Press in Italy and abroad has gone into a frenzy over the news that Italy "will further cut its F-35 order, even halving it". But reality is a bit different.
Big cuts might be coming. Or might not.
Prime
minister Renzi has announced that he is seeking 2.5 to 3 billion euro savings in
defence spending in the next 3 years of parliament. The new defence minister, Roberta
Pinotti, has underlined the need for a strategic review that sets the
requirements and decides the future of the italian armed forces, and both PM
and defence minister have confirmed that a review of the F-35 program will be
part of these operations. It is also true that there is strong opposition against
the F-35 in many parties and groups, including Renzi’s own party. It is a part
of Renzi's own Democratic Party which has called to halve the purchase of the F-35,
down to 45. But to report of this call as what is going to actually happen to the
program is a very wild call, at the moment. It is obvious that cuts to defence are
going to happen and something will go for sure. The F-35 program will
contribute to achieving these savings, but there is actually little that can
actually be cut off the F-35 program in the next three years, and there are a lot of factors to consider in order to understand what is going on.
F-35 development money is spent and gone. 800 million for the FACO have also already been spent. This money can’t be affected in any way. Italy has actually already slowed down the planned rhythm of its purchases, putting together a different plan already back in July 2013. So far, firm contracts have been signed only for 6 F-35A, spread 3 in LRIP 6 and 3 in LRIP 7.
Four more F-35A were planned to be
ordered in LRIP 8, but the plan has already been reviewed downwards to just 2.
The LRIP 9 was expected to include the first F-35B for the Navy and three more
F-35A, but the plan has been reviewed and from four aircraft we are now down to
3 (1 F-35B, 2 F-35A).
The LRIP 10, in the latest
projections, is described as including 4 aircraft (2 F-35A and 2 F-35B for the
Navy), against 6 planned earlier (2 F-35A, 3 F-35B for the Navy and the first
F-35A for the air force).
The first F-35B for the air force is
now not due for delivery before 2021 (was to be 2018, originally). By the same
date, the Navy will have received 10 F-35B.
The LRIP 11 appears to have been cut
back from 6 to 5 jets: it was to include 2 F-35A, 2 F-35B navy, 2 F-35B air
force while now it will include 3 F-35A and 2 F-35B for the Navy.
However, these changes are, as of
now, a revised delivery schedule, not a net cut, as the totals remain, for
delivery by 2027: 90 aircraft in total, made up of 60 F-35A, 15 F-35B for the
Air Force and 15 F-35B for the Navy.
The LRIP 8 order is expected to be
placed within the summer, while the LRIP 9 order would be placed next year. The
lots 8, 9, 10 and 11 are those realistically most affected by the reduction in
spending announced for the next three years. Delaying the purchase of several
aircraft is obviously going to result in a short term saving; the question is
whether this delay will be enough to achieve the current spending cut targets,
or if the plan will be changed once more.
It is possible that a complete,
temporary stop to orders could be chosen. The LRIPs allocations over the next
three years could be reviewed downwards again. But it might also not happen. It is too early to say.
Cutting the order to 45 however,
appears unlikely. First of all, the savings coming from such a decision would
not be available in the short term, unless the program is frozen entirely and orders
resume only a few years into the future. The scope for savings in the short
term is very small, and changing the long term totals, considering that the purchase is
spread over more than a decade, will only bring results in the long term. Renzi mostly cares about saving money now, as it needs funds to re-direct on his own spending priorities and, hopefully, on much needed tax cuts to help the economy.
Stil, a
complete freeze to the purchases is unlikely, i'd think, considering that Renzi openly
said he remains committed to the program and to the collaboration with
Washington: freezing the orders entirely wouldn’t go down very well with the
partners. The chiefs of Air Force and Navy are also arguing with all their
voice to ensure that they receive their F-35s relatively soon. The AMX and Tornado IDS are
aging and the air force fears capability gaps opening as early as 2018, and while the navy's AV-8B+ Harriers are still relatively young, the Navy is just
as eager to move onwards sticking to schedule. The Harrier fleet is tiny, and the airframes being worked have been pretty much always the same: they might be young in terms of years, but they have fatigue on their airframes.
