Commando Brigade under attack

It should be clear to everyone that we are far from having a clear picture of the true, full damage done by the "innovative" Army 2020 plan. The newspapers and public have been blinded by the evergreen issue of capbadges, historic regiments and other relatively meaningless issues, while a lot of true problems have gone unnoticed, and many more are still kept under wrap by the Army.

For example, the Army 2020 brochure didn't make much of an effort to explain how 14 Signals Regiment (Electronic Warfare) is losing a Squadron, down to 4, after standing up its 5th Squadron (needed to sustain enduring deployments abroad) literally only months ago, in June.
Again, the Army did not tell the public that all Light Role infantry battalions are seeing their Establishment much reduced, with the consequence, reportedly, that each Company in the Battalions will lose a Platoon. Formally, as the brochure says, the Battalions will still have 3 Rifle Companies and 1 Maneuver Support Company, but in reality they will lose the equivalent strenght of a Rifle Company by reducing Platoons from 3 per Coy to 2 per Coy.

Rumors (that i'm unable to confirm at the stage, however) say that the "largely unchanged" attack helicopter structure in the Army 2020 brochure actually means losing a Squadron of Apache helicopters (from 6 to 5) and seeing the Regimental HQs of 3rd and 4th Regiment AAC merge.
Again, the brochure will not be saying a false thing: there will be two Attack Helicopter regiments, formally, but the reality will be a lot more depressing if the voices are right.
See what the Army is doing...?

Again, few (me and...? Someone else?) reported that the Royal Signals are losing few regiments, but many Squadrons, with each Signal Squadron at brigade level being withdrawn, save for the Signal element of 16 Air Assault Brigade. It is possible that some squadrons will continue to live, as part of the restructured 5 Multi-Role Signal Regiments, which are merely the final evolution of 5 regiments already existing and already "multi-role" due to their focus on supporting, rotating in and out of theatre, the Afghan effort. But while it is possible, it is likely that most Squadrons will simply be lost.

Same goes for the Royal Artillery and Royal Engineers, largely: several Batteries and Squadrons will go, probably in the silence, because the focus is on "the historic regiment".

Lately, i've been following the still evolving situation of the supporting elements for 3rd Commando Brigade. As most readers will know, 3rd Commando is a Navy formation, largely composed of Royal Marines, in 30 IX, 40, 42 and 45 Commando battalions, plus the Commando Logistics Regiment.
However, the Brigade gets its Artillery and Engineer support from the Army, along with a fourth maneuver unit, the 1st Battalion The Rifles.
An example of successful joint work...? On the field, yes, behind the desks, no.

In 2008, to better face complex deployments in Afghanistan, 3rd Commando Brigade was given a major boost with the formation of the 24 Commando Engineer Regiment, meant to expand the engineer element of the brigade from an Independent Squadron (plus TA Squadron) to a Regiment with 2 Squadrons and HQ Squadron.
The force would expand from the sole 59 Commando Sqn to a Regiment comprising 56 Sqn, 59 Sqn and 24 HQ Sqn.

It was a welcome development, and an answer to real and obvious needs. Still, it did not deliver. 24 HQ Sqn stood up, but 56 Sqn ultimately never was.   
And in the Army 2020 restructuring, all ambitions of going ahead with the Regiment were quickly abandoned, with the plan being that 24 Commando will revert to the sole 59 Commando Sqn.

This was a bad enough news on its own. A single regular squadron is insufficient to provide adequate support to a Brigade, and it is whoefully insufficient to provide a credible engineer element to the Commando Battlegroup at readiness, as for SDSR promise.
3rd Commando Brigade is now supposed to generate 1800-strong "Battlegroups" at readiness, centered on a Commando Battalion with support from the Commando Logistic Regiment, support from 29 Commando Royal Artillery (one Gun battery and observation posts, in line of principle), support from Commando Engineers and from 30 Commando IX and other formations and Corps as needed.
There are 3 Commando Battalions that rotate in and out of readiness, and the Commando Logistic Regiment is large enough to provide a Task Group to each Battlegroup at readiness. Similary, 29 Commando Royal Artillery has 3 Gun Batteries, so that it can rotate one at a time in readiness.

