The cringeworthy debate pre-SDSR

I’ve already written out my thoughts about the SDSR 2020 and, despite the enduring noise about Cummings and cuts and other unpleasant news, i’m sticking to that description, for now at least. You can find my predictions here, if you haven’t yet read them and want to know what my position is.

This post, which I hope I’ll be able to keep short, is more of a comment to the circus of rumors, leaks and “suggestions” coming from experts ahead of every contemporary SDSR. It’s a cry of agony in front of the increasingly empty rhetoric of “sacred cows” and an expression of the deep incredulity and frustration with which Allies observe the painful process with which Britain, more often than not, commits self-harm.

The gut feeling is that those who profess the loudest objectivity are actually the most partisan, and that the “sacred cow” catchphrase has become an easy and good-looking way to advocate for cuts to fall on anything other than the pet project of the day. It makes it look like you are being all innovative and hard nosed about things. 

Most of those “sacred cows” are, in fact, valid capabilities than nowhere else in the world are subject to the same kind of denial. Moreover, these “sacred cows” are actually UK capabilities which work, which have cost billions to build up and which are competitive and respected worldwide.

I’ve already written about the absurdity ofclaiming that aircraft carriers are somehow obsolete, and I won’t go over that subject again. In this occasion I will only remark that no one else in the world, nowhere, would ever consider chopping the legs off from under a key national capability at the dawn of its service life, after 20 years of efforts, sacrifices and expenses to build it up.

The UK has a history of throwing away billions of pounds in exchange for absolutely nothing, and the Nimrod MRA4 fiasco is there to remind us all of how majestic the wasted sums can get. But Nimrod MRA4, according to what we are told at least, did not work and was “never going to work”. Personally, I doubt it, but we have to take it at face value. If we do, the question then becomes why it wasn’t stopped earlier, before wasting over 3 billion pounds, and who is responsible and why nobody is paying for such a disaster, but this is another story.

The carriers work. There is no excuse in the world that will justify turning them into pure waste, because it will be due only to self-harm, if it ever happens.

I will rather focus on the 16^th Air Assault Brigade and 3^rd Commando Brigade, which have increasingly become THE sacred cows, together with the capabilities they represent: parachuting and air assault, and amphibious capability.

This is the third SDSR in a row that begins with calls to “merge” the two brigades and / or drastically cut back on both capabilities, withdraw the amphibious ships etcetera. It is as illiterate a proposal as they can be. Merging the two brigades to achieve savings would almost certainly mean disbanding the brigade supports: either 7 RHA or 29 Commando RA; either 23 or 24 Engineer Regiments, and so along. The result would be the net loss of yet another set of Brigade enablers, which are already the true weakness of the British Army, which has already taken this path in 2010, with the result that there are 31 infantry battalions but only about a third of those sit within a brigade with any realistic chance of deploying and operating as a combined arms force.

It is true that it is increasingly dangerous to employ parachute assaults or even employ helicopters and operate in the littoral in a world of long-range SAMs and anti-ship missiles, but it is not true that either capability has ceased to be relevant. Nobody else is giving up on them: France has used small-scale parachute assaults as early as 2013 during Operation Serval; Russia and China are nowhere near considering giving up such manoeuvre capabilities, despite being the countries which are supposedly causing both capabilities to become obsolete. Russia and China are also pursuing massive strengthening of their amphibious forces.

Littoral manoevre and air manoeuvre remain as critical as they have ever been. It is true that capabilities and tactics must evolve as the sword and the shield battle it out for superiority, as it has been ever since warfare began. Just like I said for the carriers, it is not the ability to put troops ashore from the sea or from the air that becomes “obsolete”: you still need to be able to do that. What might become obsolete is your methods of doing it, and, above all else, the instruments you employ to make your way through enemy defences. It is not the amphibious ship that has become obsolete, per se: it is your ability to protect it from enemy missiles that you no longer trust. What undoubtedly needs modernization is the Ship to Shore connection. Slow and vulnerable landing craft need to be succeeded by connectors which can defend themselves and move much faster and over longer distances to restore the unpredictability of littoral manoeuvre.

The quality of the debate on both air and littoral manoeuvre has dropped to such desperately low levels that we have “experts” that sometime literally argue, at the same time, that air assault is now impossible due to the proliferation of surface to air missiles, but that the Marines should become a lighter force which gives up on surface manoeuvre in favor of long range raids enabled by helicopters.

Have you spotted the problem?

If helicopters are the future of Littoral Manoeuvre, they can’t be simultaneously obsolete. If air assault is no longer feasible, why helicopters coming from the sea are an answer? It’s absurd.

It’s what happens when your argument is actually nothing but a call for the cuts to fall on anything but what you care about.

Several of the UK defence commentators and experts have fallen in love with the nebulous STRIKE concept, for reasons that remain mysterious. There have even been repeated suggestions that STRIKE makes littoral manoeuvre unnecessary, because you can just land the STRIKE brigade in a friendly port and then drive on road to the front. This has even been offered as a solution to avoid the risks connected with facing the Anti-Access, Area Denial capability of a peer enemy, which supposedly make the Royal Navy incapable to operate in the area.

How is that a sane argument to make? 

If you are dealing with an enemy sophisticate and powerful enough to keep the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force out, how the hell are you going to create trouble for them by driving wheeled APCs up to their border?

Moreover, in a war scenario, will a country nearby to your enemy want to get involved, and let you land your forces there and then drive all the way to the border, exposing itself to all sorts of dangers? Sometimes they will. Sometimes they won’t want to get involved at all.

And ultimately, if you are landing in a safe port and then driving up to the front, why not do it with heavier, more credible armour than with expensive but nearly unarmed BOXERs? This is not a replacement for littoral manoeuvre and amphibious capability: it’s normal land warfare. Nothing at all new here.

5 years on I’m still waiting for a single rational explanation of how a mixture of BOXERs and AJAX somehow changes the reality of modern warfare. UAVs will spot and possibly attack tanks and IFVs, but not BOXERs…? They are not invisible hover-tanks, they are enormous 8x8s with very little armament on top. They are don’t have a firepower advantage. They do not solve the reality, finally admitted by the Commander Field Army himself in a recent interview with Wavell Room, that the British Army is outgunned and outranged. It faces a dramatic disadvantage in weight and reach of Fires.

