Bollocks proven wrong by facts

DefenceManagement reports that the National Security Council has, yesterday 8 april 2012, approved a re-rething and sealed the return to the F35B, with an announcement to Parliament expected before the week is over. 

The Telegraph says that with the F35B both CVFs could be put in service, and carrier air restored earlier, already in 2018. 



On the "both carriers" bit, i hope they are right. If they are not, the military top brass, the defence minister and everyone in the National Security Council should be kicked in the ass from here to Port Stanley, because putting in service both vessels is the only reason why STOVL should be considered. Wasn't for this, it shouldn't even be allowed on the table.
So either it is 2 STOVL carriers, or 1 CATOBAR. One STOVL carrier, one mothballed hulk is just demented. DEMENTED. 

The 2018 date is bollocks proven wrong by facts. There's nothing at all to suggest that the B variant will be ready in time, and even less suggests that the UK will speed the buy up to have the planes earlier.
It's a lie, pure and simple. US Department of Defense reports say clearly that the F35B is 9% behind even the revised, curred project schedule, has more than 15.000 test points to clear and at least 1500 test flights more to go.
The C is 32% ahead of schedule, has 12.000 test points to clear, and 1200 flights to go.

The US Marines might have urgency to put the F35B in service first, but they are going to do so (eventually) with an airplane that risks being unable to do what it is meant to do (STOVL) due to an as-yet uncorrected overheating issue in the transmission clutch of the Lift Fan (1).
In addition, the airplane will enter service with the software block 2B, incomplete, which is now due to include some initial weapon-release capability (which likely includes none of the british weapons: no ASRAAM, no Paveway IV), but which will need urgent replacing with the Block 3 software. Worse, these early production airplanes will need millions of dollars of mods and structural changes for which the DoD is already putting aside hundreds of millions.
Follow the USMC in this particular path only means getting blasted (with good reasons) by a NAO report telling everyone how stupid the decision is, and how much money wasted it entails.

The F35B mean corrective maintenance time for critical failures is also twice as long as planned, while the F35C is in threshold on target.
The F35B is literally losing pieces in test flights, something that Lochkeed Martin won't tell on its website, obviously. (2)
In 19 days of trials at sea on USS Wasp, one of the involved F35B needed, twice, replacement of the upper lift fan doors.

Vertical Bring Back weight requirement (the weight of a minimum fuel quantity and other
necessary payload needed to safely recover the aircraft on the ship after an operational mission, plus a representative weapons payload) is for 5000 pounds (at least it should be, might have been reduced), of which up to 1700 are made up by fuel. This vital requirement is still at very real risk. There's just 230 to 370 pounds of margin for weight growth in the next five years before the "not to exceed value" for empty weight is reached and surpassed.
Even if the requirement is met, there is not enough bring back weight margin to return to the carrier with unexpended Storm Shadow missiles ( 2870 pounds each) and even Ship Borne Rolling Vertical Landing might not solve the problem.
Someone has already suggested that Storm Shadow will not be launched by shipborne F35Bs. If it proves true, well. Better if i do not say what i just thought, it is rude.   

Regarding Ship Borne Rolling Vertical Landing, it is a UK idea, which is to turn a vertical landing into almost a CATOBAR landing, but without cables. Trials have been made with a modified Qinetiq Harrier on Charles De Gaulle and Illustrious, and the activity, which was stopped in 2010 following the switch to F35C, has cost several tens of millions.
It will have to be resumed if the F35B returns to be the preferred solution.

The SRVL approach exploits the ability of the short take-off and vertical landing F-35B to use vectored thrust to slow the speed of the aircraft while still gaining the benefit of wing-borne lift, by landing with a deck run. This offers a significant increase in "bring-back" payload compared with a vertical recovery and is likely to reduce stress on the single-engined aircraft's propulsion system.
However, deck operations become more complex and a landing runway is needed, instead of a landing spot, so much so that SRVL might require an angled deck, just as CATOBAR technique.
Pilot and deck crew training regimes would have to change, and even F35 flight control laws might have to be adjusted.
A "Bedford Array" visual aid system had to be developed and tested to guide the pilots in this new kind of approach, particularly in rough seas. And you know who liked the idea? The US Navy, which is building on it for its CATOBAR carriers. Once more, a great british idea in the naval aviation field will be exploited in the right way not by Britain, but by the americans. Read this to see how fast the idea is catching on with the CATOBAR pilots of the USN.

