Bollocks proven wrong by facts

DefenceManagement reports that the National Security Council has, yesterday 8 april 2012, approved a re-rething and sealed the return to the F35B, with an announcement to Parliament expected before the week is over. 

The Telegraph says that with the F35B both CVFs could be put in service, and carrier air restored earlier, already in 2018. 



On the "both carriers" bit, i hope they are right. If they are not, the military top brass, the defence minister and everyone in the National Security Council should be kicked in the ass from here to Port Stanley, because putting in service both vessels is the only reason why STOVL should be considered. Wasn't for this, it shouldn't even be allowed on the table.
So either it is 2 STOVL carriers, or 1 CATOBAR. One STOVL carrier, one mothballed hulk is just demented. DEMENTED. 

The 2018 date is bollocks proven wrong by facts. There's nothing at all to suggest that the B variant will be ready in time, and even less suggests that the UK will speed the buy up to have the planes earlier.
It's a lie, pure and simple. US Department of Defense reports say clearly that the F35B is 9% behind even the revised, curred project schedule, has more than 15.000 test points to clear and at least 1500 test flights more to go.
The C is 32% ahead of schedule, has 12.000 test points to clear, and 1200 flights to go.

The US Marines might have urgency to put the F35B in service first, but they are going to do so (eventually) with an airplane that risks being unable to do what it is meant to do (STOVL) due to an as-yet uncorrected overheating issue in the transmission clutch of the Lift Fan (1).
In addition, the airplane will enter service with the software block 2B, incomplete, which is now due to include some initial weapon-release capability (which likely includes none of the british weapons: no ASRAAM, no Paveway IV), but which will need urgent replacing with the Block 3 software. Worse, these early production airplanes will need millions of dollars of mods and structural changes for which the DoD is already putting aside hundreds of millions.
Follow the USMC in this particular path only means getting blasted (with good reasons) by a NAO report telling everyone how stupid the decision is, and how much money wasted it entails.

The F35B mean corrective maintenance time for critical failures is also twice as long as planned, while the F35C is in threshold on target.
The F35B is literally losing pieces in test flights, something that Lochkeed Martin won't tell on its website, obviously. (2)
In 19 days of trials at sea on USS Wasp, one of the involved F35B needed, twice, replacement of the upper lift fan doors.

Vertical Bring Back weight requirement (the weight of a minimum fuel quantity and other
necessary payload needed to safely recover the aircraft on the ship after an operational mission, plus a representative weapons payload) is for 5000 pounds (at least it should be, might have been reduced), of which up to 1700 are made up by fuel. This vital requirement is still at very real risk. There's just 230 to 370 pounds of margin for weight growth in the next five years before the "not to exceed value" for empty weight is reached and surpassed.
Even if the requirement is met, there is not enough bring back weight margin to return to the carrier with unexpended Storm Shadow missiles ( 2870 pounds each) and even Ship Borne Rolling Vertical Landing might not solve the problem.
Someone has already suggested that Storm Shadow will not be launched by shipborne F35Bs. If it proves true, well. Better if i do not say what i just thought, it is rude.   

Regarding Ship Borne Rolling Vertical Landing, it is a UK idea, which is to turn a vertical landing into almost a CATOBAR landing, but without cables. Trials have been made with a modified Qinetiq Harrier on Charles De Gaulle and Illustrious, and the activity, which was stopped in 2010 following the switch to F35C, has cost several tens of millions.
It will have to be resumed if the F35B returns to be the preferred solution.

The SRVL approach exploits the ability of the short take-off and vertical landing F-35B to use vectored thrust to slow the speed of the aircraft while still gaining the benefit of wing-borne lift, by landing with a deck run. This offers a significant increase in "bring-back" payload compared with a vertical recovery and is likely to reduce stress on the single-engined aircraft's propulsion system.
However, deck operations become more complex and a landing runway is needed, instead of a landing spot, so much so that SRVL might require an angled deck, just as CATOBAR technique.
Pilot and deck crew training regimes would have to change, and even F35 flight control laws might have to be adjusted.
A "Bedford Array" visual aid system had to be developed and tested to guide the pilots in this new kind of approach, particularly in rough seas. And you know who liked the idea? The US Navy, which is building on it for its CATOBAR carriers. Once more, a great british idea in the naval aviation field will be exploited in the right way not by Britain, but by the americans. Read this to see how fast the idea is catching on with the CATOBAR pilots of the USN.

