News and musings

The Lynx AH9A: towards a long future of service...?

AgustaWestland delivered to the British Army the updated, re-engined Lynx AH9A in record-time, but in two different subvariants: the first 12 helicopters were completed to "Batch 1" specifications, while the last 10 helicopters, ordered later, have been fitted with additional radios, FH Herstal M3M heavy machine gun, fast-rope equipment, 4 seats for soldiers and a cockpit compatible with the use of Night Vision Googles (Batch 2).
The Lynx AH9A has been doing very well in Afghanistan, and the MOD has decided to bring the first 12 Lynx up to the same standard of the second batch. The first updated helicopter has been handed back to the MOD by AgustaWestland in Janurary. These helicopters are now known as "Batch 3".

Is it just about Afghanistan, or will the Lynx AH9A be around for a longer time than planned? It was expected that the Lynx 9 would bow out in 2019, but after the upgrades the helicopter seems to have found a new youth. The engines are the same as used on the Wildcat, so there's some degree of commonality in the case the Lynx is kept around for longer time.
With just 38 helicopters on the way (30 in Recce variant, 8 in Light Assault variant) and with 6 of these going to 847 Naval Air Squadron, Commando Helicopter Force, the Army is going to be seriously short of helicopters compared to the current holding of Lynx AH7s (50 still in holding according to a Parliamentary written answer). In addition, the Army will soon enough finish retiring the Gazelle (35 still around, but probably many no longer in use).
It is quite a jump, from 50 to 32, and even more so if we factor that the Gazelle is not getting a dedicate replacement, and some of its missions will have to be covered with other helos, easily the Wildcat.

Retaining the 22 AH9A could be a relatively cheap solution.
The Lynx 9As have been mainly concentrated in the squadrons 657 and 667, but the airframes are assigned to all squadrons deploying to Afghanistan since the AH7 Lynx is underpowered and not adequate to use in theatre. Among the squadrons who have worked with the Lynx 9A in Afghanistan is 847 NAS itself.

Hopefully, keeping the 9A going on for longer will be an option taken over in the coming planning rounds.



Another Dauphin.  

8 Flight Army Air Corps has added a 5th Dauphin helicopter, procured second-hand via Eurocopter UK, to its fleet. This flight provides civilian-colored helicopters for the mobility of SAS counterterrorism teams in urban scenarions.
The 5th Dauphin was procured to strenghten the unit before the start of the Olympic games.



AIRSEEKER, SEASEEKER, LANDSEEKER 

The full triad of EW and SIGINT/ELINT capability of the armed forces is to be modernized under the variaous "-SEEKER" programmes.
AIRSEEKER is notoriously the replacement for the Nimrod R1, and it is by far the most expensive of the three programmes at nearly 1 billion (?) in initial procurement cost and with a further 1-billion support deal running to 2025, as it is procuring a fleet of 3 Rivet Joint airplanes from the US. These will be conversions of KC-135 airframes that the USAF mothballed long ago, and they will add to the US's own fleet of 17 Rivet Joints.
Mainteinance and regular technology-insertions are going to be made cooperatively, in a single, bi-national program arrangement which includes a complete strip down, refurbishment, and system upgrade every 4 years. The RAF will also participate in platform improvement, and will have a say in the evolution of the Rivet Joint system: adoption of some of the sensors used on the Nimord R1 and those that had been planned for Nimrod MRA4 is a possibility. This would be a welcome expansion of the Rivet Joint capabilities, as it currently is mostly only a SIGINT aircraft, while the ESM employed on Nimrod would greatly increase its ELINT capabilities.
RAF crews are already operating on USAF's Rivet Joints to preserve capability (the Nimrod R1 was retired in June 2011 after participating in the early Libyan operations) and familiarize with the new platform before the airplanes are delivered to RAF Waddington in 2014, where they will fly under 51 Squadron. 

LANDSEEKER is the successor to the ill-fated Soothsayer programme, and it is meant to replace the whole range of Electronic Warfare and SIGINT/ELINT assets of the Royal Signals and Royal Marines. Soothsayer was meant to cost between 140 and 202 million pounds (it experienced a cost increase of over 52 millions prior to cancellation) and it had to deliver a man-portable and a vehicle mounted solution for eavesdropping, location of signal sources and EW.
The "Light" vehicle-mounted Soothsayer was meant to equip the Army Rapid Reaction Force and 3rd Commando Brigade (The current Y Squadron (EW), 30 Commando Information EXploitation Group). It was to be a palletized system carried on a Supacat 6x6 high mobility truck.
A later phase was planned to provide enough systems to equip a further two brigades, and these would be "Heavy" formations, with Soothsayer modules installed in FRES vehicles.

Soothsayer was to replace a variety of systems including INCE (Interim Non-Communications ESM), Odette (a vehicle mounted SIGINT system that detects and locates radio transmissions) and the SCARUS man-portable ESM system.
Its cancellation meant that the Army is still using ODETTE, which can detect HF/VHF and UHF radio signals and is mounted on land rovers, armored vehicles and BV-206 (the latter is used by the Royal Marines) and INCE, while SCARUS has been supplemented, if not replaced, by Project SEER, a UOR launched to respond to the needs of the troops for ESM/EW in Afghanistan.

SEER is a man-portable system that fits in a backpack and can be operated on the move. It is the ROKE Resolve system made by ROKE in the UK. There seem to have been another UOR, Project WROTE, but not much is known. EW is one of the few areas that is still quite severely classified. At least most of the time.

LANDSEEKER is meant to introduce a new family of systems that replace the current ones. Effectively, a Soothsayer 2: let's hope it ends in a better way.

SEASEEKER is about the renewal of the Royal Navy's shipborne Communication Electronic Support Measures.
This program includes the adoption of RESM (the US system AN/SSQ-137(V) procured off the shelf) on the Type 45 destroyers (Project SHAMAN) and a series of other unspecified solutions at fleet-wide level.
An earlier plan was to have RESM fitted to 8 Type 45s (nice try...) and on 4 selected Type 23 frigates, but this changed during restructuring of both SEASEEKER and of the Type 45 program itself.
There are now 7 sets of RESM on order, in a 90 millions contract, with one system being for shore-based training. The systems arrive from the US, and BAE Systems should take care of all the platform integration work on the Type 45.
This works as a replacement for the sorely missed SIGINT capability that the Type 22 Batch 3 had. 

SEASEEKER should include other systems for other ships as well, but no details have been revealed. However, we have received this month the reassuring announcement in a parliamentary written answer that SEASEEKER is part of the Core Committed Budget and it should be given the go ahead next year for entry in service by 2017.


General Dynamics UK to install Health and Usage Monitoring systems on Army vehicles. A 4 millions deal will see GDUK install Systems Information Exploitation / Health and Usage Monitoring equipment in 578 vehicles of the British Army. The types of vehicle involved are Mastiff, Ridgback, Husky, Jackal, Coyote and Wolfhound.
The system is meant to inform the maintenance process on the vehicles and help the Army make sure that all machines are used overall equally to maximize availability.

Is this contract an indirect indication of the vehicles that the Army wants to keep post-Afghanistan, i wonder...? Warthog, as always, is not included: the suspect that the Army has no long-term role for the Singaporean vehicle is growing stronger in me with each news that comes out.
The Royal Marines might be interested in it, though, as a fleet of around 100 Warthog (depends on how many survive the Afghan trial) and the higher number of Vikings available (they had originally procured 108, but thanks to Afghanistan we have well overcome the 160 mark) might enable the Commandos to retire more of the old, non armored BV-206.

Significantly, a BV-206 replacement requirement from the Royal Marines was sacrificed in July 2008 for "internal reasons" prior to the announcement of the order for the Warthog in December. The selection of a Viking-like, amphibious vehicle for the UOR might have not been just about providing an high-mobility platform for Helmand ops, but a "replacement by stealth" for the BV206.
The All-Terrain Vehicle (Support) was a requirement for "between 47 and 212 vehicles" (sorry...? There's quite a big difference there) armoured, amphibious and armed or fitted for weapon systems, meant to be employed in support of Viking, replacing BV206.

With 100/115 (sources do not agree on the exact number) vehicles ordered, the Warthog in theory meets the main list of requirements. The difference is that, being Warthog bigger, with greater payload and better armor, if, as i imagine, the Royal Marines pick it up, it will probably be the Viking that ends up supporting the Warthog! 

The future should be bright for the Viking, regardless of what happens to Warthog: a regeneration program for resetting the heavily used (and abused) vehicles coming back from Afghanistan is already on the cards and being studied, and they continue to be part of the future of the Royal Marines. 21 Viking vehicles are also to be used for providing mobility to Watchkeeper TAC Parties able to receive imagery and data from the Army's drone.
Thanks to Afghanistan needs, the Viking family has also gained a  new version, the Ambulance, which had not been part of the initial order for 108 vehicles.
BAE systems has also completed designs for a Viking Mortar Carrier and a Viking Fire Support vehicle, both of which could do much to improve the capabilities of the Commando brigade if acquired.

RWS stabilized for fire on the move, ROTAS mast-mounted sensor, Boomerang III shooter detection system and a manned, shielded gun mount on the rear car. Still fully amphibious. What's not to love about this...? 

Fully amphibious 81 mm mortar carrier: i bet 3rd Commando Brigade has its eyes on this one.

What about a future in which the Warthog is used as APC and amphibious assault vehicle of first choice, due to its greater protection and payload, while the many Vikings cover the support roles, including Mortar and Fire Support...?
Sounds like a good plan to me, we'll see if i'm on target in the coming years. Money will dictate what actually happens in the end. 



