"More ships". Where?

Ultra quick post because the "more ships" line thrown out at random by the government has gotten annoying enough that it deserves a detailed answer.

As of now, the Royal Navy and Royal Fleet Auxiliary have:

- Lost RFA Diligence 4 years early; without any real replacement plan being in the works, removing one unique and very precious capability which used to set the Royal Navy apart from other european navies, which no not have a comparable forwards repair vessel which also doubled up as submarine tender.
Very damaging loss, for very little money saved.

- RFA Tidespring is many months late, for reasons no one really know. She is now not due in the UK before "early 2017", and after that it'll take a while to complete her fitting out and put her through final sea trials. She was originally expected in service this month.
In the meanwhile, it is almost certain that RFA Gold Rover will go out of service by the end of this year, as planned, Her deployment to the South Atlantic was meant to be the last hurrah of her service life, with decommissioning once back home. Her replacement was meant to be ready, but it will not be for several more months.

HMS Lancaster and HMS Dauntless are in reserve, tied into port as "harbour training ships" many months before entering refit, most likely because the manpower crisis has gotten bad enough to require this sort of pauses.
Lancaster should enter refit in mid 2017 and Dauntless around the end of the year. They won't deploy again before 2018 at the earliest.

That is a loss of four deployable hulls for zero gain in 2016.

Joint Expeditionary Force - Marittime 2016 

Taurus 2009 deployment. The escort on the top left side is the french Dupleix, but even without her the 2009 - 2016 difference remains scary. 

2017 should eventually see HMS Queen Elizabeth delivered, but 2018 will see HMS Ocean bowing out in exchange.
The River Batch 2 patrol vessel HMS Forth will enter service, but apparently HMS Clyde, the Falklands Patrol Ship, will promptly be dropped out of service by not renewing her lease (she is still RN operated but contractor owned). The idea seems to be to send HMS Forth down south to replace her.
4 more River Batch 2s are expected to enter service over the next few years, but the 3 River Batch 1s will be removed in exchange, meaning that there is going to be at most 1 extra OPV. The SDSR says "up to six" OPVs (up from 4), but by the look of things 5 is the actual number.

The SDSR also announced that the 3 oldest Sandown class minesweepers will be removed from service by 2025 at the latest.


The permanent losses the RN and RFA face this year and over the next few are:

- HMS Ocean
- 3x Sandown class minesweepers
- 3x River Batch 1
- 1x River Batch 1 - Helicopter (HMS Clyde)
- RFA Diligence
- x2 Rover class tankers

Also, the first Type 23 frigate is due out of service in 2023 and there's no telling yet if there will be a Type 26 ready to take her place.


The new hulls entering service are:

HMS Queen Elizabeth
HMS Prince of Wales
5x River Batch 2s
4x Tide class tankers

That's 11 ships going out, and 11 coming in. At most, the number of hulls will roughly float at the same level. And even this only if we exclude the ships that have already been lost since 2010, and the two mothballed escorts.

The losses since 2010 include also:

HMS Ark Royal
HMS Illustrious
4x Type 22 frigates
RFA Fort George
2x Point class Strategic Sealift Vessels
RFA Largs Bay
RFA Bayleaf
RFA Orangeleaf
1 Albion class LPD mothballed


More ships my arse.
It could get even worse considering that there is no clear way ahead for the "after RFA Argus", and the Type 26 and Type 31 programmes as of today give no real assurance that the number of escorts won't drop even further, at least temporarily.
The 3 remaining Fort class ships should be replaced one for one by three new supply ships.

It takes a hell of a lot of creative accounting to talk about "more ships" just because a bunch of OPVs have been ordered as an emergency stopgap measure.

Type 26 and credibility - update

Type 26, cost, delays, shipbuilding


There was a nasty stink in the air, with the River Batch 2 contract being ridiculously expensive and inclusive of a not better specified "suspension" of the TOBA agreements; with ministerial statements in the last while going in the wrong directions, and finally with the First Sea Lord being more than evasive on the subject. I had warned it was on the way, and as inexorable as taxes and death, here it comes: the Type 26 programme is struggling with costs and the Main Gate approval won't be within the planned timeline, but months late. Possibly, late enough that, in the meanwhile, the elections on May 7 and the 2015 SDSR could step in with full force and mess up the programme even worse, and slow it down further. 

It is frankly depressing to see that there isn't the confidence of being able to deliver these ships on acceptable cost figures, because, it is worth remembering, the Type 26 is a triumph of "design to cost" approach. In the sense that innovation in the design will be very, very limited, and there is planned to be a recycling strategy of second-hand equipment like i've never before seen in a warship programme.
Type 26 is going to be built as little more than a hull with engines, to inherit straight from retiring Type 23s:

- The CAMM / Sea Ceptor missile system whole;
- The Artisan 3D
- The navigation radars, if the 2016 installation for the fleet-wide replacement is confirmed.
- The light gun turrets
- The torpedo system
- Countermeasures, since it seems that to contain cost they are still going for the old school fixed tubes (a huge disappointment, as pretty much everyone is moving on to adjustable, trainable decoy launchers, more flexible and capable)
- The sonars. Surely the towed one, and according to some sources even the bow one.
- Possibly more other internal systems, from waste treatment to WEDCIS.
- Possibly the Communications Electronic Support Measures due to be added on the Type 23

I don't remember a single warship in the world being built as a new hull for such a high quantity of re-used stuff. The combat equipment's only new parts will be the main gun and, if they are indeed fitted, something which isn't even certain yet, the Strike VLS. There's also a huge, huge question mark over whether there will be an anti-ship missile on board, and what it might be. The Phalanx i'm not even counting since it smells of Fitted For But Not With from a ligh year of distance.
 
To contain costs further, the project settled for a CODELOG propulsion solution (nothing wrong on this per se, but a little more ambition could have brought to a CODELAG solution giving the ship more sprint when necessary); a medium-class radar (as good as it might be, that's what Artisan is) and a simplified, lower-than-Aster 15 performance SAM (very smart; i love how CAMM works, but again, it is a cheaper and less ambitious system with somewhat reduced performances), and still BAE can't stick to a reasonable cost...? 

Arguably all that could possibly be done to contain the cost in terms of role fit and high end equipment has been done, by pre-adopting everything via the Type 23 Capability Sustainment Programme, derisking the various pieces and literally acquiring them before the ship itself, to move them across later. 
In a further internal effort, the Royal Navy is building up a common computer infrastructure for the combat system of all its vessels, under the SC4S (Surface Combatant Common Core Combat System); it is due to standardize navigation radars on a new, common type (apparently the Kelvin Hughes Sharpeye) fleet-wide and is proceeding with the Future Maritime Radar Electronic Surveillance (FMRES) with the adoption of the the digital radar ESM (RESM) on all surface warships. 
Most, if not all of these systems will not only have been developed and de-risked and adopted by the time the first Type 26 is ready for fitting out, but will have actually already been in service for a while on the Type 23s and will be physically transfered from old to new hull. Since the passage from Type 23 to Type 26 is going to last for more than a decade (2022 to 2036, according to the plans seen so far), the equipment will be upgraded, no doubt, to some degree along the way, but in a quite common way over the two different hulls. No big revolution is expected, other than what could be afforded by the strike VLS and the new main gun. 

Even so, BAE was given a generous 127 million pounds for 4-years of design and development work in the contract signed 25 March 2010. The amount of money and time is fully compatible with the task: indeed, it is about the amount of money it cost to design three FREMM variants (the french one and the two italian versions!), so it is arguably even too generous. 

EDIT: 
The reported unexpected weight growth had apparently prompted BAE to revise the Global Combat Ship webpage to signal a speed reduced by at least two knots, from 28+ to 26+. 
And the MOD, in front of the uncertainties on the costs, has awarded a 19 million (!!!) contract with McKinsey to provide an external audit about Type 26 between October 2014 and March 2015 (thanks to Tim Fisher, Shephard News, for the heads up). 
Taking a pause to evaluate things is probably the right thing to do as the Navy does not need cost escalations later on, but i'm increasinly frustrated by the horrendous amount of money that the MOD spends in external audits, assessments, counter-assessments, and assorted power point slides. I wish someone looked into these expenses very very closely, because i don't think there's another ministry spending so much for these things, in the whole wide world. 
The March 2015 date for the results of the external audit, anyway, looks like a tombstone on any hope to achieve a contract award before the elections. 
End edit

Sincerely, there isn't much left to be attempted to contain the cost of building these warships, other than changing the design and making them smaller and less capable by straight out deleting some parts. Something which is not desirable at all, since the ship really hasn't any evident gold plating that can be done without.  Quite the opposite: as it is now, the design really could do with some touch ups here and there, such as resurrecting the sunk elements of MIDAS (Maritime Integrated Defensive Aids Suite, the project for the modernisation of the Navy's decoys and countermeasures fit) to finally achieve parity with contemporary warship designs not just in terms of decoy rounds (thankfully, the Royal Navy is not lagging on these ones, and is working with France on new payloads such as ACCOLADE), but in terms of their deployment, via a modernized launcher.  
Besides, it must be noted that big changes to what is an almost frozen design at this point are likely to cost quite a lot of money and time.

