France's adjusted Military Planning Law

France has changed course on military reductions, cancelling a good share of the planned reduction in the number of personnel and making a sizeable adjustement to funding, which has brought about an update to the plans, which include a major restructuring of the Army, under project Au Contact!, "in contact". 

The main items in the reworked plans include: 

- Army's operational, deployable manpower at 77.000 (versus 66.000 target with the earlier cuts)
- 1000 more men to the Special Forces with the creation of the GAOS, Groupement d'Appui Auix Operations Speciales; a support battalion not unlike 1 PARA SFSG in the UK 
- 1000 men to the Intelligence and ISTAR forces
- 1000 men to cybersecurity 

The Army's new structure will be detailed on May 28, but we know that the restructuring will deliver 6 land manoeuvre brigades (a cut of one HQ, the current 3rd brigade), of which two will be heavy armoured, two medium, wheeled and equipped with the new VBMR 6x6 vehicles and EBRC 6x6 reconnaissance vehicle, one Parachute and one Mountain. These brigades will have some 7000 men each, with up to 7 regiments. Two deployable Division HQs will command the brigades, three each. 
One Aviation Brigade is to be formed to bring all helicopter regiments under a unified command. This airmobile brigade will not have organic ground units, it seems, but will provide airmobility to the infantry of the line brigades. 

The Navy says that a 7th Commando unit will be raised. Its unit name hasn't yet been selected. 

 

A first graphic showing the reorganization of the army commands. More details should become available on May 28.

Several important items of equipment have been added: 

- 7 Tiger attack helicopters, bringing total planned purchase up from 60 to 67. The procurement of a laser-guided rocket to complement Hellfire missiles is planned. Hellfire itself will be replaced in 2021, most likely with an air launched development of the new MMP anti-tank missile in development for the Army, would be my guess.
The Tiger will continue to be complemented by around 80 armed Gazelle helicopters. The aim is keeping attack and reconnaissance helicopters at 146 in total.

Replacement for the elderly Gazelle should come under project HIL (hélicoptère interarmées léger) in the 2020s. The HIL should replace Army Gazelle and Air Force Fennec, and Navy Dauphin and Alouette III. The programme used to be earlier known as HC4 - Hélicoptère Classe 4 Tonnes.

- 6 more NH-90 TTH battlefield utility helicopters, bringing planned purchases to 74. These will complement 8 Caracal in use by the Special Forces, plus 26 Cougar and a number of Pumas. The total of utility helicopters in the long-term is set at 115, and more NH-90s are planned to be purchased later to keep the total unchanged as the Puma is phased out. The reductions will be progressive: in 2020 there will still be more than 115 helicopters, considering all types.

- A 3rd MUSIS satellite will be acquired. This is a space based imagery intelligence asset. CERES will deliver national, space-based electronic intelligence. 

- An electronic intelligence package for use on MQ-9 Reaper will be acquired. 12 Reaper remain planned, and deliveries are underway.
On Monday 18 may, France also signed a MOU with France and Germany for the cooperative study and development of an european MALE UAV for the 2020s, that will be the Reaper's replacement. This follows the falling apart of the UK - FR TELEMOS project. Ever since, the UK has been silent, and to this day it remains uncertain how the UK plans to move on and still deliver a UAV for the SCAVENGER requirement, which is also supposed to mitigate the loss of Sentinel R1 and Shadow R1 (pushed back to 2018, but still planned). RAF MQ-9 Reaper themselves have a funding line out to 2019, but the way ahead is uncertain. Answers on this vital requirement will be needed soon.

- 2 of the existing 14 C-130H will be fitted with a weapons capability to be employed in special forces support. 

French armed forces have made it clear that they want to keep a number of C-130s for their needs, arming them as well. Will UK special forces manage to get the MOD and government to listen to their well known, identical wish?

- France will "study", with a decision to be taken by year's end, whether to procure 4 additional C-130s, two of which would be equipped as tankers, in order to provide tactical air refuelling to the Army and Air Force's Special Forces Caracal helicopters. This is due to the delays with A400M, which reportedly include difficulties with the helicopter AAR capability. 

- Deliveries of the new A-330 MRTT "Phènix" will be accelerated. All should be delivered between 2018 and 2025. 

Phènix: what the RAF's own Voyager could and should have been, but isn't.

- 25 new generation targeting pods (the new TALIOS) will be procured in addition to 45 which were already planned. 

- The first batch of 60 SCALP cruise missiles renewed and life-extended is expected in delivery during 2019. UK and France were collaborating on a project for upgrading and life extending the SCALP / Storm Shadow. This might imply that the RAF will start to get upgraded missiles in the same years, but we don't really know. 

- In 2017, design of a successor to the MICA air to air missile will  begin. 

- A GEOINT deployable capability will be procured under the GEODE 4D project. There might be an export chance here for the system the UK has recently developed and put into service, the TIGAS.

- In 2019, the Army will seek to replace the EBG, Engine Blindè du Genie, the combat engineer tractor. France has been looking into (and trialing) the british Terrier as a candidate solution, and while the production line in the UK has shut down, BAE has mothballed the machinery in order to be able to re-open an assembly line, eventually abroad. Terrier thus remains a very likely candidate. 

