Philip Hammond, the carriers, the strategy

Philip Hammond has delivered a relevant speech at the RUSI Air Power conference yesterday, and delivered some reassuring observations. Mainly, he seems to have finally grasped the full relevance and strategic importance of the aircraft carriers, of their flexibility, of the indipendent action capability that they offer.

Relevantly, he promised that the aircraft carrier will routinely embark a full squadron of F35B jets whenever she sails "outside of home waters". On operations, it is assumed that the number would increase, potentially all the way up to 36.
Of course, he does not expand on the difficulties connected with trying to deploy a full 36-strong wing from a fleet that is now projected to number only 48 in total.
I can think of only one example of such an ambitious force generation, and that's the successful effort of the Fleet Air Arm for the Falklands War, when over 90% of the total Sea Harrier fleet was sent to the fight.
This (renewed) promise is significant, because it expands and precises the nature of the "routine": whenever the carrier goes outside home waters. Again, it is a relevant promise because the Royal Air Force is reportedly trying to secure a mostly land-based life for the F35 fleet (unsurprisingly), with leaked information that suggests the RAF tried to have the "routine" airgroup cut back all the way to just 6.
12 is already a small number, 6 would be just laughable, so it is comfortable that the minister's position goes in favor of logic and operational reasoning.

The RAF must not be allowed to bring the focus away from the need for restoring the capability to deploy serious airpower at and from the sea. That's why carriers are being built and why F35Bs are being acquired.
The fairy tale of the "Deep and Persistent Offensive Capability", in which stealth bombers will "always get through" and hit targets deep into enemy air space must be forgotten. It is a ridiculous dream, and spending money on F35 to pursue it won't stand up to an informed analysis. It is not a priority to have even more land-based jet squadrons. The F35B must be about naval operations first and foremost.
The theatre of jets taking off from Marham, refuelling in flight 5 or more times to go and throw, at huge cost, a tiny number of Storm Shadows against an enemy with nearly no chance at all of defending its air space is not, and never will be, a justification for more of the same.
To any logical mind, those raids make little to no operational sense.

The RAF would better focus its hunger for fast jets on the horribly expensive Typhoon fleet, abandoning the plan to throw to hell more than 50 still young airframes. A RAF with 7 Typhoon squadrons (2 for air defence, and the Tranche 1 is realistically more than enough for the task as of now: 5 Deployable swing-role squadrons for operations abroad) is all what is realistically needed for land-based operations. More importantly, it is an affordable and basically paid-for force. It only takes money to continue to run the Tranche 1s. And it can be done.  

A 159-strong, 7 squadrons Typhoon force can serve the country well. At Tornado GR4-standards, it can deliver 46 or more Force Elements at Readiness (FE@R), of which 16 or so would be for homeland air defence and 30 or so for speedy deployment to operations.
To this, the F35B fleet of 48 would add another 12 / 14, again reasoning at Tornado standards, and it is to be hoped that availability of the newer airplanes will be higher, once fully in service.
This is a realistic force, perhaps not as good as large 64 deployable elements at readiness which used to be the target in the early 2000s, but close enough.
It is estimated that a Brigade-sized operation can be covered with 32 deployed jets, so the force would fit into the Defence Planning Assumptions rather well.
This, i find, is the realistic and affordable target that should be pursued. 

Philip Hammond also strongly suggested that both aircraft carriers shall be put in service. He said that the additional cost would be around 70 million a year, and described it, very correctly in my opinion, as an extremely good deal.
Putting both in service gives the Navy the ability to have a carrier countinously available throughout the operational life of the class, and the possibility, in emergency time, to sail both to a warzone. He of course said, once more, that the firm decision is left for the SDSR 2015, but he clearly expressed his belief that operating both ships is the way to go.

I will add, personally, that operating one or both vessels does not only impact the capability to deploy air power at sea continuously, but it also impacts the Navy's amphibious capability. Operating a single CVF risks to be a death blow to the amphibious capabilities of the UK, since by 2022 at the latest, and probably much earlier, HMS Ocean will be gone, and with no replacement LPHs planned, the Queen Elizabeth class carriers are going to be simply crucial not so much as carriers, but as "Landing Helicopter - Aviation" ships.
With HMS Illustrious bowing out in 2014 and HMS Ocean possibly following in 2018, or anyway sometime before 2022, unless there is a dramatic rethink, the Queen Elizabeth class vessels will be the only big flat tops available to the navy, and they will have to be there to carry not just airplanes, but the Marines with their helicopters, in what has been called, ever since the publication of the SDSR 2010, "Carrier Enabled Power Projection".

It is absolutely crucial to ensure that both carriers enter service, to restore airpower at sea and to ensure the long term viability of the british amphibious capability, which would be massively depleted otherwise, with a further, massive reduction in the number of deployable Marines and with the near nullification of the amphibious force's rotary wing capability, as the LPDs and LSDs all come without hangars and thus with a quite small helicopter capability overall.

It is intended that the Royal Navy Response Force Task Group will have extensive aviation capability and room for a good 1800 Marines with their vehicles and supporting helicopters.
The presence of the Carrier in the task group is vital to ensure the whole thing remains viable. Early in last October, rear admiral Cunningham briefed the audience of the Maritime Security Challenges 2012 conference, and in his slides it can be noted that the assumption is that the Carrier task group will be always at 5 days notice to move.
If this is the planning assumption, there is no alternative to having both in service.

The much publicized anglo-french expeditionary force will instead be at 30 days notice to move, and it is planned that at least one aircraft carrier will always be part of the force, notionally being provided by each country, rotationally for one year at a time.


It is very important that the investment made on the carriers is not wasted: these are incredibly useful and relevant vessels, and it essential to use them well.

Mr. Hammond was also brought, albeit briefly, on the theme of the Maritime Patrol Aircraft, and he exposed himself justifying the Nimrod decision with a very strong description of the MRA4, which he argues had very low probabilities to ever fly, and would only be a money sink.
Frankly, i think this is gross exaggeration, and so far, while it had emerged that the Nimrod MRA4 still had some issues to iron out when it was cancelled, no one ever dared trying to say that it could not be made to work. And this is being generous: i'm assuming Hammond intended "flying" as operationally serving the RAF exactly as planned, because the Nimrod MRA4 had been flying in the more general sense of the word for many years, actually, and it tackled succesfully many trials, including torpedo releases.

Hammond of course tried to minimize the extent of the problem, but to anyone listening, the MPA situation of the UK just cannot make sense.
Even more so as Hammond (rightfully, in my opinion) underlined the "ISTAR lesson" derived from the Libya experience and the need for Europe to stand up to the security challenges of the Mediterranean, north Africa and Middle East, as we'll see further ahead.

I make no mystery of my position, which is to give great priority to the Maritime Patrol Aircraft need as part of the next SDSR. Worth reporting is also the quite clear thought of the chief of staff of the french navy about the MPA problem:

"They don’t have a maritime patrol aircraft. I don’t know if they are desperate, but if you took my MPA away, I’d be in a desperate state."