But it is evident that a single Squadron of engineers can only rotate its Platoons, at most, and a Platoon of engineers is little support for a 1800-strong battlegroup.

Now it is emerging that next in the line of fire is 29 Commando Royal Artillery, which is facing calls for a reduction of up to 30%, with the probable loss of one Gun Battery.

A Message from the Commanding Officer to the Soldiers, Officers and Families of 29 Commando Regiment.

You will have heard in the news late last week that the Secretary of State for Defence has announced the results of a major restructuring plan for the British Army. This will entail some significant changes and affects every Army unit, including those, like 29 Commando, which supports the other Services. The fundamental aim is to reduce the whole Army strength to 82,000, in line with the announcements last year by his predecessor that we would draw down from out present size of 102,000 (therefore a 20% reduction).

The headline is that these changes will affect us - the Army can't shrink by 20% without everyone getting smaller and leaner. Actually, 29 Cdo could end up being approximately 30% smaller. Quite how the changes will affect our structure is not yet confirmed but there will no doubt be changes to our footprint and our basing; getting smaller will allow us to consolidate better. Although there will be no immediate changes (we are told that nothing will happen before April 2013), I would suggest that we will have morphed into our new structure by the end of 2015 or 16.

Presently we are undermanned by some 20%, especially in the junior ranks. So, we can absorb much of the change without actual loss of manpower but I can't promise that there will not be further redundancies, particularly for more senior ranks. Phase 3 of the existing redundancy programme is now being worked up and there may be subsequent phases too. This may present some individuals with an opportunity. But, importantly, it means uncertainty for many, which is deeply regrettable. My intent is to support all our soldiers, officers and families through this extended period of turbulence.

Never forget that the commando seeks to identify and exploit advantage and opportunity in everything, regardless of how grim the situation might appear. We must not let this distarct us from our operational readiness and we must continue to support the Brigade at all times. Let us stay together - as one; the last remaining Army Commando Regiment - and step forward with purpose to build something that may be smaller but must be stronger.

Lt Colonel E Dawes RA

Fortunately, the loss of one Gun Battery is on the cards, but not set in stone, with time still there to battle such a prospect. Losing one Gun Battery would further dilute the firepower and effectiveness of 3rd Commando as a Brigade, and it would make it far harder, if not impossible, to deliver support to each Battlegroup at readiness, considering that the Army's Force Generation cycle is going to have 3 phases spread over 36 months, with only the last 12 spent "at readiness".
We should also consider that the Commando battlegroup is supposed to be at High Readiness, and at Very High Readiness when embarked and out at sea (for a scenario such as last year's Cougar exercise, which became a war operation due to the events in Libya), so that arguably even 3 batteries might not be quite enough. Certainly not two.

And it does not end here, because it appears that the Army wants to ditch 148 "Meiktila" Royal Artillery Battery as well. This unique formation provides 8 Fire Support Teams capable to direct all kinds of supporting artillery fire (from mortars to naval guns) and call in air support from helicopters and aircrafts. A couple of the teams also have additional, specialized training for underwater insertion from submarines, including via Chalfont (UK's name for the US Swimmers Delivery System: the Royal Navy has 3 such systems, purchased for the Special Boat Service, and the SDS can be fitted to any of the Astute submarines. The Trafalgar class submarines cannot employ it: this capability has been gapped for several years now, from when last SDS-compatible submarine, HMS Spartan, was decommissioned).

These highly trained Fire Support Teams are a precious national resource, not just a critical enabler element for 3rd Commando Brigade. Yet their future is in serious doubt.
Currently, the Royal Navy and the Army are battling for the future of 148 Bty and 29 Commando Royal Artillery. To put it simply, the Royal Navy is not amused by the moves made by Army 2020. The commanding officers of 3rd Commando Brigade are even less amused, and they rightfully are trying to get people to listen and realize that capabilities such as 148 Bty are critical for the future.
The Army seems to be saying that, if the Marines want certain capabilities, it is the Navy that has to supply and pay for them. If it does not, Reaction-role or not, 3rd Commando's army elements will be the first in line for cuts.

