News. And not very good ones.

Mid-June should finally bring answers.
And it will be about time, since with the often contraddictory rumors continuing to come out on the press, the future of the Army is by now as murky as it can be. A true mystery, with the reports coming out on the press so far calling in question the sanity of the Defence Chiefs and MoD and throwing a lot of question marks over to the "5 MRBs" plan. The rumors appear to go against the logic and promises of the homogeneous brigades concept, namely where they announce cuts to Cavalry (Formation Reconnaissance Regiments) and Tank regiments: with the brigades expected to have a recce regiment each and "tanks", there is theorically no room for any regiment disbanding from the RAC, as 5 Recce and 5 Tank regiments are needed, and that's the current number of formations as it is. 

Now the latest suggestion is that just 5 Infantry battalions will be lost, with the thick of the cuts being enforced on the Royal Engineers, Royal Artillery and, above all, the Royal Logistics Corps.
This second scenario might overall be the most desirable, depending on the effect it has on the Royal Engineers and Royal Artillery, mostly. I have very serious doubts on the viability of a plan that, presumably, gives the almost totality of AS90 guns over to Territorial Army formations, also considering that the TA currently does not work with the AS90 at all, but has the L118 Light Gun instead.
Again, i don't think that much can be cut from the Royal Engineers without the consequences being very serious and very undesirable. 
In October 2011, despite the second tranche of cuts having been announced in August, with the Army of 82.000 regulars being put as new target, the head of the Royal Engineers was still saying that the corp was planning for supporting 5 MRBs, 16AA and 3rd Commando, with the long-term retention of both General Support regiments as well. A very desirable outcome. The Telegraph article calls that in cause, however, suggesting that reality will be very, very different. And that would be a big problem.   

Cuts to the RLC are more realistically manageable with the use of reserves and contractors. In the latter case, it would be an expansion of a practice that already exists, anyway: one of the best examples is the Heavy Equipment Transporter (HET) truck management. The HET is made available to the MOD under a 20 years PFI contract signed in 2001 (with a 2.5 years "start up" period) with Fasttrax Ltd, which provides the vehicles, the training for regular army personnel (REME and others) involved in the HET business, the spare parts, and the drivers to the Army. 
The operators and maintainers employed by Fasttrax Ltd are all Sponsored Reserves (SR) that can be mobilised for up to nine months at a time and when 'called up' for an operational deployment, come under army command.  

The press reports curiously paint a situation in which the Army is faced by two extremes: 

- One reports a cut of 11 Infantry Battalions, 5 RAC regiments, and other heavy cuts in combat formations 

- The other talks of a loss of just 5 battalions of infantry and heavy cuts to supporting arms instead

One would hope that, in the middle, an "happy" medium is being built. The first scenario is probably way too harsh on the combat elements, but the second risks creating an army incapable to sustain the battles it picks. 
Surely there can be a more balanced mix of decisions in the restructuring? My position is very clear: i prefer to have 3 instead of 4 Infantry battalions in a brigade, but have the brigade adequately served by a regiment of Engineers and a regiment of Artillery, than have lots of infantry, unsupported. 


The suspect (and in a way the hope) is that the press is drinking from leaks that paint the picture of the two "worst case" scenarios considered in the restructuring project, with the Army probably trying to sit in the middle, to find a smarter solution.

The Army Reform is however, in any case, going to be painful, and it seems, from whichever angle you look at it, that it might well be daring too much. I am impatient to hear the announcement, to see how things are worked out. 



Victim of the book-balancing?
Until Planning Round 2011, the MoD has expended small amounts of money to follow and influence the US Navy work on CEC, Cooperative Engagement Capability, the well known force-multiplier system capable to dramatically enhance the effectiveness of air defence networks by enabling ships to cooperatively detect, track and engage targets.

The little money committed was meant to keep the soup warm, with the Royal Navy desperately trying to secure the adoption of the precious system for its ships. CEC was delayed countless times, with the Type 45 destroyers once expected to get it at build.
More recently, the plan was for the Type 45s to get CEC around 2014, with the Type 26 fitted at build in the 2020s. Now, according to a Jane's headline, CEC seems to have fallen victim to the book-balancing exercise just concluded at the MOD. If confirmed, it would be a nasty blow to the quest of the Royal Navy for improved situational awareness and better interoperability with the US.

The enhancement for a future RN with CEC-fitted Crowsnest AEW platforms, Type 45s and Type 26s ships would have been simply dramatic. If the CEC is not adopted, it makes for a very severe setback.

The worst part is that this is likely to be only the first victim to be named. More programs are likely to have been shelved or delayed to dates to be determined.


Naval Aviation: the training aspect of F35B and F35C
When the Sea Harrier fleet was around, pre-embarkation requirements were described as follows:

- First experience pilot, daytime embarkation
before going on the carrier he had to complete a minimum of 10 training sorties of which 5 from ski-jump/dummy deck for launch and recovery practice.

- For a pilot with previous experience 
the requirements were to fly the monthly minimum Sea Harrier flying hours with sorties from dummy deck “whenever possible”.