I'm under no illusion: for the Royal Navy, it isn't any more desirable to be without MPA than for the french.

Regarding the "ISTAR lesson", Hammond notes, quoting an observation already made by US Defense Secretary R. Gates, that the most advanced fighter aircraft are little use if allies do not have the means to identify, process, and strike targets as part of an integrated campaign.
The insufficient ISTAR resources available to NATO, along with insufficient air-to-air refuelling capability were the two most evident issues over Libya, followed by issues of insuffient interoperability and even difficulties in communications between allied assets. 
The full extent of the problem is still struggling to come to light, but the issues are very serious, so much so that Denmark, which had earlier opted out of the NATO AGS drone system, now has re-joined the program, after having assessed first hand the difficulties in Unified Protector (Denmark has been a major contributor, flying a surprising number of sorties and expending the near totality of its precision-guided bomb stocks). In the UK, Libya has served to re-ignite interest in systems such as Sentinel and Sea King MK7 and Sentry, so much so that while uncertainties still remain over the future of Sentinel post-Afghanistan, there is now the expectation of seeing it confirmed as part of the future force.

The ISTAR lesson seem to have surprised many in Europe, but i want to hope that the military planners, if not the politicians, only faked ignorance because "forced" to abandon investments in these areas by governments calling for cuts.
Because the ISTAR lesson should not have been a surprise. To me, it certainly was. I've been arguing for strategic enablers in forever, and ISTAR platforms featured prominently in all my calls. I'm not a genius at all, yet i had easily seen where the real problems were. I'd like to think that military professionists can see things better than i do, sincerely. 

I deem it absolutely fundamental that proper attention is paid to the unique Strategic Enablers, those capabilities that the UK can bring to the table that no other country in Europe can, with the exception of France for some of these.
So i'm thinking about Sentinel, a good-sized fleet of drones (Reaper and Watchkeeper, then Scavenger replacing Reaper), Airseeker, AWACS, the large fleet of Voyager air tankers, the carriers with their embarked aviation and AEW/ISTAR platforms, the amphibious force, the RFA (alone, it makes up 34% of the strategic at sea logistics capability available in Europe!) and Maritime Patrol Aircrafts too, a capability that has been gapped, but that should be restored as quickly as possible. And also, of course, the strategic mobility offered by an unmatched fleet of 6 Point class RoRo and 8 C17s, something that no one else in Europe has.

The "ISTAR lesson" is closely connected to the topic of multinational collaboration, and to the "new role" for a more mature, more active Europe, which far from meaning unified armed forces is anyway the only possible path to follow to achieve political and military relevance in the future.

Hammond notes:

But in the case of Libya it shone a bright light on relative military and political capabilities in terms of who "could but wouldn't"; and who "would but couldn't".

With the United States reflecting, in its strategic posture, the growing importance of the developing strategic challenge in the Pacific, the nations of Europe must find the political will to take on more responsibility for our own back yard, and fund the capabilities to allow that.

Certainly that means, shouldering the major burden in the Balkans and the Mediterranean.

But also being prepared, if necessary, to take a bigger role in relation to North Africa and the Middle East.

The bottom line is that Europe, as a whole, needs to do more, at a time when the reality is that, across the continent, aggregate defence expenditure is certain to fall in the short term and, at best, recover slowly in the medium term.

So the challenge is stark: if we can't spend more, we must do things differently;
Maximising the capability we can collectively squeeze out of the resources we have;
Increasing interoperability, closing capability gaps through joint working and greater specialisation.

For example, the UK is overhauling its ISTAR, strategic lift and combat air capabilities as part of the transition to Future Force 2020 with the new Atlas and Voyager fleets operating alongside the C17, Sentry, Sentinel, and Airseeker as well as a range of remotely piloted air systems.

These forces will allow us to offer capacity to share with our international partners in new, innovative and mutually beneficial ways.

And, for the time being at least, we will depend on others for support with maritime patrol aircraft, when we need them.
 

It is not so much the number of Tornado jets that matters. What the UK can and should bring to the table to really matter, is a series of unique capabilities that are pretty much without equal in Europe and that can form the skeleton sustaining a multinational force with little to no US involvment.
That buys power for the UK in three ways:

First, by making the UK more "indipendent", because more realistically capable to mount an operation on its own, with complete, full-spectrum capability, albeit on a small to medium scale.

Second, by making the UK less tied to the specific help of the US and more relevant to other allies, allowing the country to pursue and craft other strategic relationships. The UK cannot hope to win appreciation abroad and be seen as a good ally because of the number of jets or frigates, but can still be seen as an useful partner for its political weight and for the range of specialized, precious capabilities it can field.

Third, by gaining more US support, because such a United Kingdom strategic posture, as "leader of the Willing Europe" can be a driving force for the european side of NATO, making Europe capable to shoulder more of the tasks connected to the Mediterranean and Middle East, allowing the US forces to concentrate more on the Pacific.
In the coming years, a CVF task group deployed to the Gulf to replace a US CVBG that can so go to the Pacific is going to be very, very appreciated. The French have already understood this, and Charles De Gaulle has been visiting the Indian Ocean a lot to deliver air support to troops in Afghanistan and help the US navy keep up force levels all over the map.
The UK did it in the far past already, when the US carrier groups were tied to Vietnam operations and the british carriers filled the holes elsewhere.

After what Hammond said, i can proudly observe that professor Lindley-French and, to a lesser but important degree, I, were right in our analysis of the situation. Read this (long) but highly recommended old article of mine about giving a grand strategy to the UK to see what i mean.

The new enduring relationship-I will avoid the "special relationship" phrase-is ultimately, in Washington’s mind, with both Republicans and Democrats, built on our ability to leverage other partners, primarily Europeans but also Commonwealth members. If we lose that ability because of a profound perception of our decision not to be a major second-rank power, our influence in Washington will decline further. There will be very clear strategic, practical implications.

The specific impact will be on NATO, because what is generating and becoming very clear in Washington is that the Americans are increasingly becoming an Asia-Pacific power. What they will look for - in a sense, Libya is increasingly the test case - is Europeans under Anglo-French leadership to look after our bit of the world, which is a pretty rough neighbourhood, while an overstretched America deals with the epicentre of change in south and east Asia. If we cannot step up to that leadership role, and we are choosing not to adopt it, the fundamental assumption in the NSS that the Americans will always ultimately be there for our security and our defence is being undermined.

The question then becomes: what level of capability does Britain require to ensure that the Americans feel that they can invest in our future security defence because it is part of the overall whole? I was at a meeting in Tallinn a couple of weeks ago, and a German MP seriously said that Germany would not modernise its deployable armed forces, and that it would not even conceive of modernising nuclear forces, but that it might allow the Americans to pay for and put in place a missile defence system that protects Germany in Europe. The inference is that if we are moving inadvertently into that camp - the Dutch are certainly going into that camp - our loss of influence in Washington and, I would suggest, elsewhere, will be profound. The French, frankly, have a lot more traction than we do these days because they talk a better show than we do.

