Beyond Harpoon and Storm Shadow (and Tomahawk too...?)

SDSR 2015 – Issues, analysis and recommendations going towards the review

Budget

About that 2%

Army 

Army projects and requirements

Army vehicle projects – post DSEI 2015

Solving the problem of hollow army 2020

Royal Air Force 

Fast jets and squadrons number 

Air Capabilities

The mystery of Protector

Royal Navy 

Royal Navy and the SDSR 

Beyond Harpoon and Storm Shadow (and Tomahawk too...?)

The Tomahawk problem

Not everyone has taken notice of the fact that Tomahawk was / is about to go out of production. The 2016 US Navy Budget request had a ZERO at the voice “Tomahawk”, with no new rounds to be procured. Eventually, Congress stepped in and added funding for a new TLAM purchase to keep the production line open a bit longer.

However, the expanded defence budget crafted by Congress goes well above the amount of money that the Obama administration wants to spend, and the president has vetoed it.

Eventually, days ago a bipartisan agreement on spending limits for the next two financial years has been reached, meaning that the worst scenario will be avoided… but also meaning that the 2016 defence budget is going back to the table for corrections meant to shave 5 billion dollars off the list. The unrequested TLAM production might or might not survive the re-examination of the budget document.

TLAM might soon be out of production, and this consideration might have helped the Royal Navy in getting some funding to procure "additional Tomahawks", as mentioned in passing in the 10 Year Equipment Plan, 2015 edition. 65 TLAM rounds were requested in July 2014 and authorized by the US government, but there is news of only 20 having been effectively purchased, in september the same year.

If production ends, the Royal Navy will then have to depend on its stock, which is unfortunately pretty limited (it once consisted of 65 missiles, might be a few more now) and all composed of encapsulated missiles meant for submarine, torpedo-tube launch.

No Vertical Launch rounds in stock mean that, if production closes, the TLAM will NOT be an option for Type 26, unless the RN is able to convince the US Navy to sell some of its stock (far larger, numbering possibly up to 4000 rounds).

A major US (and UK participated) upgrade and refurbishment programme for TLAM is indeed about to start, but production of new rounds might be over soon. It will be, unless plans change in the next 2 financial years or so.
Under the current US Navy planning, recertification of existing TLAM rounds (and technology insertion) begins in 2019, using already existing TLAM stocks, with no new acquisitions.

Meanwhile, the Tomahawk successor, the Next Generation Land Attack Weapon (NGLAW) received a first 5 million funding line in 2015 with this motivation: 

Funding is provided for a Next Generation Land Attack Weapon (NGLAW), a weapons system that is long range, survivable and can be launched from multiple surface and submarine platforms. NGLAW will incorporate evaluated existing and emergent technologies to support an improved strike capability with an Initial Operational Capability (IOC) no later than 2024.

This effort will enter the Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) phase of the acquisition cycle in FY15. Upon completion, the Department of the Navy will assess the results of the AoA and make a determination on a preferred material approach, the phase of the acquisition cycle the program will enter, and when the NGLAW weapon will achieve IOC.

"Amusingly" enough, by the time the Royal Navy chooses what to do with the MK41 on Type 26, the TLAM production line might be closed already, making Tomahawk actually a non viable solution.

There is the possibility that Congress will impede the US Navy’s attempt to terminate Tomahawk purchases exactly as it impedes the USAF from grounding the A-10 fleet. But it might also not happen. 

There is the possibility that TLAM will evolve and change face to become NGLAW and succeed to itself with a new, advanced variant and with production restarting within a few years. But it might also not happen.

The Royal Navy is involved in the Tomahawk enterprise and in the recertification and upgrade programme, but is unlikely to have much of a say in what happens with US Navy purchases and successor plans.

The Royal Navy itself could keep the TLAM production line open for an additional year if it purchased a significant number of rounds (above 100), either in the submarine variant or VL variant, or both. But this will require quick thinking and available money.

If indecision continues to win the day, the Royal Navy risks to fall in the gap between the end of TLAM production and the start of the production of the new US land attack missile, whatever it ends up being.

A sizeable extension to the Royal Navy’s stock of Tomahawk missiles is arguably a strategic priority regardless of the Type 26’s armament decision. In fact, the TLAM is going to be in use for at least 15 more years after the recertification. But while the US Navy can live off a vast stock, consuming it over time and filling the holes with the new Land Attack weapon when it enters in production, the Royal Navy can’t live long on the current stock. 60 – 100 missiles can be fired very, very quickly if a major operation, or several small ones, take place in the next few years.

Basic prudence suggests that a significant expansion of the stock is indispensable to make sure that the RN doesn’t run out of one of its most important and most often used weapons years before a replacement is available.

A decision will also be needed for shaping the post-Tomahawk era.

Tomahawk developments

One major capability development for TLAM Is the cooperatively funded US Navy/United Kingdom Joint Multi-Effects Warhead System (JMEWS) / Joint Capability Technology Demonstration (JCTD). The JMEWS introduces much greater capability against Hard and Buried targets, while retaining the same blast-fragmentation effects already available. This new multi-effect warhead, first demonstrated in 2010 with perforation of a target protected by reinforced concrete, would greatly expand the range of targets that TLAM can effectively destroy.

Other enhancements in development include multiple or multi-band antennas, an integrated single box solution radio and Third-Party In-Flight Targeting (3PT). These changes enable the Tomahawk to fly attack profiles that increase its chances of surviving against complex air defence systems; allow the missile to send imagery back to base and permit the missile to loiter and be re-targeted in flight.

