HMS Queen Elizabeth will be officially named in a ceremony planned for July 4, and the ship will be pulled out of dry dock soon afterwards, so that a major, historic milestone is quickly approaching. The importance of these new carriers for the Royal Navy goes beyond the "simple" regeneration of naval fixed wing aircraft capability, expanding well into the amphibious domain. This truth has not yet been fully understood by many external observers, which continue to focus on impressive, but far less relevant aspects of the program. In this article i want to take a look at the current situation and explain how the carrier's air group is taking shape.
There
is still confusion about what role the new aircraft carrier(s?) will have in
the Royal Navy once they enter in service. Of course there’s realistic worrying
about having enough aircraft embarked, both because doubts reasonably remain on
how the RAF will utilize the aircraft (which it owns) and because the UK’s
order for the F-35B is currently standing at 48, down from what once was an
ambition for 150, then 138 from roughly 2006 onwards. More orders might be made
in the 2020s, but no one is willing to bet on those as of now, and actually
even the planned buy of 48 has to pass through the SDSR 2015 and multiple
successive Gate points, which might actually reduce the number even further. I will try and provide a more in depth explanation of what is happening.
More than anything else, however, in this article i want to explain just how important the new carriers are for the future of the british amphibious capability as well. This is a key aspect, which needs to be cleared, because getting the carriers wrong would not only end the Fleet Air Arm's fixed wing branch once and for all, but also deal a very heavy blow to the Royal Marines.
The aircraft to be carried
The
Joint Combat Aircraft program, which is the purchase of the F-35B, is currently sitting at its Main Gate 4 decision point. This major development was announced a few weeks ago, with Philip Hammond releasing an
interview to the BBC and with several reports appearing on the press. This main
gate reportedly covers the purchase of 14 F-35B plus spares and infrastructure investment, not
better specified yet, to support the whole planned fleet. It was understood
that a formal announcement in Parliament would follow, but so far this has not
happened.
Of course, this silence has been interpreted by some as a way of the
british government to distance itself from the F-35B, but this is absolutely
false. There was never going to be a big contract signed at once for the 14
jets, but only an internal budget-setting exercise to cover purchases that will
happen over several years, in different production lots, over multiple contracts signed through the F-35 Joint Project Office and the Pentagon.
The
idea seems to entail receiving 14 F-35B by 2018, in order to form the training fleet in
Beaufort and stand up the core of the first operational squadron (617 Sqn RAF).
The UK has already ordered four jets, three of which are instrumented test
aircraft destined to the soon-to-stand-up OEU Sqn (XVII Sqn RAF) on Edwards AFB,
in the United States. BK-1, BK-2 and BK-4 are the instrumented aircraft, while
BK-3 is not instrumented and will join the operational or training fleet.
The
training fleet (expected to eventually number some 6 aircraft, judging from
earlier plans) will be based on the US Marines air base Beaufort, where, in
2016, 617 Sqn will officially stand up again (the squadron disbanded on 1st April this year, with the Tornado GR4). The core of the squadron
will be trained in America, before transferring in the UK, in Marham, by 2018.
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| Aircraft Carrier Alliance image |
If this plan is respected,
the 14 aircraft the UK will soon be ordering will have to be spread at most on
LRIP 8, LRIP 9 and possibly LRIP 10. This is based on the roughly 2 years it
takes from contract finalization to delivery. The UK has long been expected to
order 4 F-35B in LRIP 8, and on March 25, 2014, the Long Lead contract for the LRIP 9 has been signed, including materials for 6 F-35Bs for the UK. That leaves 4 more
to be ordered later in LRIP 10 to make up the total of 14. The aircrafts in
production lots beyond the 10th would only be delivered in 2019 and
in the following years, as roughly two years separate the signing of the final
production contract and the delivery of the airplane.
In
early march there was also the news of a 7 million dollar contract
signed for site-activation activities for starting to make RAF Marham the
main operating base for the british F-35Bs. So, even if without a formal announcement in Parliament, the acquisition programme is indeed going on.
