The Equipment Plan and major projects report 2014

The new report by the NAO has been published, and reports about the shifting of some large sums of money within the 10 year plan. The spending profile 2014 - 2024 has shrunk by 1.4 billion compared to the 2013 - 2023 variant, but it is hard to estimate the actual impact of this change, especially since the Equipment Plan does not actually details projected acquisitions, but provides merely an indication of how much money will go towards the main spending areas.
Internal adjustements have been made, shifting several billions from the Equipment Support to the Equipment Procurement voice, betting on efficiencies and savings in support costs which have for now been achieved only in small part. The MOD will need to achieve savings of 6 billion pounds in equipment support budget in order to deliver the reworked acquisition spending profile without having to bite into the Contingency fund and to protect the Headroom money which is needed in the next strategic defence review to launch new programmes.

The NAO correctly cautions that there is still a lot of uncertainty about the future. We do not know if all the savings can be achieved and we have no certainty that cost in ongoing programmes won't grow above the forecasts. However, there is room for some optimism on this front, since the more prudent approach of the last few years has largely limited shocks and kept cost figures largely stable. This year's report, uniquely, actually documents a decrease of over 300 millions in costs, although this is not considering the cost growth reported in the past report stemming from the renegotiation of the Queen Elizabeth class contract.

The main danger to the equipment programme, and to defence in general, is anyway the new spending review and the new SDSR. The equipment plan, like all other manpower, capability and infrastructure targets of Future Force 2020, is completely dependent on the funding profile the MOD will be granted in the new parliament beginning May 2015.
The promised, but not confirmed budget flat in real terms with 1% boost to the sole equipment spending is absolutely crucial to enable a "steady as she goes" future for defence. And even if such an arrangement is granted, depending on the base budget figure over which the Flat line is calculated, negative differences of up to 15 billions are possible.
Any other cut would rapidly make the situation dramatic, and throw once more into disarray force structures, plans and equipment procurement, very possibly causing further damage by introducing cost growth in programmes affected by delays, reductions and descoping of various kind.

So, while the 2014 documents are all in all positive under many points of view, the future is at huge risk. I cannot stress enough the fact that for defence, in this year, the biggest and most important battles of all will be to obtain a budget as close to the assumption of Flat in Real Terms + 1% for equipment as possible. Whatever politicians will say in the coming months about defence will have absolutely no relevance at all until we don't get an indication of wheter they are committed to sticking to this indication they gave the MOD to plan upon or not.

There has been some media reporting about the 2% of GDP target for defence spending, and on the fact that it "might" be missed. Let me make it absolutely clear: as of now, there is no "might". The UK will soon fall well below the 2% point if the current budget trend stands. For how things are looking right now, a Flat budget is the best possible outcome in reach (and sadly it is actually widely expected that the MOD will not be given even just this minimum comfort), and it would still bring down the UK's defence spending to around 1.8% of GDP. It could fall down even further, and RUSI has already indicated that a landslide down to 1.5% is more than possible.
This is despite the UK being among the most vocal advocates for the agreement reached at the Cardiff NATO summit next year to pursue the 2% spending target across all european NATO countries in the next decade. Tell me what kind of ridicule it will be, in a few months time, to do exactly the opposite. Yet, it is what is bound to happen, especially since UK's GDP has been growing, and to maintain 2% spending it would actually take an increase to the budget.
Don't you worry though, the International Aid spending target of 0.7% of GDP, enshrined in law for some demented reason, is due to be met, by pouring yet more money into it. Doesn't that make you feel better...?

Defence spending has to stay at least stable, so that FF2020 can at least be pursued. Any reduction will bring yet more crippling damage into forces which have already been badly wrecked in several areas, causing a definitive loss of strategic weight and throwing everything into disarray again, before the 2010 cuts and reorganizations even have a chance to be completed. It will be another axe blow while the previous blade hasn't yet pulled out entirely from the wound.

"We trained very hard, but it seemed that every time we were beginning to form up in teams, we would be reorganised. I was to learn later in life that we tend to meet any new situation by reorganising, and a wonderful method it can be for creating an illusion of progress, while producing confusion, inefficiency and demoralisation."

This quote, traditionally dated all the way back to the times of Rome, is a perfect resume of what has been going on for too long in the british armed forces, where force structures and programmes have been messed up with again, and again, and again, for years. Every time, the SDR of the day has tried to sell the mess and dress up the cuts as a reorganisation for efficiency. As "doing more with less".
I can only beg whoever will form the next government to stop this state of things, and protect stability.



A look at the programmes

A summary of the most interesting bits about the status of individual programmes. 

Good news for the Astute class SSN, which seems to have finally turned the corner and got on the right course. The last big technical hurdle, the demonstration of the Top Speed requirement, has now been completed with success, the NAO reports. Up to last year's report, it was feared that at least the first 3 boats in the class would not be able to achieve the required Top Speed, although it was said that the trials were ongoing. As of March 2014, according to the NAO report, the requirement has been met.

Funding has been secured for a third "payload bay", which should actually mean a third CHALFONT dry deck shelter is being brought into service for use on the Astute class SSNs.

HMS Astute seen with CHALFONT installed

The purchase of a second Manoeuvring Training Room has been delayed to come in time with the delivery of the 4th boat, but the report assures that this will have no impact on current training requirements.
Important progress has been obtained by securing the Spearfish torpedo upgrade; the Astute Capability Sustainment Programme (not detailed, but presumably will retrofit some capabilities present at build from Boat 4 onto the earlier boats and is also expected to include new anti-torpedo countermeasures and other improvements); the integrated Communications and Radar Electronic Support Measures (CESM and RESM for Boat 4 onwards) and the Naval Extremely / Super High Frequency satcom system.

Excellent news, overall.


Complex Weapons are also treated in the NAO report, but there are no real answers about Fire Shadow, while other info, more up to date, is actually coming from other sources. DefenseNews has reported that the MOD has signed, just before Christmas, a 228 million pounds contract for the procurement of the Land variant of FLAADS, the new local area air defence system based on the CAMM / Sea Ceptor missile.
This early contract signature secures the replacement for Rapier althouth MBDA is still 6 months away from completing the work mandated by the earlier 36 million, 18-months demonstration phase deal.
Signing the contract earlier than planned might result in an earlier entry into service.

This development follows another report by DefenseNews which details how the MOD is seeking bids for the installation of a battle management, command, control, communications, computer and intelligence (BMC4I) system to deploy in defence of the Falklands Islands.
A contract should be signed in summer 2016 and the project is reportedly fully funded. The BMC4I is similar to the LEAPP system which is due to achieve operationally deployable status this year with the British Army. LEAPP is a mobile system operated by 49 independent Battery Royal Artillery as part of Joint Ground Based Air Defence. Under LEAPP, 4 "control nodes" in truck-mounted shelters have been procured, along with 3 "air picture trailers" and a single Link 11 access node, which is a specific requirement of the Royal Marines as it allows LEAPP to receive air picture data from warships via Link 11.
LEAPP provides land forces commanders with a full picture of what is moving in the air. Data is obtained by external sources, including Rapier batteries' search radars and Giraffe ABM radars (5 purchased) procured specifically to support LEAPP. Further information is obtained via air sources such as AWACS, via Data Link 16.