Experiments stateside have included TLAM retargeting from an F-22 Raptor in flight, providing a glimpse of the possibilities that would be opened by F-35s working with TLAMs as “wingmen”.

JMEWS and these enhancements are almost certainly going to be part of TLAM’s future, ensuring it remains relevant for another 15 years after 2019.

Separately, Raytheon is continuing to work on the Multi Mission Tomahawk concept, which introduces an active radar seeker (in addition to the existing guidance system) to enable much expanded moving target (and anti-ship) capability. The RF seeker is another element that could be included in the 2019 refurbishment and recertification programme. Raytheon hopes to win the US Navy’s interest (and funding), and is effectively pitching the Tomahawk MMT against LRASM and JSM for the US Navy’s Offensive Anti-Surface Warfare (OASuW) Increment 2 requirement. Lockheed Martin's LRASM for now has only been selected for OASuW Increment 1, which is an urgent programme for adding improved, modern anti-ship capability on U.S. Navy F/A-18E/F Super Hornets and U.S. Air Force B-1B Lancer bombers.

Increment 2 will address the requirements for an advanced, autonomous, anti-ship missile capable of being launched from the air, surface and sub-surface, and the solution for the requirement has yet to be selected.

The Future Cruise & Anti-Ship Weapon

The FCASW has been on the list of potential joint UK-FR projects since the Lancaster House agreement. It is a programme name that has been around for a while, but that has made virtually no progress since. Its long-term aim is to replace Harpoon, Exocet and Storm Shadow / Scalp.  

Replacing Tomahawk and Scalp Navale is going to be more a problem, because of the strike range: the 2000 + kilometers range of TLAM is what makes it truly a strategic weapon, and any downgrade to that reach reduces the number of targets that can be reached far inland from launch zones out at sea. FCASW might or might not attempt to generate the same kind of strike radius: it will most likely depend on early decisions that hinge on how to sustain and then replace the TLAM capability. If the UK decides to follow the US efforts in that area, then Tomahawk replacement will not figure among FCASW requirements.

Jane's is reporting that there should be a first phase of joint concept studies starting next year, and a technology demonstrator in 2019 if we are lucky. Assuming that the british SDSR goes the go ahead and confirms the funding, things should start moving.

When FCASW is mentioned, the temptation is to think of the MBDA Perseus concept weapon, but while the Perseus is pretty likely to be considered as part of the exercise, the concept coming out of the study could actually end up being much, much different.

The CvS401 Perseus was MBDA’s Concept Weapon for the year 2011, and it clearly was inspired by the FCASW requirement: it was presented as a cruise missile capable of extremely high speed (up to Mach 3) and a range of 250 – 300 km. It was shown with a “triple” warhead consisting of a main explosive charge (around 200 kg) within the missile and two small (40 – 50 kg) inertial-guided, droppable “effectors” that could be used to strike a ship in multiple places with the same weapon; to hit multiple targets in the same area or simply to act as a large unitary warhead when necessary.

The missile would be able to cruise and attack from high altitude or to sea skim for maximum effect against enemy warships, and it would come with a multi-sensor seeker combining AESA radar, LIDAR and semi-active laser guidance.

It would be a multi-platform weapon, compatible with ships (MK41 and Sylver A70); submarines (standard 533mm torpedo tubes); aircraft and land-based launchers. 

The Perseus was clearly aimed at the UK-Fr requirement, but it remains a concept which has not left the CGIs yet, and calling the Future Cruise and Anti Ship Missile "Perseus" and expecting it to have the same kind of characteristics is a wild guess. Perseus promises a lot from an 800 kg weapon, and it looks like a complex and expensive system. Some of its features might not be part of the actual weapon emerging from the joint programme (assuming it does eventually emerge).

Perseus’s 300 km range also makes it way too short legged to ever be considered a fitting replacement of Tomahawk and Scalp Navale. 

Perseus shown while ejecting its two sub-munitions.

The FCASW concept phase will have to answer to a number of questions about range, warhead, seeker and intended strategy for penetrating inside highly defended bubbles of airspace. The Mach 3 speed of Perseus is particularly suited for anti-ship attack, as a sea-skimming, highly supersonic weapon leaves the targeted ship with a tiny timeframe available for attempting to shoot down or decoy the missile off target.

On the other hand, a high supersonic missile inexorably loses out part of its stealthness, as speed means heat (and higher IR signature) and also requires an optimization of the aerodynamics design that precludes obtaining the lowest radar cross section.

More speed and less stealth, or the other way around? LRASM settled for stealthness. FCASW might go in another direction.

But if speed is chosen, Mach 3 might be a rather modest target: while in the West supersonic anti-ship missiles haven’t had much space so far, in Russia and in Asia several supersonic weapons already exist. The Mach 3 Russia-India BramHos missile is already operational, and research is already moving on towards the hypersonic real, with speeds of Mach 5 and higher.

FCASW would risk to achieve high supersonic speed when the rest of the world achieves hypersonic speed, perpetuating the missile disadvantage.  

Another problem with Perseus /FCASW is that the date being suggested for ISD back in 2011 was 2030.

2030 might be acceptable for the RAF and Armee de l’Air and even for the Marine Nationale, since the first two can life-extend Storm Shadow / Scalp and the second is just now putting into service the latest block evolution of the Exocet and the new Scalp Navale cruise missile.

