Commando Brigade under attack

It should be clear to everyone that we are far from having a clear picture of the true, full damage done by the "innovative" Army 2020 plan. The newspapers and public have been blinded by the evergreen issue of capbadges, historic regiments and other relatively meaningless issues, while a lot of true problems have gone unnoticed, and many more are still kept under wrap by the Army.

For example, the Army 2020 brochure didn't make much of an effort to explain how 14 Signals Regiment (Electronic Warfare) is losing a Squadron, down to 4, after standing up its 5th Squadron (needed to sustain enduring deployments abroad) literally only months ago, in June.
Again, the Army did not tell the public that all Light Role infantry battalions are seeing their Establishment much reduced, with the consequence, reportedly, that each Company in the Battalions will lose a Platoon. Formally, as the brochure says, the Battalions will still have 3 Rifle Companies and 1 Maneuver Support Company, but in reality they will lose the equivalent strenght of a Rifle Company by reducing Platoons from 3 per Coy to 2 per Coy.

Rumors (that i'm unable to confirm at the stage, however) say that the "largely unchanged" attack helicopter structure in the Army 2020 brochure actually means losing a Squadron of Apache helicopters (from 6 to 5) and seeing the Regimental HQs of 3rd and 4th Regiment AAC merge.
Again, the brochure will not be saying a false thing: there will be two Attack Helicopter regiments, formally, but the reality will be a lot more depressing if the voices are right.
See what the Army is doing...?

Again, few (me and...? Someone else?) reported that the Royal Signals are losing few regiments, but many Squadrons, with each Signal Squadron at brigade level being withdrawn, save for the Signal element of 16 Air Assault Brigade. It is possible that some squadrons will continue to live, as part of the restructured 5 Multi-Role Signal Regiments, which are merely the final evolution of 5 regiments already existing and already "multi-role" due to their focus on supporting, rotating in and out of theatre, the Afghan effort. But while it is possible, it is likely that most Squadrons will simply be lost.

Same goes for the Royal Artillery and Royal Engineers, largely: several Batteries and Squadrons will go, probably in the silence, because the focus is on "the historic regiment".

Lately, i've been following the still evolving situation of the supporting elements for 3rd Commando Brigade. As most readers will know, 3rd Commando is a Navy formation, largely composed of Royal Marines, in 30 IX, 40, 42 and 45 Commando battalions, plus the Commando Logistics Regiment.
However, the Brigade gets its Artillery and Engineer support from the Army, along with a fourth maneuver unit, the 1st Battalion The Rifles.
An example of successful joint work...? On the field, yes, behind the desks, no.

In 2008, to better face complex deployments in Afghanistan, 3rd Commando Brigade was given a major boost with the formation of the 24 Commando Engineer Regiment, meant to expand the engineer element of the brigade from an Independent Squadron (plus TA Squadron) to a Regiment with 2 Squadrons and HQ Squadron.
The force would expand from the sole 59 Commando Sqn to a Regiment comprising 56 Sqn, 59 Sqn and 24 HQ Sqn.

It was a welcome development, and an answer to real and obvious needs. Still, it did not deliver. 24 HQ Sqn stood up, but 56 Sqn ultimately never was.   
And in the Army 2020 restructuring, all ambitions of going ahead with the Regiment were quickly abandoned, with the plan being that 24 Commando will revert to the sole 59 Commando Sqn.

This was a bad enough news on its own. A single regular squadron is insufficient to provide adequate support to a Brigade, and it is whoefully insufficient to provide a credible engineer element to the Commando Battlegroup at readiness, as for SDSR promise.
3rd Commando Brigade is now supposed to generate 1800-strong "Battlegroups" at readiness, centered on a Commando Battalion with support from the Commando Logistic Regiment, support from 29 Commando Royal Artillery (one Gun battery and observation posts, in line of principle), support from Commando Engineers and from 30 Commando IX and other formations and Corps as needed.
There are 3 Commando Battalions that rotate in and out of readiness, and the Commando Logistic Regiment is large enough to provide a Task Group to each Battlegroup at readiness. Similary, 29 Commando Royal Artillery has 3 Gun Batteries, so that it can rotate one at a time in readiness.

But it is evident that a single Squadron of engineers can only rotate its Platoons, at most, and a Platoon of engineers is little support for a 1800-strong battlegroup.

Now it is emerging that next in the line of fire is 29 Commando Royal Artillery, which is facing calls for a reduction of up to 30%, with the probable loss of one Gun Battery.

A Message from the Commanding Officer to the Soldiers, Officers and Families of 29 Commando Regiment.

You will have heard in the news late last week that the Secretary of State for Defence has announced the results of a major restructuring plan for the British Army. This will entail some significant changes and affects every Army unit, including those, like 29 Commando, which supports the other Services. The fundamental aim is to reduce the whole Army strength to 82,000, in line with the announcements last year by his predecessor that we would draw down from out present size of 102,000 (therefore a 20% reduction).

The headline is that these changes will affect us - the Army can't shrink by 20% without everyone getting smaller and leaner. Actually, 29 Cdo could end up being approximately 30% smaller. Quite how the changes will affect our structure is not yet confirmed but there will no doubt be changes to our footprint and our basing; getting smaller will allow us to consolidate better. Although there will be no immediate changes (we are told that nothing will happen before April 2013), I would suggest that we will have morphed into our new structure by the end of 2015 or 16.

Presently we are undermanned by some 20%, especially in the junior ranks. So, we can absorb much of the change without actual loss of manpower but I can't promise that there will not be further redundancies, particularly for more senior ranks. Phase 3 of the existing redundancy programme is now being worked up and there may be subsequent phases too. This may present some individuals with an opportunity. But, importantly, it means uncertainty for many, which is deeply regrettable. My intent is to support all our soldiers, officers and families through this extended period of turbulence.

Never forget that the commando seeks to identify and exploit advantage and opportunity in everything, regardless of how grim the situation might appear. We must not let this distarct us from our operational readiness and we must continue to support the Brigade at all times. Let us stay together - as one; the last remaining Army Commando Regiment - and step forward with purpose to build something that may be smaller but must be stronger.

