Showing posts with label Special Forces. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Special Forces. Show all posts

Tuesday, January 19, 2016

Bits and pieces - UPDATE

The release of a first factsheet about the SDSR 2015 and some other documents and announcements begin to provide some of the details that the original document did not provide. This article is meant to provide a quick summary of what we now know.


UPDATE begins 

F-35 and weapons 

Some new information is now available about plans for putting british weapons on the F-35B. This graphic, released by US officials back in early 2015, should be confirmed:



The Block IV programme and the full list of the weapons that will effectively be integrated is still taking shape. The Pentagon and the JPO are taking time to evaluate the options and hopefully come up with a programme which is realistic and can be delivered on time and on budget. The problem is that the list of the wishes is pretty long, and steadily growing. Not everything is going to make it onto the final list.

The RAF confirms that integrating Meteor and SPEAR Capability 3 is the main priority for Block IV. Regarding SPEAR Cap 3, after a moment in which the "US option" of SDB 2 was seen as putting at risk the survival of the current programme, the RAF now confirms that they remain committed to the MBDA 100B design, which is expected to reach Main Gate in 2018.

Regarding Meteor, internal carriage requires clipped wings, especially to carry multiple rounds. These will be adopted: studies done by MBDA have long confirmed that no problems are to be expected.
After trying to secure italian participation in the Meteor integration process, the UK seems now to put much hope in Japan: a bi-national programme, known as Joint New Air to Air Missile (JNAAM) is taking shape, entering its second phase this year.
The programme is about mating the Meteor with an advanced AESA radar seeker made in Japan. There can be little if any doubt that the clipped wings will also be part of this "new" design.
Timeframes for the JNAAM have not been detailed, but the Meteor that goes into the F-35 might actually well be the JNAAM itself. Japan is purchasing the F-35A, so their interest is easily explained.

In practice, it looks like JNAAM will be the actual AMRAAM C-5 replacement for the RAF: the C-5 can now be expected to stay in service well into the 2020s, arming the retained Typhoon Tranche 1 (which cannot receive Meteor without expensive upgrades and retrofits) and, initially, the F-35B.
The AMRAAM C-5 support contract has been recently extended out to 2020, and a further 5 years or more of extension are extremely likely.

Meteor and SPEAR Cap 3 remain the UK's primary requirement for Block IV


ASRAAM New Build, also known as Block 6, should not present problems. Basically, it is the same ASRAAM as is already being integrated, with only minor changes, mainly obsolescence removal in some components. Similarly, SPEAR Cap 1 - Penetrator should not present serious challenges, as it is merely a replacement of the current warhead with the recently ordered bunker-buster one, with the same external shape. These two "integrations" should be little more than an update, easy to get through, as the F-35B is already receiving full integration of the current Paveway IV (2 internal, 4 external) and ASRAAM (2 external) in Block 3F.

The SPEAR "Seeker" is almost certainly a SPEAR Capability 1 development, which means a seeker for Paveway IV enabling better moving-target capability. Raytheon UK is indeed offering such a seeker option for PWIV, and the RAF is evidently interested, but no contract has yet been signed for this development and it looks like it will be the first one to get written off the list of requirements if the JPO asks the UK to remove something.
Other possible PWIV developments proposed include wing-kits for gliding over stand-off distances and a diminished power warhead offering lower risk of collateral damage. All these and more could come one day as SPEAR Cap 1 developments.

Finally, Storm Shadow. The RAF has now formalized its intention not to integrate Storm Shadow on the F-35, instead aiming to integrate its successor, which should come out in the 2030 - 35 timeframe, from SPEAR Capability 5, also known as the UK-France "Future Cruise and Anti-Ship Weapon" programme.

The decision does not come entirely as a surprise. Storm Shadow has been a bit on the losing side as of late: substantial stock reductions have happened after the SDSR 2010 (reportedly over 200 million in value, so a reduction possibly equating to 200+ missiles) and, in France, a dramatic decision has been taken to go down to just 100 rounds in storage.
Moreover, Storm Shadow is aging. France will begin this year a programme to update and life-extend the Scalp missiles remaining in stock, and the UK should participate, although there is no official confirmation from the british side.
The Storm Shadow life-extension is believed to make up SPEAR Cap 4.
Even with the life extension, Storm Shadow should leave service around 2030, and since integration on the F-35 could only realistically take place after 2026, as part of Block V, it is obvious that it would represent a waste of money.
The decision to aim directly to Cap 5 makes sense, but the wait will be a long one. Every effort should be made to try and shorten the wait as much as possible.

Brimstone never gets mentioned. Unfortunately, internal integration of Brimstone is very likely to be a problem due to the weapon being rail-launched rather than dropped. The development of Brimstone 2, with a whole new propulsion rocket, would have been the perfect moment for introducing a "drop launch" mode, but it does not seem to have happened. There is no talk of external integration either, for now.
However, SPEAR 3 is more of a mini-cruise than a CAS weapon, so that integrating Brimstone (or an eventual 3rd generation variant of it, coming out from SPEAR Capability 2) is probably going to be required at some point to provide a more adequate spread of capabilities.

The Common Weapon Launcher, if funded into service, will enable carriage of 2 Paveway IV or 3 Brimstone or 3 SPEAR 3 on four of the six external pylon of the F-35.


If the Common Weapon Launcher development progresses, this triple rack (being developed for Typhoon by adapting the existing triple Brimstone rack) could then become an attractive (and obvious) option for external integration on F-35 as well, potentially doubling the number of Paveway IV that can be carried externally and allowing carriage of SPEAR 3 and/or Brimstone rounds when complete stealth is not a requirement. All this, however, is left for a rather distant future, not before Block V (so after 2025/26).

In the meanwhile, BK-4 is now flying and will soon be in british hands for good. The production contracts for LRIP 9 and 10 should come soon, while some long lead orders have begun for Lot 11 as well.

It is confirmed that Marham will have an Integrated Training Center.

Finally, Squadron Ldr Jonathan Smith RAF will be the 1st international pilot to complete the entire F-35B training at MCAS Beaufor, following the move of the training squadron from Eglin. 



V-22 Osprey for the UK? 

There is not any remaining doubt about a very real british interest in the V-22 Osprey. From a number of news and declarations, it seems pretty clear that both the Royal Navy and the Special Forces Director are pushing for an Osprey purchase.

Officers from the JHC confirmed the interest days ago, but said that it is "unlikely" that the purchase might happen. The british interest for retrofitting helicopters (believed to be the Chinook, ideally, but with Merlin HC3 as alternative; SEE BELOW in this article) for air to air refueling (a new capability) is apparently a consequence of the impossibility of ordering Ospreys.

The Royal Navy interest is due to the Carrier On-board Delivery mission and, potentially, for the future ability of the V-22 to act as a tanker for AAR of helicopters and jets. Special Forces are interested because of its reach and speed, and AAR capability: the Osprey does not require a "slow" tanker, but could use the existing Voyager probes. So it costs more to procure, but does not require equipping C-130s as tankers.

V-22 demonstrating AAR capability from drogue adapter on KC-135 boom

Photo by Mike Yeo


There is interest in France and in Italy as well, and even Spain has thought about it, but all countries seem to be in a "we'd like to, but we can't" situation. The possibility of a cooperative acquisition programme is fascinating but unlikely to solve the money and manpower problems.

The british special forces do have helicopter requirements in the next few years, which include replacing the Lynx AH9A when it goes out of service in 2018. Currently employed by 657 Sqn AAC, the Lynx might end up perhaps extended to 2022, but a replacement is a real need.
The Special Forces Director seems to like the idea of going from Lynx to Osprey, but probably will have to settle for far less ambitious solutions. In 2011 it was almost forced to accept the Wildcat "Light Assault Helicopter" variant, in numer of 8. It did not progress back then, but it might return.
There is even the risk that nothing comes, which would be worse still.

In any case it goes without saying that, if the Osprey was purchased, it certainly would not go to the Army Air Corps: the RAF would most certainly want to take it, and only the Fleet Air Arm might have a chance to obtain it instead, due to its usefulness for the carriers.




CBRN 

The MOD and HMG continue to be silent on the incoming U-turn which will see the Army taking back the whole CBRN mission after it was moved entirely to the RAF Regiment back in the previous SDSR (after years of "jointery" in the Joint CBRN regiment).
The latest Factsheet provides no additional details.

In the meanwhile, however, FALCON Sqn (Royal Tank Regiment) is continuing to work up towards operational capability with the re-activated Fuchs recce vehicles. This year will include training exercises in Jordan that will put the sqn to the test.

One Troop of Fuchs on exercise. The army is back in the CBRN business. The truth is that they should have never been pushed out of it. The transfer to the sole RAF Regiment was a monumental cock-up and lots of hard won knowledge was, reportedly, literally cancelled from the hard drives. It took the tragedy of Syria to bring back some common sense (and Fuchs).

FALCON on exercise. DROPS carrying the Decontamination equipment are in sight.