The Sea Harrier community was however notoriously small and elitary. All Sea Harrier pilots used to be at sea or on training very often, they were very much active, and went to sea in a constant rotation, so had plenty of practice since they were, basically, always the same ones rotating in and out of deployment. And they were committed full time to carrier skills.

It would be far more interesting to see later requirements for carrier currency when the Joint Force Harrier changed the way things are done and introduced a much greater "on land" time. 

For a comparison, good for some reflection, US Marines, who like RAF squadrons spend quite a lot of time on land, end up doing a lot more training with their Harriers before going at sea. Initial at-sea qualification for day ops, Cat-I weather conditions takes a minimum of 35 vertical landings according to a 2004 USMC manual for AV8B training. In 2008 the minimum was slightly lowered, to 30, but it is still amazingly high. That's more landing cycles than CATOBAR certification requires. 

A pilot of a USMC squadron needs a minimum of 8 vertical landings on a land based dummy deck before being deployed to the ship. Field Carrier Landing Practice is done on a schedule, and re-qualification training can be required after just 30 days.

For training with the F35B and for Field Carrier Landing Practice two land-based dummy LHA decks are being built at Yuma and another at the Eglin F35 Training center. The second is the most interesting since it will almost certainly be now used by british pilots training with the USMC at Eglin. According to the plans, 6 F35B will be based there with the USMC training squadron.  

The above requirements, in addition, relate to embarkation on the carrier at Cat I weather conditions, and in daylight. Then there’s the issue of weather (what about operations in Category II and III?) and night ops, which are more complex and clearly require more experience and training.
The problem of the "RAF goes on ships" approach has been in night and bad weather ops. Just landing their STOVL planes on the deck every now and then won't mean much if the pilots aren't cleared for actual war operations from the aircraft carrier, unless the UK is going to fight only in day hours and with excellent weather...

With the F35B we’ll also have to see what impact Shipborne Rolling Vertical Landing eventually has on the training requirements.
The SRVL might prove indispensable to enable operations since even at 5000 lbs, the best case value, the Vertical Bring Back margin of the F35B is way too small. With as much as 1700 lbs being fuel, 3300 pounds of unexpended ordnance aren't much.
It is worth remembering how SRVL was described during the tests: 

Using SRVL F-35B aircraft would approach the carrier from astern at about 60 knots indicated air speed, 35 knots relative assuming 25 knots wind over deck (the maximum speed of a CVF will be 25 knots, so 25kts WOD is achievable even in dead calm) on a steep 5-6 degree glide path. Touch down would be about 150 feet from the stern with a stopping distance of 300 to 400 feet depending on conditions (wet flight deck, pitching ships etc). That would leave around 300 feet of flight deck for margin or even “bolters”. 

The SRVL technique has a significant impact on ship designs and aviation operations, Commander Tony Ray told a conference in February 2008: “We expect to trade some STOVL flexibility for increased bring-back and fuel. We have to .. check for for relevant CV criteria that apply to slower SRVL operations. For example flightpath control will be a far more important flight criteria for SRVL than it has been for STOVL. It is a CV trait creeping in”.

In other words SRVL is a CATOBAR-style approach, just slower and without cables to catch. Its good features are:

- Much less stress on the engine and lift system, allowing it to live longer
- Much improved bring back weight margin

Problem is that SRVL is going to require skills and training. If it is not adopted, the F35B’s combat capabilities will be severely hampered and the life of its engine plant dramatically shortened, with all the costs this implies.
And in addition to the effect on training requirements, please note that 150 feet + 400 feet + plus deck free for bolters means that when a F35B lands with SRVL approach the WHOLE deck, from end to end, has to be clear and any other aviation operation on deck is likely to be stopped entirely, making SRVL effectively more invasive than even arrested CATOBAR landings are.

Of course, CATOBAR skills are expensive, and take training to be acquired and maintained: the point of discussion is the extent of the effective gap between CATOBAR and STOVL training needs.
A good reference document about the US CATOBAR certifications and currency requirements is the US Navy Landing Signal Officer's manual. 

The CATOBAR "training penalty" is here broken down in good detail. For the US pilots, Initial Carrier Qualification comes with 12 Day landings (10 of which arrested) and 8 Night landings (6 arrested). The first night flight should last a minimum of 20 minutes. Carrier Qualification is to be achieved during a period of no longer than 30 days.
After achieving currency, the pilot is ready for service, and needs to keep current by refreshing his qualification by, of course, operating from a carrier.

Depending on the time that passes since he's last been qualified, he has to carry on some training to renew his currency.
If 12 months or more pass from he's last been current, he has to face once more the whole 20 landings ICQ, while if he's last been current 60 days to 6 months earlier, the pilot needs facing a Field Landing Carrier Practice (in this video you can see French naval pilots doing their FLCP - needs a runway, one carrier landing lights aid system, the Landing Signal Officer and, for night FLCP with more than two airplanes in the air, one LSO assistant ), followed by 4 day landings (2 to 3 of them arrested) and 2 night landings. No longer than 5 days should pass between FLCP and the first landing on the aircraft carrier.