BAE Systems get 500 million pounds order for CV90.   

The Norwegian army, fully satisfied with its CV90, has contracted BAE to deliver 43 new vehicles while upgrading the 103 existing ones. Among the improvements will be the adoption of the Kongsberg PROTECTOR RWS on all vehicle variants.
The Norwegian army by 2018 will so field 74 CV90 IFV, 21 in RECCE configuration, 15 in Command Post configuration, 16 Multirole, 16 Engineer vehicles and 2 Driver Training Vehicles.

And with Denmark and others (Denmark, Canada...) potentially soon ordering hundreds more vehicles, this is a good time for CV90.
Let's hope that chosing ASCOD as base for FRES SV doesn't end up being a losing solution: the CV90 is enjoying continuing, welcome export success, while ASCOD SV has reportedly awakened interest in several countries, but bagged no orders yet...   



MALE and UCAV contracts to be signed at Farnborough?

France and UK could sign contracts worth 40 million euro with the BAE/Dassault joint venture for the risk-reduction phase of the Medium Altitude Long Endurance (MALE) Telemos drone and for the demonstration preparation phase of the planned Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle (UCAV).
Telemos, which will be based on the BAE Mantis demonstrator, should be ready for entry in service around 2020 (the RAF had hoped for 2018, but it does not seem achievable), while the UCAV is indicatively expected in 2030.

The two activities would both last 18 months, and the contracts might be signed, according to industry sources, during the Farnborough air show (9-13 July)
BAE is restarting work on the Mantis, while it is abandoning the Herti effort, as the drone failed to find a customer. Some of the solutions it demonstrated, however, will inform the Telemos work. Mantis should be back in the air next year, flying to inform the design choices for the new MALE, which seems set to keep the twin-engine architecture, also as a main to improve reliability.

The BAE Taranis UCAV demonstrator has however had its first flight delayed once more: BAE says that the UK MOD is prioritizing ground testing of its stealth design instead, to validate low-observability solutions.  



Wireless is prone to disturbs, cables suck, weight is a no-no.

The challenge of modernizing the soldier's kit and electronic equipment is a challenge of connectivity, power, and weight. Future Integrated Soldier Technology trials made clear that the weight that soldiers carry has to go down. As soon as possible.
More electronics are awesome, but they need power, that must be generated or stored (and batteries add weight and cost and complexity) and delivered to the device of the moment: a chest-cable connected to the rifle during the trials was met with a resolute no. Cables were also an unwelcome part of the Land Warrior US soldier kit. We need power, delivered without cables, with minimal bulk and weight. Not easy.
The MOD is investing in finding the appropriate solutions, however: solar panels embedded in the uniform or backpack, devices that generate electricity just by walking, and use of the fabric that lines the soldier’s protective vest to push electrical energy and data from the battery to the devices, and back.
To reduce the bulk of batteries, BAE has developed wearable ones, and for communications they are working on body-worn antennas.

This is one field where some good research has to go! 

June 18, news - UPDATE

F35 LRIP VII long lead orders: the new Low Rate Initial Production lot is starting to take shape, with a 490 million dollars order to Lochkeed Martin for components and parts for a total of 35 jets. Of these, 19 will be US air force F35As, 6 F35Bs for the USMC and 4 F35Cs for the US Navy.
International partners will add to the total as follows:

Italy - 3 F35A
Turkey - 2 F35A
United Kingdom - 1 F35B 

The final order for production will be issued, as always, next year, and delivery of the airplane will follow about 2 years later, so this new F35B will be handed to the UK probably during 2015. Up to 2009, the plan was for the UK to order 7 F35Bs in 2013, so the reduction in quantities and the slow down in the process is evident.
Problem is that the F35B is still affected by several grave problems, some of which still without a real solution. Airframe fatigue tests meants to validate an 8000 flying hours life failed at 2000 when a bulkhead cracked, and the tests on the airframes modified with the new bulkhead are yet to be done. A wing root part cracked at 750 hours (!) and will need urgent replacement on all F35Bs produced in the first 4 LRIPS.
And F35 full rate production is now planned for 2019, no earlier.

For the UK, the F35B Initial Operating Capability has officially slipped from 2018 to 2019 for Land Based Operations and from 2020 to 2021 for Marittime Based Operations. And there might well be further delays. These targets will be eventually met with pre-production airframes missing part of their intended capabilities and in need of mods and upgrades worth many million dollars soon afterwards.

Not the best of situations.

In order to fit into the official dates, the UK will probably order a few more F35Bs in 2014, as part of LRIP VIII, differently from what expected in the 2009 plan which saw the 2014 as a "zero orders" year for the UK.

LRIP VIII (2014) will include, barring changes, 19 F35A, 6 B and 4 C for the US. If the UK is to progress with the F35 work to get it in service in the expected dates, it'll need to have some Bs ordered this year, and of course over the following ones.
LRIP IX (2015) will include 32 F35A, 6 B and 6 C for the US.
In 2016 the US orders planned are for 48, 9 and 9.
In 2017 it will be 48 F35A, 14 F35B and 14 F35C.

Norway has obtained support for the final "go ahead" for the Joint Strike Missile, and approved in Parliament its first order, for 2 F35A (on a planned order of 52, of which 4 for training and 42 operational plus an option for 6 more). There might soon be an announcement for a modification in the contract with Lochkeed Martin to include components for these two planes.

Already part of the contract is funding for adding Drag Parachute to Norwey's F35s. Drag chutes can reduce landing distance, or, more importantly for Norwey, improve safety of landing by making up for the lack of traction that ice and cold climate can cause by affecting tires and runway surface.



US Navy's UCLASS project going strong: the X47B UCAV demonstrator is progressing with its trials and demonstrations. The first phase of trials demonstrated the airworthiness of the drone in the planned flight envelope. The airplane is on track to go to sea on a Nimitz class super-carrier next year, to demonstrate the whole range of deck operations, including bolters, launch and recovery.

In 2014 the drone is expected to trial its first automated aerial refueling.

The X47B is Northrop Grumman's offering for UCLASS, and is the one in the most advanced state of development. It is seen at the leading contender. However, Boeing is working on an alternative offer, and says that their drone will be revealed soon.
General Atomics is offering the latest, jet-powered and stealthy variant of the Predator family, the MQ-9C Sea Avenger.

The land-version of the Avenger is already flying and working on operations, with one deployed to Afghanistan, a second flown for the first time last february and at least 2 more already in production. General Atomics has offered its Avenger for the UK's SCAVENGER requirement.

A pity that it can't be a Sea Avenger, able to work also from the carriers. But as Harvey told us, the RAF is not planning to share its drones with the guys at sea and they did not think at all about drone-compatibility when deciding on the CVF conversion to catapults and wires.
That's joint, cooperative thinking and long-term strategic planning for you...!



Rolls Royce nuclear win. As widely expected and anticipated, Rolls Royce has signed a 1.1 billion pounds contract with the MOD for work relating to the next generation Successor Submarine, meant to replace the current Vanguard SSBNs. What the press incorrectly calls "Trident Replacement", in other words.
Incorrectly because only the submarine platform is being replaced, for now at least: the Vanguards are approaching their life's end, and their original OSD has already been extended considerably. It is important to build new vessels if the Continuous At Sea Deterrence (CASD) is to continue.
Trident itself (the US-made missile) is not going to be replaced before 2042 at the earliest under current plans, and the warheads are being life-extended.

The deal announced includes a 500 million pounds 11-year refurbishment project for Rolls Royce’s submarine propulsion reactor factory at Raynesway in Derby, which promises to secure 300 jobs.
The remaining 600 millions cover development work and production of (one or two?) new Pressurized Water Reactor cores, of the PWR3 type, which offer improved safety characteristcs compared to the PWR2 being used on the Astute class.

The announcement is about two new reactor cores being ordered, with one for the first Successor SSBN and one for the last SSN on order: the MOD says that the 7th and last Astute SSN will be powered by a reactor core delivered under this contract.

The exact words as reported in the MOD press release:

The MOD has secured a supplier to produce new reactor cores for the Royal Navy's nuclear submarines and to upgrade the plant where they will be built.

The nuclear reactor cores will be used to power the seventh and final Astute Class submarine and the first of the Royal Navy's next generation of nuclear deterrent submarines, known as the Successor Class.

[...]

A further £600m will be spent on producing new reactor cores for the Astute and Successor Class submarines.

I find this extremely confusing, as the Astute class is powered by the PWR2 Core H reactor, which has, by now, nothing new about it, while the Successor SSBN is to be powered by a newly adopted, latest generation PWR3 reactor.
So there is different ways to read the above, undetailed-and-unclear-as-always phrases.

Is Astute 7 getting a PWR3 reactor instead of the PWR2 used on its sister boats? 

Or does "new" mean wholly new for the SSBN and old-type-but-newly-built- reactor-which-we-sneaked-into-this-only-partially-related-contract for Astute 7? 


Probably imprudently, this afternoon i wrote that Astute 7 would get PWR3, because that is the impression i got when reading the reports. 
I'm correcting this, after a reader made me re-think about it and realize that i might have been wrong. At this stage, i have actually no firm data, only allusive reports and my impressions, and changing the reactor type on the last Astute does not sound like a smart thing to do [albeit far from impossible], so i was probably wrong. 
However, I've tried to look into Rolls Royce and MOD presse releases, and into press reports of all possible newspapers, and found no clear and definitive answer. 
I'm waiting for the House of Commons Hansard to make available a full transcription of what mr. Hammond exactly said, hoping that this will answer my doubts.