RAF
Marham is expected to be built up to include a full Integrated Training Centre,
which means the UK plans to step away from training in the US to do things
domestically. The ITC won’t begin operations before 2019, but we can expect
investment for it to begin soon enough, if the plan does not change. The UK
appears interested to gain money by selling training services in its ITC to
other European customers of the F-35. Mainly, talks are ongoing with Norway. A
recent agreement
is pretty clear in foreshadowing the idea at the base of the collaboration:
Norway’s state-owned AIM hopes to do depot maintenance for the engines of the
british F-35 fleet. AIM signed
an agreement with Lochkeed Martin and Pratt & Whitney in april 2012 to
secure its role as a depot maintenance hub for the F-135 engine, and now wants
to secure a long term gain, exploiting such role.
Norway,
in exchange, would send its pilots training in the british ITC, instead of
sending them all the way to Luke, in the US.
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| It has been announced in Parliament that the F-35s will not wear squadron specific colors, but only the low-visibility grey national markings. Hope there will be a rethink... |
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| ... so we can see something like this. Image by savetheroyalnavy.org |
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| Or at least, something like this, in grey. Image @ Al Clark, janetairlines.com |
Depending
on how things go with the announced new Defence White Paper in Italy, UK and
Norway will probably have new talks with Rome about expanded cooperation. The Italian
FACO in Cameri is expected to become the regional MRO facility for the F-35,
which means doing depot maintenance and upgrades installation for the aircraft
of the USAF-Europe as well as those of all other countries that will buy in.
As
of today, a single MRO centre is expected in Europe and in the Mediterranean
area, so that the options will be restricted: UK and Norway will have to choose
between Cameri and the MRO facilities in the US.
Italy
could collaborate with the UK by co-financing Meteor missile integration
(discussions ongoing) and by sending its personnel to the UK for training in
the british ITC, instead of sending people all the way to Luke and Beaufort in
the USA. In exchange, the british F-35Bs could have their depot maintenance
done in Cameri. Finding a fair agreement with Norway will be tougher, as Italy
has already agreed to have its F-135 engines serviced by the Dutch, which are
getting their F-35s assembled (and in future maintained) in Cameri in exchange.
As
of October 2013, Lockheed Martin expects that the UK, in 2018, will have taken
delivery of some 17 aircraft, with 9 based in Marham with 617 Sqn, 3 in Edwards with
XVII Sqn, and 5 more as training fleet in Beaufort.
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| The expected 2018 situation for the F-35, as of October 2013 |
In terms of UK-specific trials, work to develop and validate the Shipborne Rolling Vertical Landing tecnique has resumed after being stopped over 2010 and 2011 when the plan was temporarily changed in favor of acquiring the C variant of the F-35. Work is now ongoing with computer simulations in Warton. SRVL will improve performance in hot climates, produce less stress on the vertical lift system and add thousands of pounds of useful payload at recovery. The F-35B is to be capable to land vertically with some 5000 pounds of unused fuel and ordnance, which is a value far higher than the Harrier's and close to the 6000 pounds carrier bring back of the old F-18 Hornet, but it could prove insufficient were the aircraft to be heavily loaded with, for example, Storm Shadow cruise missiles that the UK hopes to integrate in the future.
SRVL could add some 2000 lbs of additional payload margin, which would do wonders to enable safe operations with heavy configurations.
It has also been reported that it is likely that up to three F-35Bs, including one of the british ones, will do their first flight across the Atlantic in the Summer, to participate at the RIAT and Farnborough airshow.
Beyond the F-35B
The
CROWSNEST program for the replacement of the Sea King MK7 ASaC has finally
started to roll, and the In Service Date has been moved closer in time, to
reduce the gap that will be formed when the Sea King goes out of service.
The
Merlin HM2 fleet will be fitted with a palletized radar suite enabling the
helicopters to take up the role of Airborne
Surveillance and Control platforms.
