Type 26: where does the money go?

The MOD has announced the signature of the Type 26 Manufacture Phase 1 contract, covering the first 3 of 8 planned Type 26 frigates. First steel will be cut in the next few weeks, and perhaps we'll hear about names too. 

The latest, and presumably final CGIs released show "fat cheeks" on the superstructure that give long passageways around the bridge, good for situational awareness and for the placement of small weapons for anti-swarm, anti-FIAC defence. The mast design has been further refined, and the Sea Ceptor cells arrangement has been finalized, with the launchers being the same "mushrooms" tubes used on the Type 23s refitted with the missile. The number of cells has not changed, while the export design targeted at Canada (and, with further modifications, at Australia) has been shown replacing the CAMM cells with an additional MK41 module (from 24 to 32 cells).

The latest images show what Type 26 will look like

This model of a Type 26 proposal for Canada shows an extra MK41 module instead of CAMM cells. 

The contract is described as a 3.7 billion pounds deal, but this figure urgently needs to be clarified. Government seems to be playing games by using it: on one side, it is giving the impression that it is committing more money than it actually is; on the other it makes it impossible to figure out how much each of the three vessels is costing. Unfortunately, whatever the exact amount, the answer is: a bloody lot.

The confusion is due to the MOD having already signed contracts worth more than 1.9 billion pounds to get to this point.

The first big Type 26 contract dates back to 2010 and was a 127 million, 4-years contract for designing the new vessel.

In February 2015 this was followed by an 859 million Demonstration Phase deal, which included selection of suppliers and long lead items orders, plus the construction of three shore-based test facilities to de-risk key parts of the vessel. David Brown built a test facility to demonstrate the new cross-connect gearbox developed for the Type 26; General Electric Power Conversion built the Electric Power Generation and Propulsion facility to de-risk the power segment of the ship; and the Combat System Land Based Integration and Test laboratory demonstrated the entire Combat System. This investment should pay dividends later on by ensuring that all works as intended, preventing many of the teething issues associated with new systems in new ships.

In march 2016, contracts for 472 million in long-lead items including side doors, helicopter handling system, bow sonar domes and other parts was announced.

In July, 183 million pounds were added to procure the MK45 gun systems (including automated ammunition handling, gun fire control system and ammunition) for the first three ships; plus another system to be installed ashore as integrated training facility.

In December 2016 another large contract followed, for 380 millions, covering chilled water plants, hangar cranes, hatches and watertight doors, membrane sewage treatment plants, steering gear and stabilizers.

The long list of suppliers and systems already under contract and at work due to earlier Demonstration Phase contracts 

Most, but not all, of these almost 2 billion pounds, which have been converted in a long list of parts already on order / delivered / being delivered for the first three vessels, have effectively been announced a second time, because they are included in the 3.7 billion deal.

A part of what was already expended is counted separately: probably the non-recurring cost of setting up the shore test facilities, the gun training system, and other voices of expenditure.

Whatever the exact division of costs, the pricetag of the Type 26s remains disconcerting, because most of its known systems and capabilities are non-developmental, funded by different budget lines, or straight out recycled.

The ship will have a newly designed gearbox but will use well known MT30 gas turbines already used all around the world; and it will have a CODLOG (Combined Diesel or Gas) which is arguably the simplest configuration involving a gas turbine. A well understood, definitely non innovative propulsion system and, arguably, in some ways a step back from the Type 23’s CODLAG (Combined Diesel and Gas) which allows the ship to exploit all of its installed power for obtaining max speed.

The ship’s main defensive weapon is the CAMM / Sea Ceptor missile, which is developed and acquired under the Complex Weapons budget line and which is already being procured for the Type 23 life extension and capability sustainment project, with three vessels already refitted.

Type 26 will have more Sea Ceptor cells (48 in two well separated silos, fore and aft, of 24 cells each; versus 32 all on the bow for Type 23), but will essentially inherit most of the arsenal from the retiring Type 23s.

The ship’s gun is new to the Royal Navy, but is the latest iteration of a system which is decades old and used in hundreds and hundreds of exemplars on US Navy and other nations’ vessels all around the world. The only developmental addition is the automated ammunition handling system and depot, but similar systems are already operational around the world and hardly break the bank.

The main radar is planned to be the Artisan 3D, already operational on Type 23, from which it will migrate to the new hulls.

The Type 26’s main offensive power will entirely depend from three 8-cell MK41 vertical missile launchers. Again, a new system in Royal Navy use, but well over a thousand such VLS modules are operational in the US Navy and elsewhere. Their cost is far from prohibitive, and they are non developmental and well understood.

What is not well understood is what, if anything, the Royal Navy will put into these VLS. It currently has no weapon, in service or planned, which is ready for MK41. The Tomahawk is an obvious candidate, but the small Royal Navy stock of the missile is all in the encapsulated variant for submerged launch from submarine’s torpedo tubes.

Harpoon is going out of service next year, leaving the Royal Navy bare of any heavy anti-surface missile, and the Type 26’s offensive power is entirely dependent on “Maritime Future Offensive Surface Warfare capability”, a programme which is funded under the Complex Weapons budget (so entirely additional to other Type 26 costs) and which only appeared in the Equipment Plan in the 2016 edition. We know absolutely nothing of its exact aims and of the timeframe associated with it.

Light guns for ship’s self defence will come from retiring Type 23s, as will a good part of the decoy outfit, including the S2170 anti-torpedo system.

The towed array sonar Type 2087 also comes straight from the Type 23s. We don’t yet know about the hull-mounted sonar on the bow. Maybe this, at least, will be new. Or maybe no.

The exact details of how equipment will migrate between Type 23s and Type 26 is not known. The MOD was asked about it in a few occasions, but offered very little in terms of answers. It is obvious that a Type 23 will have to leave service early to be dismantled and robbed of parts to enable the fitting out of a new Type 26 unless a few new sets of equipment are purchased.

According to admiral sir PhilipJones, three such “extra” sets have been procured, for the first three vessels, to ensure that there is no need to shrink the fleet early to fit out the first new Type 26s. After that, the equipment for the following vessels will come from the withdrawn 23s.

Admiral Sir Philip Jones: Yes, that is absolutely true. One of the things that we think will de-risk the Type 26’s entry into service is the fact that much of its equipment will have been tested and proved by operating on the Type 23 frigates, in particular the Sea Ceptor missile system, the Artisan Type 997 air surveillance radar and a number of other things.The Type 23 that we bring in to pay off has to be the donor platform to the next Type 26. We’ve bought new equipment for each of the three first Type 26s, to sort of get the class going, if you like; that is part of the long-lead items we have procured. So we will then have, as it were, a residue of decommissioned Type 23s’ equipment, which we can return and recycle, and deliver to the builder to fit into the Type 26. We won’t have to bring one in and stop it operating before we send it north; we’ve deliberately factored that in. I think that means that we will have much more resilience and already-tested equipment in that ship, which will bring it into service much faster than we’ve seen before.

Exactly what these “extra” sets include is not clear. It seems highly unlikely that there will be extra Type 2087 sonars, for example. Probably we are only looking at the essential pieces.