- The navy will acquire a 4th B2M patrol vessel. Actually, news released since are that this fourth vessel will be a B3M: Bâtiment Multi-Mission Mutualisé. This is due to the ship being destined to be shared between the military, which will employ it for patrolling French Southern and Antarctic Lands, and the polar research institute Paul-Émile Victor. The B3M will be based in La Reunion, and will replace the patrol vessel Albatros (which will be decommissioned within days) and the ship L'Astrolabe, which supplies the Dumont d'Urville base in Antarctica. 
The previous 3 B2M vessels are replacements for the BATRAL light transport ships which for years have flown the flag in the french waters overseas. The first B2M will be based in New Caledonia, the second in the french Polynesia and the third in the West Indies. 

France is also procuring two light patrol vessels specifically designed to serve in Guyana. Having very limited draft, they will be able to push up into rivers. The Patrouilleurs Légers Guyanais were ordered back in december.
By 2020, the french navy will thus have 4 B2M/B3M ships and 2 PLGs covering overseas committments, and 7 old A-69 vessels, plus another 6 legacy patrol vessels of various kinds. The A-69 and other patrol vessels will be replaced under the BATSIMAR project expected to start in 2020. 
6 surveillance frigates based in overseas territories also remain in force. Today this is the Floreal class, but a replacement will be needed later. 

- The FREMM frigates are the losers. It is official at this point that the french navy will receive only 8, two of which configured for Air Defence (FREDA variant). 6 ASW vessels will be delivered by 2019 - 2020, despite the selling of Normandie to Egypt: building times will be speeded up. In 2021 and 2022 the two FREDA will be delivered. 
From 2023, France now plans to be launching a new design frigate, the FTI, frégates de taille intermédiaire, the design of which is not yet known. There is a possibility that it will build upon the new italian PPA design, with some discussions having reportedly already taken place. 
The target of 15 "first rank" warships remains unchanged. The tally is to include 4 anti-air defence warships and 11 frigates. Currently, the total is made up by the 2 Forbin / HORIZON class AAW destroyers, 2 F70 AAW legacy ships, old F70 ASW frigates and FREMM ships entering in service. 
The 5 La Fayette frigates will be upgraded and fitted with sonar to help keep the total at 15 as the old F70 ASW ships are withdrawn from service. 
The two FREDA will replace the F70 AAW in 2021 and 2022. 
Then, from 2023, the La Fayette themselves will be replaced by the new FTIs. 

- From 2021, SLAMF (Système de Lutte Anti Mines – Futur) is supposed to deliver new solutions to the MCM requirement. Eventually, the minesweepers will be replaced by 8 systems of unmanned surface and underwater vehicles, deployable at sea with four large motherships.
Apparently, and very surprisingly, five separate ships are also planned as bases for clearance divers, according to the MOD's document. 
The development of the unmanned vehicles and general architecture for the umanned, stand-off clearance of minefields at sea is a collaborative project with the UK, with several demonstration contracts awarded in the last few months. The UK's MHC solution will use many of the same drones. 

- Funding is provided for 4 Bâtiment de Soutien et d'Assistance Hauturier (BSAH), ocean-going tugs and support ships. 

- From 2017, France will be ordering a new assault rifle to replace FAMAS 

- For the future replacement of the C-160 Gabriel electronic warfare aircraft, France plans the procurement of Charge Universelle de Guerre Electronique (CUGE), a modular payload which will be embarked on cargo aircraft (A400, or maybe C-130 or even the smaller C-235) as necessary, removing the need for a dedicate, specific platform. 

- France will be in the market for a new solution for the training of jet pilots under the Formation Moderniseè et Entrainement Diffèrenciè des Equipages de Chasse. There is a possibility that France will collaborate with Italy, maybe even sending pilots to the 61st Wing training school at Lecce Galatina, Italy, for training.  




Other plans remain substantially unchanged from earlier versions. The army will still want to procure a tactical UAV, and the Watchkeeper is a leading candidate. 

In 2020, the Navy will seek to launch FLOTLOG, the programme for the acquisition of 3 new supply ships for the logistics of the fleet. 

Acquisition of all 630 VBCI will be followed by projects of modernisation, including the addition of turret-mounted missile launchers and enhanced networking within the SCORPION project. 
The Army plans to acquire 2080 VBMR, including 358 in "Light", 4x4 variant to replace the VAB.
248 EBRC Scouts will replace the AMX 10RC and Sagaie ERC 90.   
At a later date, 1470 VBAE (véhicules blindés d’aide à l’engagement) are expected to be procured to replace the VBL light armoured cars. 
200 Leclerc MBTs and 18 Leclerc recovery vehicles are under contract for modernization and life extension. Artillery is going to be a bit short of guns if there will not be additional purchases of CAESAR truck-mounted 155/52 howitzers. Currently, 77 are on order, but as the tracked self-propelled guns retire, more would be needed. 
13 launchers are being upgraded to GMLRS. 

The Air Force continues to plan for a long-term figure of 185 combat jets, between Rafale and modernized Mirage 2000.  
The Navy will add 40 Rafale M of its own, as the last Super Etendard Modernisee is withdrawn by 2017.

The nuclear deterrent will continue to be based on some 300 warheads. Three full sets of 16 M-51 submarine launched missiles will be maintained for the fleet of 4 SSBN; and the air force maintains a stock of some 54 ASMP-A missiles.  