It would be very weird to fit a different reactor to the last vessel of the same class, so perhaps i overreacted and read too much in the "multi-purpose" use of the word 'new' in the reports.
However, i wish the MOD learned to be a little bit clearer in his announcements, if i can express this little wish of mine.

If it is actually an order for new cores, aka PWR3, that makes of HMS Ajax (planned name of the 7th Astute boat) an oddity in its class.
The second reactor included in the order is for the first new SSBN.

The MOD has been investing in long-term deals and orders for the Successor Submarine program, and by 2016 a total of 3 billion are planned to be expended on design (by Main Gate, in 2016, design of the submarine will be at least 70% complete) and long lead orders for the first 3 boats.
No financial committment is being made to Boat 4 at this stage, as the final consistence of the SSBN fleet is left for SDSR2015 to decide.
Technology advancements are said to make it possible to have a submarine constantly on patrol with just 3 boats in the fleet, but accidents at times happen, and 4 boats is seen as the only really safe option that ensures no interruption in CASD.

I will of course update when a definitive answer is obtained.

Update 1: DefenseNews says that the Astute core will be a PWR2. 



MOD despatches. The June 2012 summary of important MOD announcements includes an interesting (if very un-detailed) further breakdown of the "160 billions balanced budget", which reports:

Ships - £18 billion worth of projects, including:

• Completion of the two Queen Elizabeth aircraft carriers;
• Completion of 6 state-of-the-art Type 45 Destroyers with the Samson RADAR and Aster missile combining to offer an unparalleled air defence capability;
• Design and development of the Type 26 frigate, which will replace the Type 23;
• Further work on the Maritime Afloat Reach and Sustainability programme, which will provide a fleet of new, modern vessels for the Royal Fleet Auxiliary. [NOTE: this, while unspecified, should be relative to the Solids Support Ships section of MARS, intended to deliver 3 stores replenisher vessels of new generation to replace the current Fort ships in the early 2020s]


[I hope to see, in the more detailed and complete summary to be released in the future, three more projects:

- MHPC
- Fast Landing Craft
- Force Protection Craft

hopefully they all survived the axe.]

Submarine and Deterrent - £37 billion
This covers all costs relating to the submarines themselves, nuclear propulsion costs and the costs of the strategic weapon system. This includes:

• The completion of the remaining 6 Astute Class attack submarines;
• Necessary costs arising from the requirement to replace the Vanguard class ballistic missile submarines, subject to a decision to be taken in the next Parliament;
• The ongoing costs of the strategic weapon system;
• A small amount of money at the end of the decade allocated to the requirement to scope a potential future underwater capability to replace Astute

Land Equipment - £12 billion [of this, 5.5 billions for Armoured Vehicles, expected to include also money for the Challenger 2 Capability Sustainment Programme.]

• An upgrade to our fleet of Warrior Infantry Fighting Vehicles, to maintain that capability with enhanced lethality out until 2040; [roughly 1 billon pounds, IOC 2018, ISD 2020] 
• Continued development of the family of Future Rapid Effects System vehicles, including Scout and Utility variants, which will replace a wide range of legacy armoured and protected vehicles; [FRES UV again confirmed]

[The MOD had an "armour budget" and a separate "protected vehicles" budget at least until 2011. It would be great to know if this separation is still valid (it should be, but you never know...), and it would be nice to know the amount of money destined for the Protected vehicles needs, as this second budget would cover important programs such as Foxhound, the MultiRole Vehicle Protected (MRV-P) and perhaps good part of the costs for moving Afghanistan UORs into Core Budget.

This budget is crucial for properly equipping the Army. The MRV-P is moving onwards as we speak, literally. By 20 June, so in two days time, the MOD will start the contract award procedure for the pre-concept demonstration phase. The Ministry has invited suppliers of protected vehicles to showcase the products they think meet the basic requirements set so far. Pre-Feasibility trials have been ongoing in Millbrook, and one of the vehicles involved is the Supacat SPV400, which has demonstrated a stunning 96% reliability on a demanding 21.000 kms trial. I plan to take a look at the MRV-P situation in the coming days, so keep your eyes open for updates on the blog!]

Combat Air - £18 billion

This sector covers fast jets, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and military flying training, including procurement of training aircraft. This investment includes:

• continuing investment in Typhoon to bring Tranche 2 & 3 aircraft fully into service. Further investment to develop and further enhance the aircraft’s multi-role and ISTAR capabilities is a priority for the future; [DETAILS PLEASE, we are all waiting! ISTAR should be a "cover" for the AESA radar, while multirole capability mainly covers the integration of strike payloads]
• increasing investment in the F35 Joint Strike Fighter – a state-of-the-art fifth generation aircraft which will incorporate cutting edge stealth technology;
• a growing investment in unmanned aerial vehicles, including through co-operation with France.

Air Support - £14 billion

This sector covers all large aircraft, including transport, air-to-air refuelling and large ISTAR platforms. This investment includes:

• The A400M future generation of strategic/tactical air transport aircraft;
• Bolstering our strategic airlift capability with the purchase of an additional C17 to bring the fleet up to 8 aircraft
• The brand new Voyager transport and air-to-air refuelling aircraft, which will replace the aging VC10 and TriStar fleets;
• New Rivet Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance aircraft will provide us with a state of the art airborne SIGINT collection capability following the retirement from Service of the Nimrod R1 last year;

Helicopters - £13 billion

• The purchase of an additional 14 Chinook helicopters as confirmed by the Secretary of State in July 2011;
• Completion of the Life Extension Programme for Puma; [OSD 2025, 24 helicopters updated]
• An upgrade of our Apache attack helicopters, to maintain their capability until 2040;
• The completion of the Wildcat programme, which will replace our existing Lynx helicopters, with separate variants for the Navy and Army. [There is no detail, but it is likely that the plan will be confirmed in its 2011 variant, with the reduction of Army recce helos from 34 to 30, with 4 airframes "re-roled" to Light Assault for Special Forces, along with 4 additional builds, plust 28 Navy helos]


[Not mentioned is the Merlin HC3 transfer to the Navy and its navalization, but these were announced and confirmed elsewhere. The Merlin HC4 is officially expected in Navy service by January 2017. It is not however clear if the change of name means that, by then, it will have been navalized. So far, only the Assessment Phase of the Merlin navalization as been confirmed in statements on the core budget]

Weapons - £11 billion

• Investment of around £7bn in the complex weapons sector which will deliver a wide range of weapons, in the short term including the Future Local Area Air Defence System, which will be based on the Sea Ceptor missile, and the Future Air-to-Surface Guided Weapon (heavy) which will equip the Royal Navy’s new Wildcat Helicopters.

[No mention of the Land iteration of Future Local Area Air Defence, but hopefully it will be confirmed. It is intended to replace the ancient Rapier in 2018]

Joint and other

We are spending over £4 billion on C4ISTAR capabilities over the next ten years, including significant investment in new Cyber capabilities. [From earlier announcements we know this includes CROWSNEST, for the vital provvision of Airborne Early Warning for the fleet and aircraft carriers]

In addition:
• Information Systems over £15bn
• Naval Bases £4.3bn  [what...?]
• Joint Supply Chain £1.1bn
• Logistics & Commodities £400m
• Safety & Engineering £300m



Elsewhere, the document also reports:

The UK Reaper Remotely Piloted Air System (RPAS) programme has now provided over 30,000 hours of high quality, persistent armed Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) support to UK and ISAF forces in Afghanistan.
• The Hermes 450 unmanned air system has provided over 50,000 hours of support to UK Forces since it entered service in 2007.
• On 6 December 2010, the Prime Minister announced that funding will be made available to enable further increases in the UK Reaper RPAS capability. RAF Waddington in Lincolnshire has been selected as the preferred location for the basing of a key element of this additional capability, the Ground Control Stations. The decision to base the Ground Control Stations at RAF Waddington was informed by the fact that the Station is the RAF’s ISTAR Hub with the required flying supervisory chain of command. Work has already commenced at RAF Waddington in preparation for the stand up of XIII Squadron, the arrival of the UK Reaper Ground Control Stations and associated equipment in 2012.
• At this stage there are no plans to base or fly UK Reaper aircraft in the UK as the aircraft are specifically required to be based in Afghanistan to support UK and Coalition Forces under Urgent Operational Requirement. However, in the future, as the Ground Control Stations will be based within the UK, RAF crews will be able to fly the UK Reaper aircraft remotely from the UK.
• The MOD intends to begin relocating 39 Squadron from Creech Air Force Base (AFB), Nevada to RAF Waddington once XIII Squadron is operational. The relocation of 39 Squadron will be phased to ensure there is no disruption to UK Reaper support to current operations. While there are a range of benefits of being collocated with the USAF at Creech AFB, the manpower requirements of 2 squadrons (39 and XIII Squadrons) will require qualified crews to be available for additional tours of duty on Reaper to reduce the training burden; in the long term, this requires both squadrons to be based in the UK.

This counters info that i had been given that was about 39 Squadron to be disbanded once XIII was up and running. I'm very glad to see the new, official version of the story.