In front of the unexpected cost issues in a programme which uniquely separates the ship from most of its expensive combat system and high end equipment, it becomes unsurprising to see potential partners basically vanishing away. Australia, which for a short while looked like the most realistic possible partner on the Global Combat Ship, has already packed up and awarded a study contract for its next generation frigates to Navantia. 

Again, i must ask the painful question of whether, and for how much longer, this destructive game can be continued. If BAE shipyards can't deliver to acceptable, at least somewhat competitive prices when compared to other european yards, something must be done. Is BAE the problem? Bring someone else in at the head of the yards. Deliver a shock to the system. Introduce actual competition. Do something radical. Building hulls abroad might be unpopular and hit shipyard's workforce and even have a political bomb in it due to the awkwardness of the Scotland situation, but not doing it if things don't change is just a way to delay the end by another short while, at the cost of the Navy. 
Something has to change, period. If things continue to go south this way, both the navy and the shipyards will be destroyed, as the navy will get less and less warships year on year due to the high costs, and the yards will become even more unsustainable due to buidling less vessels, in a self-destructive circle in which things only get worse. 
The Type 26 programme has been conceived and structured as a "rebirth" project, in which as much of the risk as possible is removed, in which the rate of innovation is "20% new to 80% old, compared to Type 45 which was the exact opposite", in which there is, at least in the words, a complete focus on affordability and even on exportability. If even this fails, it is likely to be game over, or close to it. The navy has no more hulls to lose, and the shipyard consolidation is going to leave a single building line in a few years time. One. After that, only the zero remains. 

In the coming months, and ideally before the election, the Navy and BAE will have to make it work, in a way or another, because other big-ticket projects are being rushed to contract signature (Project Marshal signed reportedly 12 months early; FRES SV signed with the demonstration phase far from completed, and more expected to follow) and not having a signed piece of paper when the budget axe will be swinging is likely to be a very big issue. 



Credibility


The First Sea Lord in recent months has talked a few times, and he always delivered some quite interesting speeches, even though i feel he did maintain a very vague line when asked about the obvious vulnerabilities and issues on the horizon. I understand he has serious limits to what he can say, but hiding the problems under the carpet is not going to solve them, and one day there will have to be a far more open and honest discussion about what the United Kingdom intends to do going ahead. 

For now, i'm going to focus on the concept of credibility, and its direct application to the Navy's escorts situation. 
In his interview with Vago Muradian at DefenseNews.com, the First Sea Lord reinstated his vision of the navy's credibility, to which he has stuck with admirable coherence ever since he got in charge: 

Q. What are the priorities you want to come out of the upcoming strategic defense and security review for the Navy?
A. The Navy has to be both credible and [have] balance. If you lose either of those qualities, you’re not in the first division and a very large-potted investment doesn’t make sense. The credibility is not judged by some pundit in a newspaper or magazine on warships. It’s judged by those who operate on those ships, and it’s judged by our potential enemies. So the quality of build, the quality of war-fighting equipment, the quality of the output effect from those platforms — subsurface, surface and air — has to be critical and the balanced force to keep part of that. If you have got the enabling elements of the construct as a whole, then you’re going to have a machine that works and gets respected. So my job is very simple: Stay credible and stay balanced, and that’s a very expensive bill for the nation to pay. But for a nation that has that ambition, and if you have ambition, you have to pay for it.

The general concept is hardly questionable. You can only agree with it. But, even being a pundit, and not even a newspaper one, but a blog one, i must ask how the concept translates into reality. The following question goes into Type 26 range, and the answer is the one which caused the FREMM speculation, since admiral Zambellas does not restrict the solution to one delivered by british yards. 

Q. Tell us how you’re maintaining affordability for the Type 26 frigate program?
A. It has to be a credible platform. We’ve set that condition, as the people who operate them, by setting a requirement we think is appropriate for these platforms. When you have a limited number of frigates to deploy worldwide, you have to be certain that you get huge utility out of them. You’ve got to be able to get the range. You have a flexibility. So if, for example, a brand new Type 26 is off the Somali coast doing counterpiracy, a relatively modest policing capability. The next thing is required to move to a hotter, more dangerous environment, you’re not in the position to say, “Oh, hang on; I’ll just change the crew. I’ll reconfigure this or that.”
You’ve got to be there. You’ve got to be able to do the job properly. So our starting point in this requirement is about credible platforms. We then place that requirement into the machine, and the acquisition process looks for a solution with the proper support to be able to give us what we need. The affordability question that comes from that depends on the best that industry can deliver. You’ll notice, I haven’t necessarily said that that’s the British industry, because the decision has not been made as to exactly what that solution to the requirement will be, and we wait to see what comes of it. But the Navy knows what it wants. It wants a credible platform with global reach and the sort of quality, particularly in ASW [anti-submarine warfare], to keep us right up there for the bigger and more important platforms.

I absolutely agree on the fact that Type 26 has got to be credible. And the design that we have seen so far has much good about it, and on paper is more than credible. The evolutionary rather than revolutionary approach is appreciable as well, as it contains risks and, supposedly, costs.
However, closer examination brings questions still searching for answers. On the equipment front, one big question is the Type 26's capability against enemy surface combatants, and its usefulness in influencing events ashore, even many miles inland. In equipment terms: is the strike VLS system going in, this time around, or will it be descoped, as it already happened with the Type 45? And what, if anything, will replace the old Harpoon, which itself hangs in the balance of things between a capability sustainment investment to stretch its life, or a speedy demise in 2018, potentially leaving the Royal Navy completely without a heavy anti-ship missile? 

These are two huge questions which directly affect the credibility of the Type 26. What will the ship actually be able to do to be credible and, moreover, to be useful in a "hotter, more dangerous area"? She can't do air area defence due to the limits of CAMM. Can she confidently engage enemy ships without depending solely by the light Sea Venom (FASGW(H)) missile carried by its embarked helicopter, or is it without an ASM weapon? Can it deliver usefulness against targets inshore by delivering some sort of deep strike? 
The ship is expected to have a 127 mm main gun which will deliver greater effect in Naval Gunfire Support, but we don't know if and when it will have modern guided, long range ammunition to deliver precision effect beyond the very coastal area. Will it have missiles on board to provide effects ashore? Again, no one knows. 

Much of the capability available to the ship will also depend on what helicopter it has on board when it gets the call to action. Merlin HM2 delivers excellent ASW capability, but only four helicopters at a time have an EO/IR turret and a DAS fit enabling them to venture in dangerous skies and survey surface targets. 
To this day, none of the Merlins has the ability to employ Sea Skua, nor is planned to receive the Sea Venom and / or LMM capability. So, a Type 26 embarking a Merlin HM2, without future improvements to the helicopter, would be severely limited in ASuW and in any use of the helicopter ashore, unless the embarked helicopter was, luckily, one of the four fitted with the DAS and EO/IR turret. 
If it had Wildcat, it could be well placed for ASuW (even though i don't think Sea Venom is a replacement for an heavy, hard-hitting ship-mounted ASM missile which is available for launch without depending from the helicopter being available and ready for take off), but the Wildcat is not going to have sonar and sonobuoys, so if the need of the moment was ASW, the ship would not really achieve credibility without doing some changes to what is on board. 

Notably, the Type 26, like the Type 23, is planned to be an ASW hunter first and foremost. That is what is driving the design: the need for an acoustically quiet, long-endurance ASW vessel. 
Even so, only 8 of a planned 13 ships are due to have the 2087 towed sonar which is the most important detection tool. So, if the mission was ASW but the closest frigate was one of the "tail-less" ones, credibility would once more be seriously reduced.
Maximum ASW credibility could only be achieved by a frigate with the 2087 and a Merlin HM2 on board.

Considering all these factors, what is credibility about, at the end of the day? And how can it ever be realistically expected that a ship deployed on a standing task will have all it needs, in equipment and training, to be able to respond to a "hot" crisis popping up, without having to properly prepare? 

Again, i might be a pundit, but to me, here is the problem. I don't consider this a realistic approach, at least not for the Royal Navy that is taking shape, because too many of the capabilities are held by one specific platform alone. There is no Arleigh Burke here.
The complete dualism between Wildcat HMA2 and Merlin HM2 is, to me, foolish, and is an image of the problems in the force structure.
I can see why Wildcat would not have a dipping sonar and sonobuoys, which are expensive, complex, would take up all the space in the cabin and cost a lot in money and human resources to fill a role which, while all-important, is relatively less likely to be exercised out of the blue. A major crisis against an enemy with a credible submarine force, in other words, should only happen with a reasonable warning time, one would expect, and it would anyway require an answer much better thought out than the movement of a lone frigate from a standing task to the frontline. 
Much less acceptable is the fact that even after the HM2 upgrade, Merlin is so limited in anything other than chasing subs, save for the UOR-fitted 4 Merlins used in the Gulf. 

