Monday, September 10, 2012

Commando Brigade under attack


It should be clear to everyone that we are far from having a clear picture of the true, full damage done by the "innovative" Army 2020 plan. The newspapers and public have been blinded by the evergreen issue of capbadges, historic regiments and other relatively meaningless issues, while a lot of true problems have gone unnoticed, and many more are still kept under wrap by the Army.

For example, the Army 2020 brochure didn't make much of an effort to explain how 14 Signals Regiment (Electronic Warfare) is losing a Squadron, down to 4, after standing up its 5th Squadron (needed to sustain enduring deployments abroad) literally only months ago, in June.
Again, the Army did not tell the public that all Light Role infantry battalions are seeing their Establishment much reduced, with the consequence, reportedly, that each Company in the Battalions will lose a Platoon. Formally, as the brochure says, the Battalions will still have 3 Rifle Companies and 1 Maneuver Support Company, but in reality they will lose the equivalent strenght of a Rifle Company by reducing Platoons from 3 per Coy to 2 per Coy.

Rumors (that i'm unable to confirm at the stage, however) say that the "largely unchanged" attack helicopter structure in the Army 2020 brochure actually means losing a Squadron of Apache helicopters (from 6 to 5) and seeing the Regimental HQs of 3rd and 4th Regiment AAC merge.
Again, the brochure will not be saying a false thing: there will be two Attack Helicopter regiments, formally, but the reality will be a lot more depressing if the voices are right.
See what the Army is doing...?

Again, few (me and...? Someone else?) reported that the Royal Signals are losing few regiments, but many Squadrons, with each Signal Squadron at brigade level being withdrawn, save for the Signal element of 16 Air Assault Brigade. It is possible that some squadrons will continue to live, as part of the restructured 5 Multi-Role Signal Regiments, which are merely the final evolution of 5 regiments already existing and already "multi-role" due to their focus on supporting, rotating in and out of theatre, the Afghan effort. But while it is possible, it is likely that most Squadrons will simply be lost.

Same goes for the Royal Artillery and Royal Engineers, largely: several Batteries and Squadrons will go, probably in the silence, because the focus is on "the historic regiment".

Lately, i've been following the still evolving situation of the supporting elements for 3rd Commando Brigade. As most readers will know, 3rd Commando is a Navy formation, largely composed of Royal Marines, in 30 IX, 40, 42 and 45 Commando battalions, plus the Commando Logistics Regiment.
However, the Brigade gets its Artillery and Engineer support from the Army, along with a fourth maneuver unit, the 1st Battalion The Rifles.
An example of successful joint work...? On the field, yes, behind the desks, no.

In 2008, to better face complex deployments in Afghanistan, 3rd Commando Brigade was given a major boost with the formation of the 24 Commando Engineer Regiment, meant to expand the engineer element of the brigade from an Independent Squadron (plus TA Squadron) to a Regiment with 2 Squadrons and HQ Squadron.
The force would expand from the sole 59 Commando Sqn to a Regiment comprising 56 Sqn, 59 Sqn and 24 HQ Sqn.

It was a welcome development, and an answer to real and obvious needs. Still, it did not deliver. 24 HQ Sqn stood up, but 56 Sqn ultimately never was.   
And in the Army 2020 restructuring, all ambitions of going ahead with the Regiment were quickly abandoned, with the plan being that 24 Commando will revert to the sole 59 Commando Sqn.

This was a bad enough news on its own. A single regular squadron is insufficient to provide adequate support to a Brigade, and it is whoefully insufficient to provide a credible engineer element to the Commando Battlegroup at readiness, as for SDSR promise.
3rd Commando Brigade is now supposed to generate 1800-strong "Battlegroups" at readiness, centered on a Commando Battalion with support from the Commando Logistic Regiment, support from 29 Commando Royal Artillery (one Gun battery and observation posts, in line of principle), support from Commando Engineers and from 30 Commando IX and other formations and Corps as needed.
There are 3 Commando Battalions that rotate in and out of readiness, and the Commando Logistic Regiment is large enough to provide a Task Group to each Battlegroup at readiness. Similary, 29 Commando Royal Artillery has 3 Gun Batteries, so that it can rotate one at a time in readiness.