It is widely expected that the Reaper will be brought into core budget at the end of Afghanistan operations, in a way or another, as stopgap on the way to Scavenger entry into service (not expected before 2020 at the earliest by now). There have been suggestions that the Reapers might stay in Afghanistan post-2014 as part of the UK's contribution to the long term security of the country, in addition to the "Sandhurst in the sand" accademy plan. Not clear how realistic this is.

Far less pleasant, the document contains this mention:

The Government has taken the difficult decision to take Sentinel out of service post Op HERRICK. Once Sentinel is withdrawn from Service, the loss of this platform will be mitigated through a range of other capabilities.

Now, we all know that this appeared in the SDSR and thus is indeed planned, but lately we have been getting good signals on the matter, with the decision to be left for SDSR15 and with the very real option of the UK offering its Sentinel R1 capability as contribution in the NATO AGS initiative, in place of cash.
I hope the above good signals are still valid. Sentinel R1 is a great and valuable system and capability to have, and should be preserved. 



Red Arrows to stay in RAF Scampton. Nick Harvey has announced that the previous Labour plan for relocation of the Red Arrows and of the Air Surveillance and Control System (ASACS) which had also been due to leave the Scampton airbase (Lincolnshire) to RAF Waddington is no longer judged a cost-effective solution and will be abandoned.
The Red Arrows will stay in Scampton at least until 2020, and the base's runway will be resurfaced later this year.
Moving the ASACS, probably the most complex and expensive of the two transfers, is to be "examined as part of other projects", but effectively ASACS will stay until the end of the decade at the very least.



Go ahead for Bae 146-200QC UOR. The MoD has acquired two BAE 146-200 airplanes in a deal with TNT Airways SA of Belgium, with their acquisition being classed as an urgent operational requirement. Now they are to be militarized in a 15.5 million deal between MOD and BAE Systems Regional Aircraft at Prestwick, to make them ready for use in Afghanistan. They will be fitted with Defensive Aid Subsystems for flying into dangerous airspace.
The actual conversion is being carried out at the Hawker Beechcraft Services facility at Broughton, North Wales, under the terms of a sub-contract awarded by BAE.

These are Quick Change aircrafts, which can be fitted with up to 96 palletized seats for passangers or transport pallets and other loads thanks to their freight floor and large upwards-opening rear door. The payload is over 10 tons.

The 32 Squadron 'The Royals' of the RAF already has two BAE 146, but these are of another variant, and normally dedicated to VIP transport. They have nonetheless been active in operations related to Afghanistan.

Lessons learned, lessons forgotten?

We are still waiting for a "Lessons Learned" report about Libya operations (promised, but not yet in sight) and it will be interesting to see what such analysis ends up saying, but what about previous "Lessons Learned" exercises? Did they have success in informing the successive decisions regarding force structures and equipment?

Yes and no.

An emblematic case is the 2003 Iraq War lessons learned exercise, in which some of the observations made were promptly forgotten in the following years, when the moment came to apply the lesson learned to facts.

For example:

The deployed fleet of 116 Challenger 2s fired a total of 1.9 tonnes of Depleted Uranium (DU) and 540 High Explosive rounds, whilst the 36 AS90s and the [39] 105mm Light Guns fired around 9,000 and 13,000 artillery rounds respectively; some 2000 of the former were bomblet shells. The Challenger 2 was used to provide very precise firepower effects, in circumstances where the risk of collateral damage prevented the use of artillery. This was crucial when operating in cities and towns such as Basrah and Az Zubayr. Artillery was critical in preventing freedom of movement of enemy forces in the open battlefield.

22.000 rounds of heavy artillery fired, despite the unprecedented availability of air support, demonstrate that there is still plenty of need for the timely delivery of barrages of artillery. In addition, over 9% of the artillery shells fired were bomblet carriers for wide area attack and anti-tank duty. It is a significant amount, which makes it hard to accept the wisdom of cancelling the SMART 155mm guided submunitions carrying shell, which the RA tried to purchase following the retirement of the earlier unguided submunitions dispensers, banned for the danger they represented because of the high number of unexploded munitions they would leave on the field.
It also continues to call into some real question the constant cutback over the number of artillery guns available to the army.  

Another interesting passage is about the old, not-very known Swingfire missile, and might come as a surprise to many:

The Swingfire anti-tank guided weapon system, which is fitted to some UK reconnaissance vehicles, was also of great utility during the combat phase. It was the longest range, integral weapon system available to reconnaissance units and was used in approximately half of their attacks despite representing only a quarter of their main weaponry.

The Swingfire missile, mounted on the FV102 Striker vehicle, of the CRV(T) family, proved highly effective and very useful, and was intensely used during the operations of Recce formations maneuvering in Iraq. 12 such vehicles were employed in 2003, on a total of 66 CVR(T) vehicles deployed on TELIC, so this is quite a proof that, despite their relative lack of fame, they were kept in high consideration.
This valuable system, which mounted 5 missiles ready to fire and 5 reloads under armor in a small, highly mobile vehicle, was lost without a real replacement when the Javelin ATGW entered service in 2005. Excellent weapon, but with only about half the range of Swingfire, and not vehicle mounted: the troop of 4 Strikers in a Recce regiment has been notionally replaced by 4 Spartan APCs carrying Javelin teams.
Only two years had passed from the experience in Iraq, yet no real effort was made to replace the capability: there were, tentatively, Overwatch vehicles with missiles in the aborted LANCER program (armed with Brimstone, no less) and one such variant was also expected to be part of FRES SV Recce Block 3, but we are back to ground zero once again as the Block 3 itself seems destined not to happen, with the indispensable variants moved down into Block 2 instead, which is, in itself, far on the horizon.

A solution, off the shelf and extremely capable, is available in the form of the SPIKE NLOS, from Israel, which is a multi-mission weapon with a range of 25 km, which would give unprecedented coverage and accurate firepower to formations on the ground.

Sandcat SPIKE NLOS, carrying sensors, quadruple launcher and 6 reloads. A lot of firepower available on call.

While there's no official confirmation, it is widely believed that the Royal Artillery's UOR missile system "EXACTOR", operated by two Troops from the batteries of 39 Regiment, is the M113-mounted SPIKE NLOS.

Thanks to its very long range and small sizes, we do not need a FRES hull either: a quadruple launcher, with space for reloads, was shown on a Sandcat 4x4 protected vehicle, which is comparable in dimensions and architecture to the Foxhound. The UK could field this kind of capability with a relatively little investment, and rather quickly too.
South Korea ordered 67 SPIKE NLOS missiles in 2011, along with an unspecified number of launchers of unknown architecture for some 43 USD millions. It is also widely believed that non-standard M113 vehicles spotted in british colors at Camp Bastion are connected to the mysteryous UOR missile system known under the name "EXACTOR", which is believed to be the SPIKE NLOS.
Two Royal Artillery Troops regularly work with the EXACTOR system in Afghanistan in any given day, and there might be an hope for a future order beyond the UOR scope. We'll see.  

The worst part, in any case, is that these are just two cases of lessons identified, learned, and forgotten, among many others. 


Anyway, speaking of the Foxhound, the good news of today is that the vehicle has been delivered to the troops in Afghanistan. There is also the definitive confirmation of the follow-on order, announced months ago, for a second batch of vehicles: the total value of the Foxhound orders is 270 million pounds (180 + 90), covering 300 vehicles. The Foxhound is produced by General Dynamics Land Systems : Force Protection Europe, and while it started as a UOR, it is already firmly part of the Core Defence budget and of Army 2020.
It promises to bring much enhanced mobility and protection to the troops, and if it will live up to its many promises it will be an excellent addition to the Army's capabilities.

Foxhound vehicles inside a RAF C17, fitted with their TES kit, inclusive of cameras for 360° situational awareness

Foxhound on in-theatre trials following delivery to Camp Bastion

I'm a bit puzzled by the choice of armament mounting, though: two pintle-mounts for GPMGs on top, one on each side. The gunners sticking out of the hatches are going to be very, very exposed when manning the guns.
Didn't a RWS make a lot more sense...?

Army 2020 according to Sky News

Sky News claims to have seen the Army 2020 report due to be announced in Parliament sometime over the next weeks, prior to Parliament's Summer Recess. I have no reasons to believe they are lying, but of course, take their article with a bit of sane skepticism, as there might be parts of it that do not ring true when the actual announcement arrives.
The article is, however, well informed, and fits in the plan introduced by General Wall's speech at the RUSI Land Warfare Conference, so it is definitely worth reporting.

Under plans drawn up by Lieutenant General Nick Carter the regular Army will number 82,000 by 2020. Reserves will be expanded to 30,000.

It will be split into Reaction Forces and an Adaptable Force.
Reaction Forces will be made up of a division of three armoured brigades, each with a tank regiment and two armoured infantry regiments [General Carter mentioned FRES SV as part of them, i think they will have a Recce Regiment embedded as well. Hopefully they will have at least another infantry battalion, Light Role, as well) plus an airborne brigade.

This division will be commanded by a major general and will be responsible for short-term interventions from instant deployment through to a larger dispatch of troops, which could take a year to prepare.
One armoured battle group and a parachute battle group would be on standby for immediate dispatch to a global emergency.
The airborne brigade and one mechanised brigade, armed with Warrior fighting vehicles, will be capable of deploying inside three months. Emergency missions would be backed by two regiments of Apache helicopters.