Lt Colonel E Dawes RA

Fortunately, the loss of one Gun Battery is on the cards, but not set in stone, with time still there to battle such a prospect. Losing one Gun Battery would further dilute the firepower and effectiveness of 3rd Commando as a Brigade, and it would make it far harder, if not impossible, to deliver support to each Battlegroup at readiness, considering that the Army's Force Generation cycle is going to have 3 phases spread over 36 months, with only the last 12 spent "at readiness".
We should also consider that the Commando battlegroup is supposed to be at High Readiness, and at Very High Readiness when embarked and out at sea (for a scenario such as last year's Cougar exercise, which became a war operation due to the events in Libya), so that arguably even 3 batteries might not be quite enough. Certainly not two.

And it does not end here, because it appears that the Army wants to ditch 148 "Meiktila" Royal Artillery Battery as well. This unique formation provides 8 Fire Support Teams capable to direct all kinds of supporting artillery fire (from mortars to naval guns) and call in air support from helicopters and aircrafts. A couple of the teams also have additional, specialized training for underwater insertion from submarines, including via Chalfont (UK's name for the US Swimmers Delivery System: the Royal Navy has 3 such systems, purchased for the Special Boat Service, and the SDS can be fitted to any of the Astute submarines. The Trafalgar class submarines cannot employ it: this capability has been gapped for several years now, from when last SDS-compatible submarine, HMS Spartan, was decommissioned).

These highly trained Fire Support Teams are a precious national resource, not just a critical enabler element for 3rd Commando Brigade. Yet their future is in serious doubt.
Currently, the Royal Navy and the Army are battling for the future of 148 Bty and 29 Commando Royal Artillery. To put it simply, the Royal Navy is not amused by the moves made by Army 2020. The commanding officers of 3rd Commando Brigade are even less amused, and they rightfully are trying to get people to listen and realize that capabilities such as 148 Bty are critical for the future.
The Army seems to be saying that, if the Marines want certain capabilities, it is the Navy that has to supply and pay for them. If it does not, Reaction-role or not, 3rd Commando's army elements will be the first in line for cuts.

The Royal Marines in the past have already lost their wider area air defence in 2004, when 20 Bty Royal Artillery (with the Rapier missile) ceased to be a "Commando" unit.
Luckily, capabilities such as Electronic Warfare, communications, Very Short Range Air Defence (vSHORAD), medical support and logistics are owned directly by the Marines respectively in 30 IX Commando and in the Commando Logistics Regiment, otherwise they would have probably been lost or put at risk at one point or another.

It is sad and actually worrisome to note, but "jointery" has largely failed in the UK, at the top-brass level. The Joint Force Harrier being the greatest example of failure, with the RAF eager to always cut back on Harrier numbers first, doing all it could to save Tornado.
Already in 2008, the First Sea Lord had to threaten resignation to stop the RAF from retiring the Harrier from service, leaving the Royal Navy without any fixed wing air element. Unfortunately, as we know, the First Sea Lord only managed to buy some time.

The Nimrod, while formally not a joint force element, was crucial to the Navy's operations more than to RAF's tasks, and, unsurprisingly i'll dare saying, it was again offered for the chop.
Sentinel R1, flown by an "Army Cooperation" squadron with a big component of Army personnel in its ranks, was also put into the killing line with the infamous announcement that it would be scrapped at the end of Afghan operations. Casually, up to the SDSR it had been a system crucial to Army operations, but not very useful to the RAF... and, again casually, the RAF's attitude towards Sentinel changed radically after the airplane was used to detect targets for air strikes in Libya.

And now the Army is being especially nice to 16 Air Assault brigade (preserving its Signals, Engineer, Medical, Police and Logistic elements) while simultaneously putting forwards heavy cuts to the supporting elements of the other Reaction Brigade.
Because "the other" is not Army's business.

The last ten years have been dense of lessons, particularly for the Royal Navy: facts have shown that the Senior Service cannot trust anyone around capabilities that are critical for its operational effectiveness. Harrier is gone, Nimrod is gone, and 3rd Commando Brigade is under attack.
The future of the Naval Aviation with the F35B is still more of a question mark than a plan, and the Commando Helicopter Force is (barely) getting on to the Merlin HC3, with the RAF said to be still resisting the move, with a "Joint Force Merlin" having been proposed.

Gods, please NO.  

The Royal Navy is learning about the failure of Joint Thinking in the UK's armed forces plagued by insufficient funding. In this climate, it does not surprise me to read that the Royal Navy is trying to go at it alone with a programme for a new Maritime Patrol Aircraft, to be controlled by the Fleet Air Arm. There is no problem at the soldier-level: RAF and RN personnel will collaborate to great results, i'm sure. But it is essential for the Navy to be in charge of all what is crucial to its future, because the last decade makes it real hard to believe in any form of real collaboration.
That's why a team directed by Commodore Simon Kings and made up of naval officers is working to try and ensure that a new MPA solution, Navy-owned, is pursued in the SDSR of 2015.

The issue, as always, will be the budget.

And now, unfortunately, the Navy is faced with another challenge: saving the support elements of 3rd Commando Brigade.
For now it is a political battle, but the only real chance the Royal Navy has to change things is to complete its control over the Commando brigade, taking over the funding and control of the Artillery and Engineer element, saving the first from the cuts and expanding the second. The men would still be trained alongside their Army comrades, but it is essential that the Navy pays and decides.

Not just Type 26s, in other words: one of the most important operational outputs of the Royal Navy, 3rd Commando Brigade, needs saving and improvement.
It is both a curse and a blessing: 3rd Commando Brigade is important. It delivers. It can ensure the Navy political weight like few other things ever could. Taking control of all its elements, making it even more effective, is only going to help the Royal Navy.
And the nation.

Towards SDSR 2015: ISTAR

It is never too early to start and discuss about what the future should ideally bring. Possibly, without losing sight of reality talking about enormous budget uplifts and acquisition of countless new weapon systems and medium bombers and other kit that is clearly destined to remain only a dream, barring a dramatic change in the world's situation and, moreover, in the priorities and policy of the british government.

In this article i'm going to explain what i'd do in the next SDSR if i was in charge. The objective is to give a coherent and sustainable mix of air assets to the Armed Forces, to face the uncertainties of the future.

ISTAR 

There is no overstating the importance of knowing what is happening on the battlefield, at all times. Knowledge is key to the victory, and situational awareness is key to successful employment of the resources available.