The fleet of maritime patrol aircraft will shrink to 15 upgraded ATL-2 over the long period. These will continue to be complemented by a further 4 ATL-2 used for surface surveillance, as well as 4 Falcon 50M, 5 Falcon 200 Guardian and a further 4 Falcon 50 due to be converted and fitted with SAR radar. 

The main helicopter of the Navy will be the NH-90 NFH Cayman, 27 of which are on order, along with 14 palletized ASW kits with sonar Flash to employ on them when and where necessary. These will still be complemented by some 40 more light helicopters (Alouette, Panther, Dauphin) in 2020.  

France's Defence White Paper

France has finally published its long awaited document of strategic and budgetary guidance for the next decade (2014 to 2025), setting a total budget of 364 billion Euro, with 179 of those committed over the years 2014 - 2019. 

34.000 posts within the armed forces will be lost by 2019. Of these, 10.000 posts already were earmarked for suppression since 2008. The document says that the reductions will mainly affect administration and support manpower, but reading the Defence Planning Assumptions does rise more than one doubt about this claim.

Reading the document, it is obvious that cuts and reductions in national ambition are on the way. As widely anticipated, the Navy is, overall, perhaps the service getting the best deal, but, even before we learn the details, it is clear that some sacrifices will be made: there won't be an order for a second aircraft carrier (PA2 has looked more and more unlikely in the last few years anyway, so it is not a real surprise) and there won't be a fourth Mistral-class LHD either, with the Dixmunde, third ship in the class, being the last vessel the french navy will get. 

The Fleet is set to have: 

1x Aircraft Carrier (Charles de Gaulle)
3x LHD (Mistral, Tonnere, Dixmunde) 

4x SSBNs 
6x SSNs 

15x "First Rank" frigates. This suggests that there will be an increase in the number of high-end escort ships as part of the new strategy.
The documents released do not really detail this figure, but it comprises the 2 Horizon-class air defence frigates (the french navy insists to call "frigates" these units which are destroyers by any other name) and the planned 11 FREMM frigates. This, though, gives a total of 13 hulls, which is the same number of high-end frigates currently available to the french navy. While the White Paper fails to detail this voice, perhaps the FREMM order will be incremented to 13. (NOTE: originally, the french navy was due to receive 17 FREMM ships, but the order was later reduced to 11).
The FREMM program is currently intended to deliver 9 ASW/Land Attack frigates and two FREDA air-defence configured vessels. The FREDA are needed to keep up the number of air defence ships in the fleet: originally, four Horizon units were envisaged, but costs were too high and the order was halved. The FREDA is seen as a lower-cost alternative.  

However, the "Dossier Thematiquè" suggests that the reality could be less pleasant: it says that the 15 tier-one ships include "less powerful combat units, notably the frigates type La Fayette upgraded with sonar". If all five La Fayette are similarly upgraded and counted in the total of 15 high-end warships, it would entail a reduction from 11 to just 8.



15x Offshore Patrol vessels. Again, not easy to exactly understand what this entails. Judging from a look at the current french fleet and previous plans, these 15 vessels should include the five La Fayette-class frigates, the 9 A69-class avisos and the patrol vessel L'Adroit which is, however, currently only available for french navy use for a period of three years, as a DCNS move to try and put its new OPV design in the spotlight, with the hope of gaining firm orders. The language of the White Paper is "ambiguous" enough that the number of patrol vessels could probably be dropped to 14 at the end of this three-year concession, but the Navy might also decide to buy the ship by then.   

The uncertainty on the future collocation of the La Fayette adds confusion to the whole picture. Anyway, there is plan, known as BATSIMAR (bâtiment de surveillance et d’intervention maritime), which will deliver replacements for the aging patrol vessels.

6x Surveillance Frigates. The current Floréal ships, we have to assume.   

The White Paper provides no information on the plans for the smaller coastal patrol vessels and does not give an indication of the planned future of the support vessels. The french navy has a requirement for 4 new tanker/supply ships. The relevant program is known as FLOTLOG (flotte logistique).
There is also no update on the plans for the future of the minesweepers flottilla. There will be one, and the SLAMF (Système de Lutte Anti-Mines navales Futur) program goes ahead to develop the future solution for the MCM requirement.  Drones, deployed by a new kind of mothership, are the envisaged solution.

Anyway, it does show that MOD personnel collaborated with the french for this White Paper...! 

The Fleet Air Arm will keep its nuclear role, with nuclear-tipped missiles carried on Charles De Gaulle for launch from the embarked Rafale M airplanes. The number of naval aircrafts, helicopters and maritime patrol aircrafts are not disclosed, for the moment. 
Programs ongoing include the upgrade of the Atlantique 2 maritime patrol aircrafts and the acquisition of 27 NH90 NFH helicopters.
With the total number of Air Force and Fleet Air Arm fighter jets now capped at 225, i would not be surprised to the see the french air force becoming more aggressive in a bid to get an as big share of them as possible: we'll have to see if the french navy fights its corner better than the Royal Navy did when faced with the same problem... 


This leads us straight to the Air Force.
As i just said, France now aims to a force of 225 fighter jets in total, comprising Air Force and Navy airplanes. With the imminent withdrawal from service of the navy's Super Etendard and of the Air Force's Mirage F1 CR, the fleet will be composed only by Rafale and Mirage (several variants). 
In the future, a monotype fleet of sole Rafale is in sight, but for many more years the Mirage will continue to be a precious workhorse. 
In recent times, the plan had been to procure 234 Rafale for the Air Force and 60 Rafale M for the navy, with the air force hoping to have, on its own, 225 aircraft by 2022. The drop in expected numbers is obviously very relevant, and the Air Force / Navy proportions might have to change as a consequence. 
The Navy wants 60 Rafale M because it aims to have three embarkable squadrons, each having (on paper) 18 airplanes. The squadrons are the 12F, 11F and 17F, the latter being the last unit to fly with the Super Etendard.  