In theory, the extra sets could afterwards ease the fitting out of the Type 31e frigate if it will ever actually come together and if there will ever be more than 5 of them. In theory, purchasing three extra sets of parts gives the Royal Navy enough kit for 16 frigates instead of 13. Whether this benefit is ever realized is anyone’s guess.

The Type 26 introduces very little in the way or truly new systems to the fleet. There is a hope that the Royal Navy will be able to improve the crucially important self-defence decoy fit by replacing current fixed-tube launchers with something like the CENTURION trainable decoy launcher, which can adjust to fire the decoy in the best possible direction for maximum effect, without the entire ship needing to change course first. This is extremely important in light of the development abroad of faster and faster anti-ship missiles which will not wait for the ship to manoeuvre into a new position. But even this very, very modest development is currently a mere hope: data about Type 26 so far makes no mention of this and earlier attempts by the RN to invest in this area were frustrated by lack of funding.

CENTURION trainable decoy launcher 

It even seems that the Type 26 will not carry ship-launched anti-submarine torpedoes. For years now there has been no mention of migrating the Type 23’s magazine torpedo launchers. In absence of a vertical launch anti-submarine weapon such as the American ASROC, the Type 26 will be entirely dependent on the embarked helicopter for prosecuting the submarines it picks up on the sonar.

While the limitations of the ship-launched light torpedo are well understood (being close enough to a submarine to employ it probably means the submarine has already fired its own much larger torpedoes), it seems rather disconcerting to do away with them entirely. And if they aren't fitted, this is another capability the Type 26’s budget is not funding.

How the ship can be quite so expensive despite all of the above is mysterious. We are light years away from the affordable pricetag that had been the target of the programme, yet many of the big-ticket items are not even contributing to the cost. 

We are left to wonder whether spreading the build on two shipyards (Scotstoun and Govan) is at least partially responsible. Earlier plans included spending serious money on finally building a single, capable “frigate factory” plant, but this would have meant closing one of the current two yards, and this was unpalatable. One look at the two-site Type 26 construction strategy, however, is enough to see how much more complication, risk and waste of time (and, inexorably, cost) it adds.

Above, the single-site shipyard proposal. 

BAE Systems two-shipyards Type 26 assembly strategy. 


The Type 26 is also now described as a 157 men ship. Earlier, the “Core Crew” had been given as 118. To be fair, however, 118 probably excluded elements such as the embarked helicopter flight, which are very much an integral part of what makes a warship work. Probably, 157 is not sign of a step away from automation, but merely a more complete and realistic indication of what it takes to make the warship operate. In 2012, the Royal Navy described the 118 core crew as needed for mere “Float, Move and Self Protect” activities, with ASW specialist “packets” coming separately, along with all other teams needed for the mission.  There is space for a further 51 souls (208 bunks in total) to be embarked to operate systems carried in the Mission Bay or as reinforced boarding teams or for other necessities.

The MOD is being very vague about timeframes for entry in service. What once was 2021 had already become 2023 and might now be closer to 2025, with the MOD talking of “around the middle 2020s”. It won’t be earlier than 2023, might be 2025. This is bad news as it means shrinking the fleet or delaying further the exit from service of the aging Type 23s. HMS Argyll was meant to bow out in 2023, followed by the others roughly with a yearly drumbeat. This will have to change unless the fleet is to dramatically shrink.

While we wait for the Shipbuilding Strategy and for a plan for the Type 31e frigate that is supposed to complement Type 26, it is hard to rejoice for Sunday’s announcement. It was a key, much delayed and long expected development, definitely overdue, but it brings forth unpleasant questions. How can this ship cost so much? How can british shipbuilding go on if this is the best price it can offer?

Strategy is a long term vision

There is not too terribly much that can be said on sir Parker’s review of the UK shipbuilding situation, at the moment. His is merely a list of suggestions, an independent report which might or might not generate policy changes. To know whether his recommendations have changed anything, we’ll have to wait for the actual Shipbuilding Strategy which the government has promised to publish sometime in “spring 2017”.

That document is the one we want to read, and the one from which answers should come. We can only hope that something serious comes out of the whole exercise, but skepticism is more than justified.

The single most important recommendation formulated by sir Parker, in my opinion, is this:

The MOD Sponsor should establish a transparent Master Plan for naval shipbuilding that lays out Defence’s procurement plans for each series of naval ships over the next 30 years. This should be backed by “set and assured” capital budgets for each new series of ships. The Master Plan should be reviewed at each SDSR.

The importance of an overarching, long term vision cannot possibly be overstated. What sir Parker denounces in his report is that the Royal Navy’s future is dependent on a series of programmes that almost come out of the blue. There is no master plan, there is no long term vision guiding the succession of studies, assessments and attempts to launch a new shipbuilding programme of any kind.

The result of the short-termism is evident in today’s frankly desperate situation, in which the Royal Navy, at very short notice, has been saddled with 5 OPVs that it didn’t really want nor yet need (the current ones could easily last another decade, as was planned until recently); while at the same time seeing its main frigate programme not only delayed, but broken into two halves, the second of which has no defined shape, role, budget. RFA Diligence is gone without replacement, RFA Argus is very much at risk of ending the same way within the next 4 years, and the future of everything else is still vague and indefinite, subject to the shifting fortunes of yearly budget negotiations.

Ultimately, the current process involves many people and too many ‘hand-offs’. Too many think they have a vote, or even a veto, in the process. Current governance is not sufficiently clear. There is no assured “Capital budget” for a RN project which means programmes are subject to arbitrary intervention and delays adding to cost. Senior Responsible Owners’ objectives and accountability are not always properly aligned. There is a clear system of financial approvals via the Investment Approvals Committee, but the system is not always applied intelligently to ensure that good quality information and early engagement with decision makers results in well evidenced and timely decisions. The result is a lack of empowered project grip.  

Sir Parker talks of “set and assured” capital budgets for the 30 year plan, and this would clearly be helpful, but it is also evidently very complicated. Even just a more flexible commitment would help, however, as it would help the Royal Navy’s struggle to preserve what’s left of the fleet.

The navy itself needs to plan that far ahead, not so much in terms of what the singular ship will look like that far away in time, but in terms of how to retain and possibly enhance a capability. There are, in my opinion, two critical cases in which long term planning is long overdue: one has to do with the role of the MCM, Hydrographic Capability (MHC) mothership expected to eventually replace current Hunt, Sandown and Echo classes, beginning in 2028. The MHC mothership plans have taken, this far, a very far back seat, with all MHC attention going to the payload development and test.

There are certainly good reasons for focusing on the new unmanned vehicles and the new kind and breadth of stand-off mine clearing they enable. It is a great innovation, with all the risks that innovation entails, and until the system is proven the Royal Navy cannot take a final decision on whether the future mothership will be a steel-hulled, multi-role vessel or a novel edition of the super-specialized GRP hulls in use today.

The Royal Navy, however, needs to take a decision quickly because as Type 31 drops down the capability ladder to become a “light frigate”, or a General Purpose vessel, the fields of usefulness of Type 31 and of the potential MHC Mothership begin to overlap.

Without a plan, there is a very real risk that the Royal Navy, within a decade, goes from having no “second line” flotilla to having three classes of second rank ships: Type 31, River Batch 2, MHC. It would be an incredibly bad use of money, because it would leave the high end fleet of escorts short of numbers and capability, while overcrowding the lower segment.