Vertical Bring Back Weight is an issue so big that already in 2004/5 the USMC "adopted" the SRVL concept, and sponsored the british activity in this direction, to feed the data into the F35 programme. 

When SRVL activities were ongoing, this very significant brief was given, and the awesome website Navy Matters still reports it:

Using SRVL F-35B aircraft would approach the carrier from astern at about 60 knots indicated air speed, 35 knots relative assuming 25 knots wind over deck (the maximum speed of a CVF will be 25 knots, so 25kts WOD is achievable even in dead calm) on a steep 5-6 degree glide path.  Touch down would be about 150 feet from the stern with a stopping distance of 300 to 400 feet depending on conditions (wet flight deck, pitching ships etc).  That would leave around 300 feet of flight deck for margin or even "bolters". [Note: 400 + 150 + 300 = 850 feet. THE WHOLE DECK IS COMMITTED TO THE LANDING. What about any other flying activity????]

The SRVL technique has a significant impact on ship designs and aviation operations, Commander Tony Ray told a conference in February 2008: "We expect to trade some STOVL flexibility for increased bring-back and fuel.  We have to .. check for for relevant CV criteria that apply to slower SRVL operations.  For example flightpath control will be a far more important flight criteria for SRVL than it has been for STOVL.  It is a CV trait creeping in".

So, the "training gap" between STOVL and CATOBAR further reduces, and deck operations are as affected by SRVL than by an arrested landing.
Or wait, that's actually worse than on a CATOBAR vessel.
Without an angled deck for SRVL, and having to rely only on the plane's brakes, in order to accommodate a bolter, the whole deck, from ski jump to stern, will have to be free and committed to the landing of the "heavy" F35B.

Isn't it awesome? The disadvantages of CATOBAR (and possibly some more) coupled to the inferior performance of STOVL airplanes.
Really smart. Really. I'm so impressed. 


The other problems with the F35B (and the C's ones, it is not perfect either, but at least much, much better...) i've covered already in other articles, so i won't repeat it all and annoy everyone to death. The US report i've linked contains the most complete non-classified liste of issues available, and the most up to date, so it remains the go-to document for any who wants to see the full table of the F35B propulsion issues and count the number of times the TBD (To Be Determined) sign comes up when the subject is "solution to this issue".

I will close this bitter piece with a brutal assessment of reality, and then an hope and wish.

First the brutal assessment:

- STOVL is less expensive in the short term. 

True, there are less costs connected to the ships, but the airplane will cost a lot more to acquire, and a lot more through life.

- CATOBAR would cost more for added ship crew for operating catapults and wires, and would impose a great training penalty, with associated cost. 

Questionable. The full extent of the training penalty and crewing difference is actually not well determined. SRVL, if adopted, risks reducing the gap by a lot. If it is not adopted, we risk seeing certain weapons not cleared for use from the carrier (Storm Shadow on top of the list) and/or many expensive weapons thrown into the waves over the plane's life.

As to the impact of catapults and wires on ship crew, a current Nimitz carrier employs 56 men for the 4 catapults and 47 for the MK7 wires.
EMALS is expected to require 30% less crew, so that could go down to 40. For a 4-rails system. The british one would have half the rails.
The Advanced Arrestor Wire (which differently from EMALS is to be retrofitted to all carriers) requires only 4 men for normal operations, namely a Pri-Fly Recovery Operator, an Arresting Gear Officer, an AAG Monitor and an AAG Retractor Operator. 

Pardon me if i continue to have reserves.  

- The F35B works: it went to sea on USS Wasp.  