But it is evident that a single Squadron of engineers can only rotate its Platoons, at most, and a Platoon of engineers is little support for a 1800-strong battlegroup.

Now it is emerging that next in the line of fire is 29 Commando Royal Artillery, which is facing calls for a reduction of up to 30%, with the probable loss of one Gun Battery.

A Message from the Commanding Officer to the Soldiers, Officers and Families of 29 Commando Regiment.

You will have heard in the news late last week that the Secretary of State for Defence has announced the results of a major restructuring plan for the British Army. This will entail some significant changes and affects every Army unit, including those, like 29 Commando, which supports the other Services. The fundamental aim is to reduce the whole Army strength to 82,000, in line with the announcements last year by his predecessor that we would draw down from out present size of 102,000 (therefore a 20% reduction).

The headline is that these changes will affect us - the Army can't shrink by 20% without everyone getting smaller and leaner. Actually, 29 Cdo could end up being approximately 30% smaller. Quite how the changes will affect our structure is not yet confirmed but there will no doubt be changes to our footprint and our basing; getting smaller will allow us to consolidate better. Although there will be no immediate changes (we are told that nothing will happen before April 2013), I would suggest that we will have morphed into our new structure by the end of 2015 or 16.

Presently we are undermanned by some 20%, especially in the junior ranks. So, we can absorb much of the change without actual loss of manpower but I can't promise that there will not be further redundancies, particularly for more senior ranks. Phase 3 of the existing redundancy programme is now being worked up and there may be subsequent phases too. This may present some individuals with an opportunity. But, importantly, it means uncertainty for many, which is deeply regrettable. My intent is to support all our soldiers, officers and families through this extended period of turbulence.

Never forget that the commando seeks to identify and exploit advantage and opportunity in everything, regardless of how grim the situation might appear. We must not let this distarct us from our operational readiness and we must continue to support the Brigade at all times. Let us stay together - as one; the last remaining Army Commando Regiment - and step forward with purpose to build something that may be smaller but must be stronger.

Lt Colonel E Dawes RA

Fortunately, the loss of one Gun Battery is on the cards, but not set in stone, with time still there to battle such a prospect. Losing one Gun Battery would further dilute the firepower and effectiveness of 3rd Commando as a Brigade, and it would make it far harder, if not impossible, to deliver support to each Battlegroup at readiness, considering that the Army's Force Generation cycle is going to have 3 phases spread over 36 months, with only the last 12 spent "at readiness".
We should also consider that the Commando battlegroup is supposed to be at High Readiness, and at Very High Readiness when embarked and out at sea (for a scenario such as last year's Cougar exercise, which became a war operation due to the events in Libya), so that arguably even 3 batteries might not be quite enough. Certainly not two.

And it does not end here, because it appears that the Army wants to ditch 148 "Meiktila" Royal Artillery Battery as well. This unique formation provides 8 Fire Support Teams capable to direct all kinds of supporting artillery fire (from mortars to naval guns) and call in air support from helicopters and aircrafts. A couple of the teams also have additional, specialized training for underwater insertion from submarines, including via Chalfont (UK's name for the US Swimmers Delivery System: the Royal Navy has 3 such systems, purchased for the Special Boat Service, and the SDS can be fitted to any of the Astute submarines. The Trafalgar class submarines cannot employ it: this capability has been gapped for several years now, from when last SDS-compatible submarine, HMS Spartan, was decommissioned).

These highly trained Fire Support Teams are a precious national resource, not just a critical enabler element for 3rd Commando Brigade. Yet their future is in serious doubt.
Currently, the Royal Navy and the Army are battling for the future of 148 Bty and 29 Commando Royal Artillery. To put it simply, the Royal Navy is not amused by the moves made by Army 2020. The commanding officers of 3rd Commando Brigade are even less amused, and they rightfully are trying to get people to listen and realize that capabilities such as 148 Bty are critical for the future.
The Army seems to be saying that, if the Marines want certain capabilities, it is the Navy that has to supply and pay for them. If it does not, Reaction-role or not, 3rd Commando's army elements will be the first in line for cuts.