The Merlin HC3 and HC3A of the Royal Air Force are going to be
navalized and transformed into amphibious support helicopters, under a contract
which has finally been signed. It will however take time to have the whole
fleet of 25 machines fully ready.
Last, but not least, the Apache attack helicopters of the British Army are
now being all fitted with additional naval features, including an emergency flotation device, to
enable them to serve on board of warships in a safer and more effective way.
Details of these and other helicopter programs can be found in this detailed article.
A key role in amphibious operations
A
factor that not always is kept in mind when talking of the new carriers,
however, is that they will not just be fundamental to restore the british
capability to deploy airpower at sea and from the sea, but they will also be
absolutely vital for ensuring that the amphibious capability of the UK
continues to exist and to respect the levels set by the SDSR 2010.
The
defence planning assumption is that the Royal Navy has to be able to land a
Royal Marines commando group with related vehicles, helicopters and supports,
sealifting and then landing a total of roughly 1800 men.
This
is only possible using one LPD of the Albion class, one LPH and the three
remaining Bay class LSDs. The LPD is fundamental because it brings to the party
the command and control facilities and the most part of the landing crafts
available to the group, as well as vehicles and substantial amounts of stores.
The LPH is fundamental as it carries the most men and almost the totality of
the helicopters. The LPD and the LSDs have very limited aviation facilities,
and no hangar, so the LPH is absolutely vital in order to ensure that the
battlegroup can be supported from the air and moved by air.
The
LSDs transport men, boats and landing crafts, bulky materials, normally at
least one army workboat, mexeflotes and a lot of the vehicles and stores of the
group.
None
of these components can go missing, otherwise the whole force is in serious
trouble. The 1800 men figure is not casual: it is quite clearly calculated on
summing the capacity of the vessels remaining in force.
LPD:
305 men
LSDs:
356 men (x 3)
LPH:
around 600
The
Royal Navy has two LPDs, but only one is in service at any one time, following
the SDSR 2010. Currently, HMS Bulwark is in service and acting as the flagship
of the fleet, while HMS Albion has been de-stored, disarmed and tied up in
Devonport, in the amphibious center now known as HMS Tamar, where it is
languishing, sealed up and fitted with controlled humidity devices to preserve
her. The plan as of now is that in 2016, when HMS Bulwark hits refit time, HMS
Albion will be re-activated, and the two ships will swap places.
The
LPHs are also two, as of now, but again this is virtual only: HMS Ocean is
about to come out of major refit, while HMS Illustrious has been working as LPH
/ Commando Carrier in the meanwhile.
HMS
Ocean will be back into action soon enough, but that will be the end of HMS
Illustrious, as she will be decommissioned.
HMS
Ocean is more or less just air assault. It can lower a pontoon in the water at
the back that serves as a steel beach. Light vehicles can drive down a ramp and
use the floating pontoon to board landing crafts, but the LPH carries just a
relatively tiny number of small vehicles and trailers (tipically Land Rovers).
Other than that, she is pure air assault.
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| HMS Ocean with the floating steel beach deployed |
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| An LCU MK10 carrying BV206 vehicles comes to the steel beach during exercises in Norway |
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| HMS Ocean normally carries just L118 Light Guns, land rovers with trailers and some BV206s |
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| This photo of HMS Ocean during operation Ellamy shows the steel beach pontoon folded up and stored on top of the structure protecting the vehicle ramp going down from flight deck to vehicle deck |
HMS Albion and HMS Bulwark are LPDs with an alarmingly low capacity for
soldiers (only about 300 unless you start being less permissive with the space
each man has, but that is not good for months-long deployments abroad which are
now the norm for amphibious task groups including the RN's RFTG), and
the LPDs offer limited air facilities, with no hangar.
The Point-class RoRo strategic sealift vessels
are fundamental to carry stores and lots of vehicles for the support of the
landing force, but they have no accommodation for troops, and can only carry
vehicles and stores meant to be loaded ashore later, when the beach head is
secure.
