December 20; News

US Congress approves the 2012 budget for Defense

The budget includes authorization and funding for the F35 LRIP Batch 6, which will buy 18 F35A, 7 F35C and 6 F35B. The bill removed a single F35A from the planned figure (- 151 USD million) and allocated 100 millions to additional development and test activity to troubleshoot the problems with the plane.

The bill is important for the UK as it includes authorization for the US Marines to swap an F35C for the BK3, the third of the 3 test F35B being built for the UK. It is so confirmed that the UK will get a first F35C as part of the test fleet.

Despite fears of massive cuts, the Budget is full of good news, overall, including the restoring of the 30 years shipbuilidng plan, funding for the JLTV (Hummer replacement), a 255 million order for 42 additional Abrams M1A2 tanks (the factory risked being closed if orders were not placed). Of course, there were adjustements, included halving (from over 800 to around 400 millions) the budget for in-year activities on the Ground Combat Vehicle.

Of course, the real battle is Budget 2013, but the fight is already on, and the Pentagon enjoys far greater support in Congress than the MOD in the UK's parliament.

End of the Japan dream

As i've been saying all along, Europe could not hope to beat the US in a tender for the Japanese armed forces. Japan announded that they will procure 42 F35As to replace their old F4s, as they regard the stealthness and long fighting range of the type essential for their needs of self-defence in the asian theatre. The Typhoon was considered the most likely alternative, with the Boeing F18 Super Hornet international as third runner. The first F35 for Japan will be delivered in 2016, LM promised. This is before the expected IOC of the type, and in the middle of development for the F35: Japan is taking a real risk here, and in fact the decision to go JSF was reportedly controversial and far from accepted by everyone.

They also wanted two engines, but they sacrificed that requirement when it became clear that the F22 was a real no-no.

The last F22 has been recently delivered to the USAF, and production is over. In service, the type continues to struggle with low availability, unresolved problems of connectivity and electronics obsolescence that will require massive investment and, even worse, serious and not yet clear issues with the onboard oxygen system, that has caused the loss of one plane and one pilot, grounded the whole fleet for a while, and caused a limitation in the flying envelope and altitude that the fighter is allowed to reach. The cause of the problem is still unclear.

End of the Oman dream too?

Oman announced a 600 million dollarsorder for 12 F16, 10 single-seat and 2 twin-seat trainers. Literally weeks before, BAE had announced to stakeholders that an order from Oman for the Typhoon is (was?) expected in early 2012. It is the same order that the MOD has been expecting like a blessing from the sky ever since 2008, when it was booked in as a 500 million pounds revenue, well before the contract was actually signed.

Oman negotiated the acquisition of 24 Typhoons, but ever since August there's been suggestions that Oman would buy both F16s and Typhoons.

A Typhoon deal should still come in the first quarter of 2012, but it will likely be for just 12 fighters.

Despite export win, still lots of problems to solve for the F35

There are pretty serious issues with the whole family, reported in a damning report come out recently. The most worrisome developments are the worse than expected latency troubles with the advanced Helmet Mounted Display, which is currently incapable to show full night vision, has symbology problems, and a much longer latency time than expected. Night flying at the moment is done with NVG googles, and development will continue using an alternative HMD, from BAE system, which has been contracted to supply a modified Striker system. The Striker is well known in the RAF, being the HMD used on the Typhoon.

The F35 HMD is however far more important, and expected to give 360° view and targeting capability to the pilot, day and night, even across the fuselage. Its succesful development is fundamental, but at the moment problems remain.

There are issues with the coating of the rear control surfaces, which will have to be modified, since after the F35 reached its max speed of Mach 1.6 with afterburner, its rear surfaces's paint bubbled, cooked, and fell off. The planes have since been limited to Mach 1, with afterburner to be used for no more than 2 minutes in a row.

Again, the under-fuselage fuel dumping valve is a nightmare as the fuel, once released, does not flow away clear of the moving control surfaces, with a risk of it catching fire over the surfaces heated by attrite. The problem is said to be particularly bad on the B variant, which is full of doors, panels and additional moving parts.

