1- Introduction and Air Manoeuver
2 - Amphibious force and the Royal Marines cut
3 - what happens to the amphibious force?
What happens to the Royal Marines, exacty? The honest answer is that we don’t yet really know. Very few details have been provided about Commando Force 2030 and the exact shape that 42 Commando will take as it loses its amphibious assault role.
2 - Amphibious force and the Royal Marines cut
3 - what happens to the amphibious force?
What happens to the Royal Marines, exacty? The honest answer is that we don’t yet really know. Very few details have been provided about Commando Force 2030 and the exact shape that 42 Commando will take as it loses its amphibious assault role.
The Royal Marines provide force
protection for the fleet as well as “green” boarding teams, trained to
undertake complex assaults on ships that oppose resistance. In 2010, these
roles were grouped within 43 Commando, in addition to the main role of this
unit which remains protection of the nuclear deterrent and related
installations. Two squadrons within 43 Commando initially delivered the fleet
roles: P Squadron and S Squadron. P was actually largely manned by the Navy,
and used to be around 167 strong. It provided force protection teams for
deploying RN and RFA vessels, but it did not last long: formed in April 2010,
it disbanded 31 December 2013 when the manpower crisis within the Navy made it
indispensable to recoup all posts for other needs. At that point, the Force
Protection task was given to the Commando in its “Standing Tasks” year. 45
Commando was the first to be given this responsibility.
40, 42 and 45 Commando have so far
operated to a 3-year Force Generation Cycle: one year in “Standing Tasks”
position; one year in “Generate” position, training for high readiness; and the
third year in “Operate” condition, with responsibility to deliver the Lead
Commando Group at 5 days notice to move, with vanguard elements at 48 hours notice.
Standing tasks include defence
engagement abroad, training and assistance, and, since 2013, ships Force
Protection.
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| Ex Black Aligator, 2015 |
S Sqn, still part of 43 Commando,
provides the Fleet Stand-By Rifle Troop (FSRT), the Fleet Contingent Troop (FCT)
and the Maritime Sniper Teams (MST). The Fleet Stand-By Rifle Troop provides 16
“green” boarding teams, complete of sniper pair from MST, which are cleared for
boarding Non-Compliant ships. The Contingent Troop provides four teams,
supported normally by two sniper pairs, trained for Opposed boarding. They are
called upon in the most complex situations.
Where does 42 Commando fit in? It is
pretty likely that S Squadron will move across from 43 Cdo. The rumor that has
started to circulate says S Sqn joins, Juliet Company disbands, Lima and Mike
companies re-role for ships force protection. Kilo company’s fate is not
mentioned.
Manpower reductions can be expected
especially in the HQ and Logistic companies, as the unit, in this new role,
will not need its 81mm mortars, Javelin missiles, HMG and GMG and medium
machine gun troop with GPMG. It might retain some machine guns, but certainly
in reworked structures. Logistic support in the new role will also be very
different and will probably require a lot fewer men.
43 Commando, if S Sqn moved out,
would remain with just O and R squadrons, in the nuclear deterrent protection
and Faslane / Coulport recapture roles. What impact on politics, if men move out of Scotland, though?
The Lead Commando Group
responsibility will fall on 40 and 45 Commando alone, in a two-year force
generation cycle. The ambitions for the LCG are unchanged: 5 days notice to
move and ability to insert two company groups (one by helicopter, one by
landing craft) within a 6 hour window of night darkness. The Commandos, unless
the new 2030 plan changes their structure, have 4 combat companies each, plus
Logistic and HQ coy, the latter incorporating the fire support role with
Mortars, AT Platoon and GPMG SF.
It seems that the Special Purpose
Task Group, a company-group unit of up to 200 personnel, will actually come out
of the Lead Commando Group and serve as its forward-based vanguard, with the
shortest reaction time (provided it is close to the right area of operations,
obviously). It is planned that a SPTG
will always be embarked on the aircraft carrier out at sea, along with at least
one “Unit of Action” comprising 4 Merlin HC4 helicopters.
According to what Jane’s report,
the Commando Helicopter Force will assign 12 Merlin to 845 NAS, which will form
three “Units of Action”. 846 NAS will have nine helicopters, mainly tied to
training and operational conversion plus the provision of a couple of
helicopters at high readiness for the Maritime Counter Terrorism reaction
force. Four helicopters at any one time will be in the sustainment fleet.