The F35B went to sea for 19 days, lost pieces in flight and had others replaced twice in three weeks. It remains plagued by multiple issues, its airframe life is currently 3000 hours (bulkheads developed cracks by this milestone) against a requirement for 8000 (the Typhoon is certified for 6000 flying hours, but BAE is still running an airframe on stress tests in Brough that have overcome the 12.000 hours milestone and aims for proving that the airframe is going to last without troubles for 18.000, to give an idea). As it is, there's an unresolved overheating issue that prevents it from entering STOVL mode in hot weather, and production airplanes in USMC squadrons will, for an undetermined time, only fly in CTOL profile).
Supposed to serve for 30 years, the F35B has a growth margin of 370 pounds at best before it reaches the not-to exceed weight. A bit little. Hope that engine technology moves ahead a lot in 30 years and increases very significantly the power output...
In short, i've issues with the "it works" statement. Not even in service yet, and already feels like it's held together in one piece with strings and scotch tape. Not the best feelings.

- STOVL operations can better cohexist with the helicopter ops necessary for the carrier to work as Assault Ship as envisaged by Carrier Enabled Power Projection


It is a marginal advantage. US Kitty Hawk in 2001, during operations against the Talibans in Afghanistan, had 8 to 12 Super Hornets on board, which flew 600 sorties in her deployment, and simultaneously was used as afloat staging base for helicopter insertions of troops and special forces, with the 160th Regiment Special Forces Aviation on board.


Actually, if SRVL is continued and adopted, and a heavy plane returns to the STOVL carrier, all deck needs to be cleared and the impact on other operations is worse than with CATOBAR ops.


- STOVL enables RAF land-based crews to embark with minimum warning and rapidly certify for all-weather ops from the deck.

Probably. But with the Harrier GR9 it didn't work very well: the number of carrier qualified RAF pilots was normally extremely low/non existant. Does not promise that well.

Again, SRVL is highly likely to make things a lot more complicated, and much more similar to CATOBAR ops.
Not adopting SRVL would be worse, though, as it would severely limit the operational viability of the F35B: the bring-back weight value is really far too low.

- We can always switch to catapults later when there will be UCAVs to launch.

Does it sound like an idiocy only to me? It reads like "ok, we are doing a stupid thing. But, eventually, we will fix the error with more money later".

After buying the most expensive, less capable fleet of airplanes.

Better if we do not reach the point in which catapults become indispensable "later". Since i can't see that much money being available for defence anytime soon, such a need would likely be a big, big issue.

- STOVL means two carriers in service.

I wish it did. But it is far from sure. We will see if there will be an announcement in this sense, eventually.
And even if there is, the destiny still passes through the SDSR 2015.



Lastly, the hope.

May both carriers enter service, and may the F35 work as intended in the end. 




NOTES:

(1): US DoD programs, F35 program testing report, page 30, 31 and 32 

"Production aircraft will be restricted from STOVL-mode flight operations until Service airworthiness authorities grant a flight clearance. A significant amountof flight test and development of system maturity of the final STOVL-mode door and propulsion system designs remains to be accomplished. A system mature enough for unmonitored STOVL-mode flight may be needed as early as late 2012 to coincide with the delivery of lot 4 F-35B aircraft to the Marine Corps at Yuma, Arizona. If testing of the changes is not complete and needed modifications are not installed by late 2012, aircraft at Yuma will fly in CTOL‑mode only.

"The interim solution to unacceptably high clutch temperatures is to add a temperature sensor and display page so that the pilot can be aware of increasing temperature inside the clutch housing. Fuel and operational conditions permitting, changing flight regimes (e.g. configuration, altitude, and airspeed) may cool the clutch so that the pilot can engage STOVL modes. Such a cooling procedure may be untenable in combat conditions."


(2): US DoD programs, F35 program testing report, page 32


"Roll control nozzle doors separated in-flight from a test aircraft twice, drawing attention to door rigging and the potential for redesign. The program plans to conduct flight test on a new door in early 2012 to support the redesign effort."

The MOD has looked into the X47B carrierborne UCAV

... But STOVL carriers will make any development in this direction impossible, since the UCAV is, you guess it, a CATOBAR one.
Wonder if politicians are aware of it... 