There are issues also with the stability of the plane in maneuvers, already with attack angles of just 20°, and these will have to be solved as well. The report also highlights worries about the fact that the current LRIPs planes are being acquired without the tests on airframe life having been completed, with the C variant practically untested at all in this sense.

The F35A, and especially the F35B, have revealed during testing that some components have developed cracks much, much earlier than planned, with some of them already replaced in LRIP5 and other improvements coming along in LRIP6.

The F35C has a problem of its own: it does fine with catapults, having launched many times from steam C13 cats and now from the EMALS as well, but it has issues catching the arresting wire due to an unhappy design of the arresting hook. Of all the embarked planes of the US Navy, besides, including even the X47B drone, the F35C is the plane that has, by far, the shortest distance between the undercarriage wheels and the arresting hook, at just over 7 feet. This makes it hard to land properly on the deck and catch the wires, and is of course a major issue that needs a solution. The report notes that, in the case that modyfing the arresting hook proves not enough, a quite major redesign will be necessary, to move back as far as possible the hook.

The report goes so far to suggest that production of the F35 should be suspended and be subject to demonstration that all problems are solved. In a way, this makes perfect sense, but in another, it would be disasterous, further slowing down development and troubleshooting, and pushing up the aircraft cost.

The Pentagon, in fact, seems to have no intention at all to follow the suggestion: LRIP6 has been contracted, and the Budget 2012 contains authorization to proceed with definition of all the next planned lots of production.

Updates on the ACA website, progresses on Queen Elizabeth

The Aircraft Carrier Alliance website has been updated, removing (finally!) all STOVL-related images and adding with new photos and videos, showing the sponsons being added with the help of the Goliath crane onto the already massive LB03 superblock. Of particular relevance is however a new video showing the next steps in the building of HMS Queen Elizabeth, complete with expected dates of the various phases.

Notably:

- 10 February 2012: the last sponson on LB03 should go in place 
- 22 June 2012 LB03 is undocked to move in the LB02 and LB01 blocks that will compose the bow 
- 09 November 2012 the first gas turbine is installed 
- 05 March 2013 first island installed
Assembly will be complete by 30 October 2013, and probably soon after that the ship will exit the dock, and parts of HMS Prince of Wales will start coming in. QE will probably face a further 2 years of fitting out, prior to contractor sea trials in 2015 and delivery to the Navy for service trials in 2016. 
The Build Updates of November is also good to get an idea of all the latest progress. 



The 8000 tons of LB03 enter the assembly dock, No1, in Rosyth, in September






SP04 is lifted up to be added onto LB03. The super block already has been fitted with the four units composing CB03: the roof of the hangar and the galley deck. CB03a to CB03d were built at A&P Tyne and delivered 5 weeks ahead of schedule. 








The 2 recent images above show, from different points of view, the evident progress made since LB03 arrived. Now the hangar is enclosed and covered, and the sponsons are going in place, giving the carrier its full flight-deck width of 74 meters.

  

Next to reach Rosyth will be the LB05 block (aft area of the vessel) and LB02 super block, a 6000 tonnes monster making up the front of the vessel. The bulbous bow (LB01) is already stored in Rosyth. 

LB02 and LB01 will be put into dock and assembled together from June or July 2012, after LB03, completed, will be temporarily pulled out of dock to allow them to enter. 

The video quoted above will explain the complex process better than any word, and the map of the many "LBs" involved is available here. An indispensable map if you want to know exactly what is going on! 

 

Future Fast Landing Craft and Force Protection Craft

The Royal Marines are hard at work to trial the prototypes of what should become, sometime in the future, the LCU MK11 and Force Protection Craft, MK6. The testing of the PACSCAT is complete, with the craft handling all its task magnificently, including delivery on the beach of the huge, heavy Hippo BARV and Challenger II MBT. With a Chally on board, the PACSCAT registered a speed of 19 knots, more than twice the maximum speed of the LCU MK10. Empty, the PACSCAT went close to 40 knots. It also delivered with no problems a load of 5 Viking vehicles. Alternatively, it can carry 4 HX60 4x4 trucks.