The Royal Marines in the past have already lost their wider area air defence in 2004, when 20 Bty Royal Artillery (with the Rapier missile) ceased to be a "Commando" unit.
Luckily, capabilities such as Electronic Warfare, communications, Very Short Range Air Defence (vSHORAD), medical support and logistics are owned directly by the Marines respectively in 30 IX Commando and in the Commando Logistics Regiment, otherwise they would have probably been lost or put at risk at one point or another.

It is sad and actually worrisome to note, but "jointery" has largely failed in the UK, at the top-brass level. The Joint Force Harrier being the greatest example of failure, with the RAF eager to always cut back on Harrier numbers first, doing all it could to save Tornado.
Already in 2008, the First Sea Lord had to threaten resignation to stop the RAF from retiring the Harrier from service, leaving the Royal Navy without any fixed wing air element. Unfortunately, as we know, the First Sea Lord only managed to buy some time.

The Nimrod, while formally not a joint force element, was crucial to the Navy's operations more than to RAF's tasks, and, unsurprisingly i'll dare saying, it was again offered for the chop.
Sentinel R1, flown by an "Army Cooperation" squadron with a big component of Army personnel in its ranks, was also put into the killing line with the infamous announcement that it would be scrapped at the end of Afghan operations. Casually, up to the SDSR it had been a system crucial to Army operations, but not very useful to the RAF... and, again casually, the RAF's attitude towards Sentinel changed radically after the airplane was used to detect targets for air strikes in Libya.

And now the Army is being especially nice to 16 Air Assault brigade (preserving its Signals, Engineer, Medical, Police and Logistic elements) while simultaneously putting forwards heavy cuts to the supporting elements of the other Reaction Brigade.
Because "the other" is not Army's business.

The last ten years have been dense of lessons, particularly for the Royal Navy: facts have shown that the Senior Service cannot trust anyone around capabilities that are critical for its operational effectiveness. Harrier is gone, Nimrod is gone, and 3rd Commando Brigade is under attack.
The future of the Naval Aviation with the F35B is still more of a question mark than a plan, and the Commando Helicopter Force is (barely) getting on to the Merlin HC3, with the RAF said to be still resisting the move, with a "Joint Force Merlin" having been proposed.

Gods, please NO.  

The Royal Navy is learning about the failure of Joint Thinking in the UK's armed forces plagued by insufficient funding. In this climate, it does not surprise me to read that the Royal Navy is trying to go at it alone with a programme for a new Maritime Patrol Aircraft, to be controlled by the Fleet Air Arm. There is no problem at the soldier-level: RAF and RN personnel will collaborate to great results, i'm sure. But it is essential for the Navy to be in charge of all what is crucial to its future, because the last decade makes it real hard to believe in any form of real collaboration.
That's why a team directed by Commodore Simon Kings and made up of naval officers is working to try and ensure that a new MPA solution, Navy-owned, is pursued in the SDSR of 2015.

The issue, as always, will be the budget.

And now, unfortunately, the Navy is faced with another challenge: saving the support elements of 3rd Commando Brigade.
For now it is a political battle, but the only real chance the Royal Navy has to change things is to complete its control over the Commando brigade, taking over the funding and control of the Artillery and Engineer element, saving the first from the cuts and expanding the second. The men would still be trained alongside their Army comrades, but it is essential that the Navy pays and decides.

Not just Type 26s, in other words: one of the most important operational outputs of the Royal Navy, 3rd Commando Brigade, needs saving and improvement.
It is both a curse and a blessing: 3rd Commando Brigade is important. It delivers. It can ensure the Navy political weight like few other things ever could. Taking control of all its elements, making it even more effective, is only going to help the Royal Navy.
And the nation.