News of the interest of the MOD for the X47B emerged in a recent written answer of Lord Hastor:

Question

Lord Moonie (Labour)
To ask what discussions they have had with the Government of the United States or Northrop Grumman Corporation about the X-47B unmanned combat air programme.

Answer

Lord Astor of Hever (Parliamentary Under Secretary of State, Defence; Conservative)
The Ministry of Defence has held an initial scoping discussion with the United States Government on the X-47B unmanned combat air programme. Northrop Grumman Corporation has not been involved.

Let's be clear on this, it does not mean that the UK wants to buy the system (at least not anytime soon), but it might be about trying to bring some of the highly advanced american research, with related achievements, into the UK's own drone programme.
But it is worth remembering that the X47B is on track to be trialed at sea on USN carriers in 2013, the same year in which the USN hopes to start trialing the F35C on a Nimitz carrier, and the USN wants, from 2018 or 2020 at the latest, be able to have 4 to 6 UCAVs embarked in each carrier air wing.
The CATOBAR, long endurance, stealth drone for reconnaissance and strike is here now. 

As a quick list, the US has:

- Developed software that was capable to guide a Super Hornet in an arrested landing on a carrier at sea without the pilots doing a thing

- Is developing software that will enable the future embarked UCAV to recognize and understand gestures and body language of the deck control crew and officers, which will so be able to guide the drone on deck as they would guide a normal fighter with a man in the cockpit

- They are leading on the technique of air to air refuelling of drones from manned tankers and even from other drones. Tests were conduced also last January as the program progresses. 

In the UK, Philip Hammond is still expected (now next week, everything keeps sliding to the right...) to bring the issue of Carrier Strike at the national security council to abandon the CATOBAR path and return to the F35B. Hopefully with the consolation of getting both carriers in service, but note that this is an ambition and not at all a certainty. If we revert to STOVL and still get one single carrier, it is officially the worst decision ever. 

Mr. Hammond came out with the genial assesment that converting Prince of Wales at build is expensive, and converting Queen Elizabeth in refit is even more expensive, and i have to say: how smart an observation!
Navy Matters.com, or even my Blog, have been saying this in forever. When people babbled about "converting Queen Elizabeth", i told them again and again "no way at this stage of the work. It'll have to be Prince of Wales, with QE fitted eventually during the first major refit".
I was all but insulted back then, but i was totally, utterly, damned right. Let me have this bit of a fit of rage and revenge. Prince of Wales is the one selected for (eventual, and more and more unlikely) conversion. Not one of the smart guys of the "It will be QE" party has admitted being awfully wrong, unsurprisingly, but still, they were and are.

We still get feed up with the 1.8 billion figure for conversion, which at times becomes 2 billions, which has never been confirmed by official sources. It's a rumor thrown out in the wind which all carrier haters have eagerly made theirs.
The only official statements are from the US Navy, which puts the EMALS and AAG cost at the same pricetag as in 2010, if not a bit lower, and which estimate conversion work cost at 400 million; and a recent answer in Parliament:

Question

Jim Murphy (East Renfrewshire, Labour)
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence whether Ministers in his Department have received any representations on technical difficulties associated with converting the aircraft carrier to a CATOBAR configuration; from whom any such representations were received; and when they were received.

Answer

Peter Luff (Parliamentary Under Secretary of State (Defence Equipment, Support and Technology), Defence; Mid Worcestershire, Conservative)
The Ministry of Defence has not received any representations regarding technical difficulties associated with converting the operational Queen Elizabeth Aircraft carrier to a CATOBAR configuration.

So, what are we actually talking about? If there are no difficulties and no cost increases on the American kit, how is the cost-ballooning ever justified?
My guess, as i said already once in another article, is that 1.8 billion is the cost of converting both carriers.The official cost figures add up perfectly to make up the figure, and while coincidences are always possible, they are far less likely than people might think.

Note that there's one whole hell of difference between presenting the cost of ONE conversion as 1.8 billion when said cost is that of converting both ships. If i'm right, this is misleading advice at its best, a revival of Australia moving 500 miles up on the maps to allow land based planes to cover the Royal Navy at sea East of Suez after the retirement of the big carriers.