The unit is a Very High Readiness formation available to the Field Army Command. It comes with two Troops (13 and 14) alternating into the "Vanguard" role.
Each troop has 4 Fuchs vehicles in two sections; plus 2 Coyote MEP vehicles carrying C2 and Logistic Sustainment kit. Each Troop also has a Decontamination capability provided by 2 Multi Purpose Decontamination Systems, currently carried on the old DROPS trucks, due for replacement with EPLS in 2017.
A 9th Fuchs is held by the Sqn HQ and works in a Confirmation role. 2 more Fuchs are possibly being used for tests and evaluation purposes, while a simulator for training has been activated.
A number of Panther and Husky vehicles are also part of the squadron's fleet of some 30 vehicles.

The old IBDS has now been replaced by a more capable, wider-area system


The Integrated Biological Detection System has been replaced by the new Biological Surveillance Collector System. Probably two such systems have been procured, and according to the contract notice for support services, each system comprises an advanced, containerized laboratory and a number of fixed, unattended sensors which can be deployed around a wide area. The sensors are, at least for now, not networked, which means that CBRN specialists must regularly visit the sensors to collect their findings. Networking is expected to be added later on. Initially, the BSCS will be taken up by 20 Wing CBRN.
The area protected is reportedly much larger than what could be covered by IBDS, but the system obviously remains a static solution, good for protecting major HQs or key rear line areas.

It is worth reminding thet the Ajax armored vehicle comes with CBRN sensors providing mobile early warning from the very frontline.

Light Role Teams, possibly 8 of them, are the most recognizable expression of the RAF Regiment CBRN capability. It is now apparently planned to move everything back into the Army field. 

Re-absorbing the capabilities provided by 20 Wing (CBRN), RAF Regiment (composed of 26 and 27 Field Squadrons) will take time, investment and manpower. FALCON Sqn is too small to do everything on its own, and hundreds of soldiers will be needed. The consequence of the return of CBRN into the Army might imply a change of role for one Cavalry regiment, probably one of the Light Cav formations.


UPDATE ends



MCM Force 

The SDSR Joint Force 2025 graphic shows 12 MCM vessels, down from 15 today. The Factsheet confirms that 3 of the oldest Sandown class vessels will leave service by 2025.
This is not unexpected as it is felt that the Hunt ships are more useful and, more importantly, more suited to be refitted to serve as motherships for the unmanned vehicles of the offboard MHC and Sweep capability in development.

The Hunt class vessels are being re-engineered and re-engined, with 5 vessels refitted by the end of this year. The remaining 3 will now however take longer to retrofit, and the programme will not be over before late 2019.
It is not clear at this stage whether the delay is connected to MHC work: the Royal Navy has been planning for a few years now to convert at least one Hunt into a mothership, needed for further MHC sperimentation.
The conversion of up to 4 Hunt vessels is part of the (UK only) Unmanned Combined Sweep capability programme, and so the first few vessels of the class might soon have their stern modified with an unmanned vehicles "hangar", a cargo space for the larger unmanned surface vehicles and an A frame for their launch and recovery.

We might learn more about the "unmanned future" late this year, when the Royal Navy will hold the "Unmanned Warrior" exercise / demonstration as part of Joint Warrior 16-2.



OPVs

The factsheet again confirms that two more OPVs will soon be ordered, bringing the total of River Batch 2 vessels on order to 5.
The fleet will grow to "up to six", which is a way to say that the future of HMS Clyde, the Falklands patrol vessel, is still uncertain. It might be kept into the far future, giving a fleet of 6 OPVs, or be replaced by one of the new vessels, giving a fleet of 5.
The River Batch 1 ships will be withdrawn from service, and might find customers abroad: Bangladesh is reportedly interested. 

The factsheet reaffirms that the role of the OPVs will be expanded to cover standing tasks abroad:

We will use these ships to support our destroyers and frigates in delivering routine tasks and to enhance our contribution to maritime security and fisheries protection.

An earlier post-SDSR statement by the First Sea Lord had already made it clear, while also adding that the Royal Navy will try to use reservists on board the OPVs whenever possible, which makes sense.

In the meanwhile, as a last confirmation that the Royal Navy has finally seen the light on OPVs, the North Atlantic standing tasks is, for the second time, being covered by a River: HMS Mersey has deployed days ago, following the success of her sister HMS Severn, which proved the feasibility of giving the Caribbean role to the OPVs.



MARS Solid Support Ships

They are expected to enter service around the middle of the 2020s, roughly in line with the out of service dates for the current Fort ships, which are spread 2022 to 2025.
No other detail released.



Amphibious role for the carriers

The factsheet reaffirms the objective of being able to land a 1800-strong Royal Marines battlegroup, even after HMS Ocean will have been withdrawn. Both carriers will receive mods to enable greater capacity to carry and deploy amphibious forces. The SDSR had mentioned the sole HMS Prince of Wales but, as could be guessed, she is likely going to just be the first to get the mods.

The scope of the upgrades is not detailed, but adding accommodations and preparing spaces for carrying ammunition and stores for the embarked marines is highly likely. Studies have also been completed on how to arrange helicopter spots on deck, dividing it in 10 operational areas. It is not clear if HMS Queen Elizabeth (which hasn't had her deck coated and painted yet) will be able to get the 10 spot deck right at build. Might have to be added during a later refit. Hopefully, Prince of Wales will get it from the start.


Fast Jets

Unavoidably, Tornado GR4 gets another life extension, with the third squadron extended again, out to 2018. The OSD remains 2019.
No further detail is provided about when the two new Typhoon squadrons will form. It is highly likely that they will depend on the rundown of Tornado.

FCAS, the joint project with France for developing a UCAV, continues. A national technology programme will complement the joint studies with national developments.



Pilots training 

No details provided, but the number of training aircraft to be procured to replace Tucano, G.115 and Beechcraft 200 will go upwards a bit from the abysmally low expected totals published by the NAO a while back, as the new shape of the RAF will require more crews.
Announcements for both the Fixed and Rotary Wing training fleet programmes are to be expected this year.



A new force generation cycle

It is now confirmed that the Army will have to adopt a different readiness cycle, on 2 rather than 3 years, as the requirement for 2025 is to have one armoured and one strike brigade at readiness at any one time.
The factsheet provides no indication about if and how the Army will continue to be able to sustain for enduring operations a brigade in the field. The focus of all documents remains on the "Maximum Effort", that is elevated from 30.000 in the SDSR 2010 to 50.000, of which 30.000 made up by the Army division with 3 brigades.
Despite what was earlier said in the House of Lords (the division would have two armoured and one strike brigade), it seems far more believable to assume that such division would have one armoured and one strike brigade, with the third composed by PARA and/or Royal Marines. Even so, it remains a formidable force, and one which would take quite some time to be generated. The expected "notice to move" required is not detailed.

Greater Ambition. By 2025 we will be able to deploy a force of around 50,000 drawn from:

• A Maritime Task Group of between 10-25 ships and 4,000 to 10,000 personnel.

• An Army Division of three brigades and supporting functions of between 30,000 to 40,000 personnel.

• An Expeditionary Air Group of between 4-9 combat aircraft squadrons, 6-20 surveillance platforms and 5-15 transport aircraft and 4,000 to 10,000 personnel.

• Joint Forces, including enablers and headquarters, of around 2,000 to 6,000 personnel.

A force of 2 to 5 Light Role Infantry battalions will be reconfigured (and made smaller to free manpower, presumably to enable the formation of the strike brigades) into units with an establishment of 450 to 500 men, tasked with defence engagement and training abroad.
The most optimistic reports have suggested that these battalions will be a "Tier 2" Special Forces capability resembling the US Green Berets, but there is every reason to be skeptical: where would the army find the money and the wide range of precious specialists in all trades which are required to form US-style "A teams"?
The effective capability range is likely to be much more modest.



Armoured Cavalry

Joint Force 2025 will require the Ajax family of vehicles to equip four rather than three brigades. Ajax will continue to provide armoured cavalry, primarily tasked with reconnaissance, to the armoured brigades, while also serving the Strike Brigades, where it will also deliver a "Medium Armour" capability.

Medium Armour used to be a capability area of FRES, and was about creating a light / medium tank with a 120mm gun. Unfortunately, Medium Armour in its original shape has been cancelled to save money and is extremely unlikely to come back.

Logic suggests that Ajax could be asked to equip 4 regiments rather than 3, requiring a bit of a change in terms of regimental allocations and structures since the number of vehicles purchased is, again, unlikely to grow.



Challenger 2 Life Extension Programme 

There will not be a smoothbore gun retrofit nor a powerpack change, but the army hopes to expand the range of ammunition natures available (no details, however). On the mobility side, it appears that new Hydrogas suspensions and a re-manufacturing of the existing engine to improve reliability and performances are on the cards. More power and better suspensions are very much welcome, considering that when fitted with the full range of add-on armor, RWS and jammers the Challenger 2 weights an astonishing 75 tons.

Another major change is the replacement of the thermal sight, which might also be re-located over the turret, away from the current not too happy placement on top of the gun mantle.



The Army is calling for 227 tanks with room for growth (or shrinkage) as Oman might want to buy in and the SDSR 2015 might imply an increase (extremely unlikely) or a further decrease (unfortunately pretty likely with the loss of the third armoured brigade).