The most welcome news of the Army 2020 announcement to me was the creation of the Surveillance Brigade HQ, even if we still haven't got much detail about its composition. Even with incomplete information available, the creation of an HQ element with the stated mission of overseeing Surveillance and Intelligence on the battlefield is something to be cheered. It'll be even more of a welcome development if this new 1-star HQ is structured as a joint organ of control bringing together UAVs, Intelligence, battlefield surveillance and Electronic Warfare (the latter being a certainty, as the HQ Royal Signals has confirmed that 14 Regiment (EW) is being transferred to the Surveillance Brigade).   

The new HQ (in itself non-deployable) will provide a central oversight and a central direction to a wide variety of efforts, controlling, more or less directly, a number of different formations and systems. I expect the brigade to include the 3 Military Intelligence battalions of the Army (plus Reserves), with the current Military Intelligence brigade HQ "folding" into the new 1-star command (and in support to this vision, the Military Intelligence brigade is not listed as part of Army 2020). Ideally, the RAF, RN and Army experts of Imagery Intelligence should also refer to the new brigade.

Then i would expect 32 and 47 regiment Royal Artillery (the UAV regiments) to transfer from 1st Artillery Brigade to the new formation.

And, while not part of the brigade, the newborn "Aviation Reconnaissance Force" of the Army Air Corps, to comprise the 1st Regiment AAC (on 4 squadrons of Wildcat recce helicopters) and the 5th Regiment AAC (2 squadrons of Defender and Islander fixed wing surveillance airplanes) would work under the new HQ's direction.

Again, during operations the HQ would control the 5th and 14th RAF Squadrons (Army Cooperation), flying respectively the Sentinel R1 and the Shadow R1. 51 RAF Squadron, with its Rivet Joint ELINT/SIGINT airplanes would also feed data to the new HQ. The RAF's UAVs would do the same.

At times, the AEW platforms of the Navy would also work for this command, in situations such as the Olympics, or such as the continued use of Sea King MK7 ASaC in Afghanistan. 

And here we come down to one of the most insensate announcements of the SDSR 2010, the retirement of Sentinel R1 at the end of operations in Afghanistan. This was an unexpected and very stupid announcement, that was met with incredulity by most, if not all, expert and commentators. The Sentinel R1 has been proving itself again and again on operations, with constant use in Afghanistan and with very successful participation in operations over Libya last year. Retiring this still-new, expensive system in 2014 makes absolutely no sense, and thankfully, most people at the MOD, starting from the RAF itself, seem to have finally understood it. It is now planned that the eventual retirement of Sentinel will be decided by the SDSR 2015, and it is widely expected that the system will get a reprieve.

In my own SDSR, Sentinel is definitely confirmed, as is Shadow. Sentinel's wide area surveillance and ground target tracking capability are simply unmatched by any other system in service or visible on the horizon of the immediate future. The loss of Sentinel would represent a massive reduction in situational awareness and battlefield surveillance capability. A loss that is unjustified, and that would openly contradict the lessons of operations in Afghanistan and Libya. Sentinel is good for COIN ops and for more conventional warfare, representing a perfect example of the flexibility required by the uncertainties of the future: in any kind of scenario, Sentinel is going to prove invaluable.

In future, the Scavenger MALE (Medium Altitude Long Endurance) unmanned airplane might be able to provide enough surveillance to make Sentinel R1 redundant, but Scavenger won't be available before 2020 at best, and it is highly likely that it won't have a radar anywhere near as powerful, and it will lack the level of C3 (Command, Control and Communications) that the manned Sentinel, with its mission specialists aboard, can offer.

At least until 2020, the Sentinel R1 has no realistic competitor, and no realistic alternative, so it has to stay.

UAVs have also proven invaluable on operations, so that while Reaper is a UOR funded by the Treasury out to 2015, bringing it into core is considered a probable RAF move as part of the 10 Years budget. Soon there will be 10 Reaper drones in service, in two squadrons (39 and 13), both based in Waddington (as 39 re-locates from the US from where it has been operating for all this time), and this force is an obvious stop-gap on the way to Scavenger.

If not, and it is possible, the base for Scavenger itself, since the selection of Reaper as base platform for the new drone is far from having been ruled out, especially now that France hesitates, thinks again about its plans and takes time, putting the joint BAE-Dassault Telemos MALE at risk of never really happening.    

In any case, with a gap of at least 5 years in sight before Scavenger delivers, bringing Reaper into Core Budget is a priority in my SDSR.

For the Army, i hope in a confirmation for the Desert Hawk III mini-UAV for use at Company/Squadron level. The Desert Hawk III would be an interim solution on the way to, ideally, a back-packable VTOL mini-UAV more adequate to operations that, as for Army doctrine, are more and more likely to happen in urban environment.

With the Desert Hawk III needing a clear area of 100x100 meters to be launched and recovered safely, and with its other limits well known, for the future the right solution in my opinion resembles the Selex Galileo ASIO, in itself a more advanced evolution of the american T-HAWK idea. The T-HAWK has the main defect of being very noisy, so that it is easily detected, meaning that in urban warfare it would probably be destroyed very soon.

The ASIO combines the advantages of vertical take off and landing (very useful in urban operations) with silent running and with the ability to "perch and stare", landing on top of a building and working as an unattended sensor for extended period of times, in alternative to hovering in the air (which obviously reduces the duration of the mission, in comparison).

Another important sector is that of Base-ISTAR, the provision of surveillance and situational awareness around main bases and FOBs. In Afghanistan, this role has grown dramatically in importance, and it is one of those needs that are here for staying. The Army and RAF Regiment, that already collaborate on Base-ISTAR, have launched the joint Project Outpost, which is about selecting the systems currently in use that are most effective and promising, and bring them into Core Budget. In Afghanistan, a number of Radar sensors, EO/IR cameras and aerostats are in use, integrated in a B-ISTAR system known as Cortez. According to the RAF Regiment, the aerostat has performed so well that it will be part of the future solution under Project Outpost. Currently in Afghanistan the British Army reportedly deploys 7 (initially 5 were ordered) american-made PGSS (Persistent Ground Surveillance System) aerostats, which aren't exactly small: 70 feet long and 25 in diameter when up in the air, and are filled with 25.000 cubic feet of helium. Once filled, it'll stay in the air at 2000 or more feet of altitude with a 150 pounds payload, normally made up by a Wescan M/X-15 Eo/IR camera, plus other kit including acoustic gunfire-locating systems or other payloads. With the M/X-15, the PGSS can detect a man standing at 12 km, and allow identification at 4 km.  