With the difference that this time it might be the Navy who uses the trick: for the RAF, owner of the JCA program and budget, the F35C is the best choice.
For the RN, given no budget increase, finding the money in the short term for converting the carriers is a huge issue. They might well be the main source of the F35B arguing, due to the scary thought of what might have to be cut in order to find the money for CATOBAR work.
It is very likely, especially considering that the RAF has craved the long range, higher payload F35C at least since 2005, and there's no reason why they should have changed their minds now.
They pay for the planes, and the C does more and costs less. Easy choice.

The Navy has to pay for the ships, and fears that vessels and Marines would have to be cut to save money for CATOBAR, since government won't give any additional funding. I can understand the fear, but i still cannot really support the solution chosen. STOVL is not much of a good decision even if it gets both carriers in service, which, again, is anyway far from sure.
It locks the UK into the F35B box, tying the destiny of the vessels and british airpower at sea to a plane that still does not really work and still risks being a failure. It ties the long-term defence equipment programme to the most expensive and less capable aircraft of the trio. And it makes the carriers effectively outdated even before they enter service.
UCAVs on carriers?

Not on british ones.
But the RAF will no doubt love to tap into the X47B tech for its notional "2030" land-based UCAV to develop in collaboration with France.
After all, they've loved the carrier's hero, the Buccaneer. I'm sure they'll love to turn another naval system in a land machine, throwing away its best capabilities. They might in exchange content themselves with the F35B.
And in the case, you can bet that its lack of range and payload will be used to argue for more UCAV funds for a "proper replacement" for Tornado, for the deep strike missions.

The reality is that an effort should be made to shoulder the short-term cost, with extra funding made available, and later there would be the benefit of the long-term gains.
But this is what the MOD never does.

CVF and JCA: why i'd go CATOBAR

 

F35B and F35C: the airplane situation

Of immense interest is the 2011 Department of Defence Annual Report for the Office of the Director, Operational Test & Evaluation which gives us an up to date major picture of the current F35 development and testing situation. In the detail, it tells of everything that still does not work with the F35, and details the progress of the program in 2011. 

It is very useful to draw some well-informed conclusions, and contains some interesting data. For example, it emerges that: 

- F35A is 11% behind schedule with its test and validation campaign

- F35B is 9% behind schedule

- F35C is 32% ahead of schedule

We must, of course, look at the 32% ahead of schedule data with the awareness that the C is the variant who entered trials last. The other two variants are ahead of the F35C with their programs of development, testing and validation as they are closer to entering active service. For example the B already went at sea, while the C won't go on an aircraft carrier until next year.
However, A and B are lagging considerably in terms of test points cleared, while the F35C has cleared 32% more test points than planned, which is very reassuring. Having started later also means that more corrections have been incorporated into the C at build, thanks to discoveries made on the other two variants.

The planning, updated to December 2011, is for the three variants to complete their development and testing with many more flights. In each flight, a number of tests are run, in order to validate long lists of requirements. Each airframe requirement makes for 1 or several "test points". As of December 2011, maturity of the F35C was 1002 test flights away, with 12.442 test points yet to clear.
 

The A still has 827 flights and 10.257 test points to go.
 

The B 1,437 flights and 15.045 points.

These values of course change rather frequently when a change proves necessary and needs to be flown and trialed, adding new flights and points to clear to the count, but they are indicative of the current plan. 

Regarding the F35B trials at sea on USS Wasp, which were presented by the STOVL prophets as having proven that the B has "no issues" and that the jet blast hazard claims were "nonsense" and that everything actually works perfectly well, well, the reality is actually a bit different. The F35B jet blast does not hole the deck as someone had (rather extremely) prophetized, no, but a jet blast issues exists and the trials at sea only confirmed it. A 75 feet danger radius is reported. 

Jet blast from the F-35Bs is expected to produce unsafe forces on flight deck personnel up to 75 feet from the short take-off line.

