much there.

The MARS SSS concept art, quite detailed, shows very well the important aviation capabilities, but, crucially, shows a RoRo ramp for vehicles and a well deck.

Alive, but in coma, are two more "projects", the replacement of RFA Argus and of RFA Diligence. Diligence entered a new Major Service Life Extension refit, being given the hundredth breath of life, to enable her to deliver her invaluable services well into the 2020s, but will eventually need replacement. Its OSD has been pushed to the right again and again, and she was already life extended in 2007, out to 2017. If the new life-extension is as ambitious, it'll be a further 10 years. At some point, though, it will be impossible to delay the decision any further.

Argus will also not live forever. Replacing her with two much enhanced 200-bed hospital ships was one of the big promises already of the SDR 1998, and here she is, still going strong and with no real alternative yet in sight. And no second vessel in the role either.
The attempts to proceed with a replacement have been numerous, and came up with several impossible acronyms, from Primary Casualty Receiving Ship (PCRS) to Joint Casualty Treatment Ship (JCTS), the current denomination of Argus herself, which is also an invaluable Auxiliary Aviation Ship used for training, but also for maritime security and disaster relief operations, deploying in the Gulf or in the Caribbean.
Currently, the name of her intended replacement is "MR3MC", keeping up the tradition of impossible acronyms. This stands for Maritime Role 3 Medical Capability.

Is it really so monstrous to suggest that the International Aid budget, only budget seeing a net increase (and what an increase, at + 35%!), helps funding an hospital ship that could well be a big investment in the kind of "soft power" that the government loves, being in first line to help in case of disaster or to routinely provide support to countries in need, while also meeting RN needs?
I don't think it would be unfair.

The Diligence replacement, indicated with the acronym OMAR (Operational Maintenance and Repair Ship) was first studied in 2006, but naturally did not go far.
I found mention in a DSTL document of a mysterious "FRC", which i suspect means Forward (or Future) Repair Capability. It was accompanied by a tiny concept drawing of a ship that would appear fitted with large cranes, space for various containers, hangars and workshops.

Interestingly, the MR3MC, the FRS and the MARS SSS seem to share the same hull design, obviously stretched and adapted to each role.

Much less detailed concept art of the new Diligence replacement (?) and of the new hospital ship. Far too early to say that they will happen and actually be as drawn, but at least there seems to be thinking going on still. The hospital ship shows a large flight deck that would enable the vessel to continue to serve as aviation training ship. The base hull design seems to be the same. 

The MARS SSS is a fundamental capability for the armed forces, as it is indispensable to sustain military effort abroad.

At times, the "want of frigates" blinds us all to the less glamorous but even more important needs of the armed forces. But Logistic Ships and other vital enablers should always be in spotlight in a coherent strategy. Without them, lots of frigates will be largely useless.

The Royal Navy is certainly short on escorts, but much as in the Army capbadges always get all the attention, in the Navy destroyers and frigates take the attention away from the kind of specialized shipping that makes the RN important.
Aircraft carriers, amphibs, SSNs and logistic ships are what really make the Royal Navy relevant and capable. Mine Countermeasures follow, also due to the fact that the americans (quite weak in this sector) value the british MCM competency immensely.

Everyone who has the armed forces's efficiency at heart should always keep in mind that, at times, the back-end is more important than the front-end.