The tragedy, for me, for London is that after all the sacrifices of the past 10 years of our armed forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, we are almost snatching contempt from the jaws of respect, on the Hill in particular. I am not overstating this; that is the consequence of these two documents on the American political mind that considers these issues.”

[...]

I fully recognise that there are a lot of European countries-mainly because of the German position, I have to say-that have been in retreat for a long time, aided and abetted by poor American leadership. I have made that point in the US several times-that the Americans have a responsibility to lead well, not just lead. Our interest is to renovate a strategic concept in Europe that ensures that there is a genuine European pillar of the alliance stabilising this turbulent world. That is our mission; and we are not stepping up to that plate. Any chance of bringing Europe back on strategic line, if you like, is, I fear, in danger of being lost.” 
 
[...]

A very, very senior person told me on Friday that the trajectory of these two documents [National Security Strategy and SDSR] could mean that the United Kingdom loses D-SACEUR-to the French, on current trajectory-because we are perceived as an unreliable ally, which is unfair but how it is being perceived. [D-SACEUR: Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Europe – the SACEUR is a US officer]

The Americans will not go on funding this bill, and there is going to be a row over missile defence. Congress has not woken up to the fact yet that the missile defence system currently proposed is one that the Americans will pay for that can protect Europe but cannot protect the United States. Already, a high-level congressional delegation last week at NATO asked the specific question, "Are there any US enablers being used for operations over Libya?" The US MilRep jumped in and said, "No." That is not the correct answer, and Congress will soon learn that. There are all sorts of implications. Whereas for the US, alliances are extremely useful but not critical, for the UK our influence in functioning alliances and international organisations is absolutely critical“.

“I think they [USA] would abandon Europe [If the UK and France stop being useful partners]. They would say, reasonably, "Look, Europe, you’re a strategic backwater right now. If you are not prepared to work with us to stabilise the world and our grand strategic mission, you can look after your own neighbourhood." The logical consequence of that is that this neighbourhood is rough. We would end up spending more, or we would take a much higher level of risk-probably the highest level of risk we have taken since the 1930s. That is the choice that we face.”

 
Professor Lindley-French, speaking to the Parliamentary Defence Committee


More importantly, in the words of Hammond i see signs of one fact: at least someone in government seems to be waking up to reality, in a way or another.
I can only hope that the concept will have been more widely grasped before it is time to write the next SDSR.
Because what defence desperately needs, is a review that comes up with a strategy and a coherent way forwards to stick to it. The first and greatest task of whatever government will be in charge at the time of the next SDSR is to write a Review that is not just a list of cuts, but a genuine assessment of the direction that should be followed.

Otherwise, rebuilding the trust between the soldiers and who leads them will be impossible.

The Interim Afloat Forward Staging Base is already on the way

The old LSD USS Ponce, which will retire March 30 from her current service role, has been identified for conversion into an Interim Afloat Forward Staging Base capable of spending long periods of time in the middle east, “supporting minesweeping operations and acting as base for CH53 heavy helicopters, including those in the mine-countermeasures role”. Crew will be mixed, with regular officers and sailors from the US Navy joined by civilian mariners employed by Military Sealift Command (MSC) giving her an hybrid crew similar to those used on the Navy’s two submarine tenders and the command ship Mount Whitney.

The list of requirements shows more ambitions that just that stated mission of acting as a minesweeper tender, though: the interim AFSB will be a mothership for special forces operations and sea control, as well as a base for RIVERINE boat squadrons operating in the littoral environment. The Minimum Requirements in fact include:

- Berthing and messing for 370 

- Supplies and provisions for at least 14 days, ship must operate 24/7

- Extensive communications fit, with 4 video teleconferencing (VTC) capable planning/conference spaces capable of accommodating 25 personnel each, plus an Operations Center for 20.

- Extensive small-boat support facilities, with the ability of simultaneously mooring and refueling:

·         2 Riverine Command Boats (CB90H modified for american use)

·         4 Small Unit Riverine Crafts (heavily armed boats similar in concept to the Royal Marines's Offshore Raiding Craft)

·         4 MK5 Zodiacs

·         2 7 meter RHIBs

- 2 cranes, one per 10.000 and one per 15.000 lbs capable, with 40 feet reach outwards, the second capable to lower loads all the way down to water level, the first reaching the Aviation Maintenance Area

- Flight deck capable to accommodate simultaneously 4 CH53 helicopters

- Additional Open Deck space for staging kit, 150 feet x 150 feet, contiguous to Flight Deck

- Additional Aviation Maintenance area of 100 x 150 feet, must be at reach of the first crane

- 10.000 gallons of JP5 fuel and two fuel stations on flight deck plus one in the open staging area

The US Navy is now moving real fast towards sea bases. 

In the near future, past this interim solution, one/two Afloat Forward Staging Bases will be required from 2014, and it appears that, for commonality, the US Navy will build them starting from the Mobile Landing Platform already on order, in itself an evolution of civilian Float On, Float Off (FLO/FLO) heavy load vessels.

Three MLPs have been funded for construction at the General Dynamics National Steel and Shipbuilding (NASSCO) shipyard in San Diego. The ships are large, 765-foot-long vessels intended to serve as a transfer station or floating pier at sea, improving the U.S. military’s ability to deliver equipment and cargo from ship to shore when friendly bases are denied, or simply don’t exist. That’s very useful in disaster situations, and equally useful for supporting US Marines once they’re ashore.

Joint High Speed Vessels (ferries), Prepositioned ships (massive Ro-Ros and other supporting vessels derived from civilian designs) and other units not suited for amphibious assaults, with no landing crafts and with a big draft which would normally need a port in order to unload the massive numbers of vehicles and stores they carry, will be able to transfer their payload at sea onto the Mobile Landing Platform (so long as they have side ramps and Sea State is no higher than 3), which will serve as a staging point thanks to a 80.000 square feet mission deck and will have 3 lanes for LCAC landing crafts that will be able to embark the kit and vehicles and bring it all ashore, going back and forth and needing no ports. Transfer of vehicles at sea is eased by the fact that the MLP’s ability to submerge decreases the relative motion problem for offloading in waves, and its modern dynamic positioning system (from Converteam, heavily involved in the propulsion systems of Type 45 destroyers and CVF, in the UK) should improve standoff distance significantly.

An interface to work with older, slower but larger Landing Utility Crafts is also sought, along with proper connections for lighterage and floating piers.

Concept art of the Mobile Landing Platform: the berths for the 3 LCAC and the massive Mission Deck are evident.

The massive Mission Deck is available for incorporating, in future, Berthing modules and Troop Accomodations, Medical facilities, Command and Control, Mission Planning, Connected Replenishment, one container-hangling crane, aviation operating spots and the already tested Test Article Vehicle Transfer System which would enable at sea transfer of vehicles including M1 Abrams tanks in Sea State 4.

TAVTS and helicopter sports and aviation facilities were once part of the original, much more ambitious requirement for the MLP, but were deleted to ensure the design would stay cheap: a Mobile Landing Platform in its current form costs 425.9 million dollars as for FY2012 funding request. They will have a 15 knots speed and a 9500 naval miles range, with a lenght of 255 meters and a beam of 50.