Credibility is achieved by the fleet as a whole construct, more than by a single ship. Being classed a frigate and weighting several thousand tons does not equate to credibility if the actual pieces of the puzzle are missing. 
Especially if the few frigates available are scattered far and wide, forever taken up by standing tasks which often could be covered just as well by lower end ships. 
I don't believe in the credibility of the ship just because it is classed a "frigate" just like i do not believe in the credibility of defence diplomacy only if done by brigadiers, admirals and air marshals (one justification often heard when the huge number of top brass is questioned). I don't think the countries the UK engages with are actually so dumb and primitive to be enchanted by the mere rank on the uniform without looking beyond it to take a look at the actual capability output that the officer represents. 

It is not so much the the lone ship, it is the task force that the Royal Navy could deploy and sustain far from home that gives the Navy its rank and its credibility.

Before Type 26 became the programme it now is, the Royal Navy had been following a different path which had, in my opinion, a lot of merit. While unaffordable in the numbers it had been conceived with, i believe the concept recognized some base truths. 
That concept was one of a two-tiered fleet, supported by a third tier, of patrol-capable MCM and hydrographic vessels. It was about building 10 "C1" high end combat ships, with ASW focus; supported by 8 "C2" ships, capable but oriented to more "general purpose" tasking, and then C3, the multi-mission replacement for current MCM, survey and patrol ships, which kind of survives still under the MHPC name. 

Type 26 is born out of the fusion of C1 and C2 into a single class of 13 hulls, 8 of which fully kitted, and 5 of which missing, basically, the towed sonar. A repeat of the current Type 23 fleet, in other words. 
This approach has a few advantages: it avoids the costs of two separate designs and programmes, and builds on the fact that, the late ships in a series build are always less expensive than the first, giving a bit of a downward slope in costs. Crucially, having a single programme removes the challenges of having a second one approved and funded, and removes the risk of the two programmes entering in direct conflict in the budgetary battle. 
The problem with this approach is that there will only be 8 Type 26 fully equipped, too few to meet the requirement, while the five others (if they ever get built, which is far from a certainty...) will have all the cost and complexity of an ASW high end frigate but an handicapped equipment. They will still require a "large" (Type 26 is actually expected to be very lean manned, but a less ambitious ship could do with less personnel and, critically, with less highly technical rates) crew with the expense that this entail, and their credibility will always be only partial. 
Modern wars, in fact, tend to be "come as you are" situations, and it is quite complex to envisage a scenario which requires the additional ASW hulls but gives you the time to procure, fit and commission the mission sonars and pieces. 

We have to ask ourselves if this is actually helpful. 

The First Sea Lord has substantially said he opposes the idea of building a second tier flottilla. In August this year, while speaking in the US, he said: 

“You aim for high end and you accept the risk your footprint’s reduced globally… I absolutely reject the idea of an ostensibly [larger] number of smaller platforms that might have a wider footprint.”
Yes, the Sea Lord said, the UK could invest in what’s called a high-low mix, buying many cheap ships suited to “constabulary” operations off Somalia and a few expensive ships in case of major war. “The danger with that is when you are needed to perform a high end — and therefore a strategically valuable — task alongside a partner, you find that your low-end capability doesn’t get through the gate,” Zambellas said. “You lose out on the flexibility and authority associated with credible platforms.”

Quote from BreakingDefense.com  article on the conference

It is, again, a concept with merit. But, when looking at the details, many questions pop up. Several questions we have already covered. Another key question is how credible it is to have a navy which has its precious, high end warships spread all over the world on standing tasks which are fundamental to the country but techinically not suited for the high end combat vessels. My opinion is that the credibility of the platform might be good, but the credibility of the navy is badly hurt, because it has to respond to Libya by using ships about to be decommissioned, and because in years it hasn't been able to exercise a proper complete task group for lack of escorts, all busy elsewhere. 
When you can't attach a frigate, an air defence destroyer and the proper logistic ships to your primary war tool, the Response Force Task Group, your credibility sinks. Cougar 14 has been the lowest point in history, in this sense.

I agree that attempting to start a specific programme for a "lower end" frigate is not going to work, in the UK. In France and Italy, where the fleet is already two-tiered, it is relatively straightforward to make separate cases for supporting the modernisation of both tiers. In the UK, where only the High Tier remains, reintroducing a secondary fleet would go entirely to the detriment of the first class ships. A resurrection of C2, in other words, is highly likely to be impossible.

It must also be remembered that a second tier ship would be, of course, limited in the range of tasks it can cover when things get hot. However, a balanced fleet can’t be made of sole high-end warships. If we take a look at the Royal Navy’s daily tasks, there are several which do not require the presence of a Type 45 or a frigate. The Atlantic Patrol Tasking North, in the Caribbean, would be best served with a cheaper OPV, ideally forward based in Bermuda. This would at one stroke remove quite a bit of stress from the rest of the fleet. Operation ATALANTA is another task that does not really require a full sized frigate. Gibraltar could be the base of another OPV / second tier vessel which would deliver much wished for political reassurance, while being available to restore a more visible british presence in the Mediterranean and along the western coast of Africa, an area which has been growing in importance and an area which could get progressively hotter if the piracy in the gulf of Nigeria escalates further.

A number of other presence and defence engagement tasks could be covered by less ambitious warships, if they were available. Relieving the high end warships of some of these tasks would help frigates and destroyers being available for commitments of greater importance. The high end warships should still have a lot to cover, so any pressure removed from their duties is a big gain:

-          Operation Kipion in the Gulf; here, the risk is always high, and arguably the Royal Navy should maintain one Type 45 and one ASW frigate in the area enduringly. To achieve this aim, the Royal Navy is now extending to 9 months the duration of deployment in the area, with a mid-deployment crew rest and ship maintenance “break” in Bahrain.

-          South Atlantic Patrol Tasking; an ASW frigate, with its all-around capability is excellent reassurance. The Royal Navy is extending South Atlantic deployments to 9 months as well, on the same model used in the Gulf.

-          Towed Array Patrol Ship; an ASW frigate with 2087 “tail” kept at readiness in home waters to support the deterrent and the effort against sneaky Russian subs probing the waters around the UK. A task rarely mentioned, but one that should have gotten a lot more important with the (inexcusable) loss of the maritime patrol aircraft

-          Fleet Ready Escort; one warship at high readiness for deployment worldwide

-          Standing NATO RF Maritime Groups; which in the new cold climate with Russia are returning to the fore. The Royal Navy has been unable to do much for the groups since 2012, but now they are again in the top slots in the list.

Finally, the ever important task of being actually available for what is the Navy’s true answer to a crisis, the Response Force Task Group. The Credibility of the Navy is best served by being able to deploy and train a coherent task force including at least one destroyer for air area defence and at least one ASW frigate for anti-surface, anti-submarine defence and for naval gunfire support and other supporting roles. The sight of the capital ships Bulwark and Ocean going around without escort is not my idea of credibility. Not at all. And when the carrier capability is finally restored, the lack of escorts will be even more unacceptable.

The extension of deployments to Kipion and South Atlantic help in covering more ground with limited resources by reducing the number of ship rotations, and cutting down on transfer times as the same vessel stays in the area for longer.
However, even with a break in the middle, it is still a 9 months stint for the same crew. It is probably the time for testing again the practice of sea-swapping the crew of major warships, because if it could be made to work, the same ship could stay deployed at least one year, while the crew would rotate to keep the pressure on personnel more bearable.
The germans are notoriously building presence warships, the F-125 frigates, which are designed specifically to deploy abroad for a whole 2 years, while the crews are rotated every four to six months.
The Royal Navy’s warships haven’t been designed for such use, but it might be possible to achieve a 12 month time on station, with the right approach. Going ahead, it might become unavoidable to try again: the RN made a first try back in 2007, swapping the crews of two Type 42 destroyers: HMS Exeter’s crew was flown from Britain to the Falklands to relived in place the crew of HMS Edinburgh which was to spend 10 months in South Atlantic. In the same period, the US Navy made its own trials, but at the time it was assessed that difficulties with maintenance and the impact on morale of detaching crews from their very own ship were too serious to go ahead with the concept.
However, the US Navy has signaled last year that Sea Swap might make a return, and the 9 months deployment for the Royal Navy might be a step in the same direction. Newer ships, new infrastructure in Bahrain and a ever growing use of training in land-based “warship simulators” might make times mature for a new attempt, successful this time.
After all, Sea Swap is not new per se: the MCM crews rotate onto deployed ships regularly. The OPV crews, including of course HMS Clyde’s, do the same. The RFA vessels spend years deployed abroad, rotating crews, and so do the survey vessels. Clearly, a complex high end warship is a different story, but I highly doubt it can’t be made to work.