Sir Parker mentions that containerized MCM kit could one day be deployed from Type 31, and while this might well be, the point that needs to be made, very quickly, is what overlap exists between Type 31 and MHC – Mothership. Can they become the same programme? If not, how can the RN make sure that the Type 31, while being “light” is an escort oriented towards the high end of warfare, with MHC covering the low end, rather than duplicating a same set of limited capabilities?

This is how wasteful procurement is born: lack of clarity, lack of long term vision.

The Type 26 itself is already suffering from severe lack of long term vision. The Royal Navy arrived to the Type 26 programme after close to two decades of desperate attempts to get a new frigate programme on the move. Countless efforts began and died without ever generating a single ship, and the last of the big studies had eventually come up with a fleet-wide plan for 10 “C1” high-end ASW combatants supported by 8 “C2”, simpler “general purpose” frigates, with a third class, the “C3” for OPV roles and MHC mothershipping.

Type 26 came out of the killing blow dealt to that tentative long term plan: C1 and C2 were merged into Type 26 and their cumulative total was reduced to 13, with any C3 equivalent deferred to a vague future.

Then, just a few years into the Type 26 programme, the Royal Navy has been effectively kicked back to a C1 and C2 situation, where 8 Type 26 are supposed to be the C1 element and the Type 31 the C2.

This is an example of catastrophic long term planning failure, and the Type 26 now arguably suffers of design imbalances caused by having to be the “one and only”. The Type 26 has been designed with extremely long logistic endurance, a vast defensive armament spread in two different areas of the ship, a very large mission bay and a Chinook-capable flight deck, and thanks to the MK41 it has the potential to be very well armed as well (overlooking for a moment the fact that right now she is far more likely to have empty cells than filled cells, again for lack of clarity on the future and cash shortage). Was all this necessary in an ASW-roled escort which, by virtue of its role, would spend most of its time in task group? They are all very helpful attributes, but being in task group means having relatively easy access to extra firepower from the other vessels; access to fuel and stores replenishment; aviation support.

Currently, the RN is facing the prospect of having a large, multi-role ASW vessel inside the task group and a cheap, light frigate doing solo deployments. One is left to wonder if it wouldn’t make more sense to have built a somewhat simpler ASW escort, more rationally thought out for Task Group roles, and a capable “global combat ship” as supporting element, designed to be a capable “solo player”.

Imbalances caused by lack of long term clarity, again.

Another area that needs long-term clarity is the amphibious capability, left in disarray by the loss of HMS Ocean without replacement, which damages very badly the UK’s capability in the sector and imposes a hybrid use of the new aircraft carriers, under the acronym CEPP, for Carrier Enabled Power Projection.

The long term solution, if a realistic amphibious capability is to be retained, is to replace the current LPDs with LHDs, combining aviation spaces with well dock and large landing crafts. But this will be extremely complex unless a coherent plan is worked out well beforehand and the government endorses the requirement. As of now, would you be willing to bet any money on the LPDs being replaced at all…? I would be very torn.

The lack of a long term plan inexorably makes it almost impossible to sustain the shipbuilding sector. How can a serious industrial and infrastructural project be put together if there is not a realistic idea of what it is that the Navy will buy, how it will do so and when? Who could ever seriously invest in shipbuilding if the only thing somewhat assured is that a few frigates will, indeed, one day be built again, while everything else might simply be replaced by vessels built abroad, if not by nothing at all?

A long term plan is desperately necessary. Everything depends on such a plan, and on decisions to be made. If we look ahead, we see that a shipbuilding plan for the surface fleet includes:

-          3 large Solid Support Ships, probably close to 40.000 tons each, to be built between 2020 and 2025

-          8 Type 26, between 2017 (hopefully) and the 2030s

-          N Type 31 between X and the 2030s

-          N MHC ships, to be defined, from the late 2020s onwards

The LPDs should enter “replacement age” around 2030 – 2032. Now that they alternate in and out of service in 5 year intervals their useful life might be effectively stretched out, but their lack of aviation facilities and overall insufficient troops and vehicles capacity, in light of the loss of Ocean, suggests that a replacement is needed sooner rather than later, so the carriers can eventually concentrate on being carriers, rather than LHAs. Depending on the choices that will be made, building the LHDs would also help sustain the whole shipbuilding sector.

By 2039, the Type 45 will all have gone out of service too, unless their 25-years life is extended. The Royal Navy is currently planning to have them gone by 2039, taking the last MK8 Mod 1 guns with them (there is currently no money for ever retrofitting the 127mm gun on Type 45).

Depending on how the government wanted / was financially able to proceed, there is no real shortage of work: these programmes often overlap, suggesting that for many years there could be a relative abundance of orders. Assuming all programmes eventually start and that ships are not procured abroad. And this is what the strategy needs to say.

In the early 2020s, the RFA Argus question will resurface as well, and a successor to RFA Diligence is highly desirable, so there is in theory a need for a couple of large civilian ship conversions or new builds, if the government is willing to endorse the requirement.

The Venator 110 is sir Parker's idea of what a Type 31 base design could be. Hard not to agree with him, especially since the two BAE alternatives seen so far, the Avenger and Cutlass, have little good to offer, particularly the former. 

 

The Royal Navy desperately needs a long term plan for weapons, too. VL or canister? Type 23/45 would need the latter, Type 26 the former, Type 31? Land attack? Anti-ship? Currently, only confusion is apparent. 

All decisions about the future of the shipyards can only be taken if there is a long term master plan upon which assumptions and plans can be built.

If the three MARS SSS ships were built in the UK, in Blocks and Super Blocks, even Rosyth could have a future as the yard of assembly. As of now, Rosyth does not have much of a post-carriers future, with the Goliath crane already expected to be sold once the work on the flagships is over and all that remains is nuclear submarine dismantling and, maybe, the carrier refits over their service life.

A decision to have the SSS built in the UK could change the situation entirely, and the LPD replacement could slot on the back of the three ships (with a bit of a gap in the middle, admittedly, but probably manageable).

The recommendation to assemble the Type 31 away from the Clyde is a political hot potato. In some ways it is highly desirable, in others it is a problem. The SNP will be given something to moan about if the Clyde does not assembly the new frigate. On the other hand, if a yard down south does the job, the SNP can be told, much more credibly, that if they play their independence stunt, the flow of work for the yards will dry up and construction will move south.

It is also evident that trying to built two different frigate types at the same time in the same yard could cause all sorts of problems, including the transmission of delays from one programme to the other whenever something does not work as intended. It might be reasonable to assume that BAE systems will attempt to craft out a plan to use Govan and Scotstoun differently, perhaps assigning a frigate type to each site. What will happen with the Type 31 is, at this moment in time, anyone’s guess.

The exportability bit is the one that leaves me shaking my head. It is hard to imagine that Type 31 will turn out a great export success. The market is already quite saturated with “cheap” warships which come with extremely good capability and a very heavy load of weaponry. If the Royal Navy insists on its usual trend of trying to contain cost by shredding sensors and weapons rather than adjusting building standards and other areas, the Type 31 will never sell. Look at the ships that are being sold, or seriously considered by this nation or that: they are capable vessels. They have probably cut corners somewhere, otherwise they would cost more, but they carry sensors, they tipically have an ASW capability, perhaps not always exploited by the customer, but present. They are heavily armed. The MEKOs sold to Algeria, for example. Or the Aster-armed ships recently sold in the Gulf.