For reasons hard to guess but extremely frustrating and groan-inducing, the Army is looking at yet another 2-year concept phase before reaching Main Gate in 2019. So slow, in fact, that the Army is considering an interim solution for the Thermal imaging sensor, to enter service in 2018. Hard to even comment.



Heavier tanks, stronger bridges

Project Tyro, the upgrade to the BR90 bridging equipment, remains an army priority. By 2022, the project hopes to deliver a replacement truck for the current Unipower while reinforcing or replacing the bridge elements to deliver a Military Load Class (Tracked) of 100, at a minimum, to restore full freedom of movement even for the most heavily loaded Challenger 2 tanks.

As last published, the requirement is for 25 to 33 sets of Close Support Bridging CSB (the bridge sets which are carried and launched by the Titan bridgelayer). 33 is the current number, but a reduction to 25 as one armoured brigade vanishes would not surprise anyone.

Each Close Support Bridging  set is composed of:

- 1 Titan bridgelayer  (not touched by Project Tyro)
- 2 bridge sets spanning 13.5 meters (No 12 tank bridge) - requirement for new system is 12 to 15 meters
- 1 bridge set spanning 26 meters (No 10 tank bridge) - requirement for new system 24 to 28 meters
- Unipower 8x8 BR90 TBT trucks for transport of the resupply bridge sets
- Trestles and combination briding equipment to enable spanning a 66 meters gap - requirement min 60 m

The requirement extends to General Support Bridging GSB, with 12 to 16 sets planned. A set is composed of:

- 1 BR90 ABLE launch truck
- 2 BR90 TBT trucks carrying bridge elements
- bridging elements to build a single-span 32 meters
- elements to build a 44 meters span bridge with Long Span equipment -
- elements to build a 62 meters two-span bridge using fixed or floating piers 


The ABLE vehicle in the middle horizontally launches the GSB bridge. The trucks on either side carry the bridge elements.


The GSB upgrade requirement is for a solution offering 28 to 36 meters in single span, scalable to a minimum of 60 meters while retaining a minimum MLC 100 (T). 





Greater accuracy for the artillery 

This year, Indirect Fire Precision Attack will try again to put something in service. The IFPA programme is a saga of Royal Artillery attempts to modernize which have almost always been frustrated by cancellation or endless delaying.
Now it is planned that AS90 will trial a precision artillery system by Orbital TK. This is believed to be their Precision Guidance Kit, a course-correction fuze with GPS which dramatically reduces the CEP for normal, existing artillery shells.

Procurement of a guided shell (with available options including Excalibur, SPG, Vulcano) was also planned, and hopefully will return to the fore.

The Royal Artillery could also definitely make good use of the Alternative Warhead for GMLRS. This round replaces the now withdrawn bomblets-carrier rocket, restoring Wide Area Attack capability with 0% of residual Unexploded Ordnance scattering. Entering production for the US Army, this round (partly) restores that "Grid Square Removal" capability that was once the pride of the MLRS but that has been lost to make it "only" a long range "sniper" with point attack capability by GPS guided unitary warhead.  

It would be sweet to one day learn the fate of the Fire Shadow loitering munition, too...



Apache CSP 

Main Gate, with the decision to be made between wholly new build or re-manufacturing of existing helicopters is "months not years away", according to JHC officials.
I'm not exactly reassured: Main Gate was planned specifically for March 2016, and the "months not years" is a downgrade. Will the decision still come in march, or will it slip to the right?



Helicopter Air to Air Refueling

One of the most surprising developments coming out from the SDSR is the (possible) procurement of an AAR capability for british helicopters. Funded by the Special Forces money, it would be the main part of the SDSR promise to give SF transport aircraft and helicopters the ability to deploy "farther, faster". 

The idea is not new: the director special forces tried to obtain such a capability already years ago, but only obtained a few Chinook HC2A, which only have the fuselage predisposition for an AAR probe. Fitted for but not with, in other words. Impossibility to procure the probe at the time brought forth the purchase of the 8 HC3 Chinook, with their "fat tanks" for extended range.

Now it is time to try again, with the wish being to procure and retrofit a number of probes on some of the Chinooks.
The only other helicopter in british hands with a latent AAR capability is the Merlin HC3, which was trialed years ago in british skies with the assistance of an italian C-130J tanker.
Italy has now procured the HH-101 CAESAR CSAR variant of the Merlin, with AAR probes available, and has 6 C-130J tankers.

JHC officials confirmed only this week that the AAR for helicopters is a real aspiration. The rumor has been around from before the SDSR publication, however.
Details, as always, are non existent. The JHC only provided vague indications, saying we are still in an early phase and even saying that the UK might not acquire tanker kits for its own C-130J, depending on allies showing up to refuel its helicopters.
There seems to be an incredible confusion in the UK about whether AAR is a key capability or not: on one side, a shiny fleet of 14 Voyager tankers with lots of give-away fuel, on the other side several strategic platforms unable to plug in to receive.
Now, the possibily of adding a bunch of helicoper receivers without procuring the tanker capability.
Tell me that it is not dumb, if you can.




Procuring two or more tanker kits for short-fuselage C-130Js really should be a no brainer.


With 14 C-130J meant to be retained in the long term, there should be no particular problem. Initially, however, the MOD has signaled to LM that only the long-fuselage C-130J-30 will be retained.
The existing tanker version of the C-130J is based on the short fuselage variant, however. It is highly questionable whether trying to create a long-fuselage tanker is feasible / worth the risks. The simplest solution would be to keep some short fuselages as part of the 14.
This might already be the case: according to Defense News, the recently signed contract for extending the support arrangements for the C-130J include provvisions for the future fleet of 14, including two aircraft earmarked for helicopter refueling.

 
Fat tanks and AAR probe make the "SF" Chinook, the MH-47, unique looking. Will the UK be given access to the probe? Apparently simple, the probe is something the US has been reluctant to export in the past.


Retrofitting the HC3 (HC5 post JULIUS upgrade) with AAR probes would make them similar to the US special forces Chinook variant, and would give them extremely long legs, making them a strategic resource.
As well as Special Operations, such helicopters could cover CSAR duties, providing the UK with a capability which has been absent for an eternity.
It is understood that the Army / Special Forces Director are looking for an Internally Transportable vehicle able to be carried, fully armed and ready, within a Chinook.


The Flyer Gen III internally transportable vehicle is used by US forces and is now being procured by Italian special forces as well. It is one of several available options.

The combination of AAR and internally carried vehicle would represent an extremely capable combination. Although it is licit to wonder if putting the Boom on at least some of the Voyagers wouldn't have had a greater strategic effect, especially with P-8 Poseidon on the way, with a confirmed future overland surveillance role as well (de-facto replacing Sentinel R1 after 2022).

The C-130J will be upgraded with Block 8.1 software and hardware, enabling the addition of enhanced communications and self-defence equipment to finally properly replace the lost C-130K in Special Forces configuration, allowing the long delayed Project Hermes to progress.
9 aircraft have already been retrofitted with external fuel tanks, expanding range.



Merlin HM2: some more, please 

The Royal Navy has not abandoned the fight to try and squeeze the last 8 Merlin HM1 into the budget for an HM2 upgrade and a continuation of service. The SDSR did not approve the request, but the Navy intends to try again and logic suggests that the best chance will come with the Main Gate for CROWSNEST. Expanding the fleet from 30 to 38 helicopters would be incredibly beneficial as it would allow for a "separate", permanent AEW fleet without biting too deeply into the availability of "normal" HM2 for ASW and Maritime Security roles.



From Zephyr to a replacement for Desert Hawk 

The SDSR factsheet again does not mention Zephyr directly, but there is little doubt that it will be the platform for the "high altitude communications relay" also described as "high altitude long endurance surveillance and relay RPAS".
Zephyr 8, to be test flown this year, is expected to stay aloft for 3 months, flying as high as 70.000 feet and has british origins and has seen constant MOD involvment.
The problem of Zephyr is that using solar power brings not just advantages but also issues: the payload margin is tiny, with only 5 kilograms available to work with. The main challenge so will probably be developing a communications relay package and a surveillance sensors package (or, with further miniaturizaiton and miniaturization, a combined payload) small enough to fit while still delivering the effects needed.
Longer term, Airbus (now owner of Zephyr) plans further developments, bringing the payload to 20 and then to 40 kg.

An operational Zephyr system could include up to 4 UAVs controlled by a single Ground Control Station. Flying several at once over the same area is made easier by the fact that no one else flies so high, so there are no deconfliction issues. Using multiple UAVs allow for very long range signal relay and means that payload problems can be somewhat avoided by having one UAV carrying surveillance sensors and another the communications relay.
There is a lot of potential. News that the MOD would purchase 3 Zephyr 8 came out before the SDSR was published. For some reason, the MOD immediately tried to silence the reports, forcing even Airbus to backtrack on its announcement.
A Zephyr purchase, though, seems all but certain at this point.

 
Within a few months we should have a better idea of what features Protector will come with, with Main Gate expected early this year. It should be based on the "certifiable" Predator B by GA-ASI and hopefully will finally employ british weapons, instead of requiring GBU-12 and Hellfire purchases.