The other way to ease the problem, is the second tier fleet. The first chance the RN gets to adopt a small second-tier flotilla is connected to the incoming River Batch 2 class of OPVs, of which i've already talked at length. Here, the optimist in me is hoping that the incoming deployment of HMS Severn to the Caribbean is not just a desperation move of a navy terribly stretched in manpower and hulls, but a way to plan for a future in which the new OPVs are put in service to cover some of the constabulary tasks that are the navy's everyday job. These ships are being built regardless of any other consideration, and I firmly believe that a serious effort must be expended to get the best operational value out of them and of the still young Batch 1s already in service. 

The incoming River Batch 2

The second opportunity, in the longer term, is the C3 / MHPC. 
The first MHPC vessel is planned to be procured in 2028, and this is interesting because, with the plan for 13 Type 26 stretching well into the 2030s, it would imply simultaneous work on two quite large programmes. Possibly the explanation is that MHPC as currently envisaged, while having a patrol capability, will have such a limited “combat” element to it that it won’t rate between the “complex warships” which require the single “frigate factory” plant planned on the Clyde. In fact, it would be nice to know more about how the future of shipbuilding is seen at the MOD: while plans never survive the impact with the enemy (budget), it is interesting to think that, in theory, the building of MARS FSS should start quite soon (since the Forts are supposed to leave service by the middle of the 2020s). Simultaneously, Type 26 should be ongoing. At some point in the 2020s, Argus and Diligence will need replacement, and in 2028 the replacement of the MCM ships should begin with the MHPC.
How all these tassels fit into the british shipbuilding situation isn’t clear, as of today, and the feeling is that, for the logistic vessels at least, building the hulls abroad will be the choice of the day, as has happened with MARS FT.
In theory, in the early 2030s the LPDs Albion and Bulwark will also be in need of a replacement, while the complex combat ship of the late 2030s, after the ending of the Type 26 build, would probably be a replacement for the Type 45.

My proposal for credibility and affordability is to cap Type 26 at 10 hulls, like the once planned C1. All ten of these hulls will have to be properly equipped as ASW frigates, inclusive of 2087. This is because where the Navy needs credible combat ships, an handicapped frigate won’t really do. These frigates are built to be ASW and ASuW vessels: let them be what they must be.
After that, put a greater focus on MHPC. A separate C2 programme is not realistic, but the mistake in my opinion was to mix C1 and C2 into the same class by merely handicapping some of the vessels in it. There is another programme which is going to happen for sure, because of the specialized roles it goes to cover: C2 should have been merged with C3. MHPC is expected to be a decently sized ship (at least 3000 tons) which will have large cargo and work space in the stern for carrying modular MCM and Survey payloads. It will have a flight deck and, differently from the Rivers, a good hangar. The ship is planned to have good sea legs and be globally deployable, but so far it has been described as having very light armament, probably just a 30 mm gun in OPV fashion.
This self-inflicted limiting factor, however, is relatively easily corrected: one only has to look to ships like the Khareef, built in Britain, to see that it is possible, at low cost, to uplift the potential of a modest hull and give it firepower adequate to be credible in a far larger range of circumstances. The UK, besides, has the advantage of CAMM, a very, very clever missile system which can be installed with minimum effort pretty much on any ship. A MHPC with a 76mm gun and a small battery of CAMM won’t make a frigate, but it will become credible for a much wider range of tasks. And it will have greater usefulness in keeping the yards busy and in preserving skills between the end of Type 26 and the beginning of the next major surface combatant project which, history suggests, will be late as the Type 45s will have their life stretched again and again for lack of cash.

The conclusion to my reasoning is that when having more high end warships is not a viable option because there’s no budget and no manpower for them,  the only way to cover more ground with less frigates is to make sure that the few hulls available are truly capable and only employed in the tasks they are meant for.
The credibility of the Navy is the task group, with its full range of capabilities, not the frigate hurriedly stolen from a standing task to be sent at speed towards a crisis.
The high end warships must be there for the task group, for the “hotter” standing tasks, for training for their actual, very demaning roles, and for showing the flag in NATO groups, so that they can actually respond to a developing crisis.
There are other ways to cover less demanding standing tasks.  

When people thinks back to the “want of frigates” of admiral Lord Nelson, they should realize that, back in his days, the Ships of the Line were today’s Type 45 and 23/26, and the frigates were the second tier flottilla. 
He did not ask for more Ships of the Line.
He asked for more workhorses to act as forward presence, as eyes and ears for the fleet, so that he could survey many places, and lead the Ships of the Line timely into decisive actions only where they could achieve the actual victory.

It is still a valid concept today, as it was back then. 

And i'm hoping that the First Sea Lord, in his experience, realizes this. I like to believe that he is showing us his best poker face, talking in a way that protects the Type 26, but with his mind planning ahead to give it some helping hands.

Experimenting to shape the future?

Interesting news from the Royal Navy today: for the first time ever, a River OPV of the Fishery Protection Squadron is about to sail across the Atlantic to take up the Caribbean standing task role from the Type 23 frigate HMS Argyll.
HMS Severn is preparing to sail from Portsmouth later this autumn to make the long transit to the North Atlantic station, Navy News reports. It came as a total surprise when i read of it, and while it smells of overstretch from far, far away, it also comes with a seed of opportunity for the future in itself, because the optimistic way to read this news is that the Navy might very much be starting to warm up seriously to the idea of making wider use of OPVs in constabulary tasks. With three new OPVs being built, and a decision to be made next year on whether it is worth (and possible) to keep them in addition to the current Rivers or not, this deployment takes on a whole new level of meaning.
As my regular readers know, i'm a big fan of the idea of keeping the River batch 2s in addition to the current ones, to help plug the gaps. Indeed, i'm quite a believer in the two-tier fleet, to a degree, as i think it is the only realistic option to keep filling standing tasks while having a true capability to respond to a crisis popping up, which is what the Navy is there for.
My earlier discussion on the River Batch 2 and its possible uses is here. I'll warn you, it is long. But i think it is genuinely worth reading, if you have an interest in this matter. 

Navy News photo of HMS Severn and HMS Tyne training together

Before anyone says it in the comments, yes, i am very much aware that, in the worst case, the Royal Navy will have to replace the current Rivers and eventually try to cover both Fishery Protection in home waters and some standing tasks abroad with the same 3 batch 2 hulls. It is a possibility, and in a way the most disappointing one, as, like a too short blanked, it can be pulled to cover the feet or the face, but not both at once, and would effectively be a cut to Home Waters coverage, pure and simple. 

It is worth noticing, about this very considerations, that barely months ago the government published its National Strategy for Maritime Security document which repeatedly quotes a joint RUSI/DSTL study (Future Coastal and Offshore Maritime Enforcement, Surveillance and Interdiction Study, RUSI & DSTL, 26 July 2013) which evidenced that the law enforcement in UK waters is already being done with fewer assets than elsewhere, and that no further reduction should take place. Release dated May 2014.
Now the same assets are being asked to cross the Atlantic as well, and it is clear that, when one of three ships is on the other side of the ocean, capability in home waters is reduced.
The Strategy also notes that the relevance of shipping is growing steadily, and implies that, as the demand for security increases, capability will have to be reviewed in light of the greater task. No, of course they won't say it has to catch up, that would be a too clear call for action.  But the meaning is, in the end, the same.

It is government policy.

So it basically has little actual value, yes, since they will of course do the opposite of what they say, as always.
But still, one has to try and hope that the SDSR 2015 will have some room for common sense.


In the meanwhile, fair winds and following seas to ship and crew for this unusually long deployment!

OPVs that come with lots of questions - UPDATED

Finally, the first steel has been cut for the first of three new Offshore (Oceanic?) Patrol Vessels for the Royal Navy. Ships which came quite out of the blue, and about which we began to know something only on the day of the ceremony for the start of building. But now work is ongoing and HMS Forth, HMS Medway and HMS Trent are the chosen names. The design selected, unsurprisingly, is a very mildly changed BAE 90 meters standard OPV already built. 


 
Of these OPVs we know that they are being built to "bridge a gap in workload" for the shipyards between the end of Block building for the aircraft carriers and the beginning of the construction of the Type 26 frigates. The MOD is locked into the financial terms of an agreement with BAE, BVT and VT groups, the infamous TOBA (Terms Of Business Agreement) which is (or better, we should probably say "was") about ensuring that the rationalized (read: reduced) shipyards left in the country are guarranteed a minimum amount of work each year, to enable their sustainment and the preservation of know how. The yearly workload to be sustained is quantified in around 230 million pounds worth of activities, and the MOD is bound to pay the shipyards to be idle, if activity falls beneath the baseline. The agreement was signed in 2009 by the Labour government with an expected validity of 15 years, renewable by 5 years intervals in absence of formal termination issued from one of the two sides.