A whole table of the time periods and associated training needs is available in the manual in chapter 6.2.

It is to be seen how much of the training advantage of STOVL is real and how much of it is virtual, especially with the F35B.
And with SRVL the assumption “STOVL = better simultaneous helicopter and fast jet ops on deck” goes to hell immediately. 

Ultimately, to say that a RAF land-based squadron will just move out, land on the carrier and be ready to operate from it in conditions other than “light load, perfect weather”, just like that, is a full-out lie and is deliberately misleading. When you hear the gurus of the F35B telling you that is as easy and merry as that, know that you are being fed lies, with reality being, as always, a bit more complex and articulated.



What comes back from Afghanistan?
According to a Daily Mail article, up to 1200 out of around 1900 protected mobility vehicles will be handed over to Afghan security forces or anyway disposed off when the UK withdraws from Helmand.

The vehicles listed for return are Mastiffs, Ridgebacks and "a number" of Jackals (presumably the Jackal 2 will be returned, while the remaining Jackal 1s won't.) Foxhounds will also be all returned to the UK, but there's no telling how many since Foxhound is a bit late and still has not made it to afghanistan in the first place. The article says that "a small number" of Warthogs will be left behind, and this affirmation puzzles me. Some 115 Warthog have been acquired, and most of these are likely in Helmand, so what is the correct interpretation of "small number" is up for debate. Will all Warthogs be disposed off? Will damaged ones be left in situ and handed to the Afghans? Will the Army bring back only a share of its Warthogs, having chosen a niche role for them in the long term plans?
It would be a waste to get rid of the Warthog so soon and after all the money expended, especially since it has proven a good and effective vehicle which, i believe, could certainly find long term roles to fulfill.

No one will miss the Vector and Snatch Land Rovers instead: their age in the British Army is, thankfully, over.

We don't know if it works, and won't know for years

Words and music by the US GAO, in its latest report on the F35 superprogram.
Among the headlights:

IOC dates are yet to be determined. The USMC reportedly aims for an early IOC with interim capabilities in 2015, while USAF and US Navy are expected to put their IOC around 2018, more prudently chosing to fully develop their airplanes before trying to use them.

Full-Rate production will not start before 2018, more likely 2019.

Testing of a fully capable and integrated F35 (with Block 3F software) is likely to happen in 2015 at the earliest, with interim operational testing to follow in 2017. 

Already 373 million dollars are required in mods and fixes for the airplanes produced this far. And more will follow, with the DoD expecting airplanes up to production Lot 10 to need some kind of fixes and mods in the future, due to the number of fixes yet to be determined, tested, rolled out.

The last year in which development funding will have to be committed is expected to be 2016.

US Navy and US Marines will receive all of their planes by 2027, (C and B), while the USAF will get the last F35A in 2035. 

Despite enormous cuts in the number of airplanes to be delivered in the near term, Lochkeed Martin is delivering the F35s with an average delay of 1 year. Only 9, over a planned 30, production F35s were delivered in 2011.
Deliveries of the engines are just as late, so that the only good thing is that engines still meet planes. 


About the F35B, the report notes:

The Department concluded that STOVL development, test, and product maturity is now comparable to the other two variants. While several technical issues have been addressed and some potential solutions engineered, assessing whether the deficiencies are resolved is ongoing and, in some cases, will not be known for years. According to the program office, two of the five specific problems cited are considered to be fixed while the other three have temporary fixes in place.

The Director, Operational Test and Evaluation reported that significant work remains to verify and incorporate modifications to correct known STOVL deficiencies and prepare the system for operational use. Until the proposed technical solutions have been fully tested and demonstrated, it cannot be determined if the technical problems have been resolved.

Software needs have grown to over 24 million lines of code, of which 9.5 millions on board of the airplane itself, and there are delays in the development and release of software. Some capabilities have been pushed to the right, and only 4% of mission system requirements have been validated this far. 

Concurrency is a disaster. It was the worst possible decision to make, and the GAO bitterly notes:

[...] a recent high-level departmental review of JSF concurrency determined that the program is continuing to discover issues at a rate more typical of early design experience, questioning the assumed design maturity that supported the highly concurrent acquisition strategy.

The future of the UK's airpower, in particular at-sea airpower, is tied tightly to the destiny of an airplane, the F35B, that is and will be produced for several more years without real assurances that it works. 

Now, that's what you call a gamble.

The balanced books and the 10 years budget program - UPDATED

Philip Hammond has made his announcement about the MOD's finances. After the cuts, programme restructuring and changes and modifications and negotiations with the Treasury, the Ministry of Defence has announced that the next 10 years will see a committed equipment budget of 152 billion pounds, inclusive, for the first time ever, of a 4 billions centrally-held reserve.
In addition, there are 8 billions of money as yet unallocated, which will be available to respond to emerging equipment requirements.
This includes the promised 1% equipment budget uplift from 2015.