They are tethered to purposefully-designed trailers weighting 16.000 lbs and can be launched in presence of a 20 knots wind, staying in the air even with a 60 knots wind. 

In the US, efforts to make these aerostats better deployable (mainly by reducing size and weight of the mooring station-trailer) are ongoing.

There are lighter, more deployable alternatives worth exploring, which also have the advantage of being british-designed and british-built. Allsopp Helikites offers the helikite solution, which reportedly is indeed already in use in Afghanistan with both British and US forces.

Helikites are semi-rigid and exploit powerful wind lift as well as helium, so a Helikites of only 11 cubic metres can fly thousands of feet high in no wind, or in in gale force winds, and can stay at high altitude unattended for weeks.

They combine aerostat and kite, with great advantages in term of sizes and handling in windy conditions. Allsopp offers the impressive Cased Helikite Aerostat Maintainable Platform (CHAMP) as a fully-self contained system that, folded up for transport, fits in a 190 kg, 4 ft x 4ft x 4ft pallet. It is a 10 cubic meters balloon with a payload of only 5 kg, but it is enough to place an all-weather, radio-downlinked surveillance camera several thousand feet into the air to gain weeks of unblinking view, even in winds of 50 mph or more. 1 sole operator can deploy the system, which comes with an helium reserve good for "months" of operations.

There are also larger formats of aerostat, with increasing payload capacity, still much smaller than the PGSS. A number of helikites have been trialed, and several seem to have gone in service already. They make for an incredibly effective and cheap solution to a range of issues: another use they have is as means to lift a linear radio antenna high into the sky, massively expanding the range of Line Of Sight communication systems.

This is an area in which relatively tiny investments can bring huge benefit to operations, so i'd expect Project Outpost to take a very good look into the range of uses of these systems.

Also, the usefulness of Helikites as communication relay systems is massive: erecting radio antennas pretty much anywhere, with minimum cost and complexity and in literally minutes is a capability that could well prove invaluable in future warfare, enabling long range and on-the-move connectivity. In Afghanistan, the province of Helmand is covered with a wireless internet system working from huge fixed antennas built into bases, but Afghanistan is a relatively static front, and a relatively permissive one. With a return to contingency operations, that include the possibility of fighting an high-end war of maneuver, Helikites represent a portable, cheap and deployable solution to recreate battlefield internet, following the progress of the maneuver.

Last, but not least, the Royal Navy is finally moving onwards with its Vertical Take-Off and Landing Unmanned Air System (VTUAS) [also known as rotary-wing unmanned air system (RWUAS)], an unmanned helicopter for at-sea ISTAR and surveillance. With a nominal entry in service date of 2020, this new helicopter could provide a wide number of useful services.  

This VTUAS could potentially weight up to 3000 kg at takeoff, and offer long endurance and sizeable payload. It is not yet clear how ambitious the Royal Navy will be with the VTUAS, but Qinetiq has offered a 1900 kg Gazelle conversion, and the US market shows some very interesting products, the most impressive of which is probably the Boeing A-160T Hummingbird.

The Hummingbird is still in development, but it is intended to fly for 4640 km or 24 hours, with an ISTAR payload of 136 kg or more. It has so far demonstrated an already impressive 18,07 hours endurance.

Alternatively, the Hummingbird can fly as an unmanned cargo carrier on shorter distances, carrying up to 1135 kg underslung from the cargo hook.

The Hummingbird is 10,66 meters long, and has a four-blade rotor with a diameter of 10,97 meters. It sits in the 3000 kg class. It is not exactly small, but luckily, its fuselage is not wide, and with a folding rotor it would not be a problem to embark it on a Type 45 alongside with a Wildcat (with the Merlin it might be harder). Even easier it would be on the Type 26 future frigate, while the Type 23's hangar might not be large enough to take it and a manned helicopter at the same time.

The Hummingbird currently is not a naval system, but Boeing is likely to be able to develop a navalized variant quite easily, and has indeed offered the helicopter UAV to the US Navy already: the problem is that, as of June 2012, the US Army has lost confidence in this impressive machine following several technical problems, and has issued a stop-work order. The Hummingbird is, literally, a step away from being terminated, and the loss of US government funding might cause Boeing to abandon the Hummingbird entirely.

The US Navy is currently pursuing its own VTUAS requirement by purchasing 28 MQ-8C Fire Scout, not to be mistaken for the original Fire Scout, the small MQ-8B already in use.

The new C uses the same software suite, but installed in a larger, more capable commercial Bell 407 helicopter airframe. Weighting 2724 kg at takeoff, the MQ-8C can operate for 8 hours at 556 km from the launching ship, carrying an ISTAR payload of up to 400 kg. The maximum endurance is 12 hours. As a cargo carrier, it can carry 227 kg internally or 1203 kg under slung.

It is 10,6 meters long and 2,4 meters wide once folded up for fitting in the hangar, and has a rotor diameter of 11,2 meters once unfolded. This means that, folded, the helicopter is smaller than a folded Lynx 8. The Type 45 could easily carry a Wildcat and a MQ-8C, and possibly it could carry a Merlin and a MQ-8C. 

A folded Lynx 8 is at least 3 meters wide and well over 10,8 meters long.

A Type 45 would have no difficulties in carrying a mixed Ship Flight comprising a Lynx/Wildcat and an MQ-8C or similar

AgustaWestland, on the lines of the MQ-8C, is offering to convert into a UAS the poland-produced light helicopter SW-4.

The Type 23 remains an issue, and quite an important one since the Dukes will be part of the fleet all the way into the 2030s, but their own Ship's Flight can be reinforced in other ways, with systems such as ScanEagle or the newer, more capable Integrator selected by US Navy and US Marines. And indeed the Royal Navy is about to purchase a number of such systems, to gain one, and then two task-lines, each capable of 300 hours of operational ISR data collection at sea per month from RFA and Type 23 platforms so that, in theory, the problem is easily solved. 

ScanEagle in british colors on a Type 23 frigate during successful trials at sea in 2007. Now the ScanEagle has a more capable brother, the Integrator. 

