The evolving USMC and USN Aviation Plan

On April 17 this year, the Armed Forces Committee of the House of Representatives had a hearing on the aviation plans of the services, with the following high-profile witnesses:


• Lieutenant General Charles R. Davis USAF 
Military Deputy, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition

• Lieutenant General Burt Field 
Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, Plans and Requirements, U.S. Air Force, USAF

• Rear Admiral Bill Moran USN 
Director of the Air Warfare Division, U.S. Navy

• Lieutenant General Robert E. Schmidle USMC 
Deputy Commandant of the Marine Corps for Aviation, U.S. Marine Corps

• Vice Admiral W. Mark Skinner USN
Principal Military Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research,
Development, and Acquisition), U.S. Navy

• Mr. Michael J. Sullivan
Director of Acquisition and Sourcing, U.S. Government Accountability Office


During the hearing, a juicy information was dropped about the future shape of the fighter/attack fleet of the US Marines Corps, which represents a very noticeable change from earlier plans daring back to the 2010 and 2011 aviation plans. The subject is, of course, the F-35. The US Marines continue to plan for a purchase of 420 aircraft, but the split between F35B and F35C has changed from 340 / 80 to 353 / 67, and the planned number of squadrons has changed very significantly.Let's see how the USMC aviation plan has evolved.


2010 plan
Up to the Memorandum of Understanding for the integration of tactical air fleet between US Navy and USMC, signed in March 2011 by the admiral Gary Roughead, the secretary for the Navy Ray Mabus and the commandant USMC James F. Amos, the USMC planned to operate a force of 420 F35B.
These were to entirely replace the "legacy force" composed by:

7 squadrons of F/A-18 Hornet A/C (12 aircraft per squadron)
5 squadrons of F/A-18 Hornet D (12 aircraft per squadron)
1 squadron of F/A-18 Hornet C (Reserve) (12 aircraft per squadron)
7 squadrons of AV-8B Harrier (14 aircraft per squadron)

1 Fleet Replacement Squadron of AV-8B and TAV-8B (28 aircraft)
1 Fleet Replacement Squadron of F/A-18 B/C/D (36 aircraft)

with a fleet of:

14 squadrons of F-35B (10 aircraft per squadron)
7 squadrons of F-35B (16 aircraft per squadron)
3 squadrons of F-35B (Reserve) (10 aircraft per squadron)

3 Fleet Replacement Squadrons of F-35B (20 aircraft each)


Post-MOU
Following the signing of the MOU on TACAIR integration, the USMC split its planned buy of F-35s between the B and C variant, with the committment to provide five squadrons of F-35C to complement the 15 US Navy squadrons on the same aircraft, needed to equip all 10 Carrier Air Wings.
This represented an uplift in the CVN responsibility of the USMC, which has so far provided only three squadrons of F/A-18 B/C/D aircraft.

The immediate effect was a change in the number of 10-aircraft F-35B squadrons, which dropped from 14 to 9, as five squadrons were now planned to deploy 10 F-35C each instead.


Today
The new USMC plan detailed in the April hearing is very different, and comes with a significant drop in the overall number of squadrons, probably due to the need to achieve significant savings in the budget.
The USMC now plans to have:

9 squadrons of F-35B (16-aircraft each)
5 squadrons of F-35B (10-aircraft each)
4 squadrons of F-35C (10-aircraft each)
2 squadrons of F-35B (Reserve) (10-aircraft each)
1 Operational Evaluation Squadron (6 F-35B)

2 Fleet Replacement Squadrons of F-35B (25 aircraft each)
10 F-35C provided for training alongside the USN's own training fleet, probably enabling the US Navy to stand up 16 instead of 15 F-35C squadrons, keeping the total of 20.

The remaining aircraft will be assigned in this way:

58 F-35B
12 F-35C

as Backup Aircraft Inventory

25 F-35B
5 F-35C

as Attrition Replacement Aircraft

The Backup Aircraft Inventory (BAI) is a reserve of airframes which are rotared into the frontline units to keep them up to strenght while aircrafts undergo scheduled and unscheduled depot-level maintenance, modifications, inspections and repairs.

The Attrition Reserve is an inventory of airframes used to replace unanticipated losses due to peacetime accidents or wartime attrition. The aircrafts can also be used to reconstitute combat units in the event of mobilization. 


The new plan will of course have an impact on Basing plans, as well. When 21 regular squadrons were planned, they were expected to be spread in the following way:

10 squadrons (plus 1 Reserve Sqn) between MCAS Beaufort and MCAS Cherry Point
5 squadrons plus OEU Sqn in MCAS Yuma (one squadron would actually be stationed to Iwakuni, Japan) 
6 squadrons in MCAS Miramar

Now it seems that both USMC F-35B training squadrons will be home-based in MCAS Beaufort, with the first, VMFAT-501 "Warlords" squadron, transferring from Eglin AFB in January 2014.
The bases will now be in competition to get a share of 18 (instead of 21) Active Component squadrons, and 2 instead of 3 Reserve Component formations.


The US Navy requirement remains set at 40 Active Duty frontline squadrons, with 440 aircraft, spread over 10 Carrier Air Wings.
In the long term, 20 squadrons will have the Super Hornet (12-aircraft per squadron) while 20 (in 2011 planned to be 15 USN + 5 USMC, now 16 + 4) will have the F-35C (10-aircraft per squadron), giving to the standard peacetime air wing a consistency of 44 strike fighter jets. Each carrier wing has two squadrons of F-35C, one squadron of F/A-18E single-seat Super Hornet and one squadron of F/A-18F twin seat.

Two Reserve squadrons (20-aircraft each) are planned, probably one for Super Hornet and one for F-35C.
There is a Fleet Replacement Squadron on each Coast, for both types. FRS have 30 aircraft each.


The transcript of the Hearing is available here.

Fast jet fleet of the future

In its October issue, Combat Aircraft Monthly has published a new report into the future of the frontline of the RAF, which is an expansion on a series of rumors and reports first published by Jane's some time ago.
While not yet officially confirmed, it seems to be a quite accurate representation of the new plans of the MOD for the future force of fast jets available to the armed forces.

The recent past tells us that in 2010, prior to the SDSR, the UK lined a force of 12 frontline squadrons of fast jets: 3 squadrons on Typhoon, 7 on Tornado GR4, 2 on Harrier GR9. The nominal strenght of the Typhoon and Tornado squadrons is 12 jets, while the Harrier squadrons had only 9 due to an endless list of earlier reductions and cuts.
During 2011, two Tornado GR4 squadrons (XIII Sqn, RAF Marham, now to stand-up as second Reaper squadron;  and 14 Squadron, RAF Lossiemouth, which re-born as Shadow R1 squadron, with the planes coming out of 5 Squadron, where they had been flown together with Sentinel R1) were disbanded, and, notoriously, the Harrier was retired from service, shrinking the force down to 8 squadrons.