Given this financial horizon and certainty, the MOD is guaranteeing the delivery of a number of projects which will be funded and given the go ahead:

- The 14 new Chinooks (2 are replacement for Afghanistan losses)
- 4.5 billion pounds in new armoured vehicles (FRES SV, Foxhound, probably expenditure on vehicles brought from UOR to core and, hopefully, the kick-start, around 2016, of the process for a new FRES UV effort) [Note: this is not a novelty, and the armour budget situation has been clear since late 2011. See my earlier article "5.5 billions, 10 years and many programs" for an accurate breakdown of the situation]
- 1 billion pounds for the Warrior upgrade programme (in-service date by 2020 with IOC in 2018)
- Complete building of both CVF aircraft carriers in STOVL arrangement
- Complete the Type 45 acquisition program
- Complete the 7- boats Astute program
- The Type 26 program will go ahead
- Go ahead with the Successor Submarine program for replacing the Vanguard SSBNs from 2028
- Apache life-extension (probably to include Block III upgrades) 
- Puma upgrade confirmed (22 helicopters to enter service)
- Wildcat helicopters (the order should be adjusted to procure 28 Naval Wildcats, 8 Special Forces "Light Assault Helicopter" Wildcats and 30 Army reconnaissance Wildcats)
- Merlin HC3 mid-life upgrade and assesment phase for its navalization (only the assesment phase...? This might be specific to Planning Round 12, unless i'm missing something: the Merlin HC3 should replace the Sea King HC4 by 2016, so there is not that much time to lose. This year the assesment phase should be launched, and then rather swiftly advanced in order to meet the 2016 date)
- A400M Atlas (22 to be procured)
- Voyager confirmed as well (9 in service as core fleet + 5 on call)
- Rivet Joint purchase confirmed (3 airplanes, under AIRSEEKER program, as Nimrod R1 replacement) 
- The 8th C17 already announced
- An ungodly 7 billions for the Complex Weapons initiative (7 billions...??? I wish we had some more details, this seems way too high a budget for the initiatives launched and/or planned this far)  

In addition, 4 billion pounds are to be committed into ISTAR, communications and intelligence projects: the MOD announcement includes SOLOMON (ground ISTAR data dissemination and fusion), Cipher crypto security management infrastructure program, the Falcon joint tactical communications trunk equipment which is entering service in its latest variant with the Army and RAF, DCNS (Defence Core Network Services) and, very importantly, CROWSNEST is also specifically mentioned, meaning that, finally, funding for the AEW platform and solution for the Navy should be made available. The target is to replace the Sea King MK7, hopefully without a "capability holiday" in the middle (the MK7 is now expected to go in 2016, CROWSNEST might not deliver before 2020 or even 2022 unless things are now adjusted), especially considering that the only great thing of an helicopter-based AEW solution is that it does not need a big carrier to operate, but just a rather standard flight deck.
The Navy has already lost fixed wing capability until 2020, losing AEW as well would be terrible. And it would be a spit in the face of experience paid with the blood of who died in the Falklands, in no small part due to the lack of airborne early warning. 


A surprise is the announcement that the MOD will purchase the three River class patrol vessels of the Fishery protection squadron (HMS Tyne, HMS Severn and HMS Mersey). These ships have so far operated under a leasing renewed every 5 years, with VT responsible of logistics and mainteinance during each charter period, with the aim of providing a minimum of 275 days at sea per ship.
The arrangement, as far as i know, always worked well, but evidently spreadsheet Phil has determined that purchasing the vessels once and for all should cost less. However, there's no news of change for HMS Clyde, the Falklands patrol vessel which is a ship derived from the basic River design and is also leased, but from BAE.
So the whole idea leaves some real doubts in me. Can i say, honestly, that the purchase of an additional OPV, or indeed a long term solution to the problem of the Antarctic patrol vessel (repair Endurance, or scrap her? Purchase Protector at the end of the current lease? What to do?) would have been a better use of the money?
Unfortunately, no one in the House had enough knowledge of the subject to think about asking explanations on this particular announcement. "Buying ships" always sounds like a good thing, after all: however, in this particular case we should carefully consider if it really is necessary and cost-effective to do so. 

The MOD is wasting no words with their announcement, as the following point proves: capability enhancements for the Typhoon are confirmed.
Nice. But which enhancements? We are waiting to have news regarding the integration of Brimstone, Storm Shadow and perhaps Paveway III, and we know the RAF wants AESA radar and Conformal Fuel Tanks in the future, at least on the Tranche 3 Typhoons, but the announcement tells positively nothing of what is incoming, nor about when it will arrive.
I'll keep my eyes open to catch any hint of what is to come, and i'll update this article and list as soon as i find out something meaningful. 

More money is to go in simulators, logistics and basing upgrades connected to the new airplanes being put in service, from Voyager to F35, but this is frankly little news: it is an inevitable component of any major acquisition programme that gives you a new piece of kit to support.