Eglin Air Force Base - F35 Integrated Training Center

I've found additional info about the F35 training program from american sources. A massively interesting presentation made by the US DoD in 2010 presents in detail the structure of the F35 ITC, and indirectly tells us of the plan that the UK was working with for the training of its F35 force prior to the switch to the C variant. 

The enormous ITC complex is to train pilots from all three US users of the F35 and from whatever partner country which will want to exploit the school. 

Eglin is being extended and refurbished, with new buildings being prepared and with an LHA deck replica being prepared for specific training of the USMC F35B crews in the nearby auxiliary airfield known as Duke Field. 

This map shows the runway extension and the construction of the "LHA deck" at Duke Field for the specific training of USMC F35B crews destined to the flat tops amphibs.

This map shows the relative positions of Eglin, the ITC main complex and the nearby Duke Field auxiliary airfield.

The ITC is to offer 10 F35 Full Mission Simulators, classrooms, 1 Ejection Seat Trainer, a number of Mainteinance Crew Simulators and some 5 Weapons Load Trainers. See my earlier article on F35 training for an overview of these systems.

Loading an AMRAAM in the weapon bay of the F35: just like the real thing. This is the first operational Weapons Loading Trainer installed at Eglin. See F-16.net.

Flying training will be carried out by a squadron from each of the main users, under the control of 33 Fighter Wing "Nomads", part of Air Education and Training Command's 19th Air Force. 

- For the USAF, the 58th Fighter Squadron "Gorillas", which will have 24 F35A

- For the USMC, the VMFAT - 501 "Warlords", with 20 F35B

- For the USN, the VFA - 101 "Grim Reapers", with 15 F35B 

In addition, there will be 33rd Operations Support Squadron. 

33rd MXG will comprise three squadrons: the 33rd Aircraft Maintenance Squadron, providing flightline maintenance support; the 33rd Maintenance Squadron, providing intermediate-level back-shop support; and the 33rd Maintenance Operations Squadron, providing maintenance control and other logistics support functions. An additional "School House" Group is being developed to manage the training systems, support centers, classrooms, simulators, and ground training devices. 

A complete overview is available here. 

The original vision was for five F35 training squadrons to be based at Eglin, but some discussions and firm decisions still have to be taken in that regard: the training squadrons might remain 3. These are expected to reach peak efficiency around 2014 or 2015. 

By then, 33 Wing expects to have somewhere between 80 and 100 pilot students on the campus on any given day. Peak in the training efficiency for mainteinance crews will be reached a bit more slowly, with a notional date being 2016, when between 600 and 800 mainteiners in training will be on the campus on any given day. 

This map of the ITC structure shows the extent of Eglin's refurbishment and expansion. The ATC building contains the simulators and classrooms, and near the runway can be seen the two new hangars, with the Department of Navy's (DoN) one being the most evident. The hall to the left is the F35C USN one, the right hall is the USMC's one, and would have served a 6-strong UK F35B flight as well.

This interesting 2010 interview to Colonel Tomassetti, 33rd Fighter Wing, Vice Commander, contains more info. 

Mentioned in passing in one of the slides is the supremely interesting note that the VMFAT - 501 was to be augmented by 6 F35B from the UK, sharing the same hangar and facilities. This, prior to the 2010 SDSR variant switch, was the plan for US-based training of UK F35 personnel. Rumor was that the 6 F35B based at Eglin would be part of 1st RAF Sqn, as part of an initial plan that was to see Joint Force Harrier becoming Joint Force Lightning, with 800 and 801 NAS squadrons plus 1 and IV RAF squadrons. Now the uncertainty rules supreme.