For the Force Protection Craft, which will also partially replace the LCVP MK5, the requirement is for some 12 units, with deliveries from 2016. Currently, the RM are testing borrowed CB90 combat boats from Sweden, which have already been deployed from current LCVP MK5 davits, proving the concept valid. The CB90s were given to the RM by their swedish counterparts, which have received a few Offshore Raiding Crafts from the UK in exchange.

Cross order possible? It would make everyone happy, i suspect. Navy News announced a reportage into the CB90 testing for their January's edition, so keep your eyes open, it should make for very interesting reading!

Trident II Life Extension Programme

2011 has been an important year for Trident, with many contracts placed by the US. The UK collaborates to the expense and work. The Trident LEP aims to keep the missile in service until at least 2042, and involves, mainly, a 1.2 billion dollars contract of the Pentagon with Lochkeed Martin. The programme will replace a number of components on the missiles, from rocket motors to the MK6 guidance system, which is being replaced by the MK6 LE. 108 new missiles are to be produced to replace the oldest ones and keep up the level of the stock.

Northrop Grumman is also involved in contracts for maintenance and future proofing, and BAE has received a 58.3 million dollars contract for integration work for the Trident Strategic Weapon System into the Advanced Missile Launcher, part of the Common Missile Compartment being jointly developed for the US and UK replacement SSBNs. The contract also includes mention of integration work of the Ohio SSGN combat system, which seems to confirm that the CMC will come with the possibility of fitting the new launch tubes with large, multiple-rounds Tomahawk canisters. The US will probably be able to afford using part of its SSBNs as SSGN while keeping up a constant at sea deterrence. The UK, with 3 or maximum 4 boats, is reportedly considering using the future SSBNs as a dual-role “SSGBN”, so to speak, maintaining CASD while covering conventional roles as well, mainly as SSN(T), by carrying large numbers of TLAM missiles. 

Renouncing to CASD policy is also a possibility being studied in the Trident value for money review, along with adoption of a cruise missile-based system.  

France efforts into satellites continues, ESA and EDA collaborate

Faithful to White Paper 2008, France continues to invest in satellites. The latest programme, ELISA, aims to deploy a constellation of 4 SIGINT/ESM satellites for signals intelligence. 

In the meanwhile, the European State Agency and the European Defence Agency have announced a collaborative project for the testing of Unmanned Air Systems flying under satellite control in nonsegregate airspace.  

Still waiting for announcements

700 top-brass, officers of high rank, could be part of the next round ofredundancies, it has been announced. But it has also been suggested, in a far more painful report, that the MOD Police could be literally halved, with up to 1500 jobs to be lost.

In the meanwhile, the Territorial Army could change name for the first time since its creation in 1908, reflecting the expansion in roles expected for the reserves.

Effectively, however, it appears that Halmond will keep us waiting for 2012 before any announcement comes out. To the Parliamentary Defence Committee, he said that he expects to make the announcemens before the clock is pushed forwards. That should mean before 25 march 2012 then, or at least within the 1^st quarter. 

40 million pounds for Future Combat Air System research

The MOD is investing 40 million pounds in a four years research and development activity targeted at shaping the future UAVs and UCAVs. It is to inform the MOD's unmanned air system strategy over the coming decades to ensure that the best use is made of these new technologies, and keep the aerospace industry of the UK in motion. 

It is not clear what the research will try to demonstrate, but the Taranis stealth UCAV, a demonstrative, Hawk-sized drone unveiled last year will probably be part of the programme, and finally make its first flight, which was expected this year, originally. 

The programme will be important to help shape the requirements and doctrine for the incoming Telemos drone, to be developed jointly with France, and for a first UCAV, which the two countries hope to put in service by 2030.

A 3 million bill for putting women on submarines  

The expense will cover modifications to the boats (first of all, the SSBNs of the Vanguard class) to have separate accommodation for female personnel, plus an emergency air supply system for any female crewmember found to be pregnant on the submarines, whose voyages last for months.