Regarding Maritime Patrol Aircraft, any decision is delayed at least until SDSR 2015, but at least Hammond says that the re-generation of MPA capability will be on the list of options for the use of the 8 billion "headroom" in the budget.
Hopefully one billion or so can be allocated to the regeneration of this capability, which remains essential.

Hammond said:

"There will be additional commitments in the future from the 8 billion pounds, releases from unused contingency, the reserve in the core budget and from savings made by delegated budget holders." 

Budget holders, as part of the defence reform, should be the heads of the three services and, for C4I and ISTAR and other joint kit, the new Joint Forces Commander. This should give the services better control on their priorities and on the use of money. As part of the reform, budget planning should now be done in annual cycles, and not in planning rounds. 

Defence research funding to stay at 1.2%. Wouldn't have been bad to grow that figure a little, but at least there's no further reductions in sight.

Work on accommodations for the forces, which has been delayed to 2014, will not be brought forwards. 2014 is and will be.


There is no turning back on the 82.000 stong army, or on the manpower reductions to Navy and RAF, but at least there's the promise of no more cuts in addition to these reductions.
At least until the SDSR 2015, eventually carried out by a different government which might well decide to throw everything to hell anyway, obviously. But this is another story. 

Some battalions from the large regiments will vanish, this is definite. Regiments of infantry are all expected to stay, though. In Hammond's words:

“Some of the multi-battalion regiments will have to lose a battalion in order that we can take this number of troops out of the army.”

The Royal Regiment of Scotland, the Rifles, Yorkshire and Mercian regiments are those most likely to "contribute" to the manpower cutting, as they are the formations with the most battalions. The Guards have also been considered for cuts, but i continue to believe it is unlikely that this government will ever dare announcing the disbandment of the oldest regiment of the Army, the Coldstream Guards, and even less would they target the Scots Guards.
Cuts to RLC, Signals, Engineers, RAC and Royal Artillery will also be part of the sad story, with some of the cuts already announced and implemented. 
We still don't have the details, however, so it is prudent, and respectful, not to speculate too much on who might get the chop. These are times of uncertainty for people as passionate as me, but we can all imagine how much worse it must be for service personnel living in the uncertainty and with the worry of being made redundant.

Hammond, however, unsurprisingly rubbished recent press claims that announced he was about to order the British Army to abandon all regimental names by 2013 (it had been suggested, namely, that such a move would turn 3 Scots - The Black Watch into 3 Scots only, cutting the last vestiges of history out of the already mutilated army). I had read the reports on the press about this move, but never accepted it as possible. If you think about it, cancelling the historic names does not save a penny, while it buys hate in tons. Anyone suggesting such a move can be only one of the following things: a reporter short of actual stories, or a wannabe (political) suicide.  

Hammond's words in facts go:

“I know people feel very strongly about this issue and I understand why. The key thing is protecting the regimental structure.
“In some cases, cap badges of old traditional regiments that have long since gone have been attached to battalion names and I understand that there will be concerns about protecting those cap badge names if we have to take out battalions.
“We will look to do everything we can to protect them.”

Apparently, there is a current that pushes these words to rather ridiculous heights, suggesting that 3 Scots could become "Black Watch and Argyl and Sutherlands Highlanders" to preserve the identity of the 5 Scots battalion if it effectively goes.
We'll see what happens. 

The 10 Years budget is now being analysed by the National Audit Office, and once the NAO validates it, it will be published in Summary form. It won't, for obvious reasons, go too in deep with details, but hopefully it'll say enough to enable us to have a far clearer picture of the situation in our minds.

As for information, I have made it clear that once the National Audit Office has completed its review, we will publish its report and a summary-level equipment plan, with the same level of detail in it as has routinely been published about the defence budget. That may not be the level of detail that the hon. Gentleman would like, but it just is not possible, for security reasons and for commercial reasons, to publish a 10-year programme in minute detail without making the situation that the MOD faces impossible.

Hammond has however also said in Parliament that an updated announcement on basing, mainly for the Army, isn't likely to arrive before around year's end. The wait will still be long for some of the information we seek.

End of the black hole?

Defence Minister Philip Hammond revealed on Sunday that he has "balanced the MOD books", and eliminated the infamous budget black hole. He is expected to make a formal announcement in Parliament this week (will it be the release of Planning Round 2012, finally?), but has already anticipated that:

"In terms of reducing the size of the Civil Service, the Army and the Air Force, we shouldn't have to do any more over and above what we've already announced."

Which is a very relieving thing to hear, especially since the cuts already announced are huge and we have reached the point in which any additional reduction mutilates the UK's possibilities forever.
He also announced that there will now be a reserve of cash in each financial year at the MOD, to be used to immediately sort out unexpected cost growths and complications.

"For the first time in the defence budget we've got a reserve in each year, which means that if something comes up we'll be able to manage it," 

It is an absolutely welcome development, and we all hope that his words prove true, and that the age of constant, daily emergency is over, giving the armed forces the chance to more rationally plan and acquire kit for the future.