The announced purchase of 200 Meteor missiles and the integration of the weapon on Rafale (by 2018) seem to still be planned.

The new White Paper will undoubtedly cause a lot of big and small changes and plan rethinks in the coming months and years, but it is worth remembering that in recent times France had been planning to: 

- Retire the Mirage F1CR. The withdrawal of this reconnaissance aircraft is to be balanced by the integration of the RECO NG Aeros pod on the Rafale. 12 such pods are planned for the Air Force and 6 for the Navy, along with 3 ground control stations. 

- Mirage 2000N: to remain in service until 2018, it is compatible with the RECO NG pod but its main role is as nuclear strike aircraft, armed with the ASMPA cruise missile. 

- Mirage 2000D: the intention is to upgrade these strike fighters so they can employ the ASTAC (Analyseur de Signaleux TACTiques) pod to provide ELINT reconnaissance. Data Link 16 and ROVER image downlink also planned. The 2000D was seen likely to be in service until 2021 or even 2025. 
A new generation laser designation pod remains planned. 

- Mirage 2000-5 and 2000C: these air defence aircraft should retire by 2018. 

The White Paper signals a reduction in the number of new tanker aircrafts to purchase, from 14 to 12. The program will be launched next year, with the A330 MRRT aircraft as the choice. Differently from the RAF, which ordered the passenger variant of the A330, the french will purchase the fully multi-mission cargo/passanger variant. In exchange for this great capability, the air force will lose the 5 A310 and A340 aircrafts currently used as strategic cargo aircrafts.  
It would appear that the full order for 50 A400M tactical cargo aircrafts is confirmed without reductions, but there is some controversity still. The A400 order could still be reduced, with the air force keeping its small fleet of C130s or some of its C160s for Special Forces use instead. 

The small transport aircrafts of the CN-235 type are not mentioned in the White Paper, but they are believed not to be part of the figure of 50 tactical cargo aircrafts. They should be (relatively) safe.

Studies for a future UCAV will go ahead, so to build up options for a future program of acquisition of a novel unmanned air combat platform in the 2020s.  

In the missiles section, the document gives a welcome promise that the FASGW(H) / ANL will get the go ahead, along with the MMP missile destined to replace the MILAN. 
An upgrade program for the SCALP / Storm Shadow is also confirmed, which will keep the missile relevant out to 2030. These confirmations mean good news for RAF and Royal Navy.  
The White Paper also promises to go ahead with the ASTER 30 modernisation (Block 1 NT) which will also expand anti-ballistic capability. Italy is interested in this development, while it is not clear if the UK will join. 
A new missile to succeed to the MICA is promised. Can't quite understand if this successor to MICA is the Meteor, or if they are talking about a new missile (presumably short-range, to complement the Meteor).

The document also promises 7 aircraft for "air detection and surveillance". I immediately thought of the E3 Sentry AWACS, but France only has four of those. It is not specified in the document, but i'm assuming the total of 7 comes from adding in the 3 E2C Hawkeye owned by the Navy. 
Not better specified manned light reconnaissance and surveillance aircrafts are mentioned, along with a planned 12-strong fleet of "drones for theatre surveillance", which should be Medium Altitude, Long Endurance (MALE) machines: it has been widely reported that France is seriously considering ordering the US Reaper for this role. 
Officially, the Reaper would be "an interim solution", but in these times of extreme budget tightness, i can't see France being much willing to committ to TELEMOS after acquiring the Reaper. TELEMOS is the joint BAE-Dassault program for the development of an european MALE, which is hoped could meet both the british SCAVENGER requirement and the french needs. 
In the end, the MQ-9 Reaper might win the day in both countries. 

Lastly, the White Paper says the Air Force will have 8 batteries of medium-range air defence missiles. This means that the SAMP-T order, which was expected to deliver 10 batteries, will be cut short. 
 

As had been reported in the last while, the Army is going to be the service hit hardest by the reductions. The White Paper says that the Army will restructure on 7 brigades, two of which will be Heavy, 3 will be Medium/Multi-Role and 2 will be light. 
Studying the current structure of the french army, and the distribution of recently purchased, critical equipment such as the VBCI, it is possible to formulate an educated guess regarding the identity of the brigades to remain in the force: 

2° and 7° Armoured brigades as the two Heavy formations 

1°, 3° Mechanised brigades plus the 9° Amphibious brigade as the Medium / Multi Role formations 

11° Parachute brigade and 27° Mountain Infantry Brigade as the two light formations. 

The above is, at the state, only my guess. The White Paper seem to suggest that the brigade to be cut will be one between the 1st, 3rd and 6th Mechanised brigades, assuming that the two heavy brigades will remain the same and expecting that the amphibious, parachute and mountain capabilities will be protected.

The new army will have a core of around 66.000 deployable personnel comprising the Special Forces, the seven combined arms brigades mentioned above, Combat Support and Combat Service Support units, "prepositioned units" and the garrisons located in overseas territories.