847 NAS, with 6 Wildcat, will
provide two 3-strong units of action.
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| The first Merlin refurhished to HC4 standard, with FLIR not yet installed. The carriers are an opportunity; the loss of Ocean a big issue; but focusing too much on "lighter, by helicopter" would be a huge and painful mistake. |
The Lead Commando Group, yearly
formed upon 40 or 45 Cdo, will include either 59 or 54 Commando Engineer
squadrons, rotating yearly into readiness, plus a Logistic Task Group from the
Commando Logistic Regiment; a formation from 30 Commando IX providing air
defence, police, reconnaissance and communications plus EW teams from 14 Royal
Signal Regiment.
29 Commando Royal Artillery provides
a gun battery with L118 and Fire Support Teams from 148 Meitkila Bty. As yet
unannounced, but pretty much certain, is the disbandment of one battery within
the regiment, between 7, 8 and 79. With one Commando less to support, the 12
guns can be expected to concentrate within two 6-guns batteries, exactly as
happens in 7 Royal Horse Artillery within 16 Air Assault Brigade.
7 Bty, based in Scotland, has hung in the balance since 2010, but with 45 Cdo, also Scotland based, staying in the amphibious role and with the know political implications of any manpower shift in the area, the pain might suddenly shift on someone else.
The Royal Marines have a
long-standing requirement for UAS support and would probably kill to have a
dedicate UAS battery, but the decisions about 29 Commando Royal Artillery are
in army hands and Land Command will want to shift as much manpower as it can
into other areas.
The Royal Marines have resorted to
double-hatting their Air Defence troop, training it on Desert Hawk III
mini-UAS, plus a little reserve element as 289 Commando Troop, 266 Battery, 104
Royal Artillery regiment. However, 104 Regiment will cease to be a UAS unit as
part of Army 2020 Refine, converting to close support with L118 and AS90.
The Marines have also tried to work
with the army to launch a Joint Mini UAS programme for procuring a replacement,
but the programme was denied funding several times in a row and to this day no
one knows what will deliver Battlegroup-and-below ISTAR after Desert Hawk III
goes out of service in 2021. The Army already plans to disband 32 Royal
Artillery regiment, the main DH III user, and give its spaces over to 5 Royal
Artillery regiment as part of the Defence Estate reduction.
News reports have included news of a
possible reduction in the landing craft inventory as well, and it is probably a
certainty. For a start, the Royal Marines disbanded 6 Assault Squadron in 2010
when one of the LPDs was mothballed. Only 4 Squadron remains, moving from
Albion to Bulwark when the ships alternate into the operational phase.
When next year HMS Ocean leaves
service, its 9 Assault Squadron and its four LCVP MK5s will also go. A number
of the 21 LCVPs are almost certainly going to go out of active service as the
number of active davits shrinks. Hopefully, an Assault Squadron will be formed
to provide LCUs and LCVPs for the Bay class LSDs, at least.
The Royal Marines have for years
attempted to replace part of the LCVP fleet with a flotilla of combat boats for
force protection, surf zone and riverine operations. Swedish CB90 boats were
loaned and extensively trialed, but no visible progress has been made towards
procuring any hull. A squadron of these boats would provide a lot of capability
in a range of roles, including counter-piracy, extending the reach of a Bay
class acting as mothership by hundreds of miles in every direction. Money,
however, is just not there for anything.
Another important requirement that
has run aground is that for a fast landing craft to replace the very slow LCU
MK10. A faster craft is an absolutely key requirement for the future as it
would enable the amphibious ships to stay further away from the beach, keeping
out of harm as much as possible. Unfortunately, despite a rather successful
test campaign with the PACSCAT prototype LCU, more than 3 times faster than the
MK10 when laden, no purchase has materialized.
On the vehicle front, the Marines
have a requirement for replacing the old and unprotected BV206s in their many
supporting roles within the brigade. The All Terrain Vehicle Support ATV(S) or
Future ATV calls for up to 233 vehicles in a range of variants including troop
carrier, mortar carrier, ambulance, command, repair and logistic flatbed. The
vehicle would replace the BV206 and serve alongside the Viking, with the latter
being more protected and combat-oriented. The Support vehicle should come with a max
protection to Level 2 standard. The first attempt at launching the programme
dates all the way back to 2008, yet no progress can be reported to this day,
almost a decade later.