The full pain of the budget cutting and forces reduction is not yet revealed, due to the fact that an announcement on Army structures is still missing. This is expected to be a controverse and very painful announcement, with lots of bad news.
Among units certain to be hit, we have the Royal Gurkha Logistics Regiment and almost certainly the 5 Scots battalion, Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders. The 4 Scots, the Highlanders, is also reportedly at risk: it appeared that both would be cancelled, but lately it seems that, in place of 4 Scots, it will be the tank regiment Royal Scots Dragoon Guards the other unit to go.
Discussions have also been ongoing on the future of Guards units, mainly on the future of the Coldstream, the oldest regiment in the Army, but reportedly also on the Scots guards. David Cameron is said to be, however, (understandably) not very eager to cut the Guards in  the year of the Jubilee, and anyway not ready to face the backlash that would follow such an unpopular move.

Waiting for the next announcements, we can at least note with some relief that Hammond has admitted that the defence budget has been cut “as far as it is prudent to do so” (and indeed more, i'll add) and the budget will need to grow as promised.
In this sense, Hammond said he talked personally with George Osborne, and received assurances that the MOD will not be subject to further calls for savings. Despite the announcement that at least 2 more years of austerity will be needed, up to 2017, the Treasury has confirmed that the MOD will get the promised 1% growth in the Equipment budget, and the rest of the budget will stay, at least, flat in real terms, or maybe will even grow slightly.

Unfortunately, in the middle there's an Election, and an SDSR, so much could still change when a new government is formed.
However, if the MOD will be on balance by then, whoever will try to enforce further draconian cuts on defence will not have the "black hole" excuse anymore, and will have to directly shoulder all the blame. 

Another lie in the statement...?

Philip Hammond said, in his statement on carrier strike:

We have discussed this decision with the French Government and with the United States. The French confirm that they are satisfied with our commitment to jointly planned carrier operations to enhance European-NATO capability.

The United States, on whose support we would rely in regenerating either type of carrier capability, has been highly supportive throughout this review and I would like to record my personal thanks to the Secretary of Defense, the Pentagon, the Navy and the Marine Corps for their high level of engagement with us. I spoke to Secretary Panetta last night and he confirmed the US willingness to support our decision and its view that UK carrier strike availability and our commitment to the JSF programme are the key factors.

Someone should have warned the Foreign Ministry of France, from which spokesman mr Bernad Lavero said words that do not exactly tell me the same story:

“We’ve taken note of the United Kingdom’s decision to choose the F-35B vertical-takeoff fighter plane, to the detriment of the F-35C catapult takeoff plane. This decision may limit our cooperation in naval aviation, which we regret. We trust that this decision, which the British government says is based on budgetary constraints, will not call our cooperation in the naval aviation sector into question."  

I'm scratching my head in front of this, for not the first time since the statement was made. He does not sound like someone who is happy and satisfied and sure of what is going to be, does he...?
Now let's wait and see if we catch sign of the big happiness of the United States.
Perhaps the Marines will be happy: the change of heart of 2010 had badly irked them, but they will more or less welcome the return to the B because they can hope in a british order helping to keep F35B costs under some control.
The US Navy will probably be a lot less thrilled. 

Anyway, now let's all push together, hard, to make the F35B work. Because there won't be a third rethink: next time that shit hits the fan, naval aviation in the UK almost certainly dies. Better be aware of this. We would also love to hear from BAE what happened with the adaptability of CVF. Ships which are to live for more than 50 years, with little to no realistic chance of being converted at decent cost for CATOBAR ops...? This is the real ugly news. If STOVL fails, the whole thing fails. 


Unless the big pricetag and the "issues" are a gross exaggeration / a lie. 
And considering that barely days ago ministers said there were no techical complications with the conversion of CVF... well. You take your guess.  




With the words of Peter Luff, 30 April 2012:

The Ministry of Defence has not received any representations regarding technical difficulties associated with converting the operational Queen Elizabeth Aircraft carrier to a CATOBAR configuration.

We will scratch our heads for a long time over this, i bet.

Type 26: propulsion and mission bay

The by-now well known 2012 design for the Type 26 had caused debate on this blog already from the release of the first, very short, video, when we noticed the two large doors for boats on a side of the superstructure, an uncommon arrangement that immediately caught the eye.

The suspect, that appears to be confirmed, albeit not officially, is that the mission bay of the frigate has been relocated amidship, into the superstructure, in an arrangement adjacent to the helicopter hangar.
This is probably due to the reduction in sizes of the vessel, which started as a well over 6000 tons giant of roughly 150 meters and went down to 5500 tons and 141 meters.
The difference might not seem dramatic at first, but it is very significant, and it is likely to have made complex, if not impossible, to fit a meaningful mission bay in the hull, under the flight deck. The presence of the mission bay in a shorter hull was likely to affect the design and push the flight deck up, an undesirable development that can affect rough-weather helicopter operations.
One of the most interesting designs proposed in the Future Surface Combatant history, the FC65 frigate, which was to be capable of over 35 knots of speed among other things, had a mission deck 40 meters long and 12 wide, with stern ramp, but the ship was around 150 meters long and 6600 tons. It is clear that, if the ship goes smaller, solutions have to be different. 