The TOBA agrement(s) set out a way forwards for the preservation of shipbuilding capability, measured with the KIC (Key Industrial Capability) indicators, and set targets for cost cutting while having the MOD committed to ensure that appropriate work was always available across the yards. 
However, the Royal Navy has been cut back again and again in the meanwhile, and the deal has become unworkable as there are not enough orders anywhere to be seen to keep the yards going. The 2009 TOBA document for example contained open mention of what was to be the C1 combat ship, to enter service in 2019: the separated 10 C1 "high end" combat vessels and the 8 C2 "lower end" general purpose frigates have been cancelled and reabsorded into the Type 26 programme, hopefully for 13 hulls in total, and with entry in service moved back to no earlier than 2021 or 2022, with an obvious impact on the plans. MARS, the programme to renew the RFA, also ended up being far smaller and far different than what had been imagined back then. 

In November 2013, the conservative government renegotiated costs for the Queen Elizabeth class and shaped out a deal on the way forwards that effectively "suspends" the TOBA agreement thanks to the OPV order, and eventually leads to the end of the TOBA. Shipbuilding in Portsmouth ends, with only a partial compensation coming thanks to renewed investment in the support, maintenance and refit infrastructure, including renovation of dock 15, a planned revamping of dock 14 and the bonification of 3 Basin to enable underwater maintenance. Even so, it is increasingly looking evident that Govan shipbuilding will cease as well, with 200 million pounds invested in improving Scotstoun to make it a one-location "frigate factory" hopefully able to build ships at far more competitive prices. 

Faced with some 230 million pounds of payments to make to BAE in absence of work between 2014 and 2016 (end of Block building for the Prince of Wales aircraft carrier and planned first steel cut for the first Type 26), the MOD correctly decided to instead order the building of some vessels, to actually preserve skills and to get something tangible out of the sizeable payment. 


Weird cost figures

There is, therefore, a challenge in sustaining a skilled shipbuilding work force in the United Kingdom between the completion of construction of the blocks for the second carrier and the beginning of construction of the Type 26 in 2016. Under the terms of the TOBA, without a shipbuilding order to fill that gap, the MOD would be required to pay BAE Systems for shipyards and workers to stand idle, producing nothing while their skill levels faded. Such a course would add significant risk to the effective delivery of the T26 programme, which assumes a skilled work force and a working shipyard to deliver it.

To make best use of the labour force, therefore, and the dockyard assets, for which we would anyway be paying, I can announce today that we have signed an agreement in principle with BAE Systems to order three new offshore patrol vessels for the Royal Navy, based on a more capable variant of the River class and including a landing deck able to take a Merlin helicopter. Subject to main-gate approval in the coming months, these vessels will be constructed on the Clyde from late 2014, with the first vessel expected to come into service in 2017.
The marginal cost of these ships, over and above the payments the MOD would anyway have had to make to keep the yards idle, is less than £100 million, which will be funded from budget held within the equipment plan to support industrial restructuring.

Secretary of State for Defence, Philip Hammond; statement to the House of Commons, 6 Nov 2013 : Column 253


230 millions however, turned out not being enough. The order for three OPVs required some 100 additional millions, bringing the total to 348, as from the contract signed in August 2014, inclusive of 20 million expended in March 2014 for long lead items. 

This is where the first question arises. 348 million is quite a lot of money for three vessels which are as basic as they could be, and only come with 29 secondary design adjustements compared to the BAE 90 meter OPV design already built in three examples in the UK and in one example in Thailand, on BAE licence. 

The three 90 meter OPVs built in the UK were constructed under a 2009 contract, worth 155 million pounds, signed by the government of Trinidad and Tobago with then VT Group. The OPV order came in the two years (2007 - 2009) over which BAE negotiated and then concluded a joint venture with VT which actually saw BAE buy the VT Group's shipbuilding activities. 

The Trinidad and Tobago deal fell apart in 2010, even with the first two ships being already ready for delivery. The then Port of Spain class was suddenly without a buyer, and the vessels were left in Britain while BAE and Trinidad sought a settlement. Eventually, Trinidad and Tobago agreed to allow BAE to seek a new customer for the ships, and in 2011 Brazil stepped in, eventually purchasing the whole trio as the Amazonas class with a 133 million pounds order placed in 2012, which also included some support and the licence to build up to five more vessels in its own yards.
2012 also saw the legal settlement between BAE and Trinidad. Trinidad and Tobago officially claims to have won the legal battle on the basis of delays in the construction of the ships and in "defects" they reportedly had, and the Trinidad government says it got almost 1,5 billion Trinidad dollars in payments. That means BAE paid Trinidad some 125 to 130 million pounds. With the money it got from Brazil, BAE avoided the loss, but made nothing out of the three ships. 

Today’s settlement is likely to be for £125m-£130m. There should be a net nil result in the working capital for the year as we understand Brazil has already paid for the ships

Financial Times report

The fourth vessel of this type was built abroad under licence: the HTMS Krabi of the Royal Thai Navy was built by the Mahidol Adulyadej Naval Dockyard, in Bangkok. Laid down in August 2010, it was launched 15 months later, on 6 December 2011. 

The vessel is built with some significant enhancements: the main armament is an Oto Melara 76 mm gun, with two DS30 30mm guns as secondary armament, combared to the Amazonas which have a 30 mm and two 25 mm guns. The Krabi has its flight deck thought for AW-139 helicopter operations.

The combat systems are different, but the main sensors are pretty much the same. 

The cost of the Krabi was 2.8 billion Baht, equating to some 54 million pounds, more or less. 

The four OPVs in the class built so far have had a cost ranging from 44 million pounds (Brazil deal) to 52 million (original Trinidad and Tobago price) to 54 million (Thai example). 
The three to be built for the UK come with a 348 million pricetag: 116 million each. 

Looking abroad, the cost comparison continues to be painful: the british OPVs cost far more than those, of similar size and comparable performances, being built for Ireland by Babcock (some 50 million euro each, around 40 or so million pounds); they cost far more than the Otago for New Zealand (90 million NZ dollars, or 45 million pounds, with hangar and work area in the stern) and they don't stand any comparison with the Holland class built on the other side of the Channel, which in my opinion, for their price, represent the best deal possible.  


Why the cost difference?

The cost difference is pretty much certainly not coming from the vessels themselves. The Royal Navy examples come with some 29 changes in the design, but none of these can quite justify such a cost difference. 
The Royal Navy ships will have the same hull and propulsion as the earlier BAE 90 meter OPVs. Range is a bit uncertain as Navy News at one time was quoting 6300 nautical miles, but generally the figure given is 5000 to 5500 nautical miles, the same as the other vessels in the class. Speed is again the same, and indeed the engines are pretty much certainly going to be the axact same as on Amazonas. 
The main radar is a SCANTER 4103, and all vessels in the class have a 4100 series. The Royal Navy example will have a Kelvin Hughes SharpEye navigation radar, reinforcing the feeling that the SharpEye is the RN's pick for the incoming renewal of the fleet's range of navigation radars (replacement of Type 1007 I-band radar; of the Northrop Grumman Sperry Marine Radar Type 1008 E/F-band radar, and of the Raytheon Radar Type 1047 I-band and Radar Type 1048 E/F-band radars, from 2016. Programme known as Navigation Radar Portfolio, ex NASAR project (NAvigation and Situational Awareness Radar), which had aimed for a 2012 ISD but was delayed). SharpEye had earlier been selected for the Tide class tankers (three such radars will be on each tanker), and has been installed on RFA Argus to control helicopter operations, while on Fort Rosalie it has been experimented in detecting and tracking FIAC threats at sea.

The main design changes include a reinforced flight deck capable to take a Merlin helicopter (the Amazonas have a flight deck capped at 7-ton class helicopters) and an improved Helicopter In Flight Refueling equipment, to support helicopter operations. 

HMS Clyde during HIFR operation with one of the two Sea King SAR based in the Falklands

According to Jane's, the other differences are:

an International Maritime Organization-compliant sewage waste treatment plant; additional accommodation for embarked military detachments; and improved watertight integrity and firefighting provisions to meet Naval Authority standards.

Jane's report 

The additional accommodation is tricky, because it is hard to see where they could put it, since the ship has exactly the same sizes, but a larger and reinforced flight deck and larger HIFR fit, i'm guessing with more fuel for helicopters, as well. Space is not going to magically augment. In fact, the BAE and MOD accommodation data suggests that there is no increase at all from the Amazonas: actually, possibly a reduction of 10, from a maximum of 70 to a maximum of 60, of which 34 / 36 base crew and some 24 EMF / helicopter flight. Almost certainly, the "additional accomodation" is said with reference to the River Batch 1 in current Royal Navy service.