This is absolutely certain, save for the "each with a tank regiment and two armoured infantry regiments", which is likely, but won't be certain until i hear it from the official sources. However, it is the force structure i was anticipating and expecting. It will be interesting to see if the number of Warriors to be upgraded is incremented accordingly: the previous plan was for 5 battalions, plus 1 to cover the rotation into Training and Demonstration role.
Now we are looking at 6 frontline battalions, and we have a Training issue to be solved. We'll see how this is tackled: seen that these brigades are the "high readiness" force, one would hope that they won't lose a battalion in turns to the training role...
Also, i wish people would stop using "Armored" and "Mechanized" titles interchangably for the same three brigades like nothing changed: the terms have a precise meaning, stick to it, goddamnit. 

Adaptable Forces will be made up of seven infantry brigades capable of providing troops for a long-term operation of several years. They will also provide the troops for on-going commitments to ceremonial duties, protecting the Falkland Islands, two battalions based in Cyprus, and one in Brunei.

This division [so are they listening to me and keeping two Divisional HQs...?] will depend heavily on reserves soldiers who will be grouped into battalions to shadow the regulars. During a long-term operation, General Carter believes that 30% of forces in the field would be reservists.

Both parts of the Army will share resources from a new element called Force Troops And Logistics Support.

This will include one artillery, an engineer, a surveillance, a medical, two signals and two logistics brigades - many of these made up of reserves.

These reforms are expected to result in the cutting of five infantry battalions and two armoured regiments.

Defence sources have told Sky News that the largely Welsh Queens Dragoon Guards and the Royal Scots Dragoon Guards are unlikely to be disbanded, which would put pressure on English cavalry regiments especially the Royal Tank Regiments.
The Brigade of Guards, Parachute Regiment, and the Gurkhas are also to be spared the axe, sources have said, leaving many of the cuts likely to fall disproportionately on English regiments, especially the Yorkshires and the Mercians.

The above is also generally true and certain already, as it was announced by General Wall. However, Sky News talks of "Division" regarding the 7 infantry brigades, and this is still a controversial point, as the Army has just finished creating a 2-stars, non-deployable HQ in Aldershot, the UK Support Command, which was supposed to control the regional brigades.
Now that the regional brigades effectively vanish into fewer but deployable, "reg-res" brigades, putting them under a restructured but hopefully deployable Divisional HQ would make total sense; however, this would almost certainly bring to the disbandment of the newly created HQ, which barely months after being announced is effectively without a real purpose.
UK Support Command might still be the HQ that commands the 7 Infantry Brigades, even if i hope in a second Divisional HQ instead, so take this passage with some prudence.

Also, the composition of the Force Troops and Logistics Support (effectively a - pointless - renaming of the current "Theatre Troops") is to be taken with prudence. While Force Troops have been specifically announced, there was no indication in General Wall's statement about the brigades that would compose the force.
Sky New's version does not imply too dramatic changes, at least in the number of Brigade HQs: the Artillery Brigade already exists (1st Artillery Brigade) and controls the GMLRS regiment, the STA regiment and the UAV regiments, [and now will get the Air Defence formations currently under Joint Ground Based Air Defence command...?]; the engineer brigade is also already there [8th Force Engineer Brigade, with 29 Land Support Group, 12 Air Support Group and 170 Infrastructure Support Group], the Medical brigade is also already an old reality (2nd Medical).

The Signals Brigades are currently 3, but it's already been more than one year from the internal announcement that 2nd 'National Communications' brigade would disband after its involvement in the Olympics with the (surviving) regiments re-assigned to the other two brigades, so both 1st and 11 Signals Brigade would seem to be safe. Not all of their parts will be, however: for example, 7th Signal Regiment will vanish by 31 July, and others might well follow.

The Logistic Brigades are also 3 (104 Brigade is the strategic "deployment-enabling" brigade, while 101 and 102 Logistic Brigades were the Divisional support formations) and so it seems that one is doomed: i realize that speculation should probably be avoided, but i can't hold back from observing that the most likely victim is 102 Logistic Brigade, as it is based in Germany.
I doubt that the unique roles of 104 Brigade can be "devolved" to two restructured divisional logistic brigades, after all, while it makes sense, with the reduction of defence ambitions to operations at most at single division scale, to retain a single support formation. This will be bad news for RLC and REME, but it has been in the air for some time, and i can't say i did not expect it: i made mention of this possibly happening in several of my past articles on the Army. I suspect in the Army they had been imagining it as well.

The only real news is that "Surveillance Brigade" mentioned in passing, given no real attention by the press. A pity, because this one might actually be new, unless the journalists are calling "surveillance brigade" the current 1st Military Intelligence brigade. This is an HQ controlling a force of 3 regular and 2 Reserve Multi-Role intelligence battalions. 
The "Surveillance" name suggests that it might be a new formation having to do with UAV regiments, which would transfer from 1st Artillery Brigade, RAF collaboration (always via drones, but perhaps Sentinel R1 will continue to play a part in it) and Base-ISTAR, i guess. Probably the Intelligence Battalions would be part of it, too, especially if the Army is taking inspiration from the US Army Battlefield Surveilance Brigades, or even from France's army, or Italy's with its RISTAEW brigade [Reconnaissance, ISTAR and EW]. 

Who's been following my posts for some time knows that i've proposed forming a "Force Protection Brigade" bringing together a Base-ISTAR regiment, the RAF Regiment inclusive of CBRN Wing and the Military Working Dog Regiment, to concentrate under the same joint command the valuable experience and skill in the protection of bases and deployed forces. My aim was also to add to it a C-RAM artillery formation, in time.
I wonder if under the "Surveillance" title there might be at least part of what i envisaged. I think, after all, that it is a good idea, at least as good as the idea of a single command overlooking UAVs and intelligence exploitation, closely connected to the RAF's own resources in this field. The Army's Intelligence and RAF's own experts can and indeed should collaborate on IMINT, ELINT and SIGINT.

As to the cuts, i won't comment on the identity of the regiments that will be lost. The names that go around by now are known and have "stabilized". There's a few names being reported, and they never change. So it is likely that the cuts will be made in that group, in a way or another, but how it will happen, we don't yet know.
The loss of 5 infantry battalions and 2 Armour Regiments is a rumor circulating from quite some time, and it seems to be correct, but again, no certainties yet.
Take it as "likely" or "very likely" for now.
Only thing, very personal, that i want to note is that the latest rumor of cuts to "Irish units" sounds politically non realistic. There is no really much in terms of Irish units: there's a single regular battalion, other than the Irish Guards (that should be definitely safe), and i honestly can't see it being cut. I might be proven wrong, but it just sounds unlikely to me. 

What i'd really want to know is what happens to the Artillery and Engineers, which are two critical enablers i want to see efficient and well structured. They are the two areas i really worry about, and i'm indeed very critical about this idea of brigades without organic artillery and engineers. I just hope that the reductions that will be announced won't make for a suicide...  

And the composition of the 7 Infantry Brigades, too, that is something else i'm eager to learn about. But at least Sky News seems to suggest that they will be more akin to deployable brigades than to the old Regional ones. And this at least is a good thing.     

Future Land Operating Concept and MOD Business Plan 2012/15

Two very important documents released recently by the MOD deserve a look and analysis: the Future Land Operating Concept (available here) is effectively the reasoning behind the new Army Structures, and sets out a bit of a (very generic) map of the investments to be made, and (in theory) sets the record on the priorities for the force.

The Business Plan 2012 (here) tells us a bit more of what is being done by the MOD, what is to happen, and when. 

I'll start from the FLOC, highlighting some of the most relevant passages and making some observations on them.

The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction amongst states and non-state actors will escalate the risk of conflict. It is likely, therefore, that the UK and its forces will fight enemies who use chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons. This means that the UK must have the capability, with its allies, to deter and defend against (or indeed counter) such attacks.

Overall i can agree with the assesment: the risk is very real, and it featured strongly inside the SDSR as well. What does not fit into the picture is the retirement of the Fuchs CBRN recce armored vehicles, without any replacement in sight. Where is the coherence in stating A and doing B? 

As we develop better ISTAR capabilities, so will our adversaries. They will actively seek ways to defeat our ISTAR system of systems, denying commanders the information and intelligence they need. We must safeguard our own ISTAR capabilities through resilience and redundancy. Equally, we must develop our own counter-unmanned aerial system capabilities.

The focus on the need for ISTAR is a constant in the document, and rightfully so. It is recognized that the Brigade will need to gather and exploit information from UAVs, direct engagement with the local people, and by traditional scouting, by stealth and by strenght, depending on the situation.
We will see if this focus on ISTAR will remain only in the words or if it will bring to some concrete investment: for example, i'm very curious to see the structure of the famous 7 infantry brigades part of the new force structure.
According to the Army's very own doctrinal studies and documents and exercises (such as Agile Warrior 2011), a Brigade Recce Force and a strong information-exploitation capability are absolutely necessary: we will see if the 7 brigades get their own dedicate ISTAR/Exploitation capability.
A model in this sense is the very succesful 30 Commando IEX Group, 3rd Commando Brigade. This 450-strong unit groups together the scouting element of the brigade and the necessary Exploitation capability.
Conversion of current TA and some of the regular Cavalry regiments into lighter Scout/ISTAR formations would seem to be the way to go.

Avoiding collateral damage will continue to be a constraint and the need for a balance between precision and suppression (including non-precision fires) will be required as an essential firepower ingredient of manoeuvre. Our requirements for suppressive fires (non-precision) will reduce, though not wholly disappear. The development of further precision weaponry, including from unmanned aerial systems, will be another important force design principle, augmenting the precision of our traditional direct fire weapons and our currently limited indirect fire precision weapons.