This is going to make another serious dent, along with Ship  Borne Rolling Vertical Landing, in the flaunted advantages of STOVL when conducting simultaneous jet and helicopter operations on deck, which some describe as indispansable for the success of Carrier Enabled Power Projection. 

With jet blast hazard and landing runs on the deck, the differences between F35B and F35C in deck usage during ops are getting smaller and smaller.  

Among the F35B issues, is the cracking of a wing carry-through bulkhead cracked before 2,000 hours of airframe life. The required airframe lifetime is 8,000 hours. Repair of the bulkhead on the test article was completed in November 2011, and F-35B durability testing should have restarted in January 2012.

Following the bulkhead crack in the F-35B test article, analysis verified the existence of numerous other life‑limited parts on all three variants. The program began developing plans to correct these deficiencies in existing aircraft by repair/modifications, and designing changes to the production process. The most significant of these in terms of complexity, aircraft downtime, and difficulty of the modification required for existing aircraft is the forward wing root rib on the F-35A [which failed after some 3000 hours] and F-35B aircraft.

The F35C's own durability testing are due to start in the next while, if it hasn't already. By August last year the C had completed all of its structural test points, including drop tests to simulate rough carrier landing stress on the airframe. 

The F35B has had  a large number of parts re-designed and replaced and corrected, and the reports notes that, so far, there's no plan in place for rolling in the modifications in production airplanes. The report acknowledges: 

The program has not completed the final re-designs and plans to correct deficiencies through modifications of F-35B production aircraft intended for the fleet, which cannot be monitored in-flight because these aircraft are not instrumented. Production aircraft will be restricted from STOVL-mode flight operations until Service airworthiness authorities grant a flight clearance. A significant amount of flight test and development of system maturity of the final STOVL-mode door and propulsion system designs remains to be accomplished. A system mature enough for unmonitored STOVL-mode flight may be needed as early as late 2012 to coincide with the delivery of lot 4 F-35B aircraft to the Marine Corps at Yuma, Arizona. If testing of the changes is not complete and needed modifications are not installed by late 2012, aircraft at Yuma will fly in CTOL‑mode only.

The full extent of issues so far detected in the airframe doors and STOVL propulsion assembly is reported in a table, and makes for rather depressing reading, with some of the solutions in development already planned not to be ready before LRIP 7 while other solutions have yet to be determined, tested, and planned for adoption on production standard airplanes. 

The table of the F35B propulsion and door issues, as presented in the report.

There is also serious problems with overheating of the clutch that can prevent the STOVL mode to be angaged (how do you land at that point if your only runway is the carrier, or is just too short for a CTOL landing???) for which a real solution does not yet exists, and the driveshaft has to be redesigned. 

Besides, the F35B has a margin for growth of sole 230 pounds before it breaks its not-to-exceed weight planned for 2015. An additional 142 pounds might be secured by a greater descent rate to touchdown, but it is far from certain, and even so that means just 372 pounds of weight growth margin available, before the deadly line is crossed, with several years of testing and development yet to go, and no military service at all done. 

Talk about constrained airframes... 

The report notes: 

This additional weight [the 142 additional pounds of margin, to 372 total] increases the margin to 1.2 percent of current weight and allows for 0.36 percent weight growth
per year. Managing weight growth with such tight margins for the balance of SDD will be a significant challenge, especially with over 70 percent of the scheduled F-35B flight sciences test flights remaining to be accomplished in the next 60 months. For comparison, weight growth on the F/A-18 E/F was approximately 0.69 percent per year for  the first 42 months following first flight.

Again, undesirable wing roll-off, airframe buffet, and sideslip occurred in transonic flight regimes, and handling characteristics as a consequence do not meet requirements. It is likely that no more changes will be made to the plane, and it will be the requirements that are reviewed and reduced, in order for the plane to "meet" them!

The final word on the F35B can be identified in this passage: 

In October 2011, the program successfully conducted initial amphibious ship trials with STOVL aircraft in accordance with the new, restructured plan for 2011; however, significant work and flight tests remain to verify and incorporate modifications to STOVL aircraft required to correct known STOVL deficiencies and prepare the system for operational use.