My belief is that the Army could benefit from a VTUAS just as much as the Navy. The ability to act as a light cargo hauler would greatly ease the strain on crews and machines tasked with delivery of multiple, relatively-small loads to troops in FOBs or at the edge of the battlefield, as proven by the US Marines experience with the K-Max unmanned helicopter in Afghanistan. This would free up a lot of precious flying hours of manned utility helicopters, that could then focus on troop-transport and other roles. The availability of an unmanned cargo-hauler would also reduce the need for the resource-intensive Combat Logistic Patrol convoys used in Afghanistan to bring supplies to FOBs on roads made dangerous by the IEDs and ambushes. Anything that can cut back the need for such convoys while also keeping the utility helos free, is to be welcomed.
If i was in charge, i'd be very keen to see the Army collaborate with the Navy to put into service each a squadron of such VTUAS, based in Yeovilton, where Army Air Corps personnel and Wildcat helicopters will be jointly based from around 2015.

I would of course go ahead with Scavenger, and specifically i'd try to prosecute the development of a national, or bi-national product along with France. Telemos is going to be fundamental for the future of the aerospace sector in the UK, after all.

I'd want the new drone to make ample use of mission pods, so to be easily reconfigurable for multiple kinds of missions, and i'd stick with the indicative number of 20 (in two squadrons) that was circulated some time ago, with no immediate purchase of attritional airframes, in the hope of procuring further drones only later, when they are needed.

I've covered the Scavenger extensively here: the article provides an update on the current situation and expands on the subject of mission pods.

Last, but not least, as part of SOLOMON the RAF should invest into the development of the Common Ground Control Station software and installation, developing a single, common model of GCS able to interact with both Scavenger and Watchkeeper and at least dialogue with the Sentinel R1 ground element.

On land, with the COBRA artillery-locating radar having been prematurely required and with MAMBA being quite limited in its performances, priority must be accorded to purchase of the Common Weapon Locating Radar, in number of 12, by 2014 at the latest, as planned. The new radar (the very effective ARTHUR C from Saab) will replace fully the already-lost COBRA and the MAMBA.

The Lightweight Counter Mortar Radar, procured as UOR, should be confirmed in service in the longer period due to its effectiveness.

In summary, in the ISTAR domain, my SDSR would include the following indications:

- Continue development of Scavenger, with the aim of acquiring 20 systems from 2020 [Planned]

- Put into service the Common Ground Control Station

- Go ahead full strength with the Rivet Joint plan [Planned]

- Retain Sentinel R1, Shadow R1 and Reaper at least until Scavenger enters service and provides a real alternative to their peculiar capabilities. Reaper is easily replaced, the Shadow should be replaceable if an adequate SIGINT payload is developed for the Scavenger, while the wide-area surveillance offered by the Sentinel's radar might remain unmatched for a long time still. Retaining Sentinel even after Scavenger arrives is probably going to be the best approach. [planned?]

- Go ahead with the urgent purchase of mini-drones for the Royal Navy [planned]

- Bring the Army into the Royal Navy VTUAS effort, buy a squadron of machines for the AAC as ISTAR and cargo-hauler platforms, with a weapons capability possibly following. The VTUAS must at least match the MQ-8C capabilities to truly benefit the forces.  

-  Maintain the Desert Hawk III mini UAS in service as an interim solution; develop/select a VTOL mini UAS for long-term use in Infantry companies and Cavalry/Armor squadrons.  

- Create a capable, integrated, joint HQ, directed by the Army, in the form of the Surveillance and Intelligence brigade, to direct the collection of ISTAR and to process and redistribute the data to the forces. [planned?]

- Retain a credible B-ISTAR package of systems and experience, jointly operated by the Army and RAF Regiment, to include aerostats and/or Helikites, on which i urge more investment due to the extremely cost-effective benefits they offer.

- Go ahead with the purchase and fielding of the Common Weapon Locating Radar; bring into Core Budget the Lightweight Counter Mortar Radars.

I do not call for a revolution in this field: many of my proposals are already part of the strategy and, crucially, of the 10 Years budget. But i do deem indispensable to pour some more specific effort into things such as the VTUAS and lower-echelon ISTAR, at Battalion and, better still, at Company level. These improvements would, in my mind, absolutely be worth the use of money from the famous 8 unallocated billions in the 10 years budget.

I did not mention Watchkeeper and Sentry AWACS because i do not advocate any change in the current fleets and plans for these two machines. On at-sea AEW, i'll expand in a future article, but i'll anticipate that i deem a Merlin-based solution sufficient to meet the realistic UK's needs, so long as the AEW role is given to the 8 currently non-upgraded HM1 airframes. Loading the AEW role on the small fleet of HM2 currently envisaged would be too much of a compromise: there is no room for another demanding and rather unique role in a fleet of airframes and men that are already very hard worked.

My solution to Crowsnest is to remove the ASW kit from the 8 HM1 airframes, while exercising the option for their upgrade to HM2 standard (barring the ASW-specific updates), instead fitting these Merlins with the AEW suite that will prove most effective: either the proven, already-in-service Cerberus/Searchwater AEW or the new Lockheed Martin Vigilance podded solution.  

For a detailed review of Crowsnest current status, i suggest reading here. 

As for maritime patrol aircraft, i'm going to talk of this vital requirement in a future article. 

Towards FF2020

Army Air Corps plans

The Army Air Corps is expecting a major mid-life upgrade for the Apache fleet, to extend their service life out to 2040 and keep the helicopters roughly in-line to the US ones. Studies to determine what the upgrade will include are ongoing, and it is possible that some further "naval" features will be added to the helicopter following the experience of operations in Libya. The Future Land Operating Concept studies also make it clear that the Army expects to operate in the littoral more often in the future, so improving the Apache's capability to go at sea is going to be important.

The other big change on the cards is the start of the Wildcat era, which will also imply the loss of one Aviation Regiment and one base under the Army 2020 plan.
The Army Air Corps is due to reorganize its command structure forming the "Aviation Reconnaissance Force", which will control both the 5th Regiment (Manned Airborne Surveillance), flying Defender and Islander fixed-wing airplanes and the 1st and 9th Regiments, flying the Lynx helicopter. This new command should be up and running by the end of this year, under the command of Colonel Richard Leakey.