The three MLPs on order are to be named: USNS Montford Point, USNS John Glenn and USNS Lewis B. Puller. They will be operated by the US Military Sealift Command, not by the Navy itself.

Trials of the MLP concept took place in the Gulf of Mexico, with the US Navy leasing the civilian FLO/FLO Mighty Servant, from dutch-based company Dockwise, and using it as a surrogate MLP to demonstrate safe transfer of vehicles at sea, all the way up to Main Battle Tanks, tank recovery vehicles and other oversize vehicles.

For the AFSB role, a fourth MLP will be built, modified with several decks atop the Mission Deck, including a hangar, topped by a large flight deck able to operate the heavy H-53s in the airborne mine countermeasures role, MV-22 troops transports and other helicopters.

The AFSB will also be able to carry Marines, support patrol and special operations craft, and fuel and arm other helicopters.

The first AFSB is expected to be requested in 2014, but the third MLP on order might be turned into an AFSB as well.

There are and will be alternative approaches available in future, though: one of the most interesting is this Maersk proposal for conversion of their massive S-class container ships (357 meters long and 42.8 wide, with 25 knots speed). They offer 40-tons cranes, Ro-Ro space for 144 Humvee-sized vehicles or loads of other vehicles, the TATVS interface, hangar and flight deck for 15 MV22 Osprey, 200-beds hospital and modular accommodations and spaces for "up to 6000" men, with 30 days endurance without replenishment. Their cost estimate of 400 million is, however, clearly wildly optimistic.

It remains a very fascinating and interesting proposal. See the video below, and the brochure here.

I made my personal proposal as well, for a barge combining MLB and AFSB functions, delivered via commercial FLO/FLO vessel, targeted at the Royal Navy. It can be seen in detail here.

My own proposal for the Joint Sea Base; Logistics, targeted at the Royal Navy

The US Defense cuts and budget priorities

The US Defense Budget preview has been released, and it is now possible to see where the cuts are heading: as i expected, the cut to the US Marines is big, but not at all substantial. Generally, the Navy and Marines are the services who get the best deal. The cuts announced are:

US Army
 

-          Cancellation of the HUMVEE recapitalization and modernization plan, judged surplus to requirement. Funding will be directed towards the new Joint Light Tactical Vehicle, to be developed in collaboration with the US Marines. This effectively reverses some decisions in the past years that favored the opposite approach by funding hummer modernization over the new JLTV.

-          Reduction of funding to the Ground Combat Vehicle

-          Manpower will go down from the peak of 570.000 in 2012 to 490.000 in the next five years

-          At least 8 Brigade Combat Teams will be cut, from 45 to 37. This still represents a larger Army than the 2003 force (33 BCTs). In addition, the US Army will be considering the space of maneuver for exploiting these cuts in order to reinforce the existing BCTs by adding a third maneuver unit (All BCTs save for Stryker brigades have only 2 maneuver battalions). The cuts seem set to hit almost exclusively the Regular force.

-          A number of bases surplus to requirement will be closed.

-          2 Heavy BCTs are to leave Europe and be replaced by a rotational presence

USMC

-          The 2007 expansion in manpower for operations in Afghanistan and Iraq is being cancelled by a 20.000 soldiers cut that will bring the Corps back to their previous strength of 182.000

-          The long term plan is to keep up the number and force of the amphibious fleet, with no reductions in the requirements. However, Fiscal Year FY2013 will see a one year delay placed on the acquisition of one LHA, delaying LHA-7 from 2016 into 2017. In addition, two older LSD-41s will be retired without immediate replacement.

-          The F35B plan stands, but orders in the next five years will be slowed down (details to follow).

-          Funding will be added for an “Afloat-Forward Staging Base that can be dedicated to support missions in areas where ground-based access is not available, such as counter-mine operations.” No details have been released, but this new kind of vessel fits into the “Sea Basing” developments. An Afloat-Forward Staging Base, in the USMC books, traditionally indicates a vessel capable to operate and maintain helicopters (a floating heliport with extensive maintenance facilities, accommodations, space for spares etcetera). To get an idea of what the Afloat base could be in the end, take a look at the video on this page. The AFSB and the Mobile Landing Platforms (the second programme, for 3 vessels, is already ongoing) are fundamental to the Sea Basing concept.  

US Navy

-          11 Carrier battlegroups confirmed, along with 10 Carrier Air Wings. There will be however a 33 months gap time with only 10 carriers available as USS Enterprise retires before John F. Kennedy is completed and enters service. Aircraft Carriers are confirmed as a fundamental part of the US defense strategy and requirements.

-          The acquisition of 1 Virginia SSN submarine will be delayed out of FY2013 and past 2017. However, funding will be added to increase the cruise missile capacity of the SSNs of the next production batches. The change will add 2 more multiple all-up round canisters (from 2 vertical launch tubes to 4) with each containing 6 TLAMs. Each Virginia will so have at least 24 Vertical Launch TLAMs aboard, probably starting from Block 5, to be ordered in 2019.

-          The construction of replacement SSBNs (SSBN(X) will be delayed by 2 years, into the from 2019 to 2021. Design for the new boat continues unfazed, however, and the document reassures that there is no impact on the Common Missile Compartment and on the UK’s own SSBN-replacement effort.

-          Funding will be made available to invest in a submarine-launched variant of the Prompt Global Strike missile system pursued by the air force. Prepare to hear a lot more talk in the next few years about “conventionally-armed Trident”. It will be interesting to see what shapes this new system eventually takes. Earlier proposals by the George W. Bush administration to develop conventional warheads for submarine-launched Trident nuclear ballistic missiles were rebuffed by critics who questioned how other nations could tell the difference between a nuclear or conventional weapon launch, but the US now say they have the technology to make the missiles distinguishable, thanks to a different, “flatter” trajectory. More details will no doubt emerge in the next future.

-          6 out of 22 Ticonderoga Anti Air Warfare cruisers will be retired. Only one of them has been modernized for Anti-Ballistic role, but is in need of other expensive repairs and overhauls. The Ticos, as impressive and heavily armed as they are, are old and have always had their defects.

-          2 Littoral Combat Ships will be delayed and removed from FY2013 funding, along with 8 Joint High Speed Vessels (modified civilian ferries for the rapid transport of troops and material over the sea). The commitment to 55 LCS was confirmed, but the cut to JHSV might be definitive.

-          F35 plans and long-term numbers are confirmed, but with a very substantial slow-down in acquisitions over the 5 years from 2013 to 2017.

-          The Navy will receive funding to start work for basing a LCS flotilla in Singapore. Patrol crafts will be based in Bahrain. In later FYs the US Navy plans to base a second LCS flotilla away from the US mainland, in Bahrain. A third LCS flotilla will be in Japan, based in Yokosuka.