Regarding the F35C, the report says: 

F-35C Flight Sciences
• As F-35C flight sciences focused on preparation for and execution of carrier launch and landing testing at Lakehurst, a limited amount of other envelope expansion occurred in 2011.
The F-35C flight sciences test points accomplished thus far are approximately 15 percent of the total expected in SDD.

• The lack of available flight envelope in the transonic regime currently constrains testing of F-35C aircraft handling qualities. In limited testing using flight control software that
benefitted from F-35A and F-35B testing, the F-35C aircraft performance in the transonic flight regime demonstrated the predicted intensity of uncommanded rolls but higher buffet
levels. The F-35C aircraft was expected to have the greatest challenge of the three variants in the transonic flight regime, which led to the decision to incorporate structural provisions for the installation of external spoilers in one test aircraft.

(Buffet is a problem of all three variants, it seems, and indeed a common problem in american naval jets, since the F-18 notoriously had this kind of issues too!) 

• The carrier launch and landing testing at Lakehurst provided valuable lessons regarding the impacts of these dynamic environments on the aircraft early in the testing.
Corrections and regression testing are needed as a result of the discoveries listed below. The program is also working to correct other performance problems such as excessive
nose gear oscillations during taxi, excessive landing gear retraction times, and overheating of the electro-hydrostatic actuator systems that power the flight controls. The program will subsequently evaluate the need for modifications of production aircraft for these items.
• Discoveries included:
-- Flight test aircraft could not engage the arrestment cable
during tests at the Lakehurst, New Jersey, test facility. The
tail-hook point is undergoing a redesign and the hold-down
damper mechanism requires modifications to enable
successful arrestments on the carrier. Resolution of these
deficiencies is needed for testing to support F-35C ship
trials in late 2013.
-- Hold-back bar and torque arm components, which keep the
F-35C aircraft from moving forward when tensioned on the
catapult at full power, require a redesign due to the use of
incorrect design load factors. Actual loads are greater than
predicted. The impact of these greater‑than‑predicted loads
on strength and fatigue characteristics is under analysis by
the program.
-- Loss of inertial navigation and GPS inputs to pilot displays
occurred during a catapult launch. Root cause analysis was
in progress at the time of this report.
-- The test team conducted initial testing in the transonic
flight regimes with one version of air vehicle software on
aircraft CF-2. Problems similar to the other variants were
observed, such as excessive buffeting and roll-off, at times
making the helmet-mounted displays unreadable.
-- Higher than predicted temperatures exist in the
electro‑hydrostatic actuator system during flight testing
of the aircraft in a landing configuration. This component
provides the force to move control surfaces.

In addition, the F35C acceleration is inferior to the hoped value.

The F35B is still far from its maturity, with several thousand test points more than the other variants to clear and with a huge variety of very serious issues to fix and with a significant amount of changes and redesigning already having taken place.

The F35C has its problems too, but is in a remarkably better shape and, save for the arrestor hook issue, which is said to be due for fixing in the next few months, has not revealed problems potentially show-stopping. The B's extremely low growth margin, with associated Bring Back weight issues, is instead a very serious menace to its viability as embarked plane for CVF. 

CATOBAR reasons and issues 

Reasons:  

- Maximum interoperability. Rafale, F-18, F-35C but also STOVL F35B can work from a big CATOBAR deck. The opposite is not true. 

- Future proof. Any kind of naval drone which will be developed in the coming years will be able to operate from the carrier. We will also be able to benefit from research and development done by the US Navy, and benefit of their support and investments into EMALS, AAG, and compatible platforms. 

- Compatible with future adoptions of better COD, AEW and tanker platforms. 

- Maximum military performances. It makes it possible to use the most capable embarked airplanes, and it fits into the operations of the two main allies of the UK. 

Issues:  

- Cost. EMALS and AAG add up-front cost to the carriers, and come with a personnel and training penalty. 

I've tried to quantify the extent of the training penalty connected to CATOBAR ops, but it is not easy at all.