The Royal Marines in the past have already lost their wider area air defence in 2004, when 20 Bty Royal Artillery (with the Rapier missile) ceased to be a "Commando" unit.
Luckily, capabilities such as Electronic Warfare, communications, Very Short Range Air Defence (vSHORAD), medical support and logistics are owned directly by the Marines respectively in 30 IX Commando and in the Commando Logistics Regiment, otherwise they would have probably been lost or put at risk at one point or another.

It is sad and actually worrisome to note, but "jointery" has largely failed in the UK, at the top-brass level. The Joint Force Harrier being the greatest example of failure, with the RAF eager to always cut back on Harrier numbers first, doing all it could to save Tornado.
Already in 2008, the First Sea Lord had to threaten resignation to stop the RAF from retiring the Harrier from service, leaving the Royal Navy without any fixed wing air element. Unfortunately, as we know, the First Sea Lord only managed to buy some time.

The Nimrod, while formally not a joint force element, was crucial to the Navy's operations more than to RAF's tasks, and, unsurprisingly i'll dare saying, it was again offered for the chop.
Sentinel R1, flown by an "Army Cooperation" squadron with a big component of Army personnel in its ranks, was also put into the killing line with the infamous announcement that it would be scrapped at the end of Afghan operations. Casually, up to the SDSR it had been a system crucial to Army operations, but not very useful to the RAF... and, again casually, the RAF's attitude towards Sentinel changed radically after the airplane was used to detect targets for air strikes in Libya.

And now the Army is being especially nice to 16 Air Assault brigade (preserving its Signals, Engineer, Medical, Police and Logistic elements) while simultaneously putting forwards heavy cuts to the supporting elements of the other Reaction Brigade.
Because "the other" is not Army's business.

The last ten years have been dense of lessons, particularly for the Royal Navy: facts have shown that the Senior Service cannot trust anyone around capabilities that are critical for its operational effectiveness. Harrier is gone, Nimrod is gone, and 3rd Commando Brigade is under attack.
The future of the Naval Aviation with the F35B is still more of a question mark than a plan, and the Commando Helicopter Force is (barely) getting on to the Merlin HC3, with the RAF said to be still resisting the move, with a "Joint Force Merlin" having been proposed.

Gods, please NO.  

The Royal Navy is learning about the failure of Joint Thinking in the UK's armed forces plagued by insufficient funding. In this climate, it does not surprise me to read that the Royal Navy is trying to go at it alone with a programme for a new Maritime Patrol Aircraft, to be controlled by the Fleet Air Arm. There is no problem at the soldier-level: RAF and RN personnel will collaborate to great results, i'm sure. But it is essential for the Navy to be in charge of all what is crucial to its future, because the last decade makes it real hard to believe in any form of real collaboration.
That's why a team directed by Commodore Simon Kings and made up of naval officers is working to try and ensure that a new MPA solution, Navy-owned, is pursued in the SDSR of 2015.

The issue, as always, will be the budget.

And now, unfortunately, the Navy is faced with another challenge: saving the support elements of 3rd Commando Brigade.
For now it is a political battle, but the only real chance the Royal Navy has to change things is to complete its control over the Commando brigade, taking over the funding and control of the Artillery and Engineer element, saving the first from the cuts and expanding the second. The men would still be trained alongside their Army comrades, but it is essential that the Navy pays and decides.

Not just Type 26s, in other words: one of the most important operational outputs of the Royal Navy, 3rd Commando Brigade, needs saving and improvement.
It is both a curse and a blessing: 3rd Commando Brigade is important. It delivers. It can ensure the Navy political weight like few other things ever could. Taking control of all its elements, making it even more effective, is only going to help the Royal Navy.
And the nation.




33 comments:

  1. Why are you so adamant that the RN controls any future MPA. Please tell me when the RN last flew any maritime patrol aircraft.
    Historicaly the RAF have always provided the aircraft and crews for these operations. Going back to WW2 when it was then 'Coastal Command' flying Sunderlands,through the Shackleton and Nimrod,as far as I am aware were never flown by FAA crews.

