Type 26 changes again

BAE has further refined the design of the Type 26 global combat ship, and the latest changes are visible in the model shown in the last few days at the Euronaval 2012 show. Thanks to Navy Recognition, even us unfortunate ones who couldn't be at the show can see the upgraded look of the frigate.

The gallery also contains countless other sweet images, including photos of the model of the next RFA Tankers to be built under MARS FT, so visit it right away: http://www.navyrecognition.com/index...aval-2012.html

As to the Type 26's latest changes, i am a bit puzzled by a couple of things. 
This was the Type 26 as last shown when the MOD announced the end of the first phase of the program:

The new model shows some significant differences:

The general lines have not changed since my last big report, the main gun is still a 127 mm, and the light guns have not moved. If you didn't read the earlier article, i suggest you do it now. It'll help you a lot in understanding the ship.
The number of missile cells does not seem to have changed: there are 24 large cells, presumably and hopefully "strike lenght", arranged in two rows of 12 on the bow.
The CAMM mini-silos have changed, and from two clusters with 3x4 cells each, now we are four separate rows each with 6 cells, for a total of 24 missiles. No change in the number of cells, only in the disposition.
24 more cells are located, in two rows of 12 each, in the main funnel mast, again no change.
The propulsion approach seems also set, by now, with the Royal Navy aiming to a CODLOG architecture, probably with a single Rolls Royce MT30 gas turbine, as already reported a while ago. 

You'll have already noticed that the Phalanx CIWS mounts have changed position, instead, as the arrangement has mutated from Bow-Stern to Port-Starboard, in an a Type 45-like arrangement. Two large sponsons have appeared to allow the Phalanx guns to have a better firing arc, clear of the superstructure.
As a consequence of this move, the missile cells on the bow are now accompanied by four launch tubes, containing decoys, that were originally mounted where the Phalanx now are (see the Top View concept picture, and you should be able to spot them). The Expendable Acoustic Device launchers, part of the S2170 "Sea Sentor" Ship Torpedo Defence System, have also been moved towards the bow.

1) the EAD launchers have moved down the deck some, to make space for the Phalanx guns 

2) the launch tubes of the Irvin GQ IDS300 Naval decoy have been moved all the way to the bow

Loading an EAD in the launcher. Look out for these 8-barrel mortars on Royal Navy ships, now that you know what they are, and you'll find them easily enough.

 
The four tubes are the IDS300 Naval radar Decoy launchers. These launch a floating, inflatable decoy that is essentially an array of radar reflector panels capable to generate a Radar Cross Section that can trick enemy surveillance radars and radar homing anti-ship missiles.

Irvin-GQ Naval Decoy deployed

Irvin-GQ Naval Decoy launch tube on HMS Westminster: it seems a second tube is missing, probably it was in maintenance when the photo was taken.

This inflatable radar decoy, known as IDS300, is also present on the Type 45, as visible in photos on this brochure. It is produced by Irvin-GQ, now Airborne Systems. The tube is extremely easily integrated on any ship and is said to have a very low RCS that does not impact the radar signature of the ship. Indeed, the tubes aren't exactly hidden away, not even on the Type 45. 

This also indirectly gives us a good idea of what Countermeasures, currently in service, are expected to migrate onto the Type 26s. 
There's a chance that the Type 26 will instead replace the current 130 mm SeaGnat fixed launcher barrels for countermeasure rounds with the Centurion trainable launch turret, which was demonstrated and offered to the Royal Navy in recent times, but arrived too late for Type 45, thus failing to gain (for now) an order.

Sea Gnat fixed launchers

The Centurion uses the same decoy rounds (MK251 SIREN, Chemring MK216 MK1 Mod 1 Chaff round and MK245 Infra Red Flare round), but instead of using multiple fixed batteries of 6 tubes each, the Centurion is a trainable turret with 12 launch tubes that can be turned in the best direction and set at the best elevation to obtain the best effect, regardless of the position of the ship.
The turret also offers advantages in terms of Radar Cross Section reduction.   

A graphic showing the Centurion turret. It might make it onto the Type 26s

Back to Phalanx, I'm not entirely happy about the change, personally, because the new position of the guns offers arcs of fire much more constrained. The bow and stern are pretty much blind corners to this kind of installation, while a Bow-Stern solution offered much better coverage.
This new installation is potentially a bit more suited if we assume the Phalanx gun is fending off an assault by fast, suicide crafts, an asymmetric menace taken very seriously in these days, and one of the main reasons behind the upgrades of the Phalanx to 1B Baseline 2 standard.
BAE says that the relocation of the Phalanx guns was made on specific request of the Royal Navy, and i suspect small, fast crafts have much to do with this wish. However, personally my vote stays with the Bow-Stern arrangement, definitely better to offer 360° degrees coverage against missiles and air threats. 