Today, following the return to life of 1st Squadron, re-formed officially on 15 September on the Leuchars airbase, the UK lines 9 fast jet squadrons: 4 on Typhoon and 5 on Tornado GR4.
According to the MOD Business Plan 2012 - 2015, 1st Squadron will now face a long build-up period towards IOC, which will conclude in March 2013.
The 5th Typhoon squadron is on the way, too, and it will stand up and achieve IOC between April 2013 and March 2015. 

Again in March 2015, the reduction in the Tornado GR4 force and readiness level will be fully implemented, with around 96 aircrafts in the fleet (down from over 130) and with just 18 Force Elements at Readiness (down from 40). It is expected that this will mean the disbandment of a further two squadrons, leaving a force of 3 Tornado squadrons to carry on until the Out of Service date for the type, now officially set as March 2019 (down from 2025, then 2021).

In the meanwhile, it is planned/hoped that the Typhoon deliveries will be completed (2017) and that the Typhoon force will achieve Full Operating Capability by March 2018.
By then, it is hoped that the Typhoon will be capable to employ Brimstone and Storm Shadow missiles, while there seems to be currently no plan to migrate the RAPTOR reconnaissance pod. Unfortunately, there is no firm date for the integration of the weaponry on Typhoon. The RAF once hoped to have it by 2014, but there seems to be no chance in hell of it happening, unless the UK (and possibly Saudi Arabia) go ahead on their own with the integration effort.

In December 2010, after the SDSR's publication, Air Vice-Marshal Greg Bagwell, commanding officer of the Royal Air Force's No. 1 Group (the HQ from which all combat squadrons depend) released an interview in which he painted a sad future of a RAF down to just 6 squadrons by 2020, with 5 being on Typhoon and 1 on F35.
At the time, however, they were reasoning on an order for 96 F35C, with a consequent build-up of the force in the years past 2020 and out to 2027 or further out into the future. Bagwell, in a demonstration of (bitter) realism, said that he was only sure about the single F35 squadron by 2020, implying that the rest of the plan was very much at risk.

The 5 Typhoon squadrons are justified by the existance of a plan for the shredding of all of the Tranche 1 aircrafts between 2015 and 2018/19, leaving a total of just 107 airframes. This plan is even mentioned on the RAF's Typhoon webpage.
In his interview, Bagwell said that the number of Typhoons was even at risk of shrinking further, with the Omani order possibly coming out of the UK's total without a replacement buy, bringing down the fleet's consistence to just 95.

The deal with Oman, which has been described as "imminent" for years now, is currently expected to be signed by year's end, but there has not been any recent mention of the planes coming out of the RAF's totals.
For a while, Oman thought about ordering up to 24 Typhoons, possibly Tranche 1 ex-RAF, but things changed with time, Oman ordered additional F16s instead, and eventually decided that it wants only 12 Typhoons, but fully-capable Tranche 3 ones.
It is still possible, in theory, that the RAF is forced to lose a dozen Tranche 3 production slots, ideally with a production tail added in 2017 to ensure the UK gets all 40 Tranche 3s on order. In the worst case, they could be simply lost.
But, as i said, this possibility has no longer been hinted at, so it probably has been abandoned, luckily. We have to keep in mind the UK would have to get the Eurofighter consortium and the partner countries approving such a change in the plans: an agreement was reached to reduce the Tranche 3 order for all 4 the countries, but another unilateral cutback might meet resistance.

Other things have changed, as well, since Bagwell released his interview. Namely:


- The standing up of the 4th and 5th Typhoon squadrons has been speeded up by a year. 

- The Prime Minister exposed himself a lot on Typhoon, on its value for the UK's armed forces and industry, and he's backing the export effort intensely.

- In Libya, the Typhoon Tranche 1 proved more effective and useful than the RAF expected.

- Last May, the last RAF Tranche 1 Typhoon was handed to BAE for the R2 retrofit to bring it to the Block 5 standard, known by the RAF as "FRG4, for Fighter-Reconnaissance-Ground attack.  

- BAE Systems is successfully collaborating with the RAF to deliver software Drops to upgrade the Tranche 1s, expand their capabilities and keep them relevant. Apparently, this method is working much better than anticipated, and at acceptable cost. It is believed to have greatly eased RAF's concerns about the cost of keeping the T1s relevant to operational needs. 

- The budget was "balanced", but in the process it was made clear that ordering 90/100 F35s in the relatively near future is not possible. Philipp Hammond has since announced that the UK is planning a first order of 48, very possibly including the 3 IOT&E airplanes already on order. And this will be it, for the moment. The switch to the F35B will be complete by April 2023, according to the Business Plan, possibly meaning that deliveries will be over by then.  
It will be close to 2030 before a second order can be discussed. Until recent times, the delivery of up to 138 (then 96) airplanes by 2027 had been the expectation.

- The export potential of the used Typhoon Tranche 1s proved very low, with the airplane not attractive enough for high-tier air forces and not cheap enough for the East-Europe air forces who are looking for western replacements for their russian fighters. Gripens and used F16s, cheaper and more complete in their capabilities, are dominating this market.


Jane's and Combat Aircraft Monthly report that the RAF's planning has changed, too.
With less F35s on the way, with not even the hope of jam tomorrow represented by new F35 squadrons in the 2020s and with the Typhoon T1 effectively without a market differently from what had been hoped, the RAF is now seriously thinking about keeping the Tranche 1 Typhoons and restore its earlier plan for 7 squadrons mounted on the type.

The aim is, quite clearly, the sustainment of a force of 8 to 9 squadrons into the 2020s, using what is available and on the way, instead of what exists only in hopes and promises.
The 5 Squadrons of Typhoons available by March 2015 could be supplemented by two more standing up in replacement of the 2 Tornado squadrons expected to go around that period, with the remaining 3 GR4 squadrons keeping numbers up.
In 2018, the first F35B squadron should be working its way into service, and by then the force could be made up by 7 Typhoon Sqns and up to 2 / 3 Tornado ones.
The following year the retirement of Tornado would leave a force of 7 + 1, and in the early 2020s a second F35B squadron would bring the force level back to 9 squadrons, which the RAF would try to sustain towards 2030, when a new F35 order is envisaged (either the B, or possibly the A variant) as a replacement for the Tranche 1s.

It represents a better utilization of available and funded resources, and keeps force levels up at acceptable levels. The F35B force would be very small (2 frontline squadrons, most likely) and very much carrier-focused, while the Typhoons would inherit most of the Tornado's work and roles.