Answering questions in the Commons, Mr Hammond said the first female officers will begin serving on Vanguard class SSBNs from late 2013 and then joined by women ratings in 2015. From around 2016, female personnel will serve on the SSNs of the Astute class as well.

Blackmailing the UK on the Falklands

After Brazil denied its ports to HMS Clyde and to RN ships bound for the Falklands, now Uruguay also adds its voice, closing its ports to all ships flagged in the Falklands islands. The UK has immediately asked for explanations, and Spain is also concerned, since most ships beating the Falklands's flag are actually owned by iberian companies.

The position of Uruguay is that the “Malvinas are the last example of colonization in South America”, so they decided to follow the suggestion, agreed on at the UNASUR conference, to close the ports to ships flagged in the Falklands. 

It is of course bad news for the Falkland Islands fishing companies, but they note, not without reason, that the move could hurt Uruguay more than it hurts the Falklands. It also appears that the vessels of the Falklands could still sail in if sporting the british merchant navy red insign.

In the meanwhile, Rockhopper has determined that the Sea Lion oil field is bigger than expected (and it is already the second time that the amount of recoverable oil proves greater than expected) and found oil at another two drilling sites. Gas was also found. 

Sea Lion is now prospected at 430 million barrels. 

There are still concerns about the cost of drilling oil and gas out of the area, but if the finds continue, the Falklands reserves will prove more and more attractive.  

5.5 billions, 10 years, many programmes

We are still waiting for a lot of things that were supposed to happen and come but are all late (10-years Equipment Programme, White Paper on industrial strategy - this might arrive next week, it has been suggested -, Type 26 Capabilities Decision Point, announcement on the start of actual work for the Telemos with France - again expected in the next week now - and others), but it seems we have a first item of data:

From now to 2021, following cuts, delays, wasting, fidgeting, battling and messing, the Army has a 5.5 billions budget allocation for armoured vehicles procurement. Almost certainly, 4.5, as 1 billion is committed to the Warrior CSP (first deliveries in 2018, ISD 2020). Which become as few as 3160 millions or so if we consider that the NAO Major Reports 2011 indicates a budget allocation of 1394 million pounds (ceiling put at 1433) for the demonstration and manufacture of the FRES SV RECCE Block 1 programme, of which we don't yet posses any firm indication in terms of numbers to be procured. Nor is it clear what the 1394 million would exactly cover: the report (the figures appear in the Volume II document, containing the project summary sheets) seems to suggest that this might only cover demonstration and manufacture of prototypes and development vehicles. Hard to think that this could be the case, as it is an ungodly amount, and a frankly unaffordable one. One has to hope that the 1394 millions include manufacture costs for the vehicles, despite being listed under "demonstration" in one of the tables.

Of some relief is noticing that the "demonstration and manufacture" voice of expense, used in the project summary of other main items of equipment in the same document (for example, the Astute submarines 1 - 3) clearly include cost of production (again, in the case of Astute 1 - 3, the report in fact lists the 3480 millions figure, which definitely includes costs of acquisition).

In addition, we have all heard the 500 millions figure used for the contract for development and demonstration of FRES SV (which is already quite a big sum). From the words used at the time of contract signature, the 500 millions specifically cover development and demonstration phase all the way to 2013, and, if no cost overruns occurs, that should be it, as after that it'll be a matter of hitting Main Gate, placing the order, and start producing. That could leave around 894 millions for acquisition of the Block 1 vehicles. As of 31 March 2011, the NAO reported that expenditure to date was 188 million pounds, 118 for the Demonstration phase, expended in 2011, and 70 for the Assessment Phase, which were spent in previous years.

According to the NAO, FRES SV is currently planned to enter service in 2017, following a 9-months delay to ISD target decided in Planning Round 2011. The demonstration phase is doing well, at least, and is 5 months ahead of schedule.

The report, unfortunately, is far from clear in other areas: for example, it seems that RECCE Block 2 and Block 3 were unified in a single RECCE Block 2 main title, separated into Block 2A and 2B.

What the advantage is, only the sky knows!

In any case, assuming that we have 3160 millions left, as we said, we would have to cover, mainly:

- RECCE Block 2 and 3 (2a and 2b now?)