Desert Hawk III has received an upgrade giving it digital communications and has seen its operational life extended 6 years, out to 2021. Further upgrades are being evaluated but are not under contract: LM offers a "3.1" upgrade package that extends endurance from a maximum of 90 to 150 minutes; fully waterproofs the drone and replaces the current interchangeable sensors with an integrated electro-optic, infrared and laser illuminator payload, so that all functions are available at the same time.


This upgrade might be a cheap solution for making the DH III the mini-UAV of choice well into the 2020s, but the Army and the Royal Marines are already investigating a replacement. Plextek is working to develop a miniaturized solution for Sense and Avoid and also a mini radar sensor that could fit within a mini-UAV fit to replace DH.
Sense and Avoid would make it much safer to employ low-flying UAVs in areas where helicopter movements are also present: the British Army has had near miss events which have caused some worry.

The Royal Navy is pushing hard to get two new UAV programmes started this year, but all depends on securing funding. The two programmes are the Flexible Deployable UAS and the Joint Mini UAS.
FDUAS is intended to be the "post Scan Eagle": the Royal Navy has extended the contract for the provision of contractor owned, contractor operated Scan Eagle systems out to the middle of 2017, with the hope of immediately moving on to a new, navy owned service. Described as a "Sea Eagle plus", the system could use a more recent variant of Sea Eagle, or the larger Integrator selected by the US Navy and USMC, or perhaps something else entirely.
It would still be a small UAV compatible with existing ships.

The JMUAS is a requirement primarily expressed by the Royal Marines, which aren't happy with how Desert Hawk performs at sea, in amphibious scenarios. JMUAS, being Joint, probably hopes to be an Army-Navy programme aiming at finding a common replacement for Desert Hawk III.

Later on, the Royal Navy continues to plan for procurement of a tactical, large, multi-role Rotary Wing UAS. The early experiments with the AgustaWestland SW-4 Solo have been convincing, but an operational system is years away, for the Royal Navy. Some interesting studies and projects are already ongoing, either for industrial initiative or with MOD funding: these include a miniaturized FLASH dipping sonar and a small pod capable to deploy mini sonobuoys, the latter potentially targeted also at the manned Wildcat helicopter.

Meanwhile, the Royal Navy is continuing to experiment with small, inexpensive 3D-printed drones. After the first successful tests from the OPV HMS Mersey, a number of the same mini-drones have been embarked on HMS Protector for her current deployment down south.  



Ballistic Missile Defence

A BMD radar will be procured, but it is not clear yet if it will be fixed or mobile, nor where it will be based. It will be a british contribution to the NATO BMD plans.

Importantly, BMD activities on the Type 45 destroyers will continue. So far, these have included developing suitable radar and software mods to enable tracking of ballistic targets. Simultaneous AAW and BMD is planned and might have already been tested.
Studies have also been funded to shape a plan for eventual adoption of MK41 launchers and SM-3 interceptor missiles.
No kinetic interception is going to be acquired for now, but at least a path is being opened.



Deployable HQ 

A new 2* deployable standing Joint Force headquarters to command and control the Joint Expeditionary Force is promised. Probably, it is actually a modernization of the Joint Rapid Reaction Force HQ element.

Thursday, July 16, 2015

SDSR 2015: Air capabilities




SDSR 2015 – Issues, analysis and recommendations going towards the review

Budget

Army 

Royal Air Force 
Air Capabilities

 
Royal Navy 



Having already written something about the Budget and my vision for fixing Army 2020, I decided to continue with more posts summarizing the situation ahead of the SDSR 2015 and exposing my thinking about what the priorities are. In this post, I’m going to cover the main areas of Air capability.


Built around and in function of ISTAR

I will start this piece by quoting a key document, presented recently by Group Captain Paul Godfrey, RAF. The subject technically is the F-35 and how its “combat-ISTAR” capability can be best exploited to ensure that the new aircraft isn’t just considered “the new jet in the stable”, but is exploited more widely, as a catalyst for change within the force. The passages that most interest us at the moment, however, are those which describe the general structure of the RAF come 2020. One slide in particular, showing the transition from 2010 to 2020, catches the eye, as the 2020 RAF includes the photo of a P-8 Poseidon.
The notes accompanying the slide make no mention of it, noting instead “lose MPA capability”. Yet, it is there, clearly recognizable. Curious, and hopefully a good signal.

The notes also say the Ground Moving Target Indicator capability currently provided by Sentinel R1 will be provided by “SCAVENGER”, the future MALE solution which is supposed to replace Reaper.
Sentinel R1 and Shadow R1 remain assumed to bow out of service in 2018. Reaper itself is currently funded out to 2019 only, and the way ahead seems littered with question marks.

My list of priorities for the SDSR 2015 is very much tied to the sorting out of problems directly and indirectly connected to ISTAR provision.



The Unmanned Side

One big problem in the assumption that SCAVENGER will take over the role of Sentinel is the fact that SCAVENGER is a (semi-?) dead project. The hope had been to develop a new MALE in collaboration with France, but the resulting Project TELEMOS has never progressed. It broke down soon after it started, and France moved on instead to sign a MOU with Germany and Italy for the design of a trinational, European MALE for the 2020s. The UK’s plans post-TELEMOS are a mystery, and it looks pretty certain that with all the time lost, in no way can a new uas be ready for 2019. It looks pretty likely to me that SCAVENGER will be, for the foreseenable future at least, a mere running on of Reaper.
Moreover, the Fr-It-Ge MALE 2020 project already seem to be encountering its share of issues, with France’s defence minister saying that it won’t be armed, with negotiations dragging on without contracts actually being signed and with Airbus already frustrated and saying that it will pull out of the project if governments continue rising issues. 
The road to a new MALE seems to be effectively blocked.

Unfortunately, even modest efforts to add capability to Reaper and prepare it for longer-term RAF service seem to be bogged down, for lack of money and/or lack of decisiveness. A long-term training solution has not yet been fleshed out; clearance for flying in UK civilian air space is not on the way and even basing is an issue. Operation Shader against ISIS in Iraq is practically a blessing for the Reaper squadrons, which have jumped at the chance of basing and flying the Reaper from the Middle East . The post-Afghanistan future of the Reaper, otherwise, was planned to be storage into its shipping container. Waddington is the base that hosts the Ground Control Stations, but no Reaper is allowed to actually fly from the base.

This is part of why I find the recent Prime Minister’s call “for more drones” somewhat irritating. The long term UAS plan seem in very urgent need of decisions and action, with clarity needed on several things before more money is splashed out on simply buying more Reapers. The RAF is heavily using all 10 it has, it is true. A written answer yesterday detailed that Reapers have fired 155 Hellfire and dropped 4 GBU-12 against Daesh in Iraq up to 30 June 2015. But before ordering more of them, a plan for training, basing, sustaining and evolving the UAS capability is needed. Reported discussions with France on a collaborative approach to the Reaper crews training problem are to be welcomed, hoping that they bring to something.

If Reaper has to make up for the loss of Sentinel’s GMTI capability, it will be necessary to fit the UAS with a larger and more capable radar. A Reaper was demonstratively fitted with a SEASPRAY 7500E surveillance radar already back in 2012, but while other countries now plan to pick this path, the UK does not seem to have given it further attention.
Trials have also successfully been carried out with Brimstone fitted to a Reaper, and Paveway IV trials were considered. But despite successful Brimstone firings back in 2014, even this development has not seen any significant progress since. For years, the UK has purchased and employed Hellfire missiles and GBU-12 bombs specifically for the Reaper. It is not efficient to continue with double stocks. Besides, Paveway IV and Brimstone 2 offer more capability. It was acceptable to arm Reapers with the same weapons used by American ones as long as Reaper was a UOR, a time-critical project. But if Reaper becomes a long term component of the RAF due to the failure in securing development of a new MALE, it will be fundamental to put british weapons on it, as well as better sensors to make up for the loss of Sentinel R1 and Shadow R1. A realistic training, basing and support solution is also needed. It might also be desirable to buy into the off-the-shelf modifications developed in recent years to expand range and endurance of the Reaper.  

The Brimstone has been successfully fired from the Reaper in trials. One of the many advantages it brings is the triple rack, which gives 6 Brimstone against the current load of 4 Hellfire.

Reaper has been demonstrated with Seaspray 7500E radar fitted. This configuration now interests both Italy and Netherlands, while the UK, which was at the forefront in the original demonstration, seems indecisive.

As far back as 2005, the UK also proved in trials with the US that the RAPTOR DB110 reconnaissance camera can be fitted and operated on Predator/Reaper. Again, the trials seem to have ended up as successess without consequences, since no further steps have been moved since.

New landing gear, new, longer wings with greater tanks and external fuel tanks are all modifications available Off The Shelt and already purchased by the USAF. They result in a massive increase in mission endurance.

It is important that the RAF, the MOD and the government finally take decisions, instead of going on and on with half-hearted trials and experiments which seem to never deliver, in the end. Decide what you want; see what is realistic; and then act to get the best of the realistic solutions. If getting a new MALE is not realistic, stop being indecisive and focus on Reaper to bring it up to the long-term task. There are ample margins to improve it and get more out of it. General Atomics is already working on adding sense and avoid sensors and safety enhancements that will allow the certification of Reaper for flying in civilian air space. This should start becoming available from 2017. 