This new thinking might have an impact on basing plans, as well, and a lot of things are said to be hanging in the balance: the transfer of Typhoons from Leuchars to Lossiemouth might not happen. The Army 2020 plan will have an impact as well, because Leuchars was expected to become an Army Base as part of the plan which would see a large Multi-Role brigade based in Scotland, but with the Multi-Role brigade concept dead, Scotland is now planned to host only an infantry brigade part of the Adaptable Force, meaning that Leuchars might well not be needed anymore.


Combat Aircraft even suggests that a third Typhoon base might be needed, and mentions Leeming and Cottersmore as possible solutions (I'd say Leeming, in the case, as Cottersmore is already an army base)  but this would imply new and additional costs, so i'd be careful on this part. I think the RAF might just squeeze more squadrons on the existing Typhoon stations.


The magazine also suggests that the activity of Tornado GR4 out to 2014 might obstacle the build-up of the F35's force at RAF Marham, which has been publically singled out as the preferred Main Operating Base for the F35s. It suggests that, while the Tornado maintenance infrastructure stays in Marham, the Tornado squadrons might end their career flying from Lossiemouth (which would then very likely be without a future, if the Typhoon transfer is really cancelled). Again, on this point more than on others i am doubtful, as i think that standing up the F35 force on Marham should be possible even with the Tornado around.

What matters the most, though, is that the F35s are heading for carrier duties and that the chance to see 7 Typhoon squadrons is growing, while the possibility of seeing the RAF down to just 6 squadrons by 2020 is growing remote.
Not bad, overall.    

  

F35B: 48 B for the carriers, then maybe some A...

The Telegraph and some other newspapers and internet sources reported about Philip Hammond having given indication during the July 19 handover of ZM135, also known as BK-1 at Forth Worth, that the UK would acquire 48 F35B.
At the start, i did not give this figure much importance: i was unable to find any hard evidence of the minister having actually said it, and the official position indeed remained the same: the number of F35s to be procured is for SDSR2015 to decide.
And, said or not, even the eventual 2015 decision won't be definitive: cuts, of course, could arrive at any moment, as we sadly well know...

Philip Hammond speaks at the official handover of ZM135, also known as BK-1, the first of 3 pre-production F35B ordered by the UK.

I was not ready to believe that Hammond would give away such an accurate figure to the press, especially when he and the other defence ministers regularly avoid giving any solid indication on quantities to Parliament despite being asked about it at least once a month.

But spreadsheet Philip is surprising me once again, since it seems that he did say that. And Jane's says that it received further confirmations from the MOD.

I'm sure that many in Parliament won't appreciate, but i fear that i now have to believe to the figure. The source, this time, is the respected Jane's, which reports:

In remarks on 19 July in the United States, Hammond said the UK would order 48 F-35Bs to equip the UK's future carrier strike force. He added that a follow-on F-35 buy would be set out in a future Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR), with the aim of replacing the Eurofighter Typhoon in UK service.

[...] 

The UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) has confirmed his comments, telling IHS Jane's : "The defence secretary said that initially the UK would buy 48 jets for the aircraft carriers and announce at a later date what the final numbers would be. We will not finalise our decisions on the F-35 programme until SDSR in 2015."

Jane's reports that the follow-on order might be made up by cheaper, longer-range, non carrier-capable F35A.
Nothing definitive, but the Split Buy rumor is back.

The first time, it was in 2005, when Future Offensive Air System (FOAS, the intended Tornado replacement programme) was killed. That's when rumors of a split buy of 80 F35B and up to 58 F35C started to circulate. The C would be the Tornado replacement, possibly under a formal programme split: the F35B would meet the original Joint Combat Aircraft requirement, with the F35C procured under Deep and Persistent Offensive Capability (DPOC, the programme the RAF conceived to replace FOAS in the Tornado-replacement role).
Back at this time, the F35C's range and full-size weapon bays were given as main reason for the choice. In pure British style, there were some "imaginative" proposals such as removing the naval features from the C (hook, folding wings etc), something that, no doubt, would have ended just like the plan for Typhoon fighters without guns: removing such weights and components would dramatically change aspects of the plane's centre of gravity, and require software modifications and other expensive adjustements that would have no doubt made the changes a source of additional expense and not of savings.  

In 2010, the SDSR killed DPOC (nominal but unallocated 1 billion budget) and assumed that the sole JCA would replace both Harrier and Tornado. The choice was the F35C, and this time there was an added reason: facts had changed.
In 2001, when the UK entered the F35 enterprise with the B as preferred solution (but never with a really definitive selection), it was expected that the F35C would be the most expensive of the 3 variants.

By 2010 it had become absolutely clear that it was actually the F35B that would cost the most to buy and then to run through life.

The 2010 decision was soon reversed, as we know, and now we are back in the B field fully, with the reason being a still rather unconvincing estimate putting the cost of fitting catapults and arrestor wires to CVF at 2 billion for Prince of Wales (converted at build) and 3 billion for Queen Elizabeth (converted at her first major refit, eventually).
I say rather unconvincing for a number of reasons. One of the funniest ones is that, in their latest explanation, MOD officers say that they found out they'd have to modify 280 compartments instead of an earlier planned figure of 80/90 in order to fit EMALS and wires into Prince of Wales, pushing costs up dramatically.
What does not really fit into the picture is that such compartments are not being built yet, so it's the paper design that needs changing, not a physical vessel (at least in Prince of Wales's case).
Again, even if 280 compartments need redesign, one cannot possibly understand how the financial impact can be so mostrous, considering that each CVF has over 2800 compartments, that the class was designed with a 111 million pounds Assessment and 175 million pounds Demonstration phases and that the virtual total unitary cost (inclusive of a 1.56 billion cost increase purely caused by a 2008 slow-down imposed to the works by Labour government) is 2.6 billion.
Rather spectacular modifications muse be necessary to double the cost of the vessel while modifying a tiny fraction of it...

At the moment, the UK has taken ownership over ZM135, the first F35B. Its brother, BK-2, should be delivered to the UK next month.
BK-3, that at one point following the SDSR 2010 was destined to be given to the US Marines in exchange for an F35C (CK-1), will arrive next year, since it was ordered one year after the first 2.
These planes will stay in the US, as probably will the first 6 "production" F35Bs.
Calling them "production" airframes is not really correct, since they are still going to be part of Low Rate Initial Production blocks. Only from 2018 or 2019 there will be full production-standard F35s.
Anyway, the UK has placed long lead orders this year, that will be formalized in 2013 as the order for the first of the 48 (if reports are true) planes planned.

In any case, here are some observations of the two possible scenarios implied by the latest development:

Scenario 1:

Tornado and Typhoon Tranche 1 go in 2019 (leaving 5 Typhoon squadrons), 48 F35B by 2023, additional F35 A or B in the 2020s.