The Falklands system is expected to be very much similar, but the MOD has opened a competition for it, instead of ordering an additional LEAPP set. The Falklands system, though, will, like LEAPP, include a Giraffe ABM radar. The "shooting end" of the system will be a battery of FLAADS(L) missiles replacing the old and by now way too limited Rapier.

Inside a LEAPP node

Brimstone 2 is scheduled for live firing trials from Tornado GR4s at China Lake in the US later this year, ahead of achieving operational capability by November.

The first Type 23 frigate should have been re-armed with Sea Ceptor and should have fired the first missiles in trials by November 2016, which suggests that soon enough this year we will know which ship entering refit will be the first to get the new system.

FASGW is expected to deliver both Sea Venom (Heavy) and Martlet (Light) by October 2020. The Royal Navy looks set to have a gap of at least 2 years in the ability to fire anti-ship missiles from helicopters, as the Lynx HM8 and the Sea Skua missile should both be gone by 2018.

SPEAR 3 development continues, and the weapon should be operable before the the F-35 achieved entry in service. Whether this includes the weapon being integrated on the F-35 or not, it is not clear.

Fire Shadow's status is even more of a mystery. Asked about the matter, MBDA replied on Twitter that they remain engaged with the british army to determine the way forwards for the system.

Earlier news reports suggested that on the SPEAR 1 front, the evolution of Paveway IV, a go ahead for the bunker-buster variant should be officialized soon. As always, details are not provided, but it seems that when this variant becomes available, the RAF will withdraw from service the Paveway II and III series. I'm not entirely comfortable with remaining with only 500 lbs weapons, especially in the bunker buster role (i'm curious to learn if the 500 lbs special warhead of the Paveway IV really matches the performance of the 4 times heavier Paveway III Blu-109), but that seems to be the way things are headed.

A curious piece of news is mentioned in the Queen Elizabeth class part of the report where it is mentioned that the carrier is not fully funded to deliver the helicopter carrying role in support of littoral manoeuvre and currently has design and safety clearances limited in relation to amphibious helicopter support capability.
Sincerely, i have no idea what this is supposed to mean, and what is the current status of play: remember that, although published yesterday, the NAO report is a still image of the situation dating back several months.
Reading the book published in July in occasion of HMS Queen Elizabeth's naming ceremony, though, it becomes possible to make some guesses: the publication quotes rear admiral Fleet Air Arm Russ Harding, who is also Chief Naval Staff (Aviation and Carriers) as he explains what is being added to enable the carriers to undertake their littoral manoeuvre role. He said that a study had just been completed on how to modify the six spot deck arrangement planned for the deck layout to a 10 spot layout to enable enhanced helicopter assault operations. He also noticed that Ship / Helicopter Operating Limits (SHOL) have to be determined and written down, clearances will have to be obtained for Apache and Chinook, clearances will also have to be obtained for the Embarked Forces's and helicopter's ammunition stowage and that increasing accommodations and support spaces for embarked forces is something that is on the cards for the 1st docking period of Queen Elizabeth.
Some of these activities evidently haven't a funding line at the moment, but this will hopefully soon change, if it hasn't already from when the NAO was compiling its report.

Regarding the F-35B, the NAO report says that Main Gate 4 was passed in January. Main Gate 4 is a 2.75 billion programme to procure the aircraft needed for the first squadron (thought to be 14 airplanes, the first 4 of which have been ordered as part of LRIP 8) plus all supporting elements, including "facilities" to enable RAF Marham to stand up as Main Operating Base and initial support out to 2020. 
In absence of details it is difficult to evaluate this price figure and what it means for unitary cost of the aircraft. It really would be necessary to know exactly what "facilities" are included in the order. The UK has in fact opened a laboratory for F-35 software capability evaluation and development; while an Integrated Training Centre is planned to be built in Marham, which will require simulators, training aids and all associated F-35 specific elements. The UK is also planning to stand up a maintenance line inside a hangar in Marham, and a facility for application and maintenance of the stealth coating and its verification in another. The equipment for all these infrastructure elements is going to have a big pricetag.
The building of 3 vertical landing pads has been contracted, and Marham's runway is planned for a resurfacing as well, while existing hardened aircraft shelters will be prepared for the F-35 age. These other items, however, are probably included in infrastructure spending, not in F-35 spending.

Entry in service for the F-35B is planned for end december 2018. The UK has contributed 144 million to the assessment phase (down from a planned 150) and has budgeted a 1874 million contribution to development. In addition, just shy of a billion pounds has been budgeted for the first 4 aircraft and their activities in demonstration.
The 2749 million budget for Main Gate 4 brings the budget for demonstration and manufacture at 5622 million.

Typhoon progress includes ongoing work to integrate Storm Shadow and the capability to change target in flight, prior to launch. Meteor integration work is also progressing, and the first trial fits of Brimstone have been made.
In the RAF 2015 publication, the commander of the Typhoon force suggests that the next priority is getting funding to integrate RAPTOR, or a reconnaissance pod offering similar tactical imagery capability, to ensure that when Tornado goes out of service, the impact on capability is limited to numbers, instead of complete gaps.
On the other hand, funding for adding Conformal Fuel Tanks isn't likely to appear anytime soon.
AESA radar development is finally under contract, but there isn't, for now, a funded plan for retrofitting the radar to the Tranche 3A.


On MARS, it is confirmed that the Solid Support Ship requirement is on the White Board as it is not an item in the core budget. This means that its progress is inexorably tied to the billion pounds of Headroom money that the Navy is supposed to get from 2015.
The tanker programme seems to be going well, with the blocks for Tidespring already over 90% done in South Korea and first steel cut for the second ship, Tiderace. 

FRES SV coverage pre-dates the signing of the production contract, so information is pretty much outdated. A recent House of Lords written answer instead has specified that the FRES SV contract includes an initial support contract for 2 years, associated training systems and appliquè armour packages. General Dynamics has already awarded a 20 million contract to XPI Simulation to deliver 28 high fidelity simulators as driver training aids for all FRES SV variants.
Negotiations are still ongoing to see if production of the vehicles can be moved into the UK from Spain, where at least the first 100 vehicles out of 589 vehicles will be built.

Warrior CSP and ABSV continue to be difficult to understand. The NAO report seems to pre-date a reported formal separation of WCSP and ABSV in budget planning. ABSV was to hit Initial Gate in the third quarter of 2013, but the Army has been reviewing the ABSV requirement and approach to finally try and address the need to replace FV430 by harmonizing WCSP, FRES SV and ABSV.