The Royal Navy has more urgent needs, considering that it still uses the ancient Harpoon Block 1C (with a 2018 OSD and an uncertain future); is faced by the possibility that TLAM production will end within two years and is planning to put in service a new frigate type beginning in 2022 that comes with 24 MK41 cells but not with a clear plan to achieve an anti-ship and land attack capability.

The urgent needs of the navy and the uncertainties of UK-Fr cooperation (Telemos is still fresh in the memory) bring forth painful questions about what to do. The FCASW concept of a single weapon able to do it all is fascinating and comes with the plus of keeping british industrial capabilities alive.

On the other hand, the US solution to both the Tomahawk and anti-ship problems will likely be ready earlier and, due to the large US purchases, might come cheaper and with a production line open for many years.

Two programmes might be needed: a collaboration with the US on the post-Tomahawk; and the FCASW for the post-Harpoon and post-Storm Shadow.

The Harpoon problem

Aside from money, one problem with replacing Harpoon is the different design philosophies followed by the vessels of the fleet. The Type 23 cannot be equipped with a vertical-launch anti-ship missile, but is not going to be completely out of service before 2036.

The Type 45 could move on from Harpoon to a VL system, but only if the space reservation was used and two MK41 Strike Length modules (with a total of 16 cells) were slotted in. This might at some point happen when Ballistic Missile Defense becomes not a “nice to have” but a “must have”. As detailed in the previous article, the Royal Navy has already been putting work into BMD software for the Type 45 and has also funded a study into the addition of the MK41 modules and the integration of the SM-3 anti-ballistic missile.

In the meanwhile, four of the Type 45s are (slowly) being retrofitted with Harpoon, using the launchers and missiles taken from the decommissioned Type 22 Batch 3 ships. As of today, HMS Duncan and HMS Diamond have received their fit.

It is possible, but not certain) that all six Type 45s will receive the computers and wiring back-end that make Harpoon work, allowing the rapid transfer of the launcher blocks from one to the other.

The incoming Type 26, on the other hand, does not seem to have provisions to ever embark a missile unless it is vertically launched from the 24 MK41 cells. 

Today, there are many western anti-ship missiles that are fired from above-deck tubes, but there is very little choice in terms of vertical launch ASMs. This is going to change, at least in part, due to the renewed US Navy interest for anti-ship missiles.

The US LRASM is thus taking shape, and Norway intends to have a go at the US opportunity by developing its Joint Strike Missile for vertical and torpedo tube launch. The JSM will also be integrated for internal and external carriage on the F-35A and, if selected by the US Navy, could go on the F-35C as well. On the F-35B, internal carriage is not possible as the bays are 14 inches shorter, but external carry is an option. The FCASW will also be required to be compatible with vertical launch.

It is reasonable to assume that over the next decade or so, the availability of VL missiles will increase, while over-deck tubes will fall progressively out of fashion.

The problem, however, remains: it is hard to imagine the Royal Navy funding two anti-ship missiles at once (it is already hard enough to see it finding the money for one), so the option is arming the Type 26 and disarming Type 23s and, at least for a while, the 45s; or leaving the Type 26 itself without an anti-ship missile.

Given the obsolescence of the Harpoon and its single-mission nature, it would seem logic to procure a more capable and dual-role missile for use on the Type 26 and, subsequently, Type 45, even if it means accepting the loss of ASMs on the Type 23 while they have still more than a decade of service ahead of them.

But if FCASW continues to aim for the distant 2030, the Royal Navy will have to consider a big Harpoon life-extension, or an interim ASM solution with an off-the-shelf missile, or deal with well over a decade of nothing.

Storm Shadow Mid Life Upgrade

France has confirmed in its Financial Law for 2016 that the defence budget will include money to start the Scalp mid life upgrade. Originally, this was to be another joint programme, with the RAF interested in life-extending its Storm Shadow missiles, close “relatives” of the French Scalp. It is possible to find news of joint studies and technology developments dating back to 2004 if not earlier. Finally, for France at least, the actual upgrade might be about to start.

Requirements and aspirations voiced in the past years included a two-way data link for in-flight retargeting and a different seeker. At one point, the DUMAS (Dual Mode Active IR and Imaging IR Seeker), result of a joint UK – FR technology demonstration programme, was expected to be part of the MLU. DUMAS combined an active infrared scanning laser and a passive infrared detector which, used in conjunction with sophisticated algorithms, provided detection, imaging and accurate identification. 

No information is coming out from the MOD at the moment, but it is pretty likely that the RAF will still want to exploit the chance to share the costs involved in life-extending Storm Shadow. 

Despite writing off more than 200 million in Storm Shadow holdings after the 2010 review, reportedly. Which might mean having reduced the stock by 200 missiles or so... 

Parliament approves

Parliament has approved the beginning of combat operations over Iraq against ISIL, and the Tornado GR4s already in Cyprus will likely fly their first mission very soon from Akrotiri. They have been flying reconnaissance sorties for a while already, along with the first (and for now only) Rivet Joint in service.
There might very well be a SSN already positioned for eventual Tomahawk launches. The RN maintains a SSN(T), with the T standing for TLAM, Tomahawk land attack missile, east of suez at all times, and it could fire its cruise weapons from the Gulf. Another could well be in the Mediterranean, too.

There will be time to talk in greater detail about the british operations and contribution to this fight, which doesn't have a clear end in sight. Tonight it is time to wish for happy hunting and for a safe return for everyone that will be involved.