Extremely well armed and cheap vessels from Russia and China are an increasingly attractive proposition.

And there is now a strong political pressure on the US Navy calling for the design of a new “small” surface combatant to build in place of the LCS-derived Fast Frigates in the 2020s. If such a ship was to emerge, it could deal the killing blow to any Type 31 export hope before Type 31 even becomes a thing.

For a variety of good reasons, it is very hard to imagine the Type 31 actually selling, especially if it is built as something which is little more than an OPV.

The Royal Navy needs to get a Type 31 which is actually useful at escorting. It also needs, possibly, to reconsider exactly how Type 26 and Type 31 will be used to cover future requirements. Perhaps it makes more sense to have Type 31s with variable depth towed sonars doing Task Group escort work and Type 26 in solo deployments.

The Royal Navy needs escorts that are credible and that respond to the two greatest dangers out there: air and sub-surface attacks. Type 31 must focus first of all on this simple truth, like the French FTI “intermediate” frigate is doing. The lower end constabulary tasks should not be a design driver, nor, arguably, should they be the Type 31’s concern. What kind of role will the MHC mothership be able to play in that area? Knowing it in good time is fundamental.

The Marine Nationale has been clear all along about what it wanted out of FTI: a ship with capable AAW defences and a good ASW capability, at a lower cost than that of a FREMM. The Type 31 should follow the same path rather than venture in "General Purpose" non-ASW land which will never deliver what the navy effectively needs from its escorts.  

Two other recommendations stand out to my eyes: that the MOD and Navy should be more intelligent buyers of ships; and that a marine design centre of excellence is missing from the picture.

There is a bond between the two things, I feel: the Royal Navy needs to be part of such a design centre of excellence, and it must probably have its own design office inside the organization. Much, if not all, of the Royal Navy’s internal know how and capability in designing warships was lost years ago, leaving the service more or less completely in the hands of industry. This was supposed to save money, but it has probably generated more trouble than benefit.

A Navy able to design its own solutions is a more capable and intelligent customer by default. It will not need to buy the solution to every problem: it can design it and then have it realized. The Italian navy is currently kicking off a major shipbuilding programme building 7 PPA, “light frigates” that will complement the FREMMs and replace everything from two of the old Destroyers down to the current OPVs. The programme also includes a massive and very capable LHD and a supply ship. The cost of the entire programme is lower than the Type 26 alone is expected to cost, and this is extraordinary.

Only 2 of the 7 PPA will be fully equipped with sensors and weaponry, at least initially (torpedoes, towed sonar, Aster missiles, Teseo SSM, 127mm, 76mm CIWS), with a few more having an intermediate fit including 76mm CIWS on top of the hangar, 127mm gun and Aster missiles and the remaining having lighter sensors fit and only the guns, with no Aster. But all come with significant innovations in their design, from the bow to their high speed, from the mission spaces under the flight deck and amidship to the new fixed-face radars to the impressive two-man "cockpit". 

One of the “secrets” of the current Italian shipbuilding programme is that the new ships have largely come out of the work of the Navy’s own design office. Industry is involved, of course, but in a very good way: the new ships introduce a large number of new systems (a new CIWS 76mm turret, new IRST, new radars, new towed sonar, a modular and multi-mission design, an innovative wave piercing bow for very high speeds (PPA is meant for 35 knots speeds) and others) designed by the nation’s industries. Why the UK can’t put together something as ambitious? Why has the Type 31 to be affordable only through being a depressingly low capability hull?

The long-term shipbuilding strategy for the UK must include a real centre of excellence in shipbuilding design, and the Royal Navy probably needs to have its own office inside. Shoulder to shoulder with industry, but with doors that can be locked when the moment calls for it. 

What's a Type 31?

PART 1:  Are escort ships still up to their tasks?

The Seat of Purpose is on the Land. For British maritime power, the real focus of maritime strategy is on what you do once you have control of the sea; ‘the essence of maritime power is the ability to influence events on land’.

 This means that while sea control is essential, only the minimum level of effort, commensurate with the acceptable level of risk, should be employed in it. The rest of our resources should be used to influence events on land, both at, and from, the sea. This also requires sea control, of course, which enables the holder to use maritime power and, if required, denies an opponent that same ability. At sea, the military, diplomatic and economic impact will depend upon the opponent’s dependence upon the maritime

environment for its security and resilience; for many states sea dependency is growing. On land, the military, diplomatic and economic impact will depend upon the holder’s ability to influence its opponent from the sea; this influence could take a variety of forms from a low-level focused maritime blockade

(such as one focused on components for weapons of mass destruction), to an invasion of the opponent’s territory.

MOD Joint Concept Note 1-12 (JCN 1-12), dated May 2012

The promised second part of my reasoning on the future "Lighter Frigate" for the Royal Navy, apparently to be known as Type 31. My question, detailed in Part 1, is whether traditional escort designs can still do their intended job. Several developments suggest that they can't, or that at least they will not be able to do it in the near future. 

So the question becomes: what should Type 31 be? 

The answer, as we saw in Part 1, is "a ship meant to deploy a number of air, surface and sub-surface systems meant to expand its capabilities and allow her to survive, to protect other ships and to contribute to the widest possible range of missions.

Part 2 looks at some ship designs from around the world and details my proposal.

The two extremes

A growing number of designs, either built, planned or simply offered, are meant to embark and employ modular mission payloads. The list would includes vessels such as the American LCS, the Italian PPA, the Damen Crossover, the Black Swan concept, up to the Danish Absalon class.

The first observation to be made is that the importance of the modular payload varies from design to design: the capability of some ships depends almost entirely from the embarked payloads, while other vessels have a wide range of equipment which is only complemented and expanded by embarking payloads.

At the two extremes, we find Black Swan (entirely shaped by payloads) and the Absalom (a fully fledged and well armed warship which also offers a large cargo space). 

The Black Swan concept, which caused lengthy debates online when it was revealed a few years ago, was a deliberately provocative proposal which brought reliance on external payloads to the extreme. The briefing paper argues for the construction of “sloops-of-war” costing no more than 65 million pounds apiece; 2000 to 4000 tons in terms of size; built to commercial standards albeit capable of operations in marginal ice; armed extremely lightly, basically like a current River OPVs perhaps with the addition of a CIWS based on laser (once mature); crew as small as 8, with room for up to 60 more; low, extremely modest speed requirements to reduce costs and complexity; diesel-electric propulsion.

The Black Swan sloop is described as a mothership vessel which operates at stand off distances by sending unmanned systems in the contested, denied area. Its capabilities are entirely driven by the payload embarked and the ship is not meant to operate in isolation but in small groups (assumption is that 4 Black Swan plus mission payloads would be built for the cost of a traditional large escort vessel).

The Black Swan Concept

The Black Swan has a very basic sensors fit, and it is even described as having a rather basic communications fit, which feels contradictory and dubious since, depending on the force of the group and having to stay in constant two-way contact with multiple unmanned vehicles, the ship can be expected to have serious ICS and bandwidth needs.     