The NAO quotes numbers that are weird and now most likely outdated anyway. According to the NAO, from an affordable fleet of 565 Warrior vehicles, 445 would be picked for undergoing upgrades under WCSP. 65 of those 445 vehicles would have been converted in APCs and Ambulances under ABSV, while the remaining 380 would consist of, probably, of around 250 Section vehicles with turret and 40mm gun, with the balance made up by Recovery and Repair vehicles.
This number would be completely insufficient to equip the planned six armoured infantry battalions. Considering also the need for a permanent training fleet, including a good number of vehicles to assign to BATUS, these numbers would probably only enable the fielding of 4 battalions. Two would be "virtual", in the sense that, even in a major emergency, there would be no vehicles for them. This seems weird, especially considering that FRES SV numbers appear to have been carefully calculated on the requirement instead. I think the numbers might be wrong / quoted in a not correct way.

WCSP should include the basic upgrades to the recovery and repair variants, so i'm guessing that 445, 380 and 65 might be "correct" numbers in the sense that 380 Section vehicles and 65 recovery / repair look more or less adequate for equipping the six battalions planned, and the sum gives the 445 total reported for CSP.
The NAO also quotes the "affordable fleet" as counting 565 vehicles. I've been guessing that the difference of 120 vehicles between this figure and the 445 could be the ABSV fleet, especially now that ABSV is being separated from WCSP. I think the long lasting confusion is due to the fact that recovery and repair variants were originally part of the ABSV branch of the WCSP programme, although i might be wrong, while now ABSV is pretty much a different thing, as it is supposed to complement FRES SV in replacing (finally) the FV430.

In particular, the huge number of command vehicles included in FRES SV has long made me guess that they will replace FV430s in this role across not just in cavalry regiments, but in tank, armoured infantry and other tracked units.

FRES SV does not include an ambulance variant, so ABSV will have to make up for this. A mortar carrier is also required, and possibly some APCs. The Army has also suggested it is considering an ABSV anti-tank missile variant. This would require more ABSV conversions but reduce the requirement for Warrior CSP turreted vehicles in exchange (currently the AT platoons employ Javelin teams carried in Warrior Section Vehicles).
The budget, as always, will be the main factor in determining ABSV's future. 

The evolving budget situation: reassuring (with risks) - UPDATE

1: Of aircraft carriers and OPVs
2: Land Forces

3: Helicopters

4: Force Structure 

5: Reversing bad decisions 

6: Army programs on the (slow) move 

7: Capabilities in the air  
8: GEOINTELLIGENCE improvements 


The financial aspect

The National Audit Office has today published the annual Major Project Report and, for the second year, the analysis of the 10-year equipment plan. The MOD has released the updated version of the 10-year equipment plan, showing the welcome short term funding re-arrangement which is, among other things, allowing the retention of hundreds of armored vehicles and related equipment purchased as UOR for operations in Afghanistan.

The documents, despite the not unexpected press focus on the cost growth (almost exclusively due to the aircraft carrier contract renegotiation), actually provide a reassuring picture of how defence equipment programs are moving on. The programs have confirmed, for the second year, to be in a stable position after a decade of chaos. The cost of the major programs, if the carriers are excluded from the count due to the particular situation which came into being with the switch to catapults and back, has actually decreased by 46 million in the past year. The cost hike on the aircraft carriers program has a cost of 754 million, leading to a negative figure of 708 million. However, this was not unexpected, and the NAO confirms the MOD position: the cost hike has largely been absorbed by the CVF's program own budget allocation, and has not required using the Contingency fund built into the 10-year budget, which is stable at 4.7 billions.
Over the 10 years from 2013 to 2023, the equipment budget is split in the following way:

Equipment procurement, 63 billion

Equipment support, 87 billion

Central contingency fund, 4.7 billion 

Uncommitted "headroom" fund, 8.4 billion 

The risks remain, obviously. Among them, the most worrisome is the uncertainty on how the budget for the next years will be calculated. The 10-year plan has been crafted on the basis of an agreement with the Treasury that would see the MOD arriving to 2015/16 with the budget levels set by the SDSR; moving to a budget flat in real terms (increasing annually with an inflation rate of 2.7%) out to 2021, with a 1% annual boost for the sole Equipment budget, out to 2023.

Since that agreement and the SDSR, however, the MOD budget has already been cut back twice, with the Autumn Statement 2012 and the Spending Review 2013. The Spending Review for the years 2014/15 and 2015/16 has reduced MOD spending by 2.9 billions overall, mostly in 2015/16 (2.6 billion) with an impact in-year of 890 millions directly on the Equipment spending voice. These reductions have been covered without major shocks to the system, through efficiencies and reprogramming, but the fragile balance achieved in these two years can be shattered in any moment.
The next Spending Review and SDSR will be absolutely decisive: details here are truly the devil. If the Flat-in-real-terms budget is calculated on the base of the reduced spending post-2013 agreement, a 15 billion shortfall in funding will have been generated over the residual life of the 10-year program. Just like that. 15 billions. It would be enough to screw everything up, very badly.

That's why, in NAO style, i'm calling this article "Reassuring (with risks)": because it is enough to look away for one minute, and the whole thing might well collapse.
Even minimum variations on the baseline budget over which the future is planned are enough to very quickly not just head away contingency and headroom money, but bite into the current Core budget as well, with catastrophic implications.

Of course, a reduction in MOD spending is not necessarily immediately aimed at the Equipment budget: the department is free to shift money between its main voices of expenditure (and does so rather regularly) to adjust to the various needs of the moment and protect this or that part: but reductions so large could only be absorbed with further, massive cuts in manpower, and the impact would be global all the same, as there really is the risk of having no men left to use the kit.
As has been observed by the Chief of General Staff himself, the Royal Navy appears to be already in a critical situation in terms of manpower. The situation of the Navy appears seriously dangerous: as it is, considering the impact of the nuclear submarines force (almost 5000 men) and the Marines (7000+) on a force that is shrinking to less than 30.000 men in total (29.900 in April 2020, with a low point at 29.850 in 2018), the surface fleet and Fleet Air Arm are being required to run on a number of sailors and airmen that is much inferior to that of even the italian navy. Of course, the RFA personnel is counted separately, but even that is overstretched, and does not change the reality of a navy which is, to say the least, impressively lean manned in comparison to peer and near peer forces.
The Guardian's commenters might find the First Sea Lord's comments unjustified and too partisan, but the data actually sides with the Navy's point: it is going be the struggle of the generation, in order to keep the Navy alive and valid. 

The 8.4 billions left currently uncommitted are needed to start off several important programs, needed to reach the capabilities envisaged by Future Force 2020 and, in the best of cases, close some of the gaps that have opened in these years. More realistically, the money will barely prevent other gaps from occurring, even if things go as planned.
The "White Board" of unfunded programs has been restructured, and despite the NAO's nice wording about the opportunity of looking at capability needs holistically instead of compiling a list of programs locked in a fight for funding, the feeling is that what happened is just a further work of scissors to shorten the list. The MOD has named only a few of the programs in the Equipment plan, and provided only graphics showing the distribution of the spending for macro areas, so that they can effectively cut and change a lot of other activities without it showing.