The STRIKE brigade will have some degree of self-deployability, and that is good. It will require less HETs, less LETs, less of a logistic train. And that is good and desirable. But pretending that they will somehow revolutionize warfare is absurd. The British Army is purchasing an 8x8 armored vehicle 30 years after everyone else, and that is it. There are much better equipped and armed wheeled, medium brigades within NATO already today, but nobody in their sane minds pretend they can not only maneuver quickly up to the fight and along it, but split up into platoon packages and rampage deep behind enemy lines.

The British Army and some commentators insist on saying that STRIKE will do that. It is not credible. Not unless something truly new and revolutionary comes to these formations. STRIKE as of now comes with no advantages over a peer / near peer enemy capability. None at all. If there is no rational reason to expect success, all that is left is hope and dreams.

The increased strategic mobility of wheeled armor is a step forwards from what the British Army has, but is not a new thing compared to wheeled formations which have been around for decades. At the end of the day, British Army 8x8s are not going to be any more unpredictable in their road moves than the enemy’s own 8x8s.

Actually, Russian 8x8s are lighter and often amphibious, so you could actually legitimately claim that their strategic and tactical mobility is superior, as they can use more routes, more bridges (BOXER and AJAX are over 38 tons behemoths) and even, with some limitations, move across rivers without seeking a bridge at all. They are less protected than BOXER, but on the other hand are far more heavily armed.

These are all factors that routinely get ignored when STRIKE is promoted as the best thing since sliced bread.

For all its merits, STRIKE is a capability that is far more limited than its supporters want us to believe.

Moreover, the British Army as a whole is currently outgunned and outranged and full of capability gaps. If you want to fill those gaps and make it more competitive, you must find many more billion pounds to invest.

Is it worth it? Is it something the UK actually needs?

The Royal Navy and RAF are small, but are already globally competitive. They line ships and aircraft which are on par, or superior to peer and near peer rivals. The Army, unfortunately, is not in as good a shape. It is small and also faces severe obsolescence issues in its equipment.

In an ideal world, those deficiencies need to be corrected, but this is not an ideal world: if the corrections are only possible by robbing Peter to pay Paul, is it worth it?

In my opinion, no. Why should you cut funded, existing capabilities which are useful and globally competitive in order to pursue the new fashion of the day?

The Army says it needs STRIKE to contribute to NATO, to be able to rush to the aid of Eastern Europe in case the Russians lash out. The first question that should be asked is: is in the UK’s interest to rush to the East for a major land campaign? Does it need to be “the first” to get there (even with STRIKE, it would not be…)? Why should the UK’s contribution take that shape? Why not give priority to completing the modernization of the heavy armour, and perhaps invest on more HETs and in rebuilding railway mobility capability which was so unwisely demolished in the SDSR 2010…?

Why not focus on providing other capabilities, which the UK is better equipped to deliver without having to find extra billion pounds, simply?

I go back to 16^th Air Assault Brigade: the UK owns 60 Chinook, 23 Puma HC2 and is getting an excellent, globally competitive Apache block III fleet. It owns 8 C-17, which in Europe are an unique, high value capability. In addition to those, it owns 22 A-400M and 14 C-130J. All these high value items are funded, operational, proven.

Nobody in Europe is currently as well equipped as the UK to build up a powerful air mobile force. Instead of babbling about the parachute regiment being a “sacred cow”, the UK should look at the excellent ingredients it owns, and think about how they can more effectively be exploited. Those 60 Chinooks are a treasure that other NATO countries would kill for. You can easily imagine the frustration of the French, for example, whenever they look at that fleet and think what they could do with it.

Many UK commentators apparently consider it not a treasure, but an expensive obstacle to throwing money on something new.

Wouldn’t it make far more sense to think about how to get more out of what you already have? You probably can’t launch an helicopter-borne force deep behind a peer enemy lines, but there is still enormous usefulness for a fleet of 60 Chinooks that could be used to quickly move whole battalions of infantry to hold ground and plug gaps in a modern, contested, wide-area combat zone. Especially with 50 Apache in support.

Instead, we get the “sacred cow” rhetoric.

Thankfully, in its interview with the Wavell Room, the Commander Field Army has demonstrated greater wisdom than the various “experts” and said that they are indeed rethinking the contribution of 16^th Air Assault to a Divisional fight, or even a Corps operation at NATO level. It might look more like the old air mobile force of BAOR days, or take yet another shape. What matters is making good use of the very expensive ingredients that are already on the table.

Similarly, the UK has excellent maritime capabilities, including the amphibious and heavy sealift vessels needed to move a capable littoral manoeuvre force, which NATO values. Why should you cut back on something that is already there, already funded, and that can deliver plenty more usefulness well into the future?

Such a sacrifice would only make sense if it resulted in some kind of truly revolutionary leap forwards in other areas, or if it resulted in plugging a capability gap that just cannot be allowed to continue. But this is not the case.

Watching british SDSRs unfold is a cringeworthy experience. The arguments thrown around, with calls for cuts of this or that expensive, precious capability are painful to listen to.

It’s like watching a guy with only very vague notions of cooking suddenly put into a kitchen with a table covered in all sorts of expensive, precious ingredients. Some of those precious ingredients he completely disregard, others he even wants to throw away (but it’s fine, so long as he describes them as sacred cows that hold back “innovation”). Some others get mashed together into some sort of half-cooked, disappointing recipe (BOXER and AJAX, I’m looking at you). Some other recipes, he starts without having all ingredients for and without being able to afford them (STRIKE). Some other recipes are started out with great enthusiasm, then abandoned halfway in (the modernization of heavy armour, which was thrown into disarray by taking Ajax out of it and might other blows via WCSP and CR2 LEP). Some other precious ingredients get kind of forgotten and are abandoned in a plate to the side, certainly not without some usefulness for the future, but not mixed together in any kind of rational recipe ( 1^st Division and its incomplete brigades without CS and CSS).

It’s a painful spectacle of waste and indecision.

Sometimes someone manages to buy at bargain price some of what is thrown away (RFA Largs Bay, swiftly picked up by Australia; next time will it be Wave class tankers taken up by Brasil, or perhaps even some Type 23s…? Maybe Sentinel R1, too. I’m sure someone would gladly buy those). Sometimes it ends literally in the garbage bin.