Probably, this US-based force would be augmented by a training Flight / Operational Evaluation Unit in the UK on the main operating base (RAF Marham is seen as the current favorite, with Lossiemouth having been assigned the Typhoons and with Marham's destiny being closure when the Tornado GR4 retired, if it is not assigned the JCA). Logic would suggest that the Main Operating Base (MOB) would be given a replica of the CVF's deck to aid training, like the USMC is to do at Duke Field with the LHA-shaped runway. Simulator(s?) are also expected to be part of the MOB's equipment, and at least one Deployable Mission Rehearsal Trainer (built inside a standard TEU container) would be based on the aircraft carrier at readiness.  

With the move to the C variant, the "geographical" change would have been minimal, since the Warlords and Grim Reapers are based in the two halls of the very same large hangar building, property of the Department of Navy.

The USMC is to buy 420 F35, of which 340 will be B and 80 will be of the C type. The fleet will sustain 21 Regular and 3 Reserve squadrons. 5 of the regular squadrons will fly the C, the other 16 will fly the B. 
Squadron strength is planned at 12, with Reserve Squadrons having probably 10, giving a frontline force of 282 F35s. 
64 are planned to be assigned to training activities, of which 20 will be based at Eglin. 6 will form an Operational Evaluation Unit and 68 airframes of B and C variants will provide an attrition reserve. 

The ratios are 4.147 frontline airplanes per attrition airframe and 4.028 frontline airframes for each airplane busy in training/OEU role. 
This means that one third of the fleet is unavailable for frontline service due to training needs and attrition. 
With the same ratio, an UK buy of 50 airplanes, which these days is seen as the best option we could hope for, could give a frontline strength of 34, enough, at a stretch, to form 3 squadrons, but not with full complement of airframes. Like with vehicles in the Army under Whole Fleet Management, the airframes would have to be assigned to the squadrons depending on the needs of the moment. 
In a major crisis, provided a sufficient number of ready pilots, it should be notionally possible to load up a carrier with a full 36-strong, 3-squadron airwing. 

The hope, though, remains for a long-term buy of at least 80 airplanes, which would support 4 squadrons and provide better margins of maneuver. 
Post SDSR, RAF sources continued to circulate the "long term ambition" of buying "up to 100" F35s.  
 

Enduring mystery

I've been subject, more than once, to heavy criticism for my position on the Tornado and Harrier issue, harmony guidelines considerations, and general wisdom of maintaining the Tornado fleet over the Harrier, despite the much larger savings on the same five years period that retiring the GR4 would have made possible.

Without going back on the whole matter of the Tornado savings and without re-presenting the whole story of the duel which the Jump Jet eventually lost, i'll link an interesting 2010 written answer which helps giving an idea of the differences at play: Harrier and Ark Royal combined will have saved, by 2015, 1.1 billion pound, 1.3 in the most optimistic projections. 

In the same time we have:

The Tornado aircraft fleet, consisting of the GR4 ground attack and F3 air defence variants, is supported by two availability based maintenance contracts. The Availability Transformation: Tornado Aircraft Contract (ATTAC), for which BAE Systems is the prime contractor, provides Depth Support until 2016 and has a total value of £1.5 billion. The Turbo-Union RB199 engine which powers the Tornado aircraft is supported by the RB199 Operational Contract for Engine Transformation 2 (ROCET 2) awarded to Rolls-Royce until 2025. The contract has a total value of £690 million. There are no penalty clauses in either contract. However, both contracts include a number of conditions that allow for early termination. Any costs associated with the implementation of these conditions following the SDSR outcome are being negotiated with the contractor.

Under the Capability Upgrade Strategy (Pilot) programme approved in December 2007, 96 Tornado GR4 aircraft will receive capability upgrades between 2011 and 2014 at an estimated cost of around £300 million. This number of aircraft is sufficient to maintain the operational capability of the Tornado GR4 Forward Available Fleet until OSD.

That makes 2490 million pounds already, with cancellation of an upgrade programme and early termination of just two contracts. Even assuming some costs for contract termination, we have already far overcome any Harrier related saving by a good margin, and the list of voices is still long. 

Not so hard, now, to see why the Tornado retirement was projected at some 7 billions of total savings.