48 F35B for the carriers. Possibly to be ordered/received by 2023, this date being indicated in the MOD Business Plan 2012 as the "end date" for the JCA effort.
Not too bad a number, but a very tight one nonetheless.
6 of these airplanes would stay in the US, with the USMC Squadron 501 "Warlords" at the Eglin F35 Integrated Training Centre, and act as a OCU to prepare pilots.
There won't be any UK-based OCU at least until 2014, but after that part of the airplanes might need to be used for a training formation at home.

Even if they are not needed and training is met by the Eglin facilities and UK force in there, the very best number of frontline squadrons that could be formed would be 3. And that would leave just 6 airframes to rotate in the force to cover maintenance needs.
The original Italian Navy assumption (now the plan has changed) was for a force of 22 F35B: 3 based in the US for training, 5 expected to be in maintenance/not available at any one time, and 14 available for embarking on the Cavour aircraft carrier.

The UK order would be a bit more than double that size, so let's make an empiric assumption and say that 6 airframes in the US do it for training. More than a quarter of the fleet would be unavailable most of the time, so that would mean 10/11 airframes. And a 6 + 32 (3 Squadrons) + 6 (attrition) airframes would struggle to make ends meet.
48 airplanes would realistically support 2 frontline Squadrons, with the third being routinely understrength to some degree.
Not unacceptable, considering that squadrons would normally rotate at different readiness levels, but this is arguably the very, very barest minimum for having an aspirational capability of filling up a CVF with a Wing of 3 squadrons in case of need.

The lack of attritional airframes would in addition mean that airframes would age faster, as there wouldn't be enough spare aircrafts to enable a rotational use, spreading the flying hours on more aircrafts.
This is, to a degree, acceptable in my view because the F35 is going to be in production for many, many years into the future, and its future price will likely drop over time, depending on how much export success it effectively reaps around the world.
With this background, it does arguably make sense to buy less airframes at the start, cutting back on the Attrition pool, in favor of buying replacement airframes in later years as and if it proves necessary.

Even so, in my opinion the eventual follow-on order should really be for the same aircraft type, to increase the number of carrier-capable aircrafts and to avoid the duplication of costs and issues that would be unavoidable if a split buy was the chosen path. F35A and F35B might have a lot in common, but they are simply not the same thing. Training and logistics would be partially different, and while the A's support and training would be less expensive per airframe, i'm not convinced that it would be an advantageous approach when all things get considered together.

The follow-on order for F35A would be, really, the third attempt of the RAF to procure a dedicate Tornado replacement. While Hammord reportedly said "that a follow-on F-35 buy would be set out in a future Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR), with the aim of replacing the Eurofighter Typhoon in UK service", i really do not think that a total replacement of Typhoon is on the cards.

The Typhoon Out of Service date is 2030, notionally, but it is unthinkable that the main industrial product of Europe, the most numerous (it'll be from around 2015, since at the moment there is technically more Tornado GR4s still) aircraft in service with the RAF, the main export offer of the UK in the defence aerospace sector, the horribly-expensive superfighter does not get a Mid-Life Upgrade like all other major defence platforms.
The idea of retiring Typhoon just 12 years after it hits Full Operating Capability (planned for 2018 at the moment) is frankly impossible to accept or conceive.
Typhoon will no doubt live much longer than 2030.

A possibility is the loss of the 52 Typhoon Tranche 1, which have for some time now been assumed to go out of service by 2019, same OSD now planned for Tornado GR4.
The Tranche 1, relatively new but hard-worked already, would cost a fortune to upgrade, and they have some structural differences compared to Tranche 2 and 3 aircrafts that would prevent them from expanding their capabilities sufficiently (or making it financially unfeasible, anyway).
The idea is to remove them early from service, and keep a 5 squadrons fleet flying with a force of 107 Tranche 2 and Tranche 3. [Note, again, that 5 frontline squadrons supported by a fleet of 107 means 21.4 airframes per each 12-aircraft frontline squadron. Applied to F35B, the same ratio supports only 2.28 frontline squadrons, as mentioned earlier. What Typhoon is not likely to have is a production line open for as long as the F35's one. In addition, there is no US centre that trains pilots for the Typhoon!]

The Tornado GR4 and Typhoon (Tranche 1) are the two machines that will need replacing in the 2020s, and a second order of F35s, plus, in good time, the hoped-for UCAV, will be the only real option available for keeping up the fast jet numbers in the UK. The hope of the RAF is probably to get around 50 more airframes: post SDSR, a long-term target figure of "around 100 F35s" continued to circulate, in fact.

For maximum efficiency, though, i'd very much prefer if the UK sticked to the sole B variant, for maximum flexibility.
The F35A, of course, costs less, has a greater range and full size weapon bays.
The B's bays are 14 inches shorter, so there is less space for fitting current and future large weapons and/or payloads. The internal hardpoint for air-ground weaponry is rated for 1500 pounds, against 2500 for A and C variants.
In addition, the second of 3 pylons under each wing of an F35B is rated for 1500 pounds payload, against 2500 for the A and C variants. The innermost underwing pylons are rated for 5000 pounds on all variants (on these pylons the UK F35 will eventually carry Storm Shadows) while the third point on each wing is for AA missiles only, and the UK F35s will carry ASRAAMs on them.

It is not just about the Weapons Bays 14 inches shorter: payload limitations extend to the pylons carrying physically less weight, and there are of course Vertical Bring Back margins which can be a problem when the aircraft is returning to the carrier or short runway with unexpended weaponry aboard.

The F35A as a standard comes fitted with USAF-style receptacle, for Boom-type air to air refuelling. The RAF uses the USN method of Probe and Drogue.
Fortunately, the F35A is "ready to take" the same kind of probe and drogue kit used by the B and C, but nonetheless, there will be additional cost to fit it.

The Boom style air refuelling is the USAF favorite method. The USN method, adopted by NATO, has the well known probes and drogues. The Voyager tankers could be fitted with a Boom, but of course, this would cost serious money. And as it stands, none of the 14 air tankers on order has the Boom. Which creates already enough problems considering that the RAF can't refuel its C17s in flight, and in future won't be able to refuel the Rivet Joint either.

The main problem is that a Split Buy without the money for making it a big split buy is only going to buy two small aircraft fleet instead of a single, decent sized one.
Instead of 100 between F35B and F35A, i'd take 80 F35B any day, if the problem is money.
If the problem is about range and payload, then stepping away from the C was not right.

And, finally, there is another fear connected to a split buy: that of the two fleets entering a competition for access to the little budget available. The kind of internal, fratricide competition that gave Harried a death from a thousand cuts (the reduction enacted in 2009 was the death blow that was used as justification for the final retirement in 2010, as the many cuts had made the fleet "too small"), that forced the First Sea Lord to announce he would resign if the RAF went ahead and sacrificed the Harrier (2008).

I really do not want to hear, in a few years time, the same old shit.

"F35A costs less..."
"We've got more range and payload than them..."
"We can't put that weapon on the B..."
"We should just cut the B..."