We should all be very careful when labeling existing capabilities for deletion and sacrifice, for many reasons. First of all, the efforts of thousands of people and billions of taxpayer money are invested into them, for a start.

Second, deletion of existing capabilities never recoups much money at all. You are certainly not getting back the billions it cost to build them up. You lose far more than you can purchase with what little money is recouped.

Third, any deletion of capability comes with a depressive effect on the force that suffers it. How much manpower is going to bleed out, and how much is the perception of your force’s future and relevance going to be impacted?

Last but not least, you have to be very, very sure that what you are going to invest in is worth the sacrifice. We have to be rational and admit that the British Army is unlikely to ever be truly competitive again. It can be improved, certainly, but it is not going to be a main continental force, not even if several more billions a year are poured into it. Does the UK need to cut back on its existing capabilities to try and reinforce the army? Why? What influence and effect is that going to buy, at the end of the day?

The new SDSR should completely ignore the empty rhetoric of sacred cows, which are mostly just the latest evolution of inter-service bickering, and assess what the UK absolutely needs to do, first of all, and immediately after it should determine what it can do well, and specifically what it can do with what it already owns.

If there are new capabilities that absolutely must be funded – and there might well be – then the first place where to look to make room is in the long list of programmes which haven’t yet started and are not yet under contract. You might have to delay, delete, prioritize.

If I had to point my finger at some kinetic capabilities that might urgently need attention, for example, I’d have to mention anti-ballistic missile defense and air-defence in general, since this is an enormous weak spot in the whole of the UK’s forces. As ballistic anti-ship missiles and theatre ballistic missiles become more and more common in the tactics and strategies of enemies and rivals worldwide, having no BMD defence at all will soon simply become unacceptable. The ability to fire back, and thus some truly powerful and modern Fires, would be by big second. The US Army has made Fires its number one priority, and it’s no mystery that I think they have got that right.

In order to make room for investments in those areas, the UK might have to cut pieces of its future-years equipment programme, and that is why the Army is worried, since most of its programmes have yet to be put under contract. According to the official schedule, after all, in this very year alone the Army should get to decisions for Warrior CSP production, JLTV procurement, Multi Role Vehicle – Protected Group 2 selection (between Bushmaster and Eagle 6x6) and Challenger 2 LEP. It’s easy to understand why the Army is particularly nervous.

The alternative is to drastically cut back on some of the stuff that is already under contract or even in service, even if it means wasting a lot of still perfectly valid capabilities and throw in the garbage bin all the money it cost to procure them.

But I hope that the actual decision makers at the SDSR table will prove more reasonable than the voices of the informal debate we are hearing in the last while. If it is not possible to do everything, you should stick to what you are good at. If your money is not enough to purchase all you’d need, at least start by using well what you already have, and have already paid.

If the UK can do well guarding the North flank, reinforcing Norway and keeping the Atlantic supply routes open, that is a plenty valid contribution. If it can supply modern, competitive airpower, from sea and from land, that is plenty good contribution. If it can also deploy a decent heavy armor force, that is good.

If you pursue a “revolutionary approach”, you’ll better make damn sure your revolution is real and workable.

Because you know what you lose, but not what you might or might not gain.

Building on strengths - Amphibious Force and the Royal Marines cut

1 - Introduction and Air Manoeuver 
2 - Amphibious Force and the Royal Marines cut 


This second chapter of the "building on strengths" series has been urged on and changed in shape by the emergence on national news of a problem that has been brewing in the background for a while. Amid enduring tightness of budgets, the Navy Command is very seriously considering cutting back on the Royal Marines in the desperate attempt of saving money.

The idea of permanently removing 42 Commando from frontline work has been lurking in the background for months. The fact that it has now appeared on the press means that it is very close to turning to reality. This leak to The Times might well be the last ditch effort to prevent it from going ahead, but it could very well not suffice.

Delegation of budget responsibilities to the frontline Commands is generally a very good thing, but when it comes to funding crises of this kind, it can turn into a monstrosity. Fallon has already clearly shrugged off the blame and appointed it like a medal on the chest of the 1^st Sea Lord, and this might serve to make the cut all but unavoidable, simply because, from a Royal Navy-only point of view, the alternatives are probably even worse as they probably involve the loss of ships.

It is a fact, however, that removing 42 Commando from frontline duty will dramatically weaken the amphibious force, even in its routine battlegroup strength. The three Commandos alternate yearly into high readiness to serve as the core of the up to 1800-strong amphibious battlegroup, which includes an engineer squadron from 24 Regiment, an artillery battery from 29 Royal Artillery, logistic group from the Commando Logistic Regiment and reconnaissance, command support, police and air defence from 30 Commando IX.

It is a fact that 16 Air Assault brigade delivers the Air Assault battlegroup at readiness mostly from just 2 units (2 and 3 PARA). But it is equally a fact that they have been reinforced with the Royal Gurkha Rifles when it became clear that two battalions on their own struggled. It is also a fact that the Royal Marines have an additional task to take care of, which is provision of “Green” boarding teams to the fleet, for the more dangerous operations. This task used to be the remit of a squadron within 43 Commando, but that squadron was disbanded and the responsibility given to the Commando group in its “Other Tasks” year.

The idea for 42 Commando, I guess, might be to turn it into the permanent provider of Green teams and other supporting capabilities at lower-than-full-Commando scale. Recently, 3 Commando Brigade developed a Personnel Recovery capability for saving downed pilots in enemy territory and negate sensitive material to the enemy. A C-SAR capability that has long been needed and that the return of Carrier Strike, as well as the sensitive nature of F-35 technology and the value of its pilots, have made more urgent than ever.

The Royal Marines are also following the USMC lead on Special Purpose Task Groups, smaller forces (roughly company-group sized, in what has been seen so far on Mounts Bay in her solo deployment in the Mediterranean) adequate for raids, quasi-SF operations and rapid reaction. It might be that 42 Commando would be permanently tasked with delivery of a number of these groups. 
At a minimum, a SPTG with 4 Merlin HC4 is expected to always feature on board of the active aircraft carrier in the future, as well. 