Another change is the downsizing and splitting of port side aft funnel mast. Indeed, it does not seem to be a funnel mast anymore, and this is possibly connected to improved use of internal spaces. The sponsons supporting the remotely-controlled light gun have also been redesigned, and they no longer sport the prominent reverse-pyramid shape they had before. Probably this change is due to RCS considerations and/or, even more likely, to management of the air flows connected to helicopter operations.

The doors in the superstructure, marking the boat spaces and the accesses to the Flexible Mission Space have also been changed. From 2 large doors on the Starboard side, both well ahead of the aft funnel, and a single large door on Port side we have moved to 2 doors on Port side and 1 on Starboard side.
More importantly, and somehow worrisome, the second door on the Port side is no longer full sized, and no longer located ahead of the aft funnels, but behind it. I hope it is only a redesign, not a shrinkage of the Mission Bay. However, the half-height door does not convince me: even if we assume that it is specifically meant to put to sea unmanned vehicles, we should be aware that, in the future, Unmanned Vehicles are likely to grow in size and complication, so we should try to have as few design limitations as possible. In partial compensation, it seems that the two doors left are higher and larger than before, at least.
A more optimistic interpretation of this change is that the Mission Bay might have actually expanded, as the door is now located in a position that before was almost certainly occupied by the now removed aft funnel. The relocation and changed design of the doors might be about better utilization of the space, and in place of the door now moved back towards the stern there might now be space and power connections for an additional container/module of equipment.

1) The funnel mast that is no longer a funnel. Underwent a split and redesign. 2) The relocated, smaller door. 3) The position of the second door on the earlier concept pictures. Actually, as i said, the side with the two doors was originally the opposite one, but you get the idea.

The main radar mast seems somewhat taller, but this might just be a feeling due to differences in the photos. The two white radomes on the mast's sides are huge, and much larger than those visible in the concept pictures, but they might be the SCOT 5 satcom X-band system, nothing particularly mysterious if that's the case.

Not dramatic changes, overall, sign that the design is frozen in its main aspects by now. Still, interesting to note and comment about. It is possible that in the next few days BAE will let us know some more things, and as always, i'll report about them as soon as possible.

For now, enjoy the novelties on show!  

SDSR: the words it didn't say

Time and obsessive attention on my part continue to bring forth more and more unpleasant and obscure elements of the SDSR and of the successive "restructuring" in programs and timelines.

DefenseNews.com today confirms a fear that i've reported more than once on this blog, that the Royal Navy will have a gap of at least four years in Airborne Early Warning capability when the Sea King ASaC MK7 is retired in 2016.
Crowsnest, which is confirmed as part of the Core Budget at least, is not expected to deliver before 2020. Indeed, some documents suggest that it could be 2021 or even 2022 before it can enter service.

The recent damning report of the Defence Committee on Marittime Surveillance after Nimrod contains the hint, where it notes that:

There is the potential for other capability gaps to occur, such as when the Sea King airborne surveillance and control helicopter is withdrawn in 2016 to be replaced by the Project Crowsnest operating from the Merlin Mk2.

This is another blow to the operational effectiveness of the Royal Navy, that is close to being zeroed. It is also spitting in the face of hard-gained direct and bloody experience: the Falklands evidently have not seen enough ships sunk to learn the goddamn lesson.

There is also apparently no hope left to see the AEW package going on the (at this point wasted) remaining Merlin HM1 airframes, as the MOD's description of Crowsnest is:

Project CROWSNEST will satisfy the requirement for an assured Airborne Surveillance and Control (ASaC) capability to provide long range surveillance and battlespace management to Carrier Strike and Littoral Manoeuvre task groups. Project CROWSNEST is to replace SKASaC. The mission system solution will be hosted on the existing Merlin Mk2 aircraft, affording that platform a true multi-role capability across the air, maritime, land, surface and sub-surface environments. This will exploit the flexibility inherent in having a bolt-on sensor package that could allow either Anti-Submarine Warfare or ASaC role to be discharged dependent on the Commander's requirements (although to note the two roles may be mutually exclusive for concurrent or simultaneous operations). 

Another sizeable reduction in the strenght of the Fleet Air Arm is ahead, with the loss of the current AEW squadrons, and the passage of yet another mission on the shoulders of a shrinking Merlin community, with the predictable result that there will be no longer enough ASW, nor enough AEW. A disaster on the whole line.
It's worth remembering that the Merlin is also supposed to "close the gap" left by the loss of Nimrod.
Someone in the MOD really believes that Merlin is a wizard, and not an helicopter present in a fleet that will only number 30 and supposed to deliver 6 to 8 Small Ship Flights, carrier-wing flight (up to 6 helicopters) and presence in Bahrain for maritime security, and presence on RFA vessels.
Asking for miracles.  