Suppressive and Area Fires (conventional, unguided artillery barrages, for example) might not be as frequent as in the past, but it'll still be required. Artillery is cheap, it is always available, pretty much unaffected by weather (differently from air support) and it is effective.
At the same time, expanding the accuracy of the Royal Artillery is a priority. But it has been at least since 2001, and, save for GMLRS and hopefully Watchkeeper and Fire Shadow, none of the programs the RA pursued were spared the axe. The SMART anti-tank intelligent shell was ordered, and soon after that cancelled. The Braveheart upgrade to 52 calibers barrels for the AS90 never went ahead. The effort for procuring the ATACMS missile for use from the GMLRS launchers seems to have run agroud for good. Longer range GMLRS rockets (over 100 km) have been demonstrated, but never were acquired. The much needed upgrade for the Warrior FV514 vehicle used by Fire Support Teams to direct artillery fire is struggling to progress.
The RA has been told that arming Watchkeeper is a project which can expect to wait at least 4 years before being seriously considered, and despite validation in 2010, it might be 2018 before the Royal Artillery can finally put in service the Excalibur GPS-guided 155mm shell.
A program to pursue Course Correction Fuzes for "all" tubed artillery apparently exists, but its status is uncertain: the MOD was shown such a fuze for the existing 81 mm HE round, by BAE Systems, and US's ATK and others can provide such fuzes, able to change standard shells into highly-accurate rounds, with solutions available for the 105 mm as well as for the 155, giving artillery a circular probable error as little as 20 meters at a fraction of the cost of the much more accurate, "silver bullet" Excalibur.

We are also kept in the dark for now about the future shape of the Royal Artillery: massive reductions are rumored, and it is highly likely that the future brigades won't even have their organic artillery regiment. This is another evident contradiction, if it'll be confirmed.   

Emphasis should be placed on improving precision, integration and interoperability. Our focus should be on: secure communications; sense, warn and engage systems; detection, location, identification and tracking systems; countering indirect fires; countering aerial threats; and the rapid clearance of joint, land and multinational fires.

Manoeuvre in the lower airspace will have implications for the assets allocated at brigade level. Air defence (particularly anti-unmanned aerial systems), as well as battlespace and air space management capabilities, are likely to be required. An enhanced find capability is also likely to be needed in this dimension.

So i take it that the Army will go ahead on the Common Artillery Locating Radar program (especially since the existing COBRA is being prematurely pensioned), a C-RAM capability and CAMM(Land) missiles, plus a reorganization of SHORAD air defence with decisions on the future of Starstreak and Stormer-mounted Starstreak, which at one point seemed set to vanish completely from 2009...?
I hope so.  

Decentralisation of forces will place significantly greater demands on commanders and soldiers to understand the character of the conflict they confront.

The reduced density of forces and increased lethality of weapon systems will place a greater responsibility and capability in the hands of smaller combat teams and more junior commanders.

Armoured infantry will be a core capability around which manoeuvre will be built. The complexity of the environment will require small and robust combined-arms teams able to fight dispersed. Mobility support will be critical in the complex battlespace; assault engineers will be required in greater numbers than at present to fight within complex environments, such as urban terrain. Armour, drawing on its protection and ability to provide precision fire, will be required primarily to provide intimate support to dismounted infantry, although armour should continue to be capable of defeating an adversary by shock action and ground manoeuvre. Control and integration of joint and organic precision fires, both physical and virtual, will have to be co-ordinated and synchronised as far down as sub-unit level.

Decentralization and dispersion of the force is another big point in the document. It is also a reality well experimented in Afghanistan, where battalions can easily end up broken down with each Company sent to a different FOB.
From the lines of the British Army Journal 2012, an hint of change can be seen: there is consideration going into retaining in the long term the Afghan "Fire Support Groups" embedded into the Companies.
There's a real possibility of a restructuring of infantry battalions on a new structure which does away with the Maneuever Support Company and the three Rifle Companies in exchange for 4 "Combined Arms" companies on 2 Rifle Platoons and a Fire Support Group each, possibly with one company being from TA.
I think it is an arrangement that makes perfect sense, and it will be particularly interesting to see if it does actually happen. 

Armor and protected mobility are identified as absolute priorities, with the upgraded Warrior equipping the heavy, high-end reaction force; while UOR vehicles, Foxhound and hopefully the to-be-chosen Multi Role Vehicle - Protected (MRV-P) and the FRES UV will provide protection and mobility to good part of the rest of the force. The 7 Infantry Brigades should be mechanized, at least to a degree, with FRES UV, to build a genuine “medium weight” force which will prove invaluable by combining some of the advantages of Light and Armored forces. In most situations, a proper “medium weight” brigade is likely to be the best solution, so I deem it very important that FRES UV and mechanization of the infantry are given a real priority.
The FLOC expects the MBT to mainly work in direct support of the Infantry, with a "shock" role as a distant second: i can't help but notice that a FRES Direct Fire variant, smaller and more suited to urban mazes and embedded into Infantry battalions would make for a better solution. Of course, money is not there for pursuing the best solution.

The above passages also highlight two other crucial future requirements: Engineers and Fire Support Teams capable to plan, direct and control the whole range of Joint Fires available in support of land maneuver. 
Fire Support Teams should be spared by the cuts, unless we get a nasty surprise. However, the platforms from which they should work (upgraded Warrior FV514 and FRES SV Joint Fires, planned as part of Recce Block 2) are still in the air: the FV514 will only get basic mechanical and electronic upgrades as part of the Warrior CSP, but won't get the desperately needed refresh of its specialized under-armor fire direction kit until the RA can secure funding for it, something that it has been trying to do at least since 2010. This requirement should be prioritized, in my opinion.
The FRES SV Joint Fires will, hopefully, arrive in a not too distant future, but as of now, it is simply not here, nor a certainty.

As to Engineers, the RE is expected to be hit rather heavily by the incoming cuts, and if it happens, there will be yet another evident contradiction between an assesed, recognized need and the action implemented.

Air manoeuvre has the ability to transition between roles and operate across the range of operational environments, most notably from the sea (via the littoral) to the land and back again. Air manoeuvre should be closely integrated with the air and maritime components, and the actions of a ground manoeuvre force if also employed. Air manoeuvre employs the agility, reach and flexibility demanded by the future operating environment and its ability to operate at range, geographically distant from main ground forces or bases, represents a key operational capability to shape, sustain or provide decisive action. The addition of the third dimension in the conduct of combined-arms operations can be enhanced by the teaming of manned and unmanned platforms for reconnaissance, strike and lift sorties.
Air manoeuvre provides a capability that can achieve speed of deployment and redeployment, independent of terrain, and deliver personnel and equipment or supplies rapidly, over distance and onto objectives that would normally be considered inaccessible by vehicle. It can also be used to seek advantage over very short distances in complex terrain where movement in vehicles is constrained. Aviation can, therefore, protect and sustain both a deployed air manoeuvre or ground manoeuvre force with intimate support from the air. Control of the air cannot be taken for granted and counter-air missions may be required in the future operating environment. Furthermore, some nonstate adversaries are also able to challenge control of the air, particularly at lower altitudes. Rotary and slow fixed-wing aircraft are vulnerable, particularly during take-off and landing, and their use may be constrained by the threat of ground-fire.

As part of the air manoeuvre capability, air assault provides a capacity to concentrate, disperse or redeploy rapidly by day or night and attack or approach from any direction across hostile terrain. It has tremendous use in irregular warfare and dispersed operations, acting as a force multiplier by enabling combat power to be massed at high tempo. A tactical battle group air assault mission can provide the massed combat power required on the ground in one wave. Air manoeuvre, air assault and air mobility capabilities will be instrumental in the seizure of the initiative and exploitation of the developing situation on the ground. Air manoeuvre will have important effects in the information domain and against many of the opponents that we may face; air manoeuvre is likely to constitute one of our asymmetric edges.

Who's been following this blog for a while knows that my position on air manoeuvre is very clear, and that i all but proposed to modify rather extensively the way 16 Air Assault Brigade is structured and the way in which it generates force packages, so to make it sure that any deploying brigade, even in the long timeframe of an enduring operation, would be given a coherent, pretty much self-sufficient "air battlegroup", centered around a strong airmobile battalion with (indicatively) an artillery battery from 7 RHA regiment and support of a large Chinook squadron, a Wildcat squadron for recce/escort/light utility, an Apache squadron for support and a Puma flight for Medium Utility, CASEVAC and MEDEVAC and other roles.
The air battlegroup would be attached to the Land Brigade and both would operate under the wider control of a 2-star Divisional HQ, in compliance to the Army's own assesment and following the general lines of what happens in Afghanistan, where there is an higher, 2-stars level controlling the deployed brigade and all other assets.   

The above passage of FLOC summarizes very well my thoughts on the matter, but despite the convergence and despite General Wall's announcing that 16 Air Assault brigade's structure will be "modified", i doubt that they will try anything as ambitious as i imagined and proposed.
The pessimist in me fears that the above words will remain, as often happens, a bit of screams in the wind, without a real impact on how things are structured and done in day to day life. The fear is that 16AA's restructuring has more to do with the expected loss of 5th SCOTS battalion than with anything else, but this is another area to keep under watch: who knows, we might be surprised.
What’s important, in my opinion, is accepting that Air Manoeuvre, at least at Battalion level, is more important than ever. Parachute insertion is likely to be an “extrema ratio” solution, for very rare, very particular situations. But the ability to combine vertical air manoeuvre with the Brigade’s land manoeuvre involving armored/mechanized formations is going to prove absolutely invaluable pretty much in any operational context.
As such, I deem it important that the way in which 16AA is employed is changed and expanded. The brigade should not only deliver the Airborne Task Force for reaction role, it should be able to provide complete “air manoeuvre” packages to a brigade on the field.  