Besides, the Points are down to 4, from the 6 they used to be, as two were
released from MOD service, despite the SDSR 2010 document promising
specifically that all six would stay.
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| The Point class Ro-Ro ships carry huge amounts of vehicles and stores |
The
LSDs used to be four, but the SDSR 2010 saw Largs Bay withdrawn from service
and sold to Australia. Of the three that remain, one is permanently deployed in
the Persian gulf (right now it is Cardigan Bay) to act as mothership for the
MCM force based in Bahrain. Cardigan Bay has been fitted with a prefabricated
shelter on deck, as a hangar of sorts, and has been recently assigned a
permanent Lynx helicopter flight. It has also now been equipped with a Sea
Eagle UAV system, which is entering in service in this week.
The
end result is that the daily reality of the amphibious force is the ability to
sealift and land a smaller force than the 1800 promised in the SDSR. The
vessels can of course be crammed with more men for short periods of time (up to
700 on the LPD and LSDs, and over 800 on HMS Ocean) but this is not a very
realistic capability, because it is not accompanied by an increase in stores
and vehicles carried. And anyway, the men will start finding the crowded
vessels unbearable very quickly, in a matter of days.
For
a normal, yearly deployment such as Cougar 13 this year, the Response Force
Task Group spends months at sea, so the ships are preferably lightly loaded in
terms of men. The already mentioned Cougar 13 is a good example: 42 Commando,
the formation currently at high readiness, did not embark whole on the ships.
For example, Lima company was flown out to Albania ahead of the rest of the
formation moving on the ships. The occasion was exploited to conduct mountain
training.
The
company then traded place with Kilo company. The end result is that the
amphibious battlegroup pretty much never was fully present at once on the ships. Aside
from the training requirements dictating the independent movements of
companies, the availability of only 2 Bay-class LSDs has obviously part of the
responsibility.
The
big problem on the horizon, however, is the planned decommissioning of HMS
Ocean, without replacement, in 2019. The task force however obviously continues
to require a big platform for the amphibious assault helicopters and for the
transport of hundreds of men, and this is where the carriers step in.
Since
the platform for helicopters is going without a direct replacement, the Queen
Elizabeth-class carriers will have to be hybrids. It is not a choice, it is an unavoidable
necessity. And hopefully the new ships can pull such a mixed role off. They
will be, in fact, closer to America than to a supercarrier. The
Royal Navy and Royal Marines will need to be able to cram hundreds of marines
into Queen Elizabeth, along with some stores and perhaps some air-liftable vehicles and L118 Light Guns too.
Helicopters, including Chinook and Apache, will have to be carried. And in
addition to that, at least a squadron of F-35B, if airpower is to be finally
brought back to the fleet.
The
fact that the new vessels are so large gives hope that the hybrid role can be
covered well, despite the design of the ship being clearly centered on delivering
fast jet sorties, not to land and support troops ashore.
The
Royal Navy has finally formally recognized the need to operate the new carrier
as a hybrid in the SDSR 2010, with the public description of the Carrier
Enabled Power Projection concept. A surprisingly detailed note was shown in the
SDSR fact sheets, when it was described that:
We
will plan concurrently to operate a mix of helicopters as well as Joint Strike
Fighters from the carrier. This will include up to 12 Chinook or Merlin
transport helicopters and eight Apache attack helicopters. The precise mix will
depend on the mission.
There
are obvious challenges to be faced and won, if this has to work. Embarking and
employing simultaneously jets and helicopters for amphibious assaults is not at
all easy. The US Marines do it routinely on ships smaller than the QE-class
carriers, but specifically thought all along for such use. And anyway, the
fixed wing component they use in such cases is normally made up by just 6 Harriers (possibly growing up to 10 F-35B on the new America LHAs). Obviously, they
enjoy the formidable cover offered by the US Navy supercarriers: the UK
doesn’t, so it will have to embark more jets to give the task force proper cover.