- FRES UV (specifically mentioned in the SDSR, it appears that the Army plans to take a decision on it in 2018 or even 2016, with the aim of getting it in service by 2022)

- Multi-Role Vehicle Protected (ex Operational  Utility Vehicle System, which was killed in Planning Round 11)

- Challenger II CSP – From NAO written evidence, it would appear that a CSP Chally won’t be in service anytime before 2023. The programme has officially been descoped. Options will be discussed again as part of PR12, but Government written answers have already made clear that they don’t expect assessment phase before around 2015/2016 at the earliest.

- Retention of Afghan UOR vehicles to complement existing capability / fill some requirements without buying new vehicles / provide an interim solution in some fields.

Starting from the last two voices of the list: retention of UORs is an important factor for the Army. It is expected that Jackal will be brought into core budget, used to replace as many Land Rovers as possible, but probably also used to equip one of 3 Squadrons into the Brigade Recce Regiments (2 Sqns will be based on FRES SV Scout, one on a wheeled platform described as more open, light, mobile, and more adequate to interact with the local population. It is a description that very much points towards Jackal).

The NAO major project report, under the OUVS/Multi-Role Vehicle Protected title, contains indication that the MOD plans to continue using the UOR-procured Tactical Support Vehicles, which include Wolfhound, Husky, Coyote and Springer. So, some or all of these should be brought into the core budget, and this will mean that the MOD will have to make provision for funding their support and related training.

Foxhound is not a UOR, and the first batch of 200, while procured in UOR-style, is already destined to core. More Foxhound vehicles, unless the Afghan experience was to prove them disappointing, will come, probably as part of  Multi-Role Vehicle Protected. The cargo-bed Utility variant of Foxhound could certainly supplement and then replace the Husky in the longer term, and perhaps even the Coyote. But replacing the Coyote only makes real sense if the Foxhound fire-support variant replaces Jackal as well: until the Jackal remains in service, the Coyote, due to the extremely high level of commonality, is the best choice of vehicle to support it on ops.

The Multi-Role Vehicle Protected might have a lot to do with Foxhound, but it will also have to include different kind of platforms (as it is to replace Pinzgauers as well), possibly less protected, and inevitably less expensive: Foxhound costs a lot, far too much for the MOD to be able to cover the whole MRVP requirement with it.

Wolfhound and Mastiff 2/3 make another great couple that could be taken into core, with Mastiff representing a good interim solution to equip the 5 expected Mechanized Infantry Battalions within the MRBs. However, they are both huge vehicles, and the British Army must consider this, and the issues that it causes in terms of road mobility in the UK.

Even more relevantly, the Army is clear that Mastiff cannot meet the target set for the FRES UV. It is helpful in this sense to read what Lieutenant-General Coward, Chief of Materiel (Land), told the House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts:

Chair: […] Can I take you to paragraph 4.5 on page 28, where there is a discussion about Mastiff? The end of that paragraph states: "The Department has stated that ‘…a vehicle such as Mastiff, does not come close to meeting the Future Rapid Effect System requirement,’ which is designed to operate across all". Is that true?

Lieutenant-General Coward: Yes, I agree.

Q95 Chair: If that is true, is there money in the budget to ensure that you would do the necessary changes? Is the money there?

Lieutenant-General Coward: I do not think you could convert Mastiff sufficiently to make it deliver to within about 80% or 85% of the utility vehicle requirement.

Q96 Chair: So we are going to dump it, are we?

Lieutenant-General Coward: No. My own view is that we should retain, pro tem, the Mastiffs, and adapt them to a small extent. We don’t have very much money. There is a limit to what you can use them for, but they will provide protected mobility-not manoeuvre, which is what the Army desperately wishes to have, but we will make do with them.

Q97 Chair: What won’t it do? Just explain to a little layperson like me, who doesn’t really get these things, what it won’t do.

Lieutenant-General Coward: With the utility vehicle or with MRAV [Boxer], we were seeking to be able to manoeuvre across country and in all terrains with a full vehicle load. Mastiff, even in version 3, doesn’t have that level of mobility. It is also not a properly integrated platform.