The ships have two Pacific 24 RHIBs and the 90 meter BAE design offers the possibility to embark up to 6 20' containers, two of which should be carried behind the RHIBs, while to carry the other four it is necessary to use the flight deck, and so negate helicopter operations. 

A scheme of the flight deck, with 4 TEU containers arranged on deck within crane reach. Another seems visible in the bottom left corner, meaning behind the RHIB, and another might be on the other side, again behind the RHIB.

 
Armament on the RN variant is one DS30M 30 mm remotely operated gun turret and two MK44 7.62mm miniguns on the sides of the bridge, making it the lightest armed variation of the 90 meters family. Not surprising, but still worth of notice. 

A written answer given to the House of Commons details the 29 changes, one of which has been dropped from the requirements:

1 Watertight Integrity Modifications
2 Fire Safety Modifications
3 Enhanced firefighting facilities
4 Automatic Emergency Lights
5 Flight Deck Officer Position
6 Domestic refrigeration Modifications
7 Sewage Treatment Plant Modifications
8 Exhaust System Modifications – (No longer required)
9 Ballast Water Modifications
10 Merlin helicopter operation
11 Helicopter In-Flight Refuelling
12 Helicopter refuelling modifications
13 Changes to ship’s minimum operating temperature
14 Davit Modifications
15 Force Protection Weapon Modifications (lose two 25mm gun turrets, replace with MK44 7.62mm gatling)
16 Install WECDIS/WAIS
17 Install Combat Management System      (better expressed by saying they are to replace the existing combat system with the OPV version of the BAE Surface Common Combat System infrastructure which has been installed on HMS Ocean and is due to appear on all other ships in the RN fleet)
18 Military communications modifications
19 Magazine Protection
20 Radio Equipment Room Modifications
21 Change lighting and domestic power voltage from 115v to 230v
22 Codification of equipment
23 Provision of life saving equipment
24 Replace navigation radars      (The River Batch 2 gets the Kelvin Hughes Sharpeye, which seems set to become in 2016 the fleet-wide replacement for the Type 1007 after being also selected for MARS FT and fitted to Argus and Fort Rosalie)
25 Install Military GPS
26 Install flight deck landing grid
27 Fuel efficiency monitoring
28 Provide emergency communication equipment
29 Machinery Space Walkway


The 2017 handover date to the Royal Navy does make me think that part of the higher cost is due to the work being done with the brake pulled. These ships can be built in some 15 months, normally, and this would mean launching the first, HMS Forth, by the end of 2015. More than a year for fitting out and delivering such a basic OPV really seems too long a time, so we might be in for a stretched out build. 
The question then becomes one of ripple effects on the Type 26 programme: the first steel cut for the first new frigate is expected in 2016, with block integration beginning in 2017. Even at 15 months per ship, there should be a significant overlap, depending on how much of the OPV work goes on at the same time. 
It would be nice to have greater details on the expected building schedule. And in the meanwhile, we are left to hope that we aren't staring at an hidded schedule slip for Type 26. 

A skills and jobs saving measure? 

Avoiding a short (at least if Type 26 isn't delayed) gap in shipyard work with an expenside order, paying three ships more than due in order to keep the yards alive might not be a bad investment IF there is a clear way ahead after this gap-filler. The 2009 plan, fixed with the TOBA, fell apart incredibly quickly, and big questions remain to be answered about this new course.

Observing the MOD plans (even bearing in mind that changes and cuts are a constant...) we have:
 
- Main Gate for Type 26 frigate expected at the end of this year with building of the first vessel expected to start in 2016. 13 vessels to be built, with the first entering service in 2021 and the last not before 2036;
 
- MARS Solid Support Ship: while the MARS Fleet Tanker requirement has been met ordering hulls in South Korea on the ground that tanker hulls are simple and are best built by yards which build commercial tankers all the time, the assumption is (was?) that MARS Solid Support Ship, being more complex and technologically sensitive, would be built in british yards. The Fort class supply vessels are due out of service in 2023 (Fort Austin) and 2024 (Fort Rosalie) and undoubtedly Fort Victoria is also planned to bow out roughly in the same timeframe (2025, possibly?), so the replacement vessels have to enter service in the early 2020s. If they are to be built in Britain, and now doubting of it is licit, they will overlap with the work for the Type 26 frigates.
 
- MHPC: in late 2012 a DSTL document said that the MCM, Hydrographic and Patrol Capability programme should deliver the first new vessel in 2028. MHPC will replace the Hunt and Sandown minesweepers and, possibly, the hydrographic ships HMS Enterprise and HMS Echo. HMS Scott and her oversized equipment are unlikely to be replaceable by the relatively small multipurpose vessel (some 3000 tons, according to most sources) envisaged for MHPC. Delivery of the first vessel in 2028 implies an overlap with the activities on the late Type 26 ships, which will continue to be built into the 2030s.

One day, RFA Argus and RFA Diligence will have to be replaced, as well. They have been hard worked ever since they were picked up from trade in 1982 for the Falklands war, and in the 2020s it'll become increasinly necessary to find solutions for their replacement. A Maritime Role 3 Medical Capability vessel (MR3MC) is a requirement and a wish ever since the Labour defence review in 1998, but progress has actually been null. Studies for the Future Repair Capability have also lead nowhere so far. 

Very rough recent concept vessels, apparently based on the hull of the MARS Solid Support Ship variant, itself still in concept phase. In 2008, the OMAR concept by BMT was presented as an interesting solution to replacing Diligence. Who knows how many more years will have to pass before anything is built. If anything gets built at all, of course.

In theory, there is plenty of work on the horizon. In theory. It will be interesting, but probably, looking at recent history, also very unpleasant, to see how things will evolve, how many ships will actually be built, and where.

The boat building activity in Portsmouth is expected to survive the closure of the major surface warship activity. Of interest in this field we have the Royal Marines requirements for a Fast Landing Craft, which has however been put on hold and won't resurface before 2020, when the slow LCU Mk10 is supposed to finally retire; and the requirement for a Force Protection Craft. The fate of this second Royal Marines requirement is not clear at the moment. During DSEI 2013, CTrunk, while unveiling its THOR catamaran solution for riverine, force protection and inshore mission, said that they were in contact with the MOD, which hoped to reveal its final requirements for the boat during 2014, but so far there is no evidence of progress.
The Force Protection Craft programme, at least until 2011 or early 2012, hoped to deliver 12 crafts, which would partially replace the current fleet of 21 LCVP MK5s, from 2016.

Perhaps the most important measure of success or failure of the OPV stop-gap order will be the Type 26 programme: keeping the line hot and the skills intact absolutely has to ensure a smooth programme for the new frigate, with ships launched on time and on budget, because otherwise both the industry and the navy will be in serious, serious trouble. 



Have ships, will sail?

In the short term, while still wondering exactly why these three OPVs are costing so much, i believe there is one imperative: getting the greatest return possible out of a combined 387 million expenditure in OPVs. 

The unpleasant bit of news about the River Batch 2 is that they are expected, at least for now, to replace the River Batch 1 OPVs. These cheap and effective vessels have only been purchased outright from BAE in 2012, for 39 million pounds. Initially, in fact, the three ships were not owned by the Royal Navy, but they had instead been built under an arrangement with the shipbuilder, Vosper Thornycroft (VT), under which the Royal Navy leased the vessels from the shipbuilder for a period of ten years. VT were responsible for all maintenance and support for the ships during the charter period. At the end of this, the Navy could then either return the ships, renew the lease or purchase them outright. The first lease period was renewed in 2007, out to 2013. In September 2012 the outright purchase was announced.
The oldest one was only launched in 2002, so in 2017, if replaced, would bow out after a mere 15 years of life and just 14 years of service, having been commissioned in 2003. In my opinion, this is shameful and can't be allowed to happen, especially not in a Royal Navy already struggling to cover its basic, daily committments.

The new ships will be extremely welcome and useful if they are kept in addition to the Rivers, so that they can fully exploit their increased capability and potential by being employed away from home waters, to offload some constabulary tasks from the high end part of the fleet.
The Rivers will be barely around 14 years old when the first new ship is delivered, in 2017, and the Royal Navy has a clear need for deployable hulls. The new OPVs, with their greater sizes and capability (including helicopter) can and should be used away from home, to relieve the frigates of some of their tasks (Caribbean, but also counter-piracy, for example), while the River continue to do what they have done well for years.

Not long ago, the government published its Maritime Security strategy. The document, while being of some interest, hardly deserves the praise it received from several commenters. Moreover, the supposed "strategy" is written out in a deliberately ambivalent, vague way, especially when it comes to the new OPVs: mentioned several times in the document, they are described as a "further improvement" to the UK's maritime security capability, but not once there is a clear statement of their fate, and that of the Rivers. The official line is that the decision is left for the next SDSR. Of course.
The document has been written in such a way to allow the government to bin the Rivers and still describe the situation as an "improvement" because of the greater capabilities of the new vessels, regardless of the fact that, observing historical trends in the use of the Rivers, it is safe to say that such additional capabilities would be hardly be needed, and will only sparsely be exploited.