However, even this "soft cut" would still deprive 3 Commando Brigade of mass, something it cannot afford to lose. In his end of year letter to the Royal Marines association, Major General Rob Magowan, commander general Royal Marines, wrote that the Corps was not in the condition of losing mass. At the time, the rumors about the push towards cuts to the RM were already alive and had already reached my ears and, no doubt, those of many others. The letter does not mention it directly, but the hints are clear: the fight was already on.

Unfortunately, the Royal Marines appear to be losing it, and going public now is probably the last bullet left to fire. If it misses, it is probably over. 3 Commando Brigade has been under constant assault since 2010: the Army, faced with its own great share of cuts, wanted to take manpower and pieces out of green Commando units. Initially, it looked like 24 Commando Engineer regiment would vanish, as well as 148 Battery Meiktila. In the end, both those cuts were successfully fought back and cancelled. 24 Commando Engineer has since had some actual success, growing 54 Squadron into a deployable engineer unit supporting the historic 59 Sqn. 131 (Reserve) Squadron has also been formally absorbed, with the regiment effectively mirroring the efforts and general organization of 23 Parachute Engineer regiment, with two deployable squadrons alternating into readiness.

7 Battery, 29 Commando Royal Artillery has had more of a struggle, between starts and stops: move south from Arbroath; stay in Arbroath; lose the guns and become Tac Gp only; keep the guns; wait for more announcements; repeat. Since 2010, the Arbroath-based battery, in theory support for 45 Commando in RM Condor, has faced a very uncertain future made of orders and counter-orders. 

Tthe last info I had suggested that its future was more than ever hanging by a thread as the loss of the Citadel and the need to relocate most of the brigade’s units as part of the “Better Defence Estate” project added to the shortage of guns, tight manpower margins and insufficient REME support. "Wait for further communications" seemed to be the thing. The artillery regiment is down to 12 guns in 3 tiny fires batteries, and could well end up having only two batteries, like 7 Royal Horse Artillery in the Air Assault role. In other words: the bare minimum needed to support a single battlegroup at readiness. The loss of 42 Commando as frontline unit is pretty much assured to come together with the loss of 7 Bty as well: no Commando to support, no artillery battery required. 

3 Commando brigade is one of just 6 brigades in the whole of the British Forces which will have any Combat Support and Combat Service Support units. In simpler terms, it is one of only 6 brigades that are actually deployable (in full or in part), in connection with the effects of Army 2020 Refine. To further damage this already pitifully small force is a crime, and is not a decision that should fall on the shoulders of the 1^st Sea Lord alone. The whole british armed forces would come out weaker from the ordeal, even before considering the precious specialized nature of Marines units (from amphibiosity to Cold Weather and Mountain specialization) and the fact that they traditionally are a privileged recruiting ground for the Special Forces.

42 Commando is in line for the shrinking and change of role 

Dismantling this area of excellence makes zero sense when observed from a whole force point of view. The Navy budget might well be the one in most immediate trouble, but this “fix” is worse than the illness. There are other areas that could be hit with cuts without the damage being anywhere near as serious, and the primary one is the “Adaptable Force” of six “infantry brigades” in Army 2020 Refine. This container of Light Role infantry battalions will have zero CS and CSS elements at its disposal as the few it had as part of Army 2020 get either dismantled or moved to 3^rd Division as part of Refine, meaning that its brigades are not deployable at all. The government needs to drop its absurd and horrendously damaging diktat that “no more than 5 infantry battalions should be lost, in order to preserve all capbadges”. This requirement, dropped on the Army’s top brass in 2010, has warped the army out of shape in an horrendous way, and now will be partially responsible of the cuts to 3 Commando Brigade as well.

The Royal Marines capability needs to be nurtured, not dismantled. They deliver unique capabilities within defence and, together with Royal Navy amphibious shipping and RFA strategic sealift (themselves already very unwisely run down dramatically beginning in 2010), they represent a huge share of the amphibious capability within NATO. The UK does itself no favor at all by depriving itself of this capability, and NATO as a whole. It is not the right way to approach Brexit negotiations either: threatening to retreat from Europe’s defence is not a very serious proposition if the forces get dismantled either way, and one of the unique or semi-unique contributions get lost before the debate even starts.

Army and Royal Marines must be looked at from the same table. 3 Commando Brigade is both a precious deployable brigade (one of far too few) and the custodian of the ability to maneuver on the sea flank and in the littoral. I cannot emphasize enough how urgent it is to fix the ridiculous imbalance of “Light Role infantry” to “everything else”. The manpower and money that go into those six undeployable, unfinished, paper-tiger infantry brigades is a treasure that the Forces cannot possibly do without in this climate. Manpower and money that should go into rebuilding lost supports, and with them lost deployable brigades. Some capbadges will be lost, but this is far, far better than the current path of self-destruction that is dismantling CS, CSS and now even the amphibious force in order to preserve more infantry regiments than the army can possibly support. That Army 2020 Refine dismantles yet another set of brigade-level supports (artillery, engineer, logistic, medical) is a act of self-harm absolutely unjustifiable, and this Royal Marines cut will add to that disaster.

Going back to my original plan for a moment, I intended to write that the UK should invest on its amphibious force. The news of the incoming cut only add urgency to the statement. The UK possesses a very large share of all of Europe’s amphibious shipping, as well as a very capable permanent strategic sealift component (the Point class RoRo vessels). It has a capable, proven, respected amphibious brigade that only needs a small investment in supports to rebuild muscle.

Moreover, the UK will have a capable carrier strike force to support and protect amphibious maneuver with. To sacrifice one to fund the other is an act of strategic blindness hard to even describe with words. The two things go hand in hand, and the 1^st Sea Lord repeatedly tried to make the point clear and understood; in several speeches he explained that the Royal Navy must be defined by three macro areas being: Nuclear Deterrent (and we should also add, the all-important SSNs), Carrier Air (not strike. Air, in general, because a key contribution of the air wing is protection of the task force in a heavily contested environment) and Amphibious capability.

The big pieces are in place, and the United Kingdom, in a rare moment of sanity and awareness of its potentiality, had actually taken leadership of a NATO “Smart Defence” initiative to develop a strategic Port Opening capability to enable theatre entry. Unfortunately, nothing has been heard since, even though this is a capability that would be simply invaluable both in war (Think Defence wrote an excellent report about the efforts, back in 2003, to reopen the port of Umm Qasr in Iraq)  and peace (think about disaster relief, such as after the Haiti earthquake, when establishing a point of easy access from the sea is vital).