The release of the uncommitted headroom money seems to have also been pushed to the right somewhat, as there is only mention of committing it starting from 2017/18, and not immediately after the SDSR 2015. This is a passage considerably less reassuring.
The 8.4 billions have been provvisionally assigned to the service commanders, who are taking up the responsibility of deciding the way forwards for their arms. Again, despite the Guardian's annoying and badly informed cry of a Navy "soaring" at the expense of the Army, the picture is far different: as of now, Land HQ has been provvisionally assigned over 50% of the headroom (4.7 billion), while the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force have been assigned 1.1 billion each. The remaining 1.5 billion has been assigned to the Joint Forces Command.

This split is hardly promising when it comes to the hope that Maritime Patrol Aircraft capability would be restored. A new MPA would be controlled by Joint Forces Command because ISTAR assets are now (rightly so) seen as force multipliers that interest all services. Even CROWSNEST falls under Joint Forces, not under Navy command. The allocation of a mere 1.5 billion looks too small to accommodate a new MPA program, especially considering that there are most certainly several other requirements to consider. The headroom money would be spent between 2017 and 2023, so it might still be that it covers the beginning of a longer MPA program stretching into later years... but this is wild guessing on my part. The current split of the scarce resources is not particularly encouraging.

The Royal Navy's 1.1 billion can be expected to be largely used for MARS Solid Support, the next phase of the renewal of the logistic fleet, which should replace the three Fort-class ships left in service by the middle of the next decade. The NAO Major Project report itself reminds several times that the existing maritime logistic capability is not sufficient to meet future requirements, and Fort Rosalie and Fort Austin will bow out in 2023 and 2024. There is not an official date for Fort Victoria OSD, but 2025 might be it. And these dates, already now, are the result of life extensions. It looks likely that the First Sea Lord's priority will be largely on their replacement.
From 2018, the Navy also hopes to roll into service new MCM capability under MHPC (not new vessels, but new unmanned vehicles and equipment), and this is another candidate area for additional funding.  




The programs



98% of requirements on the major items of equipment as studied by the NAO are forecast to be met, leaving only 3 technical requirements unsatisfied. Those are:

Typhoon landing distance; the fighter's landing distance isn't as short as was once hoped, but this has been known for years and isn't particularly concerning

Astute SSN top-speed; at least the first three of seven Astute-class submarines will not reach the hoped-for top speed value.

Aircraft Carrier availability: the NAO is still assuming that one of the aircraft carriers will be in mothball, so that availability of one carrier for every day of the year isn't possible. This problem will go away if the MOD will bring both ships into service.


A far higher number of requirements is being met with risks remaining, but this is to be expected.


One program of notice is that for the Astute SSNs. As said, in this program there is probably the only meaningful technical shortcoming in the reported projects. Of course, no one will ever told us what the speed requirement was, and by how much it has been missed. But the confirmation that at least the first 3 boats will be slower than expected is of course disappointing.

I limit myself to the first three boats because the report breaks down the Astute class into boats 1 - 3, boat 4, 5, 6 and 7, and measures their (classified) requirements under different headings. For boats 1 - 3, there's "Top Speed" requirement, not to be met, while the following boats have "Theatre Mobility" as requirement, and are forecast to meet it.
Hopefully this means that corrections have been applied to the later boats to reach the desired speed (something that would also justify hopes of seeing the improvement added afterwards to the first boats during their future refits) but there is simply no way to tell for sure.

From Boat 4 onwards, the submarines of the class will benefit of significant capability insertions and improvements thanks to the full approval, in 2013, of the Naval Extremely / Super High Frequency Satcom terminal and of the Astute Capability Sustainment Programme.
Full Communication and Radar Electronic Support Measures (CESM and RESM) capability has also been funded as baseline fit from Boat 4 onwards. The Spearfish heavyweight torpedo upgrade programme is also underway. Overall, good news.
The Rafael TORBUSTER advanced countermeasures system, which uses decoy which combine seduction and hard-kill capability, has been proposed as part of the Astute CSP by a team made up by BAE, Babcock and Rafael, but we might never get told whether it is being installed or not.

Also on the naval front, the NAO report shows that one of the requirements for the new Tide class tankers (MARS FT) includes being able to support Chinook operations on the flight deck. The ship should include an hangar sized for a Merlin, and aviation stores magazines.

This year the NAO has focused on the Complex Weapons programme, and thanks to this we have a refresh of the list of what it includes:

Future Local Area Air Defence System (Land and Marittime) - FLAADS / Sea Ceptor

Future Anti-Surface Guided Weapon (Heavy and Light) - FASGW(H) / FASGW(L)

Selective Precision Effects At Range 2 (Brimstone 2 and spiral development)

Selective Precision Effects At Range 3 (new stand-off 100 kg-class weapon)

Loitering Munition (Fire Shadow)

Meteor integration in F-35

Indirect Fire Precision Attack Simple

Indirect Fire Precision Attack Complex

Storm Shadow mid-life upgrade (also known as SPEAR 4?)

ASRAAM Capability Sustainment Programme

Very Short-Range Air-Defence Effectors (research into dismounted and vehicle-mounted solutions for replacing Starstreak)

Future Long Range Deep Fires Capability

Future Offensive Surface Warfare (new anti-ship missile)

Deep Fires Rocket System (for Royal Artillery)

Dismounted Effects (future man-portable weapon capability) 

Most of these programs haven't yet been approved and launched, however.

NOTE: missing from the NAO list, for whatever reason, is SPEAR 1 (spiral development of Paveway IV bomb). Also note that Future Long Range Deep Fires Capability and Future Offensive Surface Warfare might become one as UK and France continue cooperation on the Future Cruise and Anti-Ship Missile concept, which is intended to replace Storm Shadow, Scalp EG, Harpoon and Exocet.

From the joint declaration on Security and Defence after the bilateral meeting at Brize Norton:

Progress has also been made on the SCALP-EG and Storm Shadow refurbishment and upgrade programme where both governments have agreed to share data associated with national concept and assessment phase programmes. We aim to agree a Memorandum of Understanding for staffing by early summer 2014. Looking further ahead, we continue to work to progress the joint concept study assessing possible solutions to meet our long term requirements to replace Harpoon, Exocet, and Storm Shadow/SCALP. The concept study is due to complete later this summer.

From the UK - France collaboration agreements could emerge another project, if the UK decides to join Italy and France in the effort to expand the capability of the Aster 30 missile, with the "Block 1 New Technology" programme, which in particular greatly expands capability against ballistic threats.

We have agreed to launch a bilateral dialogue on Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD). This would include analysis of the potential to develop a longer range BMD role for the Aster missile; this work has synergies with the One Complex Weapons initiative.

Other projects that could become part of the planned, joined-up "One Complex Weapons" initiative are the Very Short-Range Air-Defence Effectors and Dismounted Effects. France will have to replace its Mistral SHORAD missile roughly in the same period planned for the demise of the Starstreak, and voices about a collaboration in this area aren't new.
France has besides just launched the development of the MMP anti-tank / multirole missile, which might gain british interest going forwards, especially considering that the current Javelin has a (provvisional) OSD set in 2025.