The Viking itself has had a bit more
luck, securing funding for a substantial upgrade and refurbishment, worth more
than 37 million pounds. 99 vehicles have been refurbished, and two new variants
introduced: 19 vehicles in Crew Served Weapon carrier configuration and 9 in
Mortar Carrier configuration.
The British Viking vehicles
originally came only in Troop Carrier, Command and Recovery variants, but in
2008 field conversions of some troop carriers into ambulances were carried out
in Afghanistan. They might not have been retained into long term service,
however.
The Royal Marines originally ordered
108 Viking vehicles in the early 2000s, as part of the Commando 21
reorganization. The Viking All-Terrain Vehicle (Protected) was meant to provide
armoured, amphibious mobility to the Commando groups, and it hit its IOC in
2005, with deliveries completed by 2006.
The Royal Marines took 33 of the new
vehicles with them in Afghanistan during their tour in October 2006, and the
all terrain mobility of the Viking proved incredibly precious during
operations, so much so that the British Army asked to retain a Viking presence
in theatre in the long term as Herrick 6 began. The Army obviously had no
Viking-trained personnel, so the new big mission of the Royal Marines Armoured
Support Group became the support of the Afghan effort, in parallel to the
deployment of the vehicle at sea on amphibious operations, including a raid
inland in Somalia last year.
Further orders for Viking vehicles
were made during the years of service in Afghanistan: in June 2008, for
example, 14 new vehicles were ordered.
Eventually, 24 Viking of the much
improved MK2 type were also ordered during 2009, with deliveries completed in
2010: these were 22 troop transports and 2 command vehicles.
In 2007 a separate order was placed,
for 21 Vikings which will be part of the Watchkeeper UAS system , carrying the
Tactical Party that will enable ground forces and HQs to access the data from
the unmanned aircrafts and assign missions to it.
In total, more than 160 Vikings have
been ordered by the UK, but at least 27 were lost during operations. 21 are
Army systems within the Watchkeeper batteries, and 99 remain in Royal Marines
service.
The 9 Mortar Carriers should be at
the same standard as that showcased at DSEI 2011 by BAE Systems,
including a turntable for mounting the 81mm L16 mortar and space for the
stowage of 140 rounds.
The 19 crew-served weapon variants
come with a protected mount for an additional weapon on the rear car, in
addition to the MR555 weapon mounts already present on all front cars. These shielded mounts can take any weapon, from a 5.56
Minimi to the HMG .50 and the GMG. The mount weights some 380 kg complete with
the .50 HMG and offers STANAG Level 2 ballistic protection to the gunner.
The Viking Crew
Served Weapon variant showcased by BAE
Systems as a very impressive, all-inclusive mobile fortress meant to provide
fire support and ISTAR to the forces on the ground: it was in fact shown fitted
with a Remote Weapon Station with a .50 HMG mounted over the front car, a
shielded ring mount mounted on top of the rear car, Boomerang III acoustical
shooter detection system and retractable, mast-mounted EO/IR sensor payload. It
is not clear if the 19 CSW vehicles for the Royal Marines will any of the more
advanced features.
The upgrade improved protection on
the older Vikings bringing them in line with the latest MK2 standard. The gross
weight grew up to 14 tons, and front and rear hulls were rebuilt to integrate
the latest generation V-shaped mine-resistant protection (with the exception of
the rear cars of Repair and Mortar variants). Modifications to brakes and
suspensions and to all other affected components were part of the overhaul. Unfortunately,
not enough money was available to replace the powerpack of the older Vikings to
fully match the MK2, but wiring and mount modifications were carried out to
simplify later adoption of the more powerful engine. The MK1 and 1A employ a
5.9 litre Cummins engine, while the MK2s use a 6.7 litre one. The MK2 has greater electrical power output, increased to 260 amperes.
The vehicles are equipped with blast-protected seats, hung on rails, and come
with four-point seat belts.
The vehicles can take add-on armour kits
and can be fitted with a cage armor to resist to RPGs, but with these additions
they are no longer amphibious. Extra protection kits were procured as part of
the refurbishment.
The Full Operational Capability of the
renewed Viking fleet was announced in April 2016. At the time, the upgrade was
said to secure the Viking’s future out to 2024, at which point another upgrade
would extend that possibly to 2034.