-          The NQ-4 Broad Area Maritime Surveillance drone (BAMS) continues. Based on the Global Hawk airframe and performances, this drone will have an incredible range and very long endurance. It will carry radar and EO sensors and communication relay payloads to provide more non-satellite bandwidth to the Navy. The US Navy plans for global coverage thanks to this drone, which will see squadrons based in an airport on the Gulf of Mexico, in one base on the US West coast, in Bahrain and in Sigonella, Sicily. Sigonella will also receive P8 Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft.

-          F35 plans and long term numbers confirmed, but delays in acquisition in the 5 years out to 2017.

USAF 

-          The USAF will cut 6 out of its 60 Tactical Fighter Wings, plus a Training squadron. It is a cut of some 108 to 144 airplanes, but the defense documents judges the reduction “safe” as the remaining force is judged more than sufficient.

-          27 old super cargo planes C5A will be retired. This will leave in service 52 C5M (modernized)

-          65 old C130s will be retired, leaving 318 in service.

-          By 2013 the C17 production for the USAF will be complete, with the delivery of the 223th airplane. No cuts planned to this fleet, which the USAF once planned in just 180 airplanes but that was expanded again and again by political intervention that added orders each FY to keep production open. The USAF is not complaining, anyway: with the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the C17 fleet, even enlarged, works hard.

-          The Joint Cargo Aircraft C27J is being cancelled. The 38 airplanes acquired so far and positively still new will be “disposed of”. Bargain price deals for excellent second-hand machines?

-          The Global Hawk Block 30 fleet is being retired from service and mothballed. The Block 30 is the recce variant that was intended to replace the ancient U2 manned plane, but according to the USAF, the Block 30 is a disaster. Its sensors are nowhere near as good as the U2’s ones. Each Global Hawk Block 30 costs a shocking 215 million dollars (there goes your “UAVs are cheap”!, a C17 with spares and support comes at 256 million and a F35 in the current, expensive low-rate production lots at around 150) and, worse, has the tendency to break down constantly. USAF sources have stated that the Block 30 is a true “hangar queen”, and that due to its inferior sensors it makes no sense to keep it flying. The worst part is that USAF sources have declared that “despite Discovery Channel hype” the UAV sensors (at least those of this ambitious drone in particular) are “billions of dollars away” from meeting their promises. The U2 will now fly at least until 2023, with plans for 42 Global Hawk Block 30 scrapped.

It is not completely a defeat for the RQ-4, however: the Global Hawk Block 40 will continue: this variant uses the Multi-Platform Radar Technology Insertion Program (MP-RTIP) radar, a powerful ground surveillance system designed to create photo-quality imagery of the Earth’s surface and overlay moving ground targets over those. The German “EuroHawk”, a national programme for 5 Global Hawks modified for ISR missions, is continuing, as is the NATO Air Ground Surveillance system, which will use 5 Global Hawks Block 40 to base in Sigonella. The Block 4 will cover the same kind of mission of the RAF Sentinel R1, capturing radar imagery and tracking stationary and moving ground targets.

As said in the US Navy space, the BAMS variant also continues.     

-          MQ-1 and MQ-9 (Predator and Reaper) are winners in the plan. The combined fleets will be enhanced, expanded and funded so to be able to provide 65 Close Air Patrols per day, with a surge capacity for 85. A CAP normally means 3 drones rotating daily for 24 hours coverage of a target area.

-          There are no additional details, but F35 long-term plan is confirmed, as is the requirement for a new strategic bomber and funding will be provided for the Prompt Global Strike programme.

Specific Programs

-          Nuclear deterrence. For now the “Triad” is confirmed, but reductions will be considered. In my opinion, being the submarine-launched missiles the most survivable and effective deterrence, eventual reductions will preferably hit the silo-based Minuteman missiles and/or the nukes delivered by air force bombers.

-          F35 will see a substantial slowdown in acquisition in the fiscal years 2013 to 2017. In 2013 the US will buy 29, 13 F35 less than planned. In 2014 they will buy only 29 out of a planned 62, 44 out of 81 in 2015 and 61 out of 108 in 2016. They however confirmed all three the F35 variants and maintain their commitment to a 2443 airplanes buy. Eventually, up to 179 F35s will be delayed to later years while development continues and the problems remaining are solved. So far, the cuts outlined indicate delays to 130 airplanes.

-          The Joint Air-Ground Missile is getting its funding slice massively reduced, with the forces invited to consider cheaper options. This could mean longer life for TOW, Hellfire and Maverick. Or, perhaps, US interest in the Brimstone Dual Mode, which is the closest thing available to what the JAGM was to deliver (a tri-seeker multimission missile for use from ground launchers, helicopters, drones and fast jets of Navy, Marines and USAF). The JAGM is not dead, and the idea feels just too good to let it go: it could make a big return in future budgets.

-          The Army Ground Combat Vehicle is slowed down.

The heavy emphasis on power projection and maritime strategy is absolutely evident in the choices made by the US. There is no mention of meeting the 313-ships plan, for the moment, but the general direction is absolutely naval oriented, so it is unlikely that there will be a dramatic breakaway from the plan even in case some reductions are mandated.

I think the nuclear force is and should be a main target for cuts. The US still field an incredible arsenal, and while they have to balance Russia’s own huge stock, I don’t see the need for a full Triad of nuclear capability. The most survivable and effective delivery method is by ballistic missiles fired by submarines, so I’d say that this branch is mostly safe. Possibly, the most vulnerable part of the Triad is the land-based, silo-launched Minuteman fleet. It would be the first thing I’d cut back if I had to reap savings.

Future Force 2020: the strategy

Before entering the thick of the Force Structure 2020 posts explaining my thinking about the armed forces future, I deem necessary to add a new post about strategic considerations. I draw heavily from the latest US Defense Strategy document, that expresses concepts I agree with, and that are absolutely valid for the UK as well.

It is also indispensable for the UK to keep in consideration the strategic posture of the US, as they are the main partner and the main force the UK look up to for providing the numbers and capabilities necessary for the complex ops.  So I’m going to report some passages of the US strategy document ”Joint Operational Access Concept” that are the concepts over which much of my reasoning for the future british armed forces structure is based.

Projecting U.S. military force invariably requires extensive use of international waters, international airspace, nonsovereign cyberspace, space, and the electromagnetic spectrum. U.S. access to and freedom of navigation within these global commons are vital to its national interests, both because the American way of life requires free access to the global marketplace and as a means for projecting military force into hostile territory. Even where the ultimate objective is the latter, operations in the global commons may be critical if an enemy attempts to gain strategic depth by pushing armed opposition out into international spaces. In fact, the contest over operational access can dominate practically all other considerations in warfare, as it did throughout the Pacific theater and in the battle for the North Atlantic during the Second World War.

This first point is absolutely valid for the UK as well. Operation Granby is perhaps the best example of this, as it required by far the most extensive use of international waters and airspaces, plus foreign nation support, cyberspace, space and electromagnetic spectrum. The UK is not at all less dependent than the US from sealanes and freedom of navigation: very possibly, it is even more dependent, in fact.

In peacetime as in wartime, the UK is heavily dependent on sealanes, and the most effective way to hit the UK, its economy and its military might, is interrupting freedom of navigation.