In terms of equipment, the White Paper announces a reduction in main battle tanks (from 254 Leclerc in active service to a planned 200). There will also be around 250 "medium tanks". Quite what vehicle is indicated by this definition is not really clear, by i think it could be the AMX 10 RC rénové. This wheeled tank, armed with a 105mm gun, is the only vehicle in the french arsenal which i'd dare calling medium tank. 256 such vehicles been upgraded ("rénové", in fact) by 2010, and their out of service date is set into the 2020s, so i think this is it. 

Continuing with the generic, never detailed trend, the White Paper promises a fleet of 2700 armoured vehicles, with no real indication of what it comprises. The fate of the SCORPION modernisation and digitalisation programme for the army, as a consequence, couldn't be more confused.  
The french army hopes to replace the ERC90 Sagaie reconnaissance vehicle and the AMX 10 RC as well, with the EBCR (Engine Blinde de Reconnaissance et de Combat).
There is also a requirement for the replacement of the aging VAB (Véhicule de l'Avant Blindé) with a new vehicle known as VBMR. How the White Paper impacts all these programs, and what is counted in the "2700" figure is impossible for me to say at the moment. Among the armoured vehicles currently available and on order we can count 191 Vikings on order, well over 3000 VABs in all variants, 700 VBCI, 1610 light armored cars Véhicule Blindé Léger (VBL) and 1500 small protected vehicles Petit Véhicule Protégé and small numbers of Buffalo, Aravis and Sherpa vehicles, ordered for use in Afghanistan.
Assuming that the Vikings and VBCI orders won't be touched, even expecting the old VBL to be retired from service in the near future, it is clear that there will be reductions and changes and the hoped-for 2326 VBMR and 292 EBCR could end up coming in much lower numbers.
EBCR might become the new "medium tank", so that would mean 250 vehicles according to current plans. The VBMR, the VBCI and the lighter vehicles including Viking should make up the 2700 figure. 

The Army will have 30 "tactical" UAVs. The french are currently trialing the british Watchkeeper, which, if selected, would fullfill this requirement. 

The Army will have 140 attack and reconnaissance helicopters, which should include the full planned 80 Tiger helicopters on order. Of these, 40 are in the HAP variant (armed only with gun, rockets and Mistral air to air missiles) while the remaining 40 are in the much improved HAD variant, which can also armed with Hellfire II missiles.
115 utility helicopters will also be available. Of these, a significant proportion should be made up by NH90 TTH helicopters (known as Caïman in the french army), but as of this month France is hesitating in placing an expected order for 34 such machines. The publication of the White Paper should be a step forwards in the right direction.
34 machines are already on order and an initial capability for the type was reached in February this year. The NH90 is mainly meant to replace over 90 PUMA helicopters used by the ALAT, the french army aviation.


Revised downwards are also the Defence Planning assumptions. France is planning to be able to deploy abroad significantly smaller force packages.
A package of 5000 men will be kept at High Readiness, in order to enable the constant availability of 
a very high readiness Joint Reaction Force numbering 2300 men. This force will be able to deploy "up to 3000 km away from the homeland" within 7 days and will comprise a 1500-strong battlegroup, Special Forces contributions, helicopters, 10 fighter jets and other supports. It will be able to deploy with the support of a small naval task group centered on one LHD. 

There is an assumption that the Army will be required to carry out multiple (up to two or three simultaneously) "crisis management operations", comparable to the british army "non-enduring operations".
To make this possible, the armed forces will be able to draw from a combined force of 6000 to 7000 army soldiers and SF operators with armored vehicles up to the mysterious "medium tank" and helicopter support. The Navy will be able to provide a frigate, and/or an LHD task group, eventually with the presence of an SSN "depending on the circumstances".
The air force would provide "a dozen fighters spread on the different theatres", and the wider forces of Air force and Navy could provide long range strikes with cruise missiles (SCALP and SCALP Navale).   

Like the british armed forces, the French are also keeping their options open for the delivery, with suitable warning (6 months notice, according to the Paper) of a non enduring "divisional effort", while retaining "some of the responsibilities already assumed in other open fronts".
This "best effort", to say it with the words that the british SDSR used, would mean deploying a Division HQ (if needed) to lead the force (which would be multinational, it is specified). The combat power would come from two brigades, representing a force of roughly 15.000 men.
These would get the support of up to 45 fighter jets (provided by Navy and Air Force together) and of a naval task group comprising the aircraft carrier, escorts, two LHDs, one SSN and support including maritime patrol aircraft. The White Paper document goes as far to suggest that it will only be possible to sustain such a level of naval support only if the british collaborate and bring to the party their own assets, as decided with the Lancaster House Agreement.
Following such "best effort", the french armed forces would be able to provide a smaller force to participate in post-war stabilisation operations.

There is also a capacity to provide up to 10.000 men in support of internal security.


Regarding the nuclear deterrence, the White Paper confirms an arsenal of "less than 300 nuclear warheads". The ASMPA air-launched cruise missile will receive a mid-life upgrade and the submarine-based ballistic deterrent will be fully supported, with work continuing on the M51 missile, which will replace the older M45 on the first three SSBNs (the fourth already had the M51 at its entry in service).  