A
key difficulty is finding suitable space for the many hundred men needed. Fast
jets and helicopters require a large number of maintenance and deck personnel,
and having to add hundreds of Royal Marines means needing lots of
accommodations.
The
needs of the Royal Marines are different from those of an aircraft ground
engineer, besides: the Marines need space for their weapons and kit, and also
need to be accommodated in spaces properly dimensioned and located around the
vessel: they need to be able, once kitted up and ready to go, to walk easily up
to the flight deck or to the ship’s boats, to board landing crafts and
helicopters.
Fortunately,
a secondary role as Commando Carrier was always part of the aircraft carriers
design, so that there are wide corridors and spaces for the embarkation of
troops. The December
2013 issue of Navy News includes one of the very first, rare
mentions of these arrangements. There are accommodation quarters for “easily”
250 men, with wide assault routes. 250 men, however, will not be enough, and it
will always be a struggle to balance embarked forces and air wing personnel
numbers and accommodations.
The Marines will probably be able to board boats and landing crafts from the boat boarding area in the stern of the carriers, which can be accessed via stairs going down from the hangar deck. It has not yet been cleared whether the boat areas of the carriers feature spaces and cranes sufficient for the embarkation of LCVP MK5 landing crafts.
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| This photo, courtesy of navyrecognition.com, shows well the stairs leading down to the boat boarding area. A crane is fitted to a sponson just beneath the flight deck level, and it could be useful to move stores to and from boats coming up behind the carrier. |
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| It is not yet clear if the larger boat areas are LCVP MK5 capable. Image from navy-matters.beedall.com | | |
|
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| This image from earlier phases of the building process shows (evidenced in blue by me) one of the large openings in the sponsons for the launch and recovery of ship's boats. |
Other
problems come from trying to operate large number of helicopters as well as
fixed wing jets. The design of the deck of the carrier is being developed and
refined with these conflicting needs in mind. As of September 2013, the Royal
Navy was reportedly trying to carefully design the deck to achieve 10
helicopter ops spots.
If
the “hybrid carrier” works, we will have a high value vessel which will be
forced to sail far closer to the shore than we'd like it to. It is true that
the Royal Navy is planning for escort ships sporting flight decks big enough to
easily accommodate even the Chinook (Type 45 already in service, and even the
new Type 26 frigate is planned to have such capability), which could be used as
forward refueling sites to allow the carrier to stay further back and still fly
troops ashore by helicopter, but the feasibility of such concept is
questionable.
At
least, even with all the conflicting requirements crammed together, all the
three key capabilities of any naval / amphibious task force will be present:
fast jets for air cover and support, helicopters, troops.
But if it does not work, we will have a disaster, with amphibious capabilities
badly maimed and with air strike capabilities set to remain dramatically
limited by the very small number of F-35B that are going to be purchased. In
practice, the gap in embarked fixed wing aviation would be closed (at least in
part), but a gap in amphibious rotorcraft capability and simply in amphibious
troops lift will open, making the whole task force just as crippled. It would
be a case of swapping a problem for
another.
The
next time someone asks what the carriers are for, or wonders why they are so
big, remind them that they are very much needed, and that their huge sizes are
to be blessed, as smaller vessels would never be able to approach the kind of
mixed role that lays ahead. And no, there is no guarrantee at all that building smaller carriers would have been made it possible to also build dedicate LHDs. It is pretty likely that the cost of more numerous, relatively smaller ships would have been equal, if not higher, especially considering that the CVF vessels have very small crews. More, smaller ships would have almost certainly required more personnel to crew and support them, and personnel is exactly what the Royal Navy post SDSR does not have.