The little that can be said right away is that already it looks like the most precious contribution that can be made will be tanker support, as well as ISR support, both in extremely high demand.
Combat aircraft are likely to be relatively less important, in a way. First of all, they are going to be few in number: the talk at the moment is for 6 Tornados, and it is going to be hard to do more, since the Tornado force is down to just three frontline squadrons, and of these one is ramping down ahead of disbandment next year (II (AC) Sqn), another has just returned from its last Afghan tour (IX Sqn) and one has just deployed in Afghanistan (31 Sqn). Add the Tornado deployed to Africa to support the ISR campaign to locate Boko Haram and the kidnapped girls in Nigeria, and the overstretch is evident.
Typhoon will have to be used, if the Iraq effort is to be ramped up. But Typhoon, as we know, is still years away from the much needed full air to ground capability, so there are many limitations, ifs, buts and maybes.

Another factor in limiting the reach of the air campaign is the distance of flight and the need for air refueling. France's own 6 Rafales, for example, flying from Al Dhafra, only fly one mission a day, roughly, tipically with two aircraft, even if double pairs have also been used. Each mission takes several hours and several AAR contacts. France has only one KC-135 tanker assigned to the operation, named Chammal, so it is very much dependent on coalition tankers, mainly USAF ones.
The USAF has been flying over 30 tanker sorties per day, and in the relatively short time since the beginning of the operations, CENTCOM has already registered a staggering 1289 tanker sorties.
The number of air strikes compared to the sorties flown is very low: only a few more than 200 airstrikes, with some 350 weapons expended in Iraq, and even less in Syria. The need for tanker support will only grow greater as the fixed, known and static targets are taken out and the focus shifts more and more to hitting mobile and relocatable targets. This will require aircraft to loiter and to hunt for targets, and will require endurance and lots of fuel. Plus, of course, even more ISR to locate the targets.
The RAF might be able to provide a Sentinel R1 to aid the ISR effort (difficult to say the least, since one is in Africa and Afghanistan still calls for Sentinel surveillance as well, which means a forward fleet of 3 machines is already well busy as it is) and some Voyager. There are 9 Voyager in service, but one is for air transport only and one is in the Falklands. When the QRA tanker requirement at home is added in, it is evident that there isn't much to go around in this field either. 
The options, in any way you want to look at it, are limited. 

Main air bases for the campaign. Approximate positions only. Incirlik is a NATO base, but Turkey is not granting authorization for its use for combat operations, at least for now. Not clear if RAF aircraft from Akrotiri will fly over Syria despite the risks this implies and despite the political hesitations. Curving south over Jordan or north over Turkey, on the other hand, only add more distance.

The overall responsiveness of coalition airpower to developments on the ground is, at this stage, still quite slow for obvious reasons: one major difference could be made by forward basing inside Iraq. The US intend to deploy aircraft to Irbil, and these will have much better chances to provide endurance and responsiveness over Northern Iraq. Of course, this does require boots on the ground, which the US already have in hundreds, with an Army Division HQ also on the way. Super Hornets coming from the USS George W. Bush (CVN 77) can also compensate the tiranny of distances somewhat, and some help comes from the USMC Harriers of USS Bataan and USS Makin Island as well.
The USAF has employed B-1 bombers as well, which have huge range and endurance, and they are likely to account for a big share of the USAF contribution so far in terms of strikes and ordnance dropped.

The start of RAF ops comes together with the announces that Belgium is to contribute 6 F-16, Denmark 7 F-16 and the Netherlands on Wednesday promised 6 F-16 plus two spare aircraft to the Coalition in one week's time.
To all of the men and women involved, again happy hunting, and wishes of a safe return.

Vertical Launching Systems and the Type 26

Much discussion has been caused by the Type 26 model shown at DSEI 2013, as this new model showed just 16 VLS Strike Length cells instead of the 24 shown earlier at Euronaval 2012. Reportedly, the main reason behind the difference is the fact that at Euronaval the model was fitted with the European SYLVER VLS system, while the DSEI model was fitted with the American MK41.

Why the very noticeable difference? 

In this photo by Navy Recognition, the Type 26 model seen at Euronaval 2012: there are 24 SYLVER A70 cells

 

The photo from DSEI 2013, showing only 16 cells, MK41 Strike Lenght. Overlayed in red, the big question: is there under-deck space for fitting two more MK41 modules, replacing the CAMM cells? The deck area is not a problem, but space under deck might be, as CAMM cells only go around 3 meters deep, while MK41 Strike would go down over twice as much.

MK41

The MK41 vertical launch system was conceived in 1976 and first appeared on the cruiser USS Bunker Hill. The vertical launch system, conceived by FMC but produced by Martin-Marietta (now part of Lockheed Martin), was a major upgrade from the MK26 launcher, which employed a twin-arm ramp with an under-deck ammunition depot for 44 missiles. The same space occupied by a MK26 launcher, thanks to the MK41, became a 61-missiles silo, with all missiles constantly ready to be fired, against only 2 ready to fire on the arms of the MK26 ramp. 

Two graphics showing the complex MK26 twin-arm launcher that the MK41 replaced.Missiles were vertically struck down in the two conveyors, and vertically pushed up onto the launcher's two arms.

 

The MK41 comes in modules which have 8 missile cells each, arranged in two rows of four aligned on the two sides of a vertical uptake used for venting hot gas. Originally, there was also a module with just 5 missile cells, with the space of the other three occupied by a fold-down crane for at sea reloading, as we’ll see. 

 

MK41 quick overview. Also shows the two large multi-module silos on Arleigh Burke-class ships

Each module carriers its own launch sequencer, motor control panel and gas exhaust system. When a missile is fired, it exhausts downwards through the blowout bottom end of its canister; the hot gas goes down into the MK41’s plenum and then vents upwards through the uptake, which has its own hatch opening between the two rows of cells.