Finally, there are relevant Satellite plans ahead.
The MUSIS Earth Observation constellation is confirmed, with France planning to put into orbit two optical satellites.
The CERES programme is also confirmed: it will deliver a space-based ELINT capability. 
There is also a New Generation COMSAT programme that will have to deliver, from 2020, a successor satellite communications system to replace the current SYRACUSE. UK-France collaboration on this requirement is a possibility, as the UK will need to think about the future of SKYNET roughly in the same period.


I'm sure we will talking again about this document and its consequences in the coming months. There are some really important developments, and some promising, much awaited news.
It is, however, rather worrisome to see that, after the UK, France is following in significantly reducing its arsenal and military capability.
Surprisingly, France is reducing its conventional force even more than the UK (in certain areas): the difference is not so much in the 200 main battle tanks against 227, obviously, but in the maximum effort that France is capable to make: 2 brigades and 15.000 men, against 3 brigades and 30.000 men.

The numbers, which are the most relevant for Europe, are starting to get truly worrisome. Capability is reducing dramatically. The numbers are truly low.

Observing the french effort, i will just add, once more, two considerations that i've made many times already:

The Royal Navy is damaged by the total absence of a "second line" of warships. The direct comparison between RN and Marine Nationale makes it very evident: while the RN leads, by quality and quantity, in terms of SSNs and high-end escorts (assuming that all 13 planned Type 26 are effectively put into service), the RN, while having just as many far and dispersed standing tasks all over the world as the french navy, totally lacks a second-tier flottilla of light frigates and large patrol ships.
The french have 21 such vessels, of various classes. The RN desperately needs to find a solution to this problem: it needs its own flottilla of "standing task" ships.

The second point i want to rise, once more, is that the UK is, in my opinion, not doing enough to exploit Space. Access to US satellites is fantastic, but are we really sure that the lack of a national capability for earth observation and space-based intelligence is a good thing?

I think it is not.

CVF and JCA: why i'd go CATOBAR

 

F35B and F35C: the airplane situation

Of immense interest is the 2011 Department of Defence Annual Report for the Office of the Director, Operational Test & Evaluation which gives us an up to date major picture of the current F35 development and testing situation. In the detail, it tells of everything that still does not work with the F35, and details the progress of the program in 2011. 

It is very useful to draw some well-informed conclusions, and contains some interesting data. For example, it emerges that: 

- F35A is 11% behind schedule with its test and validation campaign

- F35B is 9% behind schedule

- F35C is 32% ahead of schedule

We must, of course, look at the 32% ahead of schedule data with the awareness that the C is the variant who entered trials last. The other two variants are ahead of the F35C with their programs of development, testing and validation as they are closer to entering active service. For example the B already went at sea, while the C won't go on an aircraft carrier until next year.
However, A and B are lagging considerably in terms of test points cleared, while the F35C has cleared 32% more test points than planned, which is very reassuring. Having started later also means that more corrections have been incorporated into the C at build, thanks to discoveries made on the other two variants.

The planning, updated to December 2011, is for the three variants to complete their development and testing with many more flights. In each flight, a number of tests are run, in order to validate long lists of requirements. Each airframe requirement makes for 1 or several "test points". As of December 2011, maturity of the F35C was 1002 test flights away, with 12.442 test points yet to clear.
 

The A still has 827 flights and 10.257 test points to go.
 

The B 1,437 flights and 15.045 points.

These values of course change rather frequently when a change proves necessary and needs to be flown and trialed, adding new flights and points to clear to the count, but they are indicative of the current plan. 

Regarding the F35B trials at sea on USS Wasp, which were presented by the STOVL prophets as having proven that the B has "no issues" and that the jet blast hazard claims were "nonsense" and that everything actually works perfectly well, well, the reality is actually a bit different. The F35B jet blast does not hole the deck as someone had (rather extremely) prophetized, no, but a jet blast issues exists and the trials at sea only confirmed it. A 75 feet danger radius is reported. 

Jet blast from the F-35Bs is expected to produce unsafe forces on flight deck personnel up to 75 feet from the short take-off line.

This is going to make another serious dent, along with Ship  Borne Rolling Vertical Landing, in the flaunted advantages of STOVL when conducting simultaneous jet and helicopter operations on deck, which some describe as indispansable for the success of Carrier Enabled Power Projection. 

With jet blast hazard and landing runs on the deck, the differences between F35B and F35C in deck usage during ops are getting smaller and smaller.  

Among the F35B issues, is the cracking of a wing carry-through bulkhead cracked before 2,000 hours of airframe life. The required airframe lifetime is 8,000 hours. Repair of the bulkhead on the test article was completed in November 2011, and F-35B durability testing should have restarted in January 2012.

Following the bulkhead crack in the F-35B test article, analysis verified the existence of numerous other life‑limited parts on all three variants. The program began developing plans to correct these deficiencies in existing aircraft by repair/modifications, and designing changes to the production process. The most significant of these in terms of complexity, aircraft downtime, and difficulty of the modification required for existing aircraft is the forward wing root rib on the F-35A [which failed after some 3000 hours] and F-35B aircraft.

The F35C's own durability testing are due to start in the next while, if it hasn't already. By August last year the C had completed all of its structural test points, including drop tests to simulate rough carrier landing stress on the airframe. 