No. It's happened once. Strategic Thinking has been sacrified once already, and it must not happen again. 
    


The Jane's article, reportedly, talks of yet another scenario. Please be aware that i cannot check it myself, i'm reporting from other sources:

Typhoon Tranche 1 retained, giving a 7 squadrons force. 48 F35B procured by 2023, a second order of F35 in the very long term (2030) as manned part of a Typhoon replacement, probably completed by drones. 

This would see the MOD abandoning the plan of retiring Tranche 1 Typhoons by 2019.
The Typhoon force would instead grow to 7 squadrons plus OCU and OEU, probably with the Tranche 1 used for the 2 "Air Defence" Squadrons (3rd and 6th RAF) and the Tranche 2 and 3 used in 5 "Swing-Role" deployable squadrons, due to their more complete capabilities.

The F35B force would be made up by 48 airplanes, procured probably by 2023, as said in Scenario 1.

The second buy of F35 airplanes in this case is, effectively, a non-binding promise. The government might well say they will order more F35s in 2030, but effectively they don't know, they can't and won't promise.
It is a nice way to say that, really, the F35 order has been slashed from 150, then 138 all the way down to 48. Quite dramatic a cut, more than two thirds of the original planning figure.
Not even worth bothering thinking about what will happen in 2030: way too far away in time to say. Not to mention that, as i said earlier, i really do not expect the Typhoon to bow out of service that soon.

This second scenario is admittedly attractive financially speaking because retaining already available, already paid-for Typhoon Tranche 1s is undoubtedly going to be less expensive than a second F35 order in the early 2020s.

A force of 48 F35Bs, however, calls into question the sense of adopting a "60:40" split between RAF and Fleet Air Arm.
With 48 being the bare minimum number for a single carrier wing, the focus on naval operations for the force must be absolute, or it won't make much sense. 

Does it melt the decks or not...?

There are many ways to give an answer. Words can be used, with some smartness, to tell a story that, while generally true, hides a few factors.
When F35B went to sea for trials on the USS Wasp, the US Marines needed a success to show to the public and to Congress, to have the F35B taken out of probation and saved from the many threats surrounding it.
One of the things they had to demonstrate during the trials was the resistance of the ship's deck to the F35B engine's exhaust. They had to counter the famous "it will melt the deck!" claim (which, by the way, is born out of a real concern apparent from official documents relating to the F35B development prior to sea trials, and not by an urban legend).

The F35B did not melt the deck, just as the C did not melt the Jet Blast Deflectors on trials. The USMC were also quick, when they released the Wasp trials videos, to specify that the very evidently freshly re-coated flight deck of the LHA had been treated with the usual, standard coatings, and specifically so that, after using the F35B on it, it would be possible to analyze the eventual damages.

 

The trials confirmed that most of the fears were fortunately unfunded, but despite the triumphant claims made by the USMC publically, the DoD documents show that there still are some issues and worries.
The F35B jet blast generates a 75 feet danger radius that must be kept in consideration during all deck ops, and while it does not melt the deck, it does degrade the coatings and paint much, much faster than any other aircraft but the MV-22, which has the same kind of hot exhaust issues, even if the propulsion is entirely different.

The US Navy official announcement at the end of the trials eventually specified that the new coating on Wasp was actually not entirely legacy and standard, after all. Landing Spot 9, used for the Vertical Landings, was coated with a new, experimental non-skid material, the Thermion. 
With the words of the US Navy statement:

Also being tested is a newer non-skid deck surface, Thermion, which is supported by a mechanical bond of ceramic and aluminum that makes the surface more resistant to extreme heat and better endures the wear and tear of flight operations. The Thermion covers landing spot nine on the flight deck, a small area used for vertical landings.

“The Thermion shows no signs of heat stress, which is good for the F-35, and eventually good for all surface ships,” said Kalnajs. [topside design and integration technical warrant for Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA)]

In addition, a series of other modifications were made to the USS Wasp for enabling it to work with the F35B, some of them definitive, such as the re-location of some antennas and radomes, some of them made for prudence and likely to be only temporary, such as replacing the rear Sparrow missile launcher with a dummy one, laced with sensors to measure heat, vibrations, overpressure, and sound levels, to make sure that aircrafts coming in to land won't damage the actual launcher or, worse, cause a missile cock-up inside it.
 
An almost certainly definitive change is the

moving (of) the flight deck’s “Tram Line,” or yellow line, which is used by pilots to guide them when performing short landings, closer to the port side of the ship.

This is due to the larger wingspan and greater sizes of the F35B compared to the Harrier. 
In total, JSF modifications ammounted to 6.4 million dollars in expenditure.

It is fair to expect the presence of Thermion in the deck coatings of the LHDs and LHAs of the USMC in the future, and it would be no surprise at all if Thermion made its way onto CVF as well.
So long as it works, all is good.

The F35 program is continuing to progress in its test and validation phase: one very important news is that solutions to the imagery lag and jitter issues of the Helmet Mounted Display have been engineered and are going to soon be flight tested. A new model of micro-camera is also due to be tested, hopefully solving the problem of acuity of the Night Vision imagery.
These mods are crucial to the success of the F35, which has in its HMD a fundamental component, also due to the decision of having no traditional HUD on board.

The sensors and mission system tests are also speeding up, with the aim of validating the Software Block 2A in the near future. Two-ways Data Link 16, radar, and infra-red targeting systems are all being tested and progressively readied.

So far into this year, both the F35B and F35C are reportedly 20% ahead of their test schedule. We are getting closer to validating the top performances required, with the F35B having flown to Mach 1.4 and having flown to 49.000 feet altitude, so well on the way for the final target of Mach 1.6 and 50.000 feet. It also achieved its expected 7G maneuver limit and validated its maximum airspeed of 630 knots.
The F35B is 50% done through its testing with clean-wing profile.

The F35C validated its 7.5 G limit and flew to 630 knots, but the naval variant requirement is 700 knots, so testing has not concluded. The C flew to 45.000 feet.
It is roughly 40% done in clean-wing configuration testing. Testing with external payloads will have to follow.
In the summer, the re-designed tailhook is due to be tested. 

The F35A is 45% done with its overall test program.

All variants have started flying with weapon payloads, and later this year tests for validation of high angle of attack maneuvers (50° is the requirement) will start. And at that point perhaps we'll have a solution to another cry often heard by people looking at F35 videos: "That's not a fighter jet, it never makes tight turns!".

We don't know if it works, and won't know for years

Words and music by the US GAO, in its latest report on the F35 superprogram.
Among the headlights:

IOC dates are yet to be determined. The USMC reportedly aims for an early IOC with interim capabilities in 2015, while USAF and US Navy are expected to put their IOC around 2018, more prudently chosing to fully develop their airplanes before trying to use them.

Full-Rate production will not start before 2018, more likely 2019.