There is, correctly, a similar passage about Littoral / Amphibious manoeuvre too:

Littoral manoeuvre is the exploitation of the sea as an operational manoeuvre space by which a sea-based or amphibious force can influence situations, decisions and events in the littoral regions of the world. This will be achieved through an integrated and scalable joint expeditionary capability optimised to conduct deterrent and coercive activities against hostile shores posing light opposition. There is an increased likelihood that the joint force will be engaged in littoral operations given the predicted future operating environment. The denial or unavailability of ports, land routes, airfields or airspace may necessitate littoral manoeuvre. If so, future littoral operations in the joint operational area are likely to be founded on joint (or integrated) action. Amphibious forces will seek to realise simultaneous effects directly against objectives through ship to objective manoeuvre using unexpected penetration points and landing zones to avoid established defences. The seizure or denial of key terrain to the enemy may be required to facilitate the introduction of follow-on forces. If projection of greater combat mass is necessary, a full commando brigade as part of a multinational coalition could be deployed or, heavier land forces can be projected.

In any littoral scenario, a necessary pre-condition for successful joint action will be an accurate, detailed awareness or, preferably, understanding of the operational area. Defining activities will need to persist throughout all phases of an operation or campaign. Shaping activities will follow this defining activity to set the conditions for successful land manoeuvre, decisive action and exploitation. Sufficient air, surface and sub-surface capability will be required for decisive acts. Decisive activities may be necessary to influence the wider littoral or induce a favourable situation on land. In these cases, it will be necessary to project amphibious forces or land assets, to achieve objectives. Decisive activities may include the simultaneous, or sequential, projection or introduction of land forces, systematic destruction of the enemy or neutralisation of opposition through a combination of organic and joint fires, leading to further manoeuvre and consolidation.

The reasoning is correct and it is pretty much impossible not to agree with it, but the question that it causes is related to, for example, the loss of RFA Largs Bay. How does the significant reduction in amphibious capability fit into a situational assessment that calls for more littoral manoeuvre, i truly can't understand.
Especially if i'll have confirmation of the rumor about the Army losing its Ramped Craft Logistics (RCLs) along with a good share of its other boats and assets. What's the use of these studies and documents if the actual decisions in the end go straight against them?
In a Joint Force approach, this doctrinal vision also suggest that the Fast Landing Craft project and the Future Force Protection Craft should be protected, as they are two important projects to enable littoral manoeuvre. The Force Protection craft will also be invaluable against the threat of swarm attacks and other asymmetric menaces, and it will also likely offer the chance of much expanded and enhanced operational capability in Riverine environment, which, while not specifically mentioned in the FLOC, is likely to be part of the future conflicts. And indeed prominently featured in Iraq and even Afghanistan as well (Kajaki dam and operations with boats on related waterways).   

There is an operational requirement to design and test the optimal integrated headquarters in preparation for future deployments. We must design multinationality into our established formation headquarters from the start, particularly those at high readiness.

The scale, multi-dimensional nature of manoeuvre, and the complexity of the environment, require an essential level of command above brigade, or task force, where the political dialogue takes place, and judgements are made about where to concentrate force and apply economy of effort. This enables the tactical actions of the brigades, or task forces, to be sequenced in time and space. Conversely, joint and inter-agency capabilities need to be integrated at lower levels of command.

The demands of the future operating environment are such that small and mobile formation headquarters are likely to be unable to collate, process and disseminate the level of information and understanding required to generate the mixture of comprehension and agility that is needed to retain the initiative in complex modern conflict. Land forces are likely to be geographically dispersed and decentralisation is likely to be the operating principle through networked command and control. There will be a need for flat information structures and rich information services available at the tactical level. Decentralised operations demand the ability to re-group and concentrate forces when the situation demands. In order to maximise the potential of mission command to create and exploit opportunities, command and control architecture which is able to network top-down and bottom-up is required to exploit advantages in information management and information exploitation. Recognising that command is a capability in its own right, empowerment will be critical to the success in the decentralised future battlespace.

Larger, more static, main headquarters require the structures and resources to deal with the requirements of an integrated and multinational approach. The span of decentralised command, and dealing with the  demands from governments and higher headquarters, will need to be supplemented by more mobile, tactical and deployable elements. This suggests a need for a robust deployable headquarters at the divisional level and more mobile brigade headquarters. This allows commanders to remain engaged closely with the conduct of operations, when and where, the situation demands.

Headquarters and command and control are the subject of a great focus. They were considered with great attention in Exercise AGILE WARRIOR 2011, and the position of the Army is that the Brigade HQ should be mainly Tactical, Fight-oriented, and Mobile. On operations, the brigade is expected to operate under the wider strategical control of a 2-star divisional HQ. 
The contradiction here is in the fact that we seem to be losing all but 1 deployable divisional HQ under the new Army 2020 concept soon to be announced, with the other brigades being all under the newly created UK Support Command.
The target is to operate simultaneously on up to three sizeable, non-enduring operations, as announced by the SDSR, and the FLOC reminds us that, since 1945, the british army has been almost constantly deployed abroad in a manner or another. It is clear to me that one deployable Divisional HQ would soon be overwhelmed by the tasks it would have to face. The personnel and resources assigned to it would never be enough. One deployed HQ requires, in my opinion, at the very least another deployable  HQ at a decent readiness level back at home.
A minimum of 2 Deployable divisional HQs are indispensable to have a chance to meet the army's targets as they are formulated, and the "Division HQ restructuring process", which is ongoing according to the business plan, should take this in consideration. I hope some serious thought goes into solving this rather evident contradiction.  

Future land forces should be designed to train, deploy at short notice with minimal mission-specific training, and fight as a division at best effort. This responsive, intervention force should be robust in design and composed of resilient establishments to prevent the need for backfilling. It needs to be capable of combined-arms manoeuvre, land-air in design, and be able to operate in the CJIIM environment. The integration of capabilities will be key. The force should be equipped to manoeuvre, and operate in, potentially high threat, complex, or intense environments and to provide endurance to a stabilisation operation. Combat power should be concentrated in the force to
match high threats from the outset, as opposed to reliance upon a modular approach that dilutes the combat power across the force. Rapid deployment of a robustly configured force to seize and hold the initiative from an initial position of disadvantage will be critical.

[...] Brigades should be optimised to fight at the tactical level and be fully capable of manoeuvre in all environments including ground, lower air and in some cases, cyber. The structure required to achieve manoeuvre, and the training it requires, will provide the most appropriate baseline from which to adapt to other tasks.
There will be a requirement to mass scalable joint precision effect organically at an increasingly lower level than hitherto; concentration of force requires balance with economy of effort.

The above passage, lifted from the FLOC document, is the justification we get for the very recent change of heart that saw the abandon of the 5 multi-role brigades and gave us the 3 Heavy, Armored "Reaction" brigades, plus 16AA, plus the 7 infantry brigades.
My guess about the structure of the 3 Reaction brigades is for a structure on a single large tank regiment (Type 44 or 58), a Recce regiment on FRES SV (but still possibly with a squadron on Jackal jeeps as well) and, if we are lucky, 2 battalions of armoured infantry on Warrior, ideally with as many as other 2 battalions of infantry in Light Role configuration, which would, i guess, be moved by helicopter to achieve the "manoeuvre in the lower air environment".
Hopefully, at least these Reaction brigades will have their organic artillery regiments (mainly on AS90, but possibly with a L118 battery as well, assuming that double-qualification of crews on both systems continues).  
All three of these brigades might be located around Salisbury Plain. This, at least, is what General Wall hinted at RUSI, while noting how advantageous it would be to have contractors helping to keep up the 3 heavy brigades running. No "scottish Salisbury", so, and considerably less heavy stuff (if any) heading north in the case: prepare to deal with a very angry Salmond when he understands it...!
However, it undoubtedly would make practical sense, to base such formations near the port of embarkation, near their support providers and near their training area.

As a force preparing for contingency operations, it is not possible to train the whole force to be ready to fight anywhere. Force elements will need to specialise in regional and terrain specific environments where activities will enable enduring relationships and provide a much deeper level of understanding of culture, language, relationships, potential rifts between populations, and the nuances of terrain and climate. Regional specialization will require a new emphasis on language skills.The future force will need interpreters, cultural experts, intelligence officers, civil military co-operation personnel and others to understand the subtleties and nuances of the modern battlefield. Soldier-diplomats who have a progressive understanding of the ideas and technology will allow us to take the fight to the enemy, both among the people, but also in cyberspace.

It is expected that the above specialization will mainly affect the other 7 brigades, which make for the (possibly) biggest floating question mark at the moment. They will emerge from the merging of the remaining two regular brigades with the current 10 Reserve brigades, but on their structure there are no real indications, other than they will vary in size, and, i add, probably in composition.
From these brigades the Army will deliver force packages for a wide variety of roles, from Public Role in London to engagement abroad.