The plenum can withstand 7 launches from each cell, plus a restrained firing with full motor burn from any other cell. A deluge system is installed to provide flooding of missile cells to prevent warhead explosions. 

The uptake hatch between the two rows of four cells is very evident in this image, showing the launch of a Tomahawk. Notice the high pressure, high-temperature gas venting upwards from the hatch.

 

Multiple MK41 8-cell modules can be assembled together in a silo: Ticonderoga class cruisers were built with two large silos, each containing seven 8-cell modules plus, originally, a 5-cell plus crane module, giving the ship a total of 122 missile cells. 

What looks like a 5+crane MK41 module is being lowered into the silo, to join three 8-cell modules already in position. Note the density of the installation. A further four 8-cell modules will follow, to form a 61 cell large silo.

 

A 61-cell silo, completed, with a caniser being lowered towards an empty cell. Note the 3-cell wide hatch of the crane, in the second module from the bottom, to the right of the image.

On the DDG-51 Flight I and II, the MK41 modules were arranged in a silo with 29 cells on the bow (the equivalent of three cells taken up by the crane) and 61 on the stern. 

The All-Up Round missiles used in the MK41 come in sealed canisters which are used for storage, transportation, handling and, ultimately, for launch. Once a canister is struck down into a VLS cell, it becomes an integral part of the launcher system. Each canister has a common external envelope to support system launcher module interfaces, while internal mechanical and electrical components are tailored to specific missile shapes and interface requirements. In other words, to each missile, its own canister:

MK13 canisters are for Standard SM-2 series missiles;

MK14 canisters are for Tomahawk

MK15 canisters are for ASROC

MK21 canisters are for SM-3 anti-ballistic missiles

MK22 canisters are for Sea Sparrow

MK25 is the special, quad-pack canister for ESSM 

There are successive variants of the canisters. Today, the Tomahawk All-Up-Rounds come in MK14 Mod 2 canisters. Before it came the Mod 1, which had a launch security device for the control of Tomahawk employment, and by the Mod 0, which had a key-operated security device against unwanted launches, as it was meant to carry the now withdrawn nuclear-tipped Tomahawk.

The canister MK21 Mod 3, instead, is a slightly modified MK21 used with the new Standard SM-6 missile.

Canisters have a shell structure is a steel weldment with corrugated steel skins and cast steel end frames. They are fitted with a variety of vital equipment and characteristics, including: adjustable lateral restraint shoes, longitudinal shock isolators, an ablative coated steel baseplate structure, ablative blocks, deluge piping, nitrogen fill piping, cables, a code plug and a Canister Safe and Enable Switch. The Canisters also contain a telemetry antenna and monitoring connection.

The canisters are not simple boxes. They contain precious equipment, and the missile cannot do without its canister. 

Open MK41 cell hatches, showing the empty shafts. Without canisters, the MK41 is little more than a metallic frame.

An overview of the MK14 canister, employed by Tomahawk

The Tactical Lenght MK15 canister, containing the ASROC missile, and showing the MK18 canister adapter that allows the use of shorter canisters in the Strike Lenght cells

Inserting a canister down a MK41 cell

MK41 comes in different lengths, which determine the size of the canisters that can be installed and, consequently, decide which weapons can be integrated.

The canisters have a square base, with a total diameter of 25 inches. Inner diameter of the space for the missile is around 22 inches. There are three canister sizes:

-          170 inches; for self-defense weapons only (Sea Sparrow, ESSM)

-          228 inches; add SM-2 and ASROC

-          264 inches; add Tomahawk, SM-3

These canisters fit into into different length MK41 launchers, obviously. This value refers, effectively, to the heights of the modules to be installed in the ships.

-          Self Defense Launcher is 209 inches

-          Tactical launcher is 266 inches

-          Strike launcher is 303 inches

The Tactical Length canisters, however, can be and are fitted into Strike Length cells with the aid of the MK18 Canister Adapter, a steel weldment with appropriate dog-down connections that serves as a conduit for rocket motor exhaust vented to the plenum. Fitted to the bottom of the shorter canister, it allows it to fit easily down like it was a strike-length canister.   

The deck area of a 8 cell module, instead, remains the same. The short side of the launcher is 81.75 inches, while the long side is 124.63 inches. Depending on their height, empty 8-cell launcher modules weight 26.800 lbs or 29.800 lbs or 32.000 lbs for the Strike Length launcher. 

The old 5-cell plus crane MK41 module. This is no longer produced or employed, as the crane never worked as well as hoped. It remains an impressive bit of kit, though.

 

Using the crane at sea for reloading

The fold-down crane for at-sea reloading of missile cells was contained under deck in a space equivalent to just 3 missile cells, and elevated outwards during reload operations. The requirement was for the replenishment of 10 VLS cells per hour, even in Sea State 5, with the missile canisters being transferred via RAS (UNREP for the Americans) rigs.