Perhaps stop snubbing Italy, which happens to be flying Predators and Reapers routinely in corridors in its air space, flying them off the Amendola air base and employing them over the Mediterranean to watch out for immigrants. The Italian air force is seeking additions and improvements to its Reapers, which include fitting the Seaspray radar and the Reccelite pod. Italy is also working to stand up the first “UAV academy” in Europe, having already ordered simulators thought to train Reaper operators. It might be very advantageous to exploit such academy for the training of UK and French crews. If not, think about setting up an alternative training centre. But formulate a long term plan, and then stick to it. You’d be amazed by what can be achieved when a long term plan is made, and then actually followed.


Recommendations:

-          Join Italy’s UAV training academy, or set up an alternative one
-          Move to integrate of Brimstone 2 and Paveway IV
-          Focus SCAVENGER efforts on developing podded, portable sensors which can first be added to Reaper and then, eventually, migrated onto a new MALE when this will be available




Buy MPA, think ISTAR

Overall, the climate seems to be favorable to the purchase of a number of MPAs, and despite the talk of competition and competitors, it is widely accepted that the race is almost certainly restricted to two options: P-8 Poseidon, or nothing at all.

The need for a proper, ASW capable MPA is clear and I don’t think it needs to be detailed yet once more. One aspect that deserves to be covered in greater detail, however, is how I see a P-8 purchase fitting the wider ISTAR picture.
An MPA purchase is very, very likely to put the final nail in the coffin for Sentinel R1 and Shadow R1, as manpower for the new MPA will have to come from somewhere, and that somewhere won’t be a net manpower uplift for the RAF. To a degree, it’ll be a matter of robbing Peter to pay Paul. However, the capability brought to the table by Sentinel R1 is a real force multiplier, and one that sets the RAF apart from other medium power air forces. Even assuming Reaper gets equipped with a more capable GMTI radar, it will still not replace Sentinel in its entirety.

The P-8 Poseidon, however, has great potential to serve not just as MPA, but in wider sense as an ISTAR (and possibly Combat ISTAR) platform. The Poseidon comes with ample growth margins and multi-mission capability, as well as with 11 hardpoints for weaponry, 5 of which in the weapon bay, 4 under the wings and 2 fuselage stations.
India’s version, the P-8I Neptune, makes use of some of the growth potential: differently from US Navy Poseidons, the P-8I is fitted with a second radar, covering the aft sector, and the main radar has seen the addition of an air-to-air mode. The Indian P-8 is thus not just an MPA, but also, to a degree, an AWACS platform.
The US Navy itself is working on adding to the P-8’s arsenal a new, large, capable sensor, the APS-154 Advanced Airborne Sensor (AAS). This radar is the result of a highly classified development programme. It is thought to be particularly powerful in achieving mapping of surface targets in the littoral, and it has a formidable GMTI capability over land. The APS-154 might be the base of the radar the USAF wants on its JSTARS replacement aircraft, to be purchased in the next few years, but this is just a guess since the USAF hasn’t provided details yet.
The AAS is fitted in a canoe fairing which can be fitted under the front fuselage of the P-8 Poseidon, and the flight trials began last year, with the aim of putting AAS in service with the P-8 Capability Increment 3.
As of now, the AAS seems to have one major defect: looking at photos, it would appear that its carriage makes it impossible to lower and employ the MX-20HD EO/IR turret. Assuming that I’m correct in this observation, perhaps the problem will be fixed on the production line going into Increment 3. Currently, the P-8 is seeing the introduction of Increment 2 capabilities, while the Increment 3 roll-out is a 2021 affair.

 
This image shows the weapon bay open and the MX-20HD turret deployed.

The MX-20 turret out of its bay

The AAS radar "canoe" seem in conflict with the current positioning of the MX-20


From a UK perspective, purchase of the AAS would enable the Poseidon fleet to fully replace Sentinel R1, and indeed provide increased capability in all areas, over sea and land. There is a risk that being a classified, highly advanced development, the AAS might not be cleared for export so soon, but I’d recommend engaging with the US Navy from the very start to try and secure the inclusion of such capability in a british purchase.
If export clearance for the AAS cannot be obtained, it would be important to still exploit this P-8 possibility, by seeking to integrate another radar in a suitable pod. Even re-use of the Sentinel’s own radar, if at all possible, could be a good start.

Sentinel R1 proposed upgrades include tweaks to the radar to enable it to track surface targets at sea, and possibly the addition of the DB110 (better known as RAPTOR in RAF service) reconnaissance camera to add a long range optical capability as well. Weight and space growth margins in the Sentinel R1, however, are limited, and it will be financially challenging to both purchase a MPA and run on Sentinel. Although Sentinel is almost certainly considerably cheaper to run per hour, two fleets means two training and logistic lines to sustain, and more manpower needed. Moreover, it means there are two aircraft which will compete for investment going ahead in time, when both will need upgrades but the money won’t be there for both. I think that, although Sentinel is a good performing system and indeed better in some ways in its role, a single, larger fleet is a more realistic proposition for the MOD’s finances. Having a MPA fleet of Poseidons and keeping the Sentinel at the same time would be better from a capability point of view, but would quickly become a problem from the financial and manpower angles.

The P-8 has a lower service ceiling than Sentinel (41.000 feet versus 49.000), which is unfortunate as height allows radar sensors to look further away; but it comes with some SIGINT / ELINT capability, an MX-20HD EO/IR sensor, a powerful multi-mode radar (AN/APY-10) and a powerful communications suite, plus air to air refueling capability (although via receptacle only). Its unrefueled endurance all in all might not be quite as good as that of Sentinel, however.

Over time, the P-8 could become a Combat ISTAR platform thanks to its significant payload. The integration of weapons such as SPEAR 3, for example, would enable a P-8 AAS to survey a massive area, track moving and fixed targets from a great distance and even engage them directly as necessary. France, in recent times, has been using its Atlantic 2 MPAs in a Combat ISTAR role, integrating GBUs on them for use in operations in Africa and over Iraq. Something similar was envisaged as a Nimrod MRA4 capability, as well. The MRA4 was also seen as a potential Storm Shadow carrier, and the P-8 could one day carry cruise missiles as well.

Under a purely MPA point of view, the P-8 Poseidon purchase is desirable due to it including the very latest Multi-static Active Coherent sonobuoys, which are to massively increase wide-area ASW capability. Moreover, the P-8 means close partnership with the US Navy on development and integration of future updates. A support and upgrade arrangement similar to that adopted with Rivet Joint, which sees british aircraft integrated in the USAF rolling programme of bi-annual maintenance and upgrade, is highly desirable. This is a crucial factor: it is no use to purchase a cheaper MPA, if there is no clear path and reliable partner for future upgrades and support. The MOD no longer has the financial power to keep bespoke systems up to date without partners to share the cost with: we do not want, in a few years time, to see the new MPA start declining in capability because it is a unique, bespoke solution which no one else is interested in investing in. For that, there’s already the Challenger 2’s rifled gun.
In my opinion this is one major point in favor of the Poseidon: none of the other competitors can promise the same assured future as the main MPA platform of the US Navy. The USN is the partner you want, if you seek economies of scale and a plan that ensures the system stays up to date.

Notorious “issues” with the Poseidon include the fact that, to depart as little as possible from the USN’s own variant, the UK will have to adopt the High Altitude ASW approach. This means having to not only integrate Stingray Mod 1 torpedoes, but having to fit these with the same wing kit that will be added to the USN’s MK54 torpedo for launch from high altitude. This will add some to the cost.
High Altitude ASW also means no use for MAD: the MAD is not a silver bullet and its usefulness is kind of limited, but nonetheless its complete absence is not entirely desirable. The US Navy is considering adopting MAD sensors built into expendable drones which can be dropped at altitude from Poseidon. If purchased, these will add some to cost, as well. The promise is that such drones will be very cheap, of course, but the reality more often than not is not quite as rosy as the original targets.
It is true, however, that the MAD drone’s cost would be compensated, at least in part, by not having to fit a MAD to the aircraft itself. Moreover, High Altitude ASW is less stressing on the airframe, and this should give a longer operational life, and reduce maintenance needs. 



Stingray Mod 1 will need a wing kit, to work as a part of the High Altitude ASW construct


High Altitude ASW also improves survivability of the MPA and its efficiency in the hunt: it is much harder, if not impossible, for the submarine to hear the incoming aircraft (turboprop, low-altitude MPAs are tipically picked up easy on passive sonar) and the high altitude puts the aircraft out of the range of the submarine-launch SAMs which are beginning to appear and that might become a factor to consider, in the future.


Recommendations:

-          Purchase P-8 Poseidon, with the mindset of it being an ISTAR / Combat ISTAR platform, not just a MPA
-          Secure the addition of a side-scan, surface search, GMTI-capable radar, ideally the same AAS being integrated by the US Navy. AN/APY-10 offers good capability as it is, but the addition of a dedicate radar would make the withdrawal of Sentinel pretty much painless in capability terms.
-          Phase out of service Shadow and Sentinel progressively as P-8 enters service.
-          Adopt the High Altitude ASW method, and in general stick as much as possible to the USN’s own configuration, to ensure efficiencies in long-term maintenance and upgrades
-          Look at integrating weaponry beyond Stingray: anti-ship capability and ground attack.
-          Secure the higher possible number of aircraft. Rumors talk of an initial purchase of 6, with 6 options. At least 8 / 9 would be needed, especially considering the wider ISTAR role.