Testing of a fully capable and integrated F35 (with Block 3F software) is likely to happen in 2015 at the earliest, with interim operational testing to follow in 2017. 

Already 373 million dollars are required in mods and fixes for the airplanes produced this far. And more will follow, with the DoD expecting airplanes up to production Lot 10 to need some kind of fixes and mods in the future, due to the number of fixes yet to be determined, tested, rolled out.

The last year in which development funding will have to be committed is expected to be 2016.

US Navy and US Marines will receive all of their planes by 2027, (C and B), while the USAF will get the last F35A in 2035. 

Despite enormous cuts in the number of airplanes to be delivered in the near term, Lochkeed Martin is delivering the F35s with an average delay of 1 year. Only 9, over a planned 30, production F35s were delivered in 2011.
Deliveries of the engines are just as late, so that the only good thing is that engines still meet planes. 


About the F35B, the report notes:

The Department concluded that STOVL development, test, and product maturity is now comparable to the other two variants. While several technical issues have been addressed and some potential solutions engineered, assessing whether the deficiencies are resolved is ongoing and, in some cases, will not be known for years. According to the program office, two of the five specific problems cited are considered to be fixed while the other three have temporary fixes in place.

The Director, Operational Test and Evaluation reported that significant work remains to verify and incorporate modifications to correct known STOVL deficiencies and prepare the system for operational use. Until the proposed technical solutions have been fully tested and demonstrated, it cannot be determined if the technical problems have been resolved.

Software needs have grown to over 24 million lines of code, of which 9.5 millions on board of the airplane itself, and there are delays in the development and release of software. Some capabilities have been pushed to the right, and only 4% of mission system requirements have been validated this far. 

Concurrency is a disaster. It was the worst possible decision to make, and the GAO bitterly notes:

[...] a recent high-level departmental review of JSF concurrency determined that the program is continuing to discover issues at a rate more typical of early design experience, questioning the assumed design maturity that supported the highly concurrent acquisition strategy.

The future of the UK's airpower, in particular at-sea airpower, is tied tightly to the destiny of an airplane, the F35B, that is and will be produced for several more years without real assurances that it works. 

Now, that's what you call a gamble.

Pray that it works, and wait for 2015

So, with a statement that openly contradicts the official declarations of the US Navy and of the UK government itself, which barely days ago said in Parliament that there was no reported problem with the conversion of the Queen Elizabeth class carriers for the use of EMALS, now we are told that:

Because Britain’s carriers will have all electric propulsion, and therefore do not generate steam like nuclear powered vessels, the catapult system would need to be the innovative Electromagnetic version (EMALS), being developed for the US Navy. Fitting this new system to a UK carrier has presented greater design challenges than were anticipated.

Either you were lying a week ago, or you are lying now. Somehow i think it's the second. 

Anyway, the statement also says that:

Secondly, and partly as a result of the delayed timetable, the estimated cost of fitting this equipment to the Prince of Wales has more than doubled in the last 17 months, rising from an estimated £950M to around £2Bn, with no guarantee that it will not rise further.

Again, i just cannot believe it. But i suspect that, just like a promised but never published NAO report into the economic factors of keeping Harrier over Tornado, we will never be told the truth nor we will ever hear them justify this absurd figure.
There won't be a NAO investigation on this particular claim, want to bet with me?

Another lie is a few lines down the statement:

Thirdly, at the time of the SDSR, there was judged to be a very significant technical risk around the STOVL version of JSF and some commentators were speculating that it could even be cancelled. Indeed, the STOVL programme was subsequently placed on probation by the Pentagon However, over the last year, the STOVL programme has made excellent progress and in the last few months has been removed from probation. The aircraft has completed over 900 hours of flying, including flights from the USS Wasp and the US Marine Corp has a high degree of confidence in the in-service date for the aircraft.

While the USMC aims for a 2015 IOC, the reality is that production F35B are restricted from doing what they are meant to, going STOVL, as a clutch overheating problem preventing the engagement of STOVL mode in hot weather is still without a solution. 
Additionally, the USMC will declare IOC with the software Block 2 and Block 3I, which are to include basic weapon release capability [it is very likely that none of the british weapons will be cleared in Block 2 and 3I], but be otherwise largely incomplete and in need for upgrade ASAP.
The USAF and US Navy are willing to wait until 2018, in order to declare IOC with the Block 3F software.
The UK can aim for IOC whenever it wants, provided that it pays for it: early IOC means placing orders early, getting early production planes, paying more for them, and then paying more money to retrofit them with the missing pieces.
And oh, we should anticipate integration of ASRAAM and Paveway IV, too, which is planned for Block 3F, otherwise the F35B entering service "early" with the RAF will only be able to use AMRAAM, since the other weapons which will be cleared (JDAM and GBU-12) are not in UK use.

But we are used to this practice, aren't we? The last Typhoon Tranche 1 of the RAF went to Warton this month to begin its R2 retrofit which will bring it to Block 5 standard.
Years after the plane entered service and dragged on with mutilated capabilities that have arguably badly affected the Typhoon's export potential as well.

The early in service date is a lie. It entirely depends on force buildup, and it is not at all as dependent on the US's own IOC as they want to have us believe.
At most, it is in theory possible to achieve earlier at-sea IOC since Queen Elizabeth is (expected to be) compatible with STOVL ops, so that air operations at sea could begin in 2018 instead of 2020. There's no certainty that this will be possible, however, especially since the airplanes and crews available in 2018 are likely to be very few unless orders are speeded up, and it is, to say the least, unlikely.
It will also depend on decisions yet to be taken. So far, Queen Elizabeth was planned to go in mothball in 2018/19 as Prince of Wales comes online. This is likely to change in SDSR 2015, or indeed much earlier than that.
Prince of Wales might enter service, or go from shipyard to mothball immediately, without making a day of service.
It's all to be seen still.

If Hammond is not lying and the UK gets its first production F35B in 2016, the order will be placed no later than 2014, with long-lead contracts signed next year. That would mean LRIP 8 and, barring further delays, Block 3F software. In the case, it would work well. All would depend, at that point, on the number of airplanes ordered.

This simplified graphic is the result of my research into the often confusing blurry of documents available on the F35. It should be up to date, but changes are always possible. Block 3F software should start being available with LRIP 8, and will be used for the first full-rate production orders, before Block IV is developed and rolled out. It was originally planned that Block IV would include Storm Shadow and Brimstone for the UK, but the requirement was cancelled as saving measure, and at the moment there's not a plan anymore. The general rule is that the airplanes are delivered two years after the firm order is placed, with Long Lead orders placed at least a further year earlier.

A now outdated but always interesting production plan for the F35. We can guess a revised schedule with the UK ordering 0 airplanes in 2013 (but placing long lead orders for them), with firm order for 7(?) F35B in 2014, plus others in the following years. The airplanes available in 2018 for obtaining the mythical early IOC will have to be ordered between 2014 and 2016. It'll likely be 2019 at the earlier before a squadron of F35 gains full strenght in the UK.