The notional design provided at the end of the briefing paper shows a 95 meters ship, a bit over the 3000 tons, with a core crew of 8 and space for 32 mission specialists, which would all live in SSN standard accommodations (HMS Astute being the benchmark). The payload would reach 400 tons and the requirement is for a volume equal to at least 20 containers. A large hangar (Merlin + rotary wing UAV) and a Chinook-capable flight deck complete the design. 

Black Swan Sloop

The design comes with a 600 square meters mission bay and a 370 square meters hangar bay. Each of the 20 containers on the mission deck is individually accessible and can be connected to ship services. A stern ramp for boats is provided aft, flanked by two container positions for modules that require direct access to the water, such as towed array modules.

The Black Swan is an extreme concept, which tries to ensure a large number of ships can be built, and that, however cheap, each is flexible and precious even in a high end warfighting scenario. However, the reliance on external systems is pushed to the extreme, and is arguably excessive. It will be very challenging (both technically and financially) to ensure that the Black Swan can constantly keep UAVs in the air to have sensors coverage and firepower at the ready. Costs will merely shift from the mothership to the vast array of UAVs and USVs and UUVs needed, especially since the authors seem to envisage particularly capable unmanned systems, able to strike enemy targets deep into contested space in a high end warfighting scenario.

Other evident bottlenecks are:

-          Power generation and supply. It is one thing to trade speed off to lower costs, but the mothership will have to provide power to its modular payloads, and this might require substantial amounts of electricity. It might be impossible to cut down the power generation.

-          Space. The tyranny of space imposes the choice of submarine-like accommodations for the crew, and reduces the space available for the specialist teams accompanying the unmanned systems. While they have no men in the cockpit, unmanned systems to this day remain far from “unmanned”, requiring a substantial crew back at the base for maintenance and mission control. We can assume that the systems will become more and more autonomous, but betting that 32 men will be enough for everything and specifying an 8 men core crew is very likely to lead to trouble. It will also put greater pressure on the unmanned systems, which will need to be much more autonomous and much more reliable, making their development riskier, more demanding and, inexorably, more expensive.

Of course, part of the Mission Deck could be used to add accommodation modules for extra personnel, but then the space for the systems is reduced, and finding the good balance might rapidly become challenging.

The Black Swan, in my opinion, chooses the wrong hull. I’d rather have fewer but larger motherships, individually more capable, than groups of small sloops. This because the availability of great space and weight margins greatly eases integration of new systems and evolution through life.

The LCS is just one step above the Black Swan, since it has relatively little capability unless it is carrying a specific mission package.

Much has been said of the LCS, a program which has repeatedly encountered serious difficulties and has thus gained a vast armada of haters which have by now poisoned the whole debate about their merits and shortcomings.

The critique I move to the LCS is that they are trying to be two things that do not mix too well: nimble, ultra-fast littoral “street fighters” and, at the same time, motherships.

The LCS ended up absorbing features of the “Street Fighter” ship envisaged in the 90s by Vice Adm. Art Cebrowski, head of the Naval War College. The “Street Fighter” was going to a cheap, small (less than 1000 tons), extremely fast and nimble, disposable ship meant to go in the littoral and fight off FACs and other anti-access threats in the challenging brown waters were, it was felt, the big Burkes would struggle badly.

In the early 2000s, under the tenure of Donald Rumsfeld at the Pentagon, small ships and “transformational” approaches to warfare gained traction. The LCS was born, and the navy began to work on a mission and on a design for them. The LCS grew quickly as a result, to over 3000 tons, and the requirements piled on it included replacing minesweepers and Perry frigates as well as fighting back FACs in the littoral by means of speed and maneuver. It is not what the original Street Fighter was meant to be, yet it insists on extremely high speed (even if a lot lower than what was wanted from Street Fighter). The compromises that have had to be built into the design as a consequence are the root cause of most of the trouble and of the skepticism that surrounds the ships.

They have large mission bays, but the mission package must weight no more than 105 tons, which is proving difficult. Growth margins are almost inexistent. Accommodations have had to be expanded as more men are required to accomplish the missions. Autonomy is not very good, as the ships are thirsty race horses. And their armament, EW and sensors fit limits their warfighting capability. 

The LCS ASW module. Ship-mounted torpedo tubes are not included. Even the Type 26 might not have ship-mounted torpedo tubes, but there is no definitive confirmation.

Somewhat predictably, the US Navy is now working to make some of the modular payloads permanent components of the ships, particularly in the “Fast Frigate” evolution of the LCS which will represent the last batch of ships to be built. Anti-ship missiles will be added, as will a proper EW outfit. The Fast Frigate will also permanently sport light guns and a towed array, instead of having to add them as modules.

The US Navy so far is refusing to accept the evidence that, if the LCS is to become more fighting capable, it needs a capable lightweight anti-air missile fit. They are putting considerable effort into adapting a vertically-launched Hellfire missile variant as an anti-FAC weapon instead, but if the Pentagon was a bit more open to adopting foreign products they could just buy into Sea Ceptor and use it to give the LCS both decent local area air defence and anti-surface strike capability. The impossibility to mount bulky MK41 launchers would not be a problem with Sea Ceptor… 

From LCS to "Fast Frigate", several bits cease to be add-ons and become permanent features.

The rest of the problems with LCS are due to the immaturity of the modular payloads. The development of the payloads started after that of the ship, and in a period in which unmanned vehicles were still somewhat primitive. But developments in the unmanned world are becoming faster and I’m convinced that the mission bay will allow the LCS to stay relevant in all missions.

The lack of weight margin, though, is a problem. It goes to reinforce my belief that if you are going to build a carrier, you must make sure it is actually built to carry stuff.

The Italian PPA (Pattugliatore Polivalente d’Altura, which could be translated as Multimission Oceanic Patrol) is a completely new design produced by the Italian Navy’s own projects office in collaboration with Fincantieri, that will build them. The PPA is an innovative ship, introducing new systems and new concepts and it is meant to replace several classes within the Italian navy, from the 2 Durand de la Penne destroyers (due to be de-classed to frigates due to the removal from service of their old air area defence weaponry, still using the Standard SM-1) to the Minerva class corvettes, the Soldati-class “patrol frigates”, the Minerva-class corvettes and the OPVs of the classes Costellazioni and Comandanti.

The ship is required to carry out a wide range of tasks which go from disaster relief to warfighting, and will be procured in multiple configurations. Curiously the expectation is that there will be 3 levels of fitting-out: Light, Light+ and Full. The Full will, obviously, be fitted at build with all sensors and weapons, while the Light+ will have an intermediate fit and predispositions to accept the missing systems as required. The Light will have no missiles and will come fitted-for-but-not-with only in some areas. 

The PPA will be a large vessel with an empty weight just short of 5000 tons, 143 meters in length, but slender due to a beam of “just” 16.5. They are also required to be pretty fast: a maximum sustained speed of 35 knots was originally envisaged, although it seems the requirement has been relaxed to 32.