One bit of good news…

… related to the previous chapter of this series.

Interestingly, images coming in from Joint Warrior 17_1 suggest that someone in the army either reads me (just kidding) or has ideas similar to mine for investment on Air Assault and Air Manoeuver. The 2^nd Battalion, Royal Gurkha Rifles seems to be playing with Foxhounds air-landed at Keevil with C-17. 

Other deliveries have included artillery and Pinzgauers towing the guns and even Apache, with rotors folded and all bits in place for rapid entry into action. 

The brigadier commanding 16 Air Assault brigade has added a photo in tweet, showing a Tactical HQ element mounted in Foxhounds for mobility, part of an “airmobile armour” experiment.

I was not aware of it coming when I wrote my recent article, I can assure you all of it. But obviously it is pretty pleasing to see some positive development, and one that goes in the very same direction I argued for.

The Tac HQ in the Airmobile Armour experiment 

Elements of Joint Helicopter Command deployed on Salisbury Plain with Joint Helicopter Force - 1 (HQ element coming from the Attack Helicopter Force. JHF-2 is amphibious-focused and comes from the Commando Helicopter Force) along with 4 Chinook, 3 Puma and 5 Apache from 664 Sqn in its new permanent attachment to the Air Assault task force. The exercise has included refuelings from fuel bladders carried inside Chinooks adding as relocatable Forward Refueling Points.

Meanwhile, in Exercise Una Triangle, the RAF A4 force and Royal Engineer's 529 Specialist Team RE (STRE) from Wittering deployed to Cottersmore to turn the ex-airfied (now the Army's Kendrew Barracks) back into an active air hub. Tents, catering, logistics, bulk fuel installation were all exercised to create a small deployed air base. Hopefully this will be further exercised and developed in the future, to include austere basing for the F-35B in good time. According to Scott Williams, RAF pilot within the F-35 programme, Royal Engineers will renew their stock of matting panels for runway repair and construction in order to support F-35 austere operations. 

Coming to a future Joint Warrior in a non too distant future, hopefully. 

Meanwhile, you can see photos and video reports from Una Triangle on RAF Wittering's facebook page. It is nice to see that some things are still moving. 

A last summary, two weeks from SDSR day

 

SDSR 2015 – Issues, analysis and recommendations going towards the review

Budget

About that 2%

Army 

Army projects and requirements

Army vehicle projects – post DSEI 2015

Solving the problem of hollow army 2020

Royal Air Force 

Fast jets and squadrons number 

Air Capabilities

The mystery of Protector

Royal Navy 

Royal Navy and the SDSR 

Beyond Harpoon and Storm Shadow (and Tomahawk too…?

What to expect?

In general terms, it is thought that this SDSR will bring “good news”. As I wrote on Twitter back in October, its publication was pushed to the right to more closely aligned with the Spending Review (25 November), but with release “a few days before” (that was my guess, and we now know it’ll be 2 days, as the SDSR is due for release on the 23^rd) to show that, “no, It is nothing like 2010”.

In broad terms, the SDSR will re-affirm the targets for Future Force 2020. No cuts are expected, and instead there should be some good news. How many, and how actually good, we don’t yet know.

I’m moderately optimistic. The fact that we can expect overall stability is a welcome change in itself, but I’m still skeptic about the good news. If the SDSR doesn’t settle satisfactorily the MPA gap, which I consider the most problematic, I cannot consider it a success.

One thing I try to keep in mind and a warning that I feel I must give is: don’t expect too much detail. The yearly Equipment Programme document shows just how well this government is using indetermination to protect its ability to cut at leisure behind the curtains. What does the Equipment Plan include, exactly? How many vehicles? For delivery when? We don’t know. The document says nothing until firm contracts have been signed, so that anything not yet firmly on contract can be stealthily cut, pushed to the right, descoped, changed.

I expect the SDSR to be just as indecisive and vague whenever it suits the Treasury’s interests. For example, I do not expect to be given details about the plans for purchasing F-35s, other than a confirmation of the 48 needed for the OCU and the first two squadrons.

Main Gate 5, the next big programme decision point, is scheduled for 2017 and I honestly can’t imagine this government telling us much before that date.

The purchase of 20 Protector RPAS to replace the current 10 Reaper will also not be detailed before Main Gate in early 2016, I’m afraid. Until then, we are unlikely to learn much about what exactly they’ll be like, or what impact they will have on manpower, infrastructure and number of squadrons (currently, there's 2 squadrons operating 10 Reapers). 

In general, I expect plenty of questions to remain unanswered.

Some programmes are however on the move, or expected to move on with the SDSR. There is even some optimism in the press about reversing some more of the 2010 madness. The following summary shows where we are, what we know, and what rumors are floating around.

Airborne troops and helicopters

16 Air Assault Brigade is re-subordinated to the Land Forces, leaving Joint Helicopter Command. In the process, it “loses” some pieces: the Apache regiments remain as Attack Helicopter Force under JHC. 7 REME battalion splits into two, with 8 Field Company (Para) re-subordinating to 13 Air Assault Support Regiment RLC to continue delivering equipment support to the paras on the field and the aviation coys (73 Av Coy now in Yeovilton to support the Wildcat fleet, the other two in Wattisham, aligned with the two Apache regiments)  staying under JHC as 7 REME battalion. All should be done by the end of this month. The Eagle symbol retires with dignity, and the beloved Pegasus returns. 

The split of 7 REME was in my list of suggested changes to 16 Air Assault Brigade, as well as the separation of the helicopters from the troops. Of course, I called for more ambitious changes, with 8 Field Company being at least doubled into a (small) battalion better suited to support the force generation cycle of 16X and with the army and RAF helicopter squadrons reorganized into real aviation brigade(s). I did not expect it to actually happen, at least not in one go, but one can hope. The restructuring of 16X is, at least in my opinion, following the right path.  