Defending freedom of navigation and port infrastructure in the UK is one of the most vital tasks of the british Armed Forces. Security of navigation and sealanes are also absolutely indispensable for the UK to apply power abroad.

The first way to deny UK power is making it impossible for the UK to deploy its forces. With over 90% of the equipment of a modern army still being pretty much bound to the sea for transportation (again, Gramby teaches), sealift and protection of sealift assets are perhaps the absolute priority.  

Influences decisions on:

-          Port and infrastructure security

-          Naval escorts

-          Maritime Patrol Aircraft needs

-          Force Protection

Historically, a key way to mitigate the degrading effects of distance has been to establish forward bases in the anticipated operational area, thereby maintaining some of the capabilities of a home base at a distant location. The more capability and capacity that a military can amass at the forward base, the more it can mitigate the effects of distance. Moreover, permanent or long-term forward bases can assure partners and deter adversaries. The ability to establish new  expeditionary bases, or to improve those already in existence, also can serve as deterrent options. Conversely, a forward base becomes a resource requiring protection and sustainment and can even become a political liability, often by causing friction with the host nation or within the region.

Forward basing, when possible, is a very effective way to preserve a point of access to, potentially, a whole region. The UK has some very important forward bases, with four being particularly relevant: Gibraltar, Cyprus, Bahrain and Diego Garcia. Diego Garcia isn’t very frequently used by british forces, but its relevance is incredible for the US, and its importance in the coming years will only grow. The US Navy recently announced that also a submarine tender vessel will be soon based there.

Forward bases, though, are expensive. In Bahrain, the UK based forces benefit from facilities and services often provided by the UK, including deployed Force Protection crafts for the defence of ports and moored ships. The british naval base in the area was shut in 1971, and the return of UK forces in the area in recent times builds on the presence there of the US’s Fifth Fleet.

To base troops abroad, an agreement with a host nation is indispensable. Regular investment, in money and manpower, is required to keep the base active and running. The investment can be very significant, depending on the amount of infrastructure needed and available. Bahrain is cheap thanks to the US help, but this is not at all always valid.

Basing troops abroad has a deep political impact, at home and abroad. Not always presence will deliver the hoped effects, and bases abroad can be met with changing local policies and with open hostility. Gibraltar is an example of base that carries with itself a significant amount of tension with Spain. The Falklands are not exactly a forward base today, but tomorrow they might be if the south pole continent, as many anticipate, will become increasingly relevant to the global economy thanks to the large untapped resources hidden under the ice, and it notoriously carries its own burden of hostility and political sensitiveness.

Forward bases are vulnerable to many factors, which include, potentially, waning internal support for their existence: the government of the day might well decide to downsize or shut down missions abroad as an easy saving.

They are vulnerable to local governments, which might change their mind and retire support (the US have experienced this situation with several bases in the Caucasus, being kicked out of several installations important for the Afghan effort. Pakistan can be seen, in its own way, as another example of the risks), they are potentially source of tension, offer unfriendly countries an argument to launch accuses on the media that influence the public opinion if not the international community, and they are also vulnerable to physical attacks, by conventional and/or unconventional means.  

Forward basing of 5000 US soldiers in Saudi Arabia post Desert Storm, and their long-term presence, were perhaps the absolute main argument used by Osama Bin Laden to fuel muslim rage that shaped Al Qaeda: “great evil” forces on their sacred land was unacceptable. Consequences have been very, very serious.

Forward engagement is often preferable: no permanent on-land presence, but joint training exercises, naval presence, aid and disaster relief and other forms of engagement are a good solution, but do not offer the same “open door” for access in time of crisis that an established base represents. Balance, as in all things, is necessary.

Comports:

-          Decisions on forward engagement and forward basing of forces; partnering.

-          Employment of naval presence, joint training and other collaboration

The presence of forward-deployed or other in-range combat forces at the beginning of a crisis can facilitate operational access—and sometimes even deter acts of aggression in the first place. Naval forces, which can remain on station in international waters almost indefinitely, are especially suited to such missions, as could be special operations forces inserted clandestinely. Air and space forces can exploit speed and global range to move quickly into position in response to an emerging crisis. That said, forward-deployed forces, like advanced bases, can be vulnerable to attack, particularly given a lack of advanced warning.

Comports:

-          Decisions on sea-lift, sea-basing, sea-logistics and Task Forces including a powerful forcible entry capability

In shaping its new Defense Posture, which in turn will determine force structure, cuts and investments, the US notes that future challenges are characterized by 3 main factors:

The first factor is markedly decreased support abroad for an extensive network of U.S. military bases around the globe. In an increasingly globalized world, there is much greater international competition for regional influence and access. Immediately after the Cold War, states had few partnership options other than the United States, but today numerous rising powers provide alternatives. Whether due to coercive threats or inducements offered by other powers, many states will be unwilling to offer the kind of long-term basing rights the United States enjoyed during the Cold War. Gaining basing rights for expeditionary operations is already a primary concern for U.S. military planners and diplomats, and that challenge is likely to grow.

The second factor is projections of severely contracting resources. Even were there an international appetite for it, the United States simply could not afford to  establish garrisons around the globe in response to every plausible threat, especially in an era of dynamic uncertainty in which threats could emerge unpredictably.

The third factor is force protection. In an age of increased terrorism, increasingly affordable precision weapons, and heightened sensitivity to perceived impositions on national sovereignty, U.S. garrisons on foreign soil become both causes of friction and inviting targets. American sensitivity to casualties, especially to a garrison force outside a war zone, only exacerbates the problem.

These considerations are just as valid for the UK, either if acting independently or in coalition, almost certainly with the US themselves. 

Comports:

-          Better efforts in understanding local cultures and issues

-         Increased efforts in shaping solid and fair partnerships of common interests in the important regions

-       Preserving and expanding the capability to apply, project and sustain power abroad, in the awareness that local support and bases could be insufficient/negated/inexistent.

The US strategy draws a painting of the future challenges that is very complete and convincing:

Future enemies, both states and nonstates, will see the adoption of an antiaccess/area-denial strategy against the United States as a favorable course

of action for them. Those able to field layered and fully integrated antiaccess/area-denial defenses in multiple domains may attempt to deny U.S. operational access altogether, while others with less robust and comprehensive capabilities may simply attempt to inflict greater losses than they perceive the United States will tolerate politically.

Any example of such a strategy likely will exhibit some common critical

elements, to include:

1)   Long-term shaping operations prior to conflict, including information operations, designed to increase influence and build up antiaccess/area denial capabilities in a region and to encourage regional actors to deny the United States the political conditions that facilitate access.

2)   Imposing a steeper cost than the United States is willing to bear—either

through a catastrophic attack or an attrition-based defeat mechanism

designed to create substantial casualties.

3)   Creating as much strategic and operational depth as possible within

which to inflict casualties, even interdicting deploying U.S. forces by

sabotage at their points of origin or ports of embarkation.

4)   Attacking U.S. forward bases, whether by missiles, special operations units, or irregular forces—to include the use of weapons of mass destruction.