Vertical Bring Back Weight is an issue so big that already in 2004/5 the USMC "adopted" the SRVL concept, and sponsored the british activity in this direction, to feed the data into the F35 programme. 

When SRVL activities were ongoing, this very significant brief was given, and the awesome website Navy Matters still reports it:

Using SRVL F-35B aircraft would approach the carrier from astern at about 60 knots indicated air speed, 35 knots relative assuming 25 knots wind over deck (the maximum speed of a CVF will be 25 knots, so 25kts WOD is achievable even in dead calm) on a steep 5-6 degree glide path.  Touch down would be about 150 feet from the stern with a stopping distance of 300 to 400 feet depending on conditions (wet flight deck, pitching ships etc).  That would leave around 300 feet of flight deck for margin or even "bolters". [Note: 400 + 150 + 300 = 850 feet. THE WHOLE DECK IS COMMITTED TO THE LANDING. What about any other flying activity????]

The SRVL technique has a significant impact on ship designs and aviation operations, Commander Tony Ray told a conference in February 2008: "We expect to trade some STOVL flexibility for increased bring-back and fuel.  We have to .. check for for relevant CV criteria that apply to slower SRVL operations.  For example flightpath control will be a far more important flight criteria for SRVL than it has been for STOVL.  It is a CV trait creeping in".

So, the "training gap" between STOVL and CATOBAR further reduces, and deck operations are as affected by SRVL than by an arrested landing.
Or wait, that's actually worse than on a CATOBAR vessel.
Without an angled deck for SRVL, and having to rely only on the plane's brakes, in order to accommodate a bolter, the whole deck, from ski jump to stern, will have to be free and committed to the landing of the "heavy" F35B.

Isn't it awesome? The disadvantages of CATOBAR (and possibly some more) coupled to the inferior performance of STOVL airplanes.
Really smart. Really. I'm so impressed. 


The other problems with the F35B (and the C's ones, it is not perfect either, but at least much, much better...) i've covered already in other articles, so i won't repeat it all and annoy everyone to death. The US report i've linked contains the most complete non-classified liste of issues available, and the most up to date, so it remains the go-to document for any who wants to see the full table of the F35B propulsion issues and count the number of times the TBD (To Be Determined) sign comes up when the subject is "solution to this issue".

I will close this bitter piece with a brutal assessment of reality, and then an hope and wish.

First the brutal assessment:

- STOVL is less expensive in the short term. 

True, there are less costs connected to the ships, but the airplane will cost a lot more to acquire, and a lot more through life.

- CATOBAR would cost more for added ship crew for operating catapults and wires, and would impose a great training penalty, with associated cost. 

Questionable. The full extent of the training penalty and crewing difference is actually not well determined. SRVL, if adopted, risks reducing the gap by a lot. If it is not adopted, we risk seeing certain weapons not cleared for use from the carrier (Storm Shadow on top of the list) and/or many expensive weapons thrown into the waves over the plane's life.

As to the impact of catapults and wires on ship crew, a current Nimitz carrier employs 56 men for the 4 catapults and 47 for the MK7 wires.
EMALS is expected to require 30% less crew, so that could go down to 40. For a 4-rails system. The british one would have half the rails.
The Advanced Arrestor Wire (which differently from EMALS is to be retrofitted to all carriers) requires only 4 men for normal operations, namely a Pri-Fly Recovery Operator, an Arresting Gear Officer, an AAG Monitor and an AAG Retractor Operator. 

Pardon me if i continue to have reserves.  

- The F35B works: it went to sea on USS Wasp.  