So the Type 26 is now likely not to have a stern ramp for boats, but will instead probably fitted with the "grabber" arm used on the Type 45.

HMS Daring's "grabber" crane

The mission bay in the superstructure is not a new concept either. It appeared already during the endless effort for the Future Surface Combatant programme, and was an important part of the Thales C2 concept and of the F2020 frigate design they showed in 2006/07.
Online, not much material is left of that stage and design proposal, but thankfully, the excellent Navy Matters website comes to our aid, and thanks to Richard Beedall's hard work, we still have this very interesting graphic:

Image courtesy of Navy Matters - we miss you and your wonderful work, Navy Matters!

This modular mission bay space, adjacent to the helicopter hangar, goes probably very close to the concept behind the current Type 26 design shown by BAE.

We can only estimate sizes of the reconfigurable space, and try to guess its configuration. From the BAE videos, knowing that the current Type 26 lenght is 141 meters, i've tried making a few rough estimates.

The mission bay is likely to be a prosecution of the hangar, and could stretch over 26 meters in lenght past it, at least on the starboard side, where there's two boat doors. On Port side, the bay could be shorter, and stop at 14 meters or so past the hangar. The presence of the funnel means that the mission bay is not full width for all its lenght, but for probably around 14 meters or so past the end of the hangar.
The hangar has probably two storage/maintenance areas to its sides, which can be considered part of the mission bay. I've drawn a quick sketch schematics to depict the (possible) general outline of this important part of the vessel.

Quick and awful sketch showing the possible general outline and arrangement of spaces in the hangar / mission bay

Regarding the propulsion, barring dramatic changes that for now are not on the horizon, the CODLOG configuration seems by now the chosen path, with 4 High Speed Diesel engines connected to two electric motors driving the 2 shafts while cruising at up to 18 knots speed, with a single gas turbine in direct drive, used for sprints of speed over 26 knots.
I had been earlier wondering what gas turbine would eventually be fitted: WR-21 like on the Type 45, or MT30 like on CVF, LCS and Zumwalth DDG-1000?

According to Warship Technology, the answer is probably MT30: Rolls Royce is working on its top-class gas turbine to design a "compact" variant, which is seen as a leading contender for the propulsion of Type 26, in addition to being a Rolls Royce instrument for gaining an even greater foothold on the international market, beating General Electrics competition. The MT30 compact, in fact, is smaller (although over 30 tons in weight) and fits in the same spaces of the GE LM2500 turbine which powers ships such as the FREMM frigates: a clear attempt of Rolls Royce to further erode GE's market share.

MT30 package, mechanical drive configuration. - Rolls Royce

The MT30 produces 36 MW of power at 38° C and 40 MW at 15° C, while being also able to maintain efficiency even when reducing the output at 25.5 MW.
In its current form, it comes in a package weighting 27.8 tons, 8.56 meters long, 3.540 meters wide and 3.32 meters high.
The LM2500 is a bit smaller (22.7 tons, 2 meters width, 2.4 meters height) but only arrives to 35.3 MW in its latest version, and the MT30 is just at the start of its growth.

Rolls Royce aims for export successes by qualifying the MT30 Compact to civilian standards so to avoid export regulations, particularly US ones. Japan and the US themselves, for the Arleigh Burke destroyers of the future Flight III and eventual future batches, are seen as possible customers.

The Type 26 could get a propulsion package with MTU high speed diesels and the Rolls Royce gas turbine, offering excellent performances and some commonality with the CVF's own propulsion plant.

Pray that it works, and wait for 2015

So, with a statement that openly contradicts the official declarations of the US Navy and of the UK government itself, which barely days ago said in Parliament that there was no reported problem with the conversion of the Queen Elizabeth class carriers for the use of EMALS, now we are told that:

Because Britain’s carriers will have all electric propulsion, and therefore do not generate steam like nuclear powered vessels, the catapult system would need to be the innovative Electromagnetic version (EMALS), being developed for the US Navy. Fitting this new system to a UK carrier has presented greater design challenges than were anticipated.

Either you were lying a week ago, or you are lying now. Somehow i think it's the second. 

Anyway, the statement also says that:

Secondly, and partly as a result of the delayed timetable, the estimated cost of fitting this equipment to the Prince of Wales has more than doubled in the last 17 months, rising from an estimated £950M to around £2Bn, with no guarantee that it will not rise further.

Again, i just cannot believe it. But i suspect that, just like a promised but never published NAO report into the economic factors of keeping Harrier over Tornado, we will never be told the truth nor we will ever hear them justify this absurd figure.
There won't be a NAO investigation on this particular claim, want to bet with me?

Another lie is a few lines down the statement:

Thirdly, at the time of the SDSR, there was judged to be a very significant technical risk around the STOVL version of JSF and some commentators were speculating that it could even be cancelled. Indeed, the STOVL programme was subsequently placed on probation by the Pentagon However, over the last year, the STOVL programme has made excellent progress and in the last few months has been removed from probation. The aircraft has completed over 900 hours of flying, including flights from the USS Wasp and the US Marine Corp has a high degree of confidence in the in-service date for the aircraft.