FASGW(H) is finally on the move after significant delays due to France's reluctance in providing funding. A MOU has been signed in Brize Norton, finally, but the MOD had already given its approval in January 2012, hoping that France would follow within March 2012. It took much longer, and now there is no real hope to have the missile ready for use on the Wildcat helicopter in 2015. It might take until 2019, and leave the Navy with another gap in capability for several years, as the current Sea Skua is supposed to go out of service together with the Lynx.

FASGW(L), the Thales Light Multirole Missile, is technically more mature but at the time of the writing of the NAO report, it still wasn't approved.
This information is somewhat contradictory since the MOD secured a contract modification with Thales already in 2011, swapping Starstreak missiles for a batch of 1000 LMM.
It was hoped that deliveries would start in 2013, but the MOD wanted to approve FASGW(H) and (L) together. It is quite likely that the FASGW(L) will now be cleared to proceed, to ensure the Wildcat is not completely without claws when it enters in service.

My interest was also pointed onto Fire Shadow, which slipped behind curtains in silence after the planned deployment to Afghanistan was cancelled.
The report helps, but only so much. A Royal Artillery troop has been formed to use and test Fire Shadow, which has met all the requirements, including internal transport of the launcher and ammunition inside Chinook helicopters. Even this requirement, which was seen as "at risk" last year, was successfully cleared, although June 2012 firing trials weren't as successful as hoped.
Nonetheless, the Army preferred not to deploy the system in theatre, and the future of Fire Shadow remains uncertain. Unfortunately, the whole Indirect Fire Precision Attack capability for the Royal Artillery (of which Fire Shadow is a part) has been revised, and a new assessment phase has been started. Decisions will be made on how to proceed, including in regard to Fire Shadow.

Fire Shadow on its Chinook-portable launcher

IFPA has been plagued by lack of funding and by delays for many years in a row, and it looks like it is back to square one once again. It includes:

Deep Fires Rocket System

Indirect Fire Precision Attack Simple

Indirect Fire Precision Attack Complex

Within these activities (all of which planned but not yet approved), there will be requirements that the RA had formulated clearly already once, but which couldn't be funded and so are sent back to the thinking box: the Deep Fires Rocket was once expected to be the well known ATACMS missile. The M270B1 launchers of the Royal Artillery are ready to take the missile anytime, and were once supposed to do so by 2020. Now, who knows.
A precision guided 155mm shell was planned for adoption in 2018, with the Excalibur round as preferred option, already tested on AS90 in 2010. The procurement of new fuzes able to dramatically improve the accuracy of normal "dumb" artillery shells was also envisaged.
A 155mm shell cointaining precision guided anti-tank submunitions (SMART) was ordered, only to have the contract cancelled soon afterwards.
Fire Shadow has an uncertain future.
And the adoption of measures (again already demonstrated by an international team) to expand the reach of the GMLRS rockets to well beyond 100 km is also currently going nowhere.
The US Army is working to develop a new warhead for the MLRS rockets, which can replace the wide-area effects of the submunition-carrying rocket which proved so deadly in Operation Granby. The british army has abandoned all submunition-dispensers years ago, because they leave dangerous Unexploded Ordnance over the areas they hit, but this has left the M270B1 with only the unitary warhead rocket, and no wide-area suppression capability.
The new warhead in development in the US aims to solve this issue: the RA could and should look into joining in, but there's no telling if this will be possible.

Bringing into core the EXACTOR missile and the Firestorm kit for Fire Support Teams will help keep the RA relevant, but the inability of IFPA to progress to fielding any kind of new capability is worrisome. 

M270B1, traditional and Afghan TES

The Brimstone 2 missile is making excellent progress and showing immense capability, but it has suffered significant delays due to issues with the new, Insensitive Munition-compliant Vulcan rocket and with the new warhead. The biggest problem is that integration on Typhoon is currently not seen possible before 2021 (!) and that would leave a gap between the 2019 withdrawal of Tornado GR4 and the entry in service on Typhoon. The MOD is trying to find a way around the problem.

Other program of interest is the Warrior CSP. Unfortunately, there is not much new information about it, other than the mention in passing that, of 445 vehicles expected to be updated, 65 are intended to become Armoured Battlefield Support Vehicles. There's no information, unfortunately, about the role variants that the ABSV would cover, nor do we know in detail how many IFVs (with turret and working gun) and how many support vehicles (Joint Fires Command, Recovery, Repair) make up the remaining 380. With six battalions of armoured infantry, the requirement for the IFVs should be at least around 300, and actually more if the battalions were to be all fully equipped with their share of vehicles.

FRES SV brings welcome news. The Demonstration Phase has included activities to prove that additional variants, specifically Ambulance, Command Post and Engineer Recce can be obtained by installing the appropriate role fit on the Common Base Platform.
This gives new hopes for a relatively speedy expansion of the number of variants validated and fielded under FRES SV. Initially, it was expected that the separation between Blocks would be wider.
Only Block currently funded for full demonstration is the first, including Scout, Protected Mobility, Recovery and Repair variants.
Test activities have been added to the demonstration phase in the 2012 planning round to prove the feasibility of the variants of Block 2: ambulance, command post, engineer recce.
Assessment studies only, instead, have been started for Block 3, including Formation Recce (Overwatch), Joint Fires Command and Ground Based Surveillance.
These three variants, extremely interesting, should deliver a fire-support platform which would effectively replace the Striker with Swingfire missiles, used until 2005; a vehicle for the Fire Support Team that directs artillery, mortar fire and air support, and a platform carrying (mast-mounted?) long range surveillance system, to complement the Scout.

Early activities are starting on the Apache CSP. The British Army hopes to soon reach the decision point, and sign a contract to replace the current Apache AH1 helicopters with new ones, at Block III (AH-64E Guardian) standard.
The preferred plan is to take the current Apaches, tear them down into pieces, salvage everything still valid (gun, HIDAS, sights, radar, perhaps the engines even though the new US ones are more powerful) and move the components into newly built Block III airframes.
Hopefully, the resulting machine will come with even better navalisation. It has just been disclosed in Parliament that, following a contract with AgustaWestland in October 2013, all Army Air Corps Apaches are being modified to take an emergency flotation gear, deemed indispensable for operations from ships.

Early activities also for the expected re-launch of the (FRES) Utility Vehicle program. Here the most noticeable news is that France will loan 20 VBCI to the British Army, that will be trialed and used to experiment the concepts for the future medium weight armored vehicle.

UPDATE: Defense News reports that the loan of 20 vehicles cannot go ahead due to issues with british law, so that the testing is only being made on one vehicle.

Unfortunately, Wildcat was no longer included in the Major Projects Report. I hoped the NAO document would provide some information about what is happening with the Light Assault Helicopter variant which was added with a modification to the program in 2011. 4 of the Army helicopters had to be modified into LAH, and four new build helicopters had to be added to the total. There has been no further mention of the modification ever since, though. Rumor is that the Lynx AH9A will stay a bit longer and act as LAH (expected to mean they will be used by 657 AAC, in support of special forces) in the interim. It would have been interesting to see this point cleared up somewhat.