The only way to achieve big savings
would be to review the whole requirements in the White Paper, set even smaller
aircraft and manpower targets for the Air Force, and likely remove from the ORBAT some squadrons of
AMX and Tornado IDS, early and without replacement. Cutting orders of new
aircraft which would not actually happen for years and keep spending big money on the
aging platforms meant to be replaced by those would have little sense and very much limit the extent of the savings in the near future. Of course such decisions could well be made, but it is all to be seen.
Some press suggests that buying more
Typhoons in place of part of the F-35s might be an option. Everything is
possible in theory, of course, but it should be noted that this is definitely not what
the defence chiefs want. Nor is it a realistic or a financially
advantageous proposal.
Building more Typhoons is a wish of
Finmeccanica, NOT of the air force. Finmeccanica would get greater gains from
building more Typhoons rather than from building F-35, due to how the two
programs work. However, the Air Force chief definitely does not wishes to take
over more Typhoons: the plan is actually to soon withdraw from service up to 24
Tranche 1 aircraft (the indecision on numbers is due to a decision to be made
on the fate of the 2-seat aircraft used for training) leaving 72 or 75 Typhoons
out of the 96 being purchased. The Italian Air Force has been the first to
start using Typhoon for QRA, but it has also been probably the less supportive
partner, in recent years at least.
An (unlikely) order placed for the
Tranche 3B Typhoons also risks having political implications in the
international arena. The four Typhoon partners (UK, Germany, Spain and Italy)
have all expressed their intention not to purchase the Tranche 3B: if one
partner was to rethink on the issue, the Eurofighter consortium would probably
try even harder to obtain penalty payments from the other countries: UK,
Germany and Spain do not want to spend more money on more Typhoons, and most
certainly don’t want to pay big penalties either. The matter could end up
proving very complex. It is highly unlikely that the proposal could ever gain
the willing support of the defence chiefs to start with: the Italian Air Force
does not actually believe in the air to ground capabilities of the Typhoon. The
service isn’t even quite exploiting the capabilities introduced by the P1E
program, and considers the Typhoon a solution for the sole air dominance
requirement and, possibly, for the launch of Storm Shadow cruise missiles in
the future. And the Italian Typhoons are being delivered missing some capabilities
altogether: even the Tranche 3As, differently from those built for the UK, do
not have the full predisposition for conformal fuel tanks, nor the fuel dump
system. All signals of the enduring unwillingness to invest on a truly
multi-role Typhoon which is not seen as the solution for the needs of the
service in terms of Strike and CAS.
Even if more Typhoons were forced
down the throat of the air force, the total would not be 121, as the 20 or so
Tranche 1 are due to be removed from service as they are going to age badly
unless a lot of money is forked out to upgrade them to standards closer to
those of the Tranche 2 and 3 examples. They would have, again, to force the air
force to do something that is against all planning. Possible, but unlikely that
the government will go this far.
Finally, halving the F-35 order would only mostly damage Italy itself, which will have spent a lot of money on the FACO, only to destroy its return with its own hands. Already, the massive reductions already experienced (131 to 90 for Italy, and 85 to just 37 for Netherlands) have reduced, to say the least, the cost-effectiveness of the assembly line, which now pins its hopes of becoming a source of financial and technical returns almost exclusively on being chosen as the Maintenance, Repair and Overhaul (MRO) facility for all F-35 users in Europe and in the Mediterranean area. Alenia's role as second-source provider of wings for the F-35 has already been hurt by the cut from 131 to 90 aircraft, which has resulted in Lochkeed Martin cutting back its minimum promise of work from 1215 to 835 wing sets, and the deal would only worsen with a new reduction.