While the USMC aims for a 2015 IOC, the reality is that production F35B are restricted from doing what they are meant to, going STOVL, as a clutch overheating problem preventing the engagement of STOVL mode in hot weather is still without a solution. 
Additionally, the USMC will declare IOC with the software Block 2 and Block 3I, which are to include basic weapon release capability [it is very likely that none of the british weapons will be cleared in Block 2 and 3I], but be otherwise largely incomplete and in need for upgrade ASAP.
The USAF and US Navy are willing to wait until 2018, in order to declare IOC with the Block 3F software.
The UK can aim for IOC whenever it wants, provided that it pays for it: early IOC means placing orders early, getting early production planes, paying more for them, and then paying more money to retrofit them with the missing pieces.
And oh, we should anticipate integration of ASRAAM and Paveway IV, too, which is planned for Block 3F, otherwise the F35B entering service "early" with the RAF will only be able to use AMRAAM, since the other weapons which will be cleared (JDAM and GBU-12) are not in UK use.

But we are used to this practice, aren't we? The last Typhoon Tranche 1 of the RAF went to Warton this month to begin its R2 retrofit which will bring it to Block 5 standard.
Years after the plane entered service and dragged on with mutilated capabilities that have arguably badly affected the Typhoon's export potential as well.

The early in service date is a lie. It entirely depends on force buildup, and it is not at all as dependent on the US's own IOC as they want to have us believe.
At most, it is in theory possible to achieve earlier at-sea IOC since Queen Elizabeth is (expected to be) compatible with STOVL ops, so that air operations at sea could begin in 2018 instead of 2020. There's no certainty that this will be possible, however, especially since the airplanes and crews available in 2018 are likely to be very few unless orders are speeded up, and it is, to say the least, unlikely.
It will also depend on decisions yet to be taken. So far, Queen Elizabeth was planned to go in mothball in 2018/19 as Prince of Wales comes online. This is likely to change in SDSR 2015, or indeed much earlier than that.
Prince of Wales might enter service, or go from shipyard to mothball immediately, without making a day of service.
It's all to be seen still.

If Hammond is not lying and the UK gets its first production F35B in 2016, the order will be placed no later than 2014, with long-lead contracts signed next year. That would mean LRIP 8 and, barring further delays, Block 3F software. In the case, it would work well. All would depend, at that point, on the number of airplanes ordered.

This simplified graphic is the result of my research into the often confusing blurry of documents available on the F35. It should be up to date, but changes are always possible. Block 3F software should start being available with LRIP 8, and will be used for the first full-rate production orders, before Block IV is developed and rolled out. It was originally planned that Block IV would include Storm Shadow and Brimstone for the UK, but the requirement was cancelled as saving measure, and at the moment there's not a plan anymore. The general rule is that the airplanes are delivered two years after the firm order is placed, with Long Lead orders placed at least a further year earlier.

A now outdated but always interesting production plan for the F35. We can guess a revised schedule with the UK ordering 0 airplanes in 2013 (but placing long lead orders for them), with firm order for 7(?) F35B in 2014, plus others in the following years. The airplanes available in 2018 for obtaining the mythical early IOC will have to be ordered between 2014 and 2016. It'll likely be 2019 at the earlier before a squadron of F35 gains full strenght in the UK.

Next in line, ladies and gentlemen:

The balance of risk has changed and there is now judged to be no greater risk in STOVL than in other variants of JSF.

The highlighted affirmation are patently, utterly untrue. It clashes with reality and with any and every document and statement you'll ever get from the US DoD.
As always, the US DoD real words are: 

[...] significant work and flight tests remain to verify and incorporate modifications to STOVL aircraft required to correct known STOVL deficiencies and prepare the system for operational use.

By the end of November 2011, overall test point progress against planned
baseline productivity was slightly behind (9 percent).    [F35A 11% behind schedule, F35C is 32% ahead of schedule]

The endless list of unresolved issues and risks tied to the F35B completes the picture. 

Then, the next pill of awesome:

So, I can announce today that the National Security Council has agreed not to proceed with the “cats and traps” conversion, but to complete both carriers in STOVL configuration. This will give us the ability to use both carriers to provide continuous carrier availability - at a net additional operating cost averaging about £60M per year. As we set out in the SDSR, a final decision on the use of the second carrier will be taken as part of SDSR 2015.

So, hold on tight: both carriers will be capable to work with the fixed wing jets to be bought, but we could still only get one.
The only interesting / reassuring bit of info is the 60 million average annual cost for running a carrier. Adjusted for inflation, i think it matches the 2003 value of 44 millions per year, so the ship's running cost is stable and - relatively - low. An Albion class LPD costs between 20 and 30 millions a year, a Bay costs 12 million a year.
A CVF at 60 millions is more than fair.


Lies aside, the lesson of the day is: pray that the F35B works. And wait for 2015.