The army is taking control of the work to determine what comes after the Medium Stressed Platform to allow the parachuting of heavy equipment and vehicles. An attempt to find a stop-gap solution by adapting the MSP for use on the C-130J seems to have sadly been cancelled, leaving the present airborne forces badly handicapped. An handicap that will stay for a good few years, until a new platform and the A400 are ready for operations.

The US Type V platform remains on the list of possible solutions, but there’s reportedly a 500 kg problem still for using it with Jackal. The employment of Jackal with the airborne has been trialed during exercises in the US, and the vehicle has fared very well, delivering decisive firepower and faring better than the Humvees employed by the US. However, the impossibility of parachuting the Jackal into battle is a limit, and even when air landing from the C-130, the Jackal can’t just charge into the fight right away: the weapon on top needs to be re-installed after landing due to the dimensional limits of the C-130’s cargo door and hold.

It is also to be regretted that there are no plans to retain a small force of light, well armed, tracked armoured vehicles. Those would add immensely to the ability to react swiftly and to bring armoured fire support even in the most hostile territories. 

Right as the US Army resurrects ideas for a light tank capable even of being airdropped, with BAE showcasing a renewed M-8 Buford, the UK has no plan to retain a squadron of light combat vehicles. I think Ajax is a good replacement for CVR(T) in the armoured brigades, but i also see the enduring need for a small unit equipped to enter a distant theatre quickly and support the reaction force even on the worst terrain.

A bit of good news came from Joint Warrior 15-1, which saw the debut of RAF C-17 in tactical role, with it being employed in Rapid and Follow-On Air Landings. Finally! As I’ve said more than once, the UK has paid big money for a strategic cargo with great tactical capabilities: you paid for them, now use them. I hope we will see airdrops becoming part of the C-17’s routine as well. 

A capable replacement for the Medium Stressed Platform is key to keeping the airborne task force viable.

Meanwhile, the MOD has begun the process for upgrading 25 Gazelle helicopters with GPS, traffic avoidance system and a new VHF radio. The upgrade will be carried out by Gama Engineering Ltd, and should be completed by August 2017. It has to be assumed that the Gazelle OSD is no longer 2018, and that the thorny issue of its replacement will be pushed to the right by a good few years. The Gazelle remains in use with 667 (Development and Trials) Squadron and 671 Squadron as part of 7 (Training) Regiment at AAC Centre Middle Wallop; in 665 Squadron, part of 5 Regiment at Joint Helicopter Command Flying Station Aldergrove, Northern Ireland; and 29 (BATUS) Flight as part of the British Army Training Unit Suffield (BATUS) in Canada.

The SDSR should confirm the plan to upgrade 50 Apache helicopters to Block III standard, but details of how, where (Boeing or AW?) and when are most likely going to come out only in March 2016 when the Main Gate decision is planned.  

Army vehicles

The 10 Years Equipment Plan, 2015 edition is, as was to be expected, entirely devoid of details, dates, numbers, but it still provides some interesting pointers: both ABSV and MRV-P are included in the plan. The ABSV has been definitively separated from the Warrior CSP and will be, on achieving Main Gate, a new Category A programme in its own right. Unfortunately, we might have to wait for 2017 before Main Gate is reached. Entry into service might have to slip as well as a consequence, from 2020 to sometime into the 2020s. ABSV is a key programme, as it is needed to replace the ancient FV432 and complement the (insufficient) number of Warriors with 40mm gun. The effectiveness of the armoured infantry battalions is in no small measure connected with ABSV.

A curiosity: if the Equipment Plan is not just messing up numbers, the Warrior Section Vehicle becomes FV520 after the CSP (now is known as FV510) and the Infantry Command sub-variant becomes FV521 (was FV511).

The Equipment Plan confirms thinking that the MRV-P will require a 4x4 and a 6x6 vehicle. The requirement, albeit over many years, runs into the thousands of vehicles, but the funded MRV-p project for now is expected to cover only 500 troop carriers, 78 ambulances and 27 recovery vehicles. Main Gate is expected in 2017. The hope is that the MRV-p does not become another orphaned programme, abandoned after the first phase with the result of creating yet another “mini” fleet. Rationalization of the current holding of vehicles (from Land Rovers and Pinzgauers in “close to firing line” roles to Husky, Panther, WMIK) with successive purchases of MRV-P should be a key army aspiration in along the next decade.

The Challenger 2 LEP is confirmed as part of the plans. Main Gate has slipped to the right as the army tries to find ideas (and money, especially money) to try and address the growing list of deficiencies. The idea of possibly purchasing a “new” tank as replacement has quickly been abandoned, but the Army has now officially declared its concerns, especially about lethality. The powerpack would also need replacing. Whether the delay to the LEP brings to any increase in its scope, is beyond my guessing ability at this point: the army knows that upgrading only the fire control system, communications and sights won’t quite solve the problems, but might still be unable to do anything about it for lack of money.

The REME Conference 2015 has seen the announcement that there is a funded plan to procure an Air Portable Lightweight Recovery Vehicle that will be used by 16X and 3X Commando. A light recovery vehicle for the Light Protected Mobility Infantry battalions will also be procured. Finally, the Challenger recovery variant is due to receive unspecified survivability upgrades, perhaps in line with add-on armor elements of the Challenger 2 LEP.

Note that MRV-P and Air Portable recovery vehicle were grouped together with two more requirements to form the Operational Support Programme (OSP). The other two components were the new Future Protected Battle Field Ambulance (FPBFA) and the Non-Articulated Vehicle – Protected (NAV-P), the vital replacement for DROPS (also known as the vehicle which went out of service at the end of 2014 but remains used in numbers anyway because the army simply can’t do without it for many things). It is not known yet if these will progress as well. The NAV-P certainly should, because it really is an indispensable piece of capability. 



Logistic storage capacity

In Summer 2016, we should finally get to hear the recommendations for where to re-locate the vehicle storage capability from the current facilities: Ashchurch and its sister site in Mönchengladbach, Germany are the 2 major controlled humidity storage sites preserving vehicles and kit for all three the Services, but government wants to close both by 2018. Clearly, a decision on where to park the thousands of items, including armored vehicles up to the Challenger 2, is an absolute necessity.

A new site, ideally located close to the Salisbury Plain training area and well connected by rail to both Marchwood and Brize Norton, is clearly required. It will be important to see what is actually done in this key area. 