I've discovered that a Sea Harrier FA2 pilot was a Naval All Weather Fighter Pilot after 100 day and 80 night landings on deck, but i've been unable to find a figure for the number of day and night landings necessary to re-certify for ops when the pilots are assigned to active service on the carrier.

On the other side of the barricade, i don't have a figure for the number of landings required for initial pilot certification, but i know that France's carrier pilots re-certify for carrier ops currency by making 6 daytime arrested landings and 4 night time arrested landings. A direct comparison in this latest value would be invaluable in assessing the feasibility of having RAF pilots, initially certified to CATOBAR ops, getting current again quickly to reiforce the naval strike wing embarked on the carrier.

The STOVL prophets say that re-certification with the Harrier required far fewer landings, and was much more readily achievable. They say that with CATOBAR, it wouldn't be possible to have one naval squadron plus 2/3 land squadrons able to reinforce the embarked complement in case of crisis, but we'd need a CATOBAR cadre of at least 3 naval squadrons.

Assuming they are right and it is true,  my reply is: that's how things should have always been.

While there's several clear and rationale reasons for having a naval fixed wing element [provide air defence for the fleet and independent, full spectrum air power even when airbases are not available], which brings to the table some very unique capabilities, i believe the rationale for a separate land based fleet of "deep penetrating" strike planes to replace Tornado has never been weaker. And in many ways it is a duplicate of the carrier strike fleet.

The RAF's JCA plan so far has been to get a land fleet of planes, capable to, at a stretch, migrate on the carrier when necessary. But considered the difficulties of getting land pilots to operate from ships, it will always make more operational sense to have naval pilots instead, who can readily work from land bases if the situation calls for it.

It is much easier to put a naval squadron ashore than a land squadron at sea, it is undeniable.

If CATOBAR requires a greater focus on naval operations, so be it, i say. France does not do bad at all with its own naval aviation, considering that they deployed a sizeable and capable force at sea for Libya ops, even though Charles De Gaulle was back from four months of ops over Afghanistan by less than one month.

They did especially well considering that their naval air force at the time had a single Rafale squadron, 12F, with an establishment of 15 airplanes, plus two Super Etendard squadrons, 11F and 17F.

Now, finally, 11F is converting to Rafale as part of the progressive retirement of the Super Etendard. The naval fixed wing complement is of course completed by 4F squadron, with the 3 E2C Hawkeye. Numerically, if the UK is really to order 50 F35s, the numbers are similar, as France has so far ordered 48 Rafale M, and has lost 3 to accidents, giving them a fleet of potentially just 45 airframes, even if once they were hoping for 60.

Looking at France's small but efficient CATOBAR naval aviation, i say that Britain could no doubt at least match it, standing up three naval-focused, if not naval-owned, squadrons of 14 F35C each (as 2 would normally be roled as Buddy-Buddy tankers).

France trains its naval pilots in the US, where they fly and "trap" on the T-45 Goshawk. When they come back, as few as 12 hours on the Rafale simulator are sufficient to achieve conversion to type. Much like with the F35, there is not a (naval) two-seat Rafale trainer. Differently from the F35, which pretty much never envisaged it, the Rafale N was planned (naval two-seat) and the airforce has the two-seat B variant. From late 2010, the Armee de l'Air has formed a large Rafale training squadron (2/92 Aquitanie) which offers some 4 slots a year for naval pilots to exploit some hours on the two-seat Rafale for combat system advanced training.

The RAF and RN hope to cover this requirement for the F35 with the Hawk T2 and with the simulators.  

On land, carrier landing practice is done by french pilots without a carrier-shaped runway with wires: a standard runway, with a marked "square" area the same size of the one that on a carrier would sport the wires is sufficient for good practice prior to embarkation on the aircraft carrier.

Keep in mind that the F35 promises to come with the best and most realistic simulators ever developed, and much of the training is to be done on sims, so matching what France does with the Rafales is the minimum i expect.

I do not think CATOBAR represents such an insurmontable challenge, if the decision is eventually taken to go ahead with it.

The problem is financing the conversion of the two carriers, essentially. And accepting that naval aviation is a serious trade, that should not be half-assed with part-time solutions.