The 1st Regiment, currently based in Germany with 2 squadrons and formally part of the 1st UK Division, will return to the UK to be based on the Fleet Air Arm base of Yeovilton, where it will be joined by 9 Regiment AAC, transferring from Dishforth, by 2015. Dishforth is likely to close by then, as it will be effectively empty, with nothing in sight that could use the base.
1st and 9th Regiments will then merge as they convert to the Wildcat. The Army's Wildcat Fielding Team is already up and running at Yeovilton, alongside the Navy's 700W squadron, which is working to validate the naval variant.
The Army variant of the Wildcat (AH1) will hit IOC next year, and according to current plans the first squadron to convert to the new machine will be 847 Naval Air Service, the squadron supporting 3rd Commando Brigade.

Officers of the Army Air Corps said in July that the plan is for the AAC to operate 4 Wildcat squadrons. It would appear that they refer to frontline squadrons (of course the squadrons will have the manpower, but will only get the full complement of helicopters for deployment, due to the small number of airframes available), and they did not expand on how flying training will be delivered. Currently, 671 Squadron at Middle Wallop acts as Conversion to Type squadron, preparing crews for the Lynx (and Gazelle and Bell 212 too), but it is not clear if there will be changes to this.

Assuming that the 4 AAC squadrons are "frontline" ones, the net loss would be of just one squadron, as 9th Regiment has 3 Squadrons and 1st Regt has 2. Of course, the reduction in airframes that will happen as the Lynx AH7 is retired from service in 2015 is so serious that the actual reduction is worse than it appears, but still acceptable. Especially since, thanks to 847 NAS, the force can meet the "rule of the 5" and have enough manpower to sustain a long enduring committment was it ever necessary.

Farnborough: the first Wildcats are delivered to the MOD. The helicopter in the photo is of the AH (Army) variant, and clearly lacks the radome. The Army and Naval variants will anyway share a lot, included the color scheme. Army Wildcats come wired for later installation of the radar, and for adoption of weapons. Initially, only the naval Wildcat will carry missiles, however.

The Lynx AH9A currently used in Afghanistan will live on at least until 2018, and it might live on longer than that depending on how the situation will evolve. Once it retires, the AH9A will serve the AAC one last time by acting as a source of spare parts for the Wildcat (they have the same engine and other parts will be transferable), enabling a saving of probably around 20 million pounds in spares. Useful to the very end.

One thing that has somewhat vanished from the radars is the increase of the Wildcat order to 66 airframes as part of the Light Assault Helicopter procurement plan. This adjustement to the plan, which appeared in Planning Round 2011, would see 4 AH1 helicopters from the 34 on order become "Light Assault Helicopters", fitted with additional secure radios, fast-roping kit and other Special Forces gear, with a further 4 LAH produced in addition to the current order to give a force of 8 machines.
This plan was confirmed in a ministerial written answer on 14 December 2011: 

Angus Robertson: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence how many Lynx light attack helicopters he plans to convert from the battlefield reconnaissance version; and what the conversion cost will be for each such helicopter. [85589]

Peter Luff: We are planning to increase the number of Wildcat helicopters being purchased from 62 to 66. The fleet will consist of three types: 28 Helicopter Maritime Attack (HMA), 30 Army Helicopter (AH), and eight Light Assault Helicopter (LAH). Four of the LAH aircraft were previously to have been AH type. The costs of conversion are still under consideration.

The NAO Major Project report 2011 estimated the Net Cost of the new plan at 37 million pounds.
The Light Assault Helicopter was meant to replace the Lynx AH7 used by 657 Squadron, based at RAF Odiham, part of the Special Forces Support Wing, but of this plan, apparently finalized late last year, nothing has been heard since.
All statements released in the last months, as the MOD received the first Wildcat helos, speak of 62 airframes on order. While this does not necessarily go against the plan announced late next year, which might still be a plan and not a contract signed, it does cause a bit of a frown. It is likely that the NAO Major Projects report 2012, coming out in the autumn, will help understand what exactly is going on.

Replacing the helicopters used by the Special Forces is, after all, very important. So much so, indeed, that prior to the SDSR publication there were rumors about one particular, rare "spending measure" in what was going to be, as we know, a review made of nothing but cuts: at one point, a purchase of 10 helicopters for the Special Forces was mentioned, with the candidate helo being the NH90 no less.
That measure did not pass the concept phase, but replacing the Lynx helos of 657 Squadron remains a priority.

A little piece of good news is that the 6 Regiment (Volunteers) of the Army Air Corps should stand up a third reserve ground crew squadron (probably 666 Sqn) as part of the Army 2020/Future Reserves plans.
The new squadron is to stand up on Yeovilton, to support the Aviation Reconnaissance Force.


C130K and Project Hermes 

A number of C130K airplanes is likely to have its service life extended past the planned 2012 OSD, under a 10 million pounds option supported by the Director Special Forces. On the press, this was prematurely linked to the "A400 Atlas being too large to be suited to the SF mission profiles", but the actual reason (at least for the moment) is simply that the C130J is not yet ready to take on the SF role.
Unfortunately, due to delays in the US with the funding and release of the newest software for the C130J, the RAF was unable to stick to the original schedule of Project Hermes, the adaptation of the C130J to the Special Forces requirements.
A number of C130K will so have to stay around for a longer than planned time, as part of 47 Squadron.

In the future, with the C130J now planned to be out of service in 2022, it will be interesting to see how 47 Squadron is resourced for its job, since the A400 is indeed a very large plane, and the SAS seems to be already leaking out to the press that they do not consider it a good solution for their peculiar needs. Also because, clearly, there will just be too few of them...


A400 Atlas

As of July 2012, the RAF expects to hit IOC with the A400 Atlas cargo plane in 2015, with 3 airplanes in 70 Squadron. The Squadron No. 70 operated C130K until a few years ago when it was disbanded. It will resurrect as the first A400 squadron.
Full Operating Capability (FOC) will be declared in 2018, with 12 airplanes, with all 22 being delivered progressively to enable the C130J to retire in 2022.
The RAF expects to operate the A400 in the squadrons No. 70, No. 30 and No. 24, with this last squadron including the OCU Flight.

47 Squadron, the unit supporting the Special Forces missions, does not figure in the list. It is not absurd to assume that the Director Special Forces will use all its considerable political weight to ensure, come 2022, that a number of C130s live on longer. After all, the 2022 OSD for them is a SDSR10 invention, which wasn't previously envisioned.