It is also worth summarizing some other facts as well, to make it further clear what is the source of my doubts:

The 96 Tornado GR4 remaining, projected to be retired by 2021 after the SDSR changed the previous 2025 date, will provide 18 Force Elements at readiness (airplanes deployable/usable to support an operation) by 2015, going down from previous target of 40 with a fleet of 132 - 140.  

Other answers and documents disclose that only 17 Tornado GR4 have been kitted, by UOR, for ops in Afghanistan, with an increase in their number due to the increase from 8 to 10 deployed planes. 

Before, 15 UORed Tornado has sustained Afghan ops, just as 15 Harrier had been UORed before to do the same job. The addition of two more UORed airframes costed some half a million pound. 

This is another blow in the face of the argument that the Harrier fleet was too small to support ongoing Afghan ops.

18 Force Elements at readiness, interestingly, were those that the Harrier GR9/9A fleet used to provide, until 2009, with a fleet of 75 – 79 airplanes. This was reduced to 10 elements at readiness with the cuts delivered to the Joint Force Harrier in 2009, however: in December 2009, minister Bob Ainsworth announced that RAF Cottersmore would close, and one of the squadrons of the 4-strong JFH was to be disbanded. IV(AC) Squadron indeed disbanded following the announcement, even if its colors passed to the Harrier OCU, which had before had the colors of 20 Squadron. The fleet was reduced to as few as 32 frontline planes strong. This very cut has subsequently been used, post SDSR publishing, to justify the early retirement of the Harrier.   

How was the 2009 cut reached?

Early 2000s. The Sea Harrier future is sealed by the upgrade to its engine being judged too expensive. The upgrades that were deemed too expensive for recent SHAR FA.2 were made onto GR7 airframes: this included even the MK 107 improved, more powerful engine, which had been dreamed for the Sea Harrier by the Navy, with 40 engines having been ordered in 1999 for 150 million pounds of value. It took 112 million pounds in modifications to the airframe of the GR7 in order to install it, and 150 millions to acquire engines and support, for a total of 262 millions.
For the SHAR, the cost had been calculated in 230.

The justifications are that the GR9 is better suited to strike missions, the “hot thing” of the day, and by a study which promises that, once updated to GR9 standard, the Harrier will be able to use ASRAAM, Brimstone, Paveway IV, and even Storm Shadow.

Attractive, isn’t it…? Awesome, I’d dare saying. It is all backed up by a study, the BRCP 821, aimed at increasing the all-up mass of the Harrier GR7 to 34,000 lb, and perhaps beyond, to cover heavyweight roles such as Storm Shadow. The study dates 2002 – 2003, and gains the go-ahead. The GR9 upgrade is the way.  

What happens after that is the well known Joint Force Harrier. The last 3 fixed wing squadrons of the Navy, flying SHARs, are disbanded, with two planned to reform, on RAF structures, manning and under RAF control, as part of Joint Force Harrier. Only 800 NAS will be able to stand up again, however, with 801 failing to raise enough officers to fill the new, additional posts imposed by the RAF structure. Elements of 800 NAS and 801 fuse into the Naval Strike Wing, which only in 2010, shortly before being killed, reverts to the identity of 800 NAS.

As late as 2006, Parliamentary documents about the GR9 upgrade still talk about Storm Shadow. The evidence is in the Parliamentary report "Delivering Front Line Capability to the RAF", dated 2006, at upgrade already undergoing (indeed, the upgrade was contracted for in 2003, physically began in 2004 and had to be finished by 2007). Everyone with enough patience to do so, can scroll down to Page 15 of the report and read it here. 

Later, this would have proven to be bullshit, as part of the wing was apparently found to have to be removed (!) in order to install the Storm Shadow, which continued to present problems anyway as the Harrier had not enough power, even with the new Pegasus 107 engine, to bring eventually not-launched Storm Shadows back on the deck of the carrier at the end of a mission. To land, the plane would have had to ditch the 800.000 + pounds missile!