The F35B has had  a large number of parts re-designed and replaced and corrected, and the reports notes that, so far, there's no plan in place for rolling in the modifications in production airplanes. The report acknowledges: 

The program has not completed the final re-designs and plans to correct deficiencies through modifications of F-35B production aircraft intended for the fleet, which cannot be monitored in-flight because these aircraft are not instrumented. Production aircraft will be restricted from STOVL-mode flight operations until Service airworthiness authorities grant a flight clearance. A significant amount of flight test and development of system maturity of the final STOVL-mode door and propulsion system designs remains to be accomplished. A system mature enough for unmonitored STOVL-mode flight may be needed as early as late 2012 to coincide with the delivery of lot 4 F-35B aircraft to the Marine Corps at Yuma, Arizona. If testing of the changes is not complete and needed modifications are not installed by late 2012, aircraft at Yuma will fly in CTOL‑mode only.

The full extent of issues so far detected in the airframe doors and STOVL propulsion assembly is reported in a table, and makes for rather depressing reading, with some of the solutions in development already planned not to be ready before LRIP 7 while other solutions have yet to be determined, tested, and planned for adoption on production standard airplanes. 

The table of the F35B propulsion and door issues, as presented in the report.

There is also serious problems with overheating of the clutch that can prevent the STOVL mode to be angaged (how do you land at that point if your only runway is the carrier, or is just too short for a CTOL landing???) for which a real solution does not yet exists, and the driveshaft has to be redesigned. 

Besides, the F35B has a margin for growth of sole 230 pounds before it breaks its not-to-exceed weight planned for 2015. An additional 142 pounds might be secured by a greater descent rate to touchdown, but it is far from certain, and even so that means just 372 pounds of weight growth margin available, before the deadly line is crossed, with several years of testing and development yet to go, and no military service at all done. 

Talk about constrained airframes... 

The report notes: 

This additional weight [the 142 additional pounds of margin, to 372 total] increases the margin to 1.2 percent of current weight and allows for 0.36 percent weight growth
per year. Managing weight growth with such tight margins for the balance of SDD will be a significant challenge, especially with over 70 percent of the scheduled F-35B flight sciences test flights remaining to be accomplished in the next 60 months. For comparison, weight growth on the F/A-18 E/F was approximately 0.69 percent per year for  the first 42 months following first flight.

Again, undesirable wing roll-off, airframe buffet, and sideslip occurred in transonic flight regimes, and handling characteristics as a consequence do not meet requirements. It is likely that no more changes will be made to the plane, and it will be the requirements that are reviewed and reduced, in order for the plane to "meet" them!

The final word on the F35B can be identified in this passage: 

In October 2011, the program successfully conducted initial amphibious ship trials with STOVL aircraft in accordance with the new, restructured plan for 2011; however, significant work and flight tests remain to verify and incorporate modifications to STOVL aircraft required to correct known STOVL deficiencies and prepare the system for operational use.

Regarding the F35C, the report says: 

F-35C Flight Sciences
• As F-35C flight sciences focused on preparation for and execution of carrier launch and landing testing at Lakehurst, a limited amount of other envelope expansion occurred in 2011.
The F-35C flight sciences test points accomplished thus far are approximately 15 percent of the total expected in SDD.

• The lack of available flight envelope in the transonic regime currently constrains testing of F-35C aircraft handling qualities. In limited testing using flight control software that
benefitted from F-35A and F-35B testing, the F-35C aircraft performance in the transonic flight regime demonstrated the predicted intensity of uncommanded rolls but higher buffet
levels. The F-35C aircraft was expected to have the greatest challenge of the three variants in the transonic flight regime, which led to the decision to incorporate structural provisions for the installation of external spoilers in one test aircraft.

(Buffet is a problem of all three variants, it seems, and indeed a common problem in american naval jets, since the F-18 notoriously had this kind of issues too!) 

• The carrier launch and landing testing at Lakehurst provided valuable lessons regarding the impacts of these dynamic environments on the aircraft early in the testing.
Corrections and regression testing are needed as a result of the discoveries listed below. The program is also working to correct other performance problems such as excessive
nose gear oscillations during taxi, excessive landing gear retraction times, and overheating of the electro-hydrostatic actuator systems that power the flight controls. The program will subsequently evaluate the need for modifications of production aircraft for these items.
• Discoveries included:
-- Flight test aircraft could not engage the arrestment cable
during tests at the Lakehurst, New Jersey, test facility. The
tail-hook point is undergoing a redesign and the hold-down
damper mechanism requires modifications to enable
successful arrestments on the carrier. Resolution of these
deficiencies is needed for testing to support F-35C ship
trials in late 2013.
-- Hold-back bar and torque arm components, which keep the
F-35C aircraft from moving forward when tensioned on the
catapult at full power, require a redesign due to the use of
incorrect design load factors. Actual loads are greater than
predicted. The impact of these greater‑than‑predicted loads
on strength and fatigue characteristics is under analysis by
the program.
-- Loss of inertial navigation and GPS inputs to pilot displays
occurred during a catapult launch. Root cause analysis was
in progress at the time of this report.
-- The test team conducted initial testing in the transonic
flight regimes with one version of air vehicle software on
aircraft CF-2. Problems similar to the other variants were
observed, such as excessive buffeting and roll-off, at times
making the helmet-mounted displays unreadable.
-- Higher than predicted temperatures exist in the
electro‑hydrostatic actuator system during flight testing
of the aircraft in a landing configuration. This component
provides the force to move control surfaces.

In addition, the F35C acceleration is inferior to the hoped value.