Also, the SDSR said that the Hunt and Sandown classess of minesweepers would continue service (in number of 14, so one is due to retire soon...?) and start the transition to a "new capability" from 2018.
This was widely read as implying the start of their replacement with the MCM, Hydrographic and Patrol Capability ship (MHPC), but it now appears that this was very wide off the mark.
A DSTL call for papers on technological innovation in marittime applications contains a little bit of detail on the shape of MHPC, described as a "phased approach".
Ultimately, it is revealed that in 2018, at most, there will be a capability insertion into the current vessels, but new ships are not due until a decade later, in 2028 at the earliest. 

In 2018, if the plan survives the next planning rounds, the Hunt class of minesweepers (or, more likely, a selected number of ships in the class) will finally get the first new Unmanned Underwater Vehicles and Unmanned Surface Vehicles designed to provide a flexible stand-off MCM capability.
In particular, Thales and ASV Ltd have recently teamed up to develop a novel USV which will conduct payload trials in 2013 and is targeted at the Royal Navy needs, specifically for adoption on the Hunt. This new unmanned vehicle will have full payload flexibility, with the capability to tow sonars and sweep equipment and/or the capability to remotely deploy other drones, such as underwater mine-clearing devices such as the in-service SeaFox.

This is, however, only the latest reincarnation of a requirement that has been agonizing since 2005, when the Hunt minesweepers lost forever their on-board towed influence sweeping equipment.
This was due to be swiftly replaced with unmanned systems which would be fitted to 4 of the Hunt vessels under a 150 million contract. The unmanned vehicle, developed by ATLAS under the acronym FAST (Flexible Agile Sweeping Technology) didn't actually enter service, however: instead, it is to this day being used to research and demonstrate the use of unmanned vehicles in off-board MCM operations.
In 2011, FAST deployed at sea, controlled via radio, and launched a SeaFox mine-disposal drone, acting as a communications relay platform keeping the Mission Command center (installed in a container on the shore) in contact with the SeaFox in action underwater, in a world's first.

The Thales USV (which is actually apparently required to be Optionally Manned) is expected to deliver a more complete, all-round capability, which will finally enter service. Hopefully.
The numbers have reduced, and from 4 Hunt vessels fitted now the ambition is to fit only one. 
The MOD expects to buy two complete USV systems, one of which will be integrated on a Hunt vessel, while the other will be "deployable" and configured so to be operated from the shore or from a vessel of opportunity.
The USV will have to operate remotely at 12 miles from the mothership and will have to offer a wide variety of capabilities: electric, magnetic and acoustic influence sweep systems, but it will also demonstrate deployment of other, smaller Unmanned Vehicles and deployment and employment of sonars and sensors meant to detect the mines.
This will be a demonstrator to the future MHPC full capability, while delivering (with many years of delay) a replacement for the influence sweep capability once offered by the Hunt.

The USV project is part of an Unmanned Vehicle demonstrator program that was kick-started this year, to define a full equipment set comprising Medium and Small Underwater vehicles, Remotely Operated Vehicles (ROVs), Delayed Disposal Charges (as opposed to the current One-Shot SeaFox disposal vehicle, that is sacrificial, the DDC is placed on the mine and detonated when the unmanned vehicle has gotten back to safety - one off the shelf option being the COBRA system intended for use on SeaFox itself) and a surface craft capable to deploy the unmanned vehicles at stand-off range.
The package, once fully defined, will be globally deployable and able to operate from shore and from ships.

At least, the MCM package is taking the right shape, and much of the necessary systems and capabilities already exist and are, to a degree, proven.
The 2011 demonstration with FAST, SeaFox and deployable command post ashore was particularly precious and illuminating. With the USV hopefully demonstrated next year, the system will get considerably more mature.
The bad news is, of course, that MHPC vessels are far, far away in time.


In the early 2020s we should see the entry in service of the 3 vessels of the MARS Solid Support Ship type. There is still little in the way of detail about these vessels, meant to replace Fort Victoria, Fort Rosalie and Fort Austin. Fort Rosalie had a "first" last year when it became the first RFA vessel taking aboard an Apache helicopter, which it delivered to HMS Ocean for operations.
Fort Austin, which had been in reserve from 2009, has been re-activated and is about to re-enter service following an extensive refit.
Unless their lives are further extended, however, the Forts will retire in the first years of the new decade (Rosalie in 2022, Austin in 2021), and for this reason "additional work on MARS" is part of the funded Core Budget for the next 10 years. Their replacements will be needed not far into the future (in defence planning terms).