    I would go so far as to say that only the RAF have the experience needed and are trying to keep this up to date with 'seedcorn'

    To give it to the FAA would be an enormous undertaking,starting completely from scratch training flight crews,ground crews,providing suitable airfields etc. Remember the FAA are down to only 2 operational airfields and they will be fully occupied,one with rotary wing ops/training and the other with F35B.

    Sorry to say but when MPA is resurected it will undoubtedly go to the RAF,and quite frankly I don't care who fly's them as long as we get them.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. I did not say that the RAF will not be involved, or that the MPA will be based on a FAA airfield. Quite the opposite. I think the new MPA would (will?) probably be based in Waddington, for example.

      But the service that holds the budget and decides what is done with the capability, well, it should be the Royal Navy this time around. The fact that they are the ones needing the MPA the most should be a better warranty over the future of the specialty.
      And don't say it can't be done, when it is what the Harrier and F35 situation look like as it is.

      As for Seedcorn, 30 or so persons over 5 years won't make that much difference. It will be very much a start from little more than zero, like the return to carrier ops, STOVL or not, in 2018.
      People will have moved to new roles, or out of the services altogether, by then.
      Your assumptions fail to take that in consideration. It takes years to build up experience. But losing it is a real quick thing.



      Delete
  2. Hi Gabby,

    I think it's been a while since I've been here.

    MPA was a bit of a one off in some sense in that it was very political, the safety and percieved safety of the aircraft, I would say came to the fore more than any other issue. Trying to second guess what happens behind close doors 'it was again offered for the chop' and the other such in that paragraph relating to our attitude to various a/c types is very tricky at best. Anyone posting online is frankly, little more than guessing when it comes to that level of discussion.

    Anyway enough of that, I thought this comment was interesting 'As for Seedcorn, 30 or so persons over 5 years won't make that much difference' I'm not so sure. The skills are as you say hard to built up. If you've got 30 men that's a huge leap in terms of aircrew numbers in MPA posts especially in the navy you are starting from scratch even going back in history. 30 is a big plus to my mind. Although granted the above comment depends when/if we get back in that game. Again though that depends on; when push comes to shove who can and wants to pay for it.

    'The fact that they are the ones needing the MPA the most should be a better warranty over the future of the specialty. '

    Well as you suggest if this and the other control over various assets occur* it will allow people to see where the navy's priorities lie. There will be no crying off that the bigger boy did it. It will lead to some real focusing of budgets, and if I'm honest I don't think it will match upto the online thoughts/hopes of what would happen.

    *As well it might if the single service budget comes into being with the service cheif in charge.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. Between 0 and 30, choosing the 30 is easy, and certainly it is better than nothing. But we should not overstate the effect Seedcorn might have. Especially as we don't even know how much they will actually fly, in which kind of missions, doing what etc...
      Also, it is very likely that their experience will be gained on an aircraft type different from that eventually put in service.

      Better than nothing, but if you say me that Seedcorn makes the RAF the right owner for the new MPA, i have to disagree.

      Delete
  3. Hi Gabby

    'but if you say me that Seedcorn makes the RAF the right owner for the new MPA, i have to disagree.'

    No not at all, the majority of the aircrew I've little doubt of that. As to who will have the budget, it's so far in the future it's next to impossible to say.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. Let me make this clear once and for all, by the way: i do expect and wish for the RAF to be involved, a lot, in the flying and maintenance and basing of the new MPA.
      But i hope that the MPA responsibility and budget holding this time goes to the Navy, because i think it makes more sense and gives better long-term warranties.
      And it should be clear that this requires the Navy to take on itself some real responsibility.

      Delete
    2. 'Let me make this clear once and for all, by the way: i do expect and wish for the RAF to be involved, a lot, in the flying and maintenance and basing of the new MPA.'

      I didn't say or think otherwise.

      'And it should be clear that this requires the Navy to take on itself some real responsibility.'

      That is the key factor in all this, time will tell should it ever happen.