There is not, at the moment, an allocated budget or a firm decision on retaining Mastiff and bring it into Core, as the hearing makes clear in the following questions: the MOD has left the choice to the Army, giving them indications of what money is available for covering armour requirements. The Army itself will have to find a way around the money, and make the choices, but it would appear that the Mastiff option is quite likely to be taken.

Warthog might also be considered for use, due to its excellent performances in Afghanistan, but it is possibly the hardest vehicle to collocate in the post-Afghanistan army. What would be its role? In which units? Who would man it?

No matter how good it is as a vehicle, there will have to be a very convincing plan in place before some of the (very scarce) money is given to it.

My own suggestion is that Warthog could be retained in the Army to equip 5 “Protected Mobility Squadrons”, one in each of the Challenger 2 regiments, as replacement for the current, Scimitar-equipped, Interim Medium Armour Squadrons, as mitigation for the reduction in the number of tanks, and to continue to provide the under-armour mobility service they provide, with RAC crews, in Afghanistan every day.

The Warthog squadron could also assume the role of Regimental Recce Platoon as well, solving another problem: the lack of FRES Scout vehicles, which won’t enough to equip the BRRs and also all the recce platoons in armour regiments and armored infantry battalions. Thanks to its incredible mobility, the Warthog is, under certain points of view, more suited than FRES Scout itself to the recce mission. Fitted with a RWS with a powerful thermal imaging sensor, it would be an excellent, low-cost solution.

In addition, thanks to its capacity to carry infantry, the Warthog would be readily available to work, Afghan-style, in any tomorrow’s operation to provide protection and battlefield mobility to Light Role Infantry.

This would be coherent with the MOD’s own assessment of the current operational reality:

But one of the other things that we have learned during the operations in Iraq and Afghanistan is that we can no longer put our soldiers-that’s the infantrymen-in unprotected vehicles. We never had a programme for that9, so across the piece we have to look at protection for everybody, from the light infantrymen all the way through to the Mechanised Brigade. We are doing the work at the moment to see whether the urgent operational requirements that we procured are worth bringing into core, because the cost of supporting some of them may be extortionate.

Vice-Admiral Lambert, Deputy Chief of Defence Staff (Capability)

The Challenger II CSP has been moved to the right year after year, and it is to be considered again "around the middle of the decade". Unless a shocking decision comes and Challengers are withdrawn, a CSP will have to happen. It will be, of course, much less ambitious than once imagined and probably there will never be the adoption of the NATO smoothbore gun and related ammunition due to the difficulties and cost of such a move. A new round will probably be designed instead, and the CSP reduced to a minimum intervention of obsolescence removal, perhaps inclusive of installation of a modular kit, like on Warrior CSP, for the rapid application of different standard kits of additional protection.

Even so, it is clear that 3 billions are a very small amount of money. Very, very small. The Army will be very hard pressed, and acquiring the platforms needed for the future will be very complex. Retaining UOR-procured vehicles is a solution that works only so far, and FRES SV, alone, will require most of the available funding, in order to replace the CVR(T) family and some of the FV430 MK3.

Done the math, it is easily confirmed that, as it is being said from everywhere, 5.5 billions are not enough.

There will be vehicles serving many, many more years before seeing a replacement, that's for sure.

FRES UV appears particularly at risk, with the Army possibly ready to accept a long-term Mastiff solution as good enough for the Mechanized Infantry. But this, that wouldn’t be that bad, might still not be enough.

In addition, as part of NAO written evidence, we also learn that Future Force 2020 is actually… Future Force 2025, since 2025 is the date at which the armed forces are expected to deliver against the SDSR mandated targets. 

Interesting summary graphic from the NAO evidence, submitted to the Committee

And as a side note, the MOD’s own Written Evidence, in answer to a question of the committee, puts the cost of the 14 Chinooks MK6 on order at 841 million pounds, unitary cost 34 million. 

Money well spent, at least. 