Seeking a new garage

Work has already begun on the complementary storage site, the Defence Fulfillment Centre MOD Donnington, which will store and distribute food, clothing, general and medical supplies in a 80.000 square meters, two-hangars facility.

VIRTUS

With Phase 1 vests and load carrying equipment deliveries beginning, the Equipment Plan 2015 says that activities have begun for Phase 2 and Phase 3, respectively covering the development of new, advanced and lighter ballistic plates and man-worn data and power infrastructure.

Ground Based Air Defence

An anti-UAV capability demonstration was given earlier this year by SAAB to the MOD: the focus was on an Enhanced Low, Slow, and Small (ELSS) capability for the Giraffe AMB radar in service. The development of anti-UAV capability is part of Increment 2 of the Network Enabled Airspace Defence and Surveillance programme. If the schedule continues to be followed, a kinetic C-RAM capability should be acquired by 2017.  

The MOD is procuring a C4 solution for integrated air defence of the Falklands and has procured additional Giraffe AMB radars and an upgrade to the latest standard for those already in service. The fleet should now count 10 systems between radars delivered and on order.

The Phase 1 of procurement for the FLAADS(Land) batteries that will replace the current 4 Rapier batteries has begun with a contract signed in December 2014.

A new EOD robot

A new battlefield UGV for EOD work is to be procured under Project STARTER. This is curious, since I thought the recent purchase of the much celebrated CUTLASS would be enough to completely replace the old WHEELBARROWs, Evidently it is not the case. STARTER is for 56 UGVs with a further 30 options. It is meant for fire line battlefield use, and requirements include being able to fit within existing EOD vehicles, from Pinzgauers to Mastiff III EOD.

Training of aircrews

Plans for the complete renewal of the training fleets for both fixed and rotary wing fleets are progressing, and surprisingly they are doing so in complete silence. One possible explanation is that they are keeping the announcement for the SDSR, to present it as good news.

It is not, at least entirely, good news: the training fleets will be renewed, yes, but their sizes are expected to drop enormously, and there will be little to no more capability for training foreign pilots. Moreover, RAF Linton-on-Ouse is probably going to close as Basic training is moved to RAF Valley.

The SDSR should, one would expect, spend a few words to explain what will happen to the base and to the training fleets.

A “RAF Military Flying Training School” is expected to stand up in 2017 in RAF Valley, probably replacing both No 1 FTS (basic training, RAF Linton-on-Ouse) and No 4 FTS (Advanced, RAF Valley). It can be assumed with quite some confidence that the current 72(R), 208(R) and IV(R) squadrons will drop to just 2.

No 2 FTS has been re-formed in January 2014 on RAF Syerston to oversee the gliding training programme for up to 45,000 air cadets of Cadet Flights and Air Training Corps.

No 6 Flying Training School has been re-formed in September to command and manage the 15 RAF University Air Squadrons (UAS) located across the UK.

The RAF will rebuild a pipeline for training mission specialists and “back-seaters”, after losing it in 2011. The role will be covered by the same small fleet of Phenom 100 jets which will replace the Beechcraft 200 as training platform for the multi-engine pipeline.The same squadron will cover both roles, unlike what happened up to the SDSR 2010, with 55(R) Sqn using the old Dominie to deliver rear-crew training and 45(R) delivering multi-engine training.

No 3 Flying Training School at RAF Cranwell currently has 2 squadrons (16(R) and 57(R), with 16 being actually based at RAF Wittering) for elementary flying training; 115(R) Sqn (RAF Wittering) for instructor training and refresher courses and 45(R) Sqn for Multi-Engine training. The impact of the renewal of the fleet might bring further changes and downsizing.  

A new school building, with simulators and hangars for the new rotary wing training fleet is to be built by 2017 in RAF Shawbury. The details of the re-organization, and the types of helicopters that will replace Griffin and Squirrel have yet to be decided.

MPA

The big thing everyone is on the lookout for. The Sunday Times has recently reported that, just three weeks from SDSR publication, the secretary of state for defence would have stopped what was said to be a done deal for the purchase of P-8 Poseidon aircraft, throwing RAF plans in disarray. According to the Sunday Times, the SDSR will only contain an indecisive “promise” about addressing the MPA gap, perhaps through some kind of competition.

This will inexorably delay the closure of the gap and risks creating significant difficulties: top brass have warned more than once about SEEDCORN being sustainable only for a limited amount of time. The programme has recently been given a further 3 year extension, with 22 out of 36 service personnel involved deployed in the US to work on the P-8 Poseidon.

If it is true that the Secretary has suddenly awakened to the high cost of closing the MPA gap only now, after years of effort clearly targeted at boarding the Poseidon train, we have touched a new low in MOD history. This thing has been in the making literally for years now, and it is a bit late to throw everything back to square one.

I’ve talked about the MPA issue at length, so my comment at this time will be brief: there is the widespread belief that, due to money and manpower shortages, the MPA eventually acquired by the RAF will have to be a multi-ISTAR platform, coming, in particular, with a wide area surveillance, including GMTI capability sufficient for replacing Sentinel R1. In practice, the assumption is that the MPA and Protector will be accommodated using the manpower and money currently “occupied” by Sentinel R1, Shadow R1 and Predator (and then some more, probably).

For the overland surveillance requirement, the RAF will obviously look at USAF’s own experience, to try and keep the pace, so to speak. Most contenders in the JSTARS replacement race for the USAF are offering business jet platforms, size-wise, stepping down from the current huge size of the JSTARS and effectively following the general direction the RAF traced with Sentinel R1.

There is one exception: Boeing is still offering a larger aircraft, the 737-700, which is however a bit smaller than the 737-800 which is the P-8's base. The small business jet comes with the advantage of lower costs, higher altitude (good for radar range) and ability to operate from smaller airfields. However, they also come with constrained growth margins and with limited space available for systems and crew. The Sentinel R1 itself is an example: it reportedly has a growth margin as small as 700 kg, and the RAF had to renounce to fitting an air to air refueling probe which had once been in the requirements.

The main point of interest is, however, the sensor. The radar to be employed also hasn't been firmly selected yet, but one of the top contenders is the same AN/APS-154 AAS that the US Navy will put on part of its P-8 fleet for its own needs, or anyway a derivative product reportedly going by the “Skynet” name.