Reloading of missile canisters at sea, however, proved always difficult at best, and the ingenious crane, albeit fascinating, was never capable to deal with the larger and heavier canisters, such as the MK14 containing the Tomahawk. The failure of the VLS replenishment at sea is summarized as follows:

The original development of the MK 41 Vertical Launch System (VLS) for cruisers and destroyers in the late 1970’s included a requirement to replenish ten VLS canisters per hour, day or night in Sea State 5 conditions. The system actually installed consisted of the STREAM rig to transfer the VLS canister to the missile ship sliding padeye; then deck handling the canister to a position where a crane could tilt up the canister over an empty cell and then strike the canister down. The crane was a commercial Swedish folding crane. Three canister cells were combined to make stowage for the crane. An elevator raised or lowered the crane. The at sea VLS Unrep technical evaluation discussed in Miller (1992) identified that the crane did not have the capacity to lift Tomahawk VLS canisters; SM-2 VLS transfer rate was three per hour and the pendulum action of the crane limited Unrep to Sea State 3 conditions. The cranes are now in layup.

Eventually, the ambitions of at sea reloading of MK41 cells were abandoned, and the DDG51 of the Flight IIA were never fitted with the crane, instead getting 32 and 64 cells silos. The cranes were at times used during Desert Storm, to aid the correct placement of missile canisters. Desert Storm, in 1991, provided the US Navy with the first experience of wartime reloading of warships fitted with MK41: the USS John Paul Jones was the first warship to receive a wartime reload of Tomahawk missiles, but did so while pierside in Mina Jebel Ali, in the United Arab Emirates.

The closest thing to an at sea wartime reloading was the transfer of shipborne missiles from support vessels to warships in the lee of Masirah, Oman. The ships were motionless in the protected waters, but not moored to the bottom, as it was felt tactically advantageous to be able to move quickly in case of enemy attack.  

Interest in at-sea reloading is not dead, and a solution might come in service in the future, since the impossibility to rearm a major warship without pulling it away from the fight and into enclosed, friendly waters is seen as a major limitation. The logistics of VLS reloading are complex, and require extensive material handling mechanical equipment, time and adequate portside or shipborne facilities. The new Upper Harbor rearming facility built by the Royal Navy at Portsmouth is a good example of structure thought specifically for the replenishment of VLS cells. 

The new, specialized rearming facility built for Royal Navy use, with the two cranes for VLS reloading.

 

During war operations abroad, having at hand such a well-equipped facility could be a real problem, as US documents have underlined for decades.

"double-ended" VLS ships such as AEGIS cruisers and destroyers can be rearmed twice as fast if two cranes are available (a frequent bone of contention at stateside weapons stations). With both cranes swinging canisters and enough forklifts and pier-side handlers to keep up with them, a motivated AEGIS crew can completely reload the ship's VLS systems in one (long) day. Note the optimum requirements, though: a pier of sufficient length and with water alongside to accommodate ships up to 563 feet long and 32+ feet in draft; cranes, forklifts, trucks, and/or flatbed rail rolling stock; and contiguous or near-contiguous cargo ports or airfields. Such a facility is precisely the kind of "logistics node" that the JFMCC will be attempting either to defend or seize early in a regional conflict. When in friendly hands, such a facility is a prime TBM target in its own right, as seen at Jubayl, Saudi Arabia, on 16 February 1991, when an Iraqi Scud impacted within yards of an ammunition pier berthing seven ships, a supply barge, and the USS Tarawa.

An at-sea rearming technique and equipment is part of US Navy ambitions to modernize Underway Replenishment (UNREP) technology, effects and methods. The following describes one of the possible approaches:

The concept for replenishing 15 VLS per hour in Sea State 5, shown in Figures 9, 10, 11 and 12 centers around a transportable VLS rearming device that is stowed and maintained on the Combat Logistics Force (CLF) ship. When the combatant ship comes alongside for at-sea rearming or load adjustment, the rearming device is transported from the CLF ship by the new Heavy Unrep rig to the combatant ship sliding padeye along with a team to operate the rearming device. A swing arm at the base of the sliding padeye is used to position the rearming device onto three low profile rails permanently mounted atop the VLS launcher. A hydraulic power unit on the combatant ship powers the swing arm and also the rearming device after it is on the rails. 

The CLF ship will next transfer a loaded VLS canister to the sliding padeye. The canister will be lowered to the swing arm by the sliding padeye and then be released from the transfer rig. The canister will be swung around and be picked off from the swing arm by the rearming device two clamp rings. The canister will be moved by the rearming device to a position over an empty cell. The cell hatch will open and the rearming device will erect the canister to the vertical. The canister will be lowered by a wire rope hoist into the cell. The rig will be disconnected from the end of the canister, the cell hatch will close and the canister will be connected below decks to the VLS circuits. When the VLS rearming or VLS load adjustment is completed, the rearming device and team will be returned to the CLF ship.

 

The above proposal puts the VLS reloading equipment and specialized team not on the warship, as with the early crane, but on the Logistics Ship. The team and the rearming device will move on to the warship to ream at the beginning of each evolution, and will move back to the support vessel at the end.

The threat of Anti-Access and Area Denial strategies and the focus on the Pacific should both work as powerful budget and strategy drivers in the next few years to encourage the US Navy to bring work forwards on UNREP improvement. At sea logistics will be more important than ever, and we can expect to see big increases in capability.

It is worth noticing that the Heavy UNREP equipment envisaged and experimented by the US Navy appears to be very similar to the Heavy RAS equipment being experimented by the Royal Navy at HMS Raleigh in anticipation of adoption on the next generation Solid Support Ships. The wide loads being moved, in terms of bulk, and the weight mentioned (12.000 lbs) are roughly the same values indicated for the Rolls Royce H-RAS. 