The PPA is equipped with a complex propulsion system, in an “evolved” CODLAG arrangement: at slow speed, two electric motors will give a silent, fully electric propulsion up to 10 knots; the use of one Diesel will allow cruising up to 18 knots, while adding the second Diesel is meant to give a speed of 25 knots. Engaging the gas turbine allows to keep speeds higher than 31 knots. General Electric MV300 drives will be installed on the ships, allowing them to generate and send ashore 2 MW of power when stationary in port, converting the frequency from 50 to 60 hertz to allow smooth shore connections whatever the location. The capability to generate electricity and potable water are part of the requirements for Disaster Relief: it is intended that one PPA will be able to cater for the immediate needs of a disaster-struck town of 6000 people.

The autonomy figure seen so far merely says that 5000 nm is the minimum required, but the information available is still incomplete and sometimes uncertain as the design is still being finalized. 

PPA Full, profile. Copyright team Forum Difesa (http://difesa.forumfree.it)

In terms of sensors, the PPA is intended to carry a newly-developed Dual Band AESA radar by Selex, employing two sets of 4 fixed faces: one set, in C band, works as the long range volume search radar while the other set, X-band, tracks surface and air targets for engagement. At the moment it is expected that only the Full variant will have both installed.

A new IFF with a fixed, circular array for 360° coverage is part of the design as well as a 360° IRST.

The ships will be armed with a new variant of the 76/62 mm gun, the “Sovraponte”, a non-deck penetrating CIWS turret containing its own ammunition. It will fire the DAVIDE / Strales guided shells for anti-missile, anti-aircraft and anti-surface self defence. The main gun will instead be a 127/64 with a fully automated magazine and Vulcano guided, long-range ammunition.

Two 25mm light guns are provided for close range engagements.

The ship comes with two Sylver A50 modules giving 16 cells for Aster 15 and 30 missiles. The Full variant should come with space reservation for 16 more cells and the possibility of installing the A70 launchers in place of the A50, enabling the use of cruise missiles.

The missiles will be carried by the Full and Light+, while the Light will be fitted for but not with.

All ships will be able to accept 8 Teseo anti-ship missiles, although they are not expected to be installed at build, not even on the Full. 

The schemes as shown on television by the italian navy. The scheme suggests that 16 A50 cells and 16 A70 cells could be installed at the same time.

The PPA will have two mission spaces: one is located in the stern, under the flight deck, and includes one launch ramp for a boat, flanked by two spaces for container-sized payloads. On the Full, these two spaces will be used for a towed array sonar and for two 533mm Heavy Torpedo Tubes facing aft.

There is space for 5 containers or mission modules and two side openings are also part of the design: these doors will add flexibility to the procedure to deploy unmanned vehicles and will also serve as Rescue Zones for taking aboard shipwrecked migrants, a task which unfortunately is a daily occurrence for the Italian navy these days.

Another modular space is located amidship, on the weather deck, and can take another 8 containers and/or RHIBs and boats up to 15 meters. A powerful crane is provided to handle the boats and containers.

The crew varies from 90 in Light configuration to 171 for a Full with complete crew and embarked force element.

The PPA will have an innovative cockpit, similar to that found on aircraft. Sitting two men side by side, and using augmented reality in the glass windows, it is meant to ensure unparallel control over the platform, enabling the ship to be fought by as few as 4 men on bridge.

The large hangar can take one AW-101 or two NH-90 helicopters. 

Towed array module and Heavyweight torpedo tubes plus RHIBs and potentially unmanned ASW vehicles give the PPA Full a powerful array of anti-submarine capability. Heavyweight 533mm torpedoes are increasingly common in industry offers (see also the DAMEN CrossOver): looks like an admission of the fact that ship-launched 324mm light torpedoes are not a credible ASW weapon anymore.

The Italian navy has signed a contract for the construction of 7 PPA, with another 3 options to be exercised within 2021. The 8 ships on order are expected to be Light, Light, Light+, Full, Light+, Light+, Full. The options are for a Full, a Light, a Light+.

The Italian Navy has expressed a requirement for 16 PPA in total, which in addition to the 10 FREMM frigates would make for an impressive fleet. Whether so many will ever be effectively procured is far from certain. The PPA is not exactly cheap, although the first 7 vessels are expected to cost no more than 4 billion euro, including a 10-year logistic support contract. They come as part of a massive 5.4 billion “Navy Law” which the current chief of Navy staff, admiral De Giorgi, has been able to obtain by campaigning tirelessly for new ships to replace the aging equipment of the navy. Intended as merely the first step in the renewal programme, the Navy Law funds 7 PPA, 1 LHD (costing over one billion) and 1 Logistic Support Ship (around 400 million), plus two small, fast special forces support boats. 

The Augmented Reality cockpit with HUD functions

The PPA clearly leans more towards a traditional frigate, putting a lot of focus on the ship’s own sensors and weapons rather than on modular payloads. This is to be expected, since the Italian navy still hasn’t put much work into those. Cost is contained by realizing variants with a simplified combat system.

The approach of multiple sub-variants is not what the Royal Navy needs, but the ship remains a very interesting product in its own way.

The Absalon is the hybrid of a frigate and an LPD, so much so that the danes gave her a L rather than F or D pennant. It was not really thought out for operating with modular ASW systems, but rather to transport troops and vehicles, or modular hospitals or headquarters. The vast space available could be exploited with future systems of unmanned vehicles if a suitable launch and recovery system can be installed in the stern. The current gauntry crane for boats is just a beginning. It has an excellent fit of sensors and weapons but commercial standards and CODAD propulsion have allowed the danes to keep the costs down.

The large door has a ramp which can take even the weight of MBTs like Leopard 2. The smaller door allows a gauntry crane to launch and recover large boats.

The Damen Crossover is a proposed design that mates frigate and LPD, offering more flexibility than the Absalon in terms of embarking and deploying offboard equipment, thanks to a stern ramp and side doors. 

It could be an excellent starting point for the Royal Navy’s requirement, although the flexibility of the stern area does not appear to be quite matched by the flexibility of weapon options up front. The number of missile cells seems to stay low in all configurations and the largest gun offered is the 76mm.

Moreover, the fear is that, since it is really impossible politically to build the “Type 31” anywhere else other than on the Clyde, going with a Damen design would not enable cost control. Probably its cost would end up swelling a lot when construction is done in Govan and Scotstoun. 

DAMEN CrossOver brochure

CrossOver configurations

I also want to mention the proposed BMD ship based on the LPD-17 hull. This monster is definitely not cheap and not something the Royal Navy could or should pursue. But it is an impressive example of how missions traditionally associated with destroyers and cruisers can be transferred, with serious capability gains, on top of the most flexible of all naval assets: the amphibious ship. The Ballistic Missile Defence ship is armed with a rail gun on the bow, meant to engage even ballistic targets. An enormous 4-face radar, far larger than the one that can be installed on DDGs or even current cruisers, offers increased search, detect and track at longer ranges. The ship carries an amazing 288 missile cells in a multitude of MK41 modules arranged along the sides, in peripheral way. The well dock is enclosed and has been turned into a below-deck hangar, with aircraft lift sized for MV-22 Osprey. 

The impressive BMD ship is a derivative of the LPD-17 design. Of course, it is not cheap.

Adapting an LPD to a more generic, loosely defined escort mission against surface, air and sub-surface threats would actually be a very good solution. The problem, of course, is cost, as LPDs are not cheap. 

Or are they? 