      Delete
  4. Far from making yourself clear once and for all,you have put forward an idea that is a complete non starter.
    What do you mean by being 'involved,a lot,in the flying amnd maintenance and basing of the new MPA.

    To be quite clear on this,the facts are that the RAF will fly and crew the MPA,they will do the maintenance of the MPA and the MPA will be based on an RAF airfield. Manpower,logistics,and experience all logicaly way this will be the case.

    To then suggest the the RN have the responsibility and hold the budget for MPA,makes no sense whatsoever,and will never happen.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. Never as nonsensical as the RAF holding the budget and control of the Navy-manned 40% of the F35B fleet. And this is happening, you know. it's exactly what is happening.

      Just why the Navy can't control a RN-RAF element while the RAF can is something that is known only to you.
      Do you think they are all idiots in the Navy, or what?

      Delete
  5. Have to agree the the budget for and operational command and control of any future MPA is best resting with the Navy. The RAF will not fight for anything that cannot be described entirely and in any way as "RAF". The only successful jointery in the past has been led by the Navy. As for 29 Cdo keep a close watch on it's organisation .. they will need the expertise for control of the 127/64 in an NGS role but as you indicated there is bound to be some change; and don't forget that 'Fleet Protection Group' was recently 'stood up' as 43 Cdo Royal Marines and is now the largest Cdo in terms of manpower.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. Of course, but 43 Commando has its hands full as it is, with all the roles it has to cover, so it is not a maneuver unit within the Commando brigade.

      Delete
  6. Gaby

    A very thoughtful post.

    I’m afraid that what I feared has started to happen. In the wake of the recent announcement about the Army 2020 structure, it was stated that the reduction of 20,000 men would result in the loss of only 17 major units. A disingenuous argument. I don’t know what the average size of a regiment across the Army is, but let’s say, on average, it’s approx 650 personnel. On that basis, a reduction of 20,000 would result in the loss of well over 30 regiments! That, of course, did not happen. So what is taking place now is the hollowing out of the “saved” regiments by more covert methods, with rifle platoons and gun batteries being removed without any blaze of publicity.

    Of course the plan might very well be to use the TA to supplement the formations that have lost units or personnel. However, as good as the TA are in certain areas, I cannot see reserve units being able to fill those gaps satisfactorily, not just yet anyway.

    I take it that 16 AA Brigade's artillery regiment (7 Regiment RHA)is safe from any changes?

    ReplyDelete
  7. Gaby

    A very thoughtful post.

    I’m afraid that what I feared has started to happen. In the wake of the recent announcement about the Army 2020 structure, it was stated that the reduction of 20,000 men would result in the loss of only 17 major units. A disingenuous argument. I don’t know what the average size of a regiment across the Army is, but let’s say, on average, it’s approx 650 personnel. On that basis, a reduction of 20,000 would result in the loss of well over 30 regiments! That, of course, did not happen. So what is taking place now is the hollowing out of the “saved” regiments by more covert methods, with rifle platoons and gun batteries being removed without any blaze of publicity.

    Of course the plan might very well be to use the TA to supplement the formations that have lost units or personnel. However, as good as the TA are in certain areas, I cannot see reserve units being able to fill those gaps satisfactorily, not just yet anyway.

    I take it that 16 AA Brigade's artillery regiment (7 Regiment RHA)is safe from any changes?

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. It is not yet clear what the structure of 16 Air Assault will be. I'm still finding it hard to believe that they are willing to have a brigade with just the 2 PARA battalions in it. A binary brigade hasn't been seen in a long time, and last time the model was used, it completely sucked.

      But if the brigade goes down to two battalions, i would expect the artillery regiment to go down to 2 batteries: as a rule of thumb, there should be a gun battery for each maneuver battalion within a brigade, to make it easier to form battlegroups.
      But as we know, logic tends to take the back seat more often than we'd like in times of cuts.

      Delete
  8. No I don't think they are all idiots in the Royal Navy,what you are failing to realise is that it is not the Royal Navy who will make the decision,on whom controls the budget.