Storm Shadow integration is promptly abandoned, but the study (who the hell did it? How could they not see such two massively evident issues??? What have they looked at? Didn’t they see how the wing and missile were shaped? Did they massively overvalue the power that the MK107 would be able to provide??? How can it even happen?) in the meanwhile had done its job.  

By the time the Harrier GR9 upgrade had reached Capability E (including a Link 16 communications link and other improvements), the GR9 upgrade had cost 728 millions. 

By November 2008, the Harrier GR9 had swallowed a total of 860 million pounds from Opposition-supplied figures, but was finally “complete” (save for the Brimstone, the integration of which somehow ran aground after even some flight tests had already been successfully done, with the full integration pushed to the right “to 2012”) and arguably at its absolute best.  

Meanwhile, in June 2008 it had been confirmed that, early into 2009, the Harrier Force would have been replaced in Afghanistan by a force of Tornado GR4.

December 2008. The RAF, asked to make cuts in their budget, “offer” the Joint Force Harrier for the chop. First Sea Lord Sir Jonathon Band is forced to threaten to resign in order to save the “Joint” force he was supposed to be co-leading. A struggle which was still going on well into 2009. It was more than the short term provision of air power at sea: at the time, the proposal of the RAF meant that the Fleet Air Arm fixed wing branch would be killed off, with RAF-only crews filling the decks (eventually) of the new carriers after 2016, making the attempt even more poisonous, for obvious reasons, for the Navy.

In 2009, the famous “scrap for buying” announcement was in the end made. Cottersmore was to close, the JFH was to lose IV(AC) squadron, Nimrod MR2 would be retired early, leaving a gap of at least one year before Nimrod MRA4 came online, and a further jet squadron “Harrier or Tornado” squadron would also be cut, but only prior to confirmation in the SDSR 2010, to pay for 22 (+ two losses replacements) new Chinooks and the 7^th C17. The Chinooks, in the meanwhile, went down to 12 + 2 as we all know. The Tornado squadron, in the end, was not cut, but SDSR 2010 had to cut two as we know.  

In the words of the BBC:

Plan to reduce the RAF Tornado and Harrier force by a further one or two squadrons, with final decisions to be taken in the defence review due next year.

SDSR, October 2010: reportedly, the plan agreed by the NSC is, initially, to retire the Tornado fleet, but this changes “at the last moment”, according to some sources after dialogues of RAF top brass directly with David Cameron. The official mantra becomes that the Harrier force is too small – funnily enough, due to the latest, 2009 cut stemming from a 2008 RAF “offer” of scrapping the whole force – to sustain ops in Afghanistan. To try and compensate for the ridiculously small saving, 2 Tornado squadrons are also closed (June 2011), but with most of the personnel moving out to the 5 remaining frontline squadrons, which are to have an uplift in crew numbers.

The MR2 gap also becomes a permanent hole with cancellation of its successor.

How can I not suspect…? It just seems like the SDSR10 cuts were piloted, at least from 2009, with roots of the sad story going far further back in time.

Even without making theories about the infamous “Tornado Mafia”, the numbers make for a sore reality. And tell a sad story in which lots of things did not work.

The quest for answers

I try to be objective as much as possible, much as i'm accused of reasoning out of bias or even RAF-hate, or perhaps "Tornado-hate" (which never fails to amuse me, considering the number of books, reviews, posters, photo and models of Tornado that you can find in my room...). As the above shows, i've linked all the sources and provided evidence of what i'm saying.

I've always used official sources were possible, to explain my doubts and opposition to the path that's been chosen. An exercise that gives me no pleasure at all, as the last thing i'd want to do is to call for a premature demise of the "Europe's miracle", as Tornado was once fittingly nicknamed. 

Due to the (obvious) difficulty at getting around to good information (that's usually restricted or classified), i've had to read into de-relato news, as exemplified by the rather heated-up exchange between PM Mark Lancaster (conservative, TA bomb disposal officer)  and then Parliamentary Under-Secretary for Defence Kevan Jones (Labour MP). This 2008 discussion includes alarming observations about issues with Tornado availability, among other things, and MP Lancaster openly formulates the hypothesis that the switch in Afghanistan is meant to protect Tornado from the incoming financial slaughter.