The MARS SSS requirement was once only for 2 vessels, because the support to amphibious and army forces ashore from the sea would be provided by 3 "Joint Sea Based Logistic" vessels. Unsurprisingly, the JSBL was soon enough killed in budget cuts, and currently the assumption is to have their intended role "added" to the SSS, with a boost from 2 to 3 ships.

The SSS will employ the new "Heavy-RAS" kit from Rolls Royce, which can move 5-ton pallets instead of the current 2, a dramatic improvement. The H-RAS kit is already being installed in a shore training facility at HMS Raleigh.
The ships are also expected to have, much like the current Forts, a great Aviation-Support capability, with large hangars for multiple helicopters. 

Other than this, though, we do not know much about the ship's design yet. However, an interesting concept drawing has appeared, which shows a two-spot flight deck, a triple hangar for Merlin-sized helicopters and, most interestingly, a RoRo ramp for vehicles and a LPD-style well deck. This feature, which has appeared on several designs of "Joint" Solid Support vessels around the world, might be inherited, along with the role of support to troops ashore, from the defunct JSBL. It is too early to say if this project will be the definitive one, but it seems safe to assume that some real consideration is going into giving the SSS a vehicle deck and the possibility to operate with large LCU crafts for the delivery of supplies, vehicles and logistic services to troops ashore. This is important, since the JSBL ship might well have been cancelled, but the requirements that brought to her in the first place are still very much there.

The MARS SSS concept art, quite detailed, shows very well the important aviation capabilities, but, crucially, shows a RoRo ramp for vehicles and a well deck.

Alive, but in coma, are two more "projects", the replacement of RFA Argus and of RFA Diligence. Diligence entered a new Major Service Life Extension refit, being given the hundredth breath of life, to enable her to deliver her invaluable services well into the 2020s, but will eventually need replacement. Its OSD has been pushed to the right again and again, and she was already life extended in 2007, out to 2017. If the new life-extension is as ambitious, it'll be a further 10 years. At some point, though, it will be impossible to delay the decision any further.

Argus will also not live forever. Replacing her with two much enhanced 200-bed hospital ships was one of the big promises already of the SDR 1998, and here she is, still going strong and with no real alternative yet in sight. And no second vessel in the role either.
The attempts to proceed with a replacement have been numerous, and came up with several impossible acronyms, from Primary Casualty Receiving Ship (PCRS) to Joint Casualty Treatment Ship (JCTS), the current denomination of Argus herself, which is also an invaluable Auxiliary Aviation Ship used for training, but also for maritime security and disaster relief operations, deploying in the Gulf or in the Caribbean.
Currently, the name of her intended replacement is "MR3MC", keeping up the tradition of impossible acronyms. This stands for Maritime Role 3 Medical Capability.

Is it really so monstrous to suggest that the International Aid budget, only budget seeing a net increase (and what an increase, at + 35%!), helps funding an hospital ship that could well be a big investment in the kind of "soft power" that the government loves, being in first line to help in case of disaster or to routinely provide support to countries in need, while also meeting RN needs?
I don't think it would be unfair.

The Diligence replacement, indicated with the acronym OMAR (Operational Maintenance and Repair Ship) was first studied in 2006, but naturally did not go far.
I found mention in a DSTL document of a mysterious "FRC", which i suspect means Forward (or Future) Repair Capability. It was accompanied by a tiny concept drawing of a ship that would appear fitted with large cranes, space for various containers, hangars and workshops.

Interestingly, the MR3MC, the FRS and the MARS SSS seem to share the same hull design, obviously stretched and adapted to each role.

Much less detailed concept art of the new Diligence replacement (?) and of the new hospital ship. Far too early to say that they will happen and actually be as drawn, but at least there seems to be thinking going on still. The hospital ship shows a large flight deck that would enable the vessel to continue to serve as aviation training ship. The base hull design seems to be the same. 

The MARS SSS is a fundamental capability for the armed forces, as it is indispensable to sustain military effort abroad.

At times, the "want of frigates" blinds us all to the less glamorous but even more important needs of the armed forces. But Logistic Ships and other vital enablers should always be in spotlight in a coherent strategy. Without them, lots of frigates will be largely useless.

The Royal Navy is certainly short on escorts, but much as in the Army capbadges always get all the attention, in the Navy destroyers and frigates take the attention away from the kind of specialized shipping that makes the RN important.
Aircraft carriers, amphibs, SSNs and logistic ships are what really make the Royal Navy relevant and capable. Mine Countermeasures follow, also due to the fact that the americans (quite weak in this sector) value the british MCM competency immensely.

Everyone who has the armed forces's efficiency at heart should always keep in mind that, at times, the back-end is more important than the front-end.