Finally, halving the F-35 order would only mostly damage Italy itself, which will have spent a lot of money on the FACO, only to destroy its return with its own hands. Already, the massive reductions already experienced (131 to 90 for Italy, and 85 to just 37 for Netherlands) have reduced, to say the least, the cost-effectiveness of the assembly line, which now pins its hopes of becoming a source of financial and technical returns almost exclusively on being chosen as the Maintenance, Repair and Overhaul (MRO) facility for all F-35 users in Europe and in the Mediterranean area. Alenia's role as second-source provider of wings for the F-35 has already been hurt by the cut from 131 to 90 aircraft, which has resulted in Lochkeed Martin cutting back its minimum promise of work from 1215 to 835 wing sets, and the deal would only worsen with a new reduction.
The biggest risk to Italy's industry and financial returns is that some other european F-35 partner could exploit the chance and make a big return in the race for the MRO site and get the contracts and decades of maintenance work, leaving Cameri as an expensive cathedral in the desert. That would be a true disaster.
All these reasons make further big
cuts to the F-35 order relatively unlikely. Possible, of course, but before
announcing dramatic changes are coming to the program, i’d be very careful. The review of
the program might actually deliver relatively mild changes to the plan.
The effects of the
"review" of the F-35 program in Italy could go in many ways: it could
cut the (arguably useless) 15 F-35B for the Air Force, hopefully growing the
Navy's order from 15 to 20 or so, as for original plan.
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The purchase of F-35B for land use by the Air Force remains arguably the most controversial part of the italian F-35 program. |
The 15 / 15 F-35B was a political deal forced on the Air Force and Navy when the 131 F-35 were cut to 90 (original 131 aircraft plan called for : 69 F-35A, 40 F-35B air force, 22 F-35B Navy). Experts generally agree that the F-35B for the air force, officially meant to cover the requirement to operate from “austere” air facilities in expeditionary operations, are a waste of money. There is also bitter consent on the hypothesis that what the Air Force really wants with its purchase of F-35B is to follow the RAF’s example and get rid of the uncomfortable presence of an independent deployable air power capability wearing Navy colours, by absorbing it.
The Navy has been severely hampered
in its plans by the cut from 22 to just 15 F-35B, which aren’t quite sufficient
to cover training, attrition, back up and frontline requirements, forcing a
downsizing of the realistic, routine air group for the Cavour aircraft carrier.
22 jets were meant to support a training fleet of 3 based in the US, 5 aircraft
unavailable / in maintenance and a forward available fleet routinely reaching
the total of 14 jets.
A fleet of 15 jets, maintaining the
training fleet of 3, would support at most 9 deployable aircraft.
The air force’s own F-35B will be
based alongside the Navy’s ones on the navy base in Grottaglie, to concentrate
the B logistics on the same base. However, the Navy has fought to the end (and
successfully) to keep the two squadrons well and truly separated. The carrier
deployments are meant to be covered by the sole Navy squadron. The result, as
it is, is that the dangerous mess of a “fusion” Joint Force Harrier-style is
avoided, but what’s left is two pitifully small groups, with the Air Force’s
one lacking a convincing reason of existence.
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The FACO in Cameri has required a huge investment. Getting back the money will become next to impossible if wrong decisions are taken. |
Most, if not all experts, agree that
if the 90 F-35s are to be cut further, it is the 15 F-35B for the air force
that should be at the top of the list of candidate victims.
A reduction from 90 to 80, with a 60
/ 20 split between A and B, air force and Navy, would be seen with favour by
many, including myself. A better option still would be to keep the order for 90
aircraft, but still reduce the number of Bs to no more than 22, all destined to
the Navy. The air force would get 8 more F-35A instead of F-35Bs. The overall
cost would shrink (the B is more expensive to both buy and operate / maintain)
and, arguably, better overall capability would be delivered.
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The aircraft carrier Cavour, sailing for an exercise in 2012, carrying AV-8B+ Harrier of the "Wolves" group |
We’ll see what comes out of the
review and of the White Paper. Talking of halving the F-35 order, at this time
at least, seems a very wild call. The reality is likely to be quite different.
At least if defence chiefs get to say a word in the planning.