A Tactical Reconnaissance Wing

In early 2002, the RAF ended the practice of having dedicate reconnaissance squadrons of fast jets, each with its own Reconnaissance Intelligence Centre (RIC), to merge these together into the Tactical Imagery Wing, which today provides deployable teams specialized in exploitation of Full Motion Video (Crossbow Flight, Tactical Imagery Wing) and others specializing in evaluation of imagery collected by RAPTOR and Litening III pods flown on Tornado and Typhoon (Orion Flight).

With the plan for the future being the dissolution of the Sentinel R1 fleet and the spreading of wide-area GMTI across multiple platforms (SCAVENGER, P-8 [?] and the AESA radars of F-35s and Typhoons], it is probably wise to expect the formation of a third flight within the Tactical Imagery Wing, this specializing in exploitation of GMTI information. The concentration of GMTI specialists in the same unit should help preserve the maximum level of experience and efficiency, while building on the successful methods of the TIW. With the focus expanding beyond “imagery”, the Wing should be known for Reconnaissance, or for Tactical ISTAR. As the Sentinel goes out of service, its bespoke Ground Station should be replaced by a “General Purpose” ground station to allow real-time exploitation of GMTI coming from whatever platform is available, be it Reaper or F-35.

-          Preserve GMTI exploitation experience by forming a dedicate Flight within the current Tactical Imagery Wing. Specialist teams from the new Flight will deploy in support of the various platforms over which GMTI capability will be spread, including F-35 and, in the future, Typhoon Tranche 3A with AESA radar. The new Flight should operate in close liaison with the Royal Artillery, since Watchkeeper also introduces its own GMTI capability, although of course on a smaller search area.    



Restoring strategic air refueling sense

In a plan that puts such importance on P-8, the continued lack of boom air refueling capability is unacceptable. The lack of boom is one of the most disappointing facts about Voyager (aka: take the best tanker in the world and dumb it down to a civilian passenger aircraft with drogues). Airbus can fix booms to Voyager within six months, and the cost, while significant, is unlikely to be prohibitive. Any spare money the RAF might have, in my opinion, should go towards this particular requirement.
Fitting the boom is more desirable than trying to fit a probe to P-8: the boom already exists, while a probe for P-8 doesn’t; moreover, the boom makes Voyager capable to also refuel C-17, Rivet Joint and allied aircraft.
It would solve the ridiculous, absurd situation of being unable to refuel some of the most precious, strategic platforms in the whole air force.
A good start would be to fit the two “fitted for but not with” centrepoint tankers in the fleet. The RAF’s core fleet of 9 Voyagers includes a civilian registered transport-only aircraft and 8 tankers, 7 of which are KC3 with centerline station as well as the underwing ones. However, only 5 of the 7 are actually fitted with the centerline drogue. These two should be the easier to fit with boom.

It is unfortunate, and a failure of the wider policy of engagement with allies, that despite a recognized shortage of tanker capability in Europe, up to 5 Voyagers are going to be stripped of tanking equipment and chartered out to serve as civilian passenger aircraft. Currently, only one of the 5 “surge” aircraft is already contracted by a civilian air line, but four more are seeking a similar arrangement.
Meanwhile, Poland is leading a multinational effort to purchase a common fleet of new A-330 MRTT tankers. It is quite amazing that an arrangement hasn’t been fleshed out to cooperatively run the Voyager surge fleet in its intended tanker role, to help counter the shortage. The UK should engage with its NATO partners to seek an agreement in this sense, adding the boom to as many aircraft as possible.


Recommendations:

-          Fit boom to Voyager, beginning with the 2 “fitted for but not with” KC3s in the Core Fleet. Unfortunately, Sentry can be refueled both by drogue and by boom, but A400M only by centerline drogue. So, part of the fleet will have to retain the centerline drogue instead of moving over to a boom, to avoid moving from one problem to another. A400M can in theory be fitted with the receptacle for boom refueling, but this would add yet more cost.



Common Weapon Launcher and reduced number of weapon types

The announcement of a contract for the development of a Common Weapon Launcher for Typhoon is to be welcome. However, the news releases suggest that this is an early demonstration contract, and the plan seems, as way too often happens, somewhat vague and indecisive. The aim of the Common Weapon Launcher is to introduce a rack which, while preserving the same aerodynamic shape and weight, so to ease integration on fast jets, can carry different loads, including 2 Paveway IV bombs, or 3 Brimstone 2, or (possibly) 3 SPEAR 3. The Common Weapon Launcher concept, shown in computer graphics and in mock-up form at some recent air shows, is clearly a derivative of the Brimstone triple rack. Since integration of Brimstone 2 on Typhoon has been funded (finally!), the choice is particularly wise, as the launcher will be aerodynamically cleared for carriage as part of this activity, allowing for considerable savings.

The Common Weapon Launcher should definitely be developed for carrying all three the main weapon systems: PW IV, Brimstone 2 and Spear 3. It should not be a Typhoon-only affair, either, but be exploited on the F-35 external hardpoints, as well.  

On the weapons front, considerable uncertainty, unfortunately, persists regarding SPEAR 3: the considerable expense needed to develop the wholly new MBDA weapon has lead to the “US Option” of going Small Diameter Bomb II growing in strength.
A final decision is now not expected until 2018. SPEAR 3 and SDB 2 are externally and conceptually very similar, but SPEAR 3 has a key difference: it embodies a small turbojet engine which gives it a greater range and the ability to be launched in a far greater acceptable zone, irrespective of altitude, wind conditions etcetera. SDB 2 is currently an unpowered, gliding weapon.
The greater range and launch flexibility of SPEAR 3 would make it far more capable against highly defended targets, and indeed make it into a DEAD (Destruction of Enemy Air Defence) asset, much needed since the RAF has given up its main SEAD (Suppression) weapon, the ALARM anti-radar missile, to budget cuts.
Raytheon, aware of this key factor, has started promising the development of a powered Small Diameter Bomb 2: if this was to materialize, the MBDA SPEAR would lose its key advantage, and it might become just too financially attractive to go with the US weapon, which in its base form can count on tens of thousands of planned American purchases. SDB 2 is also already planned for F-35 integration, which would also save money.
The MBDA SPEAR, on the other hand, is meant to keep the national weapon industrial capability alive and in good health.
As long as the MBDA SPEAR is the only one powered, long-range choice, I think the RAF should stick with it, even if it costs more. But if a powered SBD 2 becomes reality, the MOD will be faced with a much more difficult choice.

 
Common Weapon Launcher mock-up, seen carrying two Paveway IV bombs

Another key programme is SPEAR Capability 1, which is actually the spiral development of Paveway IV capability. Apart from better, more jamming-resistant GPS module, the Paveway IV should soon gain a new warhead option, with bunker-busting capability. The smart aspect of Paveway IV developments is that the external shape and the general mass remain the same, so that there is no need to repeat the aerodynamics part of the integration process over and over again.
The Paveway IV anti-bunker seem destined to replace the older, 2000 lbs Paveway III, which will go out of service alongside Tornado GR4.
Other Paveway IV developments include a low collateral damage warhead option; the addition of a seeker (IR Imaging, it is thought) for greater capability against moving targets; and eventually the addition of a wing-kit for much improved stand-off range.
A recent briefing given by US officers about the F-35 Block 4 software seem to suggest that the RAF has decided that the first two Paveway IV developments entering service will be the anti-bunker and the seeker.

 
MBDA's SPEAR 3, without its quadruple rack, seen on a Typhoon ahead of the flying testing campaign

The same briefing also suggests that the RAF wants to soon get moving about a “new build” ASRAAM. We might be close to the launch of a Capability Sustainment Programme for the short range missile, which should build on what has been done with the CAMM / Sea Ceptor. The integration of a two-way datalink is highly likely, if the programme actually secures funding. The data-link would massively enhance the capabilities of ASRAAM to acquire its target after launch and achieve high off-boresight kills.


Recommendations:

-          Proceed with Paveway IV developments, in particular with the anti-bunker variant to avoid a gap in capability when the combination Tornado/Paveway III bows out.
-          Whatever weapon is selected for SPEAR  3 should be powered, long-range, and have a wide acceptable launch region, to make it a viable DEAD solution
-          The Common Weapon Launcher should be developed fully, and used to full effect with both Typhoon and F-35
-          The ASRAAM CSP is not as high a priority, but adding a two-way datalink is important to give it true High Off-Boresight capability, which is needed to make best use of the F-35’s DAS “bubble” and HMD.