Voyager KC2 and KC3

The Voyager force at Brize Norton is slowly working its way to IOC. Currently, 10 Squadron (a resurrected formation which used to fly VC10 until a few years ago) is the sole Voyager unit.
The Tristars fly in 216 Squadron and all VC10s are in 101 Squadron. It is not clear if both squadrons will convert to the Voyager, or if the tanker fleet will be composed by just 2 relatively lage squadrons.

The Type 26 takes shape

The BBC today reports on the Ministry of Defence's first major announcement about the Type 26 Global Combat Ship, the design of which is progressing, with the general principle and requirements by now frozen and with detailed design now underway.

The report proves me largely right, since the design now officialized was shown in detail on this blog already in March 2012, after BAE systems began to circulate a very short video of the evolved Type 26 design in January 2012.

148 meters long, and around 5400 tons in weight. The Type 26 will be a big ship, albeit smaller than once expected (up to 7000 tons in some proposals). Propulsion is expected to be CODLOG, with a MT30 gas turbine (a variant of those used on the CVF aircraft carriers) and 4 diesel engines for silent running in ASW role. Core crew was expected to be around 115 men, plus around 15 for the Helicopter Flight and space for a further 36 men. A further 84 accommodations were described as a possible use for the mission bay some time ago, but until we learn of the current shape and sizes of the flex deck, take this value as indicative only.
Updated BAE System data (they did not update the photos, though!) however suggests a crew of 118 (not clear if it includes Helicopter Flight, probably it does not) and accommodation for a further 72. It would appear that, with the Navy wanting to use drones on Type 26 in the future, a significant increase in accommodation facilities was agreed upon, from 166 to 190. A wise move.  

Speed in dash will be superior to 28 knots, and the ship will offer a logistic endurance of 60 days (very high value) with a range of 11.000 naval miles at 15 knots (7000 naval miles at 15 knots between a replenishment and another will be the typical indicative plan, though).
The Royal Navy is trying to shape the Type 26 as an innovative, future-proof multirole vessel, while doing all it can to keep costs down. Cost control on Type 26 is going to be absolutely crucial for the future of the fleet, there is no overstating this.

The Navy has decided, to help with cost control, to reverse the Type 45 approach: from an "80% new, 20% legacy" guideline to a "80% legacy, 20% innovation" ratio. But we should not look down at this thinking of Type 26 as a ship that brings nothing new to the table, because the design comes with several great new enhancements for the fleet.
And even the "legacy" equipment will be modern and top-class: the plan is, in fact, to use the Type 23 as a test bed for development and adoption of new systems that then will live on into Type 26. For example, the new frigate will receive the world-beating sonar 2087, the Type 997 Artisan 3D radar (both systems will start appearing on Type 23 in 2016) and a combat system which will be an evolution of the DNA(2)/CMS-1.

The plan is to build 8 "ASW" frigates, fitted with the 2087 towed sonar array, and 5 "General Purpose" frigates with a reduced mission fit (no 2087) but able to be eventually fitted in the future. 13 ships to replace 13 Type 23 vessels with. 


There are some good news, as it appears that the Royal Navy might have won this time around getting the go ahead for two major aspects of the design that they tried to include already into the Type 45, without success at the time: a new, modern and capable medium gun, and vertical launch cells for land attack weapons.

Type 26 will have 24 "cruise-missile compatible" Vertical Launch Cells, which should mean either MK41 or Sylver A70. In particular, the Royal Navy handbook 2012 said that the possibility of arming the ship with Tomahawk is still being considered. This means adopting flexible "strike lenght" cells and requires an investment in new Tomahawk VL missiles: the Royal Navy currently has an arsenal of sole torpedo-tube launched TLAMs, which come with a capsule for underwater launch.
The Royal Navy is also hoping to replace the Harpoon anti-ship missile with a new weapon system, vertically launched and with ground-attack capability. It is not clear yet if this new system is included in the 152 billion committed 10 years budget; we might find out only this autumn when a summary of said budget is expected to be released. I reported about this particular program here.

It is to be noted that the Fire Shadow loitering ammunition entering service with the Royal Artillery, currently as a rail-launched system, is planned to introduce canister-vertical launch in future, and the Royal Navy has been eyeing it as a possible future solution to Future Maritime Fires capability at least since 2009. The Fire Shadow can fit into a Sylver A50 cell (Type 45) and, of course, could fit easily into the "strike lenght" cells on Type 26.
Offering a 6 hours loiter at 100 or more kilometers of range, this hybrid drone/missile would add a lot of capability.

Type 26 will have a new Medium Calibre gun, which is likely to be retrofitted, in time, to Type 45 as well (the transition will last many years, in any case). In Italy there have been several reports in the last two months about ongoing negotiations between the UK MOD and Oto Melara, the italian gun-maker industry.
In July, the respected italian defence publication "Rivista Italiana Difesa" reported from Oto Melara's base in La Spezia that the Managing Director of the company, Carlo Alberto Iardella told them that a historic success in the UK was close, with the American competition (described as politically powerful but technologically inferior) left to be beaten.

Oto Melara teamed with Babcock in the UK to put forward to the Royal Navy the 127/64 Lightweight medium calibre naval gun, and it would appear that this gun has the Navy's favor.
The American competition is represented by the 127/62 MK45 Mod 4 made by United Defense (BAE Systems owned). The current MK8 Mod 1 gun seems not to be an option anymore, and this is already a big novelty in itself.

The Oto Melara 127 is an excellent gun system. Germany has selected it for its F125 frigates, and Italy is putting the gun on its FREMM General Purpose frigates, with France interested in possibly upgunning its own FREMM ships with it in the future.
With 56 rounds ready-to-fire in four revolving round magazines, the gun can have 4 different types of ammunition available for immediate use at all times, and it offers and unmatched (in its calibre class) rate of fire of 35 rounds per minute.