Engagement activity incorporates security co-operation, defence diplomacy, forward presence, reassurance, deterrence, containment and coercion. Uniquely amongst the UK’s soft power tools, defence engagement can also deliver ‘hard’ influence by being able to deter, contain and coerce, and thus provides important political levers. Given the profound strategic changes and a more networked, interconnected world, land forces must continue to invest in defence engagement as a means of preventing, in certain situations, the need to use the more expensive hard power option. This should be complementary to our diplomatic, development, intelligence and trade-promotion tools in order to contribute to our security and prosperity objectives more widely. Specifically for the land environment, engagement assists understanding to shape strategy and builds trust and co-operation amongst partners.

Defence engagement, specific to the land environment, falls into four broad categories:

a. Non-combatant Operations. Non-combatant operations and security operations will continue to be an integral part of defence engagement. This includes activities such as conventional deterrence, coercion, containment and reassurance. Special Forces will continue to be used overseas, in conjunction with partners, to counter terrorist threats. Information and cyber operations will be conducted alongside our allies to protect our national interests, and contingency operations will take place to provide reassurance and security in volatile regions.

b. Defence Diplomacy. Defence diplomacy covers activities ranging from basing and access issues, to support to current and contingent operations. The Defence Attaché network provides a frontline defence presence and face-to-face interaction with host nations. This ‘soft power’ will continue to be instrumental in building alliances, coalitions, and partnerships to ensure co-operation, burden-sharing, interoperability and capacity building. The network of loan service, exchange and liaison officers provides critical situational awareness, information and influence within multinational and multilateral organisations (such as the UN and NATO), and foreign governments on a national or regional basis.

c. Defence and Security Exports and Sales. Specialist personnel, working in concert with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, will continue to support UK Trade and Industry for the sale and export of defence and security training, advice and materiel manufactured in the UK or by UK companies.

d. Conflict Prevention, Post-conflict Reconstruction and Stabilisation. Conflict prevention, post-conflict reconstruction and stabilisation are all activities in support of the Building Stability Overseas Strategy which places an emphasis on upstream conflict prevention. Security sector reform is likely to remain a key policy instrument based on the recognition that security is essential to conflict prevention, stabilising fragile and conflict-affected environments and aiding development efforts. Capacity building will be central to conflict prevention and stabilisation tasks.

[...] An expeditionary military advisory capability should be created with specific units earmarked to provide specialist training teams. This will empower partners to operate by themselves, or alongside the UK and her allies. Foreign area officers must become ‘diagnosticians’ in designing and managing indirect and direct security assistance programmes.

Another role of these brigades will be in UK engagement and in national resilience.
On the effective deployability and fightability of these 7 brigades, we have only doubts.

Also,

UK land forces are likely to increase their contribution to UN humanitarian operations.

Really? I would not bet on it.

Experimentation should identify what level of combat and enabling capability (including the critical mass of force) represents the credibility threshold that has to be maintained, or surpassed, to provide the moral authority and ability to lead multinational forces in combat.

This is, i believe, an empty hope. No government will ever authorize a (serious) assessment of what is the minimum force level under which the UK should not go. Both because an honest assessment would probably conclude that we are already significantly under such minimum level in at least 2 services out of 3, and because once numbers and capabilities were recognized as indispensable, future cuts would become much harder to sell to the public.
And already writing certain statements and announcements and doctrinal documents filled of jargon and promises of "preserving capabilities", having the "capability to regenerate", "efficiency", "uncertainty", and all that must be really complex and awkward as it is.
70% of the documents by now are about lifting a smokescreen over the water, using always the same empty words.

There is then a list of capabilities to be prioritized:

In capability terms, dispersed sub-units may need to become more robust and resilient. Mobility support will be an essential capability and, in particular, they are likely to need organic, or attached, assault engineers able to operate in the urban terrain.

There will be a greater imperative for sub-units to have access to human intelligence assets and products in order to develop the situation in contact as a core competency.

The ability to operate and analyse organic surveillance and precision fires using small tactical armed unmanned air systems is likely to become a mainstream task for sub-units.

The land force must re-discover and re-invest in the art of manned reconnaissance, closely linking it to the confidence to exploit the situation, both in and out of contact. These forces need to be capable of operating against an enemy expert at reconnoitring.

We must seek structural and technological solutions which do not remove the strategic mobility and agility of light forces, nor detract from the tactical protected mobility of heavy forces.

There is an enduring requirement for logistic support regiments to plan and conduct deliberate logistic movement through contested battlespace.
These regiments must be resourced with an organic self-protection capability that includes suitable platforms, weapons and training.

The establishment of an information exchange group should be resourced as a priority, along with greater investment to develop scalable, flexible and mobile communication information systems architectures.
 
Lethal effects will increasingly have to be built around strategic communications and, in some cases, cyber.
 
The exploitation of the third dimension [air manoeuvre] will be critical to deliver rapid deployment, reach and flexibility in the future operating environment and will form a critical element of our high readiness contingency capability.

Although elements of the force can be held at lower readiness, it is important that the Army ‘trains as it fights’ and its Reserves are fully integrated.

The use of contractors for Logistics is welcome and possible, but contractors should take over in-base jobs and other supporting tasks at home or in the rear echelons. The "last mile" will still require military specialist regiments, and with organic force elements for escort and self protection.
Similarly, some of the work done by REME can be handed over to contractors, but battlefield support and recovery of damaged vehicles is still very much a work for the military.
Manned reconnaissance points to Brigade Recce Forces inside the brigades, too, quite unquestionably: keep it in mind when the Army structure is announced, and let's see if there's coherence with the doctrine and assumptions.


Now, on to the Business Plan. Highlights include:


Carrier Strike regeneration to be completed by December 2020

HMS Queen Elizabeth in service in December 2016

HMS Prince of Wales in service in December 2020 (depending on the choices of SDSR 2015)

Switch to the Short Take-Off and Vertical Landing (STOVL) variant of Joint Combat Aircraft (LIGHTNING II) to be complete by April 2023 (does it mean that all airplanes will have been ordered and delivered by that date?) 

IOC of the F35B for Land Based operations in March 2019 [it appears there has been a one-year delay] 

IOC of the F35B for Maritime Based operations in March 2021 [how does this fit into a Carrier Strike regeneration complete by December 2020...? If the plane is not ready, how can Carrier Strike be???]

Put in service the Merlin MK4 (fully navalized?) with the Commando Helicopter Force by January 2017

Merlin HM2 in service in September 2013

RN reserve expanded and restructured according to Future Reserves 2020 plan by December 2018

Achieve 4th Typhoon squadron [it will be 1st Squadron RAF] Initial Operating Capability (IOC) to accelerate Typhoon Force growth and increase multi-role capability by March 2013 [NOTE: increase multi-role capability means everything and nothing at the same time. Is integration of additional AG weaponry going ahead, or not?]

Achieve 5th Typhoon squadron [identity to be announced] Initial Operating Capability (IOC) to accelerate Typhoon Force growth and increase multi-role capability, to be completed by March 2015

Achieve Typhoon Force Full Operating Capability (FOC) in March 2018 [holy hell is it taking a long time. Will the FOC include capabilities such as Storm Shadow, Brimstone, Conformal Fuel Tank and AESA radar, the latter two only on Tranche 3 planes? We don't know]

Deliver the Army 2020 Study in June 2012 [Hammond say's he's absolutely confident they will deliver the announcement before Parliament's Summer Recess, we'll see]
Restructure deployable divisional headquarters, to be completed by April 2015

Restructure to deliver the new brigade structures identified by Army 2020, to be completed by April 2015



Deliver Warrior Capability Sustainment Programme (CSP), FOC by December 2020, first battlegroup should be ready in 2018

Take forward work to deliver a new range of medium weight armoured vehicles, to be concluded by December 2022 [This should be about FRES UV, but it is not clear]

Take forward work to replace unprotected support vehicles with protected ones, to be completed by December 2021 [Probably involves retaining UOR vehicles such as Husky, Coyote and Foxhound as well as hopefully introducing into service the adequate variants of the new Multi Role Vehicle - Protected]

Take forward work to deliver a range of Land Environment Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) capabilities, to be completed by January 2020 [FRES SV might be comprised under this very general voice]

Take forward work to deliver a range of capabilities to counter explosive ordinance and improvised explosive devices (IEDs), by January 2020 [retention of Talisman?] 


By December 2020 the Army is expected back from Germany.

By March 2014, the TriStar airplane will be retired from service. [term seem to have been extended, was to be 2013]

No mention of the C130K going out of service by year's end as originally expected. Indeed, the C130K is not mentioned at all; the remaining units (8) might have been given an indefinite retrieve, as anticipated also on this blog some time ago, due to delays with project HERMES (upgrade of the C130J to enable it to take over the Special Forces missions now covered by the K) and due to the airlift needs of the withdrawal from Afghanistan, which might also have a part in the delay to the TriStar retirement.

The reduction from 40 to 18 Force Elements at Readiness in the Tornado fleet will only be completed in March 2015, due to the need for constant deployments to Afghanistan.  

By March 2016 the MOD will be out of the Search and Rescue job and the SAR Sea Kings will be retired.


Interestingly, there is an ongoing review in the Force Generation rules, including Harmony Guidelines and Tour Lenght. Work is ongoing, and changes will be implemented by 2015, presumably due to the new force structure adopted. Are we going to see the end of the "rule of the five"?

There is also an interesting financial table: Typhoon is, once more, the most expensive in-year big project (and the most expensive of all in general): 0.74 billion expenditure in-year and an expected 18.2 billion whole-life cost over 30 years.
This compares to 0.59 and 5.7 for Astute, 0.17 and 5.7 for Type 45 and 0.60 and 5.1 for CVF.