 

The US Heavy UNREP equipment

 

The H-RAS facility at HMS Raleigh, in one photo from Dave Sheffield. According to the blog NavalMatters, we can expect an article on the H-RAS activities in november's edition of Navy News. The shuttle resembles that seen in the 12.000 pound mode of the Heavy UNREP kit for the US Navy, but no actual heavy load can be seen. Trials are still at an early stage

A Mk14 Mod 2 Tomahawk canister comes at 6130 pounds. Both the H-RAS and H-UNREP kit would move possibly two canisters per each lift, with a rhythm as high as 25 lifts per hour. While at-sea rearming of Royal Navy VLS ships is not on the cards, the new Solid Support vessels seem set to have the RAS capability to keep the door open for future adoption of adequate kit and methods.

SYLVER   

The European SYLVER vertical launch system follows the same principles of the MK41, but has been developed more recently, has never had any built-in at-sea reloading kit, and has made some different choices. Getting details on SYLVER is much more complex than getting adequate information on MK41, and it has taken me quite a while to collect information which is not yet as complete as I’d like.

SYLVER comes in three main sizes, in addition to the very small, self-defense for small ships A35 launcher. The main modules are the A43, A50 and A70. The number refers to the approximate length of the cells, which vary from 4.3 meters to 7 meters, roughly matching the MK41 Self Defense, Tactical and Strike lengths. The A43 launcher has a total height of 5.3 meters; the A70 is 7.6 meters tall.

DCNS, the maker of SYLVER, proudly notes that SYLVER is significantly lighter than MK41. Early claims were of 30 to 40% weight savings thanks to the use of more modern materials and composite, but this seems over-optimistic, as the declared weight of the 8-cell standard modules goes from 8 tons (A43) to 12 tons (A70).

SYLVER has a smaller deck area footprint, of 2.6 meters x 2.3 meters, while vaunting an exhaust duct which, according to DCNS, is 1.5 times larger than that of the MK41. The larger duct is meant to make the system even safer by expelling gas at lower pressure, allowing simultaneous salvo firing even while one missile has an inadverted restrained launch.

The significant difference in width of a 8-cell module (2.6 meters for SYLVER, against 3,17 meters for MK41) explains why the Euronaval 2012 model of the Type 26 had three 8-cell modules fitted abreast, while the DSEI model only had two MK41 modules sitting abreast. The first combination fits in some 7.8 meters, while the same number of MK41 modules arranged in the same way would require 9.51 meters.

The difference, however, comes at a price: the SYLVER’s cells are only 22 inches wide, 3 inches less than the MK41’s. The difference is very significant, as SYLVER of course needs its own canister, and even assuming that these are thinner, the internal diameter available for the actual missile will inexorably be less than 22 inches offered by the MK41 canisters. 

 

The current DCNS brochure says nothing of the detailed sizes of Sylver, but in older documents emerges that the SYLVER cells are 22 inches wide. Early proposals (i don't know if they went ahead or not) included developing the A35 variant using 25 inches cells, to take ESSM quad-packs and compete with MK41 on the export market. Sounds to me already like a bit of an admission that going for a smaller cell wasn't a winner.  An intermediate lenght A6X was also proposed, but never went ahead.

Although DCNS shows Tomahawk as a possible payload for the A70 launcher in its brochure, it is entirely right to question whether it would be actually possible to integrate it in the European cells. The Tomahawk missile is around 20.5 to 21 inches in diameter, so the space available to fit it, complete with a proper canister, into a 22 inches cell is truly minimal.

Integration would be a challenging affair for physical reasons, as well as for politic, economic and combat system reasons. A wholly new canister would have to be designed, and the space available to do everything that needs to be done would be minimal.

Apparently, besides, A70 canisters are circular, not square like MK41’s. 

Loading a SYLVER A70 canister on a FREMM frigate of the french navy, in an image by DCNS. The canister is circular, not square, so more similar to Russian and Chinese systems than to the MK41! 

 

There is also an unanswered question coming to mind when observing the disposition of SYLVER launchers on warships. On each vessel, the 8-cells SYLVER launchers are always in contact at most only by the short side. This can be observed on Type 45, on the Horizon destroyers of Italy and France, on the FREMM frigates and on the Formidable-class frigates of Singapore. The long side of the launcher modules is never in contact: there is always an important space of deck between one launcher and another. 

 

SYLVER A50 modules on the Type 45: two rows of three modules each, touching by the short side, but well distanced when it comes to the long side. 

 

The silo on Horizon-class destroyers. This, specifically, is Italy's Caio Duilio. The 48 launchers are arranged in three rows of 2 modules each. Very different arrangement than Type 45's one, but still there is significant space left between the rows on the long side. Compare all this space to a 4 or 8 module MK41 silo: why all this space wasted?

 

On the italian aircraft carrier, Cavour, in a photo by Chinomar, from the website Mezzi Militari Italiani

On Singapore's FORMIDABLE frigates

On Charles De Gaulle

This is not observed in MK41 silos, which show a very high density, with the separate modules in direct contact. One is left to wonder if the separation between modules is a choice made by all customers so far, or an unavoidable necessity.

Perhaps coming from the fact that the canisters themselves are thinner...? 

If this is the case, the lower deck-area of SYLVER becomes much less of a truth: basically, fitting more SYLVER modules than MK41 ones, in the same deck area, is only possible so long as the modules are installed abreast, like on Type 26. In a large multi-module silo, or in any case when the long sides should touch, a lot of space ends up wasted, for some reason.

The right choice?