Next in line, ladies and gentlemen:

The balance of risk has changed and there is now judged to be no greater risk in STOVL than in other variants of JSF.

The highlighted affirmation are patently, utterly untrue. It clashes with reality and with any and every document and statement you'll ever get from the US DoD.
As always, the US DoD real words are: 

[...] significant work and flight tests remain to verify and incorporate modifications to STOVL aircraft required to correct known STOVL deficiencies and prepare the system for operational use.

By the end of November 2011, overall test point progress against planned
baseline productivity was slightly behind (9 percent).    [F35A 11% behind schedule, F35C is 32% ahead of schedule]

The endless list of unresolved issues and risks tied to the F35B completes the picture. 

Then, the next pill of awesome:

So, I can announce today that the National Security Council has agreed not to proceed with the “cats and traps” conversion, but to complete both carriers in STOVL configuration. This will give us the ability to use both carriers to provide continuous carrier availability - at a net additional operating cost averaging about £60M per year. As we set out in the SDSR, a final decision on the use of the second carrier will be taken as part of SDSR 2015.

So, hold on tight: both carriers will be capable to work with the fixed wing jets to be bought, but we could still only get one.
The only interesting / reassuring bit of info is the 60 million average annual cost for running a carrier. Adjusted for inflation, i think it matches the 2003 value of 44 millions per year, so the ship's running cost is stable and - relatively - low. An Albion class LPD costs between 20 and 30 millions a year, a Bay costs 12 million a year.
A CVF at 60 millions is more than fair.


Lies aside, the lesson of the day is: pray that the F35B works. And wait for 2015. 

Bollocks proven wrong by facts

DefenceManagement reports that the National Security Council has, yesterday 8 april 2012, approved a re-rething and sealed the return to the F35B, with an announcement to Parliament expected before the week is over. 

The Telegraph says that with the F35B both CVFs could be put in service, and carrier air restored earlier, already in 2018. 



On the "both carriers" bit, i hope they are right. If they are not, the military top brass, the defence minister and everyone in the National Security Council should be kicked in the ass from here to Port Stanley, because putting in service both vessels is the only reason why STOVL should be considered. Wasn't for this, it shouldn't even be allowed on the table.
So either it is 2 STOVL carriers, or 1 CATOBAR. One STOVL carrier, one mothballed hulk is just demented. DEMENTED. 

The 2018 date is bollocks proven wrong by facts. There's nothing at all to suggest that the B variant will be ready in time, and even less suggests that the UK will speed the buy up to have the planes earlier.
It's a lie, pure and simple. US Department of Defense reports say clearly that the F35B is 9% behind even the revised, curred project schedule, has more than 15.000 test points to clear and at least 1500 test flights more to go.
The C is 32% ahead of schedule, has 12.000 test points to clear, and 1200 flights to go.

The US Marines might have urgency to put the F35B in service first, but they are going to do so (eventually) with an airplane that risks being unable to do what it is meant to do (STOVL) due to an as-yet uncorrected overheating issue in the transmission clutch of the Lift Fan (1).
In addition, the airplane will enter service with the software block 2B, incomplete, which is now due to include some initial weapon-release capability (which likely includes none of the british weapons: no ASRAAM, no Paveway IV), but which will need urgent replacing with the Block 3 software. Worse, these early production airplanes will need millions of dollars of mods and structural changes for which the DoD is already putting aside hundreds of millions.
Follow the USMC in this particular path only means getting blasted (with good reasons) by a NAO report telling everyone how stupid the decision is, and how much money wasted it entails.

The F35B mean corrective maintenance time for critical failures is also twice as long as planned, while the F35C is in threshold on target.
The F35B is literally losing pieces in test flights, something that Lochkeed Martin won't tell on its website, obviously. (2)
In 19 days of trials at sea on USS Wasp, one of the involved F35B needed, twice, replacement of the upper lift fan doors.

Vertical Bring Back weight requirement (the weight of a minimum fuel quantity and other
necessary payload needed to safely recover the aircraft on the ship after an operational mission, plus a representative weapons payload) is for 5000 pounds (at least it should be, might have been reduced), of which up to 1700 are made up by fuel. This vital requirement is still at very real risk. There's just 230 to 370 pounds of margin for weight growth in the next five years before the "not to exceed value" for empty weight is reached and surpassed.
Even if the requirement is met, there is not enough bring back weight margin to return to the carrier with unexpended Storm Shadow missiles ( 2870 pounds each) and even Ship Borne Rolling Vertical Landing might not solve the problem.
Someone has already suggested that Storm Shadow will not be launched by shipborne F35Bs. If it proves true, well. Better if i do not say what i just thought, it is rude.   

Regarding Ship Borne Rolling Vertical Landing, it is a UK idea, which is to turn a vertical landing into almost a CATOBAR landing, but without cables. Trials have been made with a modified Qinetiq Harrier on Charles De Gaulle and Illustrious, and the activity, which was stopped in 2010 following the switch to F35C, has cost several tens of millions.
It will have to be resumed if the F35B returns to be the preferred solution.

The SRVL approach exploits the ability of the short take-off and vertical landing F-35B to use vectored thrust to slow the speed of the aircraft while still gaining the benefit of wing-borne lift, by landing with a deck run. This offers a significant increase in "bring-back" payload compared with a vertical recovery and is likely to reduce stress on the single-engined aircraft's propulsion system.
However, deck operations become more complex and a landing runway is needed, instead of a landing spot, so much so that SRVL might require an angled deck, just as CATOBAR technique.
Pilot and deck crew training regimes would have to change, and even F35 flight control laws might have to be adjusted.
A "Bedford Array" visual aid system had to be developed and tested to guide the pilots in this new kind of approach, particularly in rough seas. And you know who liked the idea? The US Navy, which is building on it for its CATOBAR carriers. Once more, a great british idea in the naval aviation field will be exploited in the right way not by Britain, but by the americans. Read this to see how fast the idea is catching on with the CATOBAR pilots of the USN.

Vertical Bring Back Weight is an issue so big that already in 2004/5 the USMC "adopted" the SRVL concept, and sponsored the british activity in this direction, to feed the data into the F35 programme. 

When SRVL activities were ongoing, this very significant brief was given, and the awesome website Navy Matters still reports it:

Using SRVL F-35B aircraft would approach the carrier from astern at about 60 knots indicated air speed, 35 knots relative assuming 25 knots wind over deck (the maximum speed of a CVF will be 25 knots, so 25kts WOD is achievable even in dead calm) on a steep 5-6 degree glide path.  Touch down would be about 150 feet from the stern with a stopping distance of 300 to 400 feet depending on conditions (wet flight deck, pitching ships etc).  That would leave around 300 feet of flight deck for margin or even "bolters". [Note: 400 + 150 + 300 = 850 feet. THE WHOLE DECK IS COMMITTED TO THE LANDING. What about any other flying activity????]