The exchange contains several items of news: for example, a 31 million pounds cost per month for the Tornado detachment compared to 30 for an equally sized Harrier unit. It would appear that cost might actually have been closer to 40 millions, and this was before the number of deployed Tornadoes was increased. At least 42 million pounds also were expended in UORs (including early integration of Paveway IV - advanced from planned 2011 to 2009, plus a number of new IR self-defence and countermeasures pods) to prepare a number of Tornado for Afghan role. In the meanwhile, integration of Brimstone on the Harrier was delayed and effectively stopped. 

The debate between the two MPs hints to documents released to Parliament, and other data that i've sadly been unable to see with my eyes, but contains several worrisome observations, if they are true. 

I've been told informally that the document the Under-Secretary and MP talk about is "wrong" and overstates the Tornado problems, but i honestly struggle to see why the RAF (which would be heavily involved in the redaction of such a document, I’m assuming) would ever supply Parliament with wrong and self-damaging data, or even permit at all that such a damning report was released. It certainly would be grave if this had effectively been done, deliberately misguiding the Parliament. It must also be noted that the Under-Secretary never denies the data presented by Lancaster. 

Perhaps he hadn't bothered reading the document. Perhaps he was fooled too by its wrong nature... But i must believe to what i read here until better evidence comes.

I've tried to get more information, to try and keep faith to my aspirations of objectivity and honesty, and noticed, all over the internet and in the already quoted dialogue of the MPs, several hints to a NAO report on the switch from Harrier to Tornado in Afghanistan ops, due for publication in Winter 2008. 

An example of the several hints i found, talking of a report “in the making” and apparently on the way for release: 

The MP, who is a major in the Royal Engineers, TA, is not the only person looking into this move. The National Audit Office is working on an investigation into spending on the Harriers and the decision to withdraw them from Afghanistan. The report is due out in late winter. Lancaster remarked that it stands to be "pretty damning" for the RAF.

DefenceManagement website 

Such report, knowing the NAO documents, would probably provide good answers, so i've immediately tried to locate said report. 

And here is the problem. Said report apparently was never actually completed and released. I checked the Publications lists of the NAO reports from 2007 to 2011 included, for good prudence, and no such specialized report came out. I tried seeking the data as part of other reports related to Afghanistan ops, maybe the study ended up in a larger report. But again found nothing, other than a 2007 report in the progress of mainteinance process on Tornado and Harrier, which does not, however, provide any answer to the current questions.

Ultimately, i surrendered last Friday, and decided to send a mail to the NAO asking for indications about the report.

Today, i received the answer, which sent me to this report: http://www.nao.org.uk/publications/0809/high_intensity_operations.aspx, dated May 2009 and not Winter 2008.

I had already checked it over rapidly, and found nothing, so it left me puzzled, but since the NAO itself indicated it to me, i tried again, going through the pages with more patience and attention. 

Lots of good info about Chartered flights, logistical issues, waiting times for spare parts, harmony guidelines, Mastiff availability, helicopter support, every aspect of the UK operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Definitely worth a read... But. There's a big but. 

Close Air Support, for some reason, is totally absent from the report.

The word "Tornado" recurs exactly ZERO times in the whole report.

The word "Harrier", only appears in this paragraph: 

The current high level of operational commitments is affecting the ability of the Royal Air Force to train for general warfare. In order to focus on current operations, the Royal Air Force has had to “hibernate” certain skills by minimising the number of personnel trained and is therefore carrying an element of risk until they have time to regenerate capabilities. Examples include Harrier pilots landing on aircraft carriers at night and helicopter pilots training for fighter aircraft evasion.

Which tells me nothing new, of course. I can't even understand why i was linked to this report, which clearly has little to do with my question. 

The mystery continues. The sad story remains.