It is not easy to judge which system represents the right choice for the Royal Navy. I’ve already discussed in an earlier article about this complex topic, and much of the uncertainty is due to the fact that it is not clear yet what weaponry the RN hopes to fit into the VLS cells. Of course we can assume the Tomahawk in the short to medium term and the SPEAR Capability 5 (also known as UK-FR Future Cruise and Anti-Ship missile) in the longer term (not before 2030).

For the Tomahawk, its eventual successor (American design) and for other possible weapons (LRASM?), the MK41 would be the most appropriate, if not the only choice.

Going for commonality with the US Navy would be, in my opinion, more advantageous and more wise in a long-term analysis, despite the SPEAR 5 work with France. It is very hard to see how investment in SYLVER and in its weapons by UK and France (and eventually Italy) could ever match the level of support and attention that MK41 will receive from the US, Japan and other export customers. In terms of logistics and future-proofing, MK41 would make greater sense.

It is true that it is hard to see at the moment which American weapons, beyond Tomahawk, could ever be selected for the (british) Type 26. With CAMM covering the air defence role, with Sea Viper on Type 45 in the higher tier, it is hard to see british interest for any of the American SAMs for at least a few decades.

When the UK will eventually acquire an anti-ballistic missile capability (because I believe it is a matter of “when it becomes necessary”, more than a question of “if”), we can expect that the Type 45 will be the platform of choice, so being able to embark SM-3 is also not immediately relevant.

As for LRASM, the missile’s future isn’t even certain yet, and the UK will likely not procure it, unless the SPEAR 5 ambitions collapse.

However, there are logistic, support and future-proofing reasons to go MK41. Being tied to the US Navy is the most promising way to ensure that the weapon system is not without support, evolution paths, and new weapons.

I don’t see many reasons to go with the SYLVER. Certainly not Scalp Navale, which is a less performing, more expensive alternative to Tomahawk that the RN frankly does not need at all.

The main cause of interest is the SPEAR Capability 5 missile, but this is little more than a concept, and the few studies started so far are all aimed at a 2030 entry in service, which might easily slip further to the right. If the currently envisaged timelines are respected, the first Type 26 by then will be approaching the first 10 years of service life. Betting it all on a missile that might or might not come by then, does not seem the right way to go.

The main factor, at this point, is the number of VLS cells. Having 24 instead of 16 is obviously much better and preferable under many points of view. The smaller diameter of the cells, however, which already feels tight today, is a concern for the future.

It would be important to know if the Type 26 design can spare the additional under-deck space which would be needed to replace the banks of CAMM-only cells in the bow silo with an additional MK41 module or two. If these is the possibility to do so, as has been suggested to me (but not confirmed by sufficiently authoritative sources), then my suggestion is to go MK41. CAMM could just be quad-packed into some of the MK41 cells, instead of having its own single-purpose spaces.

Even if such space does not exist, I think adopting MK41 could be, in the end, the best choice, although less evidently so. MK41 promises greater certainties for the future: there’s a much larger and richer customer base investing on it, and it has the physical size advantage. You can be reasonably certain than any missile developed for the 22-inches wide SYLVER cell will fit into the 25-inches MK41, while the opposite simply is not true.    

I suspect this is a reason behind MBDA’s decision to offer European missiles for the MK41. Of course, the main reason is the global diffusion of MK41, but I believe it is nonetheless indicative that MBDA has signed an agreement with Lockheed Martin to integrate European missiles in the MK41 cells, starting with the easier system to transfer, the very interesting Sea Ceptor / CAMM. The greater width of the MK41 cell has allowed Lockheed to develop the Extensible Launching System ExLS: a simple, yet ingenious “launcher within the launcher” which can be slid into MK41 cells (or used as a stand-alone system) to accommodate foreign missile systems, with their canisters and launch electronics. When it first appeared, it was associated with plans for quick MK41 integration of smaller weapons and even countermeasures: the NULKA active radar decoy, a quadpack of RAM Block 2 missiles or a pallet of NLOS surface-strike weapons were all shown as possible payloads.

After being demonstrated with NULKA, the ExLS has now come very much back in the spotlight for its instrumental part in allowing MBDA and Lockheed Martin to get to push-through tests with the CAMM missile in a MK41 cell in very short time. After agreeing to collaborate, in May 2013, the two companies have successfully cleared the first launch trials in September: a record for the slow world of defence technology. This success has been just as quickly rewarded by the selection of CAMM in MK41 cells for the upgrade of the ANZAC class frigates of New Zealand.  

 

CAMM test fired out of an ExLS module clipped into a MK41 standard launcher

It is also worth remembering that the US Navy has already invested in a new generation of Vertical Launch System which share the same base principles but comes with longer, wider cells. The MK57 launcher comes in four-cell modules, and is so far only known for being employed by the sole DDG-1000 Zumwalth-class. These three unique ships will have 20 MK57 modules installed, not in dense silos like on Ticonderoga and Burkes, but in peripheral position along the sides of the hull. 

The new launcher is fully compatible with existing MK41 weaponry and canisters, but offers cells which are 283 inches long and 28 inches wide, with a maximum mass of 9020 lbs. It is a very noticeable increase in all parameters from the MK41 Strike Length.

It is not yet evident which new weapons will require this big space, nor is it likely that the MK57 will replace the MK41 anytime soon. For now, it is tied to a new class of warships which has been cut down to just three hulls. It will be interesting to see if the MK57 becomes part of the requirement for the proposed Arleigh Burke Flight III, or for whatever ship comes next.

The US Navy’s belief, however, seem to be that larger missiles are likely, and while the MK57 is possibly too far ahead of the current requirements, the SYLVER might soon enough fall behind requirements.