The SRVL technique has a significant impact on ship designs and aviation operations, Commander Tony Ray told a conference in February 2008: "We expect to trade some STOVL flexibility for increased bring-back and fuel.  We have to .. check for for relevant CV criteria that apply to slower SRVL operations.  For example flightpath control will be a far more important flight criteria for SRVL than it has been for STOVL.  It is a CV trait creeping in".

So, the "training gap" between STOVL and CATOBAR further reduces, and deck operations are as affected by SRVL than by an arrested landing.
Or wait, that's actually worse than on a CATOBAR vessel.
Without an angled deck for SRVL, and having to rely only on the plane's brakes, in order to accommodate a bolter, the whole deck, from ski jump to stern, will have to be free and committed to the landing of the "heavy" F35B.

Isn't it awesome? The disadvantages of CATOBAR (and possibly some more) coupled to the inferior performance of STOVL airplanes.
Really smart. Really. I'm so impressed. 


The other problems with the F35B (and the C's ones, it is not perfect either, but at least much, much better...) i've covered already in other articles, so i won't repeat it all and annoy everyone to death. The US report i've linked contains the most complete non-classified liste of issues available, and the most up to date, so it remains the go-to document for any who wants to see the full table of the F35B propulsion issues and count the number of times the TBD (To Be Determined) sign comes up when the subject is "solution to this issue".

I will close this bitter piece with a brutal assessment of reality, and then an hope and wish.

First the brutal assessment:

- STOVL is less expensive in the short term. 

True, there are less costs connected to the ships, but the airplane will cost a lot more to acquire, and a lot more through life.

- CATOBAR would cost more for added ship crew for operating catapults and wires, and would impose a great training penalty, with associated cost. 

Questionable. The full extent of the training penalty and crewing difference is actually not well determined. SRVL, if adopted, risks reducing the gap by a lot. If it is not adopted, we risk seeing certain weapons not cleared for use from the carrier (Storm Shadow on top of the list) and/or many expensive weapons thrown into the waves over the plane's life.

As to the impact of catapults and wires on ship crew, a current Nimitz carrier employs 56 men for the 4 catapults and 47 for the MK7 wires.
EMALS is expected to require 30% less crew, so that could go down to 40. For a 4-rails system. The british one would have half the rails.
The Advanced Arrestor Wire (which differently from EMALS is to be retrofitted to all carriers) requires only 4 men for normal operations, namely a Pri-Fly Recovery Operator, an Arresting Gear Officer, an AAG Monitor and an AAG Retractor Operator. 

Pardon me if i continue to have reserves.  

- The F35B works: it went to sea on USS Wasp.  

The F35B went to sea for 19 days, lost pieces in flight and had others replaced twice in three weeks. It remains plagued by multiple issues, its airframe life is currently 3000 hours (bulkheads developed cracks by this milestone) against a requirement for 8000 (the Typhoon is certified for 6000 flying hours, but BAE is still running an airframe on stress tests in Brough that have overcome the 12.000 hours milestone and aims for proving that the airframe is going to last without troubles for 18.000, to give an idea). As it is, there's an unresolved overheating issue that prevents it from entering STOVL mode in hot weather, and production airplanes in USMC squadrons will, for an undetermined time, only fly in CTOL profile).
Supposed to serve for 30 years, the F35B has a growth margin of 370 pounds at best before it reaches the not-to exceed weight. A bit little. Hope that engine technology moves ahead a lot in 30 years and increases very significantly the power output...
In short, i've issues with the "it works" statement. Not even in service yet, and already feels like it's held together in one piece with strings and scotch tape. Not the best feelings.

- STOVL operations can better cohexist with the helicopter ops necessary for the carrier to work as Assault Ship as envisaged by Carrier Enabled Power Projection


It is a marginal advantage. US Kitty Hawk in 2001, during operations against the Talibans in Afghanistan, had 8 to 12 Super Hornets on board, which flew 600 sorties in her deployment, and simultaneously was used as afloat staging base for helicopter insertions of troops and special forces, with the 160th Regiment Special Forces Aviation on board.


Actually, if SRVL is continued and adopted, and a heavy plane returns to the STOVL carrier, all deck needs to be cleared and the impact on other operations is worse than with CATOBAR ops.


- STOVL enables RAF land-based crews to embark with minimum warning and rapidly certify for all-weather ops from the deck.

Probably. But with the Harrier GR9 it didn't work very well: the number of carrier qualified RAF pilots was normally extremely low/non existant. Does not promise that well.

Again, SRVL is highly likely to make things a lot more complicated, and much more similar to CATOBAR ops.
Not adopting SRVL would be worse, though, as it would severely limit the operational viability of the F35B: the bring-back weight value is really far too low.

- We can always switch to catapults later when there will be UCAVs to launch.

Does it sound like an idiocy only to me? It reads like "ok, we are doing a stupid thing. But, eventually, we will fix the error with more money later".

After buying the most expensive, less capable fleet of airplanes.

Better if we do not reach the point in which catapults become indispensable "later". Since i can't see that much money being available for defence anytime soon, such a need would likely be a big, big issue.

- STOVL means two carriers in service.

I wish it did. But it is far from sure. We will see if there will be an announcement in this sense, eventually.
And even if there is, the destiny still passes through the SDSR 2015.



Lastly, the hope.

May both carriers enter service, and may the F35 work as intended in the end. 




NOTES:

(1): US DoD programs, F35 program testing report, page 30, 31 and 32 

"Production aircraft will be restricted from STOVL-mode flight operations until Service airworthiness authorities grant a flight clearance. A significant amountof flight test and development of system maturity of the final STOVL-mode door and propulsion system designs remains to be accomplished. A system mature enough for unmonitored STOVL-mode flight may be needed as early as late 2012 to coincide with the delivery of lot 4 F-35B aircraft to the Marine Corps at Yuma, Arizona. If testing of the changes is not complete and needed modifications are not installed by late 2012, aircraft at Yuma will fly in CTOL‑mode only.

"The interim solution to unacceptably high clutch temperatures is to add a temperature sensor and display page so that the pilot can be aware of increasing temperature inside the clutch housing. Fuel and operational conditions permitting, changing flight regimes (e.g. configuration, altitude, and airspeed) may cool the clutch so that the pilot can engage STOVL modes. Such a cooling procedure may be untenable in combat conditions."


(2): US DoD programs, F35 program testing report, page 32


"Roll control nozzle doors separated in-flight from a test aircraft twice, drawing attention to door rigging and the potential for redesign. The program plans to conduct flight test on a new door in early 2012 to support the redesign effort."