A final mention for the A400M cargo aircraft, not so much for its presence in the NAO report (nothing new to report there) but because France and UK have agreed to trade delivery slots, and the RAF will now get its first aircraft slightly earlier than planned, getting MSN 15 instead of MSN 16. 

What is really wrong with the aircraft carriers...

The new NAO report on the Queen Elizabeth class aircraft carriers program (also known as CVF, Carrier Vessel Future) unsurprisingly describes a world of ignorance within the MOD, and exposes the costs connected with some of the bad decisions made in the years.

But the 74 millions wasted in this double switch is nothing compared to the damage caused by far worse and even less coherent decisions taken by this government and by those which came before it. The 2008 decision to slow the program down, taken by Labour, added more than 1.5 billion of costs in the long term while adding absolutely nothing in terms of capability, so Labour should have the decency of just shutting up about this program in particular. 

But even this disaster is not quite the one i'm going to talk about. 

The real tragedy here is the lack of any capability to clearly select a path and follow it through with coherence. The ongoing uncertainty, the constant rethinks, the inability to recognize the capabilities that absolutely need to be preserved, are the real problems UK defence is wrestling with. 

Much more than carriers

Since the SDSR came out, i’ve been lamenting the total lack of coherence and strategy that is so evident in british military planning. The latest NAO carrier strike report adds even more to this astonishing awareness: the government and the MOD have no real idea of what they want to do.

There is not a focus. There is not a clear idea of what capabilities are needed and consequently no real plan to avoid gapping all of them in sequence. The ability of the MOD to fill up pages and pages of meaningless, useless rambling is amazing, but there is no evidence of a coherent plan behind the description “deployable armed forces”.

Deployable how? With what ambitions? With what means?

The provision of carrier strike is only part of an alarming lack of planning for the future. The “deployable armed forces” of the SDSR are facing, among others:

Soon to be gapped capability to deploy special forces safely by air, due to imminent withdrawal from service of the suitably kitted C130Ks, without Project HERMES having delivered the same level of capability on the C130Js.

Depleted capability to transport heavy equipment by sea, thanks to the removal of 2 out of 6 of the Point-class RO-RO vessels.

Insufficient air cargo capability, despite the welcome purchase of the C17s.

Depleted capability for the Army to operate in the Littoral and sustain its logistic effort in presence of water obstacles (removal from service of the Ramped Craft Logistic vessels without a replacement)

Dramatically reduced amphibious capability, due to the removal of 1 Bay-class LSD and the mothballing of one of the two LPDs.

Much depleted capability to operate at sea in presence of underwater and surface threats, due to the lack of a maritime patrol aircraft.

Much higher risks are due to be accepted in future when deploying the fleet in dangerous areas, due to the gapping of maritime airborne early warning capability.

Lack of air cover for the fleet for at least seven more years.

Most of the key enablers making complex deployments abroad possible have been or will be removed from service in the next few years. How does this fit in the ridiculous, vague claim about still having deployable forces?

It is time the MOD decided what it wants to be able to do, and take coherent decisions to reach the target.

The carriers are key enablers for an expeditionary force. They are indispensable in a wide range of scenarios which require the projection of military power far away from the UK’s shores. They are perfect for interventions that chiefly require air power, such as operations in Libya in 2011. But they are also excellent to gain air superiority far away from home and protect the arrival of land forces, including land-based aviation, which is notoriously most vulnerable on the ground, and which would incur huge risks in trying to deploy to a menaced base in a war zone in absence of friendly forces providing cover.

And they are of course essential to support a forcible entry operation, especially an amphibious assault.

For the UK, the two new aircraft carriers in construction are even more important because they are also the only possible replacement for the current LPHs platforms (HMS Illustrious and HMS Ocean), since the notional LPH(Replacement) program has been dead in the water at least since 2006.

A tiny spark of understanding of this factor emerged in the SDSR, when the Carrier Enabled Power Projection concept was revealed, and there was the first open talk of using the new vessels to carry not just fast jets, but Marines and their helicopters at the same time.

Ever since, the UK’s Strike Carriers have effectively been, in the facts if not in the design, Landing Helicopter Aviation vessels (LHAs). The Queen Elizabeth class is not just a replacement for the Invincible class carriers, but it is going to be the successor to HMS Ocean and to the “Commando carrier” HMS Illustrious (in itself a “re-rolled” Invincible class vessel).

Although non optimal, this is a coherent approach, and the only one financially sustainable and feasible, as the MOD is simply not going to be given the money to build and run the QE class purely for carrier strike, while fielding a number of sufficiently capable amphibious vessels.

While France has the nuclear powered Charles de Gaulle in the carrier role and three Mistral LHDs in the amphibious role, the UK will have to approach the problem differently.

In itself, this is because a quite debatable choice was made in the 90s to build an amphibious fleet made up by ships built around a single, main role: the LPDs (HMS Albion and HMS Bulwark) carry the best part of the task force’s landing crafts and the command and control facilities. The Bay-class LSDs carry the most of the “first wave” vehicles (more equipment would disembark later on from the civilian-standard Point RO-RO cargo vessels) while HMS Ocean (which had to have a sister which in the end was never built) would carry a big share of the Marines, and nearly all of the helicopters.

The separation in roles is dramatically reflected in the ships’ designs: the LPDs and LSDs have large flight decks, but lack hangars. Carrying and maintaining large number of helicopters on open decks at sea is nearly unthinkable, so HMS Ocean’s vast hangar is an absolutely fundamental part of any amphibious task force.

The separation of the roles is not a wrong concept in itself, but it is not a concept suited to the Royal Navy’s budget. As the failure in building a sister for HMS Ocean and the reduction in the original planned number of Bay LSDs (up to six, then reduced to four) remind us, even when the plan was first conceived it was not financially sound.

The reality is that, had the Royal Navy pursued the Landing Helicopter Dock (LHD) path and built Bulwark and Albion in such configuration, much better capability would have been obtained. The French Mistral class vessels are there to remind us of the mistake made.

The credibility of the amphibious capabilities of the UK in the era that will follow the decommissioning of HMS Ocean rests in the cavernous hangars of the QE vessels and on their vast flight decks: the new carriers are desperately needed to keep the RN able to deploy meaningful task groups in the future.

Can’t think more than half an hour ahead

The return to the F35B has one only real advantage over the F35C: it removes the large short term expenditure which would have been needed to modify HMS Prince of Wales at build to take aboard the US EMALS catapults and AAG arrestor wires.

In the long term, the F35B risks to cost more and is surely going to deliver less capability than the F35C. In terms of costs, the NAO notes that the F35B is at least 10 million pounds more expensive, per plane, than the F35C. More importantly, its through-life running costs will be 20% higher. And other sources have suggested 25% higher.

There is a real risk that the reversion to the F35B will end up being a “save now, spend more later” decision. The NAO in its report suggests that, over a 30 years period, the F35B will cost 600 million less than the F35C option, but I’m unconvinced.