Algeria has procured from Italy a "command vessel" which is "just" an evolution of the "Santi" (Saints) class of mini-LPDs the Italian Navy has been using for many years. 
This derivative built for Algeria keeps all of the amphibious capabilities of the LPD, but adds a FREMM-like mast with EMPAR radar; a 76mm gun and a battery of Aster 15 missiles for local area air defence. 2 light guns and a comprehensive fit of decoys and sensors complete the vessel, creating a sort of hybrid between a frigate and a LPD.
While not quite as cheap as we'd need Type 31 to be, it was still delivered for around 450 million euro, initial crew training included. That is an LPD costing less than a frigate. 

Being so small, the ship is somewhat limited. There is no separate hangar deck: the helicopters and the vehicles end up parked on the same deck, which ends with the well dock at the stern.

This profile by Ennr shows an italian San Giorgio LPD. The algerian ship is a derivative.

At 143 meters long and some 8000 tons, this ship is directly comparable to a Type 26 (actually, it is even shorter!) dimensions-wise. The crew is pretty large, suggesting a low reliance on automation (150 men are the given figure) and Algeria will be embarking up to 440 soldiers on them.
Two helicopter spots, a sizeable cargo deck and a well dock make it a very flexible asset, and an interesting solution worth being mentioned.

How much modularity?

Systems Not Platforms. Much as torpedoes, submarines and aircraft changed the face of maritime warfare in the last century, unmanned systems will do the same in the 21st Century. In the future, unmanned systems could help to provide a solution to maintaining a balanced fleet by matching the required capability to future threats, available resources and mandated tasks.

This future concept would concentrate investment in systems, rather than the ship, and a change in emphasis to one that does not see the ship as the fighting platform.

MOD Joint Concept Note 1-12 (JCN 1-12), dated May 2012

The Danish STANFLEX approach sought to make even weapons modular and rapidly swappable. However, its success has been somewhat limited: there is no real reason, nor any real gain to be obtained, by swapping weaponry modules on a mission by mission basis, especially since each weapon requires personnel trained and current on its employment. The STANFLEX modules continue to be employed, but their benefit has reduced to ease of installation. The ships are normally fitted with their gun and missile modules, and only lose them at the end of their service life or when a new, improved system can be added. The change can be expected to typically happen during a refit and then last for a long time. The benefit is thus mostly felt in building the warship and in recovering precious sub-systems from it at the end of its life, to move them rapidly across to another hull.

The truth is that any warship has a minimum set of capabilities that are basic requirements and never really go away. There is no real point in seeking modularity at all costs.

It seems wise to give the mothership, at a minimum:

-          Its own air defence missile battery, with the appropriate suite of sensors and EW that goes hand in hand with it and that ensures the ship can protect itself and other units in the area. For the moment there does not seem to be any advantage to be gained by trying to offload the anti-air missiles upon the “parasite” platforms deployed by the mothership.

-          A main gun, for naval gunfire support. A mission that has never gone away and that seems set for an actual rebirth in a few years time if the rail gun will keep its promises.

-          Light guns for close range self defence

The mothership ideally would also carry land-attack missiles (a fundamental part of “influencing events ashore”) and at least an hull mounted sonar for obstacle and mine avoidance at a minimum. Adding anti-ship missiles, while not strictly indispensable, would complete it.

These are the mission bits that are pretty much always needed and that are most difficult to transfer onto offboard solutions.

The Black Swan and, to a degree, the LCS chose to simply ignore these requirements, leading to units that have serious survivability and capability gaps.

The Absalom and the PPA, and the CrossOver to a degree, come with the necessary “fixed” bits of capability installed on the mothership. Their approach is to be preferred: there is nothing in sight that suggests that unmanned vehicles will be able to provide distributed air defence in the near future, nor is it clear if it would be actually advantageous to try and do so. Years ago, the Skunk Works created the stealth ship, a Small Water Area Twin Hull vessel with a low RCS, great stability and good speed. The idea they put forwards was to lead it with 64 Patriot missiles and use it as an alternative or at least a complement to Aegis cruisers and destroyers. Exploiting stealth, the ship would sail hundreds of miles up threat, ahead of a carrier air group, and shoot down incoming air targets.

The prototype, the Sea Shadow, was a 560 tons vessel, 70 feet wide, and had no weapons aboard. The idea was fascinating, but it eventually did not materialize. The Sea Shadow was used for trials and tests and for RCS studies at sea, and ended up scrapped in 2012.  

The Sea Shadow at sea. In his memories, Ben R. Rich, then director of the Skunk Works, explains that the concept for an operational Sea Shadow derivative was to carry 64 Patriot SAMs and sail up-threat to form a stealthy SAM screen ahead of a carrier battlegroup. The stealthness of the vessel was meant to allow it to target the launching aircraft (especially the russian bombers, given that we were in the late 70s and early 80s), rather than the anti-ship missiles, like Aegis. According to Rich, during tests the problem was that the Sea Shadow ended up being too stealthy, and looked like a suspicious black hole in the background radar noise caused by the waves. The problem was eventually solved, but the Sea Shadow never progressed into the air defence ship that the Skunk Works office had imagined.

Much as aircraft allow an aircraft carrier to remain at range from an engagement, so will unmanned systems for the future warship. This means that the investment needs to be in the weapon systems, manned or unmanned, rather than the ship. While crew survivability is important, money should not be wasted on the ship. Instead it should be designed along cheaper commercial lines.

MOD Joint Concept Note 1-12 (JCN 1-12), dated May 2012

Distributing air defence on “small” stealthy offboard “systems” (boats / mini-ships) would have merits and seems to be what the authors of the Black Swan study bet on for the future. However, missiles are large and require a big platform. One big enough that it would have to deploy directly from the port, rather than be carried by a mothership (unless it is a big, dedicate Float On, Float Off transport!). Is it doable? Is it financially feasible? Isn’t it a needless complication? Won’t it end up requiring many small crews, which summed up will amount to even more manpower than needed for large “traditional” warships? What impact would it have on naval base infrastructures? The placement of adequate sensors on such a launching platform would also be challenging. So, for the “visible” future at least, I think evolution, rather than revolution, is to be preferred. While unmanned, distributed MCM and ASW are rapidly becoming a reality, air defence and anti-surface don’t yet show signs of major change, and pressing on with revolutions at all costs will immediately kill any hope of keeping the costs of the programme down.

The mothership should as a consequence come with the basic bits installed; yet with vast space available for “offboard systems”, intended in the widest possible sense, to include manned helicopters and boats and embarked troops.

At the same time, cost must be kept low. Impossible?

Maybe. But what about working with container ships?

Return of the escort carrier?

The future sloop-of-war will be more akin to an aircraft carrier, or an amphibious ship (albeit on a much smaller and less sophisticated scale), providing command, hotel services, maintenance facilities and a taxi service for a range of unmanned and manned systems. These systems would be deployed in the form of a range of capability packages that can be added to the ship to meet its required tasks.