HMS Tyne, HMS Severn, HMS Mersey

There is no real operational reason why the Rivers need to be urgently replaced by larger OPVs with aviation landing facilities. While additional capability is always welcome, it should not come at the cost of the Rivers. The Rivers are not combat vessels: they patrol the economic zone of the UK and control that fishery respects the rules. They are very busy ships and they are very precious in forming the officers that will then transfer to the large warships. But they have little to no combat use, they are tied to home waters and they do not really need aviation facilities that would be seldom used at best. A flight deck could be handy to operate small rotary wing UAVs, perhaps, but a Camcopter does not take a Merlin flight deck, and i'm pretty sure that enough space could be arranged in the stern of the current Rivers, if that was the idea.
The new OPVs announcement, in other words, as it has been made, smells of back-door capability slashing. The Merlin-capable flight deck immediately made me imagine an horrible scenario in which know-nothing MPs with little understanding of the military are made to think that the ability to refuel a land-based Merlin helicopter away from the shore using the OPVs is a replacement for the missing Maritime Patrol Aircraft capability, for example. Most obviously, for a tons of very good reasons, this wouldn't even rank as mitigation of the gap, and never could it be "a replacement".
The Rivers are very busy in their intended role, besides, and the replacement vessels would be just as busy, meaning that they would actually have very little chance to even try and use their greater capabilities, which in home waters are useful, at best, but not essential.

The Fishery Protection Badge, approved recently by the Navy

The Fishery Protection Squadron is constantly out at sea around the UK, and has very little, if any time to wander far away from home. A 42 strong crew is embarked to work to a three watches mechanism. Each ship has an additional allocation of personnel used to rotate members of the crew to meet harmony rules. Personnel on the Rivers could be indicatively expected to spend four weeks at sea and two weeks on land, pretty much all year long. The River batch 1 ships each spend a minimum of 275 days out at sea, with maintenance to the vessels intended to ensure the capability of spending up to 320 days at sea. Normally there is a 9 days maintenance period and a longer one of 16 days, each year.
Combined, the three ships have to deliver at least 700 days of activity at sea, and Hunt minesweepers are used to complement the Rivers in fishery protection patrol task, but with no fixed target. Back in 2004, some three Hunt vessels could be routinely expected to be involved in supporting Fishery Protection. 
The only way in which the new OPVs could go "tackle piracy" as has been suggested, while replacing the Rivers, is reducing the fishery protection coverage in home waters. There really is no excess availability.

And having a Merlin-flight deck is of little use when the availability of spare Merlin helicopters is going to be next to none, with just 30 of them being retained (although recently news reports told of the Navy's battle in the background to get funding to upgrade to HM2 up to 8 more, as once had been planned) and all of them already overtasked, especially with the AEW role falling on them as well, under CROWSNEST. 
One thing for which the large flight decks could be useful is for landing the S-92 and AW-189 helicopters of the civilian SAR service coming up, to refuel them and enable them to expand their reach out at sea, but even this might be an illusion as it is unclear if the PFI-supplied crews will even have any deck-landing certification.

Cooperationg between the River batch 1 and the military SAR helicopters is pretty common, but despite my research, i haven't been able to verify if HIFR is an option available as of now. Another question without a certain answer is whether the incoming civilian SAR crews will be able to make any use of HIFR and even of helicopter decks on ships at sea.

MP Bob Stewart has, admiradly, thought of the same thing, but still we have no precise answer on whether that would be possible. The helicopter could surely use the deck, but would the crews be qualified for it? That's the real question. Besides, the Rivers do have a large cargo deck in the stern, which might be at least fitted with HIFR equipment to refuel helicopters without having them landing (i've been unable to verify if the Rivers already have such a capability). 
The cargo deck of the Rivers adds flexibility of its own as it can be used to carry containers, an LCVP, or pollution containment equipment, or other cargo, but it might be also adaptable to take helicopters, since HMS Clyde can, and isn't much different in design, nor much longer. 
The fear is that the new OPVs will not just take away the Rivers early, but be used to unrealistically run down other capabilities as well: 
 

Bob Stewart (Beckenham) (Con): Most people suggest that our biggest defence capability is not in maritime patrol aircraft. I am no expert—although I can see that there are many naval experts in the Chamber—but could this new River class OPV, with its enhanced length and helicopter deck, also be used to cover the gap between 240 nautical miles, the distance a land-based helicopter can go out from our shores into the Atlantic, and the 1,200 nautical miles for which we are treaty responsible? Could it perhaps play some sort of MPA role in that area?

Mr Hammond: I have not looked at the specification in detail, but I do not envisage that the thing will be able to take off and fly. I understand the point that my hon. Friend is making, however, and we are conscious of the gap in maritime patrol aircraft capability. It is one issue that will be addressed in SDSR 2015 and we will manage the gap in the meantime through close collaboration with our allies. We are considering all the options, including, potentially, the use of unmanned aerial vehicles in a maritime patrol role in the future.

Note how, as i feared, irrealistic mentions of MPA capability are made. Back-door capability cutting, camouflaged as new capability being delivered. Disasterous, and tipically suited to politicians. Better to keep one hunded eyes open on this matter. 

In other words, there is no real need to replace the Rivers with these new vessels. Losing the current River vessels would be a waste, and the greater capabilities of the replacements could also end up largely wasted.
In fact, these new vessels would be perfectly suited for interdiction of smuggling, for protection of oversea territories (And the Caribbean standing task springs to mind) and counter-piracy work as well, as noted by Hammond himself in answer to a question by Peter Luff:  

Peter Luff (Mid Worcestershire) (Con): I commend the Secretary of State, the Minister for defence equipment—the Under-Secretary of State for Defence, my hon. Friend the Member for Ludlow (Mr Dunne)—the Chief of Defence Matériel and all those involved for making the best of a very difficult situation. Will my right hon. Friend clarify the purpose and capabilities of the three new very welcome offshore patrol vessels?

Mr Hammond: They will be more capable than the existing River class, as they will be able to take a larger helicopter and will be 10 metres longer. They will be able to undertake a full range of duties, including not only fishery protection but the interdiction of smuggling, counter-piracy operations and the protection of our overseas territories.

To do all that, though, the new vessels would have to sail far away from home and, most likely for it to have any sense, they would have to be forward based, like HMS Clyde in the Falklands. While the OPV is suited for ocean navigation, it has a short logistic endurance in terms of stores (little more than one month for the new vessels) and, in part, in terms of fuel, so that sailing it back and forth from the UK would not be particularly effective. The BAE 90 meter OPV can be refueled and restored at sea, but the less this is needed, the better, as it keeps pressure off the RFA.
The new OPV would be a perfect solution for the West Indies committment, if it was forward based there. If the ships end up home-based, and tied to the River's current role, they won't be able to do anything of what they could and should do. 

In my opinion, the Royal Navy can obtain an excellent boost in capability if it manages to retain the Rivers for fishery protection and home waters, using the new vessels in addition, forward-basing them overseas. I can think of three locations:

Caribbean, removing a committment that has been a source of problems and embarrassment for the Royal Navy which has long struggled to find a way to send a warship, having to resort extensively to RFA vessels which would also be very much needed elsewhere, for their actual role. 



Gibraltar, because from the base the OPV would be able to engage with allies, with North and West African countries while also providing much needed reassurance to the Gibraltarians, which are loudly calling for a more tangible sign of UK support

Bahrain, because the OPV would be able to provide additional anti-FAC protection to the minesweeper squadron there and/or deploy to piracy-infested waters, restoring more enduring british presence in the wider area and relieving the warships from another role which has been hard to cover with a sheet which is, at the moment, just too short.



UPDATE: several comments have underlined the limitations that come with the lack of a hangar, and with a ship with limited space and accommodation for Hurricane season support. They are both valid points, and very real issues. I've decided to add a short section here to say a little bit more about how these problems impact the use of an OPV in the Caribbean. 
The lack of a hangar is the most evident sore point of this design. And it is a major limitation for long missions abroad. However, there might be the possibility to remedy to the problem later on, with the addition of a telescopic hangar, which would come forwards over the flight deck, covering and protecting the helicopter when not in use. Notable examples are the italian navy OPVs of the Comandanti class, although their telescopic hangar is relatively complex and well integrated in the superstructure, while the design of the 90 meters OPV, with a low and small read superstructure block surmounted by a crane is more problematic.

A telescopic hangar could help solve the major issue of these OPVs, although the shape of the superstructure is not very friendly

 

In this line drawing my MConrads and Enrr, the italian navy OPVs can be seen with their telescopic hangar deployed and retracted. It is the only way to obtain hangar protection in ships which don't have enough space to have a flight deck and a hangar at the same time. 