We could regret this decision in the future for a whole range of reasons: the inferior capability of the F35B could end up being a problem some day. Its cost, already expected to be higher, could escalate further. Worse, catapults and wires could soon end up being needed all the same, when the importance of large, weapon-capable unmanned aerial vehicles will grow enough to make them indispensable even for a MOD which is getting way too used to look the other way and ignore uncomfortable facts.  

For now, the MOD is hiding its head under the sand by deciding that the first UCAV (notionally planned for the 2030) will be a purely RAF affair, and will only operate out of land bases.

A great example of joint thinking and long term strategic planning, isn’t it?

I have to accept the bitter truth, however: in this case, the MOD did not have the chance to think ahead. The treasury was in no case going to help the MOD cover the higher initial costs of the catapults solution, so there was no way to accommodate the conversion costs in the budget without cutting savagely back in many other areas of Defence. 

However, the decision to return to the B can only be truly accepted, supported and welcomed if it means retaining both carriers in service. The high cost of fitting catapults and wires would have made it virtually impossible to operate both ships in carrier role. The second could and should have served as LPH, for the reasons covered earlier, even though the lack of strategic thinking of course made the government conceive the absurd, insane idea of selling or mothballing such a precious asset.  

However, the F35B makes it possible to operate both vessels as LHAs, combining the provision of combat air capability to the provision of helicopter support to amphibious operations. With the advantage that, with two hulls, an LHA is always available for deployment. 

The one thing that the return to the F35B must give us is the entry in service of both ships. 

Of course, the above concept is too simple to be readily grasped by government and MOD, and we are vaguely tempted with the option of having both ships in service, while the actual decision is pushed back to 2015.

If we ever needed a reminder of the appalling inability to think more than half an hour into the future, we have just been given it.

Self-inflicted problems

The capabilities of the F35 for the UK are further harmed by, again, the lack of a coherent plan inside the MOD. So far, the UK has only required the integration of ASRAAM and Paveway IV onto the aircraft, and according to the NAO even these requirements haven’t yet been finalized and fully costed.

There is also an ongoing saga about how and where the ASRAAM will have to be fitted on the F35: at the beginning there was a (ridiculous) requirement to integrate four ASRAAM for internal carriage. Why the RAF deemed necessary to spend huge amounts of money to try and carry four short range, infrared-guided missiles in the enclosed weapon bays of a stealth fighter goes beyond my possibilities of understanding. A return to the first Sea Harrier, with the ASRAAM carried internally replacing the Sidewinder carried externally?

It becomes even more ridiculous when you think that no one else is bothering with trying to integrate an IR missile for internal carriage on the F35; and it becomes worse when you realize that carrying 4 ASRAAMs internally means not carrying AMRAAM and not carrying air to ground weaponry.

In 2008, the difficulties and cost of such a stupid idea became clearer, and the plan changed, with ASRAAM to be integrated on the two internal AA stations in replacement of the AMRAAM and on the two AA-only external stations under the wings.

Today, it is not clear if this is still the plan of if the ASRAAM is now only due for external integration. 

ASRAAM: stations 4, 5, 7, 8 then rethink, 1, 4, 8, 11. And now?

With the AMRAAM due to leave british service by 2017 and a plan for the integration of Meteor on the F35 having not been finalized yet, the F35 at entry in service risks being as well armed for air to air combat as a Tornado GR4. How to downgrade a multirole aircraft to an under-armed bomb truck.

For a good few years, it appeared that the UK might not integrate Meteor at all on the F35. Hard not to think that the RAF was doing so not to harm procurement of the Typhoon. After all, the one service getting the bad end of the deal would have been the Navy, which ever since it lost the Sea Harrier FA2 has been tragically lacking a capable fighter for the air defence of the fleet.

Fortunately, MBDA, aiming to export opportunities, self-funded efforts to make the Meteor compatible with the weapon bays of the F35, and now the MOD seems to have regained a little bit of wisdom: a recent interview saw the Italian chief of the defence staff confirm that the UK has asked Italy to join a bi-national effort to integrate the Meteor on the JSF, presumably as part of the Block IV software release.

We have to hope that this is confirmed, otherwise the F35 might be done to the sole ASRAAM for a good few years, well into the 2020s.

The Paveway IV is only meant to be integrated on the two internal AG stations. Why?

Good question. I can’t find an answer.

Other weapons have been deleted from the list of requirements (Paveway II and III, Brimstone, Storm Shadow) and will only reappear… sometime, later on. Maybe with the Block V software release.

Just maybe, though. The NAO reports:

The Department is now planning to procure 48 STOVL aircraft in the first tranche in the same quantity and production profile as the carrier variant. Given that the STOVL variant will deliver an aircraft with less range and endurance over a target area compared to the carrier variant, the decision potentially represents a reduction in capability. However, since 2010, the Department has confirmed that it does not have plans to use weapons which would require the greater payload capacity of the carrier variant.

That reads to me like an admission that the F35B is not planned anymore to be able to employ weapons such as Storm Shadow. I hope I’m wrong, because it would make absolutely no sense if this was the case. They hopefully mean that they have no plan to procure a 2000 pounds bomb for internal carriage (the F35B has weapon bays that are 14 inches shorter than the F35C’s ones, limiting it to weapons with the same volumes as the US 1000 lbs JDAM.  

However, the things that make no sense are so common these days around the MOD that it wouldn’t surprise me if my pessimist interpretation was correct.

Among other self-inflicted problems, it is worth highlighting these passages of the NAO report:

As the Carrier Strike capability draws upon both air and navy forces, there is a risk of divergent views on delivering its benefits. There have also been a wide range of views as to what constituted the wider capability known as Carrier Enabled Power Projection while the Senior Responsible Owner has lacked budgetary power and authority to bring coherence to its elements which draw upon the different forces.

As a result, and to address concerns raised by the Committee of Public Accounts, in response to our Carrier Strike report, the Department made the Programme Director of Carrier Strike a full-time, two-star role and gave the role of Senior Responsible Owner for Carrier Enabled Power Projection to a three-star officer responsible for capability decisions across the Department. This move has effectively strengthened the budgetary authority of the role and in April 2013 their mandate was also clarified. The Senior Responsible Owner chairs an Executive Programme Board which is attended by those responsible for the delivery of all of the key elements of the capability. These changes are a welcome clarification of previously inadequate governance arrangements; however, the Senior Responsible Owner will continue to face difficult challenges in successfully delivering the Carrier Strike capability and overcoming the historic, cultural differences between the forces.

I don’t even want to comment this. I think it speaks by itself. To keep the matter under some degree of control, it has taken the formation of a castle of multi-star posts, just like it happened when Joint Helicopter Command had to be formed to remedy to the inconvenient placement of the battlefield support helicopters under RAF command instead of in the hands of the Army.

Thanks for confirming once more that bringing the RAF into the business of naval aviation ranks high among the worst decisions ever made.