It is not clear exactly how the 99
vehicles are distributed and employed. A recent news report says that the “Viking
Squadron” is a 167-strong formation, formally under control of the Commando
Logistic Regiment. Based in Bovington, where work started in 2013 to build a
permanent Royal Marines facility, the unit has a trials and training cell plus
supports and is structured on 3 Troops of 16 Vikings each, plus mortar
section with 4 vehicles.
Two Troops are kept at 5 days notice to
move and can provide lift to half of the Lead Commando Group, while the third
Troop is kept at 28 days notice. Under Commando 21, half of the strength of a
Commando unit was meant to be tracked, and half wheeled. Jackals are also part
of the Royal Marines inventory. In general, 19 Crew Served vehicles and 9
Mortar carriers suggest that the objective of the Viking refurbishment
programme was to provide protected mobility essentially to the sole Lead
Commando Group.
Despite the hard work done in the field,
the Royal Marines have not had a good time at home and in the budget battles of
the last decade and more. Their priorities for the future remain almost
completely unaddressed and the amphibious shipping has, since 2010, taken some
savage hits. It is not a good time for the amphibious force, and there is no
telling when things could look up.
In my opinion, the Marines need to try and
position themselves differently: the Special Purpose Task Group is not a bad
idea, but it is a dangerous example of shrinkage of what amphibious forces are
good for. Fighting light and inserting by helicopter is just a tiny percentage
of what makes amphibious forces important, and it is the least “special” bit of
their job. There are already Light Role infantry and Parachute troops for that.
What makes the amphibious force unique is the
ability to carry out a forcible entry carrying
a lot of heavy equipment. If the amphibious force loses its ability to kick
down the door and go ashore with vehicles and stores in quantities adequate to
support maneuver even against well equipped enemies, their purpose is lost. If
the Marines become nothing more than Light, airmobile infantry, the next cut
will be a lot more painful, because they will no longer be unique, but just
another infantry formation in the pile, just more expensive.
Arguably, instead of procuring yet another
articulated, light, all-terrain BV-X vehicle, the Royal Marines should seek to
become heavier. The Commandos never
operated a combat vehicle like the US AAV-7 or the LAV, but it is probably high
time for them to begin doing that. Arguably, Viking is the All Terrain Support
vehicle and the actual gap is in the combat role, where a new, amphibious 8x8
vehicle would give a lot more bite and purpose. Money is of course the problem,
but the Corps should begin to consider its future in new ways. They could have,
and perhaps should have, positioned themselves as a true Strike Brigade
candidate, even if that meant accepting greater army control. Because the truth
is that 3 Commando Brigade already depends heavily on Army’s decisions through
its Logistic, Engineer and Artillery component. It risked to lose a lot of
those in 2010, and next time might not be able to parry the blow, especially
because it cannot expect financial and even less manpower help from Navy
Command, which is by now the image of despair, trying hard not to fall off the
knife’s edge.
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| BAE - Iveco ACV swims ashore from an italian LPD during trials for the USMC ACV programme. The ACV can be equipped with an unmanned turret with 30mm gun; or carry a 120mm mortar, as well as come in Troop Carrier configuration. This is the field the Marines should aim towards. |
Going lighter is not going to help. The
british armed forces are already overloaded with light and poorly supported
formations. The Air Assault task force experimented in Joint Warrior with air-inserted
light armour in the form of Foxhound, and this is a very welcome development.
The Royal Marines, however, need to
reconsider with attention what makes them special, which is their ability to
deploy a significant, well equipped force, much heavier than any force that can
move in by air. The Corps should work to go heavier, not to go lighter. The
field of “light” is already overcrowded. The “Medium” field should have been
the Marines’s realm. Trials have begun with the Ares variant of the Ajax family
to prove that it can go ashore from LCU MK10, but this is not enough, and might
be too little, too late.
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| Ares goes to the beach |
In my opinion, the top priority for the
Corps is to procure a faster, large landing craft, indispensable for littoral
maneuver as part of a wider effort to build itself a role in the Medium weight arena, working together with the Army.
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| More of this work alongside the army is what really sets the amphibious force apart. Air Assault is someone else's job, and going there means losing capability... as well as the Corps, in the long run. |
The UK does not
need the Marines for helicopter-borne raids; it needs them for littoral
maneuver and for opening doors for the Army. And the Corps, if it wants to survive in the age of constant cuts, needs to realize this. It is not an easy position to hold, between an Army short of manpower but needed for key supports; and a Navy even more desperate for manpower but that has the amphibious ships that make it all possible.
It'll take courage and wisdom to hold that ground.