5)   Attacking U.S. command and control and communications, especially long-range capabilities, to include space and cyber capabilities.

6)   Attacking U.S. distribution operations at either fixed points or vulnerable

choke points in the lines of communications or through cyber attacks that disrupt logistics command and control.

7)   Employing antiaccess and area-denial capabilities in combination to contest local air and maritime superiority and land freedom of maneuver.

Beyond those common elements, any example of an antiaccess strategy will conform itself uniquely to the capabilities of the enemy and other situational factors.

Forward bases, including mobile seabases, constitute critical access infrastructure‖ which supports the deployment of forces and supplies.

The greater the capabilities and capacity that can be established at or flowed through the base, the greater the force that ultimately can be projected.

Future enemies consequently can increasingly be expected to attack those bases as part of an antiaccess/area-denial strategy in an attempt to restore the penalty of distance.

IEDs themselves are an obvious example of attempts to impose an higher than acceptable cost on the public opinion and consequently on governments, aiming for a withdrawal decision. Another tactic seen in these years has been that of kidnappings, more than once ended in brutal executions and beheadings that were filmed and made available to the public to apply pressure.

The risk of said tactics actually working can be very high, depending on the resolution of the government and people facing these attempts. The very latest example of this approach in action is exemplified by the murder of unarmed French soldiers in Afghanistan which have sparked very serious reactions in Paris, with Sarkozy well aware of the impact that events such as those have on a public opinion already largely contrary to the long conflict.

Attacking forward bases is also something we know well: it is a multiface menace that goes from kamikazes to lone wolfs operating inside the bases with friendly uniforms, waiting for the occasion to strike, from mortars to artillery and rockets (the soldiers serving in Basra are well versed with the threat of RAM), from snipers all the way to cruise and even ballistic missiles.

Effects of these attacks can be very serious: a rocket attack on Kandahar on 14 October 2005 destroyed a RAF Harrier and damaged another, taking off 30% of available air support to troops until a replacement Harrier was flown in from the UK. Even more recently, in May 2011 a Navy base in Pakistan was stormed by terrorists who caused great damage, and in particular destroyed most of Pakistan’s P3C Orion fleet on the ground.

To reduce vulnerability, and to counter the very simple reality that we can’t have (and man and finance) bases everywhere, a solution is seen in seabasing:

[one option is] seabasing, which reduces sovereignty issues that often can preclude the establishment of forward bases. The inherent mobility of seabasing can complicate the enemy’s defensive preparations by making the objective remain ambiguous through holding a large coastal area at risk. It can enhance security by complicating the enemy’s detection and targeting.

Seabasing options may be limited by capacity. One other option is to emphasize capabilities with minimal dependence on forward bases, such as amphibious, long-range strike, cyber, electronic, or space capabilities, either in primary or supporting roles.

The above considerations influence:

-          Investment in Force Protection and C-RAM defences

-          Investment in sea-basing, including sea-based logistics

-          Amphibiousness and provision of deployable airpower from aircraft carriers 

The air is another domain generally suitable for the early focus of effort, again because air forces tend not to operate in massed formations that make them vulnerable to catastrophic loss and because they tend to be broadly effective in bringing power to bear rapidly against other domains. Finally, special operations forces are valuable for locating, targeting, and destroying key enemy capabilities, as well as for cultivating indigenous resistance elements that can help disrupt the antiaccess/area-denial strategy. Like space and cyberspace forces, special operations forces likely will be in position, often operating in denied territory, in advance of the commitment of major forces to set the conditions for the employment of those forces. Operations to maintain or gain access in the

maritime commons can build on these low signature operations, avoid high density threat antiaccess weapons, and maneuver to achieve surprise and rapid operations.

I entirely agree with the above, and Special Forces and RAF will have their own very relevant roles to play. Of course, the UK cannot afford a stealth, intercontinental, optionally manned heavy bomber like the USAF, but Long Range, Non Penetrating strike platforms and approach figure in my ideal strategy, alongside, in the longer term, a stealth, long range UCAV (ideally carrier capable) that will be the UK’s own strategic bomber, at much smaller ambition and cost levels, but still effective.

Ultimately, the target of the US (and of the UK, and of anyone else) when applying force abroad, by any mean, is to, very generally speaking, influence events ashore. Peoples and government and countries exist on land, and it is on land that the final result is to be obtained. This means that, whatever the strategy of the moment and whatever the medium chosen (land battles, air power, sea power, more often a combination of two or of all three), ultimately the results of the campaign depend on what happens ashore.

Land forces remain fundamental, even in a Sea-centered strategy. However, size and configuration of land forces have to be set on the base of a firm strategy that squeezes the most effect out of every single man and vehicle, within a physical and a financial boundary, a reality which is all the more felt by the UK than not by the US.

In terms of land forces, the new US strategy notes:

In contrast, large land forces generally will be the last to penetrate within range of an enemy’s antiaccess and area-denial weapons because of the potential for catastrophic loss. That is not irrevocably true however. Land forces, for example, could be used to seize advanced bases on the outskirts of an enemy’s defenses from which to project air and naval power into the heart of those defenses. Moreover, small land or surface naval forces, to include special operations forces, could infiltrate an enemy’s antiaccess defenses undetected.

And:

Each [Land Maneuver] formation will operate in multiple domains as required. While maneuvering independently, they will maintain the ability to concentrate smoothly into larger formations as necessary. While they will be self-contained with respect to the envisioned mission, the joint force will be able to support them quickly with external capabilities as needed—principally additional air, space, electronic, and cyberspace capabilities, which can best mitigate the latency imposed by distance.

The modern, current structure of the US army is thus confirmed: the basic land maneuver formation, the Brigade Combat Team (Heavy, Stryker, Infantry, all with total strengths sitting between 3000 and 4000 men) is confirmed, as is the new asset of the army, with tens of modular Combat Support Brigades in the most various roles, ready to be assigned to this or that BCT, or within “larger formations” that are the Divisions.

Modern US Divisions, however, are merely modular Headquarters with an establishment of around 1000 men, that in peacetime oversee training and management of 4 BCTs each, but that can be deployed abroad to command totally different BCTs, of any kind, from a minimum of 1 to a maximum of 10 per HQ.

This is possible because the US Army of today, modular, coherent force of Regulars and Reserves, can deploy, at any one time, a force of up to 20 BCTs, as we’ll see in the next post of the series.

The UK, which reasons on a very different, very smaller scale, cannot think to have tens of modular brigades to group up for the various tasks. It cannot afford to have BCTs of various types, as an army of 2 Armored Brigades and 2 Light Brigades couldn’t sustain any of them in the field in the long term in their intended form.

The solution found has been the Multi Role Brigade, a larger BCT that combines the capabilities of all three kinds of US ones, including heavy armor, wheeled medium armor (there’s the aspiration to get it in time, at least) and Infantry. The minimum number of homogeneous brigades needed to keep one deployed long term is 5, for the British Army.

So the MRB concept is set. I won’t move away from it, and I do not think there are realistic, effective alternatives.