The only relief provided by the NAO report is the information that the Chief of Defence Staff is uncomfortable with the lack of carrier air capability and applied pressure to avoid gapping it for any longer time than strictly unavoidable. This is reassuring. However, Chiefs change, and the presence of the RAF in the carrier air equation risks being a source of problems and infighting forever. Will we always enjoy the presence of a Chief of Defence Staff capable to preserve the carrier capability, or will we end up having a new Harrier tragedy?

Or a Nimrod tragedy, too. You can choose your favorite disaster.

Lack of vision

Another stunning demonstration of the lack of honesty and understanding within the MOD planning is the disastrous approach to the replacement of the Airborne Early Warning capability currently provided to the fleet (and to the joint force, as the enduring commitment to Afghanistan demonstrates) by the Sea King MK7 ASaC.

Already some time ago I had written that I was only waiting for the inexorable coming of the idiotic comment sayings that, with no carriers in the water, we don’t need AEW either.

Could I be kept waiting for once? Of course not.

Defense News reports on the NAO document and notes the statement offered by Hammond in reply:

The Department does not consider that the phased introduction of Crowsnest undermines the delivery of carrier-strike capability. Crowsnest will enter service at the same time as HMS Queen Elizabeth and will be fully operational by 2022. Until then, its maritime surveillance capabilities will be augmented by other platforms and systems.

There is one, and one only advantage that an helicopter-based AEW solution offers over the much more capable Hawkeye aircraft: an helicopter can be based on almost any kind of modern warship.

Sea King MK7 has in recent times been operating from HMS Ocean as well as HMS Illustrious, and it has also been aboard Type 45 destroyers.

An helicopter AEW platform, or HEW, If you want, with the H for Heliborne, has the advantage that it can provide any kind of flotilla an invaluable AEW solution, even if there is no large flat top in sight.

HEW does NOT NEED the carrier.  

The carrier NEEDS the HEW platform.

Moreover, not only the carrier needs HEW, the whole fleet NEEDS HEW.

Conclusion: the lack of a carrier does nothing to reduce the importance of HEW.

The need for early warning of incoming air and, later on, missile attacks has been clear even since the 1940s. The massive air attacks, and the threat of the japanese Kamikaze in the Pacific theatre were the original driver for the quick development of early warning solutions.

First was the radar picket ship, vessels fitted with powerful radars sent ahead of the task force to form a first line of defence and to provide early warning to the thick of the force.

Of course, being on a picket ship was a very dangerous job: picket ships were the first to be attacked and the first to be sunk.

Desperation with this situation brought to the light a number of imaginative solutions, including the use of submersibles fitted with radars, destined to stay on the surface to track enemy air activity. Submersibles were harder to spot from the sky, and could always dive underwater, so they had much better chances of surviving the day. But they also made for poor platforms for air control radars.

Nonetheless, the US Navy did use many such EW vessels. The last such boat to be kitted for the role was a nuclear propelled submarine!

Fortunately, by then, technology had progressed enough to make airborne EW platforms viable and effective.

Already once the Royal Navy had the great idea of gapping the AEW capability. It was swiftly punished with the Falklands War, which saw the senior service having to take a step back in time, all the way to using picket ships and, to a degree, submarine EW as well, when five submarines formed a line on the edge of Argentina's 12-nautical-mile (22 km; 14 mi) territorial limit to provide some form of early warning of incoming air raids.  

A cost was paid for this in sunk ships and lost lives. HMS Sheffield is a good image of this, as she was a picket ship, deployed ahead of the main force to make up for the lost capability provided, until not much time before, by the Gannet AEW aircrafts of the old HMS Ark Royal (IV).

Evidently, not enough ships and lives were lost, because the MOD is once again planning to gap this vital capability, from 2016 all the way to 2020 or, more exactly, 2022. Four to six years of return to “stone age” for the Navy.

There is no hiding behind the superior capabilities of the Type 45 and of its Sea Viper missiles. Physics has not changed, and the radar horizon for the detection of low-flying enemies continues to be too close to the ship for defences to work properly.

And at the Falklands the threat was the subsonic Exocet. Today, the threat could well be a massive, supersonic Yakhont missile fired by the BASTION coastal defence batteries sold by Russia to countries such as Siria.

Defences might have improved, but offensive weapons also have, and a missile coming low on the waves at Mach 2 or 3 will leave a ship struggling to react in the few seconds it’ll have between detection of the incoming threat and impact.

But perhaps mr. Hammond believes that the enemy will not want to use its missiles against frigates, destroyers, amphibs and merchant ships. Maybe the enemy will only fire its missiles if there is a carrier to try and hit.

Maybe. But I don’t think so. And Hezbollah doesn’t, either. There’s many people out there who probably don’t agree with mr. Hammond.

I hope, not for him but for the sailors that would pay the ultimate price in such an event, that he can get away with this insane decision without having his own HMS Sheffield moment. 

A decision taken is never definitive  

Another dramatic problem is the dramatic way in which programs even of primary importance tend to drag on and on and on without ever delivering. Even when the MOD takes a decision and starts some kind of activity, it takes uncountable years and uncountable acronyms and "studies" and "assessment phases" and "main gates" and "planning rounds" to get any progress in. 

Again, we return to the tragedy of AEW. 

The Royal Navy has been trying to find a replacemet for Sea King MK7 for well over a decade. We were still in the 1990s when the Future Organic Airborne Early Warning Aircraft (FOAEW) started. And with further research we might find out that the activities started earlier still. 

In the early 2000s the acronym changed, to MASC (Maritime Airborne Surveillance and Control) and in 2010 we arrived to the current CROWSNEST name. 

Capability delivered: none. 

Only this year CROWSNEST has entered the Assessment Phase. The selected path is to fit palletized radar equipment to the existing fleet of Merlin HM2 helicopters, with two proposals to choose from: Northropp Grumman/Lochkeed propose the VIGILANCE radar pod, which they have been testing in flight since last year, on a Merlin HM2. 

Thales proposes migrating the CERBERUS/Searchwater 2000AEW kit from the existing Sea King MK7 to a the slightly modified Merlin HM2 airframe. 

Thales proposal, with existing radar from Sea King MK7 migrated and fitted on sliding rails on the side of the Merlin HM2 fuselage.

 

The Vigilance pod proposed by Lochkeed.

Nothing revolutionary at all, in other words. It proposes to use an helicopter which will return in full service after the upgrade to HM2 standard over the next year. An helicopter that is currently planned to leave service in 2030, notably. 

If Thales wins, even the radar could remain the same, perhaps just touched up a bit. 

Yet they are dragging it along, for budget and non-budget reasons, so much to expect an entry in service only in 2020, with systems that won't be fully operational before the end of 2022. 

That's 9 years from the start of the Assessment Phase, and well over two decades after the whole saga began.    

To set the proportions straight, the E2 Hawkeye was born from a US Navy requirement in 1956, entered service as E2A in 1964 and by 1971 it had been completely upgraded twice, up to E2C standard. All in 15 years. 

I won't add anything else. I think facts speak loud enough.