It
is painful to watch two fine LHDs of the Mistral class being built for Russia,
knowing that having at least one such vessel in Royal Navy service would solve
much of the problem, and represent an excellent boost in capability. But I’m
not going to spend much time daydreaming: the deal will go ahead, as the money
is too much and too good to pass up. Paris is highly unlikely to truncate the
deal, and even if it did, the MOD has no budget to procure the vessels. Not
one, and certainly not both. Besides, the ships would need some serious work
done to remove the Russian kit and have Royal Navy equipment fitted in its
place, which would make the purchase even more financially challenging.
Even
in the best case scenario, the problem won’t be solved until HMS Albion and HMS
Bulwark are replaced, most likely by large LHDs. Until then, the Royal Navy
will have to make do.
This
leaves the big question: will both carriers enter in service, or will the Royal
Navy get only one?
If both carriers are kept, but one is held in reserve, mothballed like Albion,
only coming out of its "coma" every six years to replace the sister
as she goes into refit, the problem remains: perhaps a major operation (but it
has to be really big) would see the second hull hastily reactivated (ala HMS
Intrepid back in 1982) with the fleet then faced by the decision of perhaps
using one as carrier and one as LPH, so only one of the two has to sail close
to the shore.
However, this neat separation would probably be judged unworkable because if
either of the two ships was damaged the task force would lose most or all of
either air power or amphibious helilift. Probably, even with both ships in the
task force, fast jets, Marines, helicopters and stores would still be split
among the two in roughly equal terms for prudence.
In normal years and normal operations, the RFTG would still be faced with the
problems coming from having a single flat top for two roles.
The above situation (with one carrier active, one tied up in port with sealed
doors and Controlled Humidity kit installed to try and keep it together while
it languishes in port for years on end) is probably the best outcome we
can realistically hope for in 2015. Which is a bad scenario, but... not the worst of
possibilities, at least.
If both ships are regularly operated, side by side, the RFTG could sail (most
of the time) with both carriers in the group, one working as LPH, one as
carrier (in "peacetime". In war, the split described before would
probably still be preferred). This would cost more in terms of money and
manpower, and i'm not optimistic. I don't think we are going to see it
happening, sadly.
Even if we do see it happening, there will still be periods in which only one of
the two hulls is available, with the other in refit. So the problem still pops
up, but at intervals.
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| Chinook night operations on HMS Illustrious during exercise Joint Warrior 14-1, in april 2014 |
So, the Perfect Solution is already out of the window, and it has crashed to
the ground already years ago: the problem won't be eased until Albion and
Bulwark are (hopefully) replaced with (hopefully) two LHDs, allowing the
carrier to act as a carrier, while the large LHD carries both the large landing
crafts and the helicopters, and more men.
The question is whether or not the Good Enough Solution (hybrid carrier /
assault ship ala America but with greater number of fixed wing aircraft
embarked, operated and supported) is achievable and workable. Considering that
QEC is considerably larger than America, i think it should be
achievable. But it is far from sure. It depends on how the spaces inside the
carrier have been configured, on accommodations, on lots of other factors.
The worry here is that this reality has apparently been fully grasped only in 2010,
with the emerging of the famous Carrier Enabled Power Projection acronym, which
includes this double role problem (along with other things less directly
connected to the carrier, such as MARS and CROWSNEST). My hope is that proper
thinking about this problem was actually going on from many years earlier inside
the RN and the design team which worked on the carriers. I hope they actually
worked on the "Commando Aircraft Carrier" (which is something
different from both the Commando Carrier and from the Aircraft Carrier) from
much earlier, and that 2010 only marked the date in which the Royal Navy
publicly admitted that, with no replacement for Ocean on the way, QEC would
have, in a way or another, to do it all. Some provisions for a secondary LPH role are understood to have been into the requirements all along, and i hope they have provided a good base to build upon.
If it wasn't so, and planning for it only began in haste in 2010, the carrier
design is probably going to struggle in taking the full burden of the
requirements on the horizon because the time for making adequate adjustments
was allowed to pass and go.
In
a way or another, the concept must be made to work, because there is no real
alternative in hand’s reach. What is clear is that the carriers are definitely
needed. Next time someone asks, you’ll know how to reply.