F-35 plans and babbling

Much noise has followed the blog post of David Axe of War is Boring about the leaked test report about the basic combat maneuvering trials begun last January between an F-35A and an F-16. The usual crowd has started self-quoting itself and shouting from the rooftops about how the F-35 had lost the dogfight and, indeed, how it could never win one. The answer provided by the JPO was to eager to dismiss the issue altogether, and actually ended up being a own-goal, adding to the noise (you need better media relationship experts, JPO: that answer really does suck).
Much of what has been said since is garbage. My general sentiments about the whole thing are very similar to the thoughts expressed here, so I recommend following the link and reading what the experienced C.W. Lemoine, an F-16 and F-18 pilot, has to say about it. 

In more detail, although I do not want to spend too much time on this, also because my own understanding of the highly complex art of air combat is limited and I don’t want to pontificate past my pay grade, the dogfight wasn’t even a dogfight.
Axe has since graced us all with the report itself. And reading it, as was to be expected, has allowed thinking heads to arrive to different conclusions to those that Axe, a notorious F-35 hater, drew. The first thing to notice in the report is the title itself: it was a test to experiment F-35 combat manoeuvres at high angles of attack.
The F-35 has excellent controllability at very high angle of attack. At entry in service it is expected to be certified for + 50° and – 10°, values much higher than most other fighter. F-16 does + 25°, Typhoon a little bit less, Rafale +29°.
What the test tried to determine was whether this capability has a value in dogfighting. The F-35 deliberately tried to manoeuvre at high angle of attack to see if it can “nose-point” like a Super Hornet. The result of the test, reading the report, say that in most situations, no, staying controllable won’t bring advantages. High Angle of Attack means losing energy very, very quickly, and the F-35 has a too high drag factor to keep its energy high enough to nose-point in a meaningful way without losing all its energy.
The test pilot said he found only one kind of manoeuvre which offers a repeatable firing chance: this one can be expected to end up in the tactics manual of the F-35, while the rest will be in the “don’t do this” list.
Outside of a test event, you are not forced  to seek high AoA in combat: if it is not advantageous, simply, you do not do it. And the air combat manual for the F-35, once written, will say this (obviously, in a much better and more detailed way).

For the rest, the report notes that the F-35 fights best around the 26° AoA angle, which is not surprising as it is a common value and particularly is the F-16’s area. The F-35 has been developed trying to obtain F-16 comparable maneuverability, after all.
In this area of flight, the test pilot expresses his frustration at the Flight Control Laws interfering with his commands: basically, the computer has limited the F-35’s agility to prevent a loss of control which was actually very far away. The test pilot at one point specifically mentions “fantastic yaw rate”, truncated by the unnecessary, unwanted, early intrusion of the computer.
The pilot’s recommendations, in the end, are to relax the control laws in the software, to let the aircraft pitch, yaw and roll faster.

There is a reason why the F-35 hasn’t had its full flying envelope opened up yet: the software control laws are still being tweaked and developed. The full flying envelope (Mach 1.6, 50.000 feet altitude, 50° AoA, max G) will only become available with Block 3F.
Block 2B, with which the USMC is about to hit IOC, is limited at Mach 1.2, 40.000 feet and 5.5 G, for example.
While the F-35 will never be a fighter defined by super-maneuverability, it will not be as limited as AF-2 was in the test. And it will not fight in the same way either, once the tactics will have been written down.
Read the report: the dogfight was a control laws test, at high AoA, with none of the aircraft involved being armed; none carrying a weapon simulation pod (needed for an actual dogfight) and with the F-35’s HMD having only a fixed reticle, absolutely not representative of the operational HMD.
There has been some rather wild jumping to conclusions going on.

I will close the “babbling” part with one question only: even assuming energy management in a dogfight is not on the F-35’s side, if you were a pilot given a choice, would you want to be on the jet which has to rush through the F-35’s BVR area to force a dogfight, or would you rather be in the F-35?
I will be in the F-35, thank you very much.

Back to the plans. The SDSR 2015 is, I fear, unlikely to provide the information we’d all like to have about how many aircraft the UK will ultimately buy. Main Gate 5, the decision point for the bulk order, has been set for 2017, and I think the government will be too tempted to leave the final decision for then. The SDSR will most likely carry on just with the plan for 48 aircraft for OEU, OCU and for the first two squadrons.

The plan is as follows:

17 Sqn (Operational Evaluation Unit) – Edwards AFB, USA

BK-1
BK-2
BK-4 (not yet delivered)

BK-1, 2 and 4 are instrumented aircraft, which will be used for development and trials and evaluation. BK-1 and 2 were among the first to undergo a retrofit, which might have brought them all the way up to Block 2B standard. 1 and 2 came in the LRIP 3, so were very early jets indeed, with quite a few limitations to overcome.


Training Unit – Embedded in the USMC 501 Sqn, Beaufort, USA, until July 2019.

BK-3
BK-5 (ordered)
BK-6 (ordered)
BK-7 (ordered)
BK-8 (ordered)

Currently, only BK-3 is available, but the training fleet will grow to 5 over the coming months and years. BK-3 was produced in LRIP 4, and will receive a retrofit later on.
The next aircraft assigned to training will be BK-5, 6, 7, 8, all coming out of LRIP 8. The LRIP 8 is much closer to the final, block 3F standard. It will be delivered with the TR2 computer processors and Block 3I software. The TR2 processor, introduced from LRIP6 onwards, means that passage to 3F will be a software change only.
The third generation HMD, which solves the well known issues of the Gen II helmet, should also come along.

Come July 2019, training of british crews in the US is expected to end, with the OCU moving into RAF Marham, where an Integrated Training Centre will have been built. It seems likely that the UK will seek to attract other European users of the F-35, beginning with Norway, hoping to get them to train their personnel in Marham.

617 Squadron – Stand up in Beaufort next year, transfers to the UK in April 2018, Deployable Land IOC by 31 December 2018

BK-9
BK-10
BK-11
BK-12
BK-13
BK-14

BK-9 to BK-14 will come from LRIP 9. A production contract will come soon, with Long Lead contracts having been already signed. LRIP 9 is expected to introduce the redesigned bulkhead 496 on the assembly line, which is the one which cracked during durability tests. The jets from the earlier lots will be retrofitted at the first Major Maintenance occasion.
If the current schedule is respected, the first frontline F-35s should thus be delivered already in their final shape, more or less, reducing to the minimum the number of retrofits which will be needed later. 

The following 4 aircraft:

BK-15
BK-16
BK-17
BK-18

are included in LRIP 10, for which the first Long Lead contracts have been signed. All should be in british hands by the end of 2018. Further aircraft will be needed to bring 617 up to strength and to stand up 809.
The following batches however haven’t been detailed yet, and the stand-up date for 809 is also not yet known. Both squadrons should be fully operational by the end of 2023, however. The OCU will probably initially be a Flight within 617 Squadron, but might be given its own identity later on. 

Expected F-35 global fleet in 2018
Trials at sea on HMS Queen Elizabeth are expected to begin around the end of 2018 and last to May 2019. They will take place in US waters, and will see the involvement of 17 Sqn and, most likely, USMC units. The trials should allow for Carrier IOC in 2020.

The UK is engaged in talks promoted by the US to place a “Block Buy” big order covering the years 2018 to 2020 (Lot 11, 12 and 13, with the first being the last of the "Low Rate" LRIP blocks, and the first two being the start of the full rate production). Placing a bulk order is expected to result in significant savings. Without even considering the partners and foreign customers, the US orders alone in these lots are expected to go from 126 (in Lot 11) to 176 (Lot 13). The quantities will be truly significant, in other words.
Regarding final number of F-35s to be procured by the UK, it is a shot in the dark still. It has been reported that, back in 2010, the RAF fought a bitter campaign to ensure recognition that the needed force level is some 9 squadrons, which could mean 4 F-35 units. However, 9 would mean one more squadron than the RAF has now, and 3 more than it will have in 2020 if the Tornado GR4 OSD isn’t pushed to the right again. Extending the service life of Tornado might become desirable not just because of its combat capability, but because keeping up the number of squadrons would help a lot in securing greater purchases of F-35S. If the number of squadrons is allowed to fall all the way down to 6, rebuild it up to 9 becomes a rather unlikely proposition.
A four squadron force with 70 to 90 F-35B is a good target to pursue, but in no way a given. 

In terms of evolution and capability growth, the F-35B will enter service capable to employ up to 4 internal AMRAAM, 2 external ASRAAM and up to 6 Paveway IV (2+4). It will also have the gunpod (operational as part of Block 3F).
The next big thing in the history of the F-35 is Block 4. This new software load will be delivered in four increments between 2019 and 2025. The list of things to add is being formalized, and should become definitive by the end of the year.
Improvements to the EOTS, video downlink and a new "big SAR" radar mode are pretty much certain additions. In terms of weapons, the UK is looking at integrating, in the order, Paveway IV bunker-buster, Paveway IV with seeker, ASRAAM CSP, Meteor and SPEAR 3. However, only by year end we will know (hopefully) what will be actually funded and included. 