The F35B is still far from its maturity, with several thousand test points more than the other variants to clear and with a huge variety of very serious issues to fix and with a significant amount of changes and redesigning already having taken place.

The F35C has its problems too, but is in a remarkably better shape and, save for the arrestor hook issue, which is said to be due for fixing in the next few months, has not revealed problems potentially show-stopping. The B's extremely low growth margin, with associated Bring Back weight issues, is instead a very serious menace to its viability as embarked plane for CVF. 

CATOBAR reasons and issues 

Reasons:  

- Maximum interoperability. Rafale, F-18, F-35C but also STOVL F35B can work from a big CATOBAR deck. The opposite is not true. 

- Future proof. Any kind of naval drone which will be developed in the coming years will be able to operate from the carrier. We will also be able to benefit from research and development done by the US Navy, and benefit of their support and investments into EMALS, AAG, and compatible platforms. 

- Compatible with future adoptions of better COD, AEW and tanker platforms. 

- Maximum military performances. It makes it possible to use the most capable embarked airplanes, and it fits into the operations of the two main allies of the UK. 

Issues:  

- Cost. EMALS and AAG add up-front cost to the carriers, and come with a personnel and training penalty. 

I've tried to quantify the extent of the training penalty connected to CATOBAR ops, but it is not easy at all.

I've discovered that a Sea Harrier FA2 pilot was a Naval All Weather Fighter Pilot after 100 day and 80 night landings on deck, but i've been unable to find a figure for the number of day and night landings necessary to re-certify for ops when the pilots are assigned to active service on the carrier.

On the other side of the barricade, i don't have a figure for the number of landings required for initial pilot certification, but i know that France's carrier pilots re-certify for carrier ops currency by making 6 daytime arrested landings and 4 night time arrested landings. A direct comparison in this latest value would be invaluable in assessing the feasibility of having RAF pilots, initially certified to CATOBAR ops, getting current again quickly to reiforce the naval strike wing embarked on the carrier.

The STOVL prophets say that re-certification with the Harrier required far fewer landings, and was much more readily achievable. They say that with CATOBAR, it wouldn't be possible to have one naval squadron plus 2/3 land squadrons able to reinforce the embarked complement in case of crisis, but we'd need a CATOBAR cadre of at least 3 naval squadrons.

Assuming they are right and it is true,  my reply is: that's how things should have always been.

While there's several clear and rationale reasons for having a naval fixed wing element [provide air defence for the fleet and independent, full spectrum air power even when airbases are not available], which brings to the table some very unique capabilities, i believe the rationale for a separate land based fleet of "deep penetrating" strike planes to replace Tornado has never been weaker. And in many ways it is a duplicate of the carrier strike fleet.

The RAF's JCA plan so far has been to get a land fleet of planes, capable to, at a stretch, migrate on the carrier when necessary. But considered the difficulties of getting land pilots to operate from ships, it will always make more operational sense to have naval pilots instead, who can readily work from land bases if the situation calls for it.

It is much easier to put a naval squadron ashore than a land squadron at sea, it is undeniable.

If CATOBAR requires a greater focus on naval operations, so be it, i say. France does not do bad at all with its own naval aviation, considering that they deployed a sizeable and capable force at sea for Libya ops, even though Charles De Gaulle was back from four months of ops over Afghanistan by less than one month.

They did especially well considering that their naval air force at the time had a single Rafale squadron, 12F, with an establishment of 15 airplanes, plus two Super Etendard squadrons, 11F and 17F.

Now, finally, 11F is converting to Rafale as part of the progressive retirement of the Super Etendard. The naval fixed wing complement is of course completed by 4F squadron, with the 3 E2C Hawkeye. Numerically, if the UK is really to order 50 F35s, the numbers are similar, as France has so far ordered 48 Rafale M, and has lost 3 to accidents, giving them a fleet of potentially just 45 airframes, even if once they were hoping for 60.

Looking at France's small but efficient CATOBAR naval aviation, i say that Britain could no doubt at least match it, standing up three naval-focused, if not naval-owned, squadrons of 14 F35C each (as 2 would normally be roled as Buddy-Buddy tankers).

France trains its naval pilots in the US, where they fly and "trap" on the T-45 Goshawk. When they come back, as few as 12 hours on the Rafale simulator are sufficient to achieve conversion to type. Much like with the F35, there is not a (naval) two-seat Rafale trainer. Differently from the F35, which pretty much never envisaged it, the Rafale N was planned (naval two-seat) and the airforce has the two-seat B variant. From late 2010, the Armee de l'Air has formed a large Rafale training squadron (2/92 Aquitanie) which offers some 4 slots a year for naval pilots to exploit some hours on the two-seat Rafale for combat system advanced training.

The RAF and RN hope to cover this requirement for the F35 with the Hawk T2 and with the simulators.  

On land, carrier landing practice is done by french pilots without a carrier-shaped runway with wires: a standard runway, with a marked "square" area the same size of the one that on a carrier would sport the wires is sufficient for good practice prior to embarkation on the aircraft carrier.

Keep in mind that the F35 promises to come with the best and most realistic simulators ever developed, and much of the training is to be done on sims, so matching what France does with the Rafales is the minimum i expect.

I do not think CATOBAR represents such an insurmontable challenge, if the decision is eventually taken to go ahead with it.

The problem is financing the conversion of the two carriers, essentially. And accepting that naval aviation is a serious trade, that should not be half-assed with part-time solutions.