    Why is it that if someone disagrees with your opinion (which it seems is the only one allowed),you resort to blatant rudeness. This may come as a surprise to you,but no one is infallable,and that includes yourself. Other people do have opinions you know and the derision you pour upon them is unworthy of you.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. You might not have noticed, but the arrogance was all in your approach, not in mine. And it is the same story every time you come here.
      Then you go and have a laugh with Think Defence on the annoyance you give me. Do you think i'm not aware of it?

      Anyway,

      "you are failing to realise is that it is not the Royal Navy who will make the decision,on whom controls the budget."

      The Royal Navy is trying to put forwards the requirement and get the MOD approval and go ahead. And there are extremely good reasons to have the RN in control of this important capability.
      They cannot DECIDE, but they can and should TRY to get the MPA's lead. And in my opinion, the MOD absolutely should give it to them.

      Delete

  9. Gabriele,
    Sorry but you are completly wrong,in fact this is only the second time I have posted on here. As far as Think Defence is concerned I have Never posted on there.I do sometimes read it but find it very anti RN and pro RAF,so I try to keep my distance. Believe it or not I am very pro RN.

    I am also aware that very shortly after the scrapping of MRA4 the British government seemed to realise it had made an almighty mistake and set up a committee to look into future MPA requirements. As I am led to believe this was chaired by the RN,they having the greater knowledge of the requirements needed for sea going surveilence.
    This in no way implies that the RN will either operate or fund the next generation MPA,only that they are the foremost thinkers in the need for such an assett.
    The MPA role seems to have worked extremely well for the last five decades to the advantage of both services.
    There is absolutely no need for infighting between the RAF and RN as to who controls these valuable assetts,the RN does NOT need to control them,and indeed the costs incurred of the RN starting from scratch are beyond our current capabilities.
    The MOD should concentrate on getting an MPA capability up and running in the best possible time,as an ex RN person myself I would not care who is protecting me as long as they are capable and proffesional. The RAF have proved their case for the last 60 odd yrs,let them do what they do best. Leave politics out of it,that is what is holding us back.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. Well, i apologize if that is the case. I've another "anonymous" who comes and goes more to irritate me than for anything else.

      But i do not agree on the fact that the Royal Navy does not need to be in control of certain capabilities. If it is not in direct control of them, it has no real voice to defend them.
      You also assume that "royal navy control" means "starting from scratch". That is not true. Being under Royal Navy control does not mean it has to be based on a royal navy station or crewed 100% by RN personnel.
      The RAF is the budget holder and owner of JCA, but (we are told) 40% of the force will be Navy.

      Is it really that hard to conceive that the RN might be the budget holder of MPA in similar fashion, while having the planes based on a RAF base and with significant RAF manning contribution?

      What i want is the Navy to be the service that gets asked if Maritime Patrol is a priority or not during the shaping of the strategy (read budget).
      Otherwise, again and again, we risk to experience other "Harrier/Nimrod vs Tornado" situations.

      Delete
  10. I can assure you that I am not that 'other anonymous' and that I do not post to irritate you,more to get information.
    I am more than interested on where your information is from concerning the budget of JCA. I am aware that the current idea is for the programme to be 60/40% in favour of the RAF. (which I completely disagree with) that being another matter.

    Yes,quite frankly it is hard to conceive the RN holding the budget for MPA,I'm afraid that it just does not work that way in the UK. You know the power of the RAF lobby in the MOD, the RN will have to up its game tenfold to get any say in these future ops.
    The Royal Navy will get a a first class service from the RAF in regards to MPA as they have always done.Of course maritime patrol is essential to the UK,something our government seems to have forgetten.
    IMHO the UK is moving forward to a far more integrated armded forces policy than are our allies in europe.The RN and the RAF will work in conjuction very easily in the future,yes there will be disagreements but they will be overcome`

    I still disagree with you on the funding of the (hopefully) future MPA for the UK.That is my opinion and I am still to be convinced otherwise. Regards.




















    ReplyDelete
  11. The other "Anonymous" comes on here to challenge you not to simply annoy you. But your ego sees it as an "irritant" that there could be a different viewpoint from yours and what's worse they might consider their viewpoint right. And you may notice that he does not simply troll your blog, he just disagrees with some of what you say. As he has said before, if you write something several billion people can potentially see and have an opinion then then you best get a thicker skin.