The JSF training

Training for the Joint Strike Fighter

The F35, notoriously, is a single-seat only airplane type. There won’t be a twin-seat trainer variant, and the plan to make the F35 as affordable as possible is to reduce to the minimum possible levels the number of training flying hours to be flown by its crews. Not just that, either, because operational training is to be largely done with simulators, including even the complex art of air to air refueling. The F22, which is also a single-seat only type, does not have simulators powerful enough, at least at the moment, to train for this delicate kind of operation, and its pilots have to fly a bridge-course on F16s. With the F35, the simulator is proving so efficient, that the US armed forces expect to prepare pilots for AAR on simulator.

Pilots are not the only ones who benefit from simulators, either, since there will be a sophisticate Maintenance simulator as well, an Ejection System Maintenance Simulator, and a weapons loading trainer, which will allow ground crew to practice the installation of weaponry onto the plane’s internal bays.

The full cadre of simulators that will allow personnel to prepare for the F35 is to include:

-          Full Mission Simulator

-          Mission Rehearsal Trainer

-          Deployable Mission Rehearsal Trainer

The above are all aimed to prepare and keep current the pilots. In addition, ground crew will be prepared thanks to:

-          Aircraft Systems Maintenance Trainer

-          Ejection System Maintenance Trainer

-          Weapons Loading Trainer

  

The Full Mission Simulator is an incredibly high-fidelity simulator capable to prepare pilots for flying complex operational scenarios. A complete FMS costs 20 million dollars, according to 2012 US DoD budget figures: the US armed forces have so far ordered a total of 10 FMSs.

The FMS is destined to be used with two distinct rooms, one for Briefing and one for Debriefing, and the system can run in Training mode, from the Briefing room to the actual simulator, while also supporting debriefing for the precedent training sortie.

Key feature of the FMS is the simulator dome, which pushes technology to the current limit, with visual display contractor Rockwell Collins having succeeded in developing and building a totally smooth dome giving 360° degrees all around visibility and simulation of the complete environment around the plane. The FMS has a 2m (6.5ft)-diameter dome surrounded by a frame mounting the 25 liquid-crystal-on-silicon (LCoS) projectors.

The FMS delivers the visual quality needed to undertake the simulation of aerial refueling and emergency procedures, particularly enabling the pilot to realistically react to an engine flameout, where one needs as much visibility as possible.

The FMS display will be further enhanced when simulated infrared imagery from the F-35's Distributed Aperture System will be fed into the pilot's helmet. This feature is currently not yet ready, but this is understandable, especially considering that, unfortunately, the Helmet Mounted Display with integrated infrared imagery capability is a source of issues still, with the original contractor having proven unable to meet the requirements, and BAE recently selected to develop an alternative, based on the Striker HMD used on the Typhoon.

The simulation is highly realistic because the F-35 FMS use the real aircraft's Operational Flight Program (OFP), but more than that, it employs all the actual computer models from the aircraft's sensor manufacturers and integrates that data, which means that the pilot flies the simulator just as he’d fly the actual plane, including the “behavior” of the engine, which runs on the very same software present on the F35.

The training simulation is controlled from the Instructor Operating Station, and the simulator can replicate the tactical environment that a pilot and his wingmen would face in combat. The FMSs can be networked to allow pilots to experience flying in a multiship environment against a vast array of air and surface threats. Eventually, FMSs dispensed on bases across the US will be linked, to allow large-scale simulations that will be almost as effective as flying air wars such the huge Red Flag exercises. It might be possible to network the simulators on a multinational basis, as well: UK pilots might train in a simulator based in the UK, flying alongside other F35s, simulated from bases in the US and flown by American personnel.

The Mission Rehearsal Trainer (MRT), is a smaller-scale variant of the FMSs, low cost and simplified. It has not the full-360° dome display, replaced by a narrow vision one. The software, however, is exactly the same.

The Deployable Mission Rehearsal Trainer puts the whole MRT package into a single shipping container ISO which can be deployed on a forward operating base or embarked on an aircraft carrier. It is expected that one will go on the Strike Carrier, in fact. The container includes two cockpits simulators and an Instructor Operating Station controlling the system.