The MK45 is also a very good gun, adopted by many Navies and used on all US Navy warships, but is not as advanced and, perhaps the true crucial difference, it is currently without a guided long range ammunition, after the advanced shell that the Mod 4 was supposed to fire was cancelled by the US Navy.
The Oto Melara 127/64 instead can come along with the Vulcano ammunition, which would offer a 70 to 120 km reach to the ship, a formidable extension in gunfire capability.
Moreover, the Vulcano ammunition comes in 155 and 127 mm NATO standard calibres, and with the Royal Artillery due to obtain a Long Range Guided ammunition by 2018 as part of the Core funded equipment budget announced by minister Hammond, going Vulcano would offer a degree of commonality between Army and Navy.  
Said commonality would be much inferior to that offered by the sadly defunct programme for the development of a modified MK8 fitted with 155/39 or even 155/52 gun, but that option died in 2010, and the Vulcano appears the second best option.
The Royal Artillery as of 2010 was working to adopt the US Excalibur GPS-guided round, trialed and validated for use on the AS90 howitzer, but with the purchase of the extended range guided shell delayed to 2018 there should be plenty of chances to use a joint approach and collaborate with the navy to obtain a capability that is much superior to the Excalibur, offering greater range (north of 70 km against 40) and potentially even greater accuracy, as a Vulcano round combining GPS and Semi Active Laser guidance (SAL) is already being tested. This version is going to be a cheaper alternative to missiles for accurate, long range strikes.

Type 26 as shown in January and March 2012

For Self Defence, the ship is shown fitted with two DS30 remote gun mounts. The Royal Navy currently uses the Bushmaster MK44 30mm gun on them, but already in 2010 there was work ongoing at DSTL to trial a navalized 40mm CTA gun, the same weapon which will be on FRES SV and Warrior. With high-power HE grenades and Airburst grenades already available, a "DS40" would greatly enhance the ship's capability against swarm attacks of fast and suicide boats.
In addition, an "A3" (Anti-Air Airbust) grenade for the CTA will soon be ready, so that the new gun would have much enhanced "CIWS-lite" capability and would be a great anti-air weapon, particularly suited to killing UAVs, a menace likely to figure heavily in the battles of the future.
The firing positions are excellent to offer great all-around coverage.

There will be 2 Phalanx 1B CIWS positions (possibly Fitted For but Not With) and three separate silos for CAMM anti-air missiles. The Common Anti-air Modular Missile, known (as a system) as Future Local Air Area Defence System (FLAADS) and named Sea Ceptor by the Navy, is a fire and forget, radar-guided missile developed using the RAF's ASRAAM missile as a base. The missile is ejected "cold" from its canister, and thrown at 100 feet of height with cold compressed air, before its main rocket ignites.
In addition, the CAMM is a radar-agnostic system that can be made to work with any kind of air search radar: on land the British Army will use it with the Saab Giraffe ABM and perhaps with the radar of the Rapier, while the Navy will use it with Artisan 3D.
These two features make the CAMM a very flexible and easily deployed system, that can be "dropped in" onto any kind of truck or vessel, as there is no hot flames and smoke to manage like in normal "hot" launch missiles and VLS systems.
The Type 26 graphic animation shows two "small" silos (actually, each seem to have 12, and possibly more cells) on the bow, to the left and right of the forward CIWS, while another large array of CAMM cells is located amidship, in the funnel tower (this one very possibly showing 24 or more cells). This suggests direct use of the CAMM's own canister-launcher: another option (more complex and expensive) would have been to fit Sylver or MK41 cells and then "quad-pack" CAMM missiles into them.
Due to the cold launch feature, there is no need for complex and expensive VLS systems and exhaust piping for smoke and rocket blast, so it makes a lot of sense to just slot in the single CAMM canisters. The graphic suggests that, anyway, a Type 26 will easily be able to carry some 48 anti-air missiles, with room for even more.
The separation of the silos in 3 locations means further shortening of the reaction times to threats approaching from different directions and, even more, it means that the ship will not be left defenceless by a single aimed hit at the main silo on the bow.
CAMM is said to have a secondary capability against surface targets (such as speedboats, for a frigate application), and has an anti-air range of 25 kilometers. Its speed is superior to Mach 3. It is a great leap in capability from Seawolf, and will appear on Type 23 from 2016, before "migrating" onto the Type 26.  


The Mission Bay for the frigate has been retained, but as i had already reported, the Flex Deck moved up, from the stern, under the flight deck, to the superstructure, forming a large space adjacent to the helicopter hangar. The press release of the MOD says that the frigate will have hangar space for "a Merlin helicopter or a Wildcat/Lynx", but i believe that, due to the arrangement of the ship's spaces, it is very likely that it will be possible to carry and employ 2 Wildcat helicopters at the same time, when necessary.
In addition, there will be fixed and rotary wing aerial drones, and surface and subsurface drones, these last ones deployed from 3 large davits.
The stern ramp and mission bay most likely ceased being viable when it was decided that the Type 26 would only be a 5400 / 5500 tons ship, opposed to the almost 7000 once envisaged. The downsizing has probably caused issues in trying to place a large flexible deck under the flight deck without affecting the height of the latter over the water, with negative consequences on all-weather aviation operations.
There is no detail on the current dimensions of the Mission Bay, but it was earlier described as capable to take four 11m boats or eleven 20' containers. The relocation to the superstructure might mean a slight reduction in the number of containers that can be carried, however at a minimum there would seem to be space for three large boats/drones plus aerial drones and support material. The superstructure shows the doors to 3 large boat davits, and in the latest graphics there would seem to be at least one additional smaller opening as well.

Thanks to Richard Beedall's Navy Matters website, we get this awesome graphic of the mission bay of the Thales F2020 frigate concept, which was part of Future Surface Combatant studies. The current Type 26's mission bay follows a similar concept.

A quick sketch i made to show how i think the current Mission Bay is configured, judging from the openings in the superstructure and other elements, such as the funnel tower and hangar.

In general, the Type 26 promises to be an excellent ship, with great patrol range and endurance, a hull and propulsion system designed to be ultra-silent and perfect for ASW missions, and a complete weapon system, which will give the ship much greater usefulness thanks to great land-attack capability. In addition, CAMM makes of this ship a good "Goalkeeper" for a larger asset (capital ships from Carrier and Amphibs to Type 45 itself).
There are, of course, challenges: first of all, the Royal Navy must do all it can to secure the funding, and then fit into it so to get all 13 hulls in the water. This is essential.
Developing a new vertical-launch multi-mission missile to replace Harpoon with is another challenge.

But the Type 26 design as revealed today is sound. Now the rule must be: stay in the budget. Get 13.