The non-definitive list of weapons to be integrated in Block IV, as shown earlier this year by US officials

Pratt & Whitney is considering a plan of upgrades and improvements to the engine, with Block 1 in 2018 and a Block 2 with advanced adaptive technology “in the early 2020s”. Targets include substantial reduction of fuel burn rate, improved cooling (with benefits extending to engine service life), possibly thrust increase by up to 10%, and range improvements between 20 and 35%.
The engine is obviously a key part of any aircraft, so the evolution of the F-135 is something to watch very closely indeed. The P&W Block update plan is currently not part of the F-35 plan proper, but it would be important for the UK to join the initiative if it progresses. General Electric is also shaping its own plan for improvements, with both companies building on the work done as part of the US Adaptive Engine Technology Development (AETD) research and development programme.



Typhoon

Apart from the AESA radar, which hopefully will start serving on Tranche 3A aircraft in the early 2020s, the RAF might want to consider the integration of a reconnaissance pod, especially if Tornado GR4 OSD is confirmed for 2019, and RAPTOR is left without a platform. 

Much lower priority goes to the Conformal Fuel Tanks, which however remain interesting, since the carriage of Storm Shadow means no underwing tanks, and the targeting pod is only integrated for carriage on the central, wet pylon under the fuselage. 
Conformal fuel tanks would keep the available fuel up, while leaving the pylons available for weapons and pods. 
The Conformal Fuel Tanks however require also an aerodynamic modification kit, it seems, which makes their addition more challenging in terms of expense and downtime. The aerodynamic modification kit has just completed flying trials on IPA7 in Germany, and brings significant agility improvements as well, including bringing Angle of Attack value up to 36°.  




Conformal Fuel Tanks wind gallery tests


It would be nice to put Conformals on Tranche 3A at some point, but it definitely is the last voice on the list of priorities. Money is still tight, and it must be used on the urgent things first. 



Sentry

Budget shortages have left the RAF’s Sentry fleet lagging badly behind the rest of NATO. While the other AWACS across the alliance are getting significant upgrades based on the Block 40/45 (E-3G Sentry) entering service with the USAF, the RAF is literally out of the picture. This situation badly needs to be corrected as soon as possible, otherwise the interoperability will suffer, and the operational value of the british Sentry will continue to decline.



Airlift

Several improvements are on the way, and others could be made. The C-17 is receiving satellite communications, for example. On the other hand, the RAF continues to make no use at all of the tactical capability of the C-17, which is only used as a strategic cargo flying from A to B. This is, in my opinion, an unjustifiable waste, and opening up some of the latent capability is something I will keep recommending.
A Boeing C-17 International Training Centre is standing up in Farnborough, with a full flight simulator and engine ground running courses. Parachuting and aidrop training could follow, if the capability is finally pursued.

The non-exploitation of the C-17’s airdrop capability is made worse by the fact that the C-130J itself is currently partially handicapped in this role: the withdrawal of the old C-130K has left the RAF with no capability to employ Medium Stressed Platforms for the airdropping of vehicles, L118 Light Guns and other key, large equipment for the air assault task force.
A replacement platform will be put in service for use on the A400M, but we are talking of a gap that will stay open for a few more years, as it’ll be 2017 or 2018 before the Atlas is ready for the task.
The RAF seem to have attempted to close the gap by putting out a request for a modified Medium Stressed Platform compatible with the C-130J’s cargo floor system. Delivery was planned for June 2015, but it is not clear what the status of the programme is.
The new airdrop platform should come with greater capability. The American Type V platform is one option. A clear requirement includes the ability to airdrop a Jackal, which is now part of the Air Assault Task Force’s equipment.

Investment in airdrop is to be supported. Modern precision airdrop equipment can ease immensely the resupply of troops from the air, and large kits allow the dropping of bulky, heavy loads, reducing the need for a small, tactical cargo capable of intra-theatre lift.
The RAF, for this role, is only going to have the 2 BAe 146 QC MK3 procured under UOR. So it’ll be Atlas, or 146 MK3. Expanding airdrop capability will compensate.

Another gap left by the withdrawal of C-130K is the Special Forces support. Unfortunately, the internationally developed software upgrades needed as base of Project HERMES, the fitting of SF equipment to the J, have suffered monstrous delays. Block 7.0 has run so late that it has been actually incorporated into Block 8.1, causing a much longer gap than once anticipated.
Block 7.0 is the biggest upgrade to the C-130J since entry in service, introducing tactical data capability, a new flight management system, new processors and 26 other changes, and it has proven challenging, to say the least. While not much has been said about it, Block 7 work has kept ZH866 in the US for over two years, returning only in December 2014 to then begin flight testing at Boscombe Down, ahead of further modification into Block 8.1.
It seems that Block 7.0 (and later) aircraft are to be known as C6, such is the extent of the changes.
In the meanwhile, at least, 9 of the C-130Js have been fitted with external fuel tanks giving a significant increase in range.

The now combined Block 7.0 / Block 8.1 modification deliver software upgrades; new Communications, Navigation, and Identification System Processor (CNI-SP); Link-16; new control wheel; new Civil Global Positioning System (GPS); new mission computer; upgraded Data Transfer and Diagnostic System (DTADS); new Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) Transponder Mode 5; Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast (ADS-B); enhanced internal-communication system (ICS); Communications, Navigation, and Surveillance/Air Traffic Management (CNS/ATM) Data Link; improved public address (PA) system; and covert light aft of the cargo ramp.
However, flight testing of Block 8.1 is expected to wrap up in 2019, quite a while away still, and the risk is that the Special Forces support gap will only be closed right before the C-130J leaves service, in 2022!

 
The welcome addition of external fuel tanks on a C-130J C4 (long fuselage)

The rumors suggest that there is a strong current within the Special Forces and the RAF calling for the running-on of 7 to 9 long-fuselage C-130Js beyond 2022 (the ones fitted with external tanks?), specifically for the Special Forces mission.
The official line for now remains that the A400M will absorb the special forces mission by 2022, but if there’s someone who might get what it wants, that is the Special Forces Director.
The A400M is expected to equip 70 Sqn and 30 Sqn (the first for sure, the second sqn has yet to stand up), while 47 Sqn, unless C-130Js are indeed kept for SF work, will be disbanded.

The A400M has had its IOC delayed from March to September this year. 7 aircraft are required for IOC, and so far the RAF has received 3 (ZM400, ZM402, ZM403). A fourth A400 has flown to Brize (the future ZM401) but is still marked with an Airbus code while it undergoes work for the integration of the DAS defensive system. At least 3 more A400M are approaching their delivery date, and will fly to Brize over the next weeks.


Recommendations:

-          Procure modified airdrop platforms for the C-130J in order to close the gap. The lack of Medium Stressed Platform is a major problem for the air assault task force, and makes it a lot less credible.
-          Invest in platforms for heavy airdrops in the longer term, with payloads including Jackal in mind, and in precision airdrop kits. Some have been procured as UOR for Afghanistan, but they should become a more common capability.
-          Ideally, run on 47 squadron on C-130Js for the Special Forces operations beyond 2022
-          Gradually bring online tactical capabilities for the C-17



Training

Contract signatures for the purchase of the new fleets of fixed wing training aircraft are expected soon. The Grob G115, the Tucano and the Beechcraft King Air 200, used respectively for Elementary, Basic and Multi-Engine training are due to be replaced by G120TP, T-6C and Phenom 100.

If the recent NAO report on the Military Flying Training System has the right figures, the renewal will be accompanied by rather dramatic reductions in the number of aircraft and instructors, and by a growth of synthetic training on simulators. The NAO expects that the Elementary Flying Training fleet will go down from 40 to 23 aircraft, with military instructors falling from 44 to 35, but with civilian instructors growing from 17 to 23.
Simulators will grow sharply in relevance, with synthetic training hours growing from 0 to 35% of the training programme.

The most evident reduction, however, is expected in Basic Training, where the NAO expects only 10 aircraft, down from 40, with military instructors going from 48 to 15 and civilians from 1 to 5. Simulation will grown from 33 to 46% of the training programme.
The Basic Flying Training will leave RAF Linton-on-Ouse (which I guess is then very likely to close down) and move into RAF Valley, probably at the same time as 208 Sqn, on Hawk T1, disbands. More on this later.

Multi-engine training will see the fleet reduced from 7 to 5 aircraft and from 25 to 16 military instructors, with civilians going from 0 to 6.

There will be little to no excess capacity to train foreign students. This dramatic reduction ties in with the planned sundown of the Hawk T1’s role in training: the plan is that flying training of british personnel on the T1 of 208 Sqn will end in early 2016. 208 Sqn will continue to train foreign students until December 2017.
208 Sqn was once planned to disband in 2012. It was saved by the signature of contracts to train crews coming from the Middle East. But it seems that its time in the sun is limited, and that by end 2017, early 2018, disbandment will again be on the cards.
The guess is that the “naval 8”, as 208 Sqn is known, might become the new Basic Flying Training squadron, taking up the role from 72 Sqn as the Tucano goes out of service and training moves to Valley.

A major question mark remains on what will happen to the Hawk T1s used in “aggressor” role in support of training by 100 Sqn RAF and 736 NAS. A replacement for the Hawk T1 has not yet been identified.

Simulation will continue to grow in importance. Recently, the RAF has acquired simulators even of the gliders of the Air Experience Flights and University Air Squadrons. An Immersive Close Air Support Simulator has been purchased to contribute to the formation of JTACs.  

The renewal of the rotary wing training fleet is expected to follow in 2018.