The ASMT will allow maintenance engineers to practice fault-location procedures, replacement of line-items and parts of the plane and other maintenance operations. The ESMT will include a mock-up of the front of the F35, and will allow technicians to train in the removal of the cockpit’s canopy and complete installation/removal procedures of the ejector seat and all related systems.

Finally, the Weapons Loading Trainer will provide ground crews with a functional mock up of the plane, designed to allow them to practice the procedures for loading and unloading weaponry, on both the internal and external hard points.   

UK company EDM is heavily involved in the simulators, being under contract to build and provide the ejection-seats and weapons-loading hardware trainers.

Actual flying training will of course remain necessary, but the number of flying hours needed to prepare crews for F35 operations will be slashed and brought down to much smaller levels. The current target is to achieve a 50/50 balance between simulator and flying exercises. Simulator “events”, at least at the beginning, will take more hours than exercise done actually flying the machine, so that effectively the pilots will have more simulator hours than flown hours, training-wise. There will also be an embedded simulation capability in the aircraft itself, and the F-35 is to be compatible with the P5 rangeless air-to-air and air-to-ground combat training system, enabling complex mission simulation when in flight, much as with the latest model of Hawk trainer of the RAF. The full extent of capabilities in this sense is being developed.   

The US have been in these years building an integrated training centre (ITC) at Eglin AFB, in Florida, fitting it with 10 full-mission simulators plus six maintenance training devices, classrooms and the training system support centre.

The centre will train pilots for all three variants for US and international customers, including, at least for the first few years, UK pilots. The original plan would have seen the UK pilots go through much of the STOVL training alongside US Marines pilots, with only a country-specific additional course being added in the end of the preparation. It is to be expected that now the main partner will be the US Navy, even though the US Marines are standing up 5 squadrons of F35Cs as well as a larger fleet of Bs. As of October 2011, the USMC actually expects that its squadrons of F35C will start operating, from US Navy carriers, before the F35C squadrons are ready to fly from the amphibious ships, despite the F35B having already had its first period of trials at sea on USS Wasp, while the F35C has yet to see the sea, even if it already completed many launches with C13 steam catapults on land, and recently was launched for the first time by a land-based EMALS catapult.

The UK always planned to eventually stand up a national Integrated Training Centre, and negotiations have been ongoing at least since 2007. It was expected that, by 2014, UK pilots would train for the F35 in the UK, but much has changed in the meanwhile, and the 2014 date is now gone.

A decision on a UK-based ITC will depend on the long-term arrangement chosen for training of the JCA pilots: several nations have already been investigating the sole implementation, on their territory, of a Maintenance Training solution, with the pilots to be instead sent to the US ITC for their course. This solution is seen as considerably cheaper, and the UK might still decide that it represents an advantageous course of action. The US Navy and USMC resources could be exploited, and lighten the financial burden of JCA.

Another issue to be solved before an ITC decision is taken, is that there is not yet a decision on which RAF base is to be the main operating base for JCA. For years, the preferred site was RAF Lossiemouth, which would have been, funnily enough, a return to the past, since Lossie used to be a Fleet Air Arm base, on which the Bucceneers for HMS Ark Royal IV were based. Lossiemouth was considered attractive also because it is close to Rosyth, where the carrier will dock for maintenance. Again, Lossiemouth is “close” to Norway, another F35 customer, with which the UK would like to collaborate.

The basing decisions that have followed the SDSR, with Lossiemouth becoming a Typhoon base, for three squadrons and QRA North service, have however kind of ruled the base out for JCA use. Marham, which is the home of the Tornado and risks being closed when the Tornado GR4 bows out, is becoming the new front-runner for selection as JCA base, with a lobbying initiative, “Make it Marham MK2” already underway. (The first “Make it Marham” was of course about ensuring that, between Marham and Lossiemouth, the second was the loser. The victim, as we know, in the end was actually Leuchars)

A decision on the Main Operating Base (almost certain to also be the only base for the type), should come relatively soon, possibly in the new year, along with some more details on the updated planning assumptions for JCA, about numbers, squadrons to be re-equipped, and dates.