Unless the superstructure is more widely modified and the crane relocated higher, the addition of a telescopic crane will have some impact on the ability of the crane to turn all the way back to load and unload large payloads onto the flight deck. 

Side plan from the BAE video. Note the crane extended. The addition of a telescopic hangar would put a bulky frame in the way, and impact the freedom of movement of the crane and, at least in part, the ability to embark TEU containers on the flight deck. Still worth it, i'd think.

 
Regarding the typical missions in the Caribbean, the OPV would be well suited to patrol and counter-smuggling. For the Counted Narcotics and Terrorism (CNT) mission, Royal Navy ships embark a ship flight and a US Coast Guard LEDET (Law Enforcement Detachment) of some 10 men. Greater accommodation wouldn't hurt at all, but the OPV should be up for it. 

Hurricane season relief is more of a problem. A normal Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) package on a "Hurricane Season" these days is an RFA vessel with a 20 men (or larger) RN HADR team, supplemented by 30 or so men taken from the RFA crew. An helicopter flight is also desirable, obviously, and space for stores is also needed. An OPV this small can't do very well in this mission. However, an enduring OPV presence in the area would still be able to remove some pressure on the RN core fleet, and a more suitable HADR platform, undoubtedly a large RFA vessel, could still visit during the crucial hurricane months (August, September and October) and be made available to some degree over the lenght of the whole hurricane season, which officially goes from June 1st to November 30. 

Despite the limitations of the design, the new OPVs could still be very useful. 
The challenge of retaining them is, of course, in budget and manpower. The Royal Navy is exceptionally lean-manned, following the latest cuts. The insufficient manpower is possibly the biggest problem that must be overcome to bring the second aircraft carrier into service alongside the first, and trying to man three new patrol vessels as well, even with the crews being pretty small, is not going to be straightforward at all.
In terms of cost, the River class costs annually just about 20 millions per year. More correctly, it did in 2010: the current value is probably different. The outright purchase of the vessels has been made in the assumption (hopefully supported by facts) that removing the lease costs would reduce the annual expenditure, while further differences are likely because of inflation and other factors. Anyway, we are talking of a very small amount for three very useful vessels with plenty of life left in them. The new OPVs will also be hopefully quite cost-effective, so the Royal Navy should make every effort to secure all six in the longer term.

The door for such a decision, at least in the words, is left open:

Mr Julian Brazier (Canterbury) (Con): I, too, pay tribute to my hon. Friend the Member for Portsmouth North (Penny Mordaunt) for her doughty struggle to get a good city deal for her constituents and for the vision for the OPVs that to my knowledge she has been outlining for at least two years. Will the Secretary of State confirm that the OPVs will to some extent provide a force multiplier for our frigate fleet? Some of the roles carried out by frigates do not require full frigate capability, so the OPVs could be a way of partially expanding that capability.

Mr Hammond: At the risk of causing her to blush, I am happy once again to praise my hon. Friend the Member for Portsmouth North. I should say to my hon. Friend the Member for Canterbury (Mr Brazier) that no decision has yet been taken about whether the old River class vessels will be retired after the new OPVs are brought into service. That decision will have to be made in SDSR 2015 based on the ongoing budget challenges of maintaining additional vessels at sea. That will be a decision for the Royal Navy.

This is somewhat reassuring, as well as the admission that there has not been a decision on where to base the new OPVs. If they were already certainly meant as a replacement for the Rivers, the basing answer would be pretty simple.
Of course, the door is not locked, but this does not make it easy to push it wide open and squeeze the new ships and the old ships through. I can only hope that the Royal Navy realizes how decisive the next SDSR is going to be for its future, and i hope people is hard at work, already now, to make sure to fight the incoming battle with the utmost determination.

Any possible solution should be actively considered. To overcome the manpower issues, it might be attractive to use RFA manpower, but we must not forget that the SDSR took away 400 men from it as well, leaving it far from being overmanned.

Another chance, which has the favor of government, is the use of reserve personnel. This is the only area that is seeing a manpower increase, and it is also low-cost manpower compared to regulars, so it might be very helpful to find ways to fill as many posts as possible on board of the OPVs with reservists, even though it is challenging: normally, a crew member on a River stays onboard for four weeks and then rotates ashore for two weeks, while the ship is at sea for most of the year. Finding a way to make good use of reserves in this cycle could be challenging. 

These new OPVs are an option for having a little bit of a two-tier fleet. It is a concept that has long made First Sea Lords nervous, as they seen the constabulary ships as a threat, in the funding battle, to the high end part of the fleet. Most recently, first sea lord Zambellas, speaking in the US, went on record reinforcing that mantra:

“You aim for high end and you accept the risk your footprint’s reduced globally… I absolutely reject the idea of an ostensibly [larger] number of smaller platforms that might have a wider footprint.”

Yes, the Sea Lord said, the UK could invest in what’s called a high-low mix, buying many cheap ships suited to “constabulary” operations off Somalia and a few expensive ships in case of major war. “The danger with that is when you are needed to perform a high end — and therefore a strategically valuable — task alongside a partner, you find that your low-end capability doesn’t get through the gate,” Zambellas said. “You lose out on the flexibility and authority associated with credible platforms.”

Breaking Defense report 

However, these ships are coming. If it was about starting a programme out of the blue to purchase "constabulary" small vessels in addition to frigates, the First Sea Lord would have every reason to be worried, and hold back on such a project, as a budgetary battle would undoubtedly follow, with the Treasury questioning expenditure on high end warships, with negative effects.
But there three OPVs by now are on the way, and the Rivers are already in service. To preserve shipbuilding in general, the Batch 2 is being built, and once they arrive, they must be used to best effect. I understand the worries of the First Sea Lord, but at the same time i must underline that in recent times the "all high end" policy of the navy just isn't working. There are too few high end platforms to respond to any unforeseen event. When an operation starts somewhere, or even just when the navy fields its most important asset, the Response Force Task Group for the yearly training deployment, the high end warships simply aren't there, because they are all tied down into standing tasks duties. Either some standing tasks are removed, or the navy needs more hulls.
Libya in 2011 was an example: it took ships that were coming back home to be decommissioned and a temporary gapping of the presence in the South Atlantic to put ships in the area of operation. This, to me, does not look like a good result. 
The Cougar deployments and Joint Warrior exercises should be the Navy's apex in peacetime, and should see the presence of all relevant capabilities, and of as many high end warships as possible so that said vessels and crews can be tested and prepared for the operations that actually require their capability. Instead, this is not possible. Cougar 14 represents rock bottom, with no british escorts to be seen. Cougar 13 managed to snag some frigate support by exploiting the fact that Type 23 in the Gulf needed replacement, and so one frigate sailed with the task group while heading there. 
Type 45s haven't yet been able to attend a single Cougar deployment. 

These three OPVs, built not for a real requirement but for helping industry, do represent a huge potential help for the fleet. They might be simple and uninpressive "cheap" (not really, as we saw) vessels, but if assigned to the right areas and constabulary tasks, they could allow some more high end warships to serve as warships and actually prepare for the high end, complex ops they were built for. They have a potential that goes far, far beyond their size and their own weapon fit. Even without a hangar (the limitation, by the way, that i find most displeasing, although it was known all along) and with just a 30mm, they can increase british presence in some areas where the full might of a frigate or destroyer isn't necessary, thus enabling these to deploy elsewhere, on more challenging tasks.

In conclusion, while giving work to the yards is the right thing to do, i urge the government of the day, whatever it wll be, and the Royal Navy and industry, to take a very, very careful look at things. A long term plan is needed. Funding is needed. And industry must get better at what it does. I'm a huge supporter of british shipbuilding, but i am not a supporter of wasting money. It isn't even my money, but i'm still against it all the same. The pricetag of these vessels is a shame, period. I do assume that the pricetag includes plenty of expenditure non related to the OPVs itself. I'm assuming it is money needed to get out of the TOBA agreement, but i sincerely hope we will be explained why and how this cost figure came together. It is a lot of money for these particular three ships. 
If there are good reasons, and this is a fundation for a better, stabler shipbuilding in the future, it will still be money well spent. Otherwise, frankly, if it turns out that british shipbuilding doubles the cost of even the simplest of OPVs, perhaps it is indeed time it dies, so the navy can be equipped at half the price, and what is saved can be invested to create jobs in other industry sectors where the same hundreds of millions are likely to put into employment a higher number of people. I will sound like a bastard, but it must be said. It is a simplification of the concept, but the general idea is that shipbuilding capability is precious and is worth overpaying for, but only to a point. When it becomes damaging for the Navy that can afford less vessels, and for jobs which require too much money to stay around, and in ever decreasing number no less, it is time to stay stop.