The F35B went to sea for 19 days, lost pieces in flight and had others replaced twice in three weeks. It remains plagued by multiple issues, its airframe life is currently 3000 hours (bulkheads developed cracks by this milestone) against a requirement for 8000 (the Typhoon is certified for 6000 flying hours, but BAE is still running an airframe on stress tests in Brough that have overcome the 12.000 hours milestone and aims for proving that the airframe is going to last without troubles for 18.000, to give an idea). As it is, there's an unresolved overheating issue that prevents it from entering STOVL mode in hot weather, and production airplanes in USMC squadrons will, for an undetermined time, only fly in CTOL profile).
Supposed to serve for 30 years, the F35B has a growth margin of 370 pounds at best before it reaches the not-to exceed weight. A bit little. Hope that engine technology moves ahead a lot in 30 years and increases very significantly the power output...
In short, i've issues with the "it works" statement. Not even in service yet, and already feels like it's held together in one piece with strings and scotch tape. Not the best feelings.

- STOVL operations can better cohexist with the helicopter ops necessary for the carrier to work as Assault Ship as envisaged by Carrier Enabled Power Projection


It is a marginal advantage. US Kitty Hawk in 2001, during operations against the Talibans in Afghanistan, had 8 to 12 Super Hornets on board, which flew 600 sorties in her deployment, and simultaneously was used as afloat staging base for helicopter insertions of troops and special forces, with the 160th Regiment Special Forces Aviation on board.


Actually, if SRVL is continued and adopted, and a heavy plane returns to the STOVL carrier, all deck needs to be cleared and the impact on other operations is worse than with CATOBAR ops.


- STOVL enables RAF land-based crews to embark with minimum warning and rapidly certify for all-weather ops from the deck.

Probably. But with the Harrier GR9 it didn't work very well: the number of carrier qualified RAF pilots was normally extremely low/non existant. Does not promise that well.

Again, SRVL is highly likely to make things a lot more complicated, and much more similar to CATOBAR ops.
Not adopting SRVL would be worse, though, as it would severely limit the operational viability of the F35B: the bring-back weight value is really far too low.

- We can always switch to catapults later when there will be UCAVs to launch.

Does it sound like an idiocy only to me? It reads like "ok, we are doing a stupid thing. But, eventually, we will fix the error with more money later".

After buying the most expensive, less capable fleet of airplanes.

Better if we do not reach the point in which catapults become indispensable "later". Since i can't see that much money being available for defence anytime soon, such a need would likely be a big, big issue.

- STOVL means two carriers in service.

I wish it did. But it is far from sure. We will see if there will be an announcement in this sense, eventually.
And even if there is, the destiny still passes through the SDSR 2015.



Lastly, the hope.

May both carriers enter service, and may the F35 work as intended in the end. 




NOTES:

(1): US DoD programs, F35 program testing report, page 30, 31 and 32 

"Production aircraft will be restricted from STOVL-mode flight operations until Service airworthiness authorities grant a flight clearance. A significant amountof flight test and development of system maturity of the final STOVL-mode door and propulsion system designs remains to be accomplished. A system mature enough for unmonitored STOVL-mode flight may be needed as early as late 2012 to coincide with the delivery of lot 4 F-35B aircraft to the Marine Corps at Yuma, Arizona. If testing of the changes is not complete and needed modifications are not installed by late 2012, aircraft at Yuma will fly in CTOL‑mode only.

"The interim solution to unacceptably high clutch temperatures is to add a temperature sensor and display page so that the pilot can be aware of increasing temperature inside the clutch housing. Fuel and operational conditions permitting, changing flight regimes (e.g. configuration, altitude, and airspeed) may cool the clutch so that the pilot can engage STOVL modes. Such a cooling procedure may be untenable in combat conditions."


(2): US DoD programs, F35 program testing report, page 32


"Roll control nozzle doors separated in-flight from a test aircraft twice, drawing attention to door rigging and the potential for redesign. The program plans to conduct flight test on a new door in early 2012 to support the redesign effort."