It will be interesting to see what choices the USAF makes, but unfortunately the JSTARS recap effort is struggling to get funding and might not progress for a while.
Key considerations to take away are: the AAS radar is a serious contender for the US JSTARS requirement and a 737 platform remains in the game.

The US Navy is working to integrate the AAS on P-8 for increased target mapping capability in the littoral and overland domains. The AN/APY-10 radar already comes with overland functionality and the P-8 as it is now is not any less of an ISTAR platform than other MPAs used over land.
It is actually probably better already. 

P-8 test flight with the AAS "canoe"

The UK requirement is for a MPA with good ASW capability and, eventually, a wide area SAR / ISAR / GMTI surveillance capability over land. The P-8 with AAS fits the requirement like a glove.

Would it be better to use a pure, high performace MPA and a smaller, higher-flying business jet with AAS for the overland role? Sure. But the UK can't realistically afford to purchase, man, operate and upgrade through life two such fleets and have reasonable numbers to work with. There is a very high risk that, at some point, two such fleets would end up locked in a fratricide struggle for funding and manpower, and one of the two would end up succumbing.  

No other MPA on offer in the world has a clear path to a wide area SAR / GMTI capability matching the AAS on P-8; no other MPA in the world has a civilian base of similar airframes and a military, international fleet as large as P-8 has; no other MPA in the world comes with tens of RAF personnel already trained / involved on it; no other MPA in the world has the kind of assured evolution path that the main MPA of the US Navy can expect to have.

There are several offers to create something that does MPA and overland ISTAR for the UK, but they all exist only on paper: the Sea Hercules, the Q-400, a UK evolution of the C-295 or P-1. They are all entirely or partially paper projects with varying degrees of risk and uncertainty.
It is a movie we’ve already seen: it starts with promises of "it'll be cheaper and better too" and then it ends in years of frustrations and cost overruns. Then, a few years later, when it is time for major upgrades, you look around for a partner to share the costs with... and while US and Australia go on with P-8, you end up alone in the room, with a Challenger 2 rifled gun and 2-piece CHARM 3 round at your side, cursing the heavens.

No MPA in the world comes ready for british weaponry, apart perhaps for the P-3 Orion of Norway, the only customer of Stingray ever.  I’m not sure if the planned integration was carried out, but even assuming it progressed, is P-3 an option / would the UK take any real advantage? No.

Integration of british-specific weaponry and equipment it is not a P-8 problem but a UK problem. Some integration of customer-specific kit is unavoidable whenever a country purchases an off-the-shelf product. Either that, or purchase of US torpedoes for P-8 use, whatever is cheaper. India decided to buy the torpedoes along with the aircraft, for example.

There is a very real risk that indecisiveness on MPA causes knock-over effects across wider ISTAR planning. If the RAF does not get P-8, money will probably tend to go to Sentinel R1 to life extend and upgrade it, leaving even less money available for a later MPA purchase. The result could end up being a horrible example of half-arsing which creates more problems than it solves.

Fast Jet squadrons

News reports lately have insistently mentioned the possibility that the SDSR will announce plans for a third F-35B squadron and two more Typhoon squadrons, the latter made possible by the retention of Tranche 1s into the 2020s (at least the first half of them). Under current plans, the Tranche 1s would be withdrawn from service by 2019 and only then would the new Tranche 3A be assigned to the squadrons.

I’ve already explained where the merits of the Tranche 1 solution are. Tornado GR4 would be more useful, but its retention is more complicated and expensive.

Assuming that the rumor is true and the Tranche 1s stay, the next big question is where does manpower come from?

The first (and possibly the only) answer is “from the Tornado fleet”, but settling the details will be complex: Typhoon will not be ready to take Tornado’s place in action for several years still, meaning that, if operations against ISIS drag on over the coming years, it will not be possible to draw down Tornado squadrons and train the personnel to move on to Typhoon. A transfer from Tornado to Typhoon does not happen overnight. The process of setting up two more Typhoon squadrons can only happen in concert with the drawdown of Tornado unless the RAF is not only given the funding for hiring more people, but manages to boost recruitment quickly and efficiently.

Even if the additional squadrons will be confirmed by the SDSR (and I certainly hope so), it’ll take quite some effort (and probably a few years) to find a way to make them happen. Two additional Typhoon squadrons would be fundamental to avoid falling to just 6 squadrons in 2020, and the Tranche 1 could act as a place holder ahead of further purchases of F-35s in the second half of the 2020s, when keeping Tranche 1s any further is likely to become a real problem.

Sentry

There are expectations about the SDSR bringing good news for the AWACS fleet too. The UK Sentry are lagging badly behind US and NATO , having not been included in the ongoing upgrade programmes for lack of money. If the problem is not addressed, the british Sentry will become more and more obsolescent and of less immediate integration within allied plans.

This is another area requiring urgent attention.

And the navy?

The Navy is a major question mark. It unfortunately starts to sound like it will be shafted once more, to some degree. Earlier optimism about being granted a manpower increase has been watered down, and there is still no real indication of what, if any, answers the SDSR will give about the fate of the River Batch 2, MARS FSS and other plans.

We are also still waiting to understand exactly what “in service” will mean for HMS Prince of Wales. 

The SDSR will reaffirm the objective of putting into service 13 Type 26 frigates, but in the facts we can only really expect the order for the first batch, of just 3 ships, with a contract expected in early 2016. It seems almost certain that the other two batches of 5 ships each will be left for future parliaments. With the last Type 26 due in service in 2035/36 and with the government having decided to go for a procurement in small successive batches instead of the hoped-for contract for 13, or even the earler "ASW batch" of 8 in one go, we can expect the uncertainty about the final number of frigates to be a fact of life for many years. 

No ship is expected to be axed, but probably the out of service date for HMS Ocean will be confirmed as 2018/19 (not necessarily saying it into the SDSR document, of course). 

The Navy is very likely to be asked to provide one carrier group presence in the Gulf with a certain regularity. This will be particularly welcomed by the US Navy, which probably wants the UK’s help to be free to focus its own carrier groups more on the Pacific, without leaving the Middle East uncovered.

The new british base to be built in Bahrain will help support this role as well as the enduring operation Kipion presence, with its significant MCM element.