    Sincerely,

    The Other Anonymous.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. Don't start.
      Yours is not a matter of different viewpoints. You do it on purpose, with never hidden hostility.

      Delete
  12. Nope I happen to think that most of your posts are interesting. But there are some I think are wrong.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. You've been quite vocal about the "wrong" ones, indeed.
      Well, nice to know that you also find something good every now and then, at least.

      Delete
  13. I have strong opinions on certain matters. You must know that plenty of people on ThinkDefence get treated to the same ideas. Bob being an extreme example.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. I sincerely apologize, but i'm not sure i understood what you meant here.

      Delete
  14. I meant that if I think someone is wrong I tell them so whatever site they are on. Bob on ThinkDefence would particularly exercise me. Anyway.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. Thank you, i hadn't understood. And i guess it's right. Indeed, the problem is probably that i have opinions just as strong as yours, if not more. And i've the defect of lacking in patience.

      Just do me a favor, if you can: drop a comment sometime also on an "interesting" article, instead of just frontally attacking me on those you cannot agree with.
      It would be a welcome change!

      Delete
  15. Gaby, quite agree about 43 not currently being a manoeuvre unit. However, what I was trying to indicate was that this could be something that could be, perhaps, preparation for further reorganisation involving the need to get back to Amphibious role and the future of 1 Rifles in the Brigade. Their are, I believe, already moves to alter/reallocate some of the tasks of the former FP Group? In my experience such events are actually laying foundations for future change.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. I'm pretty sure that 1st Rifles will soon officially no longer be part of 3rd Commando Brigade, and will end up presumably in the brigades of the Adaptable Force.

      I would however be very surprised if 43 Commando was turned into a fourth manoeuvre formation. I think the brigade will just have a 3-battalions structure.
      Besides, with the drop in shipping capacity, there would be no real reason to want a fourth organic battalion.

      I would welcome, instead, any move that gains the brigade a serious Engineer element, but sincerely i find it hard to believe that they'll come out of 43 Cdo.

      However, if you hear anything interesting, please share. I'll keep my eyes open myself, and we'll see what happens.

      Delete
  16. The MR2 was a capability manned and operated on a joint service basis. True, the overall responsibility lay with the RAF, but, and it is a big but, The Royal Navy had more of a say in it's operational deployment, whether deep blue, littoral or overland than any of the other services. Before its demise, because of an inteligent capability sustainment programme, it was actually more capable, in any aspect other than weapon systems, than the MRA4 woud have been if had come into service on the due date+12.

    The success of the overall performance of the MR2 was as much a credit to the Navy as it was to the Air Force. Whatever the future of MPA, It matters not from which station it operates, nor who holds the budget. It will always be a capability that requires true joint co-operation

    ReplyDelete
  17. And while we are venting feelings on the subject, I know, personally and professionaly, all of the people implicated in "that" inquiry; and they were all amaizingly dedicated and passionate about the AC Officers and Civil Servants who were hamstrung by budget cut after budget cut and orders handed down from way much higher on what they should be spending the money on and what not to.

    ReplyDelete
  18. "Commando Helicopter Force is (barely) getting on to the Merlin HC3, with the RAF said to be still resisting the move, with a "Joint Force Merlin" having been proposed."

    I know the RAF merlin engineering crew would be interested in this, I believe the view is currently that they will now have a two-year dead zone in their career until the Navy takes it leaving them with a misconfigured skill-set.

    ReplyDelete
  19. The Forward Observation Officer role for N.G.S has been with the 'Commando Gunners' for decades. It would be a shame and an error of judgement to lose that honed skill and wealth of experience gained by the Commando crews working with the R.N............zebedee C.P

    ReplyDelete

Everybody can comment on this blog without needing a Blogger account. It is meant to keep the discussion free and open to everyone. Unfortunately, anonymous accounts keep the door open for spammers and trolls, so i'm forced to moderate comments and approve them before they appear. Apologies for the inconvenience.