MOD Joint Concept Note 1-12 (JCN 1-12), dated May 2012

A US Navy project gives us the latest visualization of the kind of capability that can be squeezed out of a containership if it is modified in the right way. The ship in question happens to be almost a twin sister of the Point class RoRo ships the MOD already uses, making it a particularly interesting example. The MV Cragside is being transformed in a “maritime support vessel” able to support an embarked force of 207 in addition to the crew, with an endurance of at least 45 days, a range of at least 8000 miles and the capability to keep a 20 knots transit speed for at least 5 days and transit at least 3000 nm in Sea State 5. The ship is being given the equipment to simultaneously launch and recovery 4 large boats (12.5 meters); a flight deck with 2 MH-60 spots and clearance to handle single spot CH-53, MV-22 and Chinook operations. A two-bay hangar is being added, sized to take MH-60 helicopters of the special forces (folding rotor, but no folding tail boom and refueling probe adding some to the length). Aircraft maintenance spaces, storage spaces, a workout area and mission planning rooms thought for the need of special forces (including secrecy requirements) are being added to the ship. Receiving stations for fuel and stores delivered via RAS and VERTREP are being provided, and the ship will be used to refuel the boats it deploys.

8 large boats plus 4 jet skis, 4 Zodiacs and one 10 meter craft are required to be carried, next to the launch and recovery davits.

The ship is required to have 4 separate fueling stations for aviation and another four for embarked crafts and vehicles, to be provided eventually employing containerized systems and filtering tanks protected by steel armor. The requirement includes carrying 150.000 gallons of JP-5.

Obviously, ample space for stores and spare parts is specified.

A medical space with 10 beds and 2 surgical tables and supports is also part of the project.

So is a full facility for the need of divers.

Built in 2011, the MV Cragside is owned by Maersk, and the US Sealift Command is buying her services on an annual basis. A first contract, worth 73 million USD, was placed to acquire her and have her modified for the new role. 

Maritime Support Vessel Requirements

The only photo I’ve found showing MV Cragside being re-built for the new role shows the massive enlargement of the original superstructure, the addition of the flight deck above what was the original top cargo deck and the construction of the large two-bay hangar. Large openings have been cut in the side walls of the top cargo deck, suggesting that the boats will be carried and deployed mostly from there.

The extent of the modifications is impressive, and so is the array of capabilities that the MSV will offer.

Photos by The ferry site. The MV Cragside is extremely similar to the Point ships. The base design is exactly the same.

The MV Cragside being rebuilt for her new role. Note the huge block of extra superstructure aft; the two-bay hangar forward, the flight deck added on top and the large openings in the now otherwise fully enclosed upper deck.

What if the “lighter frigate” was replaced by modern day escort carriers, built upon the Point class RoRo basic design?

There is a lot of space available, which would enable installation of a rail gun on the bow even if several containers of below-deck power storage equipment were required. A Flight deck would be added like on the Cragside, but instead of the two-bay hangar I would recommend a lift leading down to the Main Deck, which would become the main mission space of the ship. Its aft half would be mainly devoted to unmanned surface and sub-surface vehicles, while the first half could serve as the hangar. This deck is 6.8 meters high, the tallest on the ship, and would enable comfortable storage of any helicopter.

The lift should be large (say, 22 meters long, for full compatibility even with folded MV-22 Ospreys), but if installed perpendicularly, it would still leave a 60 meters flight deck, only marginally shorter than that of HMS Albion and HMS Bulwark, which means that simultaneous operations of even two Chinooks should be possible.

Like on the Cragside, the enclosed deck obtained beneath the flight deck could take the RAS rigs, the davits and the ship’s manned boats plus the spaces for their maintenance.

MK41 launcher modules could be fitted along the sides, in a peripheral arrangement, like on the proposed BMD ship or DDG-1000 destroyers. This should help maximize survivability. The depth is not a problem, as even the strike-length modules would have plenty of room. Sea Ceptor canisters would be even easier to integrate, if, as it is very likely, that turned out being the most the MOD would fund. Ideally, as we saw in the first part of this discourse, a longer range and heavier surface to air missile would be required to make the ship a true escort. Sea Ceptor is good mostly for self-defence and even in that role the short range missiles like it are probably going to become less and less effective as faster and faster sea-skimming anti-ship missiles appear.

An integrated sensor mast would be added to provide the necessary sensors, and an EW and decoy fit would also have to be factored in.

Point class Ro-Ro ships

The Point class has a service speed of around 22 knots, which is not bad, and can travel 10.000 miles. It has also some capability in marginal ice and comes with enhanced stability and VERTREP clearances. Having been built with the MOD service in mind, they were given some extras right at build.

More power might be required, not for additional speed but for feeding all the new systems and the embarked modules.

Finally, a large and flexible launch and recovery system would have to be built in the stern. Using a wet dock is out of the question: it would require a costly redesign and would be a constant source of maintenance requirements. What is needed is a ramp leading to a “dry dock” system able to push-out and pull-in boats and unmanned vehicles also of important dimensions, as might be the future ASW drones that will give this novel “escort carrier” its wide-area anti-submarine capability. 

The Point class can carry a lot of stuff. It has vast, empty, strong decks which can take a lot of weight. There is much that can be done with a Point as the starting base.

The possibilities of such a vessel would be great and would cover requirements going from disaster relief to convoy escort, passing even by strategic sealift. It should be possible to keep the costs within acceptable values, and survivability would not necessarily be bad, even with the built happening at commercial standards: size has a survivability value in itself, and once adapted for her new role the ship would be separated in areas and compartments, rather than being made of completely open decks from bow to stern.

The MOD intends to soon award the contracts for the first prototype unmanned MCM system, jointly with France. What everyone is hoping is that the modular, unmanned systems for hunting, sweeping and clearing minefields will make it possible to migrate the MCM role to larger, steel-hulled ships. The US Navy is already going that way with LCS, while the Royal Navy has been forced to push the OSD of current minesweepers well to the right, and no new ship is expected before 2028.

If the MCM system of systems will keep its promises, the family of unmanned systems could well find its seabase on the “escort carrier”, removing the need for a separate, smaller class of motherships.

The “merchant escort carrier” could also be fitted out as a perfect replacement for RFA Argus, in both the auxiliary aviation and joint casualty receiving roles. This would reduce the number of separate programmes to be launched, and would release more funding for building a few more “escort carriers”, helicopters, unmanned systems and for resurrecting the Force Protection Craft effort of the Royal Marines. Imagine an Escort Carrier stationing just outside the brown waters, with its long-range missiles and its embarked helicopters, deploying and covering from behind a squadron of Royal Marines with their Force Protection Craft. It is a better way to control the Littorals then sending a “light frigate” or an LCS and engage in evolutions with smaller, faster FIACs which could still prove to be a problem. It influences a much greater area, too. 

I'm clearly not a naval engineer, but images are the best way to quickly explain an idea. This little graphic shows the general idea behind the Point Escort Carrier.

MHPC was initially going to deliver “OPV-like” motherships with some utility in constabulary tasks in addition to their main role of seabase for MCM and hydrographic unmanned vehicles.

Clearing a minefield in a contested area from a platform of that kind would be little better than doing it from a current minesweeper: intimate protection should be provided by well armed warships.

The Escort Carrier could have what it takes to protect itself while its drones accomplish the mission at stand-off distance.

The flexibility of the “Escort Carrier” is, in my mind, the real manifestation of the escort, and of the “general purpose” warship. You can find a good use for it in pretty much any scenario, from disaster relief to ASW hunting (provided, of course, that ASW unmanned boats and underwater vehicles receive investment over time) all the way to amphibious operations.