I will, however, outline my vision for the whole force of the Army, including the ideal role and support that I’d want from the future, reformed Army reserve.

On April 12 the Army should announce the result of its planning for restructuring, and we’ll see how close I’ll be to reality. I expect my vision to be different, and probably more ambitious here and there than the real one will be, but it will be interesting to see this in time.

In conclusion:

The United Kingdom remains depended on free trade and sealanes. It remains a nation engaged at global level, with far-reaching interests and with a number of Oversea Territories and allies that look at the UK for support. Consequently, high up on the list of priorities remains the capability to defend freedom of trade and navigation. The requirement for applying power abroad, Influencing, Coercing and Punishing remains real and supported by very tangible economic interests and not just by chivalrous concepts such as “Responsibility to Protect” (R2P).

The risk of direct invasion of the UK mainland is currently extremely low, and likely to be low for a long time. High is instead the risk of terrorist attacks on specific infrastructure and/or towns and people. Particularly damaging would be terrorist attacks hitting port and energy infrastructures.

Risks exist of invasion and military/politic blackmailing against oversea territories of the UK, such as Belize and Falklands islands. Other oversea territories deal with cyclical natural disasters and drug trafficking (Caribbean territories). The UK is also tied by close relationships to many nations, from the Commonwealth to European Union, to the Northern Countries of Scandinavia. Through NATO, the UK has wide-ranging responsibilities, and is involved in the effort for producing security for countries menaced to this day, including Georgia and the Baltic republics.

Economic relations of growing importance tie the UK to Brazil and India. Old promises exist that tie even UK and South Korea (the peace document signed at the end of the Korean war contains the commitment of the allies, including the UK, to collaborate again, should it ever be needed, to keep stability and peace in Korea). Other relationships exist in the South East Asia, such as the 5 Powers Agreement, and a recent document signed with Vietnam.

Economic interests of the UK are global, and a heavy focus for security and energy needs remains on the Middle East: a significant portion of the UK’s oil, but in particular 50% of the UK’s gas supplies, still come from the Gulf. The implications of a Nuclear-armed Iran, or the consequences of piracy or worse of a blockade of the Strait of Hormuz remain absolutely grave for the UK.

In other words, while a direct military attack against the Uk mainland is absolutely unlikely, terrorism and attacks, direct or indirect, conventional or unconventional, against british interests overseas are much more likely. Economic, Historic and Political ties mean that the UK’s interests reach far away across the world.

Combined, these considerations make it evident that the Armed Forces must be able of preventing and reacting, and power projection is fundamental, as whatever crisis comes up next, it will almost certainly emerge far away from the UK.

The British Armed Forces are part of the tools that the UK possesses for Influencing events, Coerce and Punish. They must be kitted to do so at great distance from the UK, where it is more likely that their presence will be needed. They must be as independent as possible in doing this, to give the UK a credible sovereign capability and to make the UK an attractive partner inside a coalition. In a tight budget, where each investment has to be evaluated in context and demonstrate that it is more needed than another, strategic enablers are to be preferred and given priority against capabilities common and already available to most allies, or simple numeric strenght. Quantity has of course a quality of its own, but the quantity game never fit the UK, and certainly does not fit today's budget and perception of the military.

Seen with the prism of the new US Strategic Posture, of the new economics of the world and of NATO, the UK’s military role as part of the alliance becomes, despite cuts, a Leading Role that the UK has not had in a long time. Said leading role will be in cohabitation with France, and it is a new role that the US are once more encouraging, if not flat-out asking the UK to assume. France and UK have the budget, the force and the experience needed to constitute a leading, hard core for the European NATO, with the rest of Europe to pool resources and do things with coordination and collaboration, to put “flesh on the UK/France bones”.

The US strategy contains the specific admission that, as Asia becomes the main focus of the American attention and the resources are now too tight to be a “two oceans/two wars” superpower, an Europe able to look after its own neighbor with much less US assistance than in the past is an absolute necessity.   

In this resource-constrained era, we will also work with NATO allies to develop a “Smart Defense” approach to pool, share, and specialize capabilities as needed to meet 21st century challenges.

UK Defence Minister Philip Hammond, in Washington for high level talks, echoed this sentiment in his own speech, recommending a thorough assessment of NATO's capabilities in order to subsequently stacke these against its current ambitions.Such an analysis would provide the basis for choices regarding 

"greater pooling and sharing of capabilities; mission, role and geographic specialization; greater sharing of technology; cooperation on logistics; alignment of research-and-development programs, and more collaborative training."

 "Prioritizing ruthlessly, specializing aggressively and collaborating unsentimentally. ... With budgets so tight, allies need to revisit approaches and ideas that might previously have seemed politically unacceptable,"

It becomes very much instructive to go back a few steps, to read what Professor Julian Lindley-French, Defence Academy of the Netherlands, member of the Strategic Advisory Group in Washington, and part of the board of the NATO Defence College in Rome, said to the UK Parliamentary Defence Committee on 8 June 2011. 

His immensely interesting answers, which i had already underlined back then, do ring even more true now, and in particular this statement is of extreme importance: 

The new enduring relationship—I will avoid the "special relationship" phrase—is ultimately, in Washington's mind, with both Republicans and Democrats, built on our [UK's] ability to leverage other partners, primarily Europeans but also Commonwealth members. If we lose that ability because of a profound perception of our decision not to be a major second-rank power, our influence in Washington will decline further. There will be very clear strategic, practical implications.

The specific impact will be on NATO, because what is generating and becoming very clear in Washington is that the Americans are increasingly becoming an Asia-Pacific power. What they will look for—in a sense, Libya is increasingly the test case—is Europeans under Anglo-French leadership to look after our bit of the world, which is a pretty rough neighbourhood, while an overstretched America deals with the epicentre of change in south and east Asia. If we cannot step up to that leadership role, and we are choosing not to adopt it, the fundamental assumption in the NSS that the Americans will always ultimately be there for our security and our defence is being undermined.

UK and France can work as a solid skeleton, providing a core of specialized capabilities and kit that the rest of Europe can beef up with contributions, if a proper coordination is established and if the UK comes up with a solid strategic concept that goes in this direction and finances it without constant hesitation and second thoughts. Who's followed this post and my comments from some time, knows that this has been my position for a long time, and that i was expecting the US review to take this direction.

The SDSR and the Lancaster Treaty have sanctioned the UK's interdependence on Allies anyway. A truth long known, in relation to need the US help for when the game gets serious. The best thing to do, accepted this reality, is to play a leading role in the interdependent alliance, and gain solid US support and appreciation by leading the European side of NATO, alongside with France.

Failing in stepping up to this role will spell a major drop in relevance of the UK and severely affect the “enduring relationship”, as Lindley-French effectively defined it. 

The Armed Forces are and remain one of the most valuable tools in the UK’s box, more valuable than most people understand. And this is a painful but crucial time, that offers an opportunity hidden behind the pains.

 

Next post in the series: 

Moving away from Divisions